Consumer Discretionary

Special Report

Highlights In this report, we build and present models designed to predict the odds of Chinese investable equity sector outperformance, based on a set of macroeconomic and equity market factors. BCA Research's China Investment Strategy service will aim to use our newly developed sector outperformance probability models to help investors to better understand the drivers of performance at any given moment, and to make more active equity sector recommendations in the future. Among the top six factors explaining historical periods of sector performance, three were macroeconomic in orientation, and two were directly related to the broad Chinese equity market. We see this as strongly supportive of the potential returns to be earned from active top-down sector rotation within China’s investable market. Cyclical stocks are very depressed relative to defensives, and we would favor them versus defensives over the coming year if China strikes a trade deal with the US and the Chinese economy incrementally improves, as we expect. Feature In our June 19 Special Report, we reviewed the predictability and cyclicality of equity sector earnings in China's investable & domestic markets, and examined the relevance of earnings in predicting relative sector performance over the past decade. We noted that a few sectors scored highly in terms of earnings predictability and the relevance of those earnings in predicting relative performance. But we also highlighted that most of China's equity sectors, in both the investable and domestic markets, either demonstrated earnings trends that were difficult to predict based on the trend in overall market earnings or exhibited relative performance that was difficult to explain based on the relative earnings profile. Our models are designed to predict equity sector relative performance using a series of macroeconomic and equity market factors. In short, our June report underscored that China’s equity sectors warranted a closer examination, with a particular emphasis on understanding the specific macroeconomic or equity market factors that have historically predicted relative sector performance. Today’s report examines this question in depth, focused on China’s investable equity market. We hope to extend our research to the A-share market in the near future. Our approach focuses on constructing and presenting models that quantify a checklist-based approach to determining the odds of equity sector performance. The aim is to use these models to better understand the drivers of performance at any given moment, and to make more active equity sector recommendations in the future. These recommendations will not mechanically follow the models; rather, we plan to use them as a stand in for what typically would be expected given the macro and financial market environment, and as a basis to investigate “abnormal” relative performance. We conclude by highlighting the substantial underperformance of cyclical vs defensives sectors over the past two years, and argue that it is highly unlikely that cyclicals will underperform defensives over the coming 12 months if China strikes a trade deal with the US and the economy incrementally improves, as we expect. We also explain the importance of monitoring the relative performance of health care & utilities stocks over the coming few months, and present a unique sector-based barometer for gauging China’s reflationary stance. The latter two relative performance trends are likely to assist investors in positioning for the big call: the outperformance of Chinese investable stocks vs the global benchmark. Detailing Our Approach In our effort to better understand historical periods of sector outperformance, we have chosen to model the probability of outperformance of each level 1 GICS sector (plus banks) based on a set of macro and equity market variables. Specifically, we use an analytical tool called a logistic regression, which forecasts the probability of a discrete event rather than forecasting the value of a dependent variable. We utilized this approach when building our earnings recession model for China (first presented in our January 16 Special Report1), and investors will often see it (in its conceptually different but practically similar probit form) employed when analyzing the likelihood of an economic recession. The New York Fed’s US recession model is a notable example of the latter,2 which has received much attention by market participants over the past year following the inversion of the US yield curve. The “events” that we modeled are historical periods of individual Chinese investable sector outperformance from 2010 to 2018, relative to the MSCI China index (the “broad market”). Charts I-1A and I-1B illustrate these periods with shading in each panel. We then attempt to explain these episodes of outperformance with the following macro predictors: Chart I-1AThis Report Builds Models Aimed At... Chart I-1B...Predicting The Shaded Regions Of These Charts Periods of accelerating economic activity, represented by our BCA's China Activity Index Periods of rising leading indicators of economic activity, represented by our BCA Li Keqiang Leading Indicator Episodes of tight monetary policy, defined as periods where China’s 3-month interbank repo rate is rising Periods of accelerating inflation, measured both by headline and core inflation We also include several equity market variables: uptrends in relative sector earnings, periods of rising broad market stock prices, uptrends in broad market earnings, and episodes of extreme technical conditions and relative over/undervaluation for the sector in question. In the case of energy stocks, we also include oil prices as a predictor. Charts I-2A and I-2B illustrate these periods as well as the macro & market variables that we have included as predictors. Chart I-2AWe Use These Macroeconomic And Equity Market Factors... Chart I-2B...To Predict Periods Of Equity Sector Outperformance Our approach also accounts for the existence of any leading or lagging relationships between the macro and market variables we have used as predictors and sector relative performance. In most cases the predictors lead relative sector performance, but in some cases it is the opposite. In the case of the latter, we have limited the lead of any variable in our models to 3 months in order to reduce the need to forecast. The link between tight monetary policy and industrial sector performance is one exception to this rule that we detail below. Finally, our approach also limits the extent to which we consider a leading relationship between our predictors and relative sector performance, in order to avoid picking up overlapping economic cycles. This issue, and the evidence supporting the existence of a 3½-year credit cycle in China, are detailed in Box 1. Box 1 Accounting For China’s 3½-Year Credit Cycle Over the course of the analysis detailed in this report, judgments concerning how much of a lead or lag to allow when accounting for any leading or lagging relationships between sector relative performance and either macroeconomic & stock market predictors were necessary. In cases where sector relative performance led any of our predictors, we capped the lead at 3-months to reduce the need to forecast the predictors when using the models. As explained below, the 8-month lead between industrial sector relative performance and tight monetary policy was the only exception to this rule. We also did not include any leading relationship between relative sector stock performance and the trend in relative sector EPS, and allowed at most a co-incident relationship. Limits were also required in the cases where our predictors led relative sector performance. While more lead time is usually better from the perspective of investment strategy, Chart I-B1 presents strong evidence of a 3½ -year credit cycle in China. Chart I-B2 illustrates the problem with including significant lags between predictors and relative sector performance when economic cycles are short. The chart shows the lead/lag correlation profile of the stylized cycle shown in Chart I-B1, and highlights that lags greater than 12-14 months risk picking up the impact of the previous economic cycle. Given this, we have limited the extent to which our predictors can lead relative sector performance in our models, and in practice lead times are generally less than one year. Chart I-B1Over The Past Decade, China Has Experienced A 3½-Year Credit Cycle Chart I-B2With Short Cycles, Excessive Lags Risk Picking Up The Previous Cycle The Key Drivers Of Chinese Investable Equity Sectors Pages 12-23 present the results of each sector’s outperformance probability model, along with a list of factors that were found to be useful predictors and a summary of the results. The importance of the factors included in the models is shown in each of the tables at the top right of pages 12-23 by a score of 1-3 stars, (loosely representing key levels of statistical significance) as well as each factor’s optimal lead or lag. A minus sign shows that the predictor leads sector relative performance, whereas a plus sign shows that it lags. Rising core inflation in China is the most important signal of sector performance that emerged from our analysis. Chart I-3China’s Sectors Linked Strongly To Core Inflation, Monetary Policy, And Growth Chart I-3 summarizes the significance of the factors in predicting sector performance in general, by summing up each predictor’s number of stars across all of the models. The chart shows that rising core inflation in China is the most important signal of sector performance that emerged from our analysis, followed by tight monetary policy, rising economic activity, rising broad market stock prices, oversold technical conditions, and rising broad market earnings. Chart I-3 highlights two important points: If regarded through the lens of causality alone, the strong relationship between rising core inflation and sector performance is somewhat surprising: normally, pricing power is subordinate to revenue/sales/demand as the primary factor driving fundamental performance. However, given that inflation is a lagging economic variable, we suspect that the significance of inflation in our models actually reflects the middle phase of the economic cycle in which sectors tend to best exhibit meaningful out/underperformance. It is also a stronger predictor of periods of tight monetary policy in China than headline inflation.3 This is an encouraging result for investors, as it suggests good odds that future episodes of meaningful sector outperformance can be identified given a particular macro view. Among the top six factors explaining historical periods of sector performance, three were macroeconomic in orientation, and two were directly related to the broad Chinese equity market. While Chinese equity sector performance can sometimes be idiosyncratic, we see this as strongly supportive of the idea that investors can earn positive excess returns by actively shifting between China’s equity sectors using a top-down approach. Turning to the specific results of our sector models, we present the following big-picture findings of our research: Defining China’s Cyclical & Defensive Sectors From a top-down perspective, the most important element of sector rotation typically involves shifting from defensive to cyclical stocks when economic activity is set to improve (and vice versa). In China, it is clear from the results of our models that the investable energy, materials, industrials, consumer discretionary, and information technology sectors are cyclical sectors. The relative performance of these sectors exhibits a positive relationship to pro-cyclical macro variables, or broad market trends. Following last year’s GICS changes, we also include the media & entertainment industry group (within the new communication services sector) in this list. Correspondingly, investable consumer staples, health care, financials, telecom services, utilities, and real estate are defensive sectors in China. Chart I-4Cyclical Stocks Are Bombed Out Versus Defensives Chart I-4 illustrates how these sectors have performed over the past decade by grouping them into equally-weighted cyclical and defensive stock price indexes, as well as the relative performance of cyclicals versus defensives. The chart makes it clear that cyclical stock performance is essentially as weak as it has ever been relative to defensives over the past decade, with the exception of a brief period in 2013. Panel 2 highlights that all of the underperformance of cyclicals over the past two years has been due to de-rating, rather than due to underperforming earnings. The Atypical Case Of Financials & Real Estate The fact that financial and real estate stocks are defensive in China is somewhat curious. In the case of financials, the abnormality is straightforward: most global equity portfolio managers would consider financials to be cyclical, and our work suggests that this is not true for the investable market. Our explanation for this apparent discrepancy is also straightforward: while small and medium banks in China have obviously grown in prominence over the past decade, large state-owned or state-affiliated commercial banks are still dominant in the provision of credit to China's old economy. In most cases China’s large banks lend to state-owned enterprises with implicit government guarantees, meaning that the earnings risk for Chinese banks has typically been lower than for the investable market in the aggregate. It remains to be seen whether this will remain true in a world where Chinese policymakers are keen to slow the pace at which China’s macro leverage ratio rises and to render the existing stock of debt more sustainable for the non-financial sector. Indeed, over a multi-year time horizon, the risk are not trivial that banks will be forced to recapitalize as a result of forced changes to loan terms (eg: significant increases in the amortization period of existing loans) or the recognition of sizeable loan losses, which would clearly increase the cyclicality of the Chinese investable financial sector. Chart I-5A Seeming Contradiction: Real Estate Is High-Beta, But Defensive On the real estate front, the anomaly is not that real estate stocks respond defensively to macroeconomic and stock market variables, it is that real estate stock prices are considerably more volatile than this defensive characterization would suggest. Globally (and especially in the US), real estate stocks are often viewed as bond proxies and thus are typically low-beta, but Chart I-5 shows that this is not the case in China. In our view, this issue is reconciled by the fact that Chinese investable real estate stocks are also highly positively linked to Chinese house price appreciation, with relative performance typically leading a pickup in house prices by up to 1 year. This strongly leading relationship has meant that real estate stocks have often outperformed the broad market as economic activity is slowing, in anticipation that policy easing will lead to an eventual recovery in house prices. Chart I-6Still Following The Defensive Playbook This Year In effect, investable real estate stocks are a high-beta sector that have acted counter-cyclically due to the historical interplay between economic activity, monetary policy, and the housing market. Real estate performance this year has not deviated from this playbook (Chart I-6), and so for now we are content to include real estate stocks in our defensive index. But similar to the case of financials, we can conceive of scenarios in which ongoing Chinese financial sector reform may change this relationship in the future. The Unique Monetary Policy Sensitivity Of Industrials And Consumer Staples Pages 14 and 16 highlight that industrials and consumer staples stocks have typically been sensitive to periods of tight monetary policy. In the case of industrials the relationship is negative, whereas consumer staples relative performance has been positively linked to these periods. In both cases, relative performance has led periods of tight monetary policy, significantly so in the case of industrials (by an average of 8 months). While the relative performance of banks, tech, and real estate stocks have also been linked to periods of tight monetary policy, industrials and consumer staples are the only sectors that have tended to lead these periods. Chart I-7Diverging Corporate Health Explains Industrials/Staples Monetary Policy Sensitivity This is a revelatory finding, and in our view it is explained by divergences in corporate health and leverage for the two sectors. We reviewed Chinese corporate health in our August 28 Special Report,4 and noted that the food & beverage sub-industry was a clear (positive) outlier based on our corporate health monitors. In particular, Chart I-7 highlights that food & beverage corporate health is markedly better than that for machinery companies or for industrial firms in general, supporting the notion that high (low) leverage is impacting the relative performance of industrials (consumer staples). The Leading Nature Of Health Care & Utilities Health care and utilities exhibit similar key drivers of relative performance: in both cases, periods of rising economic activity, rising core inflation, and rising broad market stock prices are all negatively associated with performance. Health care and utilities relative performance also happens to lead all three of those predictors, by 1-3 months on average depending on the variable in question. Our modeling work highlights that these are the only sectors whose relative performance has led multiple factors, suggesting that health care & utilities stocks are particularly interesting market bellwethers to monitor. Core Inflation Matters More Than Headline, Except For Energy & Real Estate As highlighted in Chart I-3, rising core inflation has been a much more important signal about relative sector performance than headline inflation. Chart I-8In China, Food Prices (Not Energy) Account For Headline/Core Differences The two exceptions to this rule relate to the energy and real estate sectors, with the former positively linked to headline inflation and the latter negatively linked. In both cases, we suspect that the relationship is a behavioral rather than a fundamental one. For energy, while rising headline inflation in developed countries is usually associated with rising energy prices, this is not true in the case of China. Chart I-8 highlights that differences between headline and core inflation over the past decade have almost always been driven by rising food prices. This implies that some investors (incorrectly) view energy stocks as a hedge against increases in consumer prices, even if those increases are not driven by rising fuel costs. In the case of real estate, investor expectations of eroding real disposable income and its impact on the housing market are likely the best explanation for the negative link between real estate relative performance and rising headline inflation. Whereas rising core inflation likely reflects a durable improvement in economic momentum (and thus would be positively correlated with income growth), episodes of rising Chinese headline inflation often reflect supply shocks that investors may perceive to be detrimental to household spending power (and thus expected housing demand). Investment Conclusions Our work aimed at explaining historical periods of Chinese investable sector outperformance has three investment implications in the current environment. Cyclicals will probably outperform defensives over the coming year if China strikes a trade deal with the US and the Chinese economy incrementally improves, as we expect. First, within China’s investable market, Chart I-4 illustrated that cyclical stocks are very depressed relative to defensives. Given our view that Chinese investable stocks are likely to outperform their global peers over a 6-12 month time horizon, we would also favor cyclicals to defensives over that period. For investors who are not yet overweight cyclical stocks in China, we would advise waiting for concrete signs that growth has bottomed (which should emerge sometime in Q1) before putting on a long position as we remain tactically neutral towards Chinese versus global stocks. But the key point is that it is highly unlikely that cyclicals will underperform defensives over the coming year if China strikes a trade deal with the US and the Chinese economy incrementally improves, as we expect. Second, the fact that investable health care and utilities stocks have particularly leading properties suggests that they should be monitored closely over the coming few months. A technical breakdown in the relative performance of these sectors would be an important sign that market participants are anticipating a bottoming in China’s economy, which may give investors a green light to position for a bullish cyclical stance. For now, both of these sectors continue to outperform (Chart I-9), supporting our decision to remain tactically neutral towards Chinese stocks. Third, the heightened negative sensitivity of industrials and positive sensitivity of consumer staples to monetary policy suggests that the relative performance trend between the two sectors may serve as a reflationary barometer for China’s economy. Chart I-10 shows that industrials outperformed staples last year once the PBOC shifted into easing mode, and anticipated the recovery in the pace of credit growth. However, industrials soon began to underperform staples, which also seems to have anticipated the fact that the recovery in credit was set to be less powerful than what has occurred during previous cycles. The fact that the relative performance trend is off its recent low is notable, and may suggest that China’s existing reflationary stance will be sufficient to stabilize economic activity if a trade deal with the US is indeed finalized in the near future. Chart I-9Key Defensive Sectors Are Still Outperforming, Supporting Our Neutral Tactical Stance Chart I-10Industrials Vs. Staples Anticipated That Easing Would Only Be Measured As a final point, BCA Research's China Investment Strategy service will aim to use our newly developed sector outperformance probability models to make more active equity sector recommendations in the future. These recommendations will not mechanically follow the models; rather, we plan to use the models as a stand in for what typically would be expected given the macro and financial market environment, and as a basis to investigate “abnormal” relative performance. We hope you will find these models to be a helpful quantification of the risk versus return prospects of allocating among China’s investable sectors. As always, we welcome any feedback that you may have about our approach.   Energy Chart II-1 Table II-1   Unsurprisingly, our energy sector model highlights that periods of energy outperformance are strongly linked to periods of rising crude oil prices. However, what is surprising is that periods of accelerating headline inflation in China are even more closely linked to periods of energy sector outperformance than episodes of rising oil prices, and that these periods of accelerating inflation are not generally caused by rising energy prices. The lack of a clear economic rationale for this relationship implies that some investors (incorrectly) view energy stocks as a hedge against increases in consumer prices, even if those increases are largely driven by rising food prices. The model also highlights that periods of strong undervaluation have historically been significant in predicting future energy sector outperformance, with a lag of roughly 8 months. The probability of energy sector outperformance has fallen sharply according to our model, but for now we continue to recommend a long absolute energy sector position on a 6-12 month time horizon. BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy service expects oil prices to trade at $70/barrel on average next year,5 Chinese headline inflation continues to rise, and we noted in our October 2 Weekly Report that energy stocks are heavily discounted.6 Barring a durable decline in oil prices below $55/barrel, investors should continue to favor China’s energy sector. Materials Chart II-2 Table II-2 Our model highlights that the materials sector is one of the clearest plays on accelerating industrial activity within the investable universe. Among the macro variables that we tested, periods of investable materials outperformance are strongly positively linked with periods when our BCA Activity Index and our leading indicator for the index have been rising. Periods of materials sector outperformance have also been positively correlated with prior periods of oversold technical conditions and rising broad market stock prices, underscoring that materials are a strongly pro-cyclical sector. We currently maintain no active relative sector trades, but our model suggests that investors should be underweight the investable materials sector relative to the broad investable index. Industrials Chart II-3 Table II-3 Periods of industrial sector outperformance have historically been positively correlated with relative industrial sector earnings, broad market stock prices, and prior oversold technical conditions. They have been negatively correlated with periods of tight monetary policy, rising core inflation, and prior overbought technical conditions. Since 2010, periods of industrial sector performance have led periods of tight monetary policy by 8 months, the longest lead of relative equity performance to any macro variable that we tested in our model (and the longest lead that we allowed). Industrial sector performance has also been strongly negatively linked with periods of rising core inflation. These findings, and the fact that our Activity Index and its leading indicator have not been highly successful at predicting periods of industrial sector outperformance, strongly suggest that industrials, while pro-cyclical, are primarily driven by expectations of easy monetary policy. We noted in an August 2018 Special Report that state-owned enterprises have become substantially leveraged over the past decade,7 and in a more recent report we highlighted that industries such as machinery have experienced a significant deterioration in corporate health over the past decade.8 This helps explain why industrial sector performance is so negatively impacted by tight policy. Our model suggests that the best time to be overweight industrial stocks is the early phase of an economic rebound, when Chinese stock prices are rising but market participants are not yet expecting tighter policy. These conditions may present themselves sometime in Q1, but probably not over the coming 0-3 months. Consumer Discretionary Ex-Internet & Direct Marketing Retail Chart II-4 Table II-4 Besides materials, China’s investable consumer discretionary sector has historically been the most positively associated with coincident and leading measures of industrial activity. Rising core inflation is also highly positively related to consumer discretionary outperformance, which may reflect improved pricing power for the sector. The strong link with industrial activity is in contrast to depictions of China’s consumer sector as being less correlated to money & credit trends than the overall economy, and is supportive of our view that industrial activity forms one of the three pillars of China’s business cycle.9 We ended the estimation period of our model as of December 2018, in order to avoid including the distortive effects of last year’s changes to the global industry classification standard (which resulted in Alibaba’s inclusion and overwhelming representation in the investable consumer discretionary sector). As such, the results of our model apply today to consumer discretionary stocks ex-internet & direct marketing retail. For now, the absence of an uptrend in our Activity Index and in core inflation is signaling underperformance of discretionary stocks outside of internet & direct marketing retail. Outperformance this year largely reflects a significant advance in consumer durable and apparel: by contrast, automobiles & components have underperformed the broad market by roughly 14% year-to-date. Consumer Staples Chart II-5 Table II-5 Historically, periods of consumer staples outperformance have been predicted by a falling Activity Index, periods of tight monetary policy, and over/undervalued conditions. The impact of monetary policy is particularly heavy in the model, suggesting that consumer staples are somewhat the mirror image of industrials in terms of the impact of leverage on relative equity performance. This too is supported by our August 28 Special Report,10 which noted that corporate health for the food & beverage sector was the strongest among the sectors we examined. However, the model failed to capture what has been very significant staples outperformance this year, highlighting the occasional limits of a rule-of-thumb approach to sector allocation. Investable consumer staples are reliably low-beta compared with the broad market, and we are not surprised that investors have strongly favored the sector this year amid enormous economic and policy uncertainty. An eventual improvement in economic activity, coupled with fairly rich valuation, should work against consumer staples stocks sometime in the first quarter of 2020. Investors who are positioned in favor of China-related assets should also be watching closely for any signs of a technical breakdown in the relative performance trend of investable staples. Health Care Chart II-6 Table II-6 Among the macro variables tested in our model, periods of health care outperformance are negatively related to coincident and leading measures of industrial activity and strongly negatively related to rising core inflation.  Health care outperformance is also strongly negatively related to periods of rising broad market stock prices, and positively related to prior oversold technical conditions. These results clearly signify that investable health care is a defensive sector, to be owned when the economy is slowing and when investable stocks in general are trending lower. Our model suggests that health care stocks are likely to continue to outperform, as they have been since the beginning of the year. A substantive US/China trade deal that meaningfully reduces economic uncertainty remains the key risk to health care outperformance over a 6- to 12-month time horizon. Financials Chart II-7 Table II-7 Our model highlights that periods of financial sector outperformance over the past decade have been negatively associated with periods of rising core inflation (a strong relationship), and with periods of rising index earnings. Oversold technical conditions have also helped explain future episodes of financial sector outperformance. The link between core inflation and the outperformance of financials appears to represent a behavioral rather than a fundamental relationship. When modeling periods of rising financial sector relative earnings, the trend in broad market EPS is more predictive than that of core inflation, highlighting that the latter’s explanatory power is due to investor behavior. The results of our model, and the fact that core inflation leads Chinese index earnings, suggests that financials are fundamentally counter-cyclical and that investors see rising Chinese core inflation as confirmation that an economic expansion is underway (and that broad market earnings are likely to rise). Our model is currently predicting financial sector outperformance, but investable financials have modestly underperformed since the beginning of the year. This appears to have been caused by the underperformance of financial sector earnings this year as overall index earnings growth has decelerated, contrary to what history would suggest. We suspect that the ongoing shadow banking crackdown is related to financial sector earnings underperformance, and we would advise against an overweight stance towards investable financials until signs of improving relative earnings emerge. Banks Chart II-8 Table II-8 Our model shows that periods of banking sector outperformance are more linked to macro variables than has been the case for the overall financial sector. Specifically, bank performance is negatively correlated with leading indicators of economic activity and rising core inflation, and especially negatively correlated with periods of tight monetary policy. Banks have also typically outperformed following periods of oversold technical conditions. Similar to financials, bank earnings are typically counter-cyclical, but relative bank earnings have not been good predictors of relative bank performance over the past decade. Still, the negative association of relative stock prices with leading economic indicators, rising core inflation and rising interest rates underscores that investors should normally be underweight banks if they expect overall Chinese stock prices to rise. Also similar to the overall financial sector, our model is currently predicting outperformance for bank stocks, but investable banks have underperformed year-to-date. The shadow banking crackdown is also likely impacting investable bank earnings, leading to a similar recommendation to avoid bank stocks until relative earnings look to be trending higher. “Tech+”   Chart II-9 Table II-9 Our technology model has worked well at predicting periods of tech sector outperformance over the past several years, particularly from 2015 – 2017. The model suggests that, in addition to being negatively related to prior overbought conditions, periods of technology sector outperformance are associated with improving growth conditions, easy monetary policy, and rising prices. In other words, tech stocks are a growth & liquidity play. Owing to last year’s changes to the GICS, the results of our model apply today to Chinese investable internet & direct marketing retail, the media & entertainment industry group (within the new communication services sector), and the now considerably smaller information technology sector (the sum of which could be considered the “tech+” sector). The model has been predicting tech sector outperformance since May (in response to easier monetary policy), which has occurred for the official information technology sector. However, the BAT (Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent) stocks are only up fractionally in relative terms from their late-May low. Our expectation that China’s economy is likely to bottom in Q1 means that we may recommend upgrading “tech+” stocks relative to the investable benchmark in the coming months. Telecom Services Chart II-10 Table II-10 Our model for telecommunication services (now a level 2 industry group within the communication services sector) illustrates that telecom stocks have historically been counter-cyclical. Periods of telecom outperformance have been negatively associated with periods of rising core inflation, rising broad market stock prices, and rising broad market EPS. It is notable that telecom services stocks are driven more by cycles in overall stock prices than by cycles in economic activity. This suggests that investors tend to focus on the fact that telecom stocks are reliably low-beta compared with the overall investable market, causing out(under)performance of telecoms when the broad market is falling(rising). Similar to financials & banks, telecom stocks have not outperformed this year, in contrast to what our model would suggest. Earnings also appear to be the culprit, with the level of 12-month trailing earnings having fallen nearly 10% since the summer. China Mobile accounts for a sizeable portion of the telecom services index, and the company’s recent earnings weakness seems to be due to depreciation charges stemming from forced investment on 5G spending (mandated by the Chinese government). Our sense is that this will have only a temporary effect on telecom services EPS, meaning that investors should continue to expect the sector to behave in a counter-cyclical fashion over the coming year. Utilities Chart II-11 Table II-11 The early performance of our utilities model was mixed, as it generated several false sell signals during the 2011 – 2013 period despite recommending, on average, an overweight stance. However, over the past five years, the model has performed extremely well in terms of explaining periods of relative utilities performance. The model highlights that utilities are straightforwardly counter-cyclical. The relative performance of utilities stocks is positively related to its relative earnings trend, and negatively related to economic activity, rising core inflation, and broad market stock prices.  Consistent with a decline in the overall MSCI China index, the model has correctly predicted utilities outperformance this year. We expect utilities to underperform over a 6-12 month time horizon, but would advise against an aggressive underweight position until hard evidence of a bottom in Chinese economic activity emerges. Real Estate Chart II-12 Table II-12 Our model for the relative performance of investable real estate has been among the most successful of those detailed in this report, which is somewhat surprising given the macro factors that the model shows drive real estate performance. While periods of relative real estate performance are modestly (negatively) associated with periods of tight monetary policy, rising headline inflation is the most important macro predictor of real estate underperformance. Among market factors driving performance, real estate stocks reliably underperform when broad market EPS are trending higher, and they historically outperform for a time after becoming relatively undervalued. Real estate relative performance is also strongly linked to periods of rising house prices, but the former tends to significantly lead the latter. Given that core inflation has better predicted episodes of tight monetary policy than headline inflation, investor expectations of eroding real disposable income is likely the best explanation for the negative link between real estate relative performance and rising headline inflation. Whereas rising core inflation likely reflects a durable improvement in economic momentum (and thus would be positively correlated with income growth), episodes of rising Chinese headline inflation often reflect supply shocks that investors may perceive to be detrimental to household spending power (and thus expected housing demand). Beyond the negative link between higher inflation and interest rates on investable real estate performance, the strong negative association with broad market earnings underscores that investors treat real estate as a defensive sector. We thus expect real estate stocks to continue to outperform in the near term, but underperform over a 6-12 month time horizon.   Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President jonathanl@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1. Please see China Investment Strategy, "Six Questions About Chinese Stocks," dated January 16, 2019. 2. Please see Federal Reserve Bank of New York, The Yield Curve as a Leading Indicator at https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/capital_markets/ycfaq.html 3. This is despite frequent concerns among investors that the PBOC is inclined to tighten in response to detrimental supply shocks. 4. Please see China Investment Strategy, "Messages From BCA’s China Industry Watch," dated August 28, 2019. 5. Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy, "Policy Uncertainty Lifts USD, Stifles Global Oil Demand Growth," dated October 17, 2019. 6. Please see China Investment Strategy, "China Macro & Market Review," dated October 2, 2019. 7. Please see China Investment Strategy, "Chinese Policymakers: Facing A Trade-Off Between Growth And Leveraging," dated August 29, 2018. 8. Please see China Investment Strategy, "Messages From BCA’s China Industry Watch," dated August 28, 2019. 9. Please see China Investment Strategy, "The Three Pillars Of China’s Economy," dated May 16, 2018. 10. Please see China Investment Strategy, "Messages From BCA’s China Industry Watch," dated August 28, 2019. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Underweight The downward oscillation in the S&P homebuilders index is slowly taking shape as the index lost more than 4% versus the SPX since inception a mere eight trading days ago. While still early we are surprised by the ferocity of the fall which likely signals that homebuilders have been a crowded trade. Now that interest rates are rising we reckon there is staying power in the recent down move as this niche index unwinds overbought conditions. At the margin, a hawkish Fed cut later today could put additional pressure on this interest rate-sensitive index. Finally, earnings prospects face stiff headwinds as not only lumber costs are galloping higher, but also new home prices are deflating as we highlighted in our recent Weekly Report. Bottom Line: We reiterate our recent downgrade to underweight in the S&P homebuilding index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG – S5HOME – DHI, LEN, PHM, NVR.

Underweight This Wednesday’s Hilton Worldwide Holdings earnings call was littered with cautious commentary during the Q&A section of the call. Specifically, Hilton mentioned that all around global uncertainty be it Brexit, Trade Wars, and other geopolitical events such as U.S. elections and impeachment process, are weighing on travel intensions. The above factors affect both leisure and business travel. Keep in mind that the ISM non-manufacturing survey has taken a beating of late (bottom panel) and revpar is also showing signs of distress (not shown). Nosediving small businesses’ capex intentions are also highlighting that CEOs remain cautious and are likely to become even more prudent with expense management. Historically, slowing capex has been a good predictor of personal income growth, which is also set to slow down (middle panel) subtracting from overall travel budgets. Finally, the U.S. consumer is sending a similar message as sentiment remains below the cyclical peak. Bottom Line: We reiterate our underweight call on the S&P hotels, resorts & cruise lines index. This position is currently up 18% since inception. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HOTL – MAR, HLT, RCL, CCL, NCLH.  

Underweight In yesterday’s Weekly Report1 we recommended downgrading the niche S&P homebuilding index to underweight, as most, if not all, positive profit drivers are already reflected in relative share prices. The drop in interest rates has been more than accounted for by the year-to-date outperformance in homebuilders and is no longer a positive catalyst. For instance, the mortgage application purchase index (MAPI) initially benefited from the plunge in interest rates, but the recent 30bps rise in the 10-year Treasury signals that the MAPI has tentatively crested (second panel). Simultaneously, lumber prices are gaining steam and coupled with contracting new home prices signal that homebuilding profits will suffer a setback (middle & fourth panels). This stands in marked contrast to the sell-side community that has been ratcheting up profit estimates for the S&P homebuilding index (bottom panel). Bottom Line: Downgrade the S&P homebuilding index to underweight. For additional details on the rationale behind this move please refer to the most recent Weekly Report.1 The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG – S5HOME – DHI, LEN, PHM, NVR.   1  Please See U.S. Equity Strategy, "Is This It?," dated October 21, 2019.

Highlights Portfolio Strategy Soft housing demand, the trough in interest rates, new home price deflation and weak industry employment prospects suggest that an underweight stance is now warranted in the S&P homebuilding index.      Firming demand/supply dynamics, IMO Sulfur 2020 regulations, and bombed out relative profit expectations all signal that further gains are in store for pure-play refining equities. Recent Changes Downgrade the S&P homebuilding index to underweight, today. Table 1 Feature Equities made a run for fresh all-time highs last week, continuing to cheer the trade war “phase one” deal and breathing a big sigh of relief on better-than-expected bank earnings. We doubt a real deal will materialize which would include Intellectual Property and the tech sector. Instead all we got was a trade truce, at best. Larry Kudlow’s recent football analogy is worth repeating: “It's like being on the seven-yard line at a football game…And as a long suffering New York Giants fan, they could be on the seven and they never get the ball to the end zone…When you get down to the last 10 percent, seven-yard line, it's tough". As a reminder, steep tariffs remain in place and there are high odds that the damage already done to global trade is severe enough that it will be months before the emergence of any green shoots. Meanwhile, following up on our “chart of the year candidate” we published two weeks ago, we drilled deeper and discovered two additional economically sensitive indexes that have consistently peaked prior to the SPX in the past three cycles (Chart 1). They now comprise the U.S. Equity Strategy’s Equity Leading Indicator – an equally weighted composite of the S&P Banks index, the Russell 2000 index and the Value Line Geometric index – which signals that the easy money has already been made this cycle in the SPX (Chart 2). Chart 1Three Bulletproof Signals... Chart 2...Combined Into One Leading Equity Indicator Importantly, absent profit growth, it remains extremely difficult for equities to embark on a sustainable fresh leg up by solely relying on multiple expansion. Chart 3 shows our updated Corporate Pricing Power Indicator (CPPI) and it continues to deflate. In fact the steep fall in our CPPI more than offsets the fall in wage growth warning that the margin contraction in the S&P 500 has staying power1 (bottom panel, Chart 3). Drilling beneath the surface, our CPPI is waving a red flag. As a reminder, we calculate industry group pricing power from the relevant CPI, PPI, PCE and commodity growth rates for each of the 60 industry groups we track. Table 2 also highlights shorter term pricing power trends and each industry's spread to overall inflation. Only 42% of the industries we cover are lifting selling prices by more than 1%, and 33% are outright deflating. Worrisomely, only 26% of sectors are raising prices at a faster clip than overall inflation. With regard to pricing power trends, two thirds of the industries we cover are either flat or in a downtrend (Table 2). Chart 3Nil Corporate Pricing Power Table 2Industry Group Pricing Power Gold has jumped to the top of our table galloping at a 26%/annum rate (keep in mind it was deflating in our early July update), and only three additional commodity-related industries made it to the top twenty (Table 2). The disappearance of the commodity complex from the top ranks is consistent with global PPI ills and U.S. dollar strength. This week we update two groups, one early and one deep cyclical. Interestingly, defensive sectors have a healthy showing in the top ten spots with five entries. On the flip side, commodities in general and energy-related industries in particular occupy the bottom of the ranks as WTI crude oil is steeply deflating from the October 2018 peak. Adding it up, corporate sector selling price inflation is sinking in line with depressed inflation expectations. As we posited in our recent profit margin Special Report, profit margins have already peaked for the cycle. We reiterate our cautious overall equity market view on a cyclical 9-to-12 month time horizon. This week we update two groups, one early and one deep cyclical. Cracking Homebuilding Foundations We recommend downgrading the niche S&P homebuilding index to underweight, as most, if not all, positive profit drivers are already reflected in relative share prices. Specifically, the drop in interest rates has been more than accounted for by the year-to-date outperformance in homebuilders. Since the Great Recession, homebuilders have been in clearly defined mini up-and-down cycles, and there are high odds we will soon enter a down oscillation (bottom panel, Chart 4). Interest rates bottomed in early September and there is little additional push they can exert to relative share prices (10-year Treasury yield shown inverted, top panel, Chart 4). Chart 4Relative Gains Are Exhausted Worrisomely, consumers’ expectations to purchase a new home nosedived last month according to The Conference Board’s survey, and that demand softness will weigh on housing starts and ultimately homebuilding revenues (Chart 5). Chart 5Cracks Forming Adding insult to injury, new house selling prices are losing ground to existing home prices, but such discounting is no longer boosting volumes as new home sales market share gains have stalled recently. Already, S&P homebuilding sales are contracting and the risk is that deflation gets entrenched in this construction industry (Chart 6). While the mortgage application purchase index (MAPI) has been rising on the back of the plunge in interest rates, the 30bps rise in the 10-year Treasury yield since September 1 signals that the MAPI has tentatively crested (second panel, Chart 7). Chart 6Contracting Sales Chart 7Margin Trouble Simultaneously, lumber prices are gaining steam and coupled with contracting new home prices signal that homebuilding profits will suffer a setback (middle & fourth panels, Chart 7). This stands in marked contrast to the sell-side community that has been ratcheting up profit estimates for the S&P homebuilding index (bottom panel, Chart 7). Netting it all out, soft housing demand, the trough in interest rates, deflating new home prices and weakening industry employment prospects suggest that an underweight stance is now warranted in the S&P homebuilding index. On the operating front, the labor market is also emitting a distress signal. Job openings in the construction industry are sinking like a stone and residential construction employment growth is flirting with the contraction zone. Historically, the ebbs and flows in construction jobs have moved in lockstep with relative share price performance and the current message is to expect a drawdown in the latter (Chart 8). Most of the indicators we track underscore a challenging homebuilding backdrop in the coming months. However, there is a key risk to our view: interest rates. Were the 30-year fixed mortgage rate to fall further from current levels, it would entice first time home buyers and cushion the blow to homebuilding demand (mortgage rates shown inverted, top panel, Chart 9). Similarly, bankers are willing extenders of mortgage credit and are reporting rising demand for residential real estate loans as a lagged consequence of falling rates. But, our sense is that the easy gains are exhausted and a reversal is in the offing in most of these measures (Chart 9). Chart 8Heed The Labor Market's Message Chart 9Potentially Lower Rates Are A Key Risk Netting it all out, soft housing demand, the trough in interest rates, deflating new home prices and weakening industry employment prospects suggest that an underweight stance is now warranted in the S&P homebuilding index. Bottom Line: Downgrade the S&P homebuilding index to underweight, today. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG – S5HOME – DHI, LEN, PHM, NVR. Stick With Refiners While our bullish take on refiners got to a slippery start, it has recovered all the losses and this position is now in the black. Factors are falling into place for additional gains in the coming months and we recommend investors stick with this overweight recommendation in pure-play downstream stocks. Encouragingly, refining stocks have been trouncing the overall energy index of late and have resumed their multi-year relative uptrend (top panel, Chart 10). With regard to the export relief valve, U.S. net exports of refined products are on a secular uptrend and surprisingly unaffected by the greenback’s moves (bottom panel, Chart 10). Tack on the soon to be adopted International Maritime Organization (IMO) Sulfur 2020 regulations in maritime transportation fuel, and U.S. refiners that produce lower-sulfur fuel oil are well positioned to outearn the SPX. Chart 10Resumed Uptrend Domestic refined product consumption remains upbeat and should serve as a catalyst to unlock excellent value in this niche energy subgroup (middle panel, Chart 11). In fact, gasoline consumption is expanding anew on the back of rising vehicle miles travelled (bottom panel, Chart 11). Chart 11Solid Demand... Refining product supply dynamics are also moving in the right direction. Gasoline inventories are getting whittled down and should boost beaten down refining relative profit expectations (inventories shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 12). Importantly, this firming demand/supply backdrop has been a boon to refining margins and should continue to underpin relative share price momentum (middle panel, Chart 12). In terms of what is baked in the cake for this industry, the expected profit growth bar is extremely low and falling and relative value has been fully restored. First in terms of relative valuations, the relative trailing price-to-sales ratio has corrected 35% from the mid-2018 peak (middle panel, Chart 11). On a forward PE ratio basis refiners are extremely appealing compared with the SPX following a near halving in the relative forward PE in the past fifteen months (second panel, Chart 13). Chart 12...Supply Backdrop Is Boosting Crack Spreads  Chart 13Profit Hurdle Is Uncharacteristically Low Second, relative EPS growth has sunk below the zero line both twelve months and five years forward. Such pessimism is overdone and we would lean against sell-side bearishness (bottom panel, Chart 13). Even the refining industry’s net earnings revisions ratio has collapsed, which is contrarily positive (third panel, Chart 13). Adding it all up, firming demand/supply dynamics, IMO Sulfur 2020 regulations, and bombed out relative profit expectations all signal that further gains are in store for pure-play refining equities. Bottom Line: Stay overweight the S&P oil & gas refining & marking index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG – S5OILR – MPC, VLO, PSX, HFC.   Anastasios Avgeriou, U.S. Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Special Report, “Peak Margins” dated October 7, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Stay neutral cyclicals over defensives   (downgrade alert) Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps (Stop 10%)

Special Report

Today we are also publishing a Special Report titled Chinese Auto Demand: Time For A Recovery? Highlights India is the third-largest world consumer of crude oil. Hence, fluctuations in its oil consumption is a non-negligible factor behind global oil prices. India’s petroleum demand growth is slowing cyclically due to the domestic demand slump and a dramatic drop in vehicle sales. This, combined with China’s ongoing slowdown in petroleum product demand, will have a non-trivial impact on oil prices in the next six months. From a structural perspective, India’s long-term demand growth for petroleum is decelerating as well. Feature India’s petroleum products consumption growth is slowing. Chart 1India Is The World's Third Largest Crude Oil Consumer India is the world’s third-largest consumer of crude oil, guzzling 5% of global consumption (Chart 1). Hence, fluctuations in India’s crude oil/petroleum consumption is a non-negligible factor affecting global oil prices. India’s petroleum products consumption growth is slowing. This comes on top of China’s ongoing petroleum demand deceleration. Together, the two countries account for 19% of the world’s oil intake. Therefore, deceleration in their oil consumption growth will have a considerable impact on the outlook for global oil demand growth. A Pronounced Cyclical Oil Demand Slump Indian petroleum consumption growth has decelerated significantly on the back of slumps in Indian domestic spending and economic activity (Chart 2). Please click on this link for an in-depth analysis on the domestic demand slump in India. Chart 2Indian Petroleum Consumption Growth Has Been Dwindling Specifically, vehicle purchases and industrial sectors have been hit hard. These sectors are critical for Indian petroleum consumption, since transportation demand accounts for 50% and industrial activity for around 25% of total petroleum consumption (Chart 3). Indian vehicle sales have been in freefall. Chart 3Transportation & Industry Guzzle The Most Fuel In India Chart 4Indian Vehicle Sales Are In Deep Contraction Indian vehicle sales have been in freefall. Chart 4 shows passenger car sales are shrinking at 30% and sales of two and three-wheeler units are contracting at 20% from a year ago. Moreover, commercial vehicles and tractor unit sales are falling at annual rates of 35% and 10%, respectively. Chart 5 illustrates that the number of registered vehicles is expanding at a lower rate than before – i.e., its second derivative has turned negative. This signals a further growth slowdown in gasoline and diesel consumption. We use the second derivative in this analysis because registered vehicles are a stock variable. However, we are trying to explain changes in petroleum consumption which is a flow variable. Therefore, the second derivative of a stock variable (the number of registered cars on the road) explains the first derivative of a flow variable (the growth rate of oil consumption). Looking ahead, vehicle sales will remain in the doldrums because of a lack of financing. In particular, the impulse on auto loans issued by commercial banks is negative (Chart 6). Chart 5Slowing Growth Of Vehicles On The Road = Weaker Pace Of Fuel Consumption Chart 6Indian Banks: Negative Vehicle Loan Impulse More worrisome is the ongoing turmoil in India’s non-bank finance sector (NBFCs), which has also significantly hit auto sales. In the past, the NBFC sector played a major role in funding Indian auto purchases. For instance, according to the ICRA, an independent rating agency in India, NBFCs have helped fund the purchases of 65% of two-wheelers, 30% of passenger cars and around 55% of commercial vehicles – both new and used. Given these non-bank finance companies are currently facing formidable funding and liquidity pressures amid rising NPLs (Chart 7), they are being forced to shrink their balance sheets. This is damaging to auto sales. Please click here for an in-depth analysis on the Indian banking and non-bank finance sectors. Chart 7Major Asset-Liability Mismatches Among Indian Non-Bank Finance Sector Chart 8India's Capex Has Been Weak Turning to the industrial sector, overall Indian capital spending has been weak. India’s real gross fixed capital formation has rolled over, the number of capex projects underway is nosediving and both capital goods imports and production are contracting by 7% and 12% on an annual basis (Chart 8). Falling industrial activity has taken a toll on the consumption growth of petroleum products with industrial applications, such as bitumen, naphtha and petroleum coke, etc. The growth rate in demand for these products is dropping — a significant development since they account for 25% of overall petroleum consumption in India.1  Bottom Line: India’s petroleum consumption growth has been slowing drastically from a cyclical perspective. And Moderating Structural Oil Demand Growth It appears there are structural factors at play that will also reduce India’s long-term demand for petroleum. On top of the cyclical demand slowdown, it appears there are structural factors at play that will also reduce India’s long-term demand for petroleum: Chart 9Impressive Efficiency Gains In India's Vehicle Fleet The fuel efficiency of India’s vehicle fleet is markedly improving (Chart 9). Additionally, since 2015-16 the Indian government has been proactively pursuing new emission/fuel efficiency standards. For instance, emissions standards for new passenger vehicles will fall to 4.2 L/100 KM by 2023 down from its current level of 4.6 L/100 KM. This will lead to a 7% reduction in auto fuel consumption. While this is not a large reduction, the government has the scope to implement even stricter standards since Indian car makers are easily meeting these targets. Finally, the Indian government has been aggressively promoting electric vehicles (EVs) as an alternative to traditional autos. It has made the advancement of this sector a priority. Ownership of EVs is currently negligible in India. However, the government is pushing for EVs to make up 30% of vehicle sales by 2030. In addition, it has been providing incentives such as sales tax cuts and subsidies to the sector. Finally, Mahindra and Tata Motors are already establishing a lead in the EV industry and are developing new EV models in collaboration with foreign automakers.  Bottom Line: The pace of India’s structural demand for petroleum will also be downshifting. Oil Inventory Not A Critical Factor Chart 10China: Oil Inventory Drives Oil Imports Inventory accumulation and destocking can play an important role in oil price fluctuations. For example, inventory accumulation plays a key role in driving Chinese crude oil imports (Chart 10). There is a dearth of data on Indian oil inventories to make a strong inference about its de- and re-stocking cycles. However, we have the following observations: India has the capacity to store 5.33 million tons worth of strategic oil reserves - equivalent to around 10 days of its crude oil consumption. It is not clear whether or not these reserves are at full capacity. However, even if we assume they are only 50% full and the government decides to fill its reserves all at once, this would require the importation of an additional 2.67 million tons of oil, equivalent to only 1.2% of Indian crude oil imports and 0.05% of global crude oil demand. This is a negligible amount, and is unlikely to have any impact on global oil prices. Furthermore, while the Indian government is planning to expand its storage capacity by an extra 6.5 million tons, this will only take place in the next six to eight years. Thus, it will not meaningfully affect oil imports in the medium term. Chart 11India: Oil Consumption Drives Oil Imports Finally, India’s crude oil imports are strongly correlated with its petroleum final consumption (Chart 11). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that Indian consumption – not the oil inventory cycle – is relevant for crude imports, and by extension for oil prices. Bottom Line: India’s petroleum product and crude oil inventory fluctuations are too small to influence the nation’s crude imports and hence global oil prices. Investment Conclusions From a cyclical perspective, Indian final demand for crude oil has been weakening. A major re-acceleration in economic growth and hence oil demand is not imminent. We discuss the outlook for China’s auto sales in a separate report published today. Together India and China consume 19% of world oil, and therefore a deceleration in their oil consumption growth will have a non-trivial impact on the pace of global oil demand growth. Chart 12Expansion Pace Of Vehicles On The Road Has Downshifted In India & China Our estimations for annual growth in cars on the road (excluding 2-wheelers) has dropped to 5.8% in India and 10.5% in China (Chart 12). This entails a slower pace of oil demand growth than in the past. Besides, if one rightly assumes petroleum consumption per car is declining for structural reasons due to technological advancements by car manufacturers and enforcement of stricter efficiency standards by governments, oil consumption growth will be considerably slower going forward relative to the past 20 years. Together India and China consume 19% of world oil, and therefore a deceleration in their oil consumption growth will have a non-trivial impact on the pace of global oil demand growth. This presents a major risk for crude prices in the next 6 months or so. Beyond the cyclical horizon, the long-term demand outlook for oil is also downbeat. Please note that this is the view of BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy team, and differs from that of BCA’s house view, which is bullish on oil. Chart 13India’s Relative Equities Performance Benefits From Lower Oil Prices In turn, low oil prices are positive for the relative performance of Indian stocks versus the EM equity benchmark (Chart 13). This was among the primary reasons why we upgraded the allocation to this bourse within an EM equity portfolio to neutral from underweight on September 26, 2019. In absolute terms, the outlook for Indian share prices remains downbeat, as discussed in the same report. Finally, to express our negative view on oil prices, we are reiterating our short oil and copper / long gold position recommended on July 11, 2019. Industrial commodities such as copper and oil will continue to underperform gold prices in the medium term (the next six months). Ayman Kawtharani, Editor/Strategist ayman@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      Diesel consumption will also be impacted. While the latter is mostly consumed by the transportation sector in India, diesel does have some industrial applications as well. Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Special Report

Highlights A recovery in Chinese auto sales is not imminent. Car sales will likely stage only a rate-of-change improvement, moving from deep to mild contraction or stagnation over the next three-to-six months. Low-speed electric vehicles are a cheap substitute for regular low-end cars. Their production requires fewer inputs and parts compared to cars. Hence, their rising penetration will be negative for economic activity at the margin. Auto ownership will continue to rise in China in the years to come. However, this does not necessitate rising car sales. In fact, auto ownership can increase with car sales contracting in each consecutive year. This scenario represents a major risk to auto stock prices. Feature Chart 1Chinese Auto Sales: An Extended Downturn Chinese automobile sales have been deep under water for 15 consecutive months. The magnitude of the contraction has been even worse than the one that occurred in 2008-‘09. Annualized sales1 have declined from a peak of nearly 30 million units in June 2018 to 26 million this September (Chart 1). To put this 4-million-unit decline into perspective, only about 5 million units of automobiles were produced in Germany last year. Given the already long and deep contraction, does this mean Chinese auto sales and production are about to stage an imminent recovery? Although a revival sometime next year is plausible, we are not positive in the near term. Car sales will stage a rate-of-change improvement only, moving from deep to mild contraction or stagnation (i.e. zero growth) the next three to six months (Chart 1, bottom panel). Gauging The Demand Outlook Chart 2Marginal Propensity To Spend Is Falling Reluctance to purchase a car and curtailed financing are the causes of the deep auto sales contraction in China. The factors that have weighed on consumers’ willingness to purchase cars remain intact. First, our indicator for household marginal propensity to spend continues to fall, indicating no immediate signs of a turnaround (Chart 2). Cyclically, decelerating economic activity is weighing on income expectations, prompting consumers to delay their discretionary spending. Besides, the growth rate of disposable income per capita is at the lower end of its historical range and is falling in real (inflation-adjusted) terms (Chart 3). In addition, Chinese households are more leveraged now than their U.S. counterparts (Chart 4). Their debt levels have reached over 120% of annual disposable income. Chart 3Real Disposable Income Growth Is Weakening Chart 4Chinese Households Are Increasingly Indebted   Meanwhile, the U.S.-China confrontation continues to foster uncertainty among consumers and businesses in the Middle Kingdom. Although some sort of agreement was reached last week, the future of longer-term U.S.-China relations remains highly uncertain. Hence, the potential “phase-one” trade agreement is unlikely to shift Chinese consumers’ and businesses’ overall cautious sentiment. These factors will continue to weigh on consumers’ purchasing behavior, especially on big-ticket items like automobiles. Reluctance to purchase a car and curtailed financing are the causes of the deep auto sales contraction in China. Second, Chinese auto financing penetration rate – measured as the proportion of autos bought using borrowed funds – has risen from 20% in 2014 to about 48%2 last year. This remains well below the 70%-plus penetration rate in major western countries (the U.S., Germany and France), but is not far from the 50% rate in Japan. The rapid increase in the use of auto financing has facilitated auto sales in China over the past several years. Financing for auto purchases has been provided by banks via loans and credit cards, dealer/manufacturer loans and peer-to-peer lending (P2P). While banks contribute about 40% of auto financing and auto dealers/manufacturers account for about 30%, the peer-to-peer platform has become the third major source of auto loans in recent years. Chart 5Limited Auto Financing From Peer-To-Peer Platforms However, since early last year, bankruptcies and closures of P2P platforms have significantly reduced available auto financing. P2P financing continues to shrink, further depressing loans for auto purchases (Chart 5). Third, there is an ongoing structural decline in consumers’ willingness to purchase cars due to greater traffic congestion, limited parking and improved public transportation. In addition, greater use of ride-sharing and car-sharing services, which the government is aiming to promote, will also continue to reduce the need to buy a car. Concerning government incentives for auto buyers, auto sales have failed to recover, so far this year, despite policy support and significant auto price cuts (Box 1). Although the government recently loosened some restrictive auto sales policies in certain cities,3 the scale was much smaller than what was done earlier this year. As in any market, production decisions are driven by sales, not inventories. Box 1 Policy Support And Auto Price Cut During January-September 2019 Since late January, Chinese authorities have released a set of pro-auto-consumption measures aimed at spurring auto sales. These measures include the approval of 100,000 new license plates in Guangzhou province and an additional 80,000 in Shenzhen. Since May, auto dealers in China have slashed prices of their Emission Standard 5 cars in order to liquidate inventories, as 15 provinces/provincial level cities have been implementing the new emissions standards since July 1, 2019 – one year earlier than the national implementation deadline. According to the law, vehicles that do not meet the new standard will not be allowed to be sold or registered once the new standard is implemented. Another pertinent question to address is whether inventories can be used to identify a bottom in this industry. This is difficult to gauge in China, as inventories at different stages of the supply chain are currently sending conflicting signals. Manufacturers’ inventories have dropped to low levels (Chart 6). Yet, dealers’ inventories remain elevated according to the newly released inventory data for September (Chart 7). Chart 6Auto Manufacturers Inventories Are Low... Chart 7...But Dealers Inventories Remain Elevated   Chart 8Auto Demand Drives Production As in any market, production decisions are driven by sales, not inventories. The chain reaction always starts from demand: rising sales lead to rising production. Producers do not typically ramp up output when sales are falling, even if inventories are low (Chart 8). Without a strong and durable rise in demand, manufacturers will not significantly increase their inventories. In short, low car inventories among manufacturers could lead to a short-term rise in output. A sustainable and lasting recovery in production, however, is contingent on a cyclical revival in auto sales. Bottom Line: A cyclical recovery in auto sales is not imminent in the next three-to-six months. A Threat From A Cheap Substitute In many small cities (from Tier 3 to Tier 6 cities), towns and villages where auto buyers are more sensitive to prices, consumers are opting to purchase low-speed electric vehicles (LSEVs) – a cheap substitute for regular autos. Last year, LSEV makers sold about 1.5 million units in China, accounting for about 6% of passenger vehicle sales for the year. In comparison, even with massive government subsidies, total new energy vehicle (NEV, mainly including pure electric vehicles and plug-in hybrids) sales only reached 1.2 million units in 2018, 20% lower than LSEV sales. In many small cities, towns and villages consumers are opting to purchase low-speed electric vehicles (LSEVs) – a cheap substitute for regular autos. LSEVs are small, short-range electric vehicles (three- or four-wheeled cars) with top driving speeds below 80km per hour and with a similar look to regular cars.4 They have much lower technical and safety standards: LSEVs are not considered automobiles by the country’s motor vehicle management system. Consequently, official auto production and sales data released by authorities do not include LSEV figures. Chart 9Significant Output Expansion In Low-Speed Electric Vehicles Technically, these vehicles are within some sort of grey area of Chinese regulations, but that has not stopped the industry's remarkable growth. Shandong province accounts for about 40% of the country’s LSEV output. The dramatic LSEV production expansion in the province gives a glimpse into the booming LSEV industry in China (Chart 9). Last year’s LSEV production drop was due to the government’s tightening of LSEV output policies and greater competition from small-size pure electric vehicles, which benefited from government subsidies. Both factors have diminished this year due to policy changes and the termination of subsidies for the small-size pure electric vehicle. Looking forward, consumers will continue purchasing LSEVs as a substitute for lower-end cars. They will have negative effect on low-end car sales, especially when household budgets tighten. Table 1 lays out the main differences between an LSEV and a lower-end passenger car. Clearly, the most attractive feature of an LSEV is its price, which can be as cheap as 10,000 RMB (less than US$2,000) with a big proportion of LSEVs ranging from 20,000 RMB to 30,000 RMB. In comparison, prices of lower-end passenger vehicles in general range from 50,000RMB to 80,000 RMB, more expensive than LSEVs. As nearly half of Chinese households already own an automobile, the potential of future auto sales clearly lies in lower-income households. However, the 2018 NBS household survey showed the annual household disposable income for the lowest 60% percentile rural households was lower than the low-end price of regular auto – 50,000 RMB (US$ 7,050) (Chart 10). In comparison, a much cheaper LSEV will be affordable for them. Given that they are inferior goods, LSEVs could become even more attractive at times of weak disposable income growth. In addition to cheap prices, Box 2 reveals other attractive features that will make LSEVs the most convenient and affordable form of transportation for many potential auto buyers. This will also help promote the popularity of the LSEVs in small cities and rural areas. Table 1The Comparison Between LSEVs And Lower-End Passenger Cars Chart 10Low-Speed Electric Vehicles: Affordable For Lower-Income Households   Further, this year’s regulatory changes are also favorable for the LSEV industry (Box 3). This marked a clear policy reversal from last year when the government executed a crackdown on LSEV production and issued a policy prohibiting new capacity of LSEVs. Box 2 The Non-Price Reasons For The Increasing Popularity Of The LSEVs The LSEV is more convenient as it is easy to drive and to park because of its small size. The drive range of 100 km per charge of the battery is sufficient for a person who only uses it to go to work or pick up the kids from school. It is particularly useful in small cities and rural areas where the public transportation network is poor. The speed of 40-60 km per hour is also fast enough to drive in small cities and rural area where there are not much road traffic and the roads are often designed for low driving speed. LSEVs also have the benefit of being able to charge from home electrical outlets, eliminating the need to use public charging/fueling infrastructure. Box 3 Policy On LSEV Industry: More Favorable In 2019 Than In 2018 In March, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology announced that by 2021 the national standards of the “Technical Conditions of Four-Wheel Low-Speed Electric Vehicles” would be established. This will eventually bring the LSEV market under the government’s supervision while giving LSEV makers two years to improve their technology. This will help improve the quality and safety measures of LSEVs. In May and June, over 20 cities started to issue car plates for LSEVs and approved of the LSEVs right to be on the road. This signals that the government is aiming to regulate the LSEV sector in a positive way, rather than simply banning production. Bottom Line: Cheap LSEVs will be a low-cost substitute for regular low-end cars. Their production requires fewer inputs and parts compared to cars. Hence, their rising penetration will be negative for economic activity at the margin. What About NEV Demand? New Electric Vehicle (NEV) sales were a bright spot among all categories of auto sales in China last year, with year-on-year growth of 62%. However, NEV sales growth has decelerated considerably this year as the government began cutting subsidies (Chart 11). NEV sales will remain under pressure. Table 2 shows the timeline of China’s NEV subsidy exit plan, which was released in late March. The subsidy is set to be phased out by 2021. Chart 11New Electric Vehicle Sales Growth Will Slow But Remain Positive Table 2The China’s New Electric Vehicle Subsidy Exit Plan   In comparison to last year, there will be no subsidy at all for pure electric vehicles (PEVs) with recharge mileage of 250 kilometers and lower. This will make it more difficult for mini-PEVs to compete with LSEVs with respect to price. For PEVs with recharge mileage of 250 kilometers and above, the subsidy has also been cut significantly. However, we still expect NEV demand growth to remain positive. The government will continue to maintain zero sales tax on NEVs until the end of 2020. This gives it a major advantage over non-NEV vehicles, which carry the 10% sales tax. In addition, NEVs are exempt from license restrictions on car sales and time or area restrictions on on-road autos, in cities where such policies apply. This is an attractive privilege for car buyers to consider. Current NEVs that can achieve recharge mileage of 300-450 kilometers, sell at a price of RMB 100,000 to RMB 150,000 per unit. They are both affordable and appealing for upper-middle-income and high-income urban households who prefer either green options or energy cost savings. The recharge mileage is sufficient for most daily use, and prices are in line with prices of traditional gasoline or diesel cars. If and as auto sales fail to stage a notable recovery in the next several months, Chinese auto stock  prices will likely break down. Bottom Line: With the gradual phasing out of subsidies, the period of exponential NEV sales growth is over. Nevertheless, NEV demand growth will likely remain positive. Investment Implications Chart 12Chinese Auto Stock Prices Could Break Down There are three pertinent investment implications to consider. First, Chinese auto stock prices in the domestic A-share market have dropped by 60% from their 2017 highs, and have lately been moving sideways (Chart 12). Notably, these listed automakers’ per-share earnings have plunged, and the companies have cut dividends by more than the drop in their share prices (Chart 13). As a result, their trailing P/E ratio has risen and the dividend yield has dropped (Chart 14). This implies that investors are looking through the current sales contraction and expecting an imminent recovery. Chart 13A Major Contraction In Corporate Earnings And Dividends Chart 14Rising Trailing P/E And Falling Dividend Yield   If and as auto sales fail to stage a notable recovery in the next several months, these share prices will likely break down. Second, petroleum demand growth from the transportation sector will be decelerating in China over the coming years. Rising NEV sales as a share of total auto sales, substituting autos for LSEVs and a slower pace of growth in the number of vehicles on roads imply diminishing demand for gasoline in the coming years (Chart 15). Today BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy service is also publishing a Special Report discussing India’s demand for oil. The report argues for slowing growth in Indian oil demand. Combined, China and India make up 19% of the world’s oil consumption (slightly lower than the 21% accounted for by the U.S.), and weaker demand growth in these economies is negative for oil prices. Third, investors should differentiate between a long-term economic view and investment strategy. We do not disagree with the economic viewpoint that auto ownership will rise in China in the years to come. But this will happen even if auto sales decline on an annual basis over the next 10 years. Chart 16 illustrates this point: if annual auto sales drop by 2% during each consecutive year over the next decade, and the scrap rate is around 3%, car ownership, defined as the share of households owning one car, will continue to rise from the current 50% level, reaching 80% by 2030. Chart 15Falling Growth In Existing Vehicles Entails Slower Growth In Gasoline Demand Chart 16Stimulation: Car Ownership Can Rise With Shrinking Auto Sales   Nevertheless, such a scenario – a 2% annual drop in car sales in each consecutive year over the next decade - is bearish for automakers’ share prices. Any stock price is very sensitive to long-term growth expectations for corporate earnings.5 A 2% recurring annual drop in car sales will be disastrous for auto stock valuations. This is a case when the long-term economic view on rising prosperity and car ownership in China stands in contrast with a negative investment outcome for the auto sector and its shareholders. Ellen JingYuan He, Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      Sales of total automobiles, including passenger vehicles and commercial vehicles. 2      From Chinese Banking Association Report on June 18, 2019. https://www.china-cba.net/Index/show/catid/14/id/26688.html 3      Guangzhou further added 10,000 car plates open to the public while Guiyang eliminated cap on new-vehicle sales. 4      https://www.wsj.com/video/big-in-china-tiny-electric-cars/CF7E986A-7C70-4EE3-8F7B-441621F10C94.html 5      The reason is that both interest rates and earnings long-term growth rate are present in the denominator of any cash flow discount model (Stock Price = Expected Dividends / (Interest rate – Earnings long-term growth rate)). Hence, they have the potential to affect share prices exponentially while dividends/profits are present in the numerator so their impact on equity prices is linear.

Highlights New structural recommendation: long GBP/USD. The substantial Brexit discount in the pound makes it a long-term buy for investors who can tolerate near-term volatility. The most powerful equity play on a fading Brexit discount would be the U.K. homebuilders. Specifically, Persimmon still has a further 25 percent of upside. Take profits in long Euro Stoxx 50 versus Shanghai Composite. Within Europe, close the overweight to Switzerland and the underweight to the Netherlands. Stay overweight banks versus industrials. Stay overweight the Euro Stoxx 50 versus the Nikkei 225. Fractal trade: long NZD/JPY. Feature Chart of the WeekThe Pound Has Substantial Upside If The Brexit Discount Fades Carnival Says The Pound Is Cheap Carnival, the world’s largest cruise liner company, lists its shares on both the London and New York stock exchanges. But there is an apparent riddle: in London the shares trade on a forward PE of 8.8, while in New York they trade on 9.4. How can Carnival trade at different valuations on the two sides of the Atlantic when the market should instantly arbitrage the difference away? The answer to the riddle is that the London listing is quoted in pounds, the New York listing is quoted in dollars, while Carnival’s sales and profits are denominated in a mix of international currencies. Neither Brexit developments nor a potential Jeremy Corbyn led government will prevent the pound from rallying in the longer term.  Carnival is trading on a higher valuation in New York versus London because the market is expecting its mixed currency earnings to appreciate more in dollar terms than in pound terms. Put another way, the valuation differential is expecting the pound to appreciate versus the dollar to a ‘fair value’ of around $1.40 (Chart I-2). Likewise, BHP Billiton shares are trading on a higher valuation in their Sydney listing compared to their London listing. This valuation differential is expecting the pound to appreciate versus the Australian dollar to around A$2.00 (Chart I-3). Chart I-2Carnival Says The Pound Is Cheap Chart I-3BHP Billiton Says The Pound Is Cheap In other words, the market believes that neither Brexit developments nor a potential Jeremy Corbyn led government will prevent the pound from rallying in the longer term. We tend to agree. The Wrong Way To Pick Stock Markets… And The Right Way Before continuing with the pound’s prospects, let’s wander into the wider investment landscape. One important lesson from dual-listed companies like Carnival and BHP Billiton is that a multinational’s valuation will appear attractive in a market where the currency is structurally cheap.1 This lesson has deep ramifications. Today, multinationals dominate all the major stock markets, meaning that the entire stock market will appear cheap if its currency is cheap. The stock market will also appear cheap if it is skewed towards lower-valued sectors. But sectors trade on a low valuation for a reason – poor long-term growth prospects. Through the past decade, Japanese banks seemed a relative bargain, trading on a forward PE of less than half of that on personal products companies (Chart I-4). Yet Japanese banks were not a relative bargain. Quite the contrary. Through the past decade Japanese personal products have outperformed the banks by 500 percent! (Chart I-5) Chart I-4Japanese Banks Seemed A Relative Bargain... Chart I-5...But Japanese Banks Were Not A Relative Bargain Hence, beware of picking stock markets on the basis of observations such as ‘European stocks are cheaper than U.S. stocks’. Given that a stock market valuation is the result of its currency valuation and its sector composition, assessing relative value across major stock markets is extremely difficult, if not impossible. To repeat, Carnival appears to be trading at a valuation discount in London versus New York, but the cheapness is illusory. Here’s the right way to pick major stock markets. Identify your preferred sectors and currencies, and then pick the regional and country stock markets that are skewed to these preferred sectors and currencies. In this regard, large underweight sector skews also matter. For example, China and EM have a near-zero exposure to healthcare equities, so their performances tend to correlate negatively with that of the global healthcare sector – albeit the causality could run in either direction. Identify your preferred sectors and currencies, and then pick the regional and country stock markets that are skewed to these preferred sectors and currencies. In early May, we noticed that the extreme outperformance of technology versus healthcare was at a critical technical point at which there was a high probability of a trend reversal. This high conviction sector view implied overweight Europe versus China, as well as overweight Switzerland and underweight Netherlands within Europe (Chart I-6 and Chart I-7). Chart I-6When Tech Underperforms Healthcare, China Underperforms Switzerland Chart I-7When Tech Underperforms Healthcare, The Netherlands Underperforms Switzerland   Given that this sector trend reversal has played out exactly as anticipated, it is time to bank the profits:   Close long Euro Stoxx 50 versus Shanghai Composite. And within Europe, close the overweight to Switzerland and the underweight to the Netherlands. Right now, it is appropriate to overweight banks versus industrials. It is the pace of the bond yield’s decline that has weighed on bank performance this year. But if the sharpest decline in bond yields is behind us, as seems likely, then banks should fare better versus other cyclicals (Chart I-8). Chart I-8If The Sharpest Decline In Bond Yields Is Over, Banks Will Outperform Industrials Once again, this sector view carries an equity market implication: stay overweight the Euro Stoxx 50 versus the Nikkei 225 (Chart I-9). Chart I-9Euro Stoxx 50 Vs. Nikkei 225 = Global Banks In Euros Vs. Global Industrials In Yen The Pound Is A Long-Term Buy Back to the pound. The message from the dual listings of Carnival and BHP Billiton is that the pound is cheap, and this is neatly corroborated by the relationship between relative interest rates and the pound versus the euro and dollar. Based on the pre-Brexit relationship between relative real interest rates and the pound’s exchange rate, we can quantify the ‘Brexit discount’. Absent this discount, the pound would now be trading close to €1.30 and well north of $1.40 (Chart of the Week and Chart I-10). Chart I-10The Pound Has Substantial Upside If The Brexit Discount Fades In the Brexit psychodrama, we do not claim to know exactly how the next few days or weeks will play out. In the short term, Brexit is a classic non-linear system, and non-linear systems are inherently unpredictable. However, in the longer term we expect the Brexit discount to fade in any sort of transitioned resolution that allows the U.K. to adapt to a new trading relationship with the world, or alternatively to stay in a relationship broadly similar to the current one. Whatever the eventual endpoint is, the key requirement to remove the Brexit discount is to avoid a cliff-edge. We expect the Brexit discount to fade in any sort of transitioned resolution. The stumbling block to a resolution is that the three key actors – the EU, the U.K. government, and the U.K. parliament – have conflicting red lines, so the Brexit ‘Venn diagram’ has had no overlap. The EU will not countenance a customs border that divides Ireland; the current U.K. government wants a Free Trade Agreement, which implies casting away Northern Ireland into the EU customs union; and the current U.K. parliament – unless its intentions suddenly change – wants the whole of the U.K., including Northern Ireland, to remain in the EU customs union.   Given that the EU will not budge its red line, the only way to a lasting resolution is for the government and parliament red lines to realign, This could happen via parliament being willing to sacrifice Northern Ireland, via a second referendum, or via a general election in which the government’s intentions and/or the composition of parliament changed. Given a long enough investment horizon – 2 years or more – it is likely that the government and parliament will realign their red lines to a Free Trade Agreement or to a customs union, one way or another. On this basis, the substantial Brexit discount in the pound makes it a long-term buy for investors who can tolerate near-term volatility. Accordingly, today we are initiating a new structural recommendation: long GBP/USD.  For equity investors, the most powerful play on a fading Brexit discount would be the U.K. homebuilders (Chart I-11). Specifically, if the pound reached $1.40, Persimmon still has a further 25 percent of upside. Chart I-11U.K. Homebuilders Have Substantial Upside If The Brexit Discount Fades Fractal Trading System*  Based on its collapsed fractal structure, we anticipate a countertrend rally in NZD/JPY within the next 130 days. Accordingly, go long NZD/JPY setting a profit target of 3 percent and a symmetrical stop-loss. Chart I-12 For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment’s fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions.   * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Dhaval Joshi, Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 There are also several companies with dual listings in the U.K. and the euro area. Unfortunately, these valuation differentials have been temporarily distorted by the risk of a no-deal Brexit, in which EU27 investors may have been forbidden from trading in the U.K. listed shares. Fractal Trading System Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Fractal Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields   Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations