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Consumer Discretionary

Dear Client, I am travelling this week so this report is a joint effort juxtaposing two contrasting observations about France. The ‘opulence’ part highlights France as the world’s dominant producer of luxury goods, and makes the case that some of the French luxury goods companies should form a core part of a long-term investment portfolio. The ‘rebellion’ part borrows from a recent Special Report on French politics penned by my colleague Jeremie Peloso. It analyses the recent yellow vest protests in France, and assesses whether they are a cause for concern. Best regards, Dhaval Joshi, Chief European Investment Strategist Feature Opulence Made In France Global luxury goods sales amount to a quarter of a trillion dollars, and Europe dominates in the production of these luxury goods. Measured by the number of companies, the leading luxury goods country is Italy. But on the more important metric of share of total global sales, the undisputed world leader is France. In fact, just four French companies produce a quarter of the world’s luxury goods sales. The four are: LVMH, Kering, L’Oreal, and Hermes1 (Chart of the Week, Chart I-2, and Table I-1). France’s luxury goods sector is an excellent diversifier for investors. This is because, compared to other goods and services, luxuries follow very different laws of economics: The demand for luxuries has a positive elasticity to price. Put more simply, the desirability of a luxury increases as its price goes up. This is opposite to the demand for non-luxuries which has a negative elasticity to price: for non-luxury items, the demand declines as the price goes up. By definition, you cannot compete with a luxury item by undercutting its price. Given that a luxury implies fine-craftsmanship rather than mass production, the sector is highly resilient to the existential threats confronting other European industries that emanate from out-sourcing to lower cost economies and from automation. Luxury demand is also relatively insensitive to exchange rate movements. The barrier to entry into the luxuries sector is extremely high. It takes years, or even decades, for a luxury item to acquire its premium status based on consistent high quality in materials and craftsmanship. This high barrier to entry makes it much harder for other economies to challenge the European and French dominance in providing these luxury products. Despite these attractive characteristics the sector does still require a source of structural demand. Our premise, expounded in our Special Report “Buying European Clothes: An Investment Megatrend”, is that the feminisation of consumer spending, particularly in Europe, is providing a strong structural tailwind to the demand for ‘soft’ luxury goods. A recent industry study by Deloitte corroborates this thesis, pointing out that the strongest growth in the luxury sector is to be found in cosmetics, fragrances, bags and accessories. On this premise, the four leading French companies are big beneficiaries.2,3   Are market valuations already aware of, and fully discounting, the thesis of feminisation of consumer spending? We think not, as most investors are surprised by the thesis and unaware of the on-going dynamics behind it. On this basis, three of the four French luxury companies, trading on forward PE multiples in the 20s or below, still appear reasonably valued for their growth prospects (Table I-2). The exception is Hermes which, on a multiple of 40, does seem richly priced. The bottom line is that the three other leading French luxury goods companies – LVMH, Kering, and L’Oreal – do deserve to be a core part of a long-term investment portfolio. Rebellion Made In France The yellow vest protest movement is not a coherent force led by a clear leadership. What started on the social media as a protest against the fuel tax in rural areas has evolved into a movement against President Macron. This transition occurred in part because a large segment of the population believes that Macron’s reforms have mainly benefited the wealthy. 77 percent of respondents in a recent poll view him as the “president of the rich.” The modification of the ‘wealth tax’ – which mostly shifts the focus toward real estate assets instead of financial assets – was highly criticized for favouring the wealthiest households. It resonated strongly with the perception that past governments helped the wealthiest households to accumulate more wealth on the back of the middle class. But it is not clear how intense or durable this popular sentiment will be, given that this type of inequality is not extreme in France and has not been rising (Chart I-3). Chart I-3What Income Inequality? Public support for the protests has hovered consistently around 70 percent since they started in November 2018 (Chart I-4). However, there are now more respondents who think that the protests should stop as that they should continue (Chart I-5). As a sign of things to come, a demonstration against the yellow vests and in support of Macron and his government – held by the “red scarves” – managed to gather more people on the streets of Paris than the regionally based yellow vests have done in the capital city.4 Who are the yellow vests? They are mostly rural, mostly hold a high school degree (or less), and overwhelmingly support anti-establishment political leaders Marine Le Pen (right-wing leader of the National Rally) or Jean-Luc Mélenchon (left-wing leader of La France Insoumise). This suggests that the movement has failed to cross the ideological aisle and win converts from the centre (Diagram I-1). How many French people are actually protesting? Although there was a slight pickup in protests at the beginning of January, the numbers countrywide are not high. In fact, they are far from what they were back in November and therefore would have to get much larger for markets to become concerned anew (Chart I-6). If we are to compare these protests to those in 1995 or 2010, the numbers pale in comparison (Table I-3). For instance, the protest of December 1995 brought a million people onto the streets while the demonstrations against the Woerth pension reform in 2010 lasted for seven months and gathered close to nine million protesters across eight different events (Chart I-7). We would compare the yellow vest protests to the 15-month long Spanish Indignados in 2011, which gathered between six and eight million protesters overall, and the U.S. Occupy Wall Street protests that same year. The two movements were similarly disorganized and combined disparate and often contradictory demands. In both cases, the governments largely ignored the protesters. Thus the yellow vests should not have a major impact on Macron’s reform agenda. As expected, Macron has not mentioned changing course on his most business-friendly reforms, which we see as a signal to investors that, despite the recent chaos, the plan remains the same. There is no strategic reason why Macron would reverse course. His popularity is already in the doldrums. His only chance at another term is to plough ahead and campaign in 2022 on his accomplishments. Nevertheless, to ensure that he does not plough into a rock, Macron will adjust course to calm the protesters. For example, the recent increase in the minimum wage that the government announced in response to the demonstrations was not supposed to be implemented until later in the presidential term. In a similar vein, pension reforms will likely be postponed given the ongoing protests. Macron hoped to introduce a universal, unified pension system by the middle of 2019 to replace an overly complex and fragmented system in which 42 different types of pension coexist, each one having its own rules of calculation. Though protests (both yellow vest and otherwise) have been unimpressive by historical standards, it might be too risky for the government to push the pension reform so close to these events. Such adjustments to the reform agenda should help reduce the protest movement’s fervour or otherwise its support. The bottom line is that the yellow vest protests were to be expected – they are the natural consequence of Emmanuel Macron’s push to reform the French economy and state. However, when compared to previous efforts to derail government reforms, the numbers simply do not stack up. Their disunited and broad objectives are likely to limit the effectiveness of the movement going forward.5   Dhaval Joshi,  Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Jeremie Peloso, Research Analyst jeremiep@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 In the case of L’Oreal this refers to the L’Oreal Luxe division. 2  Please see the European Investment Strategy “Buying European Clothes: An Investment Megatrend”, dated December 6, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Deloitte: Global Powers of Luxury Goods 2018, Shaping the future of the luxury industry 4 According to the government, 10,500 “red scarves” marched in Paris on January 27, 2018. 5 For the full report, please see the Geopolitical Strategy Special Report “France: La March A Suivre?”, dated February 27, 2019, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.  
The worst of the drubbing in German automobile production is likely behind us, as new orders have recently gone vertical. Backlogs are also sky-high and suggest that a definitive turn looms in German motor vehicle output. The leading indicators of Japanese…
Neutral We have successfully ridden down the S&P 1500 components index on a structural basis over the past four years. But now, factors are falling into place for an end to this multi-year bloodbath. On Monday, we lifted exposure to neutral from underweight, locking in relative gains of 36% since inception. In the U.S., light vehicle sales have been stable over the past five years and the latest Conference Board consumer confidence release showed that consumers’ plans to purchase a car remain upbeat, and could serve as a catalyst to unlock excellent relative value (middle panel). With regard to President Trump’s hawkish tariff rhetoric and the ongoing U.S./China trade tussle, automobile components makers have taken a big hit. But, there are high odds of an end to the U.S./China trade dispute. Tack on a softening greenback courtesy of a more dovish Fed. U.S. auto components producers will likely grab a larger slice of the global auto parts revenue pie (top panel). Still a number of risks keep us from turning outright bullish on this consumer discretionary subsector, including auto loan delinquencies which are increasing rapidly, approaching last cycle’s peak (bottom panel). Bottom Line: The easy money has already been made by shying away from auto component manufacturers and we lifted the S&P 1500 auto components index to neutral; please see Monday’s Weekly Report for more details. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S15AUTC – APTV, BWA, GNTX, GT, DAN, VC, FOXF, DORM, LCII, DJPH, AXL, ADNT, CTB, THRM, GTX, SMP, CPS, MPAA, SUP.
Highlights Portfolio Strategy While equities will likely be higher in the coming 9-12 months, we would refrain from committing fresh capital to the market at this juncture. A better entry point lies ahead. Tactically, this market needs a breather to digest the V-shaped formation since last December’s G20 meeting before it resumes its bull run. Firming leading indicators of global auto sales, upbeat auto components industry operating metrics, a softening U.S. dollar, the looming truce in the U.S./China trade spat and depressed relative technicals and valuations all suggest that it no longer pays to be bearish the S&P 1500 auto components index. Augment positions to neutral. The global economic soft patch that is exerting downward pressure on real interest rates, a soft U.S. dollar and rising global policy uncertainty, all signal that it still makes sense to hold a global gold mining equity portfolio hedge. Recent Changes Lift the S&P 1500 auto components index to neutral and cement gains of 36% today. From a portfolio management perspective, downgrade the S&P semi equipment index to neutral for a gain of 16% since the December 17, 2018 inception. Table 1 Feature The S&P 500 hit a trouble spot last week, despite positive news on the U.S./China trade tussle. Clearly, there is an element of “buy the rumor sell the news” in the market as equities have come a long way this year, reversing all of last December’s steep losses. But, the SPX now faces stiff resistance at the most important 2,800 level as we highlighted in recent research.1 Chart 1 shows “The Good”. From a sentiment/technical perspective, fresh all-time highs in the S&P 500 advance/decline line portend ongoing gains in this broad-based equity market advance. The junk bond market sends an equally encouraging signal: The Barclays total return high yield corporate bond index has vaulted to new highs, which bodes well for the SPX (middle panel, Chart 1). Finally, all three of the S&P risk parity total return indexes2 have slingshot into uncharted territory and suggest that the S&P 500 is headed there next. Chart 1The Good… Nevertheless, there are some cracks appearing in the U.S. economy. News of an abysmal retail sales report was quickly discredited by pundits, with some blaming poor data collection due to the government shutdown. Chart 2 shows “The Bad”. Worrisomely, contracting intermodal rail carloads and a nosedive in the “First Data merchant services dollar spend” at retailers likely corroborate the Commerce Department’s weak retail sales data. Moreover, the recent plunge in the Goldman Sachs MAP (Macro-data Assessment Platform) Surprise Index, which is now probing a three year low, suggests that the U.S. economy is in a soft-patch. Chart 2…The Bad… Charts 3 & 4 show “The Ugly”. Our Economic Impulse Indicator (EII) first introduced last October,3 has taken a turn for the worse. Six economic indicators encapsulating the U.S. economy comprise the EII, and there is clear deterioration in economic activity on a second derivative basis. The recent contraction in the overall business (manufacturing, wholesale and retail) sales-to-inventories (SI) ratio also warns of profit trouble in the coming quarters (Chart 4). Keep in mind that this data series only goes to November 2018 and once it gets updated to include December later this week, the SI ratio will likely fall deeper into the contraction zone. Chart 3…And The… Chart 4…Ugly So should investors take some chips off the table given this macro backdrop? Prior to answering the question, as a reminder, BCA’s view remains that the business cycle is alive and well and there is no recession on a cyclical time horizon. Therefore, equities should be higher in the coming 9-12 months. Our end-2019 SPX target remains at 3,000 based on $181 EPS for calendar year 2020 assuming a 16.5 multiple.4 Nevertheless from a shorter-term perspective, we would refrain from committing fresh capital to this market, as we believe a better entry point lies ahead. Tactically, this market now needs a breather to digest the V-shaped formation since last December’s G20 meeting, before it resumes its bull run. In addition, we would book gains on any alpha generating tactical trades; today we crystalize 16% gains in the S&P semi equipment tactical overweight position since the December 17, 2018 inception and downgrade to neutral. This week, we book handsome profits on a long-held underweight in a consumer discretionary subindex that Trump’s hawkish tariff rhetoric and actions have badly wounded. We also update a materials subsector that benefits from the ongoing global reflationary impulse. Auto Components: Aiming For Pole Position? We have successfully ridden down the S&P 1500 components index on a structural basis over the past four years. But now, factors are falling into place for an end to this multi-year bloodbath. We are lifting exposure to neutral from underweight, locking in relative gains of 36% since inception. Global auto sales are the main driver of auto components profits, thus identifying where we stand in the global auto sales cycle is key. Bellwether German automakers have been caught in an emissions-related downdraft with “Dieselgate” weighing heavily on this sector when new emissions-test procedures were implemented last quarter. The top panel of Chart 5 shows that the worst is likely behind this drubbing in German automobile production as new orders have recently gone vertical. Backlogs are also sky-high and suggest that a definitive turn looms in German motor vehicle output. The upshot is that global auto sales may come out of their recent funk. Chart 5Global Auto Sales Are About To Turn The Japanese car industry, the other global heavyweight, also suffered a minor setback last year, but leading indicators of Japanese auto production are also ticking higher. Japanese industrial robot shipments are at fresh cyclical highs and signal that global auto sales will hook up (bottom panel, Chart 5). In the U.S., light vehicle sales have been stable over the past five years, but auto industrial production growth has been roaring, rising 40 percentage points from the manufacturing recession trough (second panel, Chart 6). Chart 6Improving… All of this paints a brightening backdrop for U.S. auto components manufacturers. Indeed, auto components new orders are at all-time highs (middle panel, Chart 7), at a time when inventories remain tame. In fact the new orders-to-inventories ratio sits squarely above one and continues to firm, with unfilled orders also at all-time highs (Chart 8). As a result, selling prices are accelerating at a healthy clip (third panel, Chart 6). The upshot is that industry profits will likely overwhelm. Chart 7…Operating… Chart 8...Auto Component Metrics On the domestic demand front, the latest Conference Board consumer confidence release showed that consumers’ plans to purchase a car remain upbeat, and could serve as a catalyst to unlock excellent relative value (bottom panel, Chart 7). With regard to President Trump’s hawkish tariff rhetoric and the ongoing U.S./China trade tussle, automobile components makers have taken a big hit. But, there are high odds of an end to the U.S./China trade dispute. Tack on a softening greenback courtesy of a more dovish Fed. U.S. auto components producers will likely grab a larger slice of the global auto parts revenue pie (top panel, Chart 7). Despite these tailwinds, investors have relentlessly avoided auto component stocks. Technicals remain washed out and industry valuations are a small fraction of the broad market and below the historical mean as per the relative price-to-sales ratio (Chart 9). Chart 9Cheap And Oversold… Nevertheless, we refrain from turning outright bullish on this consumer discretionary subsector given the following risks: First, auto loan delinquencies are increasing rapidly, approaching last cycle’s peak. Second, car financing interest rates are still rising, which, at the margin, dents demand for new car sales. Third, auto credit growth is decelerating and demand for auto loans is also anemic according to the Fed’s latest Senior Loan Officer survey (Chart 10). This stands in marked contrast to the aforementioned Conference Board’s survey of consumers’ plans to buy a car. Finally, were President Trump to proceed with auto tariffs on European car manufacturers once he strikes a deal with China, U.S. auto parts producers will suffer a setback. Chart 10…But There Are Some Risks Netting it all out, the easy money has already been made by shying away from auto component manufacturers. Firming leading indicators of global auto sales, upbeat auto components industry operating metrics, a softening U.S. dollar, the looming truce in the U.S./China trade spat and depressed relative technicals and valuations all suggest that it no longer pays to be bearish the S&P 1500 auto components index. Bottom Line: Lift the S&P 1500 auto components index to neutral and crystalize gains of 36% today. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S15AUTC – APTV, BWA, GNTX, GT, DAN, VC, FOXF, DORM, LCII, DJPH, AXL, ADNT, CTB, THRM, GTX, SMP, CPS, MPAA, SUP. A Modest Gold Portfolio Hedge Still Makes Sense Within our broad-based U.S. equity sector and subsector coverage, we continue to recommend a modest gold-related hedge via being overweight the global gold mining index (given that the S&P gold index only comprises a single stock) versus the MSCI All-Country World Index, expressed through the long GDX:US/short ACWI:US exchange traded funds. There is compelling evidence that gold bullion is a reliable reflationary gauge. The shiny metal troughed in mid-August, leading even the JP Morgan EM FX index. Since then, it has been in an uninterrupted run rising over $180/oz. or 15% and sniffing out a reflationary impulse. Not only is there a tight inverse correlation with the trade-weighted U.S. dollar, but over the past three years the Chinese renminbi also moves in close lockstep with gold (Chart 11). Now that Chinese policymakers have opened the credit spigots (January credit data revealed the largest ever month-over-month loan increase in the history of the data, please refer to the second panel of Chart 2 in last week’s publication)5 reflating their economy, there are high odds that gold can break out of its past five year trading range in a bullish fashion. Chart 11Gold Is Sniffing Out A Reflationary Impulse Commodity sentiment and positioning data suggest that gold’s run up will prove durable and continue to underpin the relative share price ratio (second & third panels, Chart 12). Chart 12Bullish Bullion Positioning Underpins Global Gold Miners Importantly, the precious metals industry has not stood still. It has embarked on a massive consolidation phase and the recent spike in M&A activity in global gold miners signals that there is more upside for relative share prices (top panel, Chart 12). But the good news does not stop there. Globally there is a slowdown that has infected a number of economies and BCA’s calculated Global ZEW economic sentiment index has lit a fire under gold mining stocks (Global ZEW shown inverted, second panel, Chart 13). The longer the global soft-patch lasts the longer Central Banks will remain on the sidelines or even ease monetary policy in order to rekindle growth. This macro backdrop represents fertile ground for gold and gold related equities (bottom panel, Chart 14). Chart 13Rising Uncertainty, Global Growth Softpatch And… Chart 14…Falling Real Rates Are Excellent Gold Mining Supports Keep in mind that gold bullion yields zero and the gold mining equities’ dividend yield trails the broad market by 100bps; thus, there is an opportunity cost to holding gold and gold related equities, especially now that even U.S. cash yields 2.5%. This explains the inverse correlation with real interest rates and the recent 30bps fall in the U.S. 10-year TIPS yield reinforces gold bullion and the relative share price ratio (TIPS yield shown inverted, middle panel, Chart 14). Moreover, the global policy uncertainty index is perking up given the ongoing U.S./China trade tussle (top panel, Chart 13), recent news of a no deal between the U.S. and North Korea and looming Brexit deadline. All of this underpins global gold stocks (top panel, Chart 13). Tack on the recent fear that gripped markets, and skyrocketing equity risk premia, and the ingredients are in place for additional gains in the relative share price ratio (third panel, Chart 13). While some semblance of normality has returned to global bourses year-to-date, fixed income investors do not share the euphoria their equity peers are emitting. Such a dichotomy favors global gold mining stocks. Finally, with regard to relative valuations and technicals, global gold equities remain in undervalued territory, but have recently recovered smartly from deeply oversold conditions (Chart 15). Chart 15Valuations Ready To Shine In sum, gold bullion is sniffing out a reflationary impulse that is bullish for global gold mining equities. The global economic soft patch that is exerting downward pressure on real interest rates, a soft U.S. dollar and rising global policy uncertainty, all signal that it still makes sense to hold a global gold mining equity portfolio hedge. Bottom Line: Stay overweight the global gold miners index (long GDX:US/short ACWI:US), and remove the downgrade alert.   Anastasios Avgeriou, U.S. Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Trader’s Paradise” dated January 28, 2019,available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2      https://us.spindices.com/documents/methodologies/methodology-sp-risk-parity-indices.pdf?force_download=true 3      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Report, “Icarus Moment” dated October 22, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Report, “Catharsis” dated January 14, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 5      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Report, “Reflationary Or Recessionary” dated February 25, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps
Special Report Highlights Korean stocks are facing downside risks over the next several months. Exports will continue to contract on falling semiconductor prices and retrenching global demand. Growth deceleration and low inflation will lead the central bank to cut rates in 2019. Within an EM equity portfolio, we are downgrading Korean tech stocks from overweight to neutral but remain overweight the non-tech sector. We are booking gains on our strategic long positions in EM tech versus both the broader EM equity benchmark and materials. The KRW/USD exchange rate is at a critical technical juncture. Investors should wait to buy on a breakout and/or sell on a breakdown of the tapering wedge pattern. Feature   Decelerating and lately contracting South Korean exports have been a major drag on the economy and stock market (Chart I-1). The country is heavily reliant on manufacturing, with exports of goods contributing to nearly half of real GDP. Chart I-1Korean Stocks: Unsustainable Rebound? Although exports are currently shrinking, Korean domestic stock prices still rebounded. The rebound has mostly been driven by the information technology (tech) sector (Chart I-2). Is this recent rally justified by underlying fundamentals? Will share prices continue to rise in 2019? Our inclination is ‘no’ to both questions. There are still dark clouds on the horizon for both Korea’s business cycle and stock market. We are downgrading Korean tech stocks to neutral from overweight within a dedicated EM equity portfolio. However, we are maintaining our overweight in non-tech stocks relative to the EM equity benchmark. Lingering Risks In The Semiconductor Industry Korea’s dependence on the semiconductor sector has risen considerably in the past several years: Semiconductor exports have risen from under 10% to slightly above 20% of total goods exports (Chart I-3). As such, the outlook for semiconductor exports is a critical factor for future economic growth. Chart I-3Korea: Increasing Reliance On The Semiconductor Sector Table 1 lists the top 10 major exported goods from Korea, together contributing about 72% of total exports. Semiconductors are by far the largest component. Last year, overseas sales of semiconductors alone contributed to some 90% of growth in Korean exports, and about one-third of the country’s nominal GDP growth. Notably, Korea produces the largest quantity of DRAM and NAND memory chips in the world. Last year, Korean semiconductor companies accounted for about 70% of global DRAM and 50% of NAND flash global sales revenue. In 2019 Korean semiconductor exports will likely contract due to further deflation in DRAM and NAND memory prices (Chart I-4). Chart I-4Memory Prices Are Plunging The 2016-2017 surge in DRAM and NAND flash prices was due to supply shortages relative to demand. Last year, NAND prices plunged and DRAM prices began to fall as their supply-demand balances shifted to oversupply. This year, the glut will worsen. Demand Global demand for DRAM and NAND memory is slowing. Memory demand from the global smartphone sector – one important end-user market for DRAM and NAND memory chips – is contracting. According to the International Data Corporation (IDC), the global mobile phone sector is the biggest end-market for both DRAM and NAND memory chips, with nearly 40% market share in each. As major markets like China and advanced economies have entered the saturation phase of mobile-phone demand, global smartphone shipments are likely to decline further in 2019 (Chart I-5, top panel). Chart I-5Global Memory Demand Is Slowing DRAMeXchange1 expects global smartphone production volume for 2019 to fall by 3.3% from last year. In addition, the significant surge in bitcoin prices greatly boosted cryptocurrency mining activity in 2016-‘17 as miners quickly expanded their computing power. This contributed to strong DRAM demand and in turn higher semiconductor prices between June 2016 and May 2018. With the bust of bitcoin prices, this demand has vanished, which will further weigh on prices (Chart I-5, bottom panel). Supply High semiconductor prices in 2016-2017 boosted global production capacity expansion of DRAM and NAND memory chips. Based on data compiled by the IDC, global DRAM and NAND flash capacity expanded by 5.7% and 4.3% respectively in 2018 from a year earlier. As most of the global new capacity was added in the second half of 2018, the output of DRAM and NAND in 2019 will be higher than last year. Moreover, DRAM capacity will grow an additional 4% this year. Because of rising supply and slowing demand, both DRAM and NAND markets are in excess supply and have high inventories. DRAMeXchange forecasts that average DRAM prices will drop by at least another 20% in 2019, while NAND flash prices will fall another 10% from current levels. DRAM and NAND flash memory are the largest components of Korean tech producers. Yet they also sell many other tech products such as analog integrated circuits, LCD drivers, discrete circuits, sensors, actuators, and so on. Apart from the negative impact of declining global DRAM and NAND flash prices, the country’s semiconductor exports will also suffer from slowing demand in China in 2019. China, the biggest importer of Korean semiconductor products, has already shown waning demand. Its imports of electronic integrated circuits and micro-assemblies have contracted over the past two months in both value and volume terms (Chart I-6, top and middle panels). This mirrors a similar contraction in Korean semiconductor exports over the same period (Chart I-6, bottom panel). Chart I-6Weakening Chinese Semiconductor Demand Bottom Line: Korean semiconductor producers will likely face a contraction in their sales in 2019 due to weakening demand and deflating semiconductor prices. Diminishing Competitive Advantage Korea has been losing its competitive edge in key sectors like automobiles and smartphones. Even though the country remains highly competitive in the global semiconductor industry, it is beginning to show early signs of losing competitiveness there too. Improving competitiveness among other producers as well as a slowing pace of technological improvement and rising production costs are major reasons underlying Korea’s diminishing global competitiveness. Automobiles Korean auto manufacturers have lost market share in the global auto market. In China, the world’s biggest auto market, Korean brands’ market share has declined significantly in the past four years, losing out to both Japanese and German brands (Chart I-7, top three panels). Chart I-7Korea: Losing Market Shares In China's Auto Market Korean car companies have established auto manufacturing plants in China over the past decade. As a result, all Korean cars sold in China are produced within China, and automobile exports to China from Korea have fallen to zero (Chart I-7, bottom panel). Due to Korean auto manufacturers’ diminishing competitive advantage, Korean automobile production and exports peaked in 2012 in terms of volumes, and have been on a downtrend over the past seven years (Chart I-8, top panel). Chart I-8Further Decline In Korean Auto Output And Exports Is Possible While demand for Korean cars in the EU remains resilient, sales volumes in the U.S., China and the rest of world have been on a downward trajectory (Chart I-8, bottom three panels). Smartphones In the global smartphone market, Korea’s major smartphone-producing company – Samsung – has been in fierce competition with Chinese brands, and it seems to be losing the battle. Chart I-9 shows that while Samsung’s smartphone sales declined 8% year-on-year last year, smartphone sales from major Chinese smartphone producers (Huawei, Xiaomi, Oppo and Vivo) continued to grow at a pace of 20%. Chart I-9Korea: Losing Market Shares In Global Smartphone Market From 2012 to 2018, China’s share of global smartphone shipments rose from 6% to 39%. By comparison, Samsung’s share declined from 30% to 21% over the same period. Semiconductors Korean semiconductor companies – notably Samsung and SK Hynix – will likely remain the biggest producers in the memory market, given their advanced technology. However, there are still signs that Korean semiconductor companies will face increasing challenges in protecting their market share. Based on IDC data, Korean semiconductor companies’ share of global DRAM capacity will inch lower to 65% in 2019 from 65.4% in 2017, while their share of NAND capacity will decline to 53.8% from 57.5% during the same period. Meanwhile, China is focusing on boosting its self-sufficiency in terms of semiconductor production. At the moment there is still a three- to four-year technological gap between China and Korea in DRAM and NAND mass production, though the gap is likely to narrow. In the meantime, the U.S. will continue to create obstacles to prevent the rise of the Chinese semiconductor sector. However, these factors will only delay – not avert – the sector’s development and growth. We believe China will remain firmly committed to develop its semiconductor sector, particularly memory products, irrespective of the cost of investment necessary to do so. Similar to what has transpired in both automobile and smartphone production (Chart I-10), China will slowly increase its penetration in the semiconductor market with increasing capacity and a narrower technology gap over the next five to 10 years. After all, the world’s biggest semiconductor demand is in China. Chart I-10China: A Rising Star In Global Auto And Smartphone Market Significant increase in labor costs = falling export competitiveness for all sectors Korean President Moon Jae-in’s flagship economic policy, “income-led growth,” has resulted in dramatic increases in minimum wages since he took office in 2017, further damaging Korea’s competitiveness. The nation’s minimum wage was hiked by 7.3% in 2017, 16.4% in 2018 and will rise by another 11% to 8,350 KRW or $7.40 an hour, in 2019. As the president remains committed to meeting his campaign pledge of lifting the minimum wage to 10,000 KRW an hour, or about $8.90, this would require a further 20% increase in the next year or two. In addition, the government has also limited the maximum workweek to 52 hours since last July for businesses with more than 300 workers. Last month, the Cabinet further approved a revision bill whereby workers are eligible to receive an additional eight hours of wages every weekend for 40 hours of work that week. The new wage regulations have become a substantial burden on employers in all industries. The impact is more severe on small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). According a recent survey, about 30% of SMEs have been unable to pay workers due to the state-set minimum wage. It is also affecting large manufacturers. According to a joint statement released in late December by the Korea Automobile Manufacturers Association and the Korea Auto Industries Cooperative Association, local automakers’ annual labor cost burdens will increase by at least 700 billion won (US$630 million) a year. As for auto parts manufacturers, a skyrocketing financial burden due to the new policy may threaten their survival. In addition, despite the KORUS FTA agreement reached between Korea and the U.S. last September, Korean auto manufacturers still fear they will be subject to new tariffs in 2019. On February 17, the U.S. Commerce Department submitted a report about imposing tariffs on imported automobiles and auto parts to U.S. President Donald Trump, who will make a decision by May 18. Our Geopolitical Strategy Service (GPS) team believes the odds of U.S. administration imposing auto tariffs on imported cars from Korea are small as this will be against the KORUS FTA agreement.2 Our GPS team also believes Japan is less likely to suffer a tariff than the EU, and even if Japan suffers a tariff along with the EU, Japan will negotiate a waiver more quickly than the EU. In both cases, Korea is likely to sell more cars in the U.S., but it will continue to face strong competition from Japan. Bottom Line: In addition to weakening global demand, a deterioration in Korea’s competitive advantage, due in large part to improving competitiveness among other producers and rising domestic wages, will negatively affect Korean exports. What About Domestic Demand? Record fiscal spending in 2019 will boost public sector consumption considerably, offsetting weakening consumption in the private sector. As the new wage policy will likely result in more layoffs and additional shuttering of businesses, domestic retail sales growth will remain under pressure (Chart I-11). Hence, an unintended consequence of the government’s higher income policy will be weaker aggregate income and consumer spending growth. Chart I-11KOREA The New Wage Policy May Trigger More Layoffs And Weaken Retail Sales Manufacturing and service sector jobs, including wholesale and retail trade and hotels and restaurants, account for 17% and 23% of total employment, respectively. Of all sectors, these two lost the most employees in January from a year ago. Meanwhile, due to the government’s deregulation of loans in 2014, Korean household debt has increased at a much faster pace than nominal income growth (Chart 12, top panel). As a result, Korea’s household debt has rapidly risen to 86% of its GDP as of the end of the third quarter of last year, from 72% four years ago – (Chart I-12, bottom panel). Elevated household debt at a time of rising layoffs will increase consumer anxiety and weigh on household spending. Chart I-12High Household Debt Will Weigh On Spending In order to combat an economic downturn, the government last month approved a record 467 trillion won ($418 billion, 26.5% of the country’s 2018 GDP) budget for 2019, up 9.5% from last year. The last time the budget increased by such a big scale was in 2009, when spending rose 10.7% in the wake of the global financial crisis. In addition, the government will front-load spending – with 61% of the budget to be spent in the first half of 2019. Household spending and government expenditures account for 48% and 15% of real GDP, respectively, while exports equal about 50% of real GDP. Hence, the increase in fiscal spending will not entirely offset the contraction in exports and slowdown in consumer spending. This entails a considerable slowdown in economic growth in 2019. Bet On Monetary Easing With growth disappointing and both headline and core inflation well below 2% (Chart I-13), the central bank will cut rates in 2019. Chart I-13Bet On A Rate Cut So far, economic growth has decelerated in the past 10 months, and recent data shows no signs of recovery. The country’s manufacturing sector is in contraction, with manufacturing PMI holding below the 50 boom-bust line in January (Chart I-14). Meanwhile, South Korea's unemployment rate rose to a nine-year high in January, with most of the job losses in the manufacturing and construction sectors. Chart I-14Manufacturing Sector: Still In Contraction Saramin, a South Korean job search portal, surveyed 906 firms in South Korea last month, 77% of which expressed unwillingness to hire new employees due to higher labor costs and negative business sentiment. Retail sales volume growth recently tumbled to 2-3%, pointing to faltering domestic demand (Chart I-11 above, bottom panel). The fixed-income market is not pricing in a rate cut in 2019. Therefore, investors should consider betting on lower interest rates. Shrinking exports and rate cuts will likely undermine the Korean won. Bottom Line: Economic deceleration and low inflation will lead the central bank to cut interest rates in 2019. Investment Implications The following are our investment recommendations: Downgrade the Korean tech sector from overweight to neutral within the EM space. We are reluctant to downgrade to underweight because many other emerging markets and sectors within the EM universe have poorer structural fundamentals than Korean tech. The tech sector accounts for 38% of the MSCI Korea Index, and 27% of the KOSPI in terms of market value. The stock with the largest weight in the MSCI Korea equity index is Samsung Electronics, with a share of 25%, followed by SK Hynix, with a ~5% share. Both are very sensitive to semiconductor prices. Specifically, semiconductor sales accounted for 31% of Samsung’s revenue, but contributed 77% of Samsung’s operating profit last year (Table I-2). Falling prices reduce producers’ profits by more than falling volumes.3 Hence, profits of semiconductor producers in Korea and globally will shrink in 2019. This will lead to a substantial selloff in Korean tech stocks (Chart I-15). Chart I-15Falling Memory Prices Will Trigger A Sell-Off In Korean Tech Stocks Meanwhile, China accounts for 33% of Samsung’s revenue, making it the largest market (Chart I-16). The ongoing economic slump in China’s domestic demand implies weaker demand for Korean shipments to China, which account for 28% of its exports and 14% of its GDP. ​​​​​​​ We are booking gains on our strategic long position in the Korean tech sector versus the EM benchmark index first instituted on January 27, 2010. This trade resulted in a 136% gain (Chart I-17, top panel). Chart I-16Taking Profits On Our Overweight Tech Positions Consistently, we are also taking profits on our long EM tech / short EM materials stocks trade, a strategic recommendation initiated on February 23, 2010 that has yielded a 186% gain (Chart I-17, second panel). The basis for this strategic position was our broader theme for the decade of being long what Chinese consumers buy and short plays on Chinese construction, which we initiated on June 8, 2010.4 Stay overweight non-tech equities within the EM space. The fiscal stimulus will have a considerable positive impact on the economy. Besides, Korean non-tech stocks have been weak relative to the EM equity benchmark, and in a renewed EM selloff they could act as a low-beta play (Chart I-17, bottom panel). We initiated our long Korean non-tech sector versus the EM benchmark index on May 31, 2018, which has so far been flat. The KRW/USD exchange rate is at a critical technical juncture. Investors should wait and buy on a breakout or sell on a breakdown of the tapering wedge pattern. The KRW/USD has been in a tight trading range over the past eight months (Chart I-18) and is approaching a major breaking point – i.e., any move will be significant, which we expect will largely depend on the movement of the RMB/USD. Chart I-18Tapering Wedge Patterns The natural path for the RMB would have been depreciation versus the U.S. dollar. However, China may opt for a flat exchange rate versus the U.S. dollar given its promises to the U.S. within the framework of forthcoming trade agreements. We have been shorting the KRW versus an equally weighted basket of USD and yen since February 14, 2018. We continue to hold this trade for the time being. Investors should augment their positions if the KRW/USD breaks down or close this trade and go long the won if the KRW/USD breaks out of its tapering wedge pattern. With respect to fixed income, we continue to receive Korean 10-year swap rates as we expect interest rates to fall meaningfully. Local investors should overweight bonds versus stocks.   Ellen JingYuan He, Associate Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy ellenj@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1 DRAMeXchange, the memory and storage division of a technology research firm TrendForce, has been conducting research on DRAM and NAND Flash since its creation in 2000. 2 Please see the Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Trump's Demands On China", published April 4, 2018. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report “Corporate Profits: Recession Is Bad, Deflation Is Worse”, dated January 28, 2016, available at www.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report “How To Play Emerging Market Growth In The Coming Decade”, dated June 8, 2010, available at www.bcaresearch.com. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Highlights A no-deal Brexit which did not cause pain pour encourager les autres would be the much graver existential threat for the EU. A U.K. parliamentary vote to extend Article 50 by a few months would not be a game changer in itself, because it just delays the day of judgement. The real denouement will only happen when a workable route to a benign Brexit option commands a majority in the U.K. parliament. This is the point at which U.K. exposed risk-assets would outperform sustainably. Investors should then buy: the pound, the FTSE250, FTSE Small Cap, and U.K. homebuilders. Feature Chart of the WeekU.K. Homebuilders Is The Best Equity Sector To Play Brexit The Article 50 process that governs Brexit is fast approaching its two-year time limit, and the question naturally arises as to what will happen when the clock strikes midnight on March 29.1  To answer this question, it is worth stepping back to ask something even more fundamental: what was the purpose of the two-year time limit in the first place? The EU Must Protect The Integrity Of The Union The two-year time limit in Article 50 was designed to disadvantage the exiting country relative to the EU, and this disadvantage has now become abundantly clear. After the two years have run down, a no-deal or ‘cliff edge’ exit would be bad for the EU27, but it would be far worse for the U.K. This balance of power has put the EU27 very much in the driving seat of the Brexit process, and there is no reason to presume that the EU27 will do anything other than prioritise and protect its own interests. For the EU27, the priority right now is to protect the unity and integrity of the Union in the face of a growing existential threat from populists and nationalists. Unfortunately, much of this has been overlooked in the Brexiteer rhetoric, with arguments like "they need to sell us their BMWs and Prosecco". Clearly, frictionless and barrier-less trade is in the economic interests of both parties, but the economic reality is that less than a tenth of EU27 exports go to the U.K. while something approaching half of U.K. exports go to the EU27 (Chart I-2 and Chart I-3). Chart I-2Less Than A Tenth Of EU27 Exports Go To The U.K. ... Chart I-3...While Almost Half Of U.K. Exports Go To the EU27 Brexit is essentially a huge economic gamble in the name of an overarching political aim to ‘take back control’ (Chart I-4). Remember that the case for Brexit largely hinged on the desire to regain political sovereignty: specifically, controlling migration and ending the supremacy of the European Court of Justice. That’s fine, we have no qualms about that. But if the case for Brexit was largely political, it’s a bit rich to presume that the EU27 will not also prioritise its own overarching political aims – even if these political aims come at the cost of a short-term setback to the European economy. Chart I-4U.K. House Prices Have Stagnated Since The Brexit Negotiations Started Brexit Is The Litmus Test For Optimality Of The EU A catastrophic no-deal Brexit would undoubtedly hurt the EU27, and be particularly painful for the member states most exposed to U.K. trade, notably Ireland and the Netherlands. But here’s the paradox: a no-deal Brexit which did not cause pain pour encourager les autres would be the much graver existential threat for the EU. If membership of the EU and its institutions is supposedly an optimal economic and political structure for European states, then Brexit is the litmus test for the sub-optimality of exiting, and especially the heavy cost of exiting abruptly. If, after the two-year notice of Article 50, the U.K. abruptly left the EU with negligible disruption and then quickly thrived outside the EU, it would galvanize the European nationalists and populists to emulate a newly confident and resurgent U.K.’s quick and painless divorce. As this could be the death knell of the European project, the paradox is highlighted in our mischievous title: why a catastrophic no-deal might be good… for the EU. Brexit can take three ultimate shapes: The U.K. revokes its intention to withdraw the EU and remains a full member of the Union. A long transition to a new and negotiated trading relationship between the U.K. and the EU27. A sharp cliff-edge in which the U.K. abruptly becomes a third country to the EU27. The U.K. population now clearly favours option 1 – remain – over the two alternatives (Chart I-5). Meanwhile, the U.K. parliament has expressed its opposition, albeit not yet legally binding opposition, to option 3 – the no-deal Brexit. As for the EU27, the best outcome is for the U.K. to revoke its intention to withdraw and thrive within the club; the next best outcome is a long transition to Brexit, during which and after which the U.K. economy underperforms its European peers to illustrate the sub-optimality of exiting. But if Brexit is a cliff-edge, it has to be demonstrably painful. Hence, the EU27 will want to put off the day it has to confront this paradox if there is any chance of avoiding it. Article 50 does allow for this delay. The specific wording of paragraph 3 states: The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period. But a close reading suggests that if there is still a real possibility of finalising a withdrawal agreement, or if withdrawal is an outcome that the State no longer desires, then this would not represent ‘failing’. Meaning that the period of negotiation of a withdrawal agreement could be extended beyond March 29, or indeed Article 50 could be entirely revoked. A Short Delay Is Not A Game Changer, But A Second Referendum Would Be Looking at the desired outcomes of the U.K. population, the U.K. parliament, and the EU27, Brexit should rationally end up as benign options 1 or 2. The trouble is that rational outcomes can be thwarted if there is no mechanism to implement them. Although the U.K. parliament has expressed its desire to avoid a no-deal, it has not yet coalesced a majority around how exactly to avoid the cliff-edge outcome. A parliamentary vote to extend Article 50 by a few months would not be a game changer in itself because it just delays the day of judgement, though a longer extension would be more significant. But if the extension facilitated a second referendum or a general election, then that would be a game changer – as there would be the potential for the U.K. population to overturn the decision to leave.    It follows that the real denouement will only happen when a workable route to either of the benign Brexit options 1 or 2 above commands a majority in the U.K. parliament. From the perspective of investors, what this way forward turns out to be – permanent customs union, Common Market 2.0, second referendum, or general election – does not really matter. What matters is that a parliamentary majority exists for a positive course of action that eliminates no-deal rather than just delays it. This would be the point at which the BoE is finally liberated from its emergency policy (Chart I-6 and Chart I-7), pushing up U.K. gilt yields relative to other government bond yields (Chart I-8), and allowing a sustained rally in the pound (Chart I-9). Chart I-6Brexit Has Subdued The BoE... Chart I-7...Despite A Tight U.K. Labour Market Chart I-8Were It Not For Brexit, U.K. Interest Rates Would Be 1 Percent Higher... Chart I-9…And The Pound Would Be At $1.50 In this event, U.K. exposed risk-assets would also outperform. Note that the FTSE100 is not one of these investments. Whenever the pound strengthens, the weaker translation of the FTSE100 companies’ dollar-denominated earnings tends to weigh down this large-cap index (Chart I-10). Instead, investors should focus on: the FTSE250 (Chart I-11) and the FTSE Small Cap, but the best play is the U.K. homebuilders (Chart of the Week). Chart I-10When The Pound Rallies, The FTSE100 Underperforms... Chart I-11...So Prefer The FTSE250 Fractal Trading System* We are pleased to report that long Italy’s MIB versus Eurostoxx600 reached the end of its 3-month holding period very comfortably in profit which is now crystallised. This week, we note that the sharp underperformance of aluminium versus tin is at the limit of tight liquidity which has previously signalled a trend-reversal. Hence, the recommended trade is long aluminium versus tin. Set a profit target of 6.5 percent with a symmetrical stop-loss. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment’s fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-12 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. *  For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnote 1 Midnight British Summer Time Fractal Trading System Recommendations Asset Allocation Equity Regional and Country Allocation Equity Sector Allocation Bond and Interest Rate Allocation Currency and Other Allocation Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Underweight (High-Conviction) Home Depot, the S&P home improvement retail (HIR) index heavyweight, reported earnings yesterday that missed expectations as same store sales fell well short of estimates. The company also added guidance that this key figure would moderate in the coming year from 2018 levels. While a slower rate of top line growth this quarter was fairly predictable, given the Q4 collapse in lumber prices (recall that HIR earns a markup on lumber), the outlook does not bode well. This tough operating environment is captured by our model that, even with a modest recovery in lumber prices, still points to a significant decline in the S&P HIR index (third panel). Still, the HIR index trades at a premium to the broad index despite the headwinds facing the sector (bottom panel). A premium valuation seems misplaced and we accordingly reiterate our high-conviction underweight recommendation on the sector. We further point investors to our market neutral trade going long homebuilders/short HIR.1 The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index is BLBG: S5HOMI – HD and LOW.   1       Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Report, “Dissecting 2019 Earnings,” dated January 22, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights Equities can continue to outperform bonds for a few months longer. The pro-cyclical equity sector stance that has worked well since last October can also continue for a few months longer. Overweight pro-cyclical Sweden versus pro-defensive Denmark. The caveat is that these short-term trends are unlikely to persist and will viciously reverse later in the year. European ‘soft’ luxury goods companies are an excellent structural investment opportunity. Take profits on the 75 percent rally in Litecoin and 50 percent rally in Ethereum. Feature Why should European investors care so much about China? The Chart of the Week provides one emphatic answer. For Europe’s $500 billion basic resources sector, the three most important things in the world are: China, China, and China. Through the past decade, the share price performance of the resource behemoths BHP, Anglo American, Rio Tinto, and Glencore have been joined at the hip to China’s short-term credit impulse (Chart I-2 and Chart I-3). Chart of the WeekFor European Basic Resources, The Three Most Important Things In the World Are: China, China, And China Chart I-2BHP, Anglo American, And Rio Tinto Have Been Rallying For Several Months Chart I-3BHP Is Joined At The Hip To China's Short-Term Credit Impulse But China has a much deeper importance to Europe. According to Mario Draghi, the recent cycle in Europe is ‘made in China’. On the euro area’s domestic fundamentals, Draghi is upbeat, citing “supportive financing conditions, favourable labour market dynamics and rising wage growth”. Yet the economic data have continued to be weaker than expected. Why? Draghi blames a “slowdown in external demand” and specifically, vulnerabilities in emerging markets. He claims that as soon as there is clarity on the exports and the trade sector, much of the euro area’s weakness will wash out.     Federal Reserve Chairman, Jay Powell presented a remarkably similar narrative to justify the recent pause in the Fed’s sequential rate hikes: “The U.S. economy is in a good place… but growth has slowed in some major foreign economies.” If Powell claims that the U.S. domestic economy is in a good place and Draghi points out that the euro area domestic fundamentals are fine, then the explanation for what has happened – and what will happen – can only come from one place: China. Optimistically, Draghi adds: “everything we know says that China’s government is actually taking strong measures to address the slowdown.” The good news is that we can independently corroborate Draghi’s optimism, at least in the near-term (Chart I-4). Chart I-4China's Short-Term Credit Impulse Is Up Sharply, And Commodities Have Rebounded Why China Matters To Europe Chart I-5 shows the short-term credit impulses in the euro area, U.S., and China through the past twenty years. They are all expressed in dollars to allow an apples for apples comparison between the three major economies. The comparison reveals a fascinating transformation. The dominant short-term impulse – the one with the highest amplitude – charts the shift in global economic power and influence from Europe and the U.S. to China. Chart I-5The Shift In Global Economic Power From Europe And The U.S. To China Before 2008, the short-term impulses in the euro area and the U.S. dominated. But the global financial crisis was a major turning point: the credit stimulus from China dwarfed the responses from the western economies. Then through 2009-12 the impulse oscillations from the three major economies took it in turns to dominate. For example, the 2011-12 global downturn was definitely ‘made in Europe’. However, since 2013 China has taken on the undisputed mantle of dominant impulse. Most recently, last year’s peak to trough decline in China’s short-term impulse amounted to $1 trillion, equivalent to a 1.5 percent drag on global GDP. By comparison, the declines in the euro area and the U.S. amounted to a much more modest $200 billion. Likewise, the recent rebound in the China’s short-term impulse, in dollar terms, has been much larger than the respective rebounds in the euro area and the U.S. Credit Impulses And Speeding Tickets Clients complain that they are confused by the conflicting messages from differently calculated credit impulses. So let’s digress for a moment to present a powerful analogy which should clear the confusion once and for all. Imagine you floored the accelerator pedal of your car (analogous to a huge stimulus). After a hundred metres or so, the stimulus would become very apparent. Your speed over that short sprint would have surged, and possibly have become illegal! But your average speed measured over the previous kilometre would have barely changed. Now imagine a police officer rightfully presents you with a speeding ticket. To protest your innocence, you argue that you couldn’t have floored the accelerator pedal because your average speed over the previous kilometre had barely changed! Clearly, you would never offer such a ludicrous defence for pushing the pedal to the metal. Yet when assessing the impact of an economic stimulus, it is commonplace to make the same mistake.    The crucial point is that a stimulus – like flooring the accelerator pedal of your car – will barely move the needle for a longer-term rate of change, but it will become very apparent in a short-term rate of change. For this reason, financial markets never wait for the long-term rates of change to pick up. They always move up or down on the evolution of short-term rates of change. It follows that the credit impulse calculation that is most relevant is the one that provides the best explanatory power for the cycles that we actually observe in the economic and financial market data. As we described in our Special Report, “The Cobweb Theory And Market Cycles”, both the theory and evidence powerfully identify the 6-month credit impulse as the one with the best explanatory power for the oscillations that we actually observe in the economy and markets.1 For the sceptics, the charts in this report should finally dispel any lingering doubts. China’s 6-month impulse gives a spookily perfect explanation for the industrial commodity inflation cycle, and thereby the share price performance of the basic resources sector, as well as the other classically cyclical sectors (Chart I-6 and Chart I-7). Chart I-6China's Short-Term Impulse Perfectly Explains Industrial Commodity Inflation Chart I-7Semiconductors Are A Modern Day Cyclical The good news is that China’s short-term impulse has indisputably been in a mini-upswing in recent months, and this is the reason that the classical cyclical sectors have simultaneously rebounded or, at the very least, stabilised. The bad news is that the shelf-life of such mini-upswings averages no more than eight months or so. Intuitively, this is because just as you cannot accelerate your car indefinitely, it is likewise impossible to stimulate credit growth indefinitely. The investment conclusion is that the pro-cyclical equity sector stance that has worked well since last October can continue for a few months longer. This sector stance necessarily impacts regional and country allocation. For example, it is still right to be overweight pro-cyclical Sweden versus pro-defensive Denmark (Chart I-8 and Chart I-9).  Chart I-8Overweight Pro-Cyclical Sweden Versus Denmark... Chart I-9...And Versus Norway From an asset allocation perspective, it means that equities can continue to outperform bonds for the time being. But the caveat is that these short-term trends are unlikely to persist, and most likely, they will viciously reverse later in the year. Stay tuned for the signal to switch. Stay Structurally Overweight ‘Soft’ Luxuries A common question we get concerns the European luxury goods sector: is it, just like the basic resources sector, a direct play on China’s growth cycle?  The answer is no. Recently, the connection between the fortunes of ‘soft’ luxury goods brands like LVMH, Hermes, and Kering and China’s growth cycle has been weak (Chart I-10). Broadly, this is also true for ‘hard’ luxury brands – for example, luxury watches – like Richemont (Chart I-11). Chart I-10European 'Soft' Luxuries Are No Longer A China Play... Chart I-11...Neither Are European 'Hard' Luxuries As we highlighted in Buying European Clothes: An Investment Megatrend, the much bigger driver for the ‘soft’ luxury brands is the structural increase in female labour participation rates, and the feminisation of consumer spending. We expect this trend to persist for the next decade.2 Hence, we are happy to buy and hold the European clothes and accessories companies with a dominant or significant exposure to women’s clothes and/or accessories; provided they have a top-end brand (or brands) giving pricing power, and mitigating the very strong deflation in clothes prices. In summary, while European basic resources are a good tactical investment opportunity, European ‘soft’ luxury goods companies are an excellent structural investment opportunity. Fractal Trading System* We are delighted to report that the fractal trading system perfectly identified the sharp recent rebound in cryptocurrencies. Our long Litecoin and Ethereum position has hit its 60 percent profit target with Litecoin up 75 percent and Ethereum up 50 percent since trade initiation on December 19. Additionally, long industrials versus utilities has also hit its profit target. With no new trades this week, the fractal trading system now has five open positions. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment’s fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-12 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. *  For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnote 1 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “The Cobweb Theory And Market Cycles” January 11, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com  2 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Buying European Clothes: An Investment Megatrend” December 6, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System Recommendations Asset Allocation Equity Regional and Country Allocation Equity Sector Allocation Bond and Interest Rate Allocation Currency and Other Allocation Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
This stunningly poor retail sales number is obviously worrisome, especially as the control group, which enters in the calculation of GDP, fell sharply as well. This catastrophic dataset, along with a poor industrial production reading this morning, caused the…
Special Report Highlights China’s recently released pro-auto-consumption policy will lead to a moderate 5-8% recovery in auto sales/production this year. However, the impact from the stimulus will be much less than the previous two episodes in 2009 and 2016. The value of Chinese auto sales is likely to increase by RMB 200 billion to 350 billion, which is about 0.2-0.4% of the country’s nominal GDP in 2018. New-energy cars will continue to gain market share with supportive policies. Meanwhile, domestic brand car manufacturers will likely benefit most from the upcoming recovery in the Chinese auto market, while American car producers will benefit the least. We recommend preparing to go long Chinese auto stocks in the domestic market in absolute terms, subject to the terms of a trade agreement with the U.S. In addition, we continue to overweight domestic consumer discretionary stocks versus the benchmark, and versus domestic consumer staples. Feature China is the world’s largest car producer and consumer – its domestic sales account for about 30% of global auto sales (Chart 1, top panel). The country experienced a 3% contraction in auto sales and production through last year, the first year of negative annual growth in 28 years. The contraction rapidly accelerated into the double digits over the past few months (Chart 1, bottom panel). Chart 1Chinese Auto Industry: Policy Stimulus = Recovery In 2019 As the auto sector is an important driver of China’s economic growth, whenever the industry has shown signs of weakness, the central government has typically implemented a series of supportive policies designed to stimulate the domestic auto market. The authorities successfully did this in 2009-2010 and 2016-2017. Late last month, they again announced a set of pro-auto-consumption policies. The question going forward is how effective these measures will be in boosting auto sales. We believe the recovery will be rather moderate compared with the 2009-2010 and 2016-2017 episodes. Chances are that the growth of auto sales and production will recover to 5-8% in 2019. As a result, we recommend preparing to go long Chinese auto stocks in absolute terms, subject to the terms of a trade agreement with the U.S. Cyclical And Secular Forces Shaping Auto Sales A comparison of the current auto market to the one that prevailed in 2009 and 2016 is helpful to gauge the extent of the strength of the pending auto sales recovery expected this year. Box 1 shows the recently released pro-auto-consumption plan by the Chinese government, which focuses on six aspects, including promoting auto replacement, NEV sales, auto sales in rural areas, pick-up truck sales, development of the second-hand car market, and auto sales in cities that have restricted auto sales policies.   BOX 1: China’s Stimulus Package For Domestic Auto Industry The recently released pro-auto-consumption plan by the Chinese government includes: Promoting auto replacement: Providing subsidies to consumers who scrap their older, higher-polluting cars for new, lower-emission or zero-emission cars; Encouraging NEV sales: Providing subsidies to advanced NEV sales and giving more privileges to new energy trucks; Promoting auto sales in rural areas: Providing subsidies to rural residents who scrap their tricycles to buy a truck with cylinder capacity equal or less than 3.5 tons, or a passenger car with cylinder capacity equal or less than 1.6L; Promoting pick-up truck sales: Widening access areas within cities for pick-up trucks; Accelerating the development of the second-hand car market: Allowing second-hand car trades across different cities and provinces; Loosening auto sales restrictions in cities that have restricted auto sales policies. Regarding the amount of subsidies, the government did not provide details.   Putting it all together, we believe that this time the impact from the stimulus will be much more muted than the previous two episodes in 2009 and 2016. First, there is no sales tax reduction measure in this round of stimulus. The most important driver for the auto market recovery in 2009 and 2016 was a sales tax reduction in passenger cars with cylinder capacity equal to or less than 1.6L from 10% to 5% (Chart 2). However, this time, there is no such cut. While the government is maintaining zero sales tax on new energy vehicles (NEV), the sales tax on all automobiles remains at 10% this year. Chart 2The Lessons From The 2009 And 2016 Episodes Second, domestic pent-up demand for automobiles is much lower than it was in both 2009 and 2016. The car ownership rate, defined as the number of passenger cars per 1000 households, has risen significantly to 453 in 2018 (Chart 3). This means that nearly half of Chinese households already own at least one car as of 2018. In comparison, the car ownership rate was only 91 in 2008 and 318 in 2015. Chart 3Less Pent-Up Demand For Autos In 2019 Than Before Third, Chinese households’ debt levels have surged in the past few decades, constraining their ability to purchase cars and other goods (Chart 4, top panel). While many investors compare the cross-country household debt burden relative to GDP, Chinese household debt has already risen to nearly 120% of households’ disposable income, surpassing the U.S. (Chart 4, bottom panel). Chart 4Increasing Households' Debt Burden Constrains Ability To Buy A Car Fourth, while the recent stimulus packages aim to promote auto sales in rural areas, the difficulty of getting auto loans is much higher for the average rural household than for the average urban household, as the former generally have much lower income levels. In addition, peer-to-peer lending, which has become a major source of auto loans in recent years due to lower lending standards compared with banks, has collapsed since last year (Chart 5). With tightening regulations, the difficulty of acquiring auto loans through peer-to-peer lending is currently higher than before. Chart 5Rising Difficulty To Get An Auto Loan Lastly, there has been a structural decline in consumers’ willingness to buy cars due to increasing traffic congestion, limited parking space and more advanced public transportation. Moreover, more mature car rental markets and the rising use of car-sharing services have also helped reduce the need to buy a car, to some extent. This is a major difference from 2009-2010 and 2016. In Chart 6, both falling households’ marginal propensity to consume and declining consumption loan growth suggest a decreasing willingness to consume among Chinese consumers. Chart 6Chinese Consumers: Falling Willingness To Consume With all the aforementioned cyclical and structural forces in place, the impact on domestic auto sales from the recent stimulus package will be smaller in 2019 than in 2009 and 2016. That said, these policies will still be supportive, and likely sufficient to lift auto sales from contraction back to positive growth this year. Estimating the magnitude of the impact remains challenging, however, due to lingering uncertainty about the size of government subsidies. Based on all six measures listed in Box 1, the scale of subsidies provided by the government will be the major determinant for auto sales growth in China in 2019. In general, the bigger the subsidies, the stronger the push on auto sales. In 2009, both the central government and local government provided subsidies for stimulating auto sales. This time, while the financing sources could still be both central and local governments, local governments’ ability to finance auto consumption stimulus is diminishing due to their much higher debt levels and weaker revenues from land sales than in the past. For now, our view is that the impact from the stimulus will be much less significant than the previous two episodes in 2009 and 2016. Auto sales growth was 4.7% and 3% in 2015 and 2017, respectively. With recently announced stimulus, we expect the growth will be higher than in those years. Bottom Line: We expect that the growth of Chinese auto sales/production volumes will rebound to 5-8% this year, much slower than the 45% growth seen in 2009 and 14% growth in 2016. With a similar growth rate in value terms, Chinese auto sales are likely to increase by RMB 200 to 350 billion, which is about 0.2-0.4% of the country’s 2018 nominal GDP. The Winners And Losers At 5-8%, growth will be equivalent to a 1.5-2 million-unit increase in domestic auto sales. This will lead to a similar increase in auto production, as most cars are domestically produced. In terms of fuel use, automobiles can be classified as gasoline cars, diesel cars and new-energy cars. Chart 7 shows that gasoline cars currently hold 84% market share. In terms of brand, automobiles can be categorized as Chinese brands, Japanese brands, German brands, American brands, Korean brands and others. Chart 8 shows their market structure, with Chinese brands currently accounting for 42% of total market share. As the Chinese auto market is set to have a moderate recovery this year, which kinds of cars will benefit most, and which will benefit least? Even though China plans to gradually reduce its subsidies on NEVs to zero in 2021, several factors suggest that NEVs will still be the biggest winner, taking more market share from both gasoline and diesel cars. The government is aiming to increase the NEV market share from 4.5% currently to 20% by 2025. Assuming total sales rise to 32 million units in 2025 from current levels of 28 million (about 2% annual growth), this would imply that NEV sales will surge to 6.4 million units from 1.3 million currently, which is equal to 26% annual growth over the next seven years (Chart 9). Chart 9NEV Sales: Plenty Of Upside In addition to governments continuing subsidies, the sales tax on NEVs will be held at zero until the end of 2020, a big advantage over non-NEV vehicles, which carry the 10% sales tax. In addition, in cities that have license restrictions on car sales or have time or area restrictions on on-road autos, NEVs are not constrained by such policies, which is an attractive privilege for car buyers to consider. For example, in Shanghai, it costs over 80,000 RMB to buy a license plate for a non-NEV car if the potential buyer is lucky enough to be selected by random draw. In comparison, buying a NEV allows the buyer to have a free license plate. Current NEVs can achieve recharge mileage of 300-450 kilometers, with a price of RMB 100,000 to RMB 150,000 per unit. While the recharge mileage is sufficient for most daily use, prices are no longer substantially higher than prices for traditional gasoline or diesel cars. Major global and local NEV producers are expanding their production in China. For example, Tesla last month started building its mega electric car manufacturing plant in Shanghai, which will initially produce 250,000 cars per year, and eventually ramp up to half a million. This will be about five times the number of vehicles the company currently produces in the U.S. Most NEVs that have been sold in China are Chinese-brand NEVs. However, with China further opening up its auto sector and allowing more foreign NEV producers to invest and produce cars in China, Chinese NEV producers will face increasing competition and may lose some market share to foreign NEV producers. Meanwhile, Chinese NEV-related supportive policies will likely benefit both local and foreign NEV producers as the government is determined to develop the domestic NEV market and encourage NEV sales. That said, local producers will still enjoy slightly more favorable policies than foreign ones. Given that the government is promoting smaller-engine passenger car sales in rural areas and encouraging the replacement of old diesel cars with NEVs, sales and production of gasoline cars may also increase slightly, while diesel cars are likely to rise the least. In terms of brand, Chinese and American brands lost share to Japanese and German brands last year. We believe Chinese brands will benefit most from this year’s government-led auto market recovery for two reasons (Chart 10, top panel): Chart 10Chinese Brands Will Benefit Most From This Year’s Policy Stimulus The authorities will likely favor local brand producers in terms of benefitting from the subsidies they give to car buyers. In addition, local brand cars in general have lower prices than foreign brands, which could be the most attractive feature for price-sensitive rural residents. In the meantime, as the government encourages local auto replacement, this may benefit Japanese and German brands (Chart 10, second and third panels), as buyers with replacement needs will likely upgrade their cars to ones of higher quality and better reputation. Among American cars, while we are positive on American NEV car sales in China, we still expect American cars to continue to lose market share due to weakening sales of American non-NEV car sales (Chart 10, bottom panel). American cars are generally more expensive than Chinese-brand cars, and they are often perceived as slightly lower quality than either Japanese or German brands. Moreover, the ongoing trade dispute may bias Chinese buyers against buying an American car. Bottom Line: We believe NEV producers and Chinese-brand car producers will benefit most from this year’s government-led auto market recovery. Investment Implications There are several important conclusions that stem from our research. First, while rebounding auto production will likely lift demand for many metals, housing construction is artificially supporting demand and is set to decelerate over the coming year (Chart 11). Consequently, we do not believe that accelerating auto production alone is a license to be long industrial metals over the coming year. Chart 11Weakening Property Market Weighs More On Commodity Market Second, within the equity space, we recommend that global investors prepare to go long domestic auto stocks on an absolute basis after the outcome of the U.S.-China trade talks emerges later this month. Rebounding auto production will likely lead to a cyclical improvement in auto producer earnings, which in combination with deeply oversold conditions bodes well for the 6-12 month outlook (Chart 12). Chart 12Look To Long Domestic Auto Stocks In An Absolute Term U.S. negotiators are seeking increased access to the Chinese auto market, which implies that the outcome of the negotiations carries some event risk for domestic producers (particularly if China’s concessions on this front turn out to be large). But our sense is that we are likely to recommend an outright long position favoring domestic automakers barring a trade deal with deeply negative implications for domestic producer market share. Third, our bullish bias towards Chinese auto producers and our constructive outlook for the home appliance market supports two of our existing trades favoring consumer discretionary stocks. Chart 13 highlights that production and sales volume for several home appliance products is depressed, and stands to benefit from a flurry of policy announcements late last month that were intended to support the industry. Chart 13Home Appliances: Rebound Soon On Stimulus As Well Both auto producers and home appliance manufacturers belong to the consumer discretionary sector, and we recommend maintaining a long domestic consumer discretionary position versus both the domestic benchmark and relative to consumer staples (both trades were initiated on November 141). While domestic consumer discretionary stocks are expensive vs. the domestic benchmark on a P/B basis (Chart 14), the sector’s relative P/E ratio is trading at the very low end of its historical range and the trade has eked out modest positive gains since initiation. Chart 14Remain Overweighting Consumer Discretionary Sector Our long discretionary / short staples trade has faired much worse, down 11% since initiation due to a significant rally in consumer staples stocks (rather than losses in the discretionary sector). We recommend that investors stick with the trade over the coming 6-12 months despite the loss, as Chart 15 highlights that the discretionary / staples trade could not be more extreme in terms of relative performance or valuation. Our bet is that this trade will reverse course in 2019, for a meaningful period, in response to a cyclical tailwind from policy. Chart 15Stay Long Discretionary / Short Staples   Ellen JingYuan He, Associate Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy EllenJ@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research’s China Investment Strategy Special Report “Chinese Household Consumption: Full Steam Ahead?”, published November 14, 2018. Available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations