Commodities & Energy Sector

Highlights Lingering weakness evident in fundamental supply-demand data will fade next year, and with it the downward pressure on oil prices. Price risk is skewed to the upside: Continued monetary accommodation from systematically important central banks and fiscal stimulus will revive oil demand; OPEC 2.0 production restraint and market-imposed discipline in the US will slow the growth of oil supply. Shale-oil supply growth also is threatened by flaring of associated natural gas in the Bakken and Permian basins. Failure to limit the burn-off into the atmosphere at oil-production sites could provide the environmental lobby an opening to challenge growth. Elevated geopolitical tensions cannot be ignored, particularly as economic and political discontent boils over in Iraq and Iran, where leaders could feel compelled to lash out. To the downside, global economic policy uncertainty remains elevated. It continues to keep the USD well bid. This raises consumers’ local-currency costs in the EM economies driving demand growth, and lowers production costs ex-US, incentivizing supply growth at the margin. Weaker 2019 data showing up in demand and upward revisions to inventories pushed our 4Q19 Brent forecast down to $63/bbl from $66/bbl, and our 2020 forecast to $67/bbl from $70/bbl. We continue to expect WTI will trade $4/bbl below Brent. Feature In the multi-level game that drives the political economy of oil, domestic and international factors shaping supply-demand fundamentals are always shifting. As multiple constituencies vie for advantage, market participants will be forced to grapple with the consequences of policies now under consideration. The bullet points above provide a restricted aperture through which to view some of the issues currently in play.1 Markets are responding favorably to the unwinding of tighter global financial conditions this year brought about by tighter US monetary policy last year, and China’s 2017-18 deleveraging campaign. Demand-side impacts of policy shifts and policy signaling remain the most prominent feature of fundamental adjustments markets will continue to grapple with, as fall-out from the Sino-US trade war; political discontent in DM and EM electorates; and ad hoc economic policy raise global economic policy uncertainty. Markets are responding favorably to the unwinding of tighter global financial conditions this year brought about by tighter US monetary policy last year, and China’s 2017-18 deleveraging campaign. This is most visible in our global Leading Economic Indicators (LEIs), particularly in EM economies, although DM demand also looks like it could pick up (Chart of the Week). For the real economy, it is useful to remember Milton Friedman’s “long and variable lags” regarding the effects of monetary policy and how they affect oil markets.2 Chart of the WeekGlobal LEIs Point To Demand Recovery Chart 2BCA's EM Commodity-Demand Nowcast Points Toward Upturn in Oil Demand EM growth is hugely important to global oil-demand growth in our analysis. Our proprietary EM Commodity-Demand Nowcast continues to indicate EM economies are responding to easier global financial conditions (Chart 2).3 Global growth expectations for oil demand are diverging sharply in the lead-up to OPEC 2.0’s December 5 meeting in Vienna. At the low end, the US EIA expects 2019 growth of 760k b/d this year, a sharply lower estimate than the agency’s co-eval institutions; OPEC is closing in on the 1mm b/d growth threshold at 0.98mm b/d, followed by the IEA at 1mm b/d. We lowered our estimate of oil-demand growth this year to 1.1mm b/d, in line with weaker consumption data being reported by these big agencies. Shale-oil production growth faces an additional risk from the flaring of associated natural gas in the Permian and Bakken basins. We are maintaining our expectation for growth of 1.4mm b/d next year, which is close to the EIA’s estimate (Chart 3). The IEA’s estimate for 2020 stays at 1.2mm b/d, while OPEC’s is just under 1.1mm b/d. On the supply side, we expect lower US shale-oil output growth next year. Lower prices, backwardated WTI futures curves – which results in lower forward prices for producers hedging their output – and recalcitrant investors who are unwilling to commit capital to all but the most profitable shale-oil producers will take their toll (Chart 4). As a result, we expect US shale output to reach ~ 9.35mm b/d on average next year in the Big Five basins (Permian, Eagle Ford, Bakken, Niobrara and Anadarko). This leads to an 800k b/d increase in our US lower 48 output over this year’s levels, which is down from our earlier estimate of a 900k b/d increase. Chart 3Stronger Oil Demand, Tighter Supply Will Lift Oil Prices in 2020 Chart 4Lower Prices, Backwardated WTI Curve Lead to Lower Rig Count, Shale-Oil Output Shale-oil production growth faces an additional risk from the flaring of associated natural gas in the Permian and Bakken basins. Failure to limit the burn-off into the atmosphere at oil-production sites could provide the environmental lobby an opening to challenge growth, as the electorate grows increasingly restive with the practice. Industry officials in Texas and North Dakota – home to the Permian and Bakken plays – already have been sounding the alarm on this issue.4 According to Rystad Energy, flaring reached another record high in the Permian at 752 million cubic feet per day in 3Q19 amid growing oil production. Lastly, we continue to follow events in Iraq and Iran closely where economic and political discontent with the status quo has led to civil unrest. We also are penciling in an extension of OPEC 2.0’s 1.2mm-barrel-per-day output cut to year-end 2020. Over-compliance likely persists, particularly from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). Stronger non-OPEC output from Norway and Brazil offsets this somewhat (Table 1). Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) Lastly, we continue to follow events in Iraq and Iran closely where economic and political discontent with the status quo has led to civil unrest.  As our colleague Roukaya Ibrahim notes, “The country continues to be plagued by high unemployment, corruption, and an utter lack of basic services … . This has ultimately resulted in a lack of confidence in Iraqi leadership who are being increasingly perceived as benefiting from the status quo at the expense of the populace.”5 There is an underlying tension within the society between Iraqi forces loyal to Iran’s Shia theocracy and Iraqis seeking full autonomy for their country. “The widening rift between the rival Iraqi Shia blocs implies that any détente will be temporary,” according to BCA’s geopolitical strategists. We have consistently maintained markets are too complacent regarding these geopolitical risks, which also encompass US-Iran hostilities in the Persian Gulf. We are reducing our 4Q19 Brent forecast to $63/bbl from $66/bbl, and our 2020 forecast to $67/bbl from $70/bbl. That said, our balances still reflect the lingering demand weakness discussed above, and continue to work through higher inventories. In line with revisions by the EIA to historical inventory levels and lower demand growth, we are reducing our 4Q19 Brent forecast to $63/bbl from $66/bbl, and our 2020 forecast to $67/bbl from $70/bbl (Chart 5). We continue to expect WTI will trade $4/bbl below Brent (Chart 6). Chart 5Storage Revisions Help Weaken Price Forecasts Chart 6BCA 2020 Oil Price Forecasts Fall Slightly To $67/bbl For Brent, $63/bbl For WTI Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Persists While accommodative monetary policy and stimulative fiscal policy will foster a revival in commodity demand, global economic uncertainty remains elevated.6 This risks keeping the broad trade-weighted USD index for goods (TWIBG) well bid (Chart 7). This raises consumers’ local-currency costs in the EM economies driving growth, and lowers production costs ex-US, incentivizing supply growth at the margin. Chart 7Elevated Global Economic Uncertainty Keeps USD Well Bid, Retards Demand We remain confident the combination of global monetary accommodation and fiscal stimulus will revive commodity demand.  However, given the economic uncertainty confronting policymakers globally, this revival likely will be modest. As the multi-level game dominating the evolution of the political economy of the oil market becomes more complex and uncertain – particularly in re the Sino-US trade war and domestic politics in systemically important economies – monetary and fiscal policy have an additional headwind to battle in the attempt to revive aggregate commodity demand. Bottom Line: We remain confident the combination of global monetary accommodation and fiscal stimulus will revive commodity demand. However, given the economic uncertainty confronting policymakers globally, this revival likely will be modest, with oil prices rising ~ 10% next year. That said, if the phase-one Sino-US trade deal leads to a phase-two and –three – i.e., a durable resolution to the trade imbroglio and political discontent roiling markets, the recovery could be more significant.7     Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Market Round-Up Energy: Overweight. Trade-related news continues to drive short-term price movements. On Tuesday, Brent prices fell 2.5% on rising pessimism about the US-China “phase one” deal. On the supply side, OPEC 2.0 countries will meet in early December to assess whether the group should extend – and possibly deepen – output cuts. Russia signaled it is unlikely to support deeper cuts, but appears to be open to extending the current quotas until year-end 2020. Our updated global oil market balances assume OPEC 2.0 will agree to extend the current production curbs. Separately, anti-government protests in Basra, Iraq, are impacting the oil sector. On Monday, protesters reportedly blocked roads leading to the major oil fields and to commodity export terminals. Base Metals: Neutral. Copper prices seem detached from their current fundamentals, moving up and down with expectations related to the US-China trade war and ongoing protests in Chile – the world’s largest copper producer. Negative sentiment has weighed on copper most of this year. Speculative short positioning reached a high of 137k contracts in August, pushing our Copper Composite Indicator into “oversold” territory. Going forward, the metal’s fundamentals will support higher prices; quarter-to-date copper prices increased 3.5%. Global visible copper inventories resumed their downward trend in 2H19 – reaching a 10-year low. We expect global growth to pick up in the coming months – led by emerging economies. Risks are skewed to the upside. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold prices recovered to $1475/oz after trading close to our $1450/oz stop-loss last week. Slightly weaker real rates in the US and ratcheted-up trade tensions supported the yellow metal’s price this week. Over the short term, prices could be pushed lower as markets await positive developments re a Sino - US trade agreement. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Corn futures traded lower earlier in the week, but rebounded slightly Tuesday after the USDA Crop Progress reported the harvest rate for it was 76%, which was below analysts’ expectations of 77% and well below the five-year average of 92%. Wheat performed better, marking a 0.9% weekly increase in March futures on the back of a lower percentage of the crop being rated good or excellent by the USDA.  Finally, soybeans were flat throughout the week but fell almost 0.8% on Wednesday, amid reports that a phase-one trade deal between US and China may not be completed by the end of 2019.     Footnotes 1       Understanding and balancing these interests is difficult, as is forecasting outcomes. Please see Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer, 1988). 2      Friedman’s classic paper, “The Lag in Effect of Monetary Policy,” appeared in the Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 69, No. 5 (Oct., 1961). Our own research suggests these lags range from six to 18 months in commodity markets. 3      Our EM Commodity-Demand Nowcast uses our Global Industrial Activity (GIA) Index, and our Global Commodity Factor (GCF) and EM Import Volume (EMIV) models to characterize the current state of commodity demand. The GIA index uses trade data, FX rates, manufacturing data, and Chinese industrial activity statistics to gauge current global industrial activity, which is highly correlated with trade-related activity. The GCF uses principal component analysis to distill the primary driver of 28 different commodity prices traded globally. Lastly, the EMIV model is driven by EM import volumes, which are highly correlated with income; as income rises, oil demand – and commodity demand in general – rises. Please our report entitled Global Financial Conditions Support Higher Commodity Demand, which was published October 31, 2019, for additional discussion. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com.  Concerns over associated natural-gas flaring into the atmosphere are rising in the shale-oil community, as political discontent with the practice grows.  Please see Gas Flaring “Running Rampant” In The Permian, published by oilprice.com, and New Initiative will Map and Measure Methane Emissions Across the Permian Basin, a press release issued by the Environmental Defense Fund outlining their initiative to install methane emissions-monitoring gear around the Permian to begin logging the massive amount of flaring in that basin.   According to the Oil & Gas Journal, “… collective volumes of flared and vented gas from (the Permian and Bakken) basins up to about 1.15 bcfd. For comparative purposes, that represents 12 billion cu m/year of wasted gas, which exceeds the yearly gas demand of nations such as Israel, Colombia, and Romania.”  Please see Permian gas flaring, venting reaches record high published by the OGJ June 4, 2019.  Please see Permian gas flaring reaches yet another high, published by Rystad Energy on its website November 5, 2019. 4      S&P Global Platts posted an interesting podcast on its website featuring an interview with Lynn Helms, director of the North Dakota Department of Mineral Resources. He said flaring in the Bakken – where production is hitting record highs – will force state regulators to throttle back on the rate of shale-production growth beginning in 2Q20, when growth could slow substantially if gas-capture technologies are not deployed.  Growth could remain subdued for 2020-21, he said.  Please see North Dakota’s record oil growth to be upended by flaring rules, posted November 18, 2019. 5      Please see Iraq's Challenge To Iran Is Underrated, published by BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy November 8, 2019.  It is available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6      We measure uncertainty using the Baker-Bloom-Davis Global Economic Policy Uncertainty (GEPU) index. This is a GDP-weighted index of newspaper headlines containing a list of words related to economic policy uncertainty, which are found in newspapers and articles online from 20 countries representing almost 80% of global GDP are scoured for reports reflecting economic uncertainty. Please see our October 17 and October 31, 2019, reports Policy Uncertainty Lifts USD, Stifles Global Oil Demand Growth and Global Financial Conditions Support Higher Commodity Demand for the original research on this topic. Both are available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 7      This is not our base case. Our geopolitical strategists expect a temporary ceasefire in the trade war, but doubt that a “grand compromise” leading to a new period of US-China economic engagement will emerge from the negotiations. Strategic tensions will keep rising on a secular basis between the two countries. Please see BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy weekly report entitled How Much To Buy An American President? – GeoRisk Update: October 25, 2019. It is available at gps.bcaresearch.com Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q3 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades

Special Report

Highlights Saudi Aramco likely will IPO 1-2% of the company next month on its local bourse; retail investors reportedly will get up to 0.5%. The IPO will value Aramco within a range estimated at less than $1 trillion to more than $2 trillion. China’s interest in Aramco goes back almost four years to when the IPO was first proffered. It reflects an economic and geopolitical calculus encompassing more than an equity claim on the world’s largest, lowest-cost, most profitable oil company. Investing in Aramco gives it a stake in producing oil it desperately needs at home – as its imports from KSA attest – and supports its goal of filling some of the power vacuum left by the US pivot away from the Middle East (Chart of the Week). For the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), stronger ties with China will ground its Asian marketing efforts, and deepen China’s stake in the unimpeded flow of its exports. With tensions in the Gulf remaining high, this is crucial. In addition to the mutuality of KSA’s and China’s interests, “patriotic participation” by Saudi investors will help push Aramco’s valuation close to $2 trillion. A post-IPO let-down – not unusual by any stretch – is likely. Feature Chart of the WeekChina’s Oil Production Stagnates, While Imports From KSA Surge Dear Client, This week, BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy and Commodity & Energy Strategy explore the Saudi Aramco IPO scheduled for next month and its larger implications for the global economy. In keeping with our tradition, we take a multidimensional approach – financial, economic and geopolitical – consistent with our unique analytical endowment. We trust you will find this report’s approach and analysis useful in shaping your convictions. Matt Gertken and Bob Ryan The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is in an all-out sprint to diversify its economy away from a near-total dependence on oil exports by 2030 (Chart 2). Time is short. The IPO of Saudi Aramco is the sine qua non of this effort, as it will fund the investment required to effect this transformation’s ambitious goals (Table 1, Chart 3). Investing in KSA’s production and refining capabilities is attractive to China. Table 1Vision 2030 Highlights Chart 2Breaking Oil Dependency... China is engaged in an all-out effort to become self-sufficient in oil and gas production, given the vulnerabilities in its hydrocarbon-supply chain.1 Chart 3...Drives KSA's Vision 2030 Local oil-industry executives doubt this is even remotely attainable, which is one reason we believe investing in KSA’s production and refining capabilities via the Aramco IPO is so hugely attractive to China. It helps explain why policymakers sanctioned an investment of up to $10 billion in the IPO by various state-owned enterprises and funds.2 Given our expectation the IPO will value Aramco closer to $2 trillion than not, a 1-2% float would amount to between $20-$40 billion, meaning China – via its state-owned Silk Road Fund, Sinopec Group and China Investment Corp., et al – could account for as much as a quarter of the IPO if it prices out as we expect, and these state-owned investors pony up the full $10 billion being discussed in the press.3 Aramco’s Red Herring Released November 9, the Aramco Red Herring is as interesting for what it includes as what it leaves out.4 In the first six months of this year, Aramco production amounted to 13.2mm b/d of oil equivalent, 10.0mm b/d of which was crude oil and condensates. This was down slightly from the 13.6mm b/d of oil equivalent produced last year. The company notes that in 2016-18, it accounted for 12.5% of global crude output, and that its proved liquids reserves were “approximately five times larger than the combined proved liquids reserves of the Five Major IOCs,” or independent oil companies. Aramco’s 3.1mm b/d of refining capacity makes it the fourth largest integrated refiner in the world. In 2018, Aramco’s free cash flow amounted to almost $86 billion. Net income last year was $111 billion, more than the combined profits of the next six largest oil companies in the world (Chart 4). For its first year as a public company, Aramco has indicated it will pay an annual dividend of $75 billion. Investors will not know how that translates to a dividend yield until the actual number of shares floated is known. Chart 4Aramco Profitability Is Huge Chart 5Aramco Absorbs Most Of OPEC 2.0’s Production Cuts, Outside Iran, Venezuela The Red Herring foresees a compound annual growth rate in demand for the Kingdom’s oil, condensate and natural-gas liquids output of 0.9% p.a. between 2015 and 2025. Demand growth is expected to level off some time around 2035. In this baseline scenario, Aramco sees itself gaining market share globally over this period. In an alternative scenario, the company notes that if there is “a more rapid transition away from fossil fuels,” which sees demand for its hydrocarbons starting to decline in the late 2020s, “the Kingdom’s share of global supply is also expected to increase through 2050.” Saudi Arabia and Russia are the putative leaders of OPEC 2.0, the producer coalition formed at the end of 2016 to manage global oil supply growth, following a market-share war launched by OPEC in 2014. The coalition has an agreement in place to keep 1.2mm b/d of production off the market until the end of 1Q20. The Kingdom, via Aramco, has been shouldering the lion’s share of OPEC 2.0’s production restraint, outside of Iran and Venezuela, which have seen their production and exports slide due to US sanctions (Chart 5). On Wednesday, KSA informed OPEC (the original Cartel) the IPO of Aramco would not affect its commitments under the OPEC 2.0 deal.5 The IPO Will Bring KSA And China Closer China has been keen to invest in Aramco since the IPO was first floated almost four years ago. This reflects an economic and a geopolitical calculus encompassing more than simply securing an equity claim in the world’s largest, lowest-cost, most profitable oil company. An Aramco investment gives China a stake in producing oil it critically needs at home. China’s oil demand has been growing while its domestic production has been stagnating for the most part, despite the new-found emphasis on becoming self-sufficient. This is reflected in surging imports – totaling just over 10mm b/d in September, an 11% increase over August levels. China’s oil demand is expected to grow ~ 3.5% this year and next, averaging ~ 14.8mm b/d. China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) estimates China’s oil demand will peak in 2030 at 16.5mm b/d.6 China’s vulnerability to oil imports – caused by its rising import dependency and US maritime supremacy – has prompted President Xi to order increased exploration and production domestically. The trade war and US sanctions on Iran and Venezuela – two long-time crude-oil suppliers to China – drove this point home: Imports from Iran fell 46% y/y in the January – September period to 357k b/d, while imports from Venezuela fell 15% to 306k b/d.7 For its part, KSA views China as one of its primary growth markets, as its Red Herring attests. It will be investing in additional refining capacity there and view the market as key to its petchems growth. “The Company’s strategy is to continue increasing its in-Kingdom refining capability and expand its strategically integrated downstream business in high-growth economies, such as China, India and Southeast Asia, while maintaining its current participation in material demand centers, such as the United States, and countries that rely on importing crude oil, such as Japan and South Korea.” Both KSA and China would benefit from deeper economic engagement. Net, both KSA and China would benefit from deeper economic engagement, which the IPO will foster. It is not inconceivable representatives from Chinese state-owned or –affiliated entities could sit on Aramco’s board, which would provide even “greater assurance over its crude oil and refined product supplies going forward,” as we noted in a Special Report published in November 2017.8 This is a critical concern for China, with domestic production stagnating and demand for crude oil, refined products and petchems increasing. Evolution Of China’s Middle East Role While China’s involvement in the Middle East has steadily been growing in energy, trade and investment generally, it has espoused “a vision of a multipolar order in the Middle East based on non-interference in, and partnerships with, other states – one in which the country will promote stability through ‘developmental peace’ rather than the Western notion of ‘democratic peace’,” according to a recent paper from the European Council on Foreign Relations.9 China’s growing interest in the Middle East is fundamentally supportive of the Gulf Arab reform agendas. But geopolitical risk is still elevated in this region (Chart 6), especially over the one- to three-year time frame. This is primarily due to the far-from-settled conflicts between the US and China and the US and Iran. First take the US-China conflict as it pertains to the Middle East. As China’s economy has boomed, so has its import dependency. Over the past two decades Beijing's reliance on Middle Eastern crude oil has ballooned (Chart 7). The result is a deep strategic vulnerability for China. Economic and political stability depend on sea lanes that are, from China’s perspective, implicitly threatened by the United States and its allied maritime powers. Chart 6Geopolitical Risk Is Elevated In The Middle East Chart 7Beijing's Reliance On Middle Eastern Oil Has Ballooned Hence Beijing has devoted ever greater efforts over the past two decades to building a blue-water navy charged with securing its “lifeline” running from the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea to China’s hungry coastal cities (Map 1). This naval development is a disruptive process, as the US, Japan, Australia and others are seeking to maintain control of the Indo-Pacific seas along with China’s rivals like India. Map 1The Belt And Road Program Until recently, Beijing proceeded carefully in order not to galvanize efforts to oppose its growing influence. It has only timidly begun establishing forward military bases abroad — namely in Djibouti, Africa — and its activity at key civilian ports such as Gwadar, Pakistan, and Hambantota, Sri Lanka, is developing only gradually. The creation of a new “maritime Silk Road” is a long, drawn-out affair. However, slowly but surely Beijing aims to lessen its vulnerability to the US at strategic chokepoints like Malacca and the Persian Gulf. The US and allies will respond — and this will generate geopolitical risk. Thus naval conflict is a persistent “Black Swan” risk. China’s chief obstacle is America’s strategic dominance in the region. Second comes the US-Iran conflict as it pertains to China. In response to US sanctions against Iran, China has had to increase its oil imports from Arab Gulf states. Beijing — inherently a continental power — is seeking overland routes of trade and investment to acquire Siberian, central Asian, and Middle Eastern resources, which cannot be interdicted by the US. Hence the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). US Still Limits China’s Middle East Options The BRI is the umbrella term for a process that began in the 2000s. China recycles its large current account surpluses into land and resources in the rest of Asia so as to maximize supply lines and diversify its savings away from US Treasurys (Chart 8). This is also a way for Beijing to export its industrial overcapacity, particularly in construction. This BRI process faces an important limitation in that Beijing’s current account surpluses have drastically declined (Chart 9). Even so, this decline will result in greater concentration on strategic targets. The Middle East is vital both because its energy could someday be accessed overland and because it could serve as an export market in itself. It could also become a way-station for greater trade to Europe and all of Eurasia. Chart 8China Is Diversifying Its Savings Away From US Treasurys Chart 9China's Falling Current Account Surplus Limits BRI Investments The instability of BRI countries delays China’s plans for regional investment, construction, transportation, and logistics. And China lacks the appetite for overseas political and military intervention necessary to shape the domestic environment in the relevant countries — especially given that the US remains the dominant power. China’s limited agency in Iraq is case in point. It is even severely limited in allied countries like Pakistan. And it has rocky relations with some of the key regional powers, such as Turkey. Chart 10 Yet the chief obstacle is America’s strategic dominance in the region and specifically its conflict with Iran. US foreign policy keeps Iran isolated and frequently forces China to impose sanctions. Since the Trump administration imposed “maximum pressure” on Iran, in May 2019, Beijing has drastically reduced oil imports and withdrawn from the $5 billion South Pars natural gas project (Chart 10). This was partly prompted by Washington’s use of secondary sanctions that threatened to cripple China’s leading tech companies for violating Iranian sanctions. Iran’s inability to open up to the outside world prevents China from fully executing its broader overland strategy. China is not yet capable of confronting Washington over Iran. The 2020 US election is therefore a critical juncture — the re-election of the Trump administration would likely prolong the current conflict with Iran. It is unlikely to lead to full-scale war, but that scenario cannot be fully ruled out given Trump’s lack of constraints in a second term. Whereas a new Democratic administration would almost certainly return to the Obama administration policy of détente with Iran, aimed at containing the country’s nuclear program in exchange for economic opening. Either way, Beijing faces a multi-year period in which it must prepare for US pressure on the high seas and possibly also in Iran. GCC’s Attraction To China The above considerations provide a clear reason for Beijing to deepen its relations with the Gulf Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE. These states are increasingly attracted to China not only as an energy customer and investor but also as a provider of high-tech goods, arms, and telecom equipment that is necessary for their productivity and useful for their surveillance and repression of domestic dissent. Deepening its trade relationship with KSA via a meaningful equity position in Aramco would present the perfect opportunity for China to take a meaningful step toward establishing the yuan as a global reserve currency. If KSA and the other GCC states begin accepting yuan as payment for their oil and products, and they begin spending their yuan on Chinese-made goods and services, two-way trade could expand significantly and rapidly. The RMB doesn’t have to be fully convertible to USD or euros for that to happen. Such a yuan-trading bloc would encompass oil and refined products, natural gas and liquids, and goods and services made in the GCC and China. This bilateral trade would provide a base from which to build out the yuan as a global reserve currency. This would neither be a forced evolution nor a hurried one. It would naturally evolve, which would ensure its durability. The US may attempt to prevent China from gaining influence in this way, but that would require a concerted effort. And such an effort is not likely to develop until 2021 or 2022 at the earliest. It will depend on the US election outcome, the 2020-24 administration’s foreign policy, and US-China negotiations. Hence China’s evolving role is positive for its supply security as well as for the reform agendas of the Gulf Arab states as they attempt to shift away from oil dependency. The problem is that China cannot ultimately guarantee the stability of the Arab states while they reform. China and Europe are energy importers that require stability in the Mideast, while Russia and increasingly the US are energy producers that can take actions to destabilize the region — the US by partially withdrawing, Russia by reinserting itself. Chart 11US Reducing Commitments In The Middle East True, the US still broadly shares with China the desire for stable oil prices — but its growing energy independence gives it the ability to reduce its commitments, upset the status quo, and create power vacuums that are detrimental to stability until a new regional equilibrium is established. Both the Obama and Trump administrations have demonstrated this erratic tendency (Chart 11). Russia has gotten closer to China, but it also is regaining strategic influence in the Middle East and has an interest in keeping the region divided and unpredictable. This is advantageous for an oil exporter outside the region with direct overland access to the Chinese market, but not advantageous for China. The above situation encapsulates the Geopolitical Strategy theme of multipolarity, or great power competition. The Middle East is in transition and the US strategic deleveraging ensures there will not be a stable order in the near term. Chinese investment can increase the region’s economic diversification, productivity, and potential GDP. But China’s financial limitations, US foreign policy, Russian foreign policy, and the region’s chronic instability will jeopardize those positive effects. Bottom Line: China’s influence in the Middle East is growing, particularly with the Gulf Arab states. However, this process exists within the context of competition with a number of other powers, ensuring that the Gulf Arab states still face extreme uncertainty and instability in attempting to reform. The US election is a critical juncture for US policy toward Iran and hence for the Mideast and China. While the US conflict with China will wax and wane across future administrations, the 2020 election will determine whether the US conflict with Iran gets better or worse in the next 1 – 3 years. Ultimately, we would expect the US to focus on pressuring China. But its latent strength in the Middle East is a tool for doing so. China’s growing role in the region will not ensure stability.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1High Anxiety: The Trade War and China’s Oil and Gas Supply Security, by Dr. Erica Downs, provides an excellent analysis of President Xi Jinping’s all-out drive to make China self-sufficient in oil and gas. It was published by Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy November 12, 2019. The drive toward oil and gas self-sufficiency is described in local media as a war, as Dr. Downs notes: “In August 2018, (China National Petroleum Corp.) leaders met to discuss Xi’s directive and agreed to launch a ‘major offensive war’ on domestic exploration and development to enhance national energy security.” 2 Please see Chinese state firms mull up to US$10 billion investment in Saudi oil giant Aramco’s IPO published by the South China Morning Post November 7, 2019. The article also notes the Russian Direct Investment Fund also is considering taking a stake in the IPO. 3 $2.27 trillion is the upper end of a range generated by Bank of America. Please see Some banks dealing with Saudi Aramco IPO say company may be worth $1.5 trillion or even less, published by The Japan Times November 4, 2019, for additional estimates from banks involved in the deal. 4 The company’s 658-page prospectus also details business risks including terrorism, the attacks on Abqaiq and Khurais, and market-related financial risks. Not included is the size of the float – presumably that will be sized based on bids received – and how much of it will be allocated to individuals vs. institutions, who will be bidding for shares from November 17th to the 28th, and from the 17th to Dec. 4, respectively, when the issue is expected to price. The shares could be trading on December 11, 2019, on the Saudi stock Exchange, the Tadawul. No mention is made of a listing on an international exchange – e.g., London, Hong Kong, Tokyo, New York. 5 Please see OPEC says Saudi gave assurances Aramco IPO won’t affect commitment to group deals published November 13, 2019, by uk.reuters.com. 6 Please see Glimpses of China’s energy future, published by The Oxford Institute For Energy Studies in September 2019. The Institute summarized CNPC’s 2050 outlook to derive these estimates. 7 Please see footnote 1 above. 8 Please see ضد الواسطة , an Arabic phrase meaning “Against Wasta,” a practice that roughly translates as reciprocity in formal and informal dealings. This Special Report was published November 16, 2017, and is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see China’s Great Game In The Middle East, published by the European Council on Foreign Relations in October. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q3 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades

In this Monday’s Weekly Report, we initiated a market-neutral long S&P energy/short S&P utilities pair trade. The middle panel shows that energy stocks have come full circle and are trading at levels last seen two decades ago when WTI oil was fetching less than half of today’s $55/bbl price. Encouragingly, there seems to be long-term support for relative share prices at the current overly depressed level. While utilities have been making headlines all year long given their outperformance, when put in proper perspective this niche defensive sector with a mere 3% weight in the SPX looks like a shipwreck (bottom panel). Taken together, this battle between two diminishing sectors presents a tradable opportunity by favoring energy stocks at the expense of utilities. In fact, this ratio trades at more than two standard deviations below the historical uptrend, and thus offers a lucrative risk/reward profile (top panel). Bottom Line: Initiate long S&P energy/short S&P utilities pair trade. For fundamental reasons behind the trade, please refer to the most recent Weekly Report.  

Highlights Prevailing winds are still blowing in favor of the US dollar. Continue shorting a basket of EM currencies versus the greenback. Deflationary forces are gaining momentum in EM/China while inflationary pressures are accumulating in the US economy. The dollar will appreciate further, distributing inflationary pressures away from the US and into EM/China. Feature Our buy stop on the MSCI EM equity index at 1075 has not yet been triggered. Last week the EM index closed a hair short of this level. Our strategy remains intact: We continue to recommend caution and defensive positioning for EM investors, but will recommend playing the rally if the index breaks above this level. The fact that industrial metals and oil prices have failed to rally substantially even though the S&P 500 is making new highs gives us comfort that the Chinese industrial cycle is not experiencing a revival. Our buy stop on the MSCI EM equity index at 1075 has not yet been triggered.  Absent a sustained recovery in the Chinese capital spending and rising commodities prices, EM equities and currencies will not be able to maintain their rebound. Chart I-1 illustrates that the total return on EM ex-China currencies (including the carry) correlates strongly with industrial metals prices. Similarly, EM share prices move in tandem with global materials stocks (Chart I-2). Chart I-1EM Currencies Correlate Strongly With Industrial Metals Prices Chart I-2EM Share Prices Move In Tandem With Global Materials Stocks   The basis for these relationships is as follows: The majority of EM economies, and hence their share prices and exchange rates, are leveraged to China’s business cycle. The latter also drives industrial commodities prices, as the mainland accounts for 50% of global metals consumption. We elaborated on these relationships in our recent report titled EM: Perceptions Versus Reality. In this report, we examine the dichotomy between inflation in EM and US and discuss the macro rebalancing required and the implications for financial markets. Inflation: A Dichotomy Between EM… Low and rapidly falling inflation accompanying extremely weak real growth constitute the current hazards to EM economies and their financial markets: Headline and core inflation in EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan1 – the universe pertinent for EM bond portfolios – are low and falling, justifying lower interest rates (Chart I-3). Consistently, aggregate nominal GDP growth in these economies is hovering close to its 2015 low (Chart I-4). Chart I-3EM: Inflation Is Low And Falling Chart I-4EM: Nominal GDP Is Subdued And Decelerating Chart I-5EM Ex-China, Korea And Taiwan: Money And Loan Growth Are Slowing In China, core consumer price inflation is at 1.5% and falling, and producer prices are declining. Even though many EM central banks have been cutting rates, narrow and broad money as well as bank loan growth are either weak or decelerating (Chart I-5). In brief, policy easing in these economies hasn’t yet revived money and credit growth. The reason why low nominal interest rates have not yet led to a recovery in money/credit is because real (inflation-adjusted) borrowing costs remain elevated. In addition, poor banking system health stemming from lingering non-performing loans – a legacy of the credit boom early this decade – has also hindered credit origination. Corroborating the fact that borrowing costs are high in real (inflation-adjusted) terms, interest rate and credit-sensitive sectors such as capital spending, real estate and discretionary consumer spending are all extremely weak. In particular, high-frequency data such as capital goods imports and car sales are shrinking (Chart I-6). Residential property markets are very sluggish in the majority of developing economies (Chart I-7). Chart I-6EM Ex-China, Korea And Taiwan: Credit-Sensitive Spending Is Shrinking Chart I-7Property Prices In Local Currency Terms Chart I-8Chinese Imports For Domestic Consumption And EM Exports Finally, the combined exports of EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan – which are correlated with mainland imports for domestic consumption – are shrinking (Chart I-8). Without a revival in Chinese domestic demand in general, and commodities in particular, EM exports will continue to languish. Bottom Line: Risks stemming from low and falling inflation in EM are rising. While central banks are cutting rates, they are behind the curve. For now, investors should not expect an imminent domestic demand recovery based on EM central bank interest rate cuts. …And The US In contrast to EM, investors and financial markets are complacent about inflation risks in the US. This is not to say that there is a risk of runaway inflation in the US. Our point is as follows: If US growth slows further, US inflation will subside. However, if US growth accelerates, consumer price inflation will surprise to the upside. Sectors such as capital spending, real estate and discretionary consumer spending are all extremely weak. US core consumer price inflation has been trending upwards in the past several years, consistent with a positive and widening output gap (Chart I-9, top panel). The average of six core consumer price inflation measures – core CPI, core PCE, trimmed mean CPI, trimmed PCE, market-based core PCE, and median CPI – is slightly above 2% and looks to be headed higher (Chart I-9, bottom panel). US unit labor costs are rising faster than the corporate price deflator (Chart I-10, top panel). A tight labor market will translate to robust wage growth.  Chart I-9Barring Slowdown, US Core Inflation Will Rise Further Chart I-10Beware Of A US Profit Margin Squeeze   With corporate profit margins already shrinking (Chart I-10, bottom panel) and consumer spending robust, companies will try to pass on higher costs to consumers. Hence, barring a slowdown in US consumer spending, consumer price inflation will likely rise. If global growth recovers, the dollar will sell off and US manufacturing will revive. Provided these two factors have been counteracting inflationary pressures in the US, their reversal will allow inflation to rise. Bottom Line: Underlying core inflation in the US has been drifting higher. Unless growth slows, inflation will surprise to the upside. Macro Rebalancing: In The Dollar’s Favor Bond yields and exchange rates often act as shock absorbers and re-balancing mechanisms for the global economy. The agility and corresponding adjustments of these financial variables assure a more stable real global economy. Given the current inflationary pressures in the US amid deflationary forces in EM, one of the ways in which this adjustment process will manifest itself is in the form of US dollar appreciation versus EM currencies. A strong greenback will redistribute inflationary pressures away from the US and into EM. An analogy for this adjustment process is the role of wind in rebalancing air pressure around the globe. When air pressure in location A is higher than in location B, the air moves from location A to location B, causing wind. This allows for a rebalancing of air pressure around the earth. US core consumer price inflation has been trending upwards in the past several years. When air pressure differences are substantial, winds become forceful – potentially to the point of causing damage. In a nutshell, this adjustment could come at the cost of strong winds, or even a storm. Global currency markets play a similar role to wind. A strong greenback will help cap US inflation by dampening activity and employment in America’s manufacturing sector. Slumping manufacturing will moderate activity in the service sector, as well as slowdown aggregate income and spending growth.  In turn, weakening currencies will help reflate EM economies by mitigating the negative impact of lower exports in general and commodities prices in particular. EM economies need an external boost, especially now when their banking systems are in hibernation mode and China is not boosting its demand to the same extent it did during downturns since 2008. A caveat is in order here: In the case of many EMs, currency deprecation will initially hurt growth. The reason is that companies and banks in many EMs still hold large amounts of US dollar debt (Chart I-11). As the dollar appreciates, the cost of foreign debt servicing will escalate, prompting them to reduce corporate spending and bank lending. Hence, wind could turn into a storm. All in all, we continue to bet on EM currency depreciation, regardless of the direction of US bond yields. The basis is as follows: Contrary to widespread consensus, EM exchange rates correlate more strongly with commodities prices – please refer to Chart I-1 on page 1 – than US bond yields as shown in Chart I-12. Chart I-11EM External Debt Is A Risk If EM Currencies Depreciate Chart I-12EM Currencies And US Bond Yields: No Stable Relationship   Emerging Asian currencies correlate with their export prices and the global trade cycle. Neither global trade activity nor Asian export prices are recovering (Chart I-13). Therefore, the recent bounce in EM currencies is not sustainable.   Given the current inflationary pressures in the US amid deflationary forces in EM, one of the ways in which this adjustment process will manifest itself is in the form of US dollar appreciation versus EM currencies. Could it be that US inflationary pressures are dampened by deflationary tendencies originating from EM/China, producing a benign (goldilocks) scenario for financial markets? It is possible but not likely in the case of EM financial markets. Exchange rates hold the key to all EM asset classes. If the US dollar continues drifting higher – which is our bet – it will stifle the performance of EM equity, local bonds and credit markets (Chart I-14). Chart I-13Asian Export Prices And Container Freight Herald Weaker Regional Currencies Chart I-14Trade-Weighted Dollar And EM Share Prices Are Still Correlated   Further, Box I-1 on page 10 discusses the 2008 clash between inflationary forces in EM and deflation in the US. Bottom Line: We continue to recommend playing the following EM currencies on the short side versus the dollar: ZAR, CLP, COP, IDR, KRW and PHP. We are also short CNY versus the dollar. For allocations within EM equity, domestic bonds and sovereign credit, please refer to our investment recommendations on pages 16-17. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Box 1 Inflationary + Deflationary Forces = Goldilocks? Will inflationary pressures in the US be offset by disinflation in EM, resulting in a goldilocks outcome globally? A goldilocks period is one in which strong growth is accompanied by moderate inflation. It is possible, but in the global macro world inflation + deflation does not always equal goldilocks. In other words in global macro, (1-1) does not always equal zero. For instance, an inflation dichotomy was present in the first half of 2008. Back then, the US economy was already in recession, with acute deflationary pressures stemming from the deflating housing and credit bubbles. In turn, EM growth was still rampant and inflationary pressures were acute. In fact, in the period between March and mid-July of 2008, US and global bond yields were climbing on the back of rising worries about inflation. In retrospect, such an inflation dichotomy between the US and EM did not result in a goldilocks environment, but occurred on the precipice of the largest deflationary black hole in the post-war period. In the second half of 2008, US deflation overwhelmed EM inflation, generating a major deflationary tsunami worldwide. Russia: Long Domestic Bonds / Short Oil Chart II-1Undershooting CB's 4% Inflation Target Russia’s growth is already very sluggish. Lower oil prices2 entail both weaker growth and ruble weakness. The primary risk in Russia is low and falling inflation rather than rising inflation. Therefore, unlike in previous downturns, the central bank will be able to engage in counter-cyclical monetary policy, namely continue cutting interest rates. This makes a long position in local currency bonds a “no-brainer”.  The only risk to owning Russian domestic bonds is the ruble depreciation due to falling oil prices and a risk-off phase in EM exchange rate markets. To hedge against these risks, we recommend the following trade: long Russian domestic bonds / short oil. The macro backdrop in Russia justifies considerably lower interest rates and we believe the central bank will deliver further rate cuts despite moderate currency depreciation. As a result, local bonds on a total- return basis in US dollar terms will outperform oil. The basis to expect a further meaningful drop in interest rates in Russia is as follows: Inflation Is Low And Falling: Various measures of inflation suggest that disinflation is broad based (Chart II-1). As a result, inflation will continue falling towards the central bank’s inflation target of 4%. Crucially, wage growth is decelerating both in nominal and real terms (Chart II-2). Monetary Policy Is Still Restrictive: Even though the central bank has cut rates by 125bps over the past 6 months, monetary policy remains behind the dis-inflation curve. Both policy and lending rates remain too high, especially relative to the low nominal growth environment (Chart II-3). Real borrowing costs stand at 9% for consumer and 4.5% for corporate loans (Chart II-4). The macro backdrop in Russia justifies considerably lower interest rates and we believe the central bank will deliver further rate cuts despite moderate currency depreciation. Chart II-2Russia: Sluggish Wage Growth Chart II-3Russia: Tight Monetary Policy   Notably, weakening credit impulses for both business and consumer segments suggest that domestic demand will disappoint (Chart II-5). Chart II-4Russia: High Real Lending Rate Across Sectors Chart II-5Weakening Credit Impulses = Lower Demand And Investment   Since October 1, the CBR has taken measures to curb consumer borrowing from banking and non-banks credit institutions. These new guidelines limit the latter’s lending to consumers with high debt loads. In short, much lower nominal and real interest rates will be required to reinvigorate domestic demand. Fiscal Policy Is Tight: The government has overplayed its hand in running very tight fiscal policy. The government primary budget surplus now stands at 3.8% of GDP. Government spending growth both in real and nominal terms remains very weak (Chart II-6). The National Project initiative has not yet been sufficient to expand government expenditures. In fact, a recent report from the Audit Chamber suggests that total spending under this National Project program for 2019 will be below government targets of 3% of GDP per year. Finally, the authorities committed a policy mistake at the beginning of year by hiking the VAT tax which has hurt consumption. Russian local currency bond yields are set to fall, even as oil prices decline over the coming months. A Healthy Balance Of Payment (BoP) Position: Total external debt and debt servicing are extremely low by emerging markets standards. Russia has the lowest external debt amongst its EM counterparts. Likewise, Russia’s international investment portfolio liabilities – foreigners’ ownership of equities and bonds – remain one of the lowest amongst EM (Chart II-7). Chart II-6A Lot Of Room To Boost Government Spending Chart II-7Foreigners' Holding Of Russian Financial Assets Are Low   Investment Recommendations Chart II-8Local Bonds Are Decoupling From Oil Russian local currency bond yields are set to fall, even as oil prices decline over the coming months (Chart II-8). In light of this, we recommend the following pair trade: long local currency bonds / short oil. Dedicated EM fixed-income portfolios should continue to overweight Russian sovereign and corporate credit, as well as local currency government bonds relative to their respective EM benchmarks. Tight fiscal and monetary policies favor creditors. We have been bullish on Russian markets for some time arguing that they will behave as a low-beta play in EM selloff as discussed in our previous report. This view remains intact. Dedicated EM equity portfolios should continue overweighting Russian stocks, a recommendation made in October 2018. Given the ruble will likely depreciate gradually rather than plunge amid falling oil prices, the authorities will continue cutting rates and provide fiscal stimulus. That will benefit Russia versus many other EM countries. Finally, we remain long the RUB versus the Colombian Peso, a trade instituted on May 31, 2018. Andrija Vesic Research Analyst andrijav@bcaresearch.com   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1    We exclude economies of China, Korea and Taiwan because they are different in their economic structure and inflation dynamics compared with majority of EMs. 2   BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy team expects lower oil prices consistent with its thesis of EM slowdown. This is different from BCA’s house view that is bullish on oil. Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Highlights Portfolio Strategy Depressed technicals, compelling valuations, macro tailwinds, improving operating fundamentals and the messages from our relative profit growth models and relative Cyclical Macro Indicators all signal that the time is ripe to initiate a long energy/short utilities pair trade. Pricey valuations, overbought technicals, the sell-off in the bond market and weak profit fundamentals, all warrant an underweight stance in the S&P utilities sector. Recent Changes Initiate a long S&P Energy/short S&P Utilities pair trade today. Table 1 Feature Equities propelled to uncharted territory, celebrating an easy Fed and the US/China détente with a hint of a tariff rollback, overcoming the seasonally difficult months of September and October. Historically, investors chase performance during the end of the year and seasonality will likely favor further flows into equities in the last two months of the year. On the economic front, while manufacturing remains in recession, a resilient labor market is providing a significant offset allaying fears of recession gripping the broad economy. Drilling deeper on the labor front is revealing. The unemployment rate ticked higher to 3.6% last month based on the household survey as the participation rate increased. However, according to the Sahm Rule Recession Indicator (SRRI), courtesy of Fed economist Claudia R. Sahm,1 were the unemployment rate to average 4% for three consecutive months by September 2020, the US economy will enter recession. In other words, based on empirical evidence the SRRI shows that when the three-month average unemployment rate has jumped by 50bps compared with previous twelve month low, the US has entered recession 100% of the time since the end of WWII (Chart 1). Chart 1Watch The Sahm Rule Recession Indicator Meanwhile, the parallels drawn with the mid-to-late 1990s and the current market backdrop have mushroomed, but our view is that the differences could not be wider. Since the history of our reconstructed SPX data going back to the late-1920s, there has never been a five-year period when the S&P 500 rose by at least 20% every year except for the 1995-1999 era. In that five-year period the SPX soared more than threefold, increasing annually by 34%, 20%, 31%, 27% and 20%, respectively. Investors forget that those were manic markets and despite a high and rising fed funds rate that peaked at 6.5% in early 2000 (real rates were over 4%), the forward P/E multiple went to the stratosphere ignoring theory and defying logic (Chart 2). Putting the late-1990s exuberance into perspective is instructive: if 1995 is similar to 2016 (and 1998 is similar to 2019) then the SPX should spike to over 6000 by the end of next year! Moving over to economic green shoots, we turn our attention to the signal the emerging markets are emitting. While both the EM and the Chinese manufacturing PMIs are expanding smartly, leading indicators suggest that the recovery may be running on empty. Chart 2One Of A Kind Chart 3Mixed Signals Chart 3 shows that the Chinese credit impulse is contracting, weighing on EM FX momentum and also signaling that the CAIXIN China manufacturing PMI, that has opened the widest gap with the official China NBS manufacturing PMI since the history of the data, will likely suffer a setback in the coming quarters. In the transportation sector, the Baltic Dry Index is down 33% since the early-September peak and is also losing steam on year-over-year basis, warning that a global trade recovery is skating on thin ice. Moreover, EM sentiment is downbeat. Investor flows into EM equities, according to the most liquid iShares MSCI EM ETF, have been drifting lower since the 2018 peak and have more recently gapped down (bottom panel, Chart 3). Thus, the recent green shoots may prove fleeting. This week we are initiating a new market-neutral pair trade and reiterate our negative view on a niche defensive sector. With regard to US liquidity, that we have been inundated with client requests recently, we highlight our simple liquidity indicator: industrial production (IP) growth versus M2 money supply growth. In other words, we gauge how fast a unit of currency is translated into IP. Chart 4 highlights that IP/M2 is contracting at an accelerating pace, heralding further earnings growth pain for the S&P 500. US dollar based liquidity is also contracting as we showed in last week’s US Equity Strategy Webcast slides. Chart 4Clogged Pipelines Weighing On Profit Growth Other SPX profit indicators we track continue to suggest that the earnings soft patch is not out of the woods yet (we use forward EBITDA estimates to gauge trend growth, which excludes the one time fiscal easing boost to net EPS). Net forward EBITDA revisions are below zero, the ISM manufacturing new orders-to-inventories ratio has fallen 40% from the 2018 peak and is hovering near parity, momentum in the key ISM manufacturing new orders subcomponent is contracting and BCA’s boom/bust indicator continues to deflate. All of this, suggests that a turnaround in profits remains elusive and is a first half of 2020 outcome, at the earliest (Chart 5). Already, Q4/2019 profit growth estimates have now sunk into negative territory according to the latest FactSet data.2 Finally, the Fed released the last Senior Loan Officer Survey of the year in the past week and demand for C&I loans collapsed. This data series has broken below the 2016 trough and warns that C&I credit origination will continue to contract. Chart 5No Pulse Chart 6Capex Contraction Dampens Need For Credit Such a souring backdrop makes intuitive sense as animal spirits have died down courtesy of the Sino-American trade war. CEO’s are still voting with their feet and are canceling/postponing capital outlays. Absent capex, C&I credit demand runs aground (Chart 6). It remains unclear if a US/China “phase one” trade deal including tariff rollbacks can reverse the ongoing global trade contraction, signaling that caution is still warranted on the prospects of the broad equity market for the next 9-12 months. This week we are initiating a new market-neutral pair trade and reiterate our negative view on a niche defensive sector. Long/Short Idea: Buy Energy/Sell Utilities There is an exploitable opportunity in going long the S&P energy sector/short the S&P utilities sector and we recommend initiating this market-neutral trade today. The top panel of Chart 7 shows that energy stocks have come full circle and are trading at levels last seen two decades ago when WTI oil was fetching less than half of today’s $55/bbl price. Encouragingly, there seems to be long-term support for relative share prices at the current overly depressed level. While utilities have been making headlines all year long given their outperformance, when put in proper perspective this niche defensive sector with a mere 3% weight in the SPX looks like a shipwreck (bottom panel, Chart 7). Taken together, this battle between two diminishing sectors presents a tradable opportunity by favoring energy stocks at the expense of utilities. In fact, this ratio trades at more than two standard deviations below the historical uptrend, and thus offers a lucrative risk/reward profile (Chart 8). Chart 7Buy Energy… Chart 8…At The Expense Of Utilities Beyond depressed technicals and compelling overall valuations with an alluring relative dividend yield (investors are paid an unprecedented 100bps in dividend yield carry to put on this trade, Chart 9), macro tailwinds, improving operating fundamentals, and the messages from our relative profit growth models and relative Cyclical Macro Indicators (CMI), all signal that the time is ripe to initiate a long energy/short utilities pair trade. On the macro front, inflation expectations have tentatively troughed and if oil rebounds further, as our Commodity & Energy Strategy service expects, then given their tight positive correlation with oil prices, rising inflation expectations should put a definitive floor under the relative share price ratio (Chart 10). Chart 9Unloved And Oversold Chart 10Return Of Inflation… However, the real interest rate component (i.e. growth) also explains roughly half of the selloff in the 10-year Treasury yield since early September, which also moves in lockstep with relative share price momentum (bottom panel, Chart 10). Were this budding global growth recovery to gain steam into the first half of 2020, then energy profits would outshine utility sector profits. As a reminder, oil is a global growth barometer and rises with increasing global growth while defensive utilities flourish when growth sputters (Chart 11). The US dollar’s recent appreciation has also dealt a blow to this trade and a grinding lower currency which is synonymous with a modest global growth recovery would also reverse this pair trade’s fortunes (top two panels, Chart 12). Chart 11…And Green Shoots Beneficiary Chart 12Operating Metrics Also… Zooming into the relative operating outlook, the bottom panel of Chart 12 shows that oil price inflation is outpacing natural gas selling prices. This relative underlying commodity backdrop is important as energy stocks move with the ebbs and flows of the oil market, whereas the marginal price setter for utility services is natural gas prices. The upshot is that heading into 2020, bombed out relative share prices should play catch up to the firming relative commodity backdrop. Capital spending outlays also favor energy shares over utilities stocks (top two panels, Chart 13). Surprisingly, the utilities sector net debt-to-EBITDA ratio is above 5x, waving a red flag, but energy indebtedness is coming down fast in the aftermath of the early 2016 oil price collapse and the energy sector’s net debt-to-EBITDA ratio is close to 2x (bottom panel, Chart 13). Our relative CMIs and relative profit growth models do an excellent job capturing all these moving parts and are unanimously sending a bullish message that an earnings-led recovery is in store for the relative share price ratio (Chart 14). Chart 13…Favor Energy Over Utilities Chart 14Green Light From US Equity Strategy Models Bottom Line: Initiate a long S&P energy/short S&P utilities pair trade today. Out Of Power Warning Utilities stocks have been all the rave this year, but given their small weighting in the SPX they only explain a very small part of the broad market’s run (in contrast, the heavyweight tech sector explains most of the S&P 500’s rise as we highlighted in recent research).3 We reiterate our underweight stance in this small defensive sector that has run way ahead of soft profit fundamentals. Worrisomely, utilities trade with a 20 forward P/E handle and command a 20% premium to the broad market, but their forecast EPS growth rate at 5% trails the SPX by 350bps (not shown). Chart 15 shows that our composite relative Valuation Indicator has surged to one standard deviation above the historical mean, a level typically associated with recession. Technicals are also extended (bottom panel, Chart 15), warning that this crowded trade is at risk of deflating, especially if the breakout in bond yields gains steam.   Chart 15Overbought And Overvalued   In sum, pricey valuations, overbought technicals, the selloff in the bond market and weak profit fundamentals, all warrant an underweight stance in the S&P utilities sector. The top panel of Chart 16 shows that relative share prices and the 10-year Treasury yield are closely inversely correlated. Now that the risk free asset is having a more competitive yield, investors will likely start to abandon this niche defensive sector. Similarly, the recent selloff in the total return bond-to-stock ratio also warns that buying up expensive utilities at the current juncture is fraught with danger (second panel, Chart 16). The jury is still out on the final outcome of the Sino-American trade war. However, there has been a decisive change of heart in US exporters and the ISM manufacturing survey’s new export orders subcomponent reflects an, at the margin, improvement in the US/China trade relationship. This bodes ill for safe haven utilities stocks (new export orders shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 16). Chart 16Budding Recovery Weighing On Utilities Chart 17Sell The Strength Turning over to the sector’s operating metrics reveals that investors piling into utilities is unwarranted. Natural gas prices are contracting at the steepest pace of the past four years (middle panel, Chart 17) and signal that the path of least resistance is lower for relative share price momentum. Meanwhile, electricity capacity utilization is in a multi decade downtrend, warning that the relative profitability will remain under pressure in the coming quarters (bottom panel, Chart 17). In sum, pricey valuations, overbought technicals, the sell-off in the bond market and weak profit fundamentals, all warrant an underweight stance in the S&P utilities sector. Bottom Line: Shy away from the expensive S&P utilities sector. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG – S5UTIL– PPL, PNW, ATO, PEG, FE, EIX, AEE, SO, SRE, AEP, XEL, DTE, EVRG, WEC, AES, CMS, LNT, ED, NRG, D, AWK, DUK, ETR, EXC, NEE, CNP, NI, ES.   Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1     https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/claudia-r-sahm.htm 2       https://insight.factset.com/sp-500-now-projected-to-report-a-year-over-year-decline-in-earnings-in-q4-2019 3       Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Insight Report, “Deciphering Sector Returns” dated August 30, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.   Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Stay neutral cyclicals over defensives (downgrade alert) Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps (Stop 10%)

Highlights The correlation between oil and petrocurrencies has shifted in recent years. It no longer makes sense going long petrocurrencies versus the US dollar blindly. One of the reasons has been the impressive and prominent output from US shale. We are currently long a basket of petrocurrencies versus the euro, but intend to shift this trade towards a short USD position on more visible signs of a breakdown in the US dollar. Go short CAD/NOK for a trade. Feature Chart I-1Oil And Petrocurrencies Have Diverged Since the middle of the last decade, one of the most perplexing disconnects has been the divergence between the price of oil and the performance of petrocurrencies. From the 2016 bottom, oil prices more than doubled, but the petrocurrency basket has underperformed by a whopping 110% versus the US dollar. This has been a very perplexing result that has surprised many investors on what was traditionally a very sound correlation (Chart I-1).  In general, an increase in oil prices usually implies rising terms of trade, which should increase the fair value of a currency. Throughout our modeling exercises, terms of trade were uncovered as what mattered the most for commodity currencies in general, and petrocurrencies in particular. In theory, this makes sense, given the improvement in balance-of-payment dynamics (that tend to be observed with a lag) and the ability for increased government spending, allowing a resident central bank to tighten monetary policy. In the case of Canada and Norway, petroleum represents over 20% and 50% of total exports. For Saudi Arabia, Iran or Venezuela, this number is much higher. Therefore, it is easy to see why a big fluctuation in the price of oil can have deep repercussions for their external balances. Historically, getting the price of oil right was usually the most important step in any petrocurrency forecast, but it has now become a necessary but not sufficient condition. Oil Demand Should Recover We agree with our commodity strategists that the outlook for oil prices is to the upside. Oil demand tends to follow the ebb and flow of the business cycle, with demand having slowed sharply on the back of a manufacturing recession. Transport constitutes the largest share of global petroleum demand. Ergo the trade slowdown brought a lot of freighters, bulk ships, large crude carriers and heavy trucks to a halt (Chart I-2). Chart I-2Oil Demand Has Been Weak Part of the slowdown in global demand is being reflected through elevated inventories. However, part of the inventory building has also been a function of refinery maintenance (Chart I-3). Chinese oil imports continue to hold up well, and should easier financial conditions put a floor on the manufacturing cycle, overall consumption will follow suit (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Oil Inventories Are Elevated Chart I-4China Oil Imports Holding Up The increase in oil demand will be on the back of two positive supply-side developments. First, OPEC spare capacity is only at 2%. This means that any rebound in oil demand in the order of 1.5%-2% (our base case), will seriously begin to bump up against supply-side constraints – especially in the face of OPEC production discipline. Second, unplanned outages wiped out about 1.5% of supply in 2018, and should this occur again as oil demand recovers, it will nudge the oil market dangerously close to a negative supply shock (Chart I-5). Chart I-5Opec Spare Capacity Is Low Bottom Line: A recovery in the global manufacturing sector will help revive oil demand. This should be positive for oil prices in general. A Necessary But Not Sufficient Condition Rising oil prices are bullish for petrocurrencies, but being long versus the US dollar is no longer an appropriate strategy. This is because the landscape for oil production is rapidly shifting, with the US shale revolution grabbing market share from both OPEC and non-OPEC members. As the now-largest oil producer in the world, the US dollar is itself becoming a petrocurrency. In 2010, only about 6% of global crude output came from the US. Collectively, Canada, Norway and Mexico shared about 10% of the oil market. Meanwhile, OPEC’s market share sat just north of 40%. Fast forward to today and the US produces almost 15% of global crude, having grabbed market share from many other countries. In short, as the now-largest oil producer in the world, the US dollar is itself becoming a petrocurrency (Chart I-6). Chart I-6US Has Grabbed Oil Production Market Share This explains why the positive correlation between petrocurrencies and oil has been gradually eroded as the US economy has become less and less of an oil importer. Put another way, rising oil prices benefit the US industrial base much more than in the past, while the benefits for countries like Canada and Mexico are slowly fading. Meanwhile, falling production in Iran, Venezuela, and even Angola has been a net boon for US production and the dollar.  In statistical terms, petrocurrencies had a near-perfect positive correlation with oil around the time US production was about to take off (Chart I-7). Since then, that correlation has fallen from around 0.9 to around 0.2. At the same time, the DXY dollar index is on its way to becoming positively correlated with oil as the US becomes a net energy exporter. Chart I-7Falling Correlation Between Petrocurrencies And The US Dollar Bottom Line: Both the CAD and NOK remain positively correlated with oil. So do the Russian ruble and the Colombian peso. That said, a loss of global market share has hurt the oil sensitivity of many petrocurrencies. Oil Consumers Versus Producers Our strategy going forward will be twofold. First, buying a petrocurrency basket versus the dollar will require perfect timing in the dollar downleg. We are long an oil currency basket versus the euro, but intend to make the switch once our momentum indicators for the dollar decisively break lower. With bond yields having already made a powerful downward adjustment, the valve for financial conditions to get any looser could easily be via the US dollar (Chart I-8). A loss of global market share has hurt the oil sensitivity of many petrocurrencies. The second strategy is to be long a basket of oil producers versus oil consumers. Chart I-9 shows that a currency basket of oil producers versus consumers has both had a strong positive correlation with the oil price and has outperformed a traditional petrocurrency basket. Rising oil prices are a terms-of-trade boost for oil exporters but lead to demand destruction for oil importers. It is also notable that the correlation has strengthened as that between petrocurrencies and the US dollar has weakened. Chart I-8The Dollar As An Arbiter Of Growth Chart I-9Buy Oil Producers Versus Oil Consumers Sell CAD/NOK The Norges Bank has been quite hawkish in spite of the dovish tilt by most other central banks. As such, the underperformance of the Norwegian krone, especially versus the euro, has been quite perplexing in the face of diverging monetary policies (Chart I-10). Our bias is that speculators have been using the thinly traded krone to play USD upside, but that momentum is now fading. The Norwegian economy remains closely tied to oil, with the bottom in oil prices in 2016 having jumpstarted employment growth, business confidence, and wage growth. With inflation near the central bank’s target and our expectation for oil prices to grind higher, we agree with the central bank’s assessment that the future path of interest rates is likely higher. A weak exchange rate will also anchor inflation expectations (Chart I-11). Chart I-10Diverging Monetary ##br##Policies Chart I-11A Weak Exchange Rate Will Anchor Inflation Expectations Higher The underperformance of the Norwegian krone has mirrored that of global oil and gas stocks. Perhaps sentiment towards the environment and climate change has been pushing investor flows out of these markets, but given the central role oil plays in the global economy, we may have reached the point of capitulation (Chart I-12). Our recommendation is that NOK long positions should initially be played via selling the CAD, as an indirect way to express USD shorts. Our recommendation is that NOK long positions should initially be played via selling the CAD, as an indirect way to express USD shorts (Chart I-13). The CAD/NOK briefly punched through the 7.1 level in October but is now seeing a powerful reversal. Our intermediate-term indicators also suggest the next move is likely lower. The discount between Western Canadian Select crude oil and Brent has also widened, which has historically heralded a lower CAD/NOK exchange rate (Chart I-14) Chart I-12ESG And Global Divestments Chart I-13NOK Will Outperform CAD (I) Chart I-14NOK Will Outperform CAD (II) Bottom Line: Go short CAD/NOK for a trade, but more aggressive investors should begin accumulating long NOK positions versus the US dollar outright. Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the US have been strong:  The labor market remains tight: nonfarm payrolls increased by 128K in October, well above expectations of 89K. Average hourly earnings continue to grow by 3% year-on-year. Unit labor costs grew by 3.6% year-on-year in Q3. The ISM manufacturing PMI increased to 48.3 from 47.8 in October. The non-manufacturing PMI soared to 54.7 from 52.6 in October, well above expectations. The trade balance narrowed by $2.5 billion to $52.5 billion in September. The DXY index appreciated by 0.8% this week. ISM PMI data points to improvements in both manufacturing and services sectors, mainly supported by production, new orders, and the employment components. It will be interesting to monitor if this signals an improvement in the global manufacturing cycle, or is a US-centric issue. Report Links: Signposts For A Reversal In The Dollar Bull Market - November 1, 2019 On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver - October 11, 2019 Preserving Capital During Riot Points - September 6, 2019 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area have been positive: The Markit manufacturing PMI slightly increased to 45.9 from 45.7 in October. The services PMI also improved to 52.2 from 51.8. The Sentix confidence index increased to -4.5 from -16.8 in November.  Retail sales grew by 3.1% year-on-year in September, an improvement from the 2.7% yearly growth rate in the previous month. EUR/USD fell by 0.8% this week. On Monday, Christine Lagarde, the former managing director of the IMF, gave her first speech as the new ECB president where she urged Europe to overcome self-doubt, aiming to boost investor and business confidence in the euro area. However, no comments were given regarding ECB monetary policy. Report Links: On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver - October 11, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 Battle Of The Central Banks - June 21, 2019 Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan have been negative: Vehicle sales shrank by 26.4% year-on-year in October. The monetary base grew by 3.1% year-on-year in October. The services PMI plunged to 49.7 from 52.8 in October. The Japanese yen depreciated by 1% against the US dollar this week. We remain short USD/JPY given global economic uncertainties and domestic deflationary tailwinds. Should the global economy pick up early next year, the yen could still remain bid against the USD, allowing investors time to rotate their short USD/JPY bets. Report Links: Signposts For A Reversal In The Dollar Bull Market - November 1, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 Has The Currency Landscape Shifted? - August 16, 2019 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the UK have been positive: The Markit manufacturing PMI increased to 49.6 from 48.3 in October. Services PMI increased to 50 from 49.5 in October. Retail sales increased by 0.1% year-on-year in October, compared to a contraction of 1.7% in the previous month. Halifax house prices grew by 0.9% year-on-year in October. GBP/USD depreciated by 1% this week. On Thursday, the BoE decided to leave its interest rate unchanged at the current level of 0.75%. However, unlike a unanimous decision as in previous policy meetings this year, two BoE officials unexpectedly voted to lower interest rates amid signs of deeper economic slowdown and entrenched Brexit chaos. Report Links: A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 United Kingdon: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? - Sept. 20, 2019 Battle Of The Central Banks - June 21, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia have been mostly positive: Retail sales grew modestly by 0.2% month-on-month in September. The Commonwealth composite PMI fell slightly to 50 from 50.7 in October. The services PMI also fell to 50.1 from 50.8. The trade balance increased by A$1.3 billion to A$7.2 billion in September. Both exports and imports grew by 3% month-on-month in September. The Australian dollar has been volatile against the US dollar, but returned flat this week. The RBA has left its interest rate unchanged this Monday, as widely expected. We remain positive on the Australian dollar and went long AUD/CAD last week, which is currently 0.3% in the money. Report Links: A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns - April 19, 2019 Not Out Of The Woods Yet - April 5, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand have been mostly negative: The participation rate increased marginally to 70.4% from a downward-revised 70.3% in Q3. The labor cost index increased by 2.3% year-on-year in Q3. The unemployment rate however, climbed to 4.2% from 3.9%, higher than expectations of a rise to 4.1%. The kiwi fell by 1.4% against the US dollar, making it the worst performing G-10 currency this week. Despite the rise of the unemployment rate in Q3, the under-utilization rate, a broad measure of labor market spare capacity has fallen to the lowest level in over 11 years, as suggested by the manager of Statistics New Zealand, Paul Pascoe. That said, we remain underweight the kiwi given it will likely lag other commodity currencies in a global growth upswing. We will change this view if New Zealand terms of trade start to inflect meaningfully higher. Stay with our long AUD/NZD and SEK/NZD positions. Report Links: USD/CNY And Market Turbulence - August 9, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Not Out Of The Woods Yet - April 5, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada have been negative: The Markit manufacturing PMI was little changed at 51.2 in October. The trade deficit narrowed marginally from C$1.24 billion to C$0.98 billion in September. Exports and imports both fell in September. Ivey PMI fell to 48.2 from 48.7 in October. USD/CAD increased by 0.3% this week. The recent uptick in oil prices support the Canadian dollar, but the loonie will likely underperform other petrocurrencies. We remain bullish on the oil prices, however, spreads will likely continue to move against the Western Canadian Select blend. Report Links: Signposts For A Reversal In The Dollar Bull Market - November 1, 2019 Preserving Capital During Riot Points - September 6, 2019 Portfolio Tweaks Into Thin Summer Trading - July 5, 2019 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland have been mostly negative: Headline CPI fell below 0 at -0.3% year-on-year for the first time over the past 3 years in October. On a month-on-month basis, it contracted by 0.2%. Real retail sales grew by 0.9% year-on-year in September. PMI improved to 49.4 from 44.6 in October. FX reserves were little changed at CHF 779 billion in October. The Swiss franc fell by 0.9% against the US dollar this week. Faced with deflationary pressures, the SNB will likely to use its currency as a weapon to stimulate the economy and exit deflation. This will favor long EUR/CHF positions. Report Links: Notes On The SNB - October 4, 2019 What To Do About The Swiss Franc? - May 17, 2019 Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns - April 19, 2019 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway have been mixed: Industrial production contracted by 8.1% year-on-year in September, mainly caused by the slowdown in extraction and related services. On the positive side, manufacturing output grew by 2.9% year-on-year. The manufacturing output of ships, boats, and oil platforms in particular, grew by 26.2% year-on-year in September. The Norwegian krone appreciated by 0.3% against the US dollar this week, despite the broad dollar strength. The WTI crude oil price increased by nearly 6% this week, which is a tailwind for petrocurrencies. We maintain a pro-cyclical stance and expect oil prices to increase further. The global growth recovery and a weaker US dollar should all boost the oil demand, and lift the Norwegian krone. Please refer to our front section this week for more detailed analysis on the NOK. Report Links: A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 Portfolio Tweaks Into Thin Summer Trading - July 5, 2019 On Gold, Oil And Cryptocurrencies - June 28, 2019 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden have been negative: The manufacturing PMI fell marginally to 46 from 46.3 in October. Industrial production growth slowed to 0.9% from 2.1% year-on-year in September. Manufacturing new orders contracted by 1.5% year-on-year in September. The Swedish krona has been flat against the USD this week. The PMI components of new orders, industrial production, and employment all continued to fall. On the positive side, the export component increased marginally. We expect the cheap krona to help improve the trade dynamics in Sweden and put a floor under the krona. Report Links: Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades