Commodities & Energy Sector

Special Report

Highlights We expect limited upside to gas prices from current levels as the comeback of US Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) exports will add to an already oversupplied market. In the short term, prices will remain below full-cycle costs. This will limit investment in LNG and the infrastructure required to get it to market in future. European storage will peak below maximum capacity. Gas forwards are pricing a rapid drawdown over the winter. Whether this occurs depends critically on winter demand in the northern hemisphere and a continued recovery in world economic activity. In the US, declining production in the prolific natural-gas shales and rising LNG exports will help balance its domestic gas markets: Rig counts in the Appalachian basin are at multiyear lows, which is weighing on output. Collapsing oil production in major shale-oil basins is dramatically reducing associated gas output, which represents more than 16% of total gas production. Still, a second wave of COVID-19 that results in another round of widespread lockdowns could send natgas prices back below $2/MMBtu as storage fills. Over the next few months, the balance of risk in natgas markets – especially in the US – remains to the downside, though highly uncertain. We are staying on the sidelines for now.  Over the medium term, global demand for LNG will catch up with supply by 2024, supported by additional coal-to-gas switching and slower supply growth. Feature The mounting probability inventories will fill up to maximum capacity before this coming winter’s heating season has pushed major European and Asian benchmarks below US LNG’s variable costs. Global natural gas markets have been severely hit by the COVID-19 pandemic. Natgas prices in Asia, Europe, and the US were amongst the worst performing commodities during the crisis (Chart 1). This reflects weak fundamentals – i.e. a significant global supply surplus – which gas markets faced even before the exogenous shock. The mounting probability inventories will fill up to maximum capacity before this coming winter’s heating season has pushed major European and Asian benchmarks below US LNG’s variable costs. This development renders shipments of US gas overseas uneconomical. The cancellation of US cargoes is acting as the primary balancing factor and will allow inventories to stay below full capacity – assuming global economic activity continues to accelerate in 2H20. Henry Hub prices surged by 34% since the beginning of the month on the back of higher gas demand – from warmer-than-normal weather and rebounding global economic activity – depressed US LNG exports, and prolonged maintenance at Australia’s Gorgon plant. Chart 1Global Gas Benchmarks Collapsed In 1H20 Chart 2Relative Prices Will Favor Additional US LNG Exports As storage-related fears abate, LNG economics is turning favorable for cargoes to be delivered in 4Q20 and 1Q21. This will allow exports of US gas to Europe and Asia to resume as regional demand rises. This improvement is already apparent in relative futures curves (Chart 2). Still, we expect only limited price gains from current levels, especially in the US. The resurgence in US LNG exports will add to the global supply surplus and cap the upside. Relative prices will remain below LNG offtakers' (exporters) full-cycle costs, limiting additional investments in LNG projects over the medium term. We expect demand to catch up to supply by 2024. Gas Fundamentals Worsened In 2019 Global gas demand increased by 2% y/y in 2019, led by growth in the US and China as coal-to-gas switching intensified amid the low-price environment (Chart 3). However, this rate of growth is a marked slowdown relative to the average 3.5% y/y growth from 2016-2018. It was also slower than the strong global supply growth – up 3.4% y/y – and LNG export growth – up 12.7% y/y. Chart 3US, China Supported Gas Demand Growth In 2019 The US was the largest contributor to both new gas and LNG supply, accounting for 65% of the world’s incremental gas production (Chart 4). The liquefaction capacity addition from the first wave of investments – i.e. projects that received a final investment decision (FID) before 2017 – is now mostly operational. Chart 4US Dominated Natgas Supply And LNG Growth In 2019 US LNG capacity stands at ~10 Bcf/d and serves as a needed pressure valve to its oversupplied domestic market – a consequence of rapid shale production growth – forcing the excess gas to Europe and Asia. However, the economic slowdown in Asia in 2H19 meant the region could no longer adequately absorb these new volumes. As a result, global gas markets moved to a supply-surplus. Relative gas price spreads began trending downward and moved in favor of exports to Europe over Asia.1 Europe plays a growing role as a market of last resort for global natural gas – particularly US LNG – due to its well-developed storage infrastructure, regasification units, and pipeline networks. Around 80% of LNG exports from newly added terminals were absorbed by European markets, and most of that went into storage. Around 40% of the global natural gas supply increase last year ended up in storage, according to the IEA (Chart 5). Moreover, milder-than-expected weather last year exacerbated these trends and forced global prices to converge closer to Henry Hub. Chart 5European Storage Absorbed ~ 40% Of Global Gas Supply Growth By the end of 2019, gas storage in Europe was drastically higher than its 5-year average for that period (Chart 6). Chart 6Elevated US And Europe Gas Storage European Storage Will Stay Below Capacity-Testing Levels Cargo cancellations for September have been markedly lower, a sign of improving – though still oversupplied – fundamentals. Global gas markets confronted the COVID-19 pandemic from a fragile starting point. The shock reinforced the imbalances that began in 2019 and completely erased US LNG’s competitiveness in European and Asian markets. As demand fell in response to lockdowns – down 2.8% in the US and 7% in Europe y/y in Jan-May by IEA’s reckoning – storage in Europe was projected to reach full capacity by end-August.2 Consequently, in June, natural gas prices plunged to a more than two-decade low to incentivize supply and demand adjustments. Around 100 LNG cargoes from the US were cancelled for delivery in June and July, based on EIA estimates (Chart 7). US LNG supply is now the main balancing factor in global gas markets: It is a high-cost source of supply when delivered to Europe or Asia and is contracted under more flexible agreements facilitating cargo cancellations. Over the short term, the number of vessels cancelled each month is an important indicator of storage availability in Europe. The decision to cancel a cargo is complex but mainly depends on whether the spreads between US Henry Hub (HH) and Dutch Title Transfer Facility (TTF) or Japan Korea Marker (JKM) prices cover the exporter's variable costs. Based on a Cheniere-type contract,3 this implies the spread must be higher than 115% of Henry Hub prices plus shipping and regasification costs (Chart 2). Chart 7US LNG Vessel Cancellations Balance Global Gas Markets The spread failed to cover variable costs for most of 2020 and even moved to a premium – i.e. HH above TTF – in July. Moreover, because most contracts have a 40-day to 70-day notice period for cancellation, the supply of US LNG only reacted to the rapid drop in demand with a lag, aggravating the supply surplus and flooding European inventories. The resulting supply adjustments, combined with stronger-than-expected demand in Europe, have slowed the storage injections rates in August and pushed prices higher.4 Cancellations for September have been markedly lower, a sign of improving – though still oversupplied – fundamentals. Forward curve behavior suggests market participants expect US LNG shut-ins, combined with robust demand recovery in Asia and Europe, to move price spreads above variable costs by November this year (Chart 8). This is mostly a consequence of rising Asian LNG prices. We expect this will incentivize added exports of US LNG over the coming months which will move Henry Hub prices slightly higher over the winter. Chart 8Relative Price Spreads Cover LNG Variable Costs, But Not Total Costs In fact, some cargoes are reportedly already selling their gas in forward Asian markets and taking longer routes or reducing their travel speed to remain at sea for longer and profit from these higher deferred prices.5 Still, the increase in US prices will be limited given that relative prices need to remain wide enough to cover LNG variable costs. While global prices will move up gradually over the winter, we believe their upside is bounded by the supply surplus, especially as US exports normalize. At current storage levels, a resurgence of lockdowns in the US or Europe would have drastic consequences, sending prices back below $2/MMBtu. On the demand side, low prices will favor additional coal-to-gas switching as economies recover in 2H20 (Chart 9). Current forward TTF prices are signaling deep drawdowns in European storage this winter as demand in the region increases (Chart 10). Chart 9Cheap Gas Favors Coal-To-Gas Switching Chart 10TTF Forwards Signaling Strong Inventory Draws This Winter In Chart 11, we simulated the remaining of the filling season based on previous monthly seasonal injection rates for Europe. This suggests storage remains at risk of being maxed out by October. However, we believe – in agreement with current forward curves – that the pickup in demand from recovering economic activity, coal-to-gas switching, and lower US exports will further diminish injection rates in Aug-Sep-Oct relative to historical rates (Chart 12). This will allow inventory to reach its seasonal peak slightly below capacity-testing levels. Chart 11Euopean Storage Remains A Significant Downside Risk Chart 12Low US LNG Exports, Warmer Weather Drastically Reduced Injections In July Moreover, flows from Europe to Ukraine should continue freeing up capacity in core EU storage facilities (Chart 13).6 Chart 13Filling Ukrainian Storage Acts As A Safety Valve Chart 14Lower US Gas Supply Slows Inventory Builds In the US, the multi-year-low active gas rigs in the Appalachian basin are starting to weigh on production. Moreover, collapsing oil production in major shale-oil basins is bringing associated gas – which is now more than 16% of total gas production – down rapidly (Chart 14). This contributes to the slowdown in domestic storage injection and to the recent Henry Hub price gains. Still, at current storage levels, a resurgence of lockdowns in the US or Europe would have drastic consequences, sending prices back below $2/MMBtu (Chart 15). Consequently, we believe short-term downside risks from lockdowns are too elevated to try to profit from the limited price increase expected this winter. Chart 15Renewed Lockdowns In Europe Would Push Storage to Capacity   Rising US-Russia Competition Keeps Prices Lower For Longer Global gas markets will stay oversupplied over the medium term. This will keep relative prices between the US and Europe/Asia below LNG exports’ full-cycle costs. In 2019, a record volume of liquefaction capacity reached FID globally (Chart 16). By 2025, global LNG capacity is expected to reach ~73Bcf/d, a ~ 15Bcf/d increase from current levels. Despite the COVID-19 shock, most projects under construction in the US remain on track to be completed as previously scheduled in 2020.7 Global gas markets will stay oversupplied over the medium term. This will keep relative prices between the US and Europe/Asia below LNG exports’ full-cycle costs – i.e. below variable costs plus a fixed contracted liquefaction capacity fee estimated at ~$3/MMBtu. Chart 16Record FID Risks Keeping Markets Oversupplied Mounting competition – especially from Russia – in both Europe and Asia will hold down prices over the coming years. In Europe, the completion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline would add 5.3Bcf/d of cheap Russian gas supply and could keep prices ~ $1/MMBtu lower than otherwise.8 These new volumes would be absorbed by higher European consumption – fueled by low prices – and lower US LNG exports – from weak relative prices. Geopolitics is a major factor driving Russian behavior and hence oversupply: The US and Russia will vie with each other for market share in Europe. As gas markets further liberalize globally, Europe will be increasingly essential for US LNG as its destination of last resort in times of low demand elsewhere. If Russia floods this market with gas, it reduces Europe’s ability to absorb US gas, which will lead to lower Henry Hub prices. It will shut in US supply in times of low demand, making investments there riskier. While US administrations of either party almost always attempt to engage Russia at the beginning of a four-year term, the US foreign policy establishment no longer believes that engagement with Russia is beneficial (Chart 17). This is apparent under the Russia-friendly Trump administration but will be especially relevant if the Democratic Party wins the White House in November. Democrats blame Russia for undermining and ultimately reversing the Obama administration’s policies by betraying the US-Russia diplomatic “reset” and interfering in the 2016 election. Chart 17Russian Geopolitical Risk Set To Increase Even If Trump Re-Elected Hence the US will continue to impose sanctions on Russia and probably on a range of companies involved in Nord Stream 2 and Turkstream. If both pipelines are completed, then Washington will ask Europe to compensate for its Russia dealings in other ways. Meanwhile Russia will use a combination of commercial and strategic measures to woo Germany and the Europeans so that they do not commit to preferential bilateral deals with the United States. Because the US and Russia are engaged in a great power struggle – rather than healthy trade competition – they will attempt to achieve their aims through means other than price and volume. Punitive measures will create volatility by occasionally removing supplies but probably cannot change the backdrop of oversupply. The gist is that US-Russia relations will remain antagonistic and Europe will benefit from the oversupply except during times of surprise sanctions and strategic blows. In China, we expect imports of US LNG to increase. However, rising Russian LNG and pipeline supplies, increasing domestic gas output, and a persistent global oversupply of gas will limit the incentives for Chinese buyers to sign long-term agreements with US exporters at a price above full-cycle costs – i.e. ~ $7/MMBtu.9 The ongoing US-China trade conflict will encourage China to use US LNG imports as a negotiating lever. This has large implications for the US gas market, as LNG capacity represents ~ 11% of its domestic supply – based on 1H20 production levels. Low demand growth for its gas in Europe or Asia will keep Henry Hub prices low to limit supply growth from shale gas and limit investment in additional liquefaction capacity. Here too geopolitics will undermine Henry Hub prices: China is strengthening economic ties with its strategic partner, Russia, and the ongoing US-China trade conflict will encourage China to use US LNG imports as a negotiating lever. A Biden administration would approach China differently from the Trump administration but it would still have to face fundamental trade tensions due to China’s mercantilism and the US attempt to contain China’s technological rise. China is crucial for global LNG demand growth, but trade tensions will reignite even under Biden and spill over into China’s demand for US commodities. China has substitutes for American LNG. If trade tensions affect China’s imports of US LNG then they will lead to lower Henry Hub prices and possibly to vessel cancellations, especially if European storage once again proves unable to absorb these exports during the injection season. The Biden administration will not ultimately be China-friendly, looking beyond any diplomatic “reset” in its first year, and thus the risk of China diversifying away from US LNG is real. Global natgas prices are moving up, ahead of this winter, but gains will be limited by the persistent oversupply. There are currently more than 6Bcf/d of approved, not yet FID, projects in the US. We do not expect much of this capacity to move forward until LNG economics turn favorable and buyers’ willingness to sign long-term contracts comes back. Large projects expected to start closer to 2025 – e.g. Shell’s LNG Canada and Total’s Mozambique LNG – could be delayed to the second half of the decade. On the demand side, persistent low prices will reinforce two ongoing trends. First, this will favor additional coal-to-gas switching in most regions, helping demand to catch up to supply by 2024 and eventually forcing European and Asian prices significantly higher in anticipation of tighter fundamentals. Second, low spot LNG prices in Asia and the availability of flexible supply will accelerate the shift to a merchant/trading market.10 The movement toward shorter and non-indexed-oil contracts continued in 2019, with spot and short term contracts reaching 34% of total LNG flows in 2019, up 32% vs. 2018 (Chart 18). The COVID-19 shock augmented the incentive to switch to non-oil-indexed contracts given the steep discount it created in LNG spot market prices versus oil-indexed contracts. Based on our Brent price forecasts, we expect this divergence to persist in 2021 (Chart 19). Chart 18Shorter, Gas-On-Gas Contracts Will Increase In Asia Chart 19Spot Prices Will Decouple From Oil-Indexed Again In 2021 The convergence in regional prices that began in 2019 is disrupting the standard LNG model based on significant regional price spreads. Low and uniform prices reduce the arbitrage of moving gas overseas. Companies will need to start using sophisticated financial instruments and will increasingly resort to spot and futures markets, like in oil markets.11 Crucially, our expectation that demand will catch up to supply assumes government policies aimed at reducing carbon emissions continue being implemented in major consuming countries. Future gas consumption is a function of economic – i.e. price incentives – and policy variables. A reversal in China’s environmental policies could drastically slow gas demand growth and remains a risk to our view. At present China’s policy setting aims for growth recovery at all costs, but the driver of Xi Jinping’s green policy is the middle class demand for healthier air and environment (Chart 20). Hence the slog to diversify away from coal will resume over the medium and long run. Bottom Line: The large collapse in prices will remain bearish for US LNG over the short term as global gas markets remain firmly oversupplied and storage levels hew dangerously close to maximum capacity. Global natgas prices are moving up, ahead of this winter, but gains will be limited by the persistent oversupply. Relative prices will be capped close to variable costs. These unfavorable conditions for additional investments in LNG projects could create a supply deficit later in the decade. Chart 20China"s Green Policy Is Driven By Its Growing Middle Class   Hugo Bélanger Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com         Footnotes 1     These destination adjustments in response to price incentives are possible because of the flexibility in US long-term LNG agreements. These contracts, for the most part, have no predetermined destination clause. 2     For instance see "NWE gas storage sites could be 'almost' full by end-August: Platts Analytics" published by S&P Global Platts on May 21, 2020. 3    There exists two main types of LNG contracts in the US: (1) Tolling agreements in which the LNG exporter needs to secure the feedgas, transport the gas to the liquefaction facility, and ship it to the buyer. In this model, the LNG operator charges a fixed fee – usually in the range of $2.25 to $3.5/MMBtu, paid regardless of whether they use their contracted LNG space to liquefy the gas. The ownership of the gas remains in the hand of the offtaker. (2) Chienere-type agreements – or a hybrid merchant-tolling structure – in which the LNG operator secures the feedgas and transports it to its liquefaction facilities. It takes ownership of the gas until it is liquefied and sold to the exporter responsible for shipping the gas to the final buyer – the pricing scheme is usually ~115% of Henry Hub gas prices + a fixed liquefaction fee. In the US, the Cove Point, Freeport, Cameron, and Elba terminals mostly use the tolling model, while all of Cheniere’s installations – i.e. Sabine Pass and Corpus Christi – are operating under Cheniere-type models. In our analysis we use the Cheniere-type as it is slightly more flexible and seems more vulnerable to cargo cancellations – subject to a penalty, or fixed fee, to ensure a reliable cash flow to Cheniere. Moreover, it is difficult to estimate how much of the shipping cost are truly variable, some offtakers have long-term shipping contracts to diminish total variable costs. Please see “Steady as She Goes, Part 5 - How Global Prices Drive U.S. LNG Cargo Destinations,” published by RBN Energy on August 1, 2020 for a detailed discussion of LNG exporters’ costs. 4    Maintenance delays at Australia’s Gorgon LNG plant also contributed to the price increase, especially in Asia. Please see "Chevron says expects to restart Train 2 of Gorgon LNG plant in early September" published by reuters.com on July 28, 2020 for more details. 5    Please see "Buyers of U.S. LNG cancel September cargoes but pace slows, sources say," published by reuters.com on July 21, 2020. 6    Since May this year, the Ukrainian storage and gas pipeline managing company UkrTransGaz started offering discounts on transportation fees and other arrangements to incentivize European traders to storage gas at their facilities. Natgas stored by non-resident in customs warehouses with UkrTransGaz are more than four times higher than last year. Please see “European gas storage: backhaul helps open the Ukrainian safety valve,” published by Oxford Institute For Energy Studies in May 2020. 7     A few projects reported lockdown-related delays of up to 4 months. 8    Please see "Nord Stream 2 and the battle for gas market share in Europe" published by Wood Mackenzie on July 24, 2020. 9    Please see “No Upside: The U.S. LNG Buildout Faces Price Resistance From China,” published by The Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA), July 2020. 10   We highlighted in our October 4, 2018 report titled "US Set To Disrupt Global LNG Market" that the large LNG supply expansion in the US would incentivize consumers to shorten the tenor of oil-indexed contracts, replacing them with hedgeable futures-based contracts. 11    Please see “Covid-19 And The Energy Transition,” published by Oxford Institute For Energy Studies in July 2020. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 2020 Q2 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2020 Summary of Closed Trades

Special Report

Highlights The Beirut blast calls attention to instability in the Shia Crescent. A turbulent push for political change will now ensue in Lebanon. Hezbollah’s and Iran’s political capital in Lebanon will suffer significantly. Lebanon is a red herring, but Iraq is a Black Swan. It is at risk of social unrest contagion. Iran’s financial troubles are weighing on its ability to maintain its sphere of influence. It is adopting a strategy of measured sabotage and deterrence against US interests in Iraq. The double whammy of low oil prices and pandemic is weighing on Saudi Arabia’s finances. Nevertheless it is prioritizing a cooperative relationship with Iraq. Iran could stage a major attack or President Trump’s poor election prospects could force him to “wag the dog.” Massive excess oil capacity will mute the oil market impact of a supply shortfall in Iraq. However, the risk becomes more relevant as demand recovers and markets rebalance in the second half of the year. Stay long Brent crude oil and gold. Feature The August 4 explosion at the Port of Beirut was devastating. It killed more than 220, wounded over 6000, left 300,000 homeless, and damaged buildings as far away as 9km from the site of the explosion. The blast added insult to injury to the country’s already troubled finances. Estimates for the cost of repair range anywhere between $5 billion and $15 billion. Global investors can largely write off the incident as an idiosyncratic shock. Even though emigration is likely to pick up, Lebanon’s population is only a third of Syria’s prior to its civil war. Assuming that a third of Lebanese become displaced abroad – a generous assumption more suitable to Syrian-style civil war than Lebanon’s situation – about 2 million Lebanese will be displaced, half of which will make their way to Europe or elsewhere outside the Middle East. As long as an antagonistic Turkey upholds its agreement with the EU, a mass exodus from Lebanon does not risk an unmanageable migrant crisis for Europe (Chart 1). Political tensions will rise and potentially lead to a populist backlash, given Europe’s battered economy. But Lebanon alone is not enough. The risk is broader Middle Eastern instability, which is a credible risk. Chart 1Middle Eastern Instability Could Fuel European Populism Thus Lebanon in itself is a red herring, but it is a bellwether for further unrest in the Middle East in countries that are not red herrings (Map 1). Map 1Lebanon Is A Red Herring; Iraq And Saudi Arabia Are Relevant A major conflict in Iraq is an underrated risk to global oil supply. The catastrophe calls attention to instability the Shia Crescent – a region in a tug of war between rival sectarian and geopolitical interests. Whereas the 2008 crisis led to the largely Sunni Arab states in the so-called Arab Spring, the 2020 crisis is piling pressure onto already unstable Shia states and regions: Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and possibly eastern Saudi Arabia. Of particular significance is the fate of Iraq. Popular grievances are eerily similar to Lebanon’s. Baghdad is on shaky ground, yet the ramp up in US-Iran tensions going into the November US elections makes the threat of instability in Iraq more acute. As OPEC’s second ranked oil producer, a major conflict in Iraq poses an underrated risk to global oil supply. Supply losses are a tailwind to oil prices when market conditions are tight. However OPEC 2.0’s 8.3mm b/d of voluntary cuts means massive spare capacity is available globally to offset potential losses in Iraq, reducing the potential upside to oil prices. Nevertheless, this risk becomes more relevant as markets tighten on the back of a demand-side recovery, i.e. as balance is restored to the oil market and as excess spare capacity is eliminated. With oil markets likely rebalancing in 3Q20, unrest in Iraq poses an upside risk to our Commodity & Energy Strategy service’s expectation that 2H20 Brent prices will average $44/bbl and 2021 prices will average $65/bbl (Chart 2). Even though gold has already rallied 30% since mid-March, geopolitical risks including US-Iran tensions suggest any near-term selloff is a buying opportunity (Chart 3). The bullish gold narrative – geopolitical risks, falling dollar, and low real interest rates for the foreseeable future – remain intact even as the downturn gives way to a cyclical recovery. We continue to recommend gold on a strategic time horizon. Chart 2Oil Price Rally Remains Intact Chart 3Gold Is Due For A Breather Lebanon’s economic collapse highlights risks to other regional economies tied to the oil dependent Arab economies of the Persian Gulf. As the latter grapple with record low oil prices, production cuts, and the pandemic-induced recession, second-order effects will reverberate throughout the region, hitting economies such as Egypt and Jordan whose economic as well as political structures are intimately intertwined with Gulf Cooperation Council finances and policies. Lebanon’s Collapse Was Inevitable Lebanon was already going through an economic and financial meltdown before the explosion (Chart 4). Aside from the humanitarian loss, the economic impact is also profound. The country – highly dependent on imports of basic goods and suffering from food insecurity – must now contend with the loss of its main port and most of its grain reserves, destroyed in the explosion. As the dust settles, grief is morphing into anger on the streets. Regardless of whether the blast was due to happenstance or malice, the immediate cause was 2,750 tons of ammonium nitrate in storage for six years. The government was warned about the risks of the explosive chemicals at least four times this year – with the latest being on the day of the blast. Chart 4Beirut Port Explosion Accelerated Lebanon’s Collapse Mass protests are already taking place, calling on the government to be held accountable for criminal negligence. A controversial petition to return Lebanon to French mandate has gained more than 60,000 signatures. Prime Minister Hassan Diab’s seven-month-old cabinet has resigned. (It was put in place last year amid an earlier bout of unrest.) Official incompetence and neglect are in fact the best-case explanations for the explosion. Many questions remain unanswered. For instance, what triggered the fire? Israel swiftly denied any connection and offered humanitarian aid, while Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah claimed to know more about the Port of Haifa than about Beirut Port. Early parliamentary elections and the cabinet’s resignation will not appease the protesters. Photos of Nasrallah, President Aoun, Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, and former Prime Minister Saad Hariri were among those hung by protesters in gallows in Martyrs’ Square over the weekend. Berri and Gebran Bassil are known to be the source of the cabinet’s decision-making power.1 They have veto over all decisions, large and small. During the mass protests in October 2019, Nasrallah stated that Hezbollah has two red lines:     Aoun must finish his term, which expires in 2022;     No early elections will be held, i.e. the speaker of the house will not be changed. While early elections have now been promised, these red lines highlight that corruption runs deep in Lebanon and opposition groups face an uphill battle against the establishment. A turbulent push for political change will now ensue. Hezbollah’s and Iran’s political capital in Lebanon will suffer significantly. Another Israeli confrontation with Hezbollah is not the base case but it could occur. Bottom Line: Lebanon is a failed state. As with the Arab Spring, the question is whether popular anger will prove contagious and spread to more market-relevant neighboring countries. The rally in the Israeli shekel in trade weighted terms since mid-March has already started to fizzle and may be tested further as turmoil in Lebanon raises the risk of confrontation. Contagion? In order for a geopolitical event in the Middle East to warrant investors’ attention, it must affect at least two of the following factors : (1) global oil supply, (2) geography of existential significance to a regional power, or (3) sectarian conflict which could lead to contagion. In this context, Lebanon is a red herring, but Iraq is not – therefore investors should watch to see if anything causes destabilization in Iraq. A decline in Iranian funds will weaken Tehran’s sphere of influence. Like Lebanon, Iraq is dominated by a highly corrupt sectarian system that has been plundering the wealth; people are suffering from rising rates of unemployment; and the regime is in the crosshairs of competing foreign agendas (Chart 5). Chart 5Iraqis And Lebanese Suffer Similar Grievances Iraq is in Iran’s sights because it aspires to establish a land bridge to the Mediterranean through a friendly “Shia Crescent” (Map 2). Iran’s modus operandi is to establish a presence in its neighbors’ domestic politics through Iran-backed factions. Map 2Iraq Essential To Iran’s Aspirational ‘Land Bridge’ To The Mediterranean Given the current state of Iran’s economy, it is not far-fetched to envision a significant drop in the funding of its foreign proxies (Chart 6). Historically these funds have followed the ebbs and flows of oil prices. For instance, in 2009, when faced with declining oil prices and US sanctions Iran’s funds to Hezbollah were estimated to have fallen by 40%. This happened again in 2014-16 and is not too different from today. Thus Iraq is at risk of contagion. Iran’s financial troubles are weighing on its ability to maintain its sphere of influence. Syrian fighters have reported paychecks being slashed, Iranian projects in Syria have stalled, and Hezbollah employees report to have missed paychecks and lost other benefits. Tehran’s finances are essential for Hezbollah’s survival.2 Iran’s proxies in Iraq are facing a similar fate.3 Chart 6Iran Suffering Under "Maximum Pressure" Bottom Line: Iraq faces an uptick in social unrest due to the poor living conditions and possible contagion from Lebanon. Meanwhile, Iran-backed groups there face a decline in funds from Tehran, which will send them searching for replacement funds. If Lebanon falters the world can usually ignore it but if Iraq falters the world will have to take notice. Saudi Arabia Prioritizes Revenue Over Growth Beirut’s foreign policy stances in recent years have been seen as appeasing Iran at the expense of Gulf Arab states.4 This trend coincides with a decline in Gulf Cooperation Council financing to Lebanon. Now the collapse in oil prices and pandemic have weighed on Saudi Arabia’s budget, which still depends on the energy sector for most of its revenues despite efforts to diversify. State revenues were down 49% year-on-year in Q2 pulling the budget deficit down to $29 billion (Chart 7). Riyadh is reassessing its priorities. Opting for revenue at the expense of growth, Riyadh has tightened the screws on its citizens. The government has had to pare back some of the benefits Saudis have long been accustomed to. The value-added-tax rate tripled from 5% to 15%, and a bonus cost-of-living allowance of $266 for public sector employees ended. The kingdom also announced plans to reduce spending on major projects by $26 billion – including some of those associated with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s reform agenda, Vision 2030. Chart 7Saudi Arabia Under Pressure From Double Whammy Severe economic turmoil poses a risk to the Saudi social contract in which citizens pledge allegiance to the ruling class in exchange for financial and social guarantees. The risk now is that the fiscal challenges dent Saudi citizens’ pocketbooks and thus impact social and political stability. However, oil prices are recovering to levels consistent with the kingdom’s fiscal breakeven oil price next year. The global economic recovery will begin to support the kingdom’s economy in the second half of this year (Chart 8). This will ease pressure on the budget and hence households. Moreover the slowdown is likely to hit foreign workers hardest and thus hasten the Saudization process. Foreign workers are the lowest hanging fruit and will be the first to find themselves jobless. In that sense the crisis is expediting some of Riyadh’s long-term reform targets. That said, there is still some risk of internal instability or even a palace coup. Tehran could incite sectarian tensions in the kingdom’s Eastern Province where an estimated 30-50% of the population is believed to be Shia. This is relevant given that nearly all Saudi oil production is located there. Chart 8KSA Benefits From EM GDP Growth ... Regarding the possibility of a palace coup, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has spent this year cracking down on potential dissidents. Former Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef and King Salman’s only surviving full-brother Prince Ahmed bin Abdulaziz – both influential and well-liked – were among those detained in March. The kingdom’s contradictory policies – reform through repression – may eventually culminate in an overt political crisis. Though such a crisis may not occur until the time of royal succession. These economic and political challenges may force Saudi Arabia to adopt an inward stance. Its foreign interventions to date have been costly and come with little benefit – judging by the war in Yemen. It is also possible that Saudi Arabia, which is already the third largest defense spender globally, will try to strengthen its position vis-à-vis Iran. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has already stated that the kingdom will pursue a nuclear program if Iran develops a nuclear bomb. This is relevant in today’s context with Iran no longer complying with restrictions to its nuclear program (Table 1). Saudi Arabia, like Iran, claims its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes – in order to generate nuclear power as part of efforts to diversify its economy.5 Table 1Iran No Longer Complying With 2015 Nuclear Deal Still, low oil prices tend to discourage petro states from engaging in conflict (Chart 9). Arab petro states may show restraint, at least until oil markets recover. Chart 9Low Oil Prices Discourage Petro States From Engaging In Conflict Overall weakness in oil-producing economies will hurt various countries that rely on remittances (Chart 10). The downturn will also hurt countries dependent on remittances from petro states in the region such as Egypt and Jordan. Bottom Line: The collapse in oil prices is forcing Saudi Arabia to reconsider its priorities and is expediting some long-term reforms. For now, it is adopting a pro-revenue rather than a pro-growth stance. This is likely to result in a focus inward for the kingdom. The implication is that countries that are leveraged to the petro-economies of the Gulf for remittances, bilateral aid, and capital flows will take a hit. These include Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan. Chart 10Egypt And Jordan Also Vulnerable To Petro State Weakness Iraq Is The Prize Not unlike Lebanon, Iraq’s political class has been suffering a legitimacy crisis since protests erupted there last October resulting in the resignation of then-Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi. However unlike Lebanon, Iraq is a significant geography for global investors. It is a major OPEC producer – second only to Saudi Arabia – accounting for 16% of the cartel’s production last year. The Iraqi oil minister’s first foreign trip was to the Saudi capital. This is not surprising. Iraq not only seeks Saudi leniency in OPEC 2.0 cuts, but also needs financial assistance to develop a natural gas field that will allow it to reduce dependence on Iran. Saudi Arabia also hopes to reduce Iraq’s dependence on Iranian natural gas and coax it into its sphere of influence. When it comes to crude oil, the additional 1mm b/d of voluntary cuts in June announced unilaterally by Saudi Arabia beyond its agreed OPEC 2.0 commitments are also a sign of Saudi willingness to accommodate Iraq and its non-compliance  (Chart 11).6 Saudi Arabia does not want to see Iraq’s newly elected government failing on the back of budgetary strain. In fact, al-Kadhimi is an opportunity for the Saudis. Formerly the director the National Intelligence Service with warm ties to the US, he is a champion of Iraqi sovereignty. Even though Iraq is being forced to compensate for past overproduction of oil in August and September, it was cajoled by the promise of a $500 million “bridging” loan from Saudi Arabia, to be repaid when oil markets recover. While financial assistance shows the kingdom’s commitment to Iraq, more significantly it reflects Riyadh’s desperation to revive oil markets and bring prices closer to its fiscal breakeven oil price amid the still uncertain demand outlook. Chart 11Saudi Arabia Willing To Accommodate Iraq Neither Saudi Arabia’s nor al-Kadhimi’s efforts are guaranteed to succeed in pulling Iraq out of Iran’s sphere. The prime minister received a rude awakening upon his arrest of 14 Kata’ib Hezbollah fighters in June on grounds of a plan to launch a rocket attack on US interest in Baghdad. They were swiftly released, and the case against them dropped. It is hard to curb Iranian influence. For its part, Iran stood behind al-Kadhimi’s nomination despite him being perceived as pro-Western. Tehran needed to avoid an anti-Iranian backlash on the streets of Baghdad if it had stood against him. Instead, Iran’s calculus was that it is in its best interest to swallow the pill and work with the new government at a time when Iraqi anger was targeted against US involvement rather than at Iranian interference. Prior to the US assassination of Qassem al-Suleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis on Iraqi soil, Iraqis were rebelling against Iran’s influence. That being said, Iran will maintain pressure on Iraq through continued attacks on US interests there (Table A1 in Appendix). This is also reflected in the July assassination of top Iraqi security expert Hisham al-Hashimi, who had previously advised the government on how to curb Iranian control. Iran was looking to make it to the US election in November without an escalation in tensions, hoping the US elections will result in a more dovish Democratic Party leadership averse to conflict with Iran. However, recent cyber-attacks on key Iranian infrastructure raise the likelihood that tensions will escalate ahead of the elections. The US is also threatening to maintain maximum sanctions even if the United Nations Security Council disagrees. As always, Iraq will find itself in the crossfire of any deterioration in relations. Bottom Line: Maintaining a cooperative relationship with Iraq aligns with both of Saudi Arabia’s interests there: limiting Iranian interference and supporting global oil markets through supply-side discipline. Iran will maintain pressure on Iraq’s new government through continued attacks on US interests. However, these attacks are supposed to fall short of killing US citizens and giving President Trump a reason to launch air strikes that could give him a patriotic boost in opinion polls. Nevertheless, tensions in the Gulf could escalate if Iran stages a major attack or if President Trump’s poor election prospects force him to “wag the dog.” In that case Iraqi oil supply would be disrupted. Investment Implications The Shia Crescent remains at heightened risk of instability on the back of Iran’s economic deterioration. Massive excess oil capacity will mute the oil market impact of a supply shortfall in Iraq. However, the risk becomes more relevant as demand recovers and markets rebalance in the second half of the year. Given that the Saudi loan will ensure Iraq’s commitment to compensatory production cuts in August and September, supply-side risks are a tailwind to oil prices in H2. The elevated risk of an escalation in US-Iran tensions also favors holding gold. President Trump’s polling has bottomed, yet he remains the underdog in the election – we maintain his odds of winning reelection are 35%. This raises the risk that he adopts a “war president” posture. Iran could become a target as the financial price of confronting Iran is negligible for Trump, whereas a major China confrontation could sink the stock market. The collapse in oil prices and pandemic have weighed on Saudi Arabia’s budget. It has adopted a revenue over growth posture. While this could be a risk to domestic stability, our base case is that it accelerates the kingdom’s long-term reforms. The oil market rout and economic downturn will hurt other countries in the region that are leveraged to Arab petro states – chiefly Egypt and Jordan. Investors should monitor risks to state stability in the coming years. Lebanon’s crisis will incentivize emigration, but given the relatively small size of its population, the major risk to Europe comes from any broader state failures and Middle Eastern instability rather than from Lebanon’s failure alone. If the Democratic Party wins the US election, as expected, then the US-Iran strategic détente will resume and Iran will get a lifeline. But the immediate transition will still be rocky given the Israeli and Saudi desire to exploit Iran’s extreme vulnerability and build leverage with Washington. The COVID-19 crisis heralds another round of Middle Eastern crisis, much as the 2008 crisis led to the Arab Spring. Stay strategically long Brent crude oil and gold. Also, in the wake of yesterday’s 15% pullback in silver, go strategically long silver (XAGUSD), which will continue benefiting from the same structural trends favoring gold but also outperform gold as the global economy recovers, given its greater industrial utility.     Roukaya Ibrahim Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com       Appendix Table A1Iran Adopting Deterrence Strategy In Iraq   Footnotes 1     Berri is of the Hezbollah-allied Amal Movement and has been parliamentary speaker since 1992, while Bassil is President Aoun’s son-in-law and president of the Free Patriotic Movement, which has the most seats in parliament. 2     Hezbollah gains legitimacy at home through its charity work that plugs the gap in services normally provided for by the government. 3    According to a commander of an Iran-backed paramilitary group in Iraq, Iran slashed its monthly funding to the top four militias by nearly half this year. Please see “Coronavirus and sanctions hit Iran’s support of proxies in Iraq,” Reuters, July 2, 2020. 4    Hezbollah has gained control over the foreign policy and Lebanon has recently taken stances that are seen as bowing to Iranian pressure. Lebanon did not attend a March 22, 2018 extraordinary Arab League meeting discussing violations committed by Iran. Prior to that, Beirut did not condemn Iranian attacks on a Saudi diplomatic mission in Tehran. 5    However an undisclosed facility for processing uranium ore in the northeast of the kingdom has recently appeared. 6    This is not unlike the US’s decision to extend sanction waivers by four months, allowing Baghdad to import Iranian energy in order to ensure that the new government of Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi can stand on its own and is not overly dependent on Iran.

Highlights While difficult to forecast, the trajectory of global auto sales likely will follow that of GDP growth (Chart of the Week). As a result, palladium’s supply constraints will re-emerge, but its “epic rally” likely unfolds at a slower pace as global economic conditions normalize at an uneven rate.1   We expect the COVID-19 pandemic will be contained – likely via a vaccine later this year or early next year, if public-health officials are correct in their assessments, and populations become habituated to observing social-distancing and face-mask measures.2   There is evidence to suggest that in the post-pandemic world consumers will avoid public transportation in favor of their own vehicles.  This would lift palladium demand at the margin – assuming environmental regulations are not relaxed dramatically. South Africa’s derelict power grid will continue to limit palladium supply growth, despite new investment in Russia.  We expect palladium prices to remain close to current levels at ~ $2,300/oz to year-end. Chart of The WeekGlobal Auto Production Will Follow GDP’s Trajectory Feature COVID-19 clobbered palladium, just as it has commodities generally – taking prices from close to $2,900/oz in February to just under $1,600/oz in mid-March (Chart 2). Since then, prices rallied to more than $2,350/oz and are now languishing just above $2,200/oz. As dramatic as the metal’s price action has been, the pandemic's demand destruction only provided a respite from what remains a fraught supply backdrop. Chart 2Palladium’s Rollercoaster Ride Will Not Encourage New Output South African palladium output, which represents 36% of global supply, is once again threatened by rolling electricity blackouts, which have plagued the economy for years.3 Russia accounts for 42% of global palladium supply, and its top producer, Nornickel is maintaining production guidance of ~2.7mm ounces of palladium output this year. Even so, Nornickel expects global palladium output will total ~ 6.3mm ounces this year, down 1.3 mm ounces from 2019 levels (Chart 3).4 Inventories remain tight, and, with any recovery, can be expected to contract further (Chart 4). Chart 3Palladium's Physical Deficit Will Persist Chart 4Any Increase In Automobile Demand Will Further Strain Inventories This will continue a decade-long contraction in supply relative to demand, which spurred prices from $407.3/oz in 2010 to current levels but failed to energize supply growth or capex, which, from 2015 to 2019, grew by 7% and 15.2%, respectively. Auto Production Drives Palladium Demand Forecasting a recovery in palladium demand is extremely difficult, so much so even the most in-the-know market participants have suspended their usual balances assessments.5 All the same, there is a strong relationship between GDP and automobile production, as the Chart of the Week shows.6 This production drives the demand for palladium, as it is critical to the functioning of anti-pollution technology in gasoline-powered cars, which predominate in the global automobile market. Monthly car production in our sample peaked in November 2017 at 5.6mm units. In our modeling, we expected production will come in at ~ 4.3mm units in December of this year, and 4.6mm units in December 2021. This translates into a downturn of close to 6% in auto production this year versus 2019, and a recovery of ~ 9% for next year. If realized, this year’s downturn in auto production would only amount to a brief respite from the chronic supply-side weakness that has plagued the palladium market for a decade. In its May 2020 assessment, Johnson Matthey (JM) projects South African platinum-group metals (PGM) mining output will fall “at least 20%” this year. This suggests to us the physical deficits in palladium will widen and continue to do so over the medium term, which, all else equal – i.e., the global economic recovery we anticipate remains on track – will force prices higher if for no other reason than to attract capex to the PGM space. Upside Price Risk For Palladium Palladium prices will be prone to upside risk if the massive fiscal and monetary stimulus deployed globally is effective in reviving consumer demand for automobiles as household budgets are restored (Chart 5). Chart 5Rising Incomes Will Boost Auto Demand We find GDP (income) growth is an important explanatory variable for price, and would expect rising incomes in DM and EM markets would restore global employment growth and consumer confidence, leading to higher demand for new autos (Chart 6). In addition, anti-pollution regulations continue to be enforced, although states could relax these to help auto manufacturers reduce unsold inventories and to reduce the overall contribution palladium makes to a vehicle’s cost (Chart 7). Chart 6Fiscal And Monetary Stimulus Will Revive Consumer Demand These regulations pushed palladium loadings in internal-combustion engines globally up 14% last year, led by stout increases in Europe and China, according to JM. At 9.6mm ounces of the total gross demand for palladium, autocatalysts accounted for ~ 84% of global consumption last year (Chart 8). Chart 7Environmental Regulations Drive Palladium Demand Chart 8Autocatalysts Dominate Palladium Demand Bottom Line: The COVID-19 pandemic provided a respite for the palladium market’s relentless drive to take prices high enough to encourage new capex to bring no new supply. However, with the massive stimulus now deployed globally, we expect global GDP growth to revive in line with the World Bank’s estimates, which drive our modeling of GDP growth. This will cause demand for automobiles to revive next year, pushing demand for palladium higher as supplies are contracting – assuming, of course, governments do not relax environmental regulations pushing demand for the metal higher.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Fernando Crupi Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy FernandoC@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Overweight  Brent crude oil trade through $46/bbl, or ~ 3.7% in early trading Wednesday, on the back of sharp inventory drawdowns for the week ended reported by the US EIA Wednesday. We continue to forecast a physical deficit for the balance of the year and expect to see continued draws as a result. Our price forecast for the 2H20 remains at $44/bbl and $65/bbl next year for Brent, with WTI expected to trade ~ $3/bbl below that this year and next (Chart 9). Base Metals: Neutral Copper production in Peru, the second-largest producer in the world, fell 20.4% y/y in 1H20, according to mining.com. Production appears to have recovered by June, with output increasing almost 41% m/m to 180,792 MT. The government began relaxing its quarantine restrictions, imposed in March, in May. Precious Metals: Neutral We are moving our rolling stop on gold to $1,950/oz at tonight’s close, up from our previous stop of $1,850/oz. Gold was trading close to $2,050/oz early Wednesday. We also are moving our silver stop-loss to $26/oz at tonight’s close, up from $23.50/oz, and making this a strategic position. We remain bullish these precious metals, expecting central banks globally, led by the Fed, to continue to flood markets with liquidity, particularly USD liquidity. This will keep real rates low, and will, in our view, continue to support a weakening of the USD, both of which are bullish for gold and silver (Chart 10). The Fed has made it clear they are not considering any rate increases in the foreseeable future, which will lead markets to expect continued weakness in real rates. Ags/Softs:  Underweight The USDA reported 72% of the US corn crop was in good-to-excellent condition for the week ended August 2, compared to 57% for the same period last year in the 18 states accounting for 91% of the crop. 73% of the soybean crop was in good-to-excellent condition vs. 54% last year at this time. Chart 9 Chart 10 Footnotes 1 Please see Epic Palladium Rally Likely Continues, which we published February 27, 2020.  2 Please see Anthony Fauci Explains Why the US Still Hasn’t Beaten Covid published by wired.com July 29, 2020. 3 Eskom, the South African electricity monopoly supplying ~ 90% of the country’s power, resumed rolling blackouts last month as COVID-19-induced lockdowns were relaxed.  The lockdowns provided a brief respite to the overloaded grid.  Please see Eskom: SA on the brink of load shedding again, as six units ‘trip-out’ published by thesouthafrican.com news service July 27, 2020.  We discuss this in our earlier publication cited in fn 1. 4 Please see Pandemic helps Russia tighten its grip on a key strategic metal published by miningweekly.com July 2, 2020.   5 See, e.g., Johnson Matthey’s Pgm Market Report: May 2020 published May 18, 2020, which notes, “At the time of writing, it was not possible to quantify these changes to supply and demand and we have elected not to publish forecasts for 2020. Our autocatalyst pgm demand models incorporate external industry estimates of vehicle production; at the time of preparing our report, these industry forecasts for 2020 were undergoing regular downgrades as the pandemic progressed across Asia and then to Europe and North America. It is also unclear to what extent primary and secondary supplies will be disrupted.” 6 Automobile demand also could get a boost at the margin from more people choosing to use their own cars and light vehicles instead of public transportation in the post-COVID-19 world. The IBM Institute for Business Value surveyed 25k US consumers in April, and found COVID-19 prompted almost 20% of their sample to say they intended to use their personal vehicles more frequently. Please see https://newsroom.ibm.com/2020-05-01-IBM-Study-COVID-19-Is-Significantly-Altering-U-S-Consumer-Behavior-and-Plans-Post-Crisis. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 2020 Q2 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In Summary of Trades Closed In

Please note that we will be on our summer holidays next week. Our next report will come out on August 20. Highlights The 30-year bond yield is the puppet master pulling the strings of all other investments. Where 30-year bond yields are still far from the lower bound, they will ultimately get a lot closer. Continue to overweight 30-year bonds in the US and periphery Europe versus 30-year bonds in core Europe. Continue to overweight the US stock market versus the European stock market. An expected near-term setback to stocks versus bonds will briefly pause the European currency rally. The gold rally is also due a pause, given that it is overstretched relative to the decline in the real bond yield. Fractal trade: Long USD/PLN. Feature Chart I-1AThe Collapsed 30-Year Bond Yield Explains The Collapse Of Banks... Chart I-1B...And The Collapsed Earnings Yield (Surging Valuation) Of Tech And Healthcare   The abiding mantra of this publication is that investment is complex, but it is not complicated. By complex, we mean that the financial markets are not fully predictable or analysable. By not complicated, we mean that the relative prices of everything are inextricably connected, rather like the movements of a puppet. All you need to do is find the puppet master pulling the strings. Right now, the puppet master is the 30-year bond. The Real Action Is In 30-Year Bonds While most people are focussing on the 10-year bond yield, the real action has been at the ultra-long 30-year maturity. In the US and periphery Europe, 30-year yields are within a whisker of all-time lows. Yet these ultra-long bond yields are still well above those in core Europe which are much closer to the lower bound. The upshot is that while all yields have equal scope to rise, yields have more scope to fall further in the US and periphery Europe than in core Europe (Chart I-2 and Chart I-3). Chart I-230-Year Yields In The US And Periphery Europe... Chart I-3...Are Still Well Above Those In ##br##Core Europe This simple asymmetry has created a winning relative value strategy that will keep on winning. Overweight 30-year bonds in the US and periphery Europe versus 30-year bonds in core Europe. Our preferred expression is to overweight 30-year bonds in the US and Spain versus Germany and France. Bond yields have more scope to fall further in the US and periphery Europe than in core Europe. Remarkably, in the US, the 10-year real yield is also tightly tracking the 30-year nominal yield (minus a constant 2.2 percent) (Chart I-4). Using a little algebra, this means that the market’s 10-year inflation expectation is just a steady-state value of 2.2 percent minus a shortfall equalling the shortfall in the 10-year nominal yield versus the 30-year nominal yield (Chart I-5). Chart I-4The 10-Year Real Yield Is Just ##br##Tracking The 30-Year Nominal ##br##Yield Chart I-5The 10-Year Inflation Expectation Can Be Derived From The 30-Year And 10-Year Nominal Yields 10-year inflation expectation = 2.2 – (30-year nominal yield – 10-year nominal yield) The reason that this is remarkable is we can explain the trend in inflation expectations from just the 30-year and 10-year nominal yields, and nothing more. In turn, gold is tightly tracking the inverted real yield, as it theoretically should. Gold, which generates no yield, becomes relatively more valuable as the real yield on other assets diminishes (Chart I-6). Having said that, the most recent surge in the gold price is stretched relative to its relationship with the real bond yield, suggesting that the strong rally in gold is due a pause (Chart I-7). Chart I-6Gold Is Just Tracking The (Inverted) Real Yield... Chart I-7...But Gold's Most Recent Surge Is ##br##Stretched The 30-Year Bond Is Driving Stock Markets Moving to the stock market, bank relative performance has closely tracked the collapse in the 30-year yield, because the collapsed bond yield signals both weaker bank credit growth and a likely increase in banks’ non-performing loans (Chart of the Week, left panel). Banks and other ‘value cyclicals’ whose cashflows are in terminal decline are highly sensitive to the prospects for near-term cashflows, which are under severe pressure in the pandemic era. At the same time, as the distant cashflows are small, the banks’ share prices are less sensitive to the uplifted net present values of these distant cashflows that come from lower bond yields. In contrast, technology, healthcare and other ‘growth defensives’ generate a growing stream of cashflows. Making their net present values highly sensitive to a change in the bond yield used to discount those large distant cashflows. The profits of the tech and healthcare sectors are proving to be highly resilient in the pandemic era. Through 2018, the 30-year yield went up by 1 percent, so the forward earnings yield of growth defensives went up by 1 percent (their valuations fell). Subsequently, the 30-year yield has collapsed by 2 percent, so unsurprisingly the forward earnings yield of growth defensives has also collapsed by 2 percent (their valuations have surged). To repeat, financial markets are not complicated (Chart of the Week, right panel). Moreover, the profits of the growth defensives are proving to be highly resilient in the pandemic era, holding up well in the worst shock to demand since the Great Depression. The combination of resilient profits with higher valuations explains why the technology and healthcare sectors are reaching new highs, while the rest of the stock market is going nowhere (Chart I-8). Chart I-8Tech And Healthcare At New Highs While The Rest Of The Market Languishes Meanwhile, the relative performance of stock markets is also uncomplicated. It just stems from the relative exposure to the high-flying growth defensive sectors. Compared with Europe, the US has a 20 percent larger exposure to technology and healthcare (Chart I-9). Which is all you need to explain the consistent outperformance of the US versus Europe (Chart I-10). Chart I-9The US Is 20 Percent Over-Exposed To Tech And Healthcare... Chart I-10...Which Explains Its Consistent Outperformance Versus Europe A Quick Comment On European Currencies And The Dollar Turning to the foreign exchange market, the recent rally in European currencies can at least partly be explained as a sell-off in the dollar. Begging the question, what is behind the dollar’s recent weakness? The dollar has moved as a mirror-image of the global stock market. For the broad dollar index, the explanation is quite straightforward. True to its traditional role as a haven currency, the dollar has moved as a mirror-image of the global stock market, measured by the MSCI All Country World Index (in local currencies). Simply put, as the stock market has shaken off its year-to-date losses, the dollar has shaken off its year-to-date gains (Chart I-11). Chart I-11The Dollar Has Just Tracked The (Inverted) Stock Market Looking ahead, we can link the prospects of currencies to the outlook for 30-year bond yields. A further compression in yields will weaken the dollar, and help European currencies, in two ways. First, as already mentioned, yields have more scope to decline in the US than in core Europe, and a fading US yield premium will weigh on the dollar. Second, to the extent that the lower yields can prevent a protracted bear market in stocks and other risk-assets, non-haven currencies can perform well versus the haven dollar.  Having said that, an expected near-term setback to stocks versus bonds will briefly pause the European currency rally. Concluding Remarks The charts in this report should leave you in no doubt that the 30-year bond yield – particularly in the US – is the puppet master pulling the strings of all investments: bond market relative performance, real bond yields, gold, banks, growth defensives, equity market relative performance, and major currencies. Which raises the crucial question, can the downtrend in 30-year bond yields continue? Yes, absent an imminent vaccine or treatment for Covid-19, the downtrend in yields can continue. As we explained last week in An Economy Without Mouths And Noses Will Lose 10 Percent Of Jobs, the spectre of mass unemployment is looming large. Specifically, the major threat to the jobs market lies in the coming months when government lifelines to employers – such as state-subsidised furlough schemes – are cut or weakened. Where 30-year bond yields are still far from the lower bound, they will ultimately get a lot closer. Hence, it is inevitable that those central banks that can become more dovish will become more dovish. Given the political difficulties of using fiscal policy bullets, the lessons from Japan and Europe are that the monetary policy bullets get fully expended first. In practical terms, this means that where 30-year bond yields are still far from the lower bound, they will ultimately get a lot closer. The upshot is that core European bonds will continue to underperform US bonds, and that the European stock market will continue to underperform the US stock market. European currencies will trend higher versus the dollar, albeit a setback to stocks versus bonds is a near-term risk to the European currency uptrend. Fractal Trading System* This week’s recommended trade is to play a potential countertrend move in the dollar via long USD/PLN. The profit target and symmetrical stop-loss is set at 4 percent. The rolling 1-year win ratio now stands at 57 percent. Chart I-12USD/PLN When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated  December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com.   Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System   Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields   Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations