Sorry, you need to enable JavaScript to visit this website.
Skip to main content
Skip to main content

Economy

Highlights Portfolio Strategy Expensive valuations leave no room to maneuver in the S&P real estate index that has to contend with a higher interest rate backdrop and deteriorating cash flow growth fundamentals. Trim to underweight. In contrast, capital markets stocks are firing on all cylinders and the return of animal spirits, the capex upcycle, booming M&A activity and a brighter operating backdrop auger well for this highly cyclical financials sub-index. Stay overweight. Recent Changes S&P Real Estate - Downgrade to underweight today. Table 1 Feature Equities rebounded in the past two weeks, as earnings took center stage and they delivered beyond expectations. Impressively, the blended Q1 EPS growth rate is running at 20% (versus 18.5% expected on April 1) with roughly 18% of the S&P 500 constituents reporting profit numbers. This earnings validation served as a catalyst for the SPX to briefly reclaim the key 50-day moving average and, most importantly, the Advance/Decline (A/D) line hit fresh all-time highs. Historically, the A/D line and the S&P 500 move hand-in-hand and there is a high chance that the SPX will follow suit in the coming quarters (top panel, Chart 1). Our upbeat cyclical 9-12 month equity market view remains intact, as the odds of a recession are close to nil. Despite fears of a generalized global trade war, global trade volumes have been resilient vaulting to multi-year highs on a short-term rate of change basis (middle panel, Chart 2). While a global growth soft patch cannot be ruled out, as long as manufacturing PMIs can stay above the 50 boom/bust line, synchronized global growth will remain the dominant macro theme. Chart 1New Highs Ahead? Chart 2What Slowdown? The IMF concurred in its April, 2018 World Economic Outlook: "The global economic upswing that began around mid-2016 has become broader and stronger. This new World Economic Outlook report projects that advanced economies as a group will continue to expand above their potential growth rates this year and next before decelerating, while growth in emerging market and developing economies will rise before leveling off." 1 The bond market is also not sending a distress signal as very sensitive junk bond spreads have nosedived of late (shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 1). Under such a backdrop, EPS will continue to shine and underpin stocks (Chart 2). Nevertheless, steeply decelerating money supply growth is slightly disconcerting. This is not only a U.S. only phenomenon, but G7 money supply growth is also losing momentum. Chinese and overall emerging markets money growth numbers are also stuck in a rut (Chart 3). While this could be the precursor to a global growth slowdown, we would expect commodity prices to be the first to sniff it out (Chart 4). Clearly this is not the case as commodities spiked last week. Moreover, keep in mind that money growth tends to peak before recessions and what we are currently observing is likely a typical late cycle phenomenon. We will continue to closely monitor money growth around the globe, as this steep deceleration represents a risk to our sanguine equity market view. This week we are updating our corporate pricing power indicators. Chart 5 shows that our corporate sector pricing power proxy and our diffusion index are holding on to recent gains. On the labor front, the business sector's overall wage inflation and associated diffusion index from the latest BLS employment report ticked lower (fourth panel, Chart 5). Chart 3Money Growth Yellow Flag... Chart 4... But Commodities Are Resilient Chart 5No Margin Trouble Yet However, the spread between job switchers and stayers (courtesy of the Atlanta Fed Wage Growth Tracker) suggests that wage inflation should pick up steam in the coming months. While rising pay would eat into profit margins and thus dent profits ceteris paribus, this would be problematic only if businesses failed to lift selling prices in the coming months. We assign low odds to this outcome as domestic (and global) final demand is firm, suggesting that companies will manage to pass on rising input prices either down the supply channel, to the government and/or the consumer. Table 2Industry Group Pricing Power Table 2 summarizes the sectorial results. We calculate industry group pricing power from the relevant CPI, PPI, PCE and commodity growth rates for each of the 60 industry groups we track. Table 2 also highlights shorter term pricing power trends and each industry's spread to overall inflation. Chart 6Cyclicals Have The Upper Hand Over 83% of the industries we cover are lifting selling prices, and 45% are doing so at a faster clip than overall inflation. This is a slight improvement compared with our late-January report The number of outright deflating sectors dropped by three to 10 since our last update. Encouragingly, only 7 industries are experiencing a downtrend in selling price inflation, on par with our most recent report. Impressively, deep cyclicals/commodity-related industries continue to dominate the top ranks, occupying the top 7 slots (top panel, Chart 6). Improving global trade dynamics and sustained softness in the greenback are behind the commodity complex's ability to increase prices. In contrast, tech, telecom, autos and airlines populate the bottom ranks of Table 2. In sum, firming corporate sector pricing power will continue to boost sales growth for the rest of the year. Tack on operating leverage kicking into higher gear at this stage of the cycle, especially for the high fixed cost deep cyclical businesses, and still modest wage inflation, and profit margins and EPS growth will remain upbeat. This week we downgrade a niche interest rate-sensitive sector and update our view on a very cyclical financials sub-sector. DowngREITing There are good odds that laggard REITs will suffer the same fate as telecom services and utilities stocks and plumb relative all-time lows, breaching the early 2000s nadir (Chart 7). A higher interest rate backdrop, a key BCA theme for 2018, along with deteriorating profit fundamentals compel us to downgrade the niche S&P real estate sector to an underweight stance. Real estate stocks are behaving like fixed income proxied equities, given that, by construction, REITs are high dividend yielding. Thus, a tightening monetary backdrop serves as a noose around their necks (top panel, Chart 8). Not only is the Fed slated to raise interest rates two or three more times this year, but FOMC median projections also assume an additional two to three hikes in 2019. At the margin, competing higher yielding risk free assets will eat into demand for REITs. On the operating front, a number of indicators we track are sending an outright bearish signal for the commercial real estate (CRE) sector. The occupancy rate has crested just shy of 90% or 160bps below the previous cycle's peak. Rising vacancies are emblematic of decreasing rents and thus CRE related cash flows (middle panel, Chart 8). Chart 7New Lows Looming Chart 8Rental Deflation Alert Importantly, CRE prices continue to defy gravity and are steeply deviating from our petered out occupancy rate composite (bottom panel, Chart 8). This supply/demand imbalance typically resolves itself via deflating prices. Industry overbuilding explains this disequilibrium, as ZIRP and loose credit standards encouraged a construction boom. Overall non-residential construction is probing all-time highs and multi-family housing starts are expanding close to 400K/annum, a level that has coincided with previous peaks in the CRE market (third & fourth panels, Chart 9). This industry oversupply should weigh heavily on rents especially given the slackening demand backdrop, according to the message from our REITs Demand Indicator (RDI). The softening RDI reading also bodes ill for CRE price inflation (bottom panel, Chart 10). The latest Fed Senior Loan Officer Survey (FSLOS) corroborates that demand for CRE loans is in a steady decline and bankers are not willing extenders of CRE credit, exerting a downward pull on CRE prices (middle panel, Chart 10). Chart 9Rents Are Under Attack Chart 10CRE Prices Skating On Thin Ice Historically, demand for CRE loans as per the FSLOS has been an excellent leading indicator of actual CRE loan growth, and the current message is grim (second panel, Chart 11). It would be unprecedented for another upleg to take root in the CRE market with the absence of credit growth to fuel such an overshoot phase. Worrisomely, there is no valuation cushion to absorb the plethora of possible CRE mishaps. Cap rates have troughed for the cycle and a rising interest rate backdrop warns that a de-rating in expensive valuations is looming (third panel, Chart 11). While CRE credit quality shows no signs of deterioration, at this stage of the cycle and given weak industry profit fundamentals we would caution against extrapolating such good times far into the future (bottom panel, Chart 11). Adding it all up, our S&P real estate profit growth model does an excellent job encapsulating all of these forces, and it is currently sending an unambiguous sell signal (Chart 12). Chart 11Happy Days Are Over Chart 12Model Says Sell Bottom Line: Downgrade the niche S&P real estate index to a below benchmark allocation. Capital Markets: Stay The Bull Course We upgraded capital markets stocks to an above benchmark allocation mid-May last year. Our thesis, recovering overall market top and bottom line growth would prolong the overshoot phase in equities at a time when monetary conditions would stay sufficiently loose, has panned out and this hyper sensitive early-cyclical index has added alpha to our portfolio raising the question: is it time to book profits or are there more gains in store? The short answer is that it is too soon to crystalize gains. This financials sub-index thrives when animal spirits are rising, CEOs embrace an expansionary mindset, and investor risk appetites are healthy. The opposite is also true. We first started exploring the underappreciated global capex upcycle theme in mid-October2 and by late-November it became one of our two core themes for 2018 (rising interest rate backdrop is the other).3 The second panel of Chart 13 shows that capex intentions move in tandem with relative EPS and are pointing toward a profit reacceleration in the coming months. Bankers are also willing extenders of credit, a necessary fuel for the capex upcycle phase, and demand for loans is upbeat as per our commercial loans & leases model. Historically, such a macro backdrop has been a sweet spot for capital markets stocks (Chart 13). Not only business, but investor confidence is also sky high. Junk bond spreads have once again plumbed multi-year lows and even investment grade bond spreads are tight (high-yield spread shown inverted, Chart 1). Corporate bond issuance remains resilient. The Equity Risk Premium has also narrowed by 200bps since the end of the manufacturing recession (shown inverted, top panel, Chart 14), reducing the cost of equity capital. This is fertile ground both for IPOs and secondary stock offerings. Chart 13Solid Foundation Chart 14Enticing Operating Backdrop Meanwhile, the return of volatility has caused revenue generating equity trading desks to breathe a huge sigh of relief, as we had posited in early March,4 and this earnings season made abundantly clear. Trading volumes have soared and margin debt continues to climb both in absolute terms and relative to GDP (Chart 14). If volatility stays elevated as the year progresses, as we expect, then more gains are likely for investment bank trading desks. The upshot is that the capital markets' EPS upswing is in the early innings. Another key earnings driver, M&A activity, is booming around the globe. Still sloshing global liquidity with near generationally low interest rates is fueling an M&A spree. In the U.S. alone, M&A has hit a fresh cycle high and is running near $3.1Tn/annum. Even relative to output, M&A has returned to the previous cycle's peak (bottom panel, Chart 14), and is music to the ears of investment bankers. The implication is that a capital markets ROE expansion phase looms (bottom panel, Chart 15). On the operating front, capital markets employment is hyper-cyclical. Investment banks are quick to slash labor costs during a downturn and equally swift to expand headcount in anticipation of good times. Currently, industry payrolls are rising steadily and outpacing overall non-farm payroll growth, and represent a positive backdrop (Chart 16). Chart 15M&A Fever Is Positive... Chart 16...And So Is Rising Headcount Sell-side analysts have taken notice and EPS pessimism has violently swung into extreme optimism in the past 18 months. Granted, President Trump's election and tax reform euphoria are part of the slingshot recovery in EPS expectations. However, firming industry-specific EPS growth prospects are also driving analysts' upward revisions (bottom panel, Chart 16). Bottom Line: We recommend an above benchmark allocation in the still compellingly valued S&P investment banks & brokers index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5INBK - ETFC, GS, MS, RJF, SCHW. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2018/03/20/world-economic-outlook-april-2018 2 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Special Report, "Top 5 Reasons To Favor Cyclicals Over Defensives," dated October 16, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "High-Conviction Calls," dated November 27, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Special Report, "Top 10 Reasons We still Like Banks," dated March 5, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth Stay neutral small over large caps (downgrade alert)
Dear Client, Alongside this week's report we are also sending you a fascinating short Special Report written by Jennifer Lacombe of our Global ETF Strategy sister service. The report, which demonstrates the use of ETF flows as a leading indicator of FX trends, points to downside for the EUR/USD and GBP/USD this year. I trust you find the piece informative. Best regards, Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy Highlights A debate over slack is raging within the ECB. We tend to side with President Draghi, and believe there is more labor market slack in the euro area than suggested by the OECD's measures. Arguing in favor of this case is the presence of hidden labor market slack, the paucity of wage gains, even in Germany, and the potential for NAIRU to decline in many large economies. With global and European growth slowing, this will limit how hawkish the ECB can be in the short term, and thus limits the euro's gains in 2018. However, on a long-term basis, the presence of slack today argues that the euro area's potential GDP is higher than if there were no slack, and therefore policy rates and the euro have more long-term upside. Feature The recent release of the European Central Bank's account of its March policy meeting was very revealing. The ECB is currently torn between two camps: one believing there is little slack in the euro area labor market, and the other, led by ECB President Mario Draghi and chief economist Peter Praet, arguing that the continent's job market is still replete with excess capacity. This debate has enormous implications for the path of the euro. If there is no slack left in the euro area, this would point to an immediate need for higher rates and a higher euro, but it would also suggest the scope for the terminal policy rate in Europe to rise is limited. The long-term upside in the euro would therefore also be small. If there is still a large amount of slack in the euro area labor market, this implies that policy rates do not have much scope to rise over the next 18 months, and that the euro will find it difficult to appreciate much over this time frame. However, it also suggests that the potential growth rate of the euro area is higher than would otherwise be the case and that terminal policy rates can rise more in the long-run - implying that on a long-term basis the euro still has meaningful upside. We side in the latter camp. Chart I-1No Slack In Europe? Hidden Labor Market Slack... The question of slack in the euro area has been ignited by a simple reality: both the OECD's measure of the European output gap and the difference between the official unemployment rate and the equilibrium unemployment rate calculated by the OECD (NAIRU) are close to zero (Chart I-1). This observation would vindicate the desire of some ECB members to increase rates sooner than later, since the absence of an unemployment gap should lead to both higher wages and higher inflation. But before making too prompt a judgment, the U.S.'s recent experience is illuminating. Only now that the unemployment rate is 0.5% below NAIRU are U.S. wages and core inflation showing some signs of life (Chart I-2). In the U.S., we observed that while the headline unemployment rate has been consistent with accelerating wages as early as in 2015, discouraged workers back then represented 0.4% of the working age population, and were in fact willing participants in the job market. Only now that this number has fallen back to 0.27% - levels associated with full-employment in the previous business cycle - are employment costs perking up. There is little reason to believe that the eurozone economy is very different from the U.S. in this respect. In fact, the euro area suffered a double-dip recession, the second leg of which ended only in 2013, suggesting Europe suffered a severe enough shock to also fall victim to the symptoms of hidden labor market slack. A simple comparison helps illustrates that Europe is likely to still be experiencing labor market slack. Chart I-3 shows various measures of total and hidden labor market slack in the U.S. and the euro area. To begin with, despite a sharp rise in the female participation rate, the euro area's employment-to-population ratio for prime-age workers is not only well below the level that currently prevails in the U.S., it is also below its 2008 peak by a greater extent than is the case on the other side of the Atlantic. This suggests there is greater total labor market slack in Europe than in the U.S. Additionally, discouraged workers and long-term unemployment remain much closer to post-crisis highs in the euro area than in the U.S. In the latter, these ratios have mostly normalized close to levels consistent with full employment. Chart I-2The U.S. Experience WIth##br## Hidden Labor Market Slack Chart I-3The Euro Area Still Has ##br##Plenty Hidden Slack Looking at some euro area-specific variables also dispels the idea that the European job market is near full employment and about to generate inflation: The ECB's labor underutilization measure1 still shows a high level of slack, especially in the European periphery (Chart I-4). Another problem for Europe is irregular work contracts. Europe, like Japan, is plagued with a dual labor market. On one hand, permanent employees are still protected by generous employment laws. On the other hand, employees under temporary work contracts are not. In Japan, this same disparity has been blamed for keeping wages down, as temporary employees are often willing to switch to positions offering the protection of regular job contracts for no wage increases. These workers are a form of hidden labor-market slack. Temporary employment in Europe remains at elevated levels, and contract work represents a record share of employment in Italy and France (Chart I-5), suggesting the same disease present in Japan also lingers in vast swaths of the European economy. Chart I-4The ECB's Metrics Also Show ##br##Elevated Labor Underutilization Chart I-5A Dual Labor Market Weighs ##br##On Wage Growth Labor reforms could also be creating labor market slack in Europe. As Chart I-6 shows, after Germany implemented its Hartz IV labor reforms in 2004, NAIRU collapsed. Spain, which has implemented equally draconian measures, could also witness its own equilibrium unemployment rate trend sharply lower over the coming years (Chart I-6, bottom panel). In France, timid reforms were implemented during the Hollande presidency, but President Macron is pushing an agenda of deep job market reforms. While Italy remains a laggard and its current political miasma offers little hope, the reality remains that much of Europe could also be experiencing a decline in NAIRU like Germany did last decade. Even Germany shows limited signs of an overheating labor market, despite an unemployment rate of 5.3%, the lowest reading ever in re-unified Germany: not only have German wages been unable to advance at a faster pace than the experience of the past 15 years, recent quarters have seen a slowdown in wage growth (Chart I-7). The presence of slack in the rest of Europe therefore appears to be limiting wage pressures even in that booming economy. Chart I-6The Impact Of Labor Reforms##br## On Full Employment Chart I-7No Wage Growth##br## In Germany Bottom Line: The euro area is likely to be under the same spell as the U.S. was a few years ago. Traditional metrics portend a labor market at full employment, but broader measures in fact highlight that there is still plentiful slack. Additionally, the implementation of labor market reforms in key European economies in recent years could imply that Europe's NAIRU is lower than the OECD's estimate and may further decline in coming years. ... And Slowing Global Growth It is one thing for Europe to be experiencing hidden labor market slack, but if growth is set to accelerate further, this would mean that this slack could nonetheless dissipate fast enough to allow for a more hawkish ECB in the short run. However, this is not the case. The European economy is very sensitive to global growth gyrations, and signs are accumulating that the global synchronized boom is petering out. As we have already highlighted, the diffusion index of the OECD global leading economic indicator has plummeted well below the boom/bust line, pointing to a sharp slowdown in the LEI itself (Chart I-8, top panel). EM carry trades have been underperforming, which normally leads a slowdown in global industrial activity (Chart I-8, middle panel). Additionally, Japanese export growth is decelerating sharply (Chart I-8, bottom panel). In a previous report we attributed major responsibility for this slowdown to monetary, fiscal and regulatory tightening in China. Europe is not immune to this malaise. European exports growth and foreign orders are all slowing sharply, but interestingly domestic factors are also at play. As the top panel of Chart I-9 illustrates, the European credit impulse is now contracting, suggesting domestic demand is set to slow. In fact, this has already begun as the growth of German domestic manufacturing orders is in negative territory (Chart 9, bottom panel). Chart I-8Global Growth Is Slowing Clouds##br## Hanging Over Global Growth Chart I-9Euro Area Domestic##br## Growth Is Flagging No matter the source, the end result for Europe is the same: the torrid pace of European growth is set to slow, not accelerate. Not only have European economic surprises fallen precipitously (Chart I-10, top panel), but the Ifo survey - a key bellwether of German activity - has also peaked. Moreover, the Sentix survey points to a sharp slowdown in the manufacturing PMIs (Chart I-10, bottom panel). Because there is slack in the European economy and growth is set to slow, there is a good reason for the Draghi-led ECB to remain very cautious in the coming quarters before sounding hawkish. As a result, the euro faces strong headwinds over the next six months or so, especially as the Federal Reserve faces milder handicaps than the ECB: U.S. economic slack has dissipated and U.S. inflation is rising. These inflationary pressures could even intensify thanks to U.S. President Donald Trump's late-cycle fiscal stimulus. Relative growth dynamics also support the dollar this year as euro area industrial production is already lagging behind the U.S. (Chart I-11). This trend is set to continue for the coming quarters because the U.S. economy is less exposed to a global growth slowdown and U.S. households' are experiencing sharply accelerating disposable income growth, a support for domestic demand. Chart I-10Weakening European ##br##Growth Outlook Chart I-11European Growth Will ##br##Underperform The U.S. Further Bottom Line: Not only is there still slack in the euro area labor market, global growth is showing signs of a slowdown. This is likely to have a deleterious impact on European growth as the eurozone credit impulse is already contracting. As a result, European growth is likely to lag that of the U.S., an economy where there is no more slack, and where inflation is perking up. This combination represents a potent headwind for the euro over the next six months or so. The Euro Cyclical Bull Market Is Far From Over The combination of slowing global growth and labor market slack in the euro area suggests the euro may depreciate by six to eight cents over the next six months, but it does not sound the death knell of the euro's cyclical rally. To the contrary, the presence of slack in Europe suggests the euro still has significant cyclical upside. Historically, the euro performs well when the U.S. business cycle enters the last two years of expansion (Chart I-12). This is because European growth begins to outperform U.S. growth in the late stages of the economic cycle, allowing investors to upgrade their assessment of the path of long-term monetary policy in the euro area relative to the U.S. This time an additional impetus could emerge. If there is more slack in the euro area than traditional unemployment metrics imply, the euro area's potential GDP is also higher than these traditional metrics would submit - i.e. trend growth in Europe could be higher than once thought. The impact of labor market reforms in France and Spain further bolster this possibility. A consequence of a higher trend growth rate would also be a higher than originally assessed level for euro area neutral interest rates, or the so-called r-star. The European five-year forward 1-month OIS could therefore have significant upside from current levels (Chart I-13, top panel). This would also imply that expected rates in Europe have room to increase versus the U.S., lifting the euro in the process (Chart I-13, bottom panel). Chart I-12The Euro Rallies Late##br## In The Business Cycle Chart I-13European Slack Today Means ##br##Higher Rates Tomorrow Bottom Line: The presence of slack in Europe suggests that its potential GDP is higher than once thought. Hence, Europe could still have a few more years of robust growth in front of her. The following paradox ensues: if the presence of slack limits the upside for European interest rates today, it also suggests that European policy rates can rise much more in the future than if there was no slack today. Therefore, while this limits the capacity of the euro to rise further this year, the euro cyclical bull market has much more upside than if there was no slack in Europe today. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 This underutilization measure is based on the number of unemployed and underemployed, those available to work but not seeking a job and those seeking a job but not available for one. Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 U.S. data was decent: Retail sales ex. Autos increased at a 0.2% monthly pace, in line with expectations; Housing starts and building permits both beat expectations, coming in at 1.319 million and 1.354 million, respectively; Industrial production grew by 0.5% at a monthly pace, beating expectations; Capacity utilization also increased to 78%; Continuing and initial jobless claims both came out higher than expected; U.S. data continues to generally beat expectations, especially when contrasted with European data, representing a sharp reversal from last year's environment. The yield curve has flattened which has weighed on the greenback preventing the USD from rallying despite an outperforming U.S. economy. Report Links: U.S. Twin Deficits: Is The Dollar Doomed? - April 13, 2018 More Than Just Trade Wars - April 6, 2018 Do Not Get Flat-Footed By Politics - March 30, 2018 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 European data has been disappointing: German Wholesale price index increased by only 1.2%, less than the expected 1.5%; European industrial production grew at a 2.9% yearly pace, less than expectations of 3.8%; The ZEW Economic Sentiment and Current Situation Survey for Germany disappointed; European headline inflation disappointed, coming in at 1.3%, while core was in line with expectations of 1%. Signs of a slowdown are now emerging in European data, however the euro has yet to follow. The euro area's leading economic indicator is rolling over, suggesting that cyclical factors could drag the euro down in the coming months. The waning of inflationary pressures across the euro area is likely prompt a dovish tone in upcoming ECB communications, which will induce a downward revision in rate expectations by investors. Report Links: More Than Just Trade Wars - April 6, 2018 Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 The Euro's Tricky Spot - February 2, 2018 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan has been negative: Exports yearly growth underperformed expectations, coming in at 2.1%. Moreover, imports yearly growth also surprised to the downside, coming in at -0.6%. Finally industrial production yearly growth also disappointed, coming in at 1.6%. USD/JPY has remained relatively flat this week. Overall, we expect that the yen will continue to appreciate, as global geopolitical risks are on the rise and a potential slowdown in China's growth could will likely lead to a pick-up in FX market volatility. On the other hand, the yen remains at risk in the long term, given that economic data continues to underperform due to the strong yen and Japan's great exposure to global growth. This means that the BoJ will have to keep policy easy in order to support the economy. Report Links: The Yen's Mighty Rise Continues... For Now - February 16, 2018 Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC! - January 12, 2018 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. has been mixed: Headline inflation underperformed expectations, coming in at 2.5%. Moreover, core inflation also surprised negatively, coming in at 2.3%. Retail prices yearly growth also underperformed, coming in at 3.3%. However, the ILO unemployment rate surprised positively, coming in at 4.2%. After being up nearly 1.4% this week, GBP/USD fell more than a percentage point following the disappointing inflation numbers. Overall, the data follows our prediction from a couple of weeks ago: inflation in the U.K. is set to decline substantially despite a tightening labor market. This is because inflation in the U.K. is mainly driven by previous currency movements. Therefore, given the steep appreciation of the pound since 2017, prices will likely fall, causing the hawkishly-priced BOE to tighten less than expected, hurting the pound in the process. Report Links: Do Not Get Flat-Footed By Politics - March 30, 2018 Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 The Euro's Tricky Spot - February 2, 2018 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 The Aussie has traded in a wave pattern against the greenback since the beginning of 2016. This week, AUD once again rebounded off the trough of the wave, catalyzed by higher prices in the metals space. Recent announcements by Anglo-Australian group BHP Billiton about curtailing production forecasts provided a boost to iron ore prices. This was coupled with the PBOC's decision to cut banks' reserve requirements which is raising the specter of a potential reflation wave in China. While, for now, external factors are proving to be positive for the Antipodean economy and its currency, the domestic story remains the same: labor market slack, high debt loads, and not enough wage inflation. Recent employment figures confirm this reality: employment grew by only 4,900, driven by a decline in full-time employment of 19,900. Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 From Davos To Sydney, With a Pit Stop In Frankfurt - January 26, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand has been mixed: The food price index month-on-month growth came in at 1%. Meanwhile, headline inflation came in at 1.1%, in line with expectations. NZD/USD has fallen by nearly 1.3% this week. Overall, we expect that the NZD will suffer in the current environment of rising volatility and geopolitical risks. Moreover, on a long term basis, the kiwi continues to be at risk, given that the new populist government is set to decrease immigration and implement a dual mandate for the RBNZ; both factors would lower the real neutral rate. Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 This year's disappointing first quarter GDP growth of 1.7% QoQ growth was regarded as an important factor in the BoC's decision this week to hold interest rates unchanged. The statement recognized the weaker housing market and flailing exports as the two culprits in this development. Bank officials denoted the tight capacity utilization as a constraint to further export growth, stating that growth will not be sufficient "to recover the ground lost during recent quarters". While this was an overall dovish policy statement, the Bank still continues to see robust growth going forward, revising their 2019 growth forecast from 1.6% to 2.1%. Importantly, this revision widened the output gap as the potential growth rate was revised higher. In terms of monetary policy, investors still predict two more rate hikes this year, bringing the benchmark rate to 1.75%, which is still below the Bank's estimated neutral rate of 2.5% - 3.5%. This means that if NAFTA is not abrogated in any major way - our base case scenario for the current negotiations - there is still plenty of upside for Canadian rates, and therefore, the CAD. Report Links: More Than Just Trade Wars - April 6, 2018 Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC! - January 12, 2018 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 EUR/CHF has gone up by 1% this week. Overall, we continue to believe that the franc will continue to depreciate on a cyclical basis, given that Swiss inflationary pressures remain too weak and economic activity is still highly dependent on the easy monetary conditions brought about by the weak franc and low rates. Therefore, the SNB will remain very dovishly enclined in order to keep an appreciating franc from hurting the economy. Moreover, the Swiss franc continues to be expensive, putting further downward pressure on this currency. On a tactical basis however, this cross could have some downside in an environment of rising volatility and rising geopolitical risk. Report Links: The SNB Doesn't Want Switzerland To Become Japan - March 23, 2018 Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 USD/NOK has been relatively flat this week. We continue to be negative on the krone against the U.S. dollar, even in an environment of rising oil prices. This is because this cross is more correlated to real rate differential than it is to crude. Therefore, in an environment where the Fed hikes more than expected, real rates should move in favor of the U.S., helping USD/NOK in the process. That being said, the krone will likely outperform other commodity currencies like the AUD, as oil has a relatively lower beta than industrial metals to global growth and Chinese economic activity. Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC! - January 12, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 A slight economic slowdown is still being felt in the Scandinavian economy. As leading economic indicators in both Sweden and the euro area roll over, disinflationary winds continue to batter Swedish shores. As a result, EUR/SEK continues to trade at lofty levels, especially as global investors remain nervous about the risks of a global trade war. The Swedish yield curve has flattened 53 bps since January highs, which is one of the most severe moves in the G-10. It seems that Stefan Ingves' extreme dovishness is again being taken seriously by investors, especially as core CPI is at a mere 1.5%, despite CPIF clocking in at 2%. This core measure and global reflation will need to pick up for Ingves to change his view. While the SEK is cheap, and thus have limited downside from current levels, this economic backdrop suggests it is still risky for short-term investors to buy the SEK. Long-term players, however, should use current weaknesses as a buying opportunity. Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Canaries In The Coal Mine Alert 2: More On EM Carry Trades And Global Growth - December 15, 2017 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Special Report Highlights It is well established that portfolio flows play an important role in determining exchange rates. ETF flows are considerably timelier than the standard measures of investment flows, and they permit more precise tracking of currency demand. Economies with a low absolute value of basic balance of payment as a share of GDP tend to have USD exchange rates that are sensitive to equity ETF flows. The currencies of economies with high positive net international investment positions (NIIP), like Japan, Norway and Switzerland, have been impervious to equity ETF flows. For currencies with high exchange-rate sensitivities, flows into flagship country equity ETFs tend to lead currency moves by about six months. EUR/USD and GBP/USD could depreciate in the short term, while emerging market and commodity currencies may have more room to appreciate before they roll over. Feature A Vote Of Confidence Mutual fund flows are an entrenched measure of investor sentiment. Data on mutual fund flows from the Investment Company Institute (ICI) and other providers are widely followed. The view that international portfolio flows tend to be backward looking is reasonably well supported. Empirical evidence suggests that flows into a country's equity market coincide with, or lag, its performance. After all, it can be argued that foreign assets don't pour into a country's stock market until local demand has already driven prices higher, raising its global profile. But portfolio flows play a direct determining role in currency fluctuations. Cyclical fundamental supports for exchange rates include a country's current account balance, net foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio flows. The last is also a measure of sentiment. So are mutual fund and ETF flows. After all, currency movements are ultimately a reflection of investors' confidence in a country's economy and markets. Benefits Of A "Great Rotation" While current account balances and net FDI transactions are better suited to long-term exchange-rate forecasting, portfolio flows exert a powerful influence on immediate currency trends. However, conventional measures of portfolio flows are released with a time lag. Because they are publicly listed securities, ETFs have to comply with high standards of daily liquidity and information transparency. An investor can easily track an ETF's share count on a weekly basis. In contrast to conventional aggregated flow measures, ETF flows offer the added benefit of allowing for more granularity at the individual-bourse level. Conventional flow measures tend to sum flows from mutual funds and flows from ETFs. But today, the market capitalization of U.S.-listed ETFs is US$2.5 trillion, and assets have rotated from actively managed mutual funds into cheaper index-tracking alternatives. As ETFs get larger and offer a clearer window into investors' preferences, the analysis of ETF flows is becoming increasingly relevant for investors' decision making (Chart 1). Chart 1A Mirror Image All Currencies Are Equal, But Some Currencies Are More Equal Than Others Table 1The NOK, CHF And JPY Should Sit On One Side Of The Spectrum And The AUD, CAD And EUR On The Other While all currencies are affected by foreign flows, some currencies display a greater sensitivity to this factor than others. In theory, countries with high positive net international investment positions (NIIP) should be less affected by foreign portfolio flows. A high positive NIIP indicates that domestic investors own more assets abroad than foreigners own locally. Therefore, the demand stemming from domestic investors when shifting their assets in and out of the country is an overwhelming determinant of their exchange rate. Countries with very high positive NIIP include Norway, Switzerland and Japan (Table 1). On a cyclical horizon, currencies are a function of a country's current account balance, FDI and portfolio flows. The sum of the first two items is also known as the narrow basic balance of payments (BBOP). Mathematically, countries that exhibit a low absolute BBOP as a share of GDP (-2% to +2%) should also be more sensitive to portfolio flows. Countries with a narrow basic balance close to equilibrium include Australia, Canada, Japan and the Eurozone. The Non-Resident ETFs Limitation The U.S.-listed ETF market is currently the largest and most developed in the world (Chart 2). Flows into unhedged U.S.-listed country equity ETFs are a good proxy for U.S. investors' demand for that country's currency. We are excluding hedged vehicles as they have zero net impact on currency demand. Investors hedge their currency exposure by selling the foreign currency forward, effectively locking in the number of dollars they will receive for every unit of foreign currency sold. The purchase of the underlying equity to create the ETF increases the demand for the foreign currency while the commitment to sell that currency also increases its supply. From an exchange-rate perspective, the entire transaction is a wash. Currently, the lion's share of ETF assets under management (AUM) for any country's equity is held by one or two flagship funds. We use the flows into these unhedged flagship country equity funds to gauge the demand from USD-based investors for a particular currency (Table 2). Chart 2A U.S.-Dominated ETF Market Table 2Flagship Regional And Broad Commodity ETFs Listed On U.S. Exchanges Estimating the other leg of the two-way trade is far more challenging. Because ETFs listed outside the U.S. are not currently as firmly established as U.S. vehicles, they may not provide as accurate a read on external demand for the USD. In the particular case of the E.U., the UCITS1 regime allows all E.U.-based investors access to ETFs listed on any bourse within the E.U., obscuring the home-currency source of USD demand, be it euro, sterling, franc or any of the varieties of krone/a. A Leading Indicator Of Exchange Rates In spite of this data limitation, we have found that the analysis based on gross ETF flows still yields compelling results. The Most Robust Relationships Perhaps the most impressive relationships pertain to the Eurozone and emerging markets. We have found that flows into flagship unhedged U.S.-listed Eurozone and emerging markets equity ETFs have led the fluctuations in the EUR/USD and aggregate EM/USD exchange rates by six months (Chart 3 and Chart 4). It makes sense that the demand for U.S.-listed Eurozone Equity ETFs should be a significant driver of the EUR/USD: this cross is the most traded currency pair in the world, accounting for nearly a quarter of global FX turnover, and the Eurozone is a very open economy. Meanwhile, the observed relationship with EM exchange rates also makes sense as the key marginal price setters in EM capital markets often are the foreign investors, which tend to provide the marginal liquidity in these markets. U.S. investors' demand for U.K. equities also exhibits interesting leading properties in determining the direction of GBP/USD six months out (Chart 5). Chart 3Country Equity ETF Flows Perfectly Lead The EUR/USD... Chart 4...As Well As Aggregate EM/USD Exchange Rates... Chart 5...And Do A Good Job Leading GBP/USD Resource Economies Slightly different variables are at play when it comes to commodity currencies. They are open economies highly levered to emerging markets and Chinese demand. We found that U.S. investors' demand for commodities and EM equities are a better leading indicator of commodity currencies than the demand for the countries' respective equities (Charts 6, 7 and 8). The size of the aggregate AUM of the flagship Australia, Canada and New Zealand ETFs, relative to the aggregate AUM in flagship EM and commodity ETFs, suggests that only the most globally dedicated U.S. investors would seek exposure to peripheral DM equity markets and that most players would prefer direct EM/commodity exposures. Australia, Canada and New Zealand account for just over half of emerging markets' representation in the MSCI All Country World Index. Chart 6Commodity Currencies Are Also Led By... Chart 7...Flows Into EM Equity ETFs... Chart 8...And Flows Into Broad Commodity ETFs Peripheral G10 Currencies And The Yen Chart 9The Swedish Krona Is Also Sensitive To Flows Into The Eurozone We have found that the relationship between flows into Japanese equities, Norwegian equities and Swiss equities ETFs and the USD/JPY, USD/NOK and CHF/USD is much weaker. Consistent with Table 1, this result is unsurprising, given these economies' high NIIP. The Swedish krona's low correlation to flows into Swedish equity ETFs doesn't fit the theoretical framework as easily. Sweden is an open economy that is highly leveraged to global trade, but the EUR acts as an anchor for the SEK, dampening its fluctuations against the USD. We found that the sum of flows into the flagship Swedish and Eurozone equity ETF predicts USD/SEK moves better than the flows into the Swedish ETF alone (Chart 9). Finally, both the NOK and the SEK may not be on U.S. investors' radar, as USD/SEK and USD/NOK only represent 1.3% and 0.9% of global FX turnover. Investment Implications We are well aware that the data limitation only allows us to assess one leg of a two-way trade. The results are nonetheless compelling, and we will look to refine our measure as soon as we can gain more clarity into the origin of the ETF flows. That said, ETF flows do offer a fairly timely measure of portfolio flows, and their six-month lead on exchange rates is worth investors' attention. From these indicators, we can most reasonably expect the EUR and the GBP to depreciate in the short run, while aggregate EM and commodity currencies may have more room to appreciate before their run is complete. More broadly, a U.S.-based investor should consider the signal from ETF flows when deciding whether or not to hedge his/her foreign equity investments. Our global model portfolios currently include the unhedged iShares MSCI Eurozone, United Kingdom and EM equity ETFs (tickers: EZU, EWU and EEM). In light of these results, we may consider switching into HEZU and HEWU, the respective USD-hedged versions of the MSCI Eurozone and U.K. trackers, when we reassess our model portfolios at the beginning of May. We will leave our EM currency exposure unhedged. Jennifer Lacombe, Senior Analyst jenniferl@bcaresearch.com 1 UCITS stands for Undertakings for the Collective Investment of Transferable Securities. It creates a harmonized regime for the sale of mutual funds throughout the European Union. In the case of ETFs, it allows the same instrument to be listed on several European stock exchanges.
Highlights The global economy is slowing. However, growth should stabilize at an above-trend pace over the next few months, as fiscal policy turns more stimulative and interest rates remain in accommodative territory. President Trump's macroeconomic policies are completely at odds with his trade agenda. Fortunately, Trump appears willing to cut a deal on trade, even if it is on terms that are not nearly as favorable to the U.S. as he might have touted. The recently renegotiated South Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement is a case in point. We remain cyclically overweight global equities, but acknowledge that valuations are stretched and the near-term market environment could remain challenging until leading economic indicators improve. Feature Global Equities: Near-Term Outlook Is Still Hazy We published a note on February 2nd entitled "Take Out Some Insurance" warning investors that the stock market had become highly vulnerable to a correction.1 The VIX spike began the next day. Although volatility has fallen and equities have rebounded so far in April, we are reluctant to sound the all-clear. The near-term signal from the beta version of our MacroQuant model has improved a bit but remains in bearish territory, as it has for over two months now (Chart 1). Chart 1MacroQuant Model Suggests Caution Is Warranted The model is highly sensitive to changes in growth. Starting early this year, it began to detect a weakening in a variety of leading economic indicators in the U.S. and, to an even greater degree, abroad. Most notably, global PMIs and the German IFO have dipped, Korean and Taiwanese exports have decelerated, Japanese machinery orders have fallen, and the Baltic Dry Index has swooned by 36% from its December high (Chart 2). The model also noted an increase in inflationary pressures, suggesting that monetary policy would likely end up moving in a less accommodative direction. The emergence of stagflationary concerns came at a time when bullish stock market sentiment stood at very elevated levels (Chart 3). Our empirical work has shown that equities perform worst when sentiment is deteriorating from bullish levels and perform best when sentiment is improving from bearish levels (Chart 4). Chart 2Growth Has Peaked Chart 3Stock Market Sentiment Was Very ##br##Bullish Earlier This Year Chart 4Swings In Sentiment And ##br##Stock Market Returns Waiting For The Economic Data To Stabilize The good news is that the drop in equity prices has caused sentiment to return to more normal levels. The bad news is that the activity data has continued to disappoint at the margin, as evidenced by the weakness in economic surprise indices and various "nowcasts" of real-time growth (Chart 5). Ultimately, we expect global growth to stabilize at an above-trend pace over the coming months, which should allow equities to grind higher. Monetary policy is still quite accommodative. The yield on the JP Morgan Global Bond Index has averaged 1.88% since the end of the Great Recession (Chart 6). We do not know where the "neutral" level of bond yields has been over this period. However, we do know that unemployment in the major economies has been falling, which suggests that monetary policy has been in expansionary territory. Despite the move away from quantitative easing by many central banks, the yield on the JP Morgan Global Bond Index is only 1.53% today. This implies a fortiori that bond yields today are well below restrictive levels. The conclusion is further strengthened if one assumes, as seems highly plausible, that the neutral bond yield has risen over the past few years, as deleveraging headwinds have abated and fiscal policy has turned more stimulative (Chart 7). Chart 5Unexpected Slowdown In Growth Chart 6Interest Rates Are Off Their Bottom, ##br##But Are Not Restrictive Chart 7Fiscal Policy Will Be Stimulative ##br##This Year And Next The Protectionism Bugbear Global growth has not been the only thing on investors' minds. The specter of a trade war has also loomed large. It is true that the standard early-19th century Ricardian model that first-year economics students learn predicts very small welfare losses from increased protectionism.2 The model, however, makes highly antiquated assumptions about how trade works. Trade today bears little resemblance to the world in which David Ricardo lived - the one where England exchanged cloth for Portuguese wine (the example Ricardo used to illustrate his famous principle of comparative advantage). Chart 8Trade In Intermediate Goods Dominates To an increasingly large extent, countries do not really trade with one another anymore. One can even go as far as to say that different companies do not really trade with each other in the way they once did. A growing share of international trade is between affiliates of the same companies. Trade these days is dominated by intermediate goods (Chart 8). The exchange of goods and services takes place within the context of a massive global supply chain, where such phrases as "outsourcing," "vertical integration" and "just-in-time inventory management" have entered the popular vernacular. This arrangement has many advantages, but it also harbors numerous fragilities. A small fire at a factory in Japan that manufactured 60 percent of the epoxy resin used in chip casings led to a major spike in RAM prices in 1993. Flooding in Thailand in 2011 wreaked havoc on the global auto industry.3 The global supply chain is highly vulnerable to even small shocks. Now imagine an across-the-board trade war. Equities represent a claim on the existing capital stock, not the capital stock that might emerge after a trade war has been fought. A trade war would result in a lot of stranded capital. It is not surprising that investors are worried. Trump's Dubious Trade Doctrine The psychology of a trade war today is not that dissimilar to that of an actual war among the great powers. It would be immensely damaging if it were to happen, but because everyone knows it would be so damaging, it is less likely to occur. How then should one interpret President Trump's tweet that "Trade wars are good, and easy to win?" One possibility is that he is bluffing. The U.S. exported only $131 billion in goods to China last year, which is less than the $150 billion in Chinese imports that Trump has already targeted for tariffs. China simply cannot win a tit-for-tat trade war with the United States. Unfortunately, there is also a less charitable interpretation, as revealed by the second part of Trump's tweet, where he said, "When we are down $100 billion with a certain country and they get cute, don't trade anymore - we win big. It's easy!" Trump seems to equate countries with companies: Exports are revenues and imports are costs. If a country is exporting less than it is importing, it must be losing money. This is deeply flawed reasoning. I run a trade deficit with the place where I eat lunch, but I don't go around complaining that they are ripping me off. One would think that Trump - whose businesses routinely spent more than they earned, accumulating debt in the process - would understand this. But apparently not. As we discussed two weeks ago, the U.S. runs a trade deficit mainly because its deep and open financial markets, along with a relatively high neutral rate of interest, make it an attractive destination for foreign capital.4 If a country runs a capital account surplus with the rest of the world - meaning that it sells more assets to foreigners than it buys from foreigners - it will necessarily run a current account deficit. Trump's Macro Policy Colliding With His Trade Policy In this respect, President Trump's macroeconomic policies are completely at odds with his trade agenda. By definition, the current account balance is the difference between what a country saves and what it invests. The U.S. fiscal position is set to deteriorate over the coming years, even if the unemployment rate continues to fall - an unprecedented occurrence (Chart 9). A bigger budget deficit will drain national savings. Chart 9The U.S. Budget Deficit Is Set To Widen Even If The Unemployment Rate Continues To Decline Meanwhile, an overheated economy will cause capital spending to rise as firms run out of low-cost workers. If Trump succeeds in boosting infrastructure spending, aggregate U.S. investment will rise even more. The current account deficit is highly likely to widen in this environment. A Temporary Reprieve? Chart 10Trump's Protectionist Agenda Is A ##br##Popular One Among Republican Voters The prospect of a wider trade deficit means that Trump's protectionist wrath will not go quietly into the night. It may, however, go into remission for a little while. Trump's approval rating has managed to rise over the past few months because his protectionist agenda is popular with a large segment of the population (Chart 10). However, if the problems on Wall Street begin to show up on Main Street - as is likely to happen if stocks resume their decline - Trump will change his tune. This is especially true if a trade war threatens to hurt U.S. agricultural interests. Rural areas have been a key source of support for Trump's populist rhetoric. Trump has shown a willingness to cut a deal on trade even if the negotiated outcome falls well short of his bluster. Consider the agreement between the U.S. and Korea in late March to amend their existing trade pact. Trump had called the South Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement an "unacceptable, horrible deal" and a "job killer." After the agreement was renegotiated, the President described it as a "wonderful deal with a wonderful ally." What did Trump get that was so wonderful? The Koreans agreed to double the ceiling on the number of U.S. automobiles that can be exported to Korea without having to meet the country's tough environmental standards to 50,000. The problem is that the U.S. only shipped 11,000 autos to Korea last year, so the original quota was nowhere close to binding. The Koreans also agreed to reduce steel exports to the U.S. to about 70% of the average level of the past three years in exchange for a permanent exemption from Trump's 25% steel tariff. That may sound like a major concession, but keep in mind that only 12% of Korea's steel exports go to the United States. Korea also re-exports steel from other countries. These re-exports can be curtailed without causing major damage to Korea's steel industry. The shares of Korea's largest publicly-listed steel companies jumped by 1.7% on the first trading day after news of the deal broke, eclipsing the 0.8% rise in the KOSPI index. Investment Conclusions The global economy is going through a soft patch and this could weigh on stocks in the near term. However, if trade frictions fade into the background and global growth stabilizes over the coming months, as we expect will be the case, global equities should rally to fresh cycle highs. Granted, we are in the late stages of the business-cycle expansion. U.S. interest rates are likely to move into restrictive territory in the second half of 2019. Given the usual lags between changes in monetary policy and the real economy, this would place the next recession in 2020. By then, barring any fresh stimulus, the U.S. fiscal impulse will have dropped below zero. It is the change in the fiscal impulse that matters for growth. If growth has already slowed to a trend-like pace by late 2019 due to a shortage of workers, the economy could easily stall out in 2020. Given the still-dominant role played by U.S. financial markets, a recession in the U.S. would quickly be transmitted to the rest of the world. Stocks will peak before the next recession starts, but if history is any guide, this will only happen six months or so before the economic downturn begins (Table 1). This suggests that the equity bull market still has another 12-to-18 months of life left. The extent to which investors may wish to participate in any blow-off rally this year is a matter of personal preference. As was the case in the late 1990s, long-term expected returns have fallen to fairly low levels. A comparison between the Shiller P/E ratio and subsequent 10-year returns over the past century suggests that the S&P 500 will deliver a total nominal annualized return of only 4% during the next decade (Chart 11). A composite valuation measure incorporating both the trailing and forward P/E ratio, price-to-book, price-to-cash flow, price-to-sales, market cap-to-GDP, dividend yield, and Tobin's Q shows only modestly higher expected returns for stock markets outside the U.S. (Appendix A). Table 1Cyclically, It Is Too Soon To Get Out... Chart 11...But Long-Term Investors, Take Note As such, while we recommend overweighting global equities over a 12-month horizon, we would not fault long-term investors for taking some money off the table now. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Take Out Some Insurance," dated February 2, 2018. 2 Roughly speaking, the Ricardian model predicts that the welfare loss from protectionism will be one-half times the average percentage-point increase in tariffs times the change in the import-to-GDP ratio. Imports are about 15% of U.S. GDP. Consider a 10 percent across-the-board increase in tariffs. Assuming a price elasticity of import demand of 4, this would reduce trade by 1-0.96^10=0.33 (i.e., 33%), which would take the import-to-GDP ratio down from 15% to 10%. As such, the welfare loss would be 0.5*0.1*(15%-10%)=0.25%, or just one quarter of one percent of GDP. 3 James Coates, "Real Chip Shortage Or Just A Panic, Crunch Is Likely To Boost Pc Prices," Chicago Tribune, dated August 6, 1993. "Thailand Floods Disrupt Production And Supply Chains," BBC.com, dated October 13, 2011; Ploy Ten Kate, and Chang-Ran Kim, "Thai Floods batter Global Electronics, Auto Supply Chains," Reuters.com, dated October 28, 2011. 4 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "U.S.-China Trade Spat: Is R-Star To Blame?" dated April 6, 2018. APPENDIX A Chart 1Long-Term Real Return Prospects Are Slightly Better Outside The U.S. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Our analysis is often focused on China, commodities prices and Asia's business cycle. The key points of these discussions are applicable to the majority of EM countries and their financial markets. Yet, there are some countries that are not exposed to China, commodities or global trade. India and Turkey are two prominent examples from the EM space that fall into this category. This week we re-visit our analysis on these economies and their financial markets. Feature India: Inflation Holds The Key Indian government bonds sold off sharply over the past eight months, with the yield gap widening significantly relative to EM local currency bonds (Chart I-1, top panel). During this time, the country's stock market has been underperforming the EM benchmark notably (Chart I-1, bottom panel). Rising Indian inflation was a main culprit behind the selloff. However, the most recent print for headline CPI was down (Chart I-2). Diminished inflation worries have recently led to a modest drop in bond yields. Chart I-1India Relative To EM: Bonds And Stocks Chart I-2Indian Inflation Has Accelerated The key question for investors is if inflation will rise or stay tame. This, by extension, will determine whether Indian stocks will outperform their EM counterparts. Risks: Inflation, Fiscal Balance And Bond Yields Odds point to upside inflation surprises ahead, and a potential rise in bond yields: The supply side of the economy has been stagnant. Chart I-3 illustrates that Indian consumption has been outpacing investments since 2012, creating a significant accumulated gap. Capex is now picking up (Chart I-4, top panel) but the fact that past investment was low means that the output gap could become positive sooner than later. Chart I-3Consumption Is Outpacing Investments Chart I-4Timid Pick Up In Capex Crucially, in order for the capex rebound to be robust and sufficient to expand the economy's productive capacity, Indian commercial banks need to finance corporate investments aggressively. The bottom panel of Chart I-4 shows that this is not yet the case. On the fiscal front, the Indian central government released a mildly expansionary 2018-2019 budget, and is pushing for fiscal consolidation beyond 2019. Importantly, this was the last budget announcement of the ruling National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition before the 2019 general elections. It therefore entails a 10% increase in government expenditures. Growing government expenditures are often inflationary in India; hence a 10% rise in government spending could boost inflation modestly (Chart I-5). Additionally, there are also non-trivial risks that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government might end up spending beyond the official budget announcement in order to appease voters in the run-up to the 2019 general elections. The risks of overspending extend to state governments as well. The latter plan to raise their employees' housing rental allowances (HRA). Depending on the magnitude and timing of these increases, inflation could accelerate significantly and have spillover effects. Turning to bond yields, excess demand for credit by borrowers against a restricted supply of financing by banks is also creating a ripe environment for higher bond yields: The combined Indian central and state fiscal deficit is very wide, signaling strong demand for credit by the government (Chart I-6, top panel). Yet broad money creation by banks has generally been weak (Chart I-6, bottom panel). Chart I-5Indian Government ##br##Expenditure Is Inflationary Chart I-6Large General Fiscal Deficit ##br##Amid Slow Money Creation Chart I-7 illustrates that the combined central and state government fiscal deficit plus the annual change in the total broad stock of money is negative. This signals that new money creation might be insufficient. Commercial banks' holdings of government bonds is also falling (Chart I-8, top panel). Indian banks are at the margin beginning to turn their focus to private sector lending (Chart I-8, bottom panel). Chart I-7Insufficient New Funding ##br##For The Economy Chart I-8Indian Commercial Banks Are Shifting ##br##Focus To The Private Sector This is expected as commercial banks' holdings of government bonds have reached 29% of total deposits, which is significantly above the minimum required Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) of 19.5%. Given the ongoing improvement in private sector growth and hence demand for credit, Indian banks are now more inclined to augment their loan portfolios. Non-bank financial corporations such as insurance companies could offset banks' lower demand for government securities, but the former are not as large players as banks to make a meaningful impact. They own only 24% of government bonds compared to the banks' 42% ownership. Mutual funds and other non-bank finance corporations' ownership of government bonds is even smaller than that of insurance companies. Chart I-9India's Cyclical Profile Bottom Line: Upside risks to government spending, the budget balance and inflation will likely keep upward pressure on domestic bond yields. That amid high equity valuations might lead to lower share prices in absolute terms. India Can Still Outperform The EM Benchmark While Indian government bonds could sell off and stocks could fall in absolute terms, India is in a better position relative to its EM counterparts. Our view remains that we will see a material slowdown in Chinese growth this year - which is negative for commodities prices and EM economies. This scenario will be beneficial for India at the margin relative to other EM bourses. Importantly, Indian economic activity is gaining upward momentum: Overall loan growth has picked up meaningfully, and consumer loan growth in particular is accelerating at a double-digit pace (Chart I-9, top panel). Motorcycle sales have resumed their upward trend (Chart I-9, panel 2). Commercial vehicle sales are now accelerating robustly (Chart I-9, panel 2) and manufacturing production has picked up noticeably (Chart I-9, panel 3). Bottom Line: We recommend investors keep an overweight position in Indian equities versus the EM benchmark. Ayman Kawtharani, Associate Editor ayman@bcaresearch.com Turkish Markets Are In Freefall The lira has been in freefall and local bond yields have spiked (Chart II-1) following the Turkish government's announcement that it wants to stimulate growth even further by implementing a new investment incentive package worth $34 billion, or 5% of GDP. Our view is that the recent lira depreciation as well as the selloff in stocks and bonds have further room to go. Stay short/underweight Turkish risk assets. The Turkish economy is clearly overheating and inflation has broken out into double digit territory (Chart II-2). This comes as no surprise, given high and accelerating wage growth together with stagnant productivity gains (Chart II-3, top panel). Unit labor costs are surging in both manufacturing and services sectors (Chart II-3, bottom panel). Demand is booming, as such firms will likely succeed in hiking selling prices further, reinforcing the wage-inflation spiral. Chart II-1Turkey: Currency Is Falling And ##br##Bond Yields Are Rising Chart II-2Turkey: Genuine Inflation Breakout Chart II-3Turkey: Wage Growth Is Too High Most alarmingly, Turkish policymakers are doing the opposite of what is currently needed - instead of tightening, they have been easing policy: On the fiscal side, government expenditures excluding interest payments have accelerated significantly (Chart II-4). On the monetary policy side, Turkey's banking system has been relying on enormous amounts of liquidity provisions by the central bank (Chart II-5, top panel) to sustain its ongoing credit boom and hence economic growth. Chart II-4Turkey: Fiscal Policy Is Easing Chart II-5Turkey: Monetary Policy Is Too Accommodative On the whole, the central bank's net liquidity injections into the banking system continue to increase rapidly. The nature of the central bank's reserves provisions to commercial banks has shifted away from open market operations and more towards direct lending to banks (Chart II-5, bottom panel). Yet, the essence remains the same: to provide liquidity to banks so that the latter can continue expanding their balance sheets. Adding all the liquidity facilities - the intraday, overnight and late window facilities - the Central Bank of Turkey's (CBT) outstanding funding to banks is TRY 90 billion, or 3% of GDP, abnormally elevated on a historical basis. All this entails that monetary policy is too loose. Consistently, even though local currency bank loan growth has moderated, it still stands at 18% (Chart II-6). With the newly announced government stimulus plan, bank loan growth will likely accelerate from an already high level. As debt levels rise, so are debt servicing costs (Chart II-7). Notably, debt (both domestic/local currency and external debt) servicing costs will continue to escalate as the currency plunges. The reason is that Turkish private sector external debt stands at 40% of GDP, with 13% of GDP being short-term, the highest among EM countries. Currency depreciation will make external debt more expensive to service. Chart II-6Turkey: Rampant Credit Growth Chart II-7Higher Debt Servicing Costs Lastly, the Turkish authorities are expanding the Credit Guarantee Fund, what we would call the "free money" program. The aim of this fund is to incentivize banks to lend more, making the government essentially assume credit risk on loans extended to small and medium enterprises. Under this scheme, the government is effectively giving a green light to flood the economy with more money/credit. This will only heighten inflationary pressures and lead to much more currency devaluation. So far, the scheme has been responsible for the creation of TRY 250 billion, or 8% of GDP worth of new credit. The new tranche of this program announced in January of this year entails another TRY 55 billion. While smaller than the previous tranche, it is still significant at 1.8% of GDP. Fiscal and monetary policies are overly simulative and the country's twin deficits - both fiscal and current account - are widening (Chart II-8). The current account deficit now exceeds 6% of GDP. With foreign holdings of equities and government bonds already at historic highs (Chart II-9), it is questionable whether Turkey has the capacity to attract more capital inflows to finance a widening current account deficit on a sustainable basis. Chart II-8Turkey: Large Twin Deficits Chart II-9Turkey: Foreign Holdings Of ##br##Stocks And Bonds Are Large Remarkably, despite extremely strong exports due to robust growth in the euro area, the current account deficit in Turkey has been unable to narrow at all. This confirms the excessive domestic demand boom. Chart II-10The Turkish Lira Is Not Cheap Even after undergoing large nominal depreciation, Chart II-10 demonstrates that the Turkish lira is still not cheap, according to unit labor cost-based real effective exchange rate, which in our opinion is the best valuation measure for currencies. With wage and general inflation in the double digits and escalating, it will take much more nominal deprecation for the lira to become cheap. At this point, the Turkish authorities are clearly over-stimulating growth while disregarding inflation. The current policy stance will all but ensure that the lira depreciates much further. Excessive money creation is extremely bearish for the local currency. To put the amount of outstanding money into perspective and gauge exchange rate risk, one can compute the ratio of foreign exchange reserves to broad money (local currency money supply). Chart II-11 illustrates that the current net level of foreign exchange reserves (excluding banks' foreign currency deposits at the central bank) including gold currently stands at US$30 billion, which is equivalent to a mere 11% of broad local currency money M3. The ratio for other EM countries is considerably higher (Chart II-12). Chart II-11Turkey: Central Bank FX ##br##Reserves Level Is Inadequate Chart II-12Foreign Exchange Reserves Adequacy In EM Given the inflationary backdrop and the risk of further currency depreciation, interest rates will have to rise. With time this will inevitably trigger another upward non-performing loan (NPL) cycle. Banks are very under-provisioned for non-performing loans (NPLs). Even worse, banks have been reducing the ratio of NPL provisions to total loans in order to book strong profits. NPLs and NPL provisions are set to rise substantially, and banks' equity will be considerably eroded as a result. Lastly, as Chart II-13 demonstrates, rising interest rates are bearish for bank share prices. Investment Implications The government is doubling down on pro-growth policies and is disregarding inflation. Hence, inflation will spiral out of control and the central bank will fall even more behind the curve. This is extremely bearish for the lira. We are reiterating our short position on the lira. We remain short the lira versus the U.S. dollar, but the lira will likely also continue to plummet versus the euro as well. As such, we are also reiterating our underweight/short stance on Turkish stocks in general, and banks in particular (Chart II-14). Chart II-13Turkey: Higher Interest Rates ##br##Will Hurt Bank Stocks Chart II-14Stay Short/Underweight Turkish Stocks A weaker lira will undermine returns for foreign investors on Turkish domestic bonds and assures widening sovereign and corporate credit spreads. Dedicated EM fixed income and credit portfolios should continue to underweight Turkey within their respective EM universes. Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Highlights EUR/USD will eventually drift up to the ECB calculated equilibrium range of 1.30-1.35. Tactical short NOK/AUD. Tactical long SEK/GBP. On a six month horizon, stay underweight Basic Materials and Financials and own some government bonds. The overall equity market will lack any sustained direction. Sell any sharp rallies and buy any sharp dips. Feature We have seen the shape of things to come. Norway has just lowered its inflation target from 2.5 to 2.0 per cent. This follows years of failure to achieve the higher target (Chart of the Week). More important, Norway's Royal Decree on Monetary Policy emphasizes flexibility: Inflation targeting shall be forward-looking and flexible so that it can contribute to high and stable output and employment and to counteracting the build-up of financial imbalances. Norway follows hot on the heels of Sweden. Last September, the Riksbank also added flexibility to its inflation mandate. The inflation target remains 2 per cent but the central bank introduced a variation band of 1-3 per cent, because "monetary policy is not able to steer inflation in detail." We applaud the Riksbank for its honesty, but we would go a step further. It is near impossible to sustain an arbitrary point target, like 2 per cent (Chart I-2). Chart of the WeekNorway Has Given Up On##br## Its 2.5% Inflation Target Chart I-2Sweden Has Also Struggled To ##br##Achieve Its Inflation Target One Per Cent And Two Per Cent Are Indistinguishable In 1979, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky formalized a new branch of behavioural finance called Prospect Theory, which would ultimately win Kahneman the Nobel Prize for Economics. One of the key findings of Prospect Theory is that the human brain is incapable of distinguishing between very small numbers. In the case of inflation, very few people can really distinguish between an inflation rate of, say, 1 per cent and a rate of 2 per cent. For most people, anything within a range of around 0-2 per cent is indistinguishably perceived as 'negligible inflation'. Since prices rising at 1 per cent or 2 per cent are indistinguishable to most people, Prospect Theory finds that it is near impossible for monetary policy to fine tune inflation expectations - and therefore inflation itself - to a point-target like 2 per cent (Chart I-3). Chart I-3Mission Impossible: 2% Inflation The good news - as we are seeing in Scandinavia - is that central banks are creating, or already have in place, a degree of flexibility and tolerance in their inflation mandates: the Swiss National Bank targets an inflation range of 0-2 per cent; the BoE has a variation band of 1-3 per cent; the Fed has a dual mandate of price stability and maximizing employment;1 New Zealand's government recently asked its Reserve Bank to balance its inflation goal with another aimed at employment; and the BoJ keeps extending the timeframe which it needs to achieve 2 per cent inflation. One of the original reasons for the 2 per cent inflation target has disappeared. To counter a recession, central banks wanted the freedom to take real interest rates to around -2 per cent. With the lower bound of nominal interest rates thought to be zero, this implied an inflation target of 2 per cent. However, we now know that the lower bound of nominal rates is not zero, it is somewhere close to -1 per cent. On this basis, the 2 per cent inflation target should become 1 per cent. All of which makes the ECB's fixation on a 2 per cent point-target for inflation look positively antediluvian. The ECB treaty defines 'price stability' as its single mandate, but the precise definition of price stability is up to the central bank. Given the powerful findings of Prospect Theory, and the general direction of travel of all the other central banks, it is only a matter of time before the ECB interprets or creates more flexibility in its mandate too. Small Differences In Central Bank Mandates Amplify To Huge Moves In Currencies Are we just splitting hairs in pointing out small differences in central bank mandates? No, Prospect Theory finds that people cannot distinguish between inflation rates within a 0-2 per cent range. Yet, for central banks, there can be a huge difference between 0 per cent, 1 per cent and 2 per cent. Hence, within this range, small differences in central bank mandates and definitions of inflation can amplify to huge differences in monetary policies. As we highlighted last week in Where President Trump Is Right About Europe, core consumer prices in the euro area and the U.S. - measured on a like-for-like basis - have increased at a near identical rate over the long term (Chart I-4) and the short term.2 In the euro area, consumer prices exclude the consumption costs of owner-occupied housing; in the U.S. they include it. But both can't be right. Either owner-occupied housing should be excluded from the price basket, and U.S. inflation is running lower than we think; or owner-occupied housing should be included, and euro area inflation is running higher than we think. In 2014, like-for-like inflation was running at exactly the same rate in the two economies (Chart I-5). Yet the small differences in central bank mandates and definitions of inflation led to diametrically opposite policies: ultra-accommodation from the ECB and tightening from the Fed. The upshot is that the EUR/USD exchange rate has seen huge swings: from 1.39 to 1.03 and then back up to 1.24 today. To repeat, like-for-like inflation was not, and is not, that different. Which makes the huge moves in the currency markets highly undesirable and highly unnecessary (Chart I-6). Chart I-4The Euro Area And U.S. Have Experienced ##br##The Same Like-For-Like Core CPI Inflation Chart I-5In 2014, The Euro Area And U.S. Had The ##br##Same Like-For-Like Core CPI Inflation... Chart I-6...Yet Monetary Policy Went In Opposite ##br##Directions And EUR/USD Had Huge Swings In the medium term, we expect the ECB will have no choice but to interpret or create more flexibility in its price stability mandate. If the ECB reaction function becomes less differentiated from its peers, EUR/USD will eventually drift up to the ECB calculated equilibrium range of 1.30-1.35. Returning to Norway, the recent rally in the NOK is overdone. Lowering the inflation target from 2.5 per cent to 2.0 per cent does create the scope for tighter (or at least, less loose) policy than was previously expected. But our tried and tested indicator of excessive groupthink suggests that the currency may have overpriced the pace of change (Chart I-7). Play this through a tactical short in NOK/AUD. Chart I-7The Recent Rally In The NOK Is Overdone In Sweden, the same indicator of excessive groupthink suggests that the recent sell-off in the SEK is also overdone (see page 7). Play this through a tactical long in SEK/GBP. Distinguish Catalysts From Causes Finally, a quick comment on the equity market's struggles this year. To explain these struggles, it would be easy to fixate on the news stories that are dominating the international headlines. But it is always important to distinguish catalysts from causes. When a tree loses its foliage in the autumn, a day of strong winds is the catalyst, it is not the cause. The underlying cause is that the autumn leaves are fragile and due to fall anyway. Likewise, for the market's struggles, trade war skirmishes and missile attacks in Syria are simply catalysts, they are not the cause. The underlying cause is that risk-assets were fragile and due a setback. On price to sales, world equities are as highly valued as at the peak of the dot com bubble (Chart I-8). Meanwhile, global economic growth has entered a mini-deceleration phase which we expect to continue at least into the summer months. In such mini-downswings, bond yields tend to be capped, or even trace down. And cyclical sectors such as Basic Materials and Financials always underperform (Chart I-9). Therefore, on a six-month horizon, own some government bonds and stay underweight Basic Materials and Financials. Chart I-8World Equities As Highly Valued As ##br##At The Peak Of The Dot Com Bubble... Chart I-9...And Global Growth Is Entering##br## A Mini-Downswing The overall equity market will meet both resistance and support. A mini-deceleration in growth implies downside to economic surprises. Against this, if bond yields stabilise or trace down, it will underpin all valuations. Taken together, this suggests that the overall equity market will lack any sustained direction. Sell any sharp rallies and buy any sharp dips. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Some people even argue that the Fed has a triple mandate which includes financial stability. 2 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report 'Where President Trump Is Right About Europe' April 12, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* As discussed in the main body of the report, this week's trade recommendation is long SEK/GBP. The profit target is 3% with a symmetrical stop loss. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights An additional heavy salvo of U.S. import tariffs, were they to occur, would cause a material deceleration in Chinese economic growth (ceteris paribus). Trade negotiations are likely to produce a relatively benign outcome, but Chinese stocks and related financial assets may suffer meaningfully if not. Chinese policymakers have several policy options at their disposal to ease the impact of a major export sector shock, but many drawbacks make the choice a difficult one. For now, manufacturing sector-specific stimulus is the most likely policy response. A broad reading of key leading indicators for China's business cycle suggest that the industrial sector continues to slow. Recent bright spots in the data appear to be linked to unsustainably strong export demand, which is likely to wane in the months ahead. Stay overweight Chinese ex-tech stocks versus their global peers despite the looming trade threat, but with a short leash. Feature Trade frictions between China and the U.S. continue to dominate the headlines of the financial press. The most significant potential escalation in the conflict came two weeks ago, when President Trump instructed the U.S. Trade Representative to consider an additional $100 billion in tariffs on imports from China (on top of the initially proposed $50 billion). For investors, the possibility of a full-blown trade war between China and the U.S. and its implications for financial markets remains the "question that won't go away". Given that negotiations between trade representatives of both countries are highly active, the President's public suggestion that an additional heavy salvo of tariffs may be levied appears to be a clear case of economic saber-rattling. Still, investors cannot neglect the odds that such a scenario does indeed materialize, and in this week's report we revisit some of our previous work on the impact of proposed U.S. tariffs on Chinese economic growth. We also outline the (difficult) policy options available to Chinese policymakers, update investors on the state of China's business cycle, and reiterate our recommended investment strategy of staying overweight Chinese ex-tech stocks (with a short leash). The Impact Of Proposed Tariffs On Growth, Part II Chart 1150$ Billion In Import Tariffs Would Seriously ##br##Harm Chinese Export Growth We presented our framework for modeling the impact of U.S. import tariffs on overall Chinese export growth in our March 28 Weekly Report.1 Our approach suggested that the original $50 billion in proposed tariffs would cause China's total export growth to decelerate about 2%, which would work to counteract the acceleration in underlying export growth that we would normally expect over the coming months given the pace of the global demand. Chart 1 updates this framework assuming a total of $150 billion in tariffs. While overall nominal export growth would not contract outright as a result of the tariff imposition, it would decelerate materially from our estimate of its underlying rate (currently 10%). There are good odds that Trump's suggestion of an additional $100 billion in tariffs against China was merely a negotiating tactic, and it is clear that China has a strong incentive to agree to a trade deal with the U.S. that will prevent the scenario depicted in Chart 1 from taking place. But were it to, it would represent a significant threat to China's cyclical economic momentum, in a manner that would surpass the direct contribution to Chinese growth from the external sector. Charts 2 and 3 explain why. Chart 2 first presents an annual time series of the net export (NX) contribution to Chinese real GDP growth, relative to final consumption expenditure and gross capital formation. Investors might initially react to this chart by concluding that a significant deceleration in export growth would have a minimal impact on the Chinese economy, since the net contribution to growth from the external sector has typically been small relative to the other expenditure categories. Chart 2Net Exports Are Not A Huge##br## Direct Contributor To Growth... Chart 3...But The Export Sector Is Highly ##br## Investment-Intensive However, this perspective misses two important elements of the Chinese economy that are crucial to understand: China's import demand is strongly tied to the export channel, given that roughly half of Chinese imports are commodity-oriented. This means that Chinese import growth would also suffer from a sudden hit to U.S. exports, which would reverberate the shock to China's trading partners (and back again to China). In short, the imposition of major U.S. tariffs on imports from China would cause a negative feedback loop for China and its key trading partners. Abstracting from the global financial crisis, Chart 3 highlights that there is a strongly positive relationship between the annual change in contribution to growth from China's net exports and subsequent investment. This underscores that an important portion of China's gross capital formation, which is a significant contributor to the Chinese economy, is driven by the export sector. Based on the relationship shown in Chart 3, and the historical relationship between nominal exports and the real contribution from net exports, the scenario depicted in Chart 1 could cause the contribution to growth from Chinese investment to fall 0.5-0.6 percentage points, which could push real GDP growth to or below 6% if consumption remained constant. While we have not focused on real GDP growth as an accurate measure of Chinese economic activity, a deceleration of that magnitude would be on par with what occurred in 2011-2012, when Chinese stocks and related financial assets fared quite poorly. Bottom Line: An additional heavy salvo of U.S. import tariffs, were they to occur, would cause a material deceleration in Chinese economic growth. Trade negotiations are likely to produce a relatively benign outcome, but Chinese stocks and related financial assets may suffer meaningfully if not. China's Policy Options Our analysis above did not incorporate a stimulative response from Chinese policymakers, which we would certainly expect if China experienced a large shock to its export sector. Table 1 presents a brief list of policy actions that the Chinese government could employ in response; some are narrowly focused on the export channel, and some would impact the economy more broadly. Table 1No Easy Cure-Alls To Ease The Impact Of Tariffs Our assumption is that policymakers will initially choose more focused policies and will refrain from broad-based stimulus unless the impact of the export sector shock is expected to much more significant than is currently the case. This is particularly true given that Table 1 highlights the difficulty facing Chinese policymakers, in that there are significant drawbacks associated with any of the policies described. Given that the proposed import tariffs will primarily affect firms manufacturing goods for export to the U.S., the most focused policies would be to provide some offsetting form of stimulus to the manufacturing sector and to depreciate the RMB versus the U.S. dollar. In our view, manufacturing sector-specific stimulus is the most likely to occur of any policies described in Table 1: the drawbacks are primarily structural in nature, and China has already announced a slight reduction in the tax rate for manufacturing industries as part of a series of changes to the VAT regime. We expect to see more announcements in this vein over the coming months. Materially depreciating the RMB vs the U.S. dollar, however, is quite unlikely to occur as a stimulative response, as it would very likely inflame trade tension with the U.S. Chinese authorities may use threats of backtracking on the non-trivial appreciation in CNYUSD over the past year during talks with the U.S., but we doubt that authorities would actually go ahead with this barring a complete breakdown in negotiations. Depreciating versus the euro is similarly problematic. Chart 4 highlights that the RMB has barely risen at all versus the euro over the past year, implying that a meaningful depreciation would likely anger euro area policymakers, especially given that the trade-weighted euro has already risen nearly 10% over the past year. Instead, Chart 5 highlights the most likely route if China chooses to use the RMB as a relief valve: a depreciation against Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and India. China's combined export weight to these countries is meaningful, and the chart shows that there is depreciation potential: a weighted RMB index versus these currencies has risen about 8% in the past 12 months. Chart 4The RMB Has Not Appreciated ##br##Against The Euro Chart 5Room To Depreciate Against A ##br##Basket Of Asian Currencies We will revisit the remaining policies listed in Table 1 if the U.S. does indeed follow through with a second round of significant tariffs against Chinese imports, or if the economic effect of the first round proves to be more significant than we expect. From a bigger picture perspective, the potential for broader stimulus from Chinese authorities (in response to a more impactful shock) raises the interesting possibility of another economic mini cycle in China. While the need to stimulate broadly, were it to occur, would clearly imply that the economy would first be weakening, investors should remember that China's economy ultimately accelerated meaningfully in response to the last episode of material fiscal & monetary easing. We presented our framework for tracking the end of China's current mini-cycle in our October 12 Weekly Report,2 and argued that a benign, controlled deceleration was the most likely outcome (Chart 6). In our view the economic data has validated this call over the past six months, and we do not see any reason yet to deviate from it (see next section below). But a severe export shock followed by a burst of economic stimulus would clearly alter our expectations for China's business cycle dynamics, and would also create some exciting investment opportunities for investors (both on the downside and the upside). While the odds of this scenario are not currently probable, we raise the possibility because of the significance that another cycle would have for global investor sentiment and the returns from Chinese financial assets. Chart 6A Stylized View Of China's Recent "Mini-Cycle" Bottom Line: Chinese policymakers have several policy options at their disposal to ease the impact of a major export sector shock, but many drawbacks make the choice a difficult one. For now, manufacturing sector-specific stimulus is the most likely policy response. Abstracting From Trade, China Continues To Slow As noted above, we have been flagging a deceleration in China's industrial sector since early-October. Table 2 is an updated version of a table that we presented in our March 7 Weekly Report,3 which shows recent data points for several series that we have identified as having leading properties for the Chinese business cycle, as well as the most recent month-over-month change, an indication of whether the series is currently above its 12-month moving average, and how long this has been the case. While we do not yet have all of the March components of our BCA Li Keqiang leading indicator, the four that are available all declined in March from February, suggesting that the ongoing economic slowdown continues. Table 2Key Chinese Data Do Not Signal A Broad Acceleration The table does highlight, however, two relatively positive developments: the Bloomberg Li Keqiang index was materially higher on average in January and February than it was in the two months prior, and now both the official and Caixin manufacturing PMIs are above their 12-month moving average, with the latter having been so for 4 months in a row. An average of the two measures, along with its 12-month moving average, in shown in Chart 7. Are these budding signs of a durable upturn in China's industrial sector? We do not take a dogmatic approach to forecasting China's cyclical trajectory, and will be monitoring this possibility over the coming months. But in our current judgement, the answer is no. The January pop in Bloomberg Li Keqiang index reflects two separate factors: a jump in the annual growth of rail cargo volume in January (which subsequently unwound in February), as well as strong growth in electricity production on average in January and February (Chart 8). Normally this would be an encouraging sign for China's economy, but when connected with the countertrend move in the manufacturing PMIs and the sharp, unsustainable rise in February's export growth, a pattern begins to emerge. Chart 7A Modest Tick Up In China's ##br##Manufacturing PMIs Chart 8The Li Keqiang Index: ##br##A Brief, Countertrend Move While far from conclusive, it would appear that China experienced a very sudden burst of goods production for the purposes of export. Given that this is occurring in the context of considerable trade frictions and the eventual imposition of import tariffs, and against the backdrop of strong but steady (and possibly peaking) global demand, it is conceivable that China's exporters are attempting to front-load shipments for the year before these tariffs take effect. Although a February surge is visible in Chinese export growth to several countries (not just the U.S.), and undoubtedly some of the effect is due to the timing of the Chinese new year, it is possible that Chinese exporters are acting in anticipation of possible additional tariffs on other countries or global industries that China acts as a supplier to. We noted above that the imposition of the first round of U.S. tariffs will likely be enough to arrest any acceleration in overall Chinese export growth, with a second round likely to cause a downward change in trend. Thus, to us, it is difficult to see an export-driven catalyst for China's industrial sector continuing over the coming months. On the import side, the data has also been more positive than we would have expected, given the close link between import growth and the Li Keqiang index (Chart 9). Part of this deviation may be accounted for by unsustainable export growth, given the typically strong link between import and export growth in highly trade-oriented economies. Interestingly, Chart 10 highlights that the flat trend in import growth appears to be supported by an uptrend in manufactured products, whereas the trend of primary products imports is much more consistent with what our indicators would suggest. For now, we are sticking with the signal given by the latter, since it has historically been a more reliable predictor of whether overall future import growth will be growing at an above-trend pace. But as we stated above, our view of a benign slowdown in China is empirically-based, and we will continue to monitor the data for signs that the external sector of China's economy warrants a change in our slowdown view. Chart 9Import Growth Has Held Up##br## Better Than We Expected... Chart 10...But Commodity Imports Suggest##br## Broad Import Growth Will Weaken Bottom Line: A broad reading of key leading indicators for China's business cycle suggest that the industrial sector continues to slow. Recent bright spots in the data appear to be linked to unsustainably strong export demand, which is likely to wane in the months ahead. Investment Implications We noted in our March 28 Weekly Report that the shift in U.S. protectionism from rhetoric to action and the continued decline in our leading indicators makes a tenuous case for a continued overweight stance towards Chinese stocks.1 We recommended in that report that investors put Chinese ex-tech stocks on downgrade watch over the course of Q2. This recommendation stands, although it is notable that the relative performance of Chinese ex-tech shares (versus global) remains comfortably above its 200-day moving average (Chart 11). Chinese tech stocks, on the other hand, have sold off meaningfully over the past month (Chart 11 panel 2) due in part to the tech oriented nature of the U.S.' trade action. We advised investors to reduce their exposure to the tech sector in our February 15 Weekly Report,4 based on elevated earnings momentum and very rich valuation. Conversely, pricing also appears to be at the root of resilient ex-tech relative performance: Chart 12 shows that the 12-month forward earnings yield versus U.S. 10-year Treasurys is considerably higher for Chinese ex-tech companies than in developed or other emerging equity markets. This reinforces an argument that we have made in previous reports, which is that investors should have a high threshold for reducing exposure to China. Chart 11Chinese Ex-Tech Stocks ##br##Are Doing Fine, For Now... Chart 12...Supported By A Sizeable ##br##Risk Premium The key question is therefore whether the probable shock to Chinese export growth coupled with the ongoing slowdown in the industrial sector is significant enough to pre-emptively downgrade Chinese stocks. Our answer to this question remains "no", since investors still do not have the requisite visibility on the magnitude of the hit to exports and the likely policy response. Until this information emerges, we continue to recommend that investors stay overweight Chinese ex-tech stocks unless a technical breakdown emerges, and to watch for additional updates on this issue from BCA's China Investment Strategy service over the coming weeks and months. Bottom Line: Stay overweight Chinese ex-tech stocks versus their global peers despite the looming trade threat. Our downgrade watch remains in effect, and we are likely to advise a reduction in exposure in response to a technical breakdown. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Chinese Stocks: Trade Frictions Make For A Tenuous Overweight", dated March 28, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Tracking The End Of China's Mini-Cycle", dated October 12, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China And The Risk Of Escalation", dated March 7, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "After The Selloff: A View From China", dated February 15, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Special Report Highlights Dear Client, This week, we are publishing a Special Report produced by Mark McClellan, author of The Bank Credit Analyst and Mathieu Savary, author of Foreign Exchange Strategy. This report discusses the long-term outlook for the dollar and argues that the greenback is in a structural downtrend. Cyclically too, the dollar is likely to continue to soften. However, despite this negative multi-year view on the USD, BCA still sees a high probability of a dollar rebound in 2018. This move would therefore be a countertrend bounce. Best regards, John Canally, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy In this Special Report, we review the theory behind exchange rate determination and examine the cyclical and structural forces that will drive the dollar. The long-term structural downtrend in the dollar is intact. This trend reflects both a slower underlying pace of U.S. productivity growth relative to the rest of the world and a persistent external deficit. The U.S. shortfall on its net international investment position, now at about 40% of GDP, is likely to continue growing in the coming decades. Fiscal stimulus means that the U.S. twin deficits are set to worsen, but the situation is not that dire that the U.S. dollar is about to fall off a cliff because of sudden concerns regarding sustainability. The U.S. is not close to the point where investors will begin to seriously question America's ability to service its debt. The U.S. will continue to enjoy a net surplus on its international investments except under a worst-case scenario for relative returns. From an economic perspective, we see little reason why the U.S. will not be able to easily continue financing its domestic saving shortfall in the coming years. There are some parallels today with the Nixon era, but we do not expect the same outcome for the dollar. The Fed is unlikely to make the same mistake as it made in the late 1960s/early 1970s. There are risks of course. Growing international political tensions and a trade war could threaten the U.S. dollar's status as the world's premier reserve currency. While the underlying trend in the dollar is down, cyclical factors are likely to see it appreciate on a 6-12 month investment horizon. Growth momentum, which moved in favor of the major non-U.S. currencies in 2017, should shift in the greenback's favor this year. U.S. fiscal stimulus is bullish the dollar, despite the fact that this will worsen the current account balance. Additional protectionist measures should also support the dollar as long as retaliation is muted. Feature The U.S. dollar just can't seem to get any respect even in the face of a major fiscal expansion that is sure to support U.S. growth. Nonetheless, there are a lot of moving parts to consider besides fiscal stimulus: a tightening Fed, accumulating government debt, geopolitical tension and growing trade protectionism among others. The interplay of all these various forces can easily create confusion about the currency outlook. Textbook economic models show that the currency should appreciate in the face of stimulative fiscal policy and rising tariffs, at least in the short term, not least because U.S. interest rates should rise relative to other countries. However, one could also equate protectionism and a larger fiscally-driven external deficit with a weaker dollar. Which forces will dominate? In this Special Report, we sort out the moving parts. We review the theory behind exchange rate determination and examine the cyclical and structural forces that will drive the dollar in the short- and long-term. Tariffs And The Dollar Let's start with import tariffs. In theory, higher tariffs should be positive for the currency as long as there is no retaliation. The amount spent on imports will fall as consumer spending is re-directed toward domestically-produced goods and services. A lower import bill means the country does not need to export as much to finance its imports, leading to dollar appreciation (partially offsetting the competitive advantage that the tariff provides). Tariffs also boost inflation temporarily, which means that higher U.S. real interest rates should also lift the dollar to the extent that the Fed responds with tighter policy. Chart 1At Full Employment,##BR##Import Tariffs Raise Rates That said, the tariffs recently announced by the Trump Administration are small potatoes in the grand scheme. The U.S. imported $39 billion of iron and steel in 2017, and $18 billion of aluminum. That's only 2% of total imports and less than 0.3% of GDP. If import prices went up by the full amount of the tariff, this would add less than five basis points to inflation. The positive impact on U.S. growth is also modest as the tariffs benefit only two industries, and higher domestic prices for steel and aluminum undermine U.S. consumers of these two metals. A unilateral tariff increase could be mildly growth-positive if there is no retaliation by trading partners. This was the result of a Bank of Canada study, which found that much of the growth benefits from a higher import tariff are offset by an appreciation of the currency.1 Even a short-term growth boost is not guaranteed. A detailed analysis of the 2002 Bush steel tariff increase found that the import tax killed many more jobs than it created.2 Shortages forced some U.S. steel-consuming firms to source the metal offshore, while others made their steel suppliers absorb the higher costs, leading to job losses. A recent IMF3 study employed a large macro-economic model to simulate the impact of a 10% across-the-board U.S. import tariff without any retaliation. It found that tariffs place upward pressure on domestic interest rates, especially if the economy is already at full employment (Chart 1). This is because the central bank endeavors to counter the inflationary impact with higher interest rates. However, a stronger currency and higher interest rates eventually cool the economy and the Fed is later forced to ease policy. This puts the whole process into reverse as interest rate differentials fall and the dollar weakens. The economic outcome would be much worse if U.S. trading partners were to retaliate and the situation degenerates into a full-fledged trade war involving a growing number of industries. In theory, the dollar would not rise as much if there is retaliation because foreign tariffs on U.S. exports are offsetting in terms of relative prices. But all countries lose in this scenario. China is considering only a small retaliation for the steel and aluminum tariffs as we go to press, but the trade dispute has the potential to really heat up. The bottom line is that the Trump tariffs are more likely to lead to a stronger dollar than a weaker one, although far more would have to be done to see any meaningful impact. Fiscal Stimulus And The Dollar Traditional economic theory suggests that fiscal stimulus is also positive for the currency in the short term. The boost in aggregate demand worsens the current account balance, since some of the extra government spending is satisfied by foreign producers. The U.S. dollar appreciates as interest rates increase relative to the other major countries, attracting capital inflows. The currency appreciation thus facilitates the necessary adjustment (deterioration) in the current account balance. The impact on interest rates is similar to the tariff shock shown in Chart 1. All of the above market and economic adjustments should be accentuated when the economy is already at full employment. Since the domestic economy is short of spare capacity, a vast majority of the extra spending related to fiscal stimulus must be imported. Moreover, the Fed would have to respond even more aggressively to the extent that inflationary pressures are greater when the economy is running hot. The result would be even more upward pressure on the U.S. dollar. Reality has not supported the theory so far. The U.S. dollar weakened after the tax cuts were passed, and it did not even get a lift following the Senate spending plan that was released in February. The broad trade-weighted dollar has traded roughly sideways since mid-2017. Judging by the market reaction to the fiscal news, it appears that investors are worried about a potential replay of the so-called Nixon shock, when fiscal stimulus exacerbated the 'twin deficits' problem, investors lost confidence in policymakers and the dollar fell. Twin deficits refers to a period when the federal budget deficit and the current account deficit are deteriorating at the same time. Chart 2 highlights that the late 1960s/early 1970s was the last time that the federal government stimulated the economy at a time when the economy was already at full employment. Seeing the parallels today, some investors are concerned the dollar will decline as it did in the early 1970s. Chart 2A Replay Of The Nixon Years? Current Account And Budget Balances Often Diverge... Chart 3Twin Deficits And The Dollar The two deficits don't always shift in the same direction. In fact, Chart 3 highlights that they usually move in opposite directions through the business cycle. This is not surprising because the current account usually improves in a recession as imports contract more than exports, but the budget deficit rises as tax revenues wither. The process reverses when the economy recovers. The current account balance equals the government financial balance (i.e. budget deficit) plus the private sector financial balance (savings less investment spending). Thus, swings in the latter mean that the current account can move independently of the budget deficit. Even when the two deficits move in the same direction, there has been no clear historical relationship between the sum of the fiscal and current account balances and the value of the trade-weighted dollar (shaded periods in Chart 3). In the early 1980s, the twin deficits exploded on the back of the Reagan tax cuts and the military buildup, but the dollar strengthened. In contrast, the dollar weakened in the early 2000s, a period when the twin deficits rose in response to the Bush tax cuts, the Iraq War, and a booming housing market. ...But Generally Fiscal Expansion Undermines The Current Account Over long periods, a sustained rise in the fiscal deficit is generally associated with a sustained deterioration in the external balance. Numerous academic studies have found that every 1 percentage-point rise in the budget deficit worsens the current account balance by an average of 0.2-0.3 percentage points over the medium term. One study found that the current account deteriorates by an extra 0.2 percentage points if the fiscal stimulus arrives at a time when the economy is at full employment (i.e. an additional 0.2 percentage points over-and-above the 0.2-0.3 average response, for a total of 0.4 to 0.5).4 Given that the U.S. economy is at full employment today, these estimates imply that the expected two percentage point rise in the budget deficit relative to the baseline over 2018 and 2019 could add almost a full percentage point to the U.S. current account deficit (from around 3% of GDP currently to 4%). It could be even worse over the next couple of years because the private sector is likely to augment the government sector's drain on national savings. The mini capital spending boom currently underway will lift imports and thereby contribute to a further widening in the U.S. external deficit position. Chart 4Structural Drivers Of The U.S. Dollar Nonetheless, theory supports the view that the dollar will rise in the face of fiscal stimulus, at least in the near term, even if this is accompanied by a rising external deficit. Theory gets fuzzier in terms of the long-term outlook for the currency. However, the traditional approach to the balance of payments suggests that the equilibrium value of the dollar will eventually fall. An ongoing current account deficit will accumulate into a rising stock of foreign-owned debt that must be serviced. The Net International Investment Position (NIIP) is the difference between the stock of foreign assets held by U.S. residents and the stock of U.S. assets held by foreign investors. The NIIP has fallen increasingly into the red over the past few decades, reaching 40% of GDP today (Chart 4). The dollar will eventually have to depreciate in order to generate a trade surplus large enough to allow the U.S. to cover the extra interest payments on its growing stock of foreign debt. The structural depreciation of the U.S. dollar observed since the early 1980s supports the theory, because it has trended lower along with the NIIP/GDP ratio. However, the downtrend probably also reflects other structural factors. For example, U.S. output-per-employee has persistently fallen relative to its major trading partners for decades (Chart 4, third panel). The bottom line is that, while the dollar is likely to remain in a structural downtrend, it should receive at least a short-term boost from the combination of fiscal stimulus and higher tariffs. What could cause the dollar to buck the theory and depreciate even in the near term? We see three main scenarios in which the dollar could fall on a 12-month investment horizon. (1) Strong Growth Outside The U.S. First, growth momentum favored Europe, Japan and some of the other major countries relative to the U.S. in 2017. This helps to explain dollar weakness last year because the currency tends to underperform when growth surprises favor other countries in relative terms. It is possible that momentum will remain a headwind for the dollar this year. Nonetheless, this is not our base case. European and Japanese growth appears to be peaking, while fiscal stimulus should give the U.S. economy a strong boost this year and next. (2) A Lagging Fed The Fed will play a major role in the dollar's near-term trend. The Fed could fail to tighten in the face of accelerating growth and falling unemployment, allowing inflation and inflation expectations to ratchet higher. If investors come to believe that the Fed will remain behind-the-curve, rising long-term inflation expectations would depress real interest rates and thereby knock the dollar down. This was part of the story in the Nixon years. Under pressure from the Administration, then-Fed Chair Arthur Burns failed to respond to rising inflation, contributing to a major dollar depreciation from 1968 to 1974. We see this risk as a very low-probability event. Today's Fed acts much more independently of Congress beyond its dual commitment on inflation and unemployment. And, given that the economy is at full employment, there is nothing stopping the FOMC from acting to preserve its 2% inflation target if it appears threatened. Chair Powell is new and untested, but we doubt he and the rest of the Committee will be influenced by any political pressure to keep rates unduly low as inflation rises. Even Governor Brainard, a well-known dove, has shifted in a hawkish direction recently. President Trump would have to replace the entire FOMC in order to keep interest rates from rising. We doubt he will try. (3) Long-Run Sustainability Concerns It might be the case that the deteriorating outlook for the NIIP undermines the perceived long-run equilibrium value of the currency so much that it overwhelms the impact of rising U.S. interest rates and causes the dollar to weaken even in the near term. This scenario would likely require a complete breakdown in confidence in current and future Administrations to avoid a runaway government debt situation. Historically, countries with large and growing NIIP shortfalls tend to have weakening currencies. The sustainability of the U.S. twin deficits has been an area of intense debate among academics and market practitioners for many years. One could argue that the external deficit represents the U.S. "living beyond its means," because it consumes more than it produces. Another school of thought is that global savings are plentiful, and investors seek markets that are deep, liquid and offer a high expected rate of return. Indeed, China has willingly plowed a large chunk of its excess savings into U.S. assets since 2000. If the U.S. is an attractive place to invest, then we should not be surprised that the country runs a persistent trade deficit and capital account surplus. But even taking the more positive side of this debate, there are limits to how long the current situation can persist. The large stock of financial obligations implies flows of income payments and receipts - interest, dividends and the like - that must be paid out of the economy's current production. This might grow to be large enough to significantly curtail U.S. consumption and investment. At some point, foreign investors may begin to question the desirability of an oversized exposure to U.S. assets within their global portfolios. We are not suggesting that foreign investors will suddenly dump their U.S. stocks and bonds. Rather, they may demand a higher expected rate of return in order to accept a rising allocation to U.S. assets. This would imply that the dollar will fall sharply so that it has room to appreciate and thereby lift the expected rate of return for foreign investors from that point forward. Chart 5 shows that a 2% current account deficit would be roughly consistent with stabilization in the NIIP/GDP ratio. Any deficit above this level would imply a rapidly deteriorating situation. A 4% deficit would cause the NIIP to deteriorate to almost 80% of GDP by 2040. The fact that the current account averaged 4.6% in the 2000s and 2½% since 2010 confirms that the NIIP is unlikely to stabilize unless major macroeconomic adjustments are made (see below). Chart 5Scenarios For The U.S. Net International Investment Position Academic research is inconclusive on how large the U.S. NIIP could become before there are serious economic consequences and/or foreign investors begin to revolt. Exorbitant Privilege The U.S. has been able to get away with the twin deficits for so long in part because of the dollar's status as the world's premier reserve currency. The critical role of the dollar in international transactions underpins global demand for the currency. This has allowed the U.S. to issue most of its debt obligations in U.S. dollars, forcing the currency risk onto foreign investors. The U.S. is also able to get away with offering foreign investors a lower return on their investment in the U.S. than U.S. investors receive on their foreign investment. Chart 6 provides a proxy for these two returns. Relatively safe, but low yielding, fixed-income investments are a large component of foreign investments in the U.S., while U.S. investors favor equities and other assets that have a higher expected rate of return when investing abroad (Chart 7). This gap increased after the Great Recession as U.S. interest rates fell by more than the return U.S. investors received on their foreign assets. Today's gap, at almost 1½ percentage points, is well above the 1 percentage point average for the two decades leading up to the Great Recession. Chart 6U.S. Investors Harvest##BR##Higher Returns Chart 7Composition Of Net International##BR##Investment Position A yield gap of 1.5 percentage points may not sound like much, but it has been enough that the U.S. enjoys a positive net inflow of private investment income of about 1.2% of GDP, despite the fact that foreign investors hold far more U.S. assets than the reverse (Chart 6, top panel). In Chart 8 we simulate the primary investment balance based on a persistent 3% of GDP current account deficit and under several scenarios for the investment yield gap. Perhaps counterintuitively, the primary investment surplus that the U.S. currently enjoys will actually rise slightly as a percent of GDP if the yield gap remains near 1½ percentage points. This is because, although the NIIP balance becomes more negative over time, U.S. liabilities are not growing fast enough relative to its assets to offset the yield differential. Chart 8Primary Investment Balance Simulations However, some narrowing in the yield gap is likely as the Fed raises interest rates. Historically, the gap does not narrow one-for-one with Fed rate hikes because the yield on U.S. investments abroad also rises. Assuming that the yield gap returns to the pre-Lehman average of 1 percentage point over the next three years, the primary investment balance would decline, but would remain positive. Only under the assumption that the yield gap falls to 50 basis points or lower would the primary balance turn negative (Chart 8, bottom panel). Crossing the line from positive to negative territory on investment income is not necessarily a huge red flag for the dollar, but it would signal that foreign debt will begin to impinge on the U.S. standard of living. That said, the yield gap will have to deteriorate significantly for this to happen anytime soon. What Drives The Major Swings In The Dollar? While the dollar has been in a structural bear market for many decades, there have been major fluctuations around the downtrend. Since 1980, there have been three major bull phases and two bear markets (bull phases are shaded in Chart 9). These major swings can largely be explained by shifts in U.S./foreign differentials for short-term interest rates, real GDP growth and productivity growth. A model using these three variables explains most of the cyclical swings in the dollar, as the dotted line in the top panel of Chart 9 reveals. Chart 9U.S. Dollar Cyclical Swings Driven By Three Main Factors The peaks and troughs do not line up perfectly, but periods of dollar appreciation were associated with rising U.S. interest rates relative to other countries, faster relative U.S. real GDP growth, and improving U.S. relative productivity growth. Since the Great Recession, rate differentials have moved significantly in favor of the dollar, although U.S. relative growth improved a little as well. Productivity trends have not been a factor in recent years. Note that the current account has been less useful in identifying the cyclical swings in the dollar. Looking ahead, we expect short-term interest rate differentials to shift further in favor of the U.S. dollar. We assume that the Fed will hike rates three additional times in 2018 and another three next year. The Bank of Japan will stick with its current rate and 10-year target for the foreseeable future. The ECB may begin the next rate hike campaign by mid-2019, but will proceed slowly thereafter. We expect rate differentials to widen by more than is discounted in the market. As discussed above, we also expect growth momentum to swing back in favor of the U.S. economy in 2018. U.S. productivity growth will continue to underperform the rest-of-world average over the medium and long term. Nonetheless, we expect a cyclical upturn in relative productivity performance that should also support the greenback for the next year or two. Conclusion Reducing the U.S. structural external deficit to a sustainable level would require significant macro-economic adjustments that seem unlikely for the foreseeable future. We would need to see some combination of a higher level of the U.S. household saving rate, a balanced Federal budget balance or better, and/or much stronger growth among U.S. trading partners. In other words, the U.S. would have to become a net producer of goods and services, and either Europe or Asia would have to become a net consumer of goods and services. Current trends do not favor such a role reversal. Indeed, the U.S. twin deficits are sure to move in the wrong direction for at least the next two years. Longer-term, pressure on the federal budget deficit will only intensify with the aging of the population. The shortfall in terms of net foreign assets will continue to grow, which means that the long-term structural downtrend in the trade-weighted value of the dollar will persist. Other structural factors, such as international productivity trends, also point to a long-term dollar depreciation. It seems incongruous that the U.S. dollar is the largest reserve currency and that U.S. is the world's largest international debtor. The situation is perhaps perpetuated by the lack of an alternative, but this could change over time as concerns over the long-run viability of the Eurozone ebb and the Chinese renminbi gains in terms of international trade. The transition could take decades. The U.S. twin-deficits situation is not that dire that the U.S. dollar is about to fall off a cliff because of sudden concerns about the unsustainability of the current account deficit. Even though the NIIP/GDP ratio will continue to deteriorate in the coming years, it does not appear that the U.S. is anywhere close to the point where investors would begin to seriously question America's ability to service its debt. The U.S. will continue to enjoy a net surplus on its international investments except under a worst-case scenario for relative returns. From an economic perspective, we see no reason why the U.S. will not be able to easily continue financing its domestic saving shortfall in the coming years. There are other risks of course. Growing international political tensions and a trade war could threaten the U.S. dollar's status as the world's premier reserve currency. In 2018, we expect the dollar to partially unwind last year's weakness on the back of positive cyclical forces. Additional protectionist measures should support the dollar as long as retaliation is muted. Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 A Wave of Protectionism? An Analysis of Economic and Political Considerations. Bank of Canada Working Paper 2008-2. Philipp Maier. 2 The Unintended Consequences of U.S. Steel Import Tariffs: A Quantification of the Impact During 2002. Trade Partnership Worldwide, LLC. Joseph Francois and Laura Baughman. February 4, 2003. 3 See footnote to Chart 1. 4 Fiscal Policy and the Current Account. Center for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 7859 September 16, 2010.
Special Report Highlights Slower nominal GDP growth explains virtually all of the increase in China's debt-to-GDP ratio over the past ten years. The authorities were unwilling to restrain debt growth as it became obvious that nominal income was decelerating because this would have only exacerbated the economic downturn. Excess private-sector savings forced the Chinese government to rely on debt-financed investment by state-owned companies (SOE) and local governments in order to keep aggregate demand elevated. Financial deregulation also encouraged debt accumulation. Debt growth linked to speculative activity can be curbed without endangering the economy, but a lasting solution to the surplus savings problem will require consumers to spend more. This will take a while. At some point over the next few years, the central government will transfer a large fraction of SOE and local government debt onto its own balance sheet. The risk to investors is that this "debt nationalization" happens reactively rather than proactively. Feature If there are too many pro-cyclical factors in the economy, cyclical fluctuations are magnified and there is excessive optimism during the period, accumulating contradictions that could lead to the so-called Minsky Moment. - Zhou Xiaochuan, Former Governor of the People's Bank of China, October 19, 2017 The Calm Before The Storm? Stability begets instability. That is the nature of business cycles, Hyman Minsky famously argued. Rising confidence leads to excessive risk-taking, higher asset prices, and mounting economic imbalances. Eventually the mood sours. Like Wile E. Coyote running off a cliff, investors look down and see that there is nothing but thin air between them and the ground below. Panic ensues. Is China on the verge of its own Minsky Moment? A glance at the evolution of its debt-to-GDP ratio would certainly say so. But before running towards the exit door, consider the following: People have been fretting about spiraling Japanese government debt levels for over twenty years now. And yet, interest rates remain at rock-bottom levels in Japan. China's Savings Glut In many respects, China finds itself facing similar problems to those that have haunted Japan. The simultaneous bust in equity and real estate prices in 1990 sent Japan's private sector into a prolonged deleveraging cycle (Chart 1). In order to prop up demand, the Japanese government was forced to run large budget deficits. In effect, the government had to absorb the excess savings of the private sector with its own dissavings. The abundance of domestic private-sector savings forestalled a financial crisis, but it also led to today's gross government debt-to-GDP ratio of 240%. Like Japan, China suffers from a dearth of spending, or equivalently, an abundance of savings. The IMF estimates that Chinese gross national savings reached 46% of GDP in 2017. While this is down from a peak of 52% of GDP in 2008, it is still abnormally high for any major economy, even by emerging market standards (Chart 2). Chart 1 Japan Relied On Large Fiscal Deficits And Current Account Surpluses To Offset The Rise In Private-Sector Savings Chart 2China's Savings Rate Stands Out Even By EM Standards By definition, whatever a country saves must either be invested domestically or channeled abroad via a current account surplus. China's savings rate has edged lower over the past ten years, but its current account surplus has dropped even more, falling from nearly 10% of GDP in 2007 to 1.4% of GDP at present. As a result, investment as a share of GDP has actually risen to 44%, a three-point increase since 2007 (Chart 3). The decline in China's current account surplus was inevitable (Chart 4). In 2007, China accounted for 6% of global GDP in dollar terms. Today it accounts for 15%. Having a massively undervalued currency, as China had in 2007, is just not politically tenable anymore, especially with Donald Trump in the White House. Simply put, China has become too big to continue exporting its way out of its problems. Chart 3Since The Great Financial Crisis, Chinese Savings Have Been Channeled Into Domestic Investment, Not Funneled Abroad Chart 4Undervalued Currency And Massive Current Account Surplus: Modus Operandi Of The Past Debt As The Conduit Between Savings And Investment How does a country transform savings into investment? In an economy like China where the stock market at times appears to be little more than a casino, the answer is that credit markets must play the dominant role. Households or firms with surplus savings park their funds in banks or other financial institutions. These institutions channel the savings to willing borrowers. Debt ends up being the natural byproduct of surplus savings. China is still a relatively poor country with a lot of catch-up potential. Capital-per-worker is a fraction of what it is among advanced economies (Chart 5). Even with its bleak demographics, China would need to grow by around 6% per year over the next few years just to converge with South Korea in output-per-worker by 2050 (Chart 6). All this means that China needs to invest more than most other economies, which is only possible if it saves more than other economies. Chart 5China Has More Catching Up To Do (1) Chart 6China Has More Catching Up To Do (2) Unfortunately, one can have too much of a good thing. The fact that China's capital stock-to-output ratio has risen dramatically in recent years means that the economy is already investing too much. And the optimal amount of investment will only fall over time as potential GDP growth continues to decelerate. Unless savings come down, China will find itself increasingly awash in excess capacity. Chart 7If Only GDP Growth Did Not ##br## Decelerate Over The Past Ten Years Slower trend growth will also make deleveraging more difficult to achieve. The overall stock of nonfinancial debt grew at an annualized rate of 18.8% between 2008 and 2017. Notably, this growth rate was not much higher than the one of 16.5% between 2003 and 2007 - a period when the debt-to-GDP ratio was broadly stable. The main difference between the two periods lies in the denominator of the debt-to-GDP ratio, not in the numerator: Nominal GDP expanded at an annualized rate of 11.2% between 2008 and 2017, a sizable retreat from the pace of 18.4% between 2003 and 2007. Chart 7 shows that the debt-to-GDP ratio today would be virtually identical to its end-2007 level had nominal GDP continued to grow at its 2003-2007 pace over the past ten years. Financial Deregulation Has Exacerbated The Debt Problem The Chinese government's reluctance to crack down on credit growth was motivated by the desire to support aggregate demand. However, in turning a blind eye to what was happening in credit markets, a lot of debt was generated that was not directly tied to the intermediation of savings into investment. Chart 8Debt And Capital Accumulation Went Hand In Hand Debt can be created when someone borrows money to finance the purchase of goods or services. Debt can also be created when someone borrows money to finance the purchase of pre-existing assets. Crucially, while the former typically requires additional "savings" (i.e., someone needs to reduce their spending relative to their income), the latter does not.1 Granted, savings can still play an indirect role in facilitating debt-financed asset purchases. Financial assets are typically backed by something of value. A mortgage is backed by a piece of property. A corporate bond is backed by both the tangible and intangible capital that a firm possesses. The more a country has been able to save over time, the larger its capital stock will be. China, of course, has been saving like crazy for years. It is thus no surprise that its debt-to-GDP ratio has soared as its capital stock has expanded (Chart 8). Financial deregulation in China has allowed a large share of its capital stock to repeatedly shift hands. Debt has often been created in the process. The problem is that debt-financed asset purchases drive up asset prices, sometimes to unsustainable levels. And the higher the price of the asset, the greater the risk that it will not yield enough income to cover the borrowing costs. When asset prices are rising, borrowers and lenders are apt to disregard this risk, figuring that they can always sell the asset at a high enough price to pay back the loan. But once prices start falling, reality sets in very quickly. Stability begets instability. Consumers Need To Step Up The authorities are keenly aware of the risks discussed above. This is the key reason why they are clamping down on the shadow banking system, which has increasingly become the main source of speculative lending in China. We expect the pressure on shadow banks to persist in 2018. This will continue to weigh on credit growth. The more vexing challenge is how to reduce excessive household savings. The government's current strategy of cramming down the capital stock by taking out excess capacity from sectors such as steel, coal, and solar may be better than nothing, but it still pales in comparison to a strategy of encouraging consumer spending. Higher consumer spending would obviate the need for state-owned companies and local governments to keep people employed in make-work projects. The good news is that there are plenty of ways that China can boost household consumption. Government spending on education, health care, and pensions as a share of GDP is close to half of the OECD average (Chart 9). Increasing social transfer payments would give households the wherewithal to spend more. Unlike in most countries, the poor in China are net savers (Chart 10). Expanding the social safety net would discourage precautionary savings. Chart 9Chinese Social Welfare Spending ##br##Is Lagging The OECD Average Chart 10Low Income Households Are Net ##br##Savers In China The Chinese income tax structure is fairly regressive. Poor households face an effective income tax rate exceeding 40%. This is well above OECD norms (Chart 11).2 A more progressive tax system would boost spending among poorer households. It would also curb inequality, which has increased sharply over the past few decades (Chart 12). The saving rate among the richest 10% of Chinese earners is close to 50%. Policies that shift income from the rich to the poor would reduce overall household savings. Chart 11High Tax Burden For ##br##Low Income Households In China Chart 12Shifting Income To Poorer Households Would Reduce ##br##China's Household Savings Rate Debt Nationalization Is Inevitable Chart 13Ratio Of Workers-To-Consumers Is Peaking,##br## And China Is No Exception Realistically, reforms aimed at encouraging consumption will take a while to implement. In the meantime, debt levels are likely to keep rising. Much of China's debt burden remains on the books of state-owned companies and local governments. At some point over the next few years, the central government will transfer a large fraction of this debt onto its own balance sheet. This would ease concerns about a mass wave of defaults. The key question for investors is whether this de facto "debt nationalization" is done proactively or reactively in response to a crisis. If the latter occurs, investors should steer clear of Chinese assets, as well as China-related plays such as commodities and commodity currencies. If the former pans out, global risk assets could rally. While the truth will fall somewhere between those two extremes, our bet is that the proactive view will prove closer to the mark, at least relative to market expectations (keep in mind that Chinese banks are trading below book value, so a lot of bad news has already been priced in). The Chinese authorities talk a lot about the importance of reducing moral hazard, but in practice, they have shown very little tolerance for defaults. Just as they did in the early 2000s, government leaders could commission state-owned asset management companies to purchase distressed debt from banks and other lenders at inflated prices. Chinese financials, which are nearly 70% of the H-share index, will benefit. Will investors balk at the prospect of the Chinese government blowing out the budget deficit in order to rescue insolvent borrowers? There might be some short-term panic, but as has been the case with Japan, as long as there are plenty of excess domestic savings to go around, the risk of a debt crisis will remain minimal. Indeed, the issuance of more government debt would help alleviate what has become a critical problem for Chinese savers: The lack of safe, liquid domestic assets available for purchase. What is true, from a longer-term perspective, is that the combination of higher debt and slower growth will eventually create a strong incentive for the Chinese government to inflate away debt. As in many other countries, China's "support ratio" -- broadly defined as the ratio of workers-to-consumers -- has peaked (Chart 13). As the growth of output and income falls behind consumption growth, China's savings glut will become a thing of the past. Rather than raising rates, the PBOC will just let the economy overheat. Such a day of reckoning is probably still at least five years away, but eventually inflation will return to China. Concluding Thoughts On The Current Market Environment A true "Minsky moment" in China - one where the financial sector seizes up due to spiraling fears of bankruptcies and defaults - is not in the cards. Nevertheless, China's economy is slowing, and growth is likely to decelerate further over the next few quarters as the authorities restrain credit growth and the property market continues to cool. The slowdown in Chinese growth is occurring at the same time as the economic data has been deteriorating around the world. The equity component of our MacroQuant model - which is highly sensitive to changes in the direction of growth - has been in bearish territory for two straight months (Chart 14). Our base case remains that global growth will stabilize over the next few months at an above-trend pace. Global bond yields are still near record-low levels and fiscal policy is moving in a more stimulative direction (Chart 15). It would be odd for the global economy to deteriorate sharply in such an environment. Chart 14MacroQuant Model Suggests Caution Is Warranted Trade protectionism is an obvious risk to this sanguine cyclical view. BCA has long argued that globalization is under threat from the combination of rising populism and the end of America's role as the world's sole superpower. However, the retreat from globalization will occur in fits and starts. Just as investors were overly complacent about protectionism a few months ago, they have become overly alarmist now. Both the U.S. and China have a strong incentive to reach a mutually-satisfying agreement over trade. President Trump has been able to shrug off the decline in equities because his approval rating has actually risen during the selloff (Chart 16). However, if the problems on Wall Street begin to show up on Main Street - as is likely to happen if stocks continue to fall - Trump will change his tune. Chart 15Global Economy Buttressed By ##br##Accommodative Fiscal And Monetary Policy Chart 16Trump's Approval Rating Has ##br##Actually Risen During Equity Selloff For its part, the Chinese government is also looking to strike a deal. The U.S. exported only $131 billion in goods to China last year. This is already less than the $150 billion in Chinese goods that Trump has targeted for tariffs. China simply cannot win a tit-for-tat trade war with the United States. Bottom Line: The near-term picture for global equities and other risk assets is murky, but the 12-month cyclical outlook is still reasonably upbeat. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 For instance, if someone buys stock on margin or takes out a second mortgage on their house, new debt is created without anyone having to cut back on spending. In the context of China, imagine a financial institution which funds the purchase of a building by issuing a certificate of deposit or by selling a "wealth management" product. Both the asset and liability side of the financial institution's balance sheet go up (i.e., new debt is created). Suppose further that the company that sold the building puts the proceeds into a certificate of deposit or wealth management product. The entire transaction is self-financing. The example above illustrates that debt can go up in some situations even if everyone's spending habits remain the same. The need to intermediate savings is one source of debt growth, but it does not have to be the only one. 2 Please see "People's Republic Of China: Selected Issues," IMF Country Report, dated August 15, 2017.