Economy
Highlights Chart I-1The Economy Has Stabilized##br## But Has Not Recovered Brazil desperately needs to boost nominal growth to avoid public debt spiraling out of control1. We do not think it is possible without resorting to meaningful currency depreciation and much lower interest rates. The Brazilian economy has stabilized, but it has not yet recovered (Chart I-1). To stage a sustainable recovery, much easier monetary conditions and fiscal stance are required. However, monetary conditions remain tight and fiscal policy is tightening: Feature Real interest rates are about 5.5-6% - as high as they were before the current rate-cut cycle commenced (Chart I-2). The Brazilian central bank's aggressive rate cuts have largely matched the drop in the inflation rate, keeping real borrowing costs elevated. Besides, household debt servicing costs (interest payments and principal) are high, above 20% of disposable income (Chart I-3) and employment conditions remain extremely poor. In this environment, households will not be inclined to expand leverage considerably. The Brazilian real is not cheap. In fact, the real effective exchange rate is slightly above its fair value (Chart I-4). Nominal GDP growth is currently running close to 4%, while the government's budget assumption for nominal GDP growth in 2017 is 5-5.5%. Not surprisingly, government revenues are disappointing and the budget deficit is above its target (Chart I-5). Furthermore, the improvement in government revenues in the past 12 months has been due to one-off measures such as non-recurring privatization revenue, repayment by the national development bank (BNDES) of 100 billion BRL and tax amnesty/capital repatriation programs that will not be repeated. In brief, more tax hikes are needed to achieve revenue targets but higher taxes will in turn jeopardize the economic revival. Taxes on fuel have been raised in recent weeks. Chart I-2Interest Rates Are##br## Still Very High Chart I-3Household Debt Servicing##br## Ratio Has Not Yet Declined Chart I-4The Real Is Not Cheap Chart I-5Brazil: No Improvement In Fiscal Accounts Given that fiscal policy is straightjacketed by high and rapidly rising public debt levels, the onus of boosting nominal growth is squarely on the central bank. Not only have the monetary authorities cut interest rates, they have also been monetizing government debt. Chart I-6 shows that the central bank's holdings of government securities have skyrocketed, i.e., the central bank has bought BRL531 billion of government paper since January 2015. While it has partially sterilized its debt monetization by using these securities as reverse repos with banks, the amount of high-powered money/liquidity withdrawal via repos has been much smaller than the central bank's liquidity injections. Chart I-6aBrazil: Central Bank Has##br## Been Monetizing Public Debt... Chart I-6b...And Sterilizing It ##br##Only Partially This has helped liquidity in the banking system considerably, and smoothed the banking system adjustment at a time of surging non-performing loans. However, it has not generated enough purchasing power in the economy to boost nominal growth. Notably, broad money growth is slowing (Chart I-7). Even though bank loan growth may have troughed (Chart I-7, bottom panel), it is unlikely to recover strongly due to high real rates. Broad money captures the stance of credit and fiscal policies because broad money reflects purchasing power created by commercial banks and central bank when lending to and buying government bonds from non-banks. Remarkably, the broad money impulse - which is the second derivative of outstanding broad money - points to weakness in nominal GDP growth (Chart I-8). Chart I-7Brazil: Broad Money##br## And Bank Loans Chart I-8Broad Money And Terms Of Trade Point ##br## To Weaker Nominal Growth In addition, nominal GDP growth correlates with terms of trade, and the latter has also relapsed (Chart I-8, bottom panel). Furthermore, high-frequency data reveal that manufacturing PMI and consumer confidence have also rolled over lately, pointing to stalling improvement in both the manufacturing sector and consumer spending (Chart I-9). All in all, policymakers are behind the curve. The central bank could continue cutting interest rates, increase its purchases of government bonds, and also use other measures to inject more money – both high-powered money and broad money – into circulation. If they do so, it will eventually help the economy recover and boost inflation, yet it is bearish for the exchange rate. However, if the exchange rate relapses on its own (due to other factors), that will limit the authorities' ability to reduce interest rates further. This is on top of heightened political uncertainty that does not bode well for Brazilian financial markets. In a nutshell, Brazil needs to engineer currency depreciation to boost nominal growth and make public debt sustainable. This is true especially as Argentina is opting to keep its currency competitive, and it will be even more critical if commodities prices relapse, as we expect (Chart I-10). Provided the share of foreign currency public debt is low, reflating via currency depreciation is the least painful way out for Brazil. Bottom Line: Policymakers are desperate to boost nominal growth to stabilize public debt. Yet, in our opinion, nominal growth will not improve without further sizable rate cuts and meaningful currency depreciation. Eventually, policymakers will allow the BRL to depreciate 20%-plus, which will hurt foreign investments in local asset markets. We remain negative on/underweight Brazil equities, currency and sovereign debt. That said, we recommend fixed-income investors to bet on the 3/1-year yield curve flattening: receive 3-year / pay 1-year swap rate (Chart I-11). Chart I-9High-Frequency Indicators:##br## Improvement Has Stalled Chart I-10Other Headwinds##br## For BRL Chart I-11A New Trade: ##br## Bet On 3/1-Year Yield Curve Flattening Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic, Research Assistant andrijav@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report titled, "Has Brazil Achieved Escape Velocity?", dated February 8, 2017, link available on page 11 - we argued that Brazil's public debt dynamics is unsustainable without strong nominal growth and/or social security reforms. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Highlights Easier financial conditions will lift U.S. growth in the second half of this year. However, given the Fed's dovish predisposition, aggressive tightening measures are unlikely until next year, when inflation will begin to accelerate. We see little downside for the dollar over the coming months, but think the next major leg of the structural dollar bull market will only come in 2018, as the Fed begrudgingly comes to terms with the fact that it has been behind the curve in raising rates. Even then, the Fed's efforts to tighten monetary policy will not be enough to prevent a secular rebound in inflation from taking root. Structural factors, ranging from population aging to chronically weak productivity growth, will further fuel inflation in the U.S. and around the world. Political populism - historically, an inflationary force - will come roaring back, while globalization, a deflationary force, will remain in retreat. Remain overweight global equities for now, but look to raise cash next summer. A structurally underweight position in government bonds is appropriate. Feature The Fed Stands Pat As expected, the Fed kept rates on hold this week and signaled its intention to start shrinking its balance sheet later this year. The FOMC upgraded its assessment of the state of the labor market to "solid," but sounded a note of caution on the recent weak inflation readings. It was the latter point that caught investors' attention. The dollar promptly sold off. We went long the DXY index in October 2014. We maintained our bullish dollar view going into the U.S. presidential elections, controversially arguing in September 2016 that "Trump will win and the dollar will rally."1 While our long dollar trade is still comfortably in the black, the dollar's recent swoon does imply that we stayed at the party longer than was warranted. Chart 1Investors Dismiss Future Inflation Risk What went wrong this year? The failure of the Trump administration to make progress on tax reform in recent months has hurt the dollar. So has the decline in core inflation. Core PCE inflation registered 1.4% in May, down from a high of 1.8% in January. As a result, the market is now pricing in only 26 basis points of rate hikes over the next 12 months and just a 45% chance that the Fed will raise rates by December. Hawkish comments from the ECB, the Bank of Canada, and several other central banks have added fuel to the dollar selloff. Shifts in speculative positioning haven't helped either. Investors were extremely bullish the dollar going into 2017 while bearish the euro. Today, euro longs are at record highs, while sentiment towards the dollar is in the pits. Looking out, sentiment towards the dollar should normalize, while U.S. growth should surprise to the upside over the next few quarters. U.S. financial conditions have eased sharply this year thanks to the decline in bond yields, narrower credit spreads, higher equity prices, and of course, a weaker dollar. Historically, easier financial conditions have boosted growth with a lag of 6-to-9 months. In contrast, euro area growth may be close to plateauing, as already foreshadowed this week by the decline in the PMI for July. All this should be enough to put a floor under the dollar over the remainder of the year. However, at this point, it looks increasingly likely that the next (and last) leg of the dollar bull market will have to wait until inflation begins to accelerate. This may not happen until 2018, suggesting that the dollar could trade in a range until then. We are maintaining our view that EUR/USD will eventually reach parity, but now see this as most likely to happen in the second half of next year. Many investors are skeptical that inflation will rise even if the unemployment rate continues to trend downwards. They argue that the relationship between economic slack and inflation - epitomized by the so-called Phillips curve - has completely broken down. We disagree with this assessment. As we argue below, not only is inflation likely to accelerate next year, but a number of powerful structural factors will propel inflation higher over a longer-term horizon. In fact, the 2020s could turn out to look a lot like the 1970s. Current market-based inflation expectations do not reflect this risk at all (Chart 1). Cyclical Forces Will Boost Inflation Spare capacity has declined significantly in most economies since 2009 (Chart 2). By many measures, the U.S. is now close to full employment (Table 1). Historically, diminished slack has corresponded with higher inflation (Chart 3). Chart 2Output Gaps Have Narrowed Table 1Comparing Current Labor Market Slack With Past Cycles Chart 3Diminished Slack Has Corresponded With Higher Inflation The fact that decreased spare capacity has not yet translated into higher inflation is not especially surprising. Inflation is a severely lagging indicator. As we noted last week, inflation typically does not peak until well after a recession has begun and does not bottom until well after it has ended (Chart 4).2 Trying to infer the true level of economic slack from today's inflation rate is like trying to read the speedometer of an automobile when there is a 30-second delay between what the dial says and when you step on the accelerator. Chart 4Inflation Is A Lagging Indicator Moreover, the relationship between slack and inflation tends to be highly non-linear. When there is a lot of spare capacity, reducing it modestly tends not to have much of an effect on inflation. However, when there is little or no slack, even a small reduction in spare capacity can lead to a big jump in inflation. The 1960s provide an extreme example of what can happen (Chart 5). The unemployment rate steadily declined between 1960 and 1966. Yet, core inflation remained remarkably stable during this period, consistently hovering between 1.5% and 2%. In early 1966, the unemployment rate finally broke below 4%. Within the span of 12 months, core inflation jumped from 1.5% to 3.7%. Such a rapid burst in inflation is unlikely in the near term. Inflation expectations are better anchored and unions have less power today than in the 1960s. Moreover, unlike then, some of the excess in aggregate demand can be absorbed through a larger trade deficit rather than through higher prices for goods and services. Nevertheless, as slack elsewhere in the world comes down, global inflation will rise. Our "pipeline inflation" indices, comprised of such variables as core PPI inflation and unit labor costs, are already pointing in that direction (Chart 6). The cyclical pressure on inflation will only intensify if crude prices grind higher, as our energy strategists expect they will. Chart 5Inflation In The 1960s Took Off Once ##br##The Unemployment Rate Fell Below 4% Chart 6Pickup In Global Pipeline Measures Of Inflation Structural Trends Are Becoming More Inflationary Meanwhile, several structural forces will slowly lift inflation over a longer-term horizon of five-to-fifteen years. Weaker productivity growth is one of them (Chart 7). We have argued in the past that much of the decline in global productivity growth reflects structural factors.3 As a matter of arithmetic, gross domestic output (GDP) must equal gross domestic income (GDI). If productivity growth stays weak, slow income growth could end up depressing savings by more than it depresses investment. This could push up equilibrium real interest rates. Unless central banks respond by raising policy rates, inflation will rise. The retirement of millions of highly paid baby boomers could also lead to labor shortages and lower aggregate savings. Chart 8 shows the estimated consumption and income profile for a typical U.S. individual over a lifetime. Notice that consumption tends to peak very late in life due to rising health care expenditures. Chart 7Productivity Growth Has Fallen, ##br##Particularly In Developed Economies Chart 8Spending And Saving Over The Lifecycle Using existing demographic projections, we can compute the impact that population aging is likely to have on savings. The effect is substantial. In the U.S., aging will reduce the household saving rate by about four percentage points between now and 2030. In Germany, the saving rate will sink by six points, while in China it will decline by five points. This will reduce the massive current account surpluses in these two countries, which have been major contributors to the global savings glut and the corresponding low level of real interest rates. The Japan Experience Japan's household saving rate will also continue to fall, having already declined from 14% in the late 1980s to 2% today. Amazingly, the decline in Japan's saving rate over the past few decades has occurred even though a larger share of the population is employed today than in 1980 (Chart 9). Rising female participation accounts for this. However, now that Japan's female employment rate has surpassed America's and Europe's, this demographic tailwind will dissipate (Chart 10). As a result, Japan's labor force will begin to shrink in earnest, while spending on health care and pensions will keep rising. What will be left is a large government debt burden. Chart 9Japan: Saving Rate Has Fallen Despite Rising Employment/Population Chart 10Japan: Female Employment-To-Population ##br##Has Surpassed The U.S. And Euro Area Whether debt is inflationary or deflationary depends both on economic and political considerations. On the one hand, a high degree of indebtedness may restrain spending throughout the economy. That is deflationary. On the other hand, high debt levels may provide an incentive for governments to crank up inflation in order to reduce the real value of outstanding debt obligations. Historically at least, the latter factor has often won out. One can debate whether Japan would have welcomed higher inflation even if it had the means to generate it. There are good arguments for both sides of the issue. But, in practice, the Bank of Japan's ability to create inflation was cut off very early into its first lost decade. This is because falling property prices and pervasive corporate deleveraging pushed the neutral nominal interest rate deep into negative territory. This meant that even an interest rate of zero was not enough to boost inflation. Now that property prices appear to be bottoming, corporate balance sheets are in reasonably good shape, and the prospect of significant labor shortages looms on the horizon, Japan may finally be able to gain some traction over monetary policy. Such an outcome would come as a complete surprise to most investors. The Benefits Of Higher Inflation Japan's struggles illustrate the pitfalls of excessively low inflation. Had Japanese inflation been higher in the early 1990s, the Bank of Japan might have been able to bring real rates far enough into negative territory without ever encountering the zero-bound constraint on nominal rates. This may have prevented a vicious circle where falling inflation put upward pressure on real rates, leading to weaker growth and even lower inflation. Fast forward to the present and what was once regarded as a uniquely Japanese problem is now seen as a concern in many countries. It is not surprising, therefore, that a growing chorus of economists is advocating that central banks aim for a higher inflation target than the standard 2%. The logic is straightforward: If inflation is 4% and a deep economic downturn requires that central bankers temporarily bring real rates down to -3%, this can be achieved by cutting nominal rates to 1%. In contrast, if inflation is 2%, it may be difficult to cut nominal rates to -1% since people could choose to hold cash over a negative-yielding asset. Another lesson that central bankers have learned from both the Great Recession and the recession that followed the dotcom boom is that burst asset bubbles can cause significant harm to economies. Here again, a bit more inflation can provide a safety valve of sorts. If the trend rate of inflation had been higher going into the housing bust, nominal home prices would have fallen less for any given change in real prices. This implies that fewer mortgages would have gone underwater. A higher underlying inflation rate would have also made it more difficult for lenders to offer zero-interest mortgages since their funding costs in real terms would have been greater. This would have imposed more discipline on lenders and borrowers alike. Then there is the labor market. The reluctance of workers to accept nominal wage cuts makes it difficult for real wages to adjust downwards in the face of adverse economic shocks when underlying inflation is very low. If inflation is higher, that problem diminishes. This point is especially relevant for the euro area, where labor markets are quite inflexible to begin with and many countries do not have the ability to respond to adverse shocks with either countercyclical fiscal policy or currency depreciation. Inflation As A Political Choice It is sometimes said that low inflation or even outright deflation is the natural state of affairs in capitalist economies. This is arguably true under monetary regimes such as the gold standard, but it is not true in a world of fiat money. Inflation took off in the late sixties because policymakers who grew up during the 1930s were more concerned about propping up aggregate demand than keeping a lid on prices. In contrast, the generation that reached adulthood in the 1970s was more worried about runaway inflation. It is this latter group that has run the world's central banks for the better part of the past few decades. As they step aside, they will be replaced by a younger cohort whose formative years were shaped by the financial crisis and the deflation shock that followed. Things have come full circle again. A recent NBER paper documented that age plays a major role in determining whether central bankers turn out to be dovish or hawkish.4 Those who witnessed stagflation in the 1970s as adults are much more likely to express a hawkish bias than those who were still in diapers back then. The implication is the future generation of central bankers is likely to see the world through a more dovish lens than its predecessors. Globalization In Retreat, Populism Ascendant Globalization has been a strong deflationary force through history. That force is now waning, as evidenced by the stagnation in global trade (Chart 11). In contrast, political populism - historically, a highly inflationary force - is on the rise. Much of the slowdown in globalization can be attributed to structural factors. Tariff rates fell steadily in the second half of the 20th century, helping to boost global trade in the process (Chart 12). Now that most goods cross borders duty free, further efforts at trade liberalization will be subject to diminishing returns. The same goes for outsourcing. In fact, growing evidence suggests that many firms have outsourced too much, leaving them with an unwieldy maze of suppliers around the world. Chart 11Globalization Has Stalled Chart 12Global Trade Was Boosted By Falling Tariffs ##br## In The Second Half Of The 20th Century Likewise, the integration of Eastern Europe and China into the capitalist economy brought a billion additional workers into the global labor force, giving globalization a huge boost (Chart 13). Nothing similar awaits over the horizon. Chart 13The Transition To Capitalism Enlarged The Global Labor Force Politics represents another headwind to globalization. Trade among rich countries tends to have smaller distributional consequences than trade between rich and poor countries. As emerging markets have become larger players in the global trading system, the impact on less-skilled workers in developed countries has grown. People in Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania voted for Trumpism, not Trump. The problem is that Trump does not understand this, as his cyberbullying of Attorney General Jeff Sessions this week demonstrates. If Trump deserts his base, his base will find someone more to their liking. Either way, populism will prevail. For their part, the Democrats are also honing their populist message. Their "Better Deal" agenda harkens back to the populist roots of FDR's New Deal. It promises to "raise the wages and incomes of American workers," "crack down on unfair foreign trade and fight back against corporations that outsource American jobs," and root out "monopolies and the concentration of economic power," while also making sure that "Wall Street never endangers Main Street again."5 Bernie Sanders may have lost the Democratic nomination, but he won the soul of the Democratic party. European populists have been on the back foot over the past year, having suffered defeats in the Dutch, Austrian, and French elections. Yet, it would be a mistake to count them out. Populists do best when times are tough. European growth is strong these days and unemployment is falling. When the next recession rolls around, populist parties will gain favor. This will especially be the case if the migrant crisis re-escalates, as seems likely. Investment Conclusions Getting inflation up to 2% - let alone something higher - has seemed like "mission impossible" for most of the past eight years because of elevated levels of economic slack. However, as this slack is absorbed, boosting inflation will become easier. Central banks only need to raise rates by less than standard Taylor rules imply. As we discussed last week, the Fed, the Bank of Canada, the Swedish Riksbank, and the central banks of Australia and New Zealand are all somewhat behind the curve in raising rates.6 As inflation in these economies picks up next year, they will be forced to raise rates more aggressively than what the markets are currently discounting, causing bond yields to rise and their currencies to strengthen. This could sow the seeds of a slowdown or even a recession in 2019. The recession is unlikely to be especially severe since financial and economic imbalances are not as pronounced today as they were a decade ago. Yet, the policy reaction will be disproportionately large: Interest rates will be cut and talk of additional asset purchases will begin to swirl. Inflation will come down, but not all the way back to current levels. Likewise, bond yields will fall, but nowhere close to the secular lows recorded in mid-2016. As in previous inflationary episodes, the path for nominal bond yields over the next 15 years will be marked by higher highs and higher lows. Fixed-income investors should pare back duration and increase exposure to inflation-indexed securities. Gold will become a valuable hedge once the dollar peaks next year. Equities will suffer in a stagflationary environment. We remain cyclically overweight global stocks for now, as reflected in our asset allocation recommendations (Appendix 1). However, we will be looking to reduce exposure significantly next summer. Peter Berezin, Global Chief Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Three (New) Controversial Calls," dated September 30, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Are Central Banks Behind The Curve Or Ahead Of It?" dated July 21, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Is Slow Productivity Growth Good Or Bad For Bonds?" dated May 31, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Ulrike Malmendier, Stefan Nagel, and Zhen Yan, "The Making Of Hawks And Doves: Inflation Experiences On The FOMC," NBER Working Paper No. 23228 (March 2017). 5 Chuck Schumer, "A Better Deal for American Workers," The New York Times, July 24, 2017, and "A Better Deal," available at http://www.democraticleader.gov. 6 Please see footnote 2. Appendix 1 Tactical Global Asset Allocation Monthly Update To complement our analysis, we use a variety of time-tested models to assess the global investment outlook. At present, these models generally favor global equities over bonds over a three-month horizon (Appendix Table 1). Our business cycle equity indicators remain firmly in bullish territory, as reflected in strong global growth and rising corporate earnings. The monetary and financial indicators are also flashing green. In contrast, our sentiment readings are sending mixed signals. Low implied equity volatility points to a heightened risk of complacency, while continued investor skepticism towards the rally (especially among retail investors) suggests that stocks have further to run. As has been the case for some time, our valuation measures are saying stocks are expensive, but these are typically useful only for horizons beyond one or two years. Calendar effects are also negative at the moment due to the tendency of stocks to underperform during the summer months. Regionally, we see more upside in more cyclically-exposed, higher-beta equity markets such as those in Europe and Japan. Canada also looks attractive based on our cyclically positive outlook for crude prices. Emerging market equities are fairly valued, although China still appears cheap based on our measures. Within the fixed-income arena, U.S. Treasurys remain overvalued based on the cyclical outlook, as do, to a lesser extent, most European bonds. Japanese bonds are the default winners simply because JGB yields are likely to remain flat on account of the BoJ's interventions. Appendix Table 1BCA's Tactical Global Asset Allocation Recommendations* Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Highlights EUR/USD is likely to correct over the course of the coming weeks, however, the picture remains too murky to be aggressive. The dollar move since 2015 is still in line with previous sideways consolidations. Economic developments suggest that the USD is more likely to break out than breakdown over the next 12 months. Inflation will hold the keys to the next big trend. The RBA is hampered by a high degree of labor underutilization, and the roll-over in the Chinese Keqiang index bodes poorly for the AUD. Feature The euro's recent strength has been nothing short of stunning. Abandoning our "dollar correction" stance at the end of May was clearly a mistake.1 Now that EUR/USD has punched back above its 2015 high, it is time to reflect whether this year's dollar decline was indeed a correction or whether the euro's bear market is over, in which case EUR/USD could move back above its PPP fair value of 1.33. A Dollar Move Chart I-1The Dollar Is Weak Against Everything The rally in EUR/USD has been more than just a period of euro strength: it has been reflective of a broad-based decline in the USD. As Chart I-1 illustrates, the plunge in the dollar's advance/decline line indicates the greenback has been weak against pretty much everything out there. While the White House's failures and its lack of action on the fiscal stimulus front have played a role in explaining the dollar's weakness, the Federal Reserve's absence of credibility among market participants has been an even greater factor. Weak U.S. inflation, with core CPI at 1.7% and core PCE at 1.4%, implies that the Fed is not achieving its 2% inflation target. Thus, the probability of another rate hike in December has now fallen below 50%, and the OIS curve only anticipates one interest rate hike per year for the next two years. We can add color by looking at specific contracts. At the end of 2016, the December 2019 Eurodollar futures sported a nearly 2.6% implied rate. Today, the same contract trades below 2%. This seems too complacent. For one, U.S. financial conditions have massively eased in response to the collapse in the dollar and the rally in risk assets. This suggests U.S. growth should perk up toward 3% for the remainder of 2017 (Chart I-2). Chart I-2Financial Conditions Will Support Growth Moreover, this is not happening in a vacuum. The official U.S. output gap is more or less closed, and our Composite Capacity Utilization Gauge - which incorporates both the traditional capacity utilization measure along with the unemployment gap - has now moved decisively into "no slack" territory. Under such circumstances, accelerating growth is likely to put heightened pressures on existing resources, raising the risk of a resumption in inflation. Also, in and of itself, this indicator has historically displayed long leads on inflation. Based on this measure, inflation should bottom during the third quarter of 2017 (Chart I-3). With the narrative that inflation is low forever well-entrenched in the market, an inflation surprise in the fall is a growing threat that would prompt a violent repricing of the Fed's path toward something closer to the "dots." This would support a rebound in the DXY. Would this rebound be playable? Our bias is to say yes. The U.S. labor market is still much tighter than the rest of the G10. The U.S. unemployment remains 2.7 percentage points below its 10-year moving average, versus 0.3 percentage points for the rest of the G10 (Chart I-4). Hence, U.S. rates have more upside relative to other advanced economies. This suggests that peak monetary divergences have yet to be seen. Moreover, from a technical perspective, it is far from clear that the dollar bull market is over. While the dollar A/D line has swooned, it has yet to break down - a pattern reminiscent of the second half of the 1990s, when the dollar bull market also experienced a long pause before powering ahead again (Chart I-5). Chart I-3The Trough In Inflation Is Coming Chart I-4The U.S.: In A Tighter Spot Chart I-5Too Early To Tell If The Greenback Is Dead Bottom Line: The euro's strength has been a reflection of generalized weakness in the USD. So far, the USD's weakness in 2017 continues to look and smell like a correction, similar to the action in the late 1990s. However, we cannot be dogmatic: the USD will remain under the thralls of inflationary dynamics in the U.S. The easing in U.S. financial conditions, along with the elevated level of resource utilization, suggests U.S. inflation will pick up this fall, which should prompt a repricing of the Fed's path by investors. The Euro Specifics When it comes to that specifics of the euro, the economic fundamentals are in favor of the dollar right now. First, it is undeniable the euro area inflation has been surprising to the upside relative to that of the U.S. However, this is principally a reflection of the lagging stimulative impact of the 25% collapse in the euro from April 2014 to March 2015. Its 12% appreciation since then points to a reversal of this dynamic (Chart I-6). Second, aggregate relative financial conditions (FCI) tell a similar story. The tightening in euro area FCI relative to the U.S. also points to a slowdown in relative growth in favor of the U.S. Most crucially though, this tightening in relative FCI also portends a change in relative inflation dynamics. As Chart I-7 illustrates, the change in relative FCI has been a reliable leading indicator of comparative inflation dynamics. At this juncture, it argues that inflation in Europe should slow down relative to the U.S. Chart I-6Inflation Surprises Will Move##br## From Europe To The U.S. Chart I-7FCIs Point To A Reversal ##br##Of Inflation Fortunes This makes sense. The U.S. has had trouble generating much inflation despite the U6 unemployment rate standing at 8.5% - a level at which wages and inflation accelerated in previous cycles. Meanwhile, the euro area's labor underutilization remains very high, especially outside Germany. This suggests that euro area inflation could be vulnerable to the tightening in financial conditions that has materialized in the wake of the euro's rally. In other words, the euro's strength is doing the ECB's job while the dollar's weakness is undoing some of the Fed's tightening. Third, the trading action around the release of the German Ifo survey this past Tuesday was very interesting. The Ifo came in at 116, another record reading and substantially above market expectations, yet the euro fell on the news until it was rescued by the Fed. What is fascinating is that, while the German Ifo is near record highs, the Belgian Business Confidence (BCC) survey has begun to sag (Chart I-8). Because Belgium is a logistical center deeply intertwined within European supply chains, the BCC has been an even better leading indicator of European growth trends than the Ifo. The current extreme gap between the Ifo and the BCC confirms that Europe owes a lot of its current health to Germany's boom - and indicates that the rest of the euro area is already suffering blowbacks from the euro's rally. Fourth, euro area equities have eradicated all of their gains for the year relative to U.S. equities. This is happening exactly as the euro area economic surprise index has rolled over against its U.S. counterpart (Chart I-9). This corroborates the economic risks created by the tightening of FCI in Europe versus the U.S. Fifth, the EUR/USD is trading at its greatest premium to our preferred intermediate-term fair value measure since December 2009 (Chart I-10). This measures incorporate real rate differentials at both the short end and long end of the curve, global risk aversion, and commodity prices, suggesting that the EUR/USD has dissociated from most reasonable guides.2 Chart I-8European Growth Is About Germany Chart I-9Stocks Are Sending A Dark Omen For The Euro Chart I-10Euro And Fair Value Bottom Line: European financial conditions have tightened considerably, especially relative to the U.S. This suggests European inflation will once again lag that of the U.S. Moreover, the pain of tighter FCIs is rearing its head: European stocks are once again underperforming the U.S., and the relative economic surprise index has markedly rolled over. We are thus experiencing a euro overshoot. Timing Chart I-1Skewed Positioning In EUR/USD These fundamental considerations do point to a weaker EUR/USD, but they provide little guidance in terms of timing the end of the euro bull run. Most metrics we follow are in fact pointing to trouble ahead. As we highlighted, euro longs are at all-time highs, while euro shorts have been massively purged. This suggests that chasing any further gains in the euro could be a high-risk proposition (Chart I-11). Additionally, the euro's fractal dimension is fully indicative of massive groupthink, and warns that both short-term and long-term investors are both positioned on the long side of the trade (Chart I-12). While the paucity of willing sellers in the market has been a key ingredient bidding up the euro, this also makes the currency vulnerable to a buying exhaustion phase as potential future buyers are already in the market, and will not be there to support it in the coming months. However, because of this very scarcity of sellers, only a few new buyers are necessary to bid up the euro further. Therefore, with the euro having broken above its 2015 high, a rally toward 1.2 could materialize in the blink of an eye. Because of this risk, we have been shorting the euro through the EUR/SEK, EUR/CAD, and EUR/NOK pairs, a strategy that has paid off. This week, for traders with greater liquidity needs, we recommend a tactical speculative short EUR/USD bet, with a tight stop at 1.182 and a target 1.12. Chart I-12Groupthink In Action Bottom Line: The euro is displaying signs of massive groupthink on the long side. Moreover, speculators are excessively long. Our preferred strategy is still to play a euro correction on its crosses, where the risk reward ratio seems more attractive. However, we are opening a tactical short EUR/USD bet this week with a tight stop. The Almighty AUD In a Special Report published four weeks ago, we positioned Australia in the middle of the pack within G10 central banks in terms of hiking sequence.3 Essentially, while Australia does not suffer from as much slack as the euro area and Switzerland, and from as much uncertainty as the U.K., or as severely entrenched inflation expectations as Japan, it still suffers from much more labor underutilization than Canada, Sweden, or New Zealand. As Chart I-13 illustrates, labor underutilization in Australia is still hovering near 20-year highs, underpinning low wage growth and policy rates. This weakness in wages is likely to continue to weigh on core inflation (Chart I-14). Chart I-13The Root Cause Of The RBA's Dovishness Chart I-14Wages Continue To Weigh On Core CPI Furthermore, while being deeply embedded in the Asian business cycle has helped Australia avoid a recession since 1991, this also means that Australian inflation has been greatly influenced by regional dynamics. Thus, based on recent trends, Aussie headline inflation could endure another down leg, especially as the AUD has rallied 16% since January 2016 (Chart I-15). This means that on all fronts, Australian inflationary pressures will remain muted. The recent speech by Governor Philip Lowe focusing on the flatness of the Australian Philips curve highlights that all these concerns are at the forefront of the Reserve Bank of Australia's mind. As a result, we continue to expect Australian interest rates to lag those in the U.S. As Chart I-16 illustrates, when the unemployment gap - as measured by the difference between unemployment and its 10-year moving average - is greater in Australia than in the U.S., the RBA lags the Fed. This also highlights that the AUD is at risk of a sharp correction once the broad USD rally resumes, especially as its recent strength is completely out of line with policy differentials. Chart I-15The Asian Inflation Anchor Chart I-16The Labour Market Points To A Weaker AUD Beyond the USD's own weakness, the rebound in the Chinese economy has been the main reason behind the Australian dollar's rally - despite the continued dovish bias of the RBA. Australian exports expressed in U.S. dollar terms have surged in response to the Chinese mini boom in late 2016/early 2017 (Chart I-17). However, this positive for the Australian economy and Australian profits is dissipating: the Chinese Keqiang index has rolled over, and Beijing is likely to continue to limit speculative excesses in Chinese real estate - a key source of demand for Australian exports. Chart I-17China's Boost Is Dissipating Moreover, the Australian dollar is trading 10% above its PPP, has moved out of line with interest rate differentials, and investors are massively long this currency; yet Australia still sports a negative international investment position of 60% of GDP. This combination makes the Aussie's strength untenable. When EM stocks break, a view espoused by our Emerging Market Strategy sister service, the AUD should prove the greatest victim within the G10 FX space. Bottom Line: Inflationary pressures in the Australian economy remain muted as labor underutilization remains plentiful. As a result, the RBA is likely to keep a dovish tone at least until the end of the year. The rebound in Chinese activity has been the key factor that has supported the AUD this year. However, the recent rollover in China's Keqiang index indicates this pillar of support to growth and profits is vanishing. The AUD will prove the greatest victim of any EM weakness or risk-off event. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Haaris Aziz, Research Assistant haarisa@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled, "Bloody Potomac", dated May 19, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report titled, "In Search Of A Timing Model", dated July 22, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy and Global Alpha Sector Strategy Special Report titled, "Who Hikes Next?", dated June 30, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 U.S. Dollar U.S. data was somewhat mixed recently: Continuing and initial jobless claims both came in higher than expected; New home sales also increased at a lesser-than-anticipated pace, with home prices also fairing worse than investors hoped for; However, durable goods increased by very solid 6.5%; Building permits and housing starts, however, are also growing robustly. The DXY has hit a crucial point. It has given up all of its gains since 2015 and even from mid-2016. The greenback has previously fared well at this level, and a buying opportunity should emerge when U.S. inflation picks up as positioning is skewed against the dollar. Report Links: Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Look Ahead, Not Back - June 9, 2017 Capacity Explosion = Inflation Implosion - June 2, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Data in core Europe is still firm, although it is becoming increasingly mixed: Headline inflation is staying at the consensus figure of 1.3% and core inflation came in higher than expected at 1.2%; PPI is increasing at a 2.4% pace annually; The IFO survey was robust, with the current assessment, business climate and expectations all beating expectations; However, ZEW survey was weaker than expected; PMIs were also weaker across the board. The recent strength in the euro was also compounded by weakness in the U.S. The euro has failed to appreciate nearly as much against commodity currencies due to higher global growth. Given its much lofty momentum, we are reluctant to bet on more euro upside. Report Links: Bad Breadth - July 7, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 A Market Update: June 23, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Japanese trade balance worsened as exports and imports grew at 9.7% and 15.5% respectively; However, the all-industry activity index declined by 0.9% in May; The Leading Economic Indicator increased by only 0.4 to 104.6; The Coincident Index, however, declined to 115.8 from 117.1; USD/JPY has been declining recently due to softer U.S. data and lower bond yields. However, we remain yen bears as the absence of inflation remains the key challenge facing the Japanese economy. Report Links: Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 A Market Update: June 23, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Data out of the U.K. was mixed: Real retail sales expanded at a 2.9% annual pace, with the 'ex-Fuel' measure expanding at 3%; PPI managed to increase by 2.9%; However, CPI came in at 2.6%, falling short of the 2.9% expected. GBP/USD has managed to appreciate close to 10% since the beginning of the year, while depreciating around 5% against EUR in the same time period. We still believe the pound has more short-term downside against the euro, and longer-term downside against the greenback. Report Links: Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 The economic data flow in Australia saw a somewhat softer patch this week: RBA trimmed-mean CPI increased at a 1.8% pace, in line with consensus but below the previous data point; Headline CPI, however, increased by 1.9%, which was less than expected; Both the export price index and the import price index contracted 5.7% and 0.1% quarterly. Weaker data from the U.S. is helping the AUD sustain its gains, however, external pressures from China are proving to be even more paramount to the Aussie's strength. Domestically, however, the Australian economy remained challenged by persistent underemployment. We therefore believe the RBA is unlikely to follow the Bank of Canada in 2017. Report Links: Bad Breadth - July 7, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Data out of New Zealand has been mixed: Visitor Arrivals increased at a 17.3% annual pace; The trade balance improved slightly, and both exports and imports also increased; The Global Dairy Trade price index increased by 0.2%; However, CPI came in at 1.7%, disappointing consensus by 0.2%, and falling short of the previous 2.2% figure. While the NZD has strengthened against the USD, it has lagged the euro and the rest of the commodity currency complex. WHile the RBNZ is better placed than the RBA to increase rates, it will continue to lag the BoC and the Fed this year. Report Links: Bad Breadth - July 7, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 The Canadian economy continues to exhibit signs of strength: Wholesale sales increased at a 0.9% monthly pace in May; Manufacturing shipments increased at a 1.1% monthly pace; Foreign portfolio investment in Canadian securities also increased to USD 29.46 bn; The CAD has experienced an unbelievable couple of months, appreciating more than 9% in the process. Weak U.S. data, a hawkish BoC, and somewhat stronger oil, have all added to the CAD's gains. We believe that the BoC will stay hawkish and Saudi Arabia will remain adamant in reducing oil inventories to their 5-year average by the end of the year. While these factors will limit the CAD downside this year, it is now vulnerable to a short-term pullback. Report Links: Bad Breadth - July 7, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Exploring Risks To Our DXY View - May 26, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Swiss data has been mixed: Trade balance disappointed at 2,813 mn; UBS Consumption Indicator improved to 1.38 from 1.32; However, the ZEW Survey's Expectations increased to 34.7 from 20.7. EUR/CHF has appreciated more than 2% this past week, while USD/CHF has also been strong. This weakness is welcomed by the SNB, but more softness is needed before durable inflation trend can emerge in the Alpine Confederation. Report Links: Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Norway's recent labor force survey showed that the unemployment rate fell to 4.3%, better than the consensus 4.5%. Along with rebounding oil prices, this has been a key source of support for the NOK. BCA Energy Strategists continue to believe that oil inventories will be reduced to their 5-year average by the end of the year, which should warrant a healthy degree of downside for EUR/NOK. Against the dollar, the picture will become less positive once U.S. inflation picks up again. Report Links: Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 A Market Update: June 23, 2017 Exploring Risks To Our DXY View - May 26, 2017 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 This week's data in Sweden has been somewhat weak: PPI increased at a 4.8% annual pace, less than the previous 7.2%; Consumer confidence decreased to 102.2, below the expected 103.1, and less than the previous 102.6; Unemployment rate increased to 7.4% from 7.2; However, the trade balance increased by 4.2 bn from the previous month. These explain the recent softness in the krona in recent days, however, we doubt that this represents the end of the period of weakness in EUR/SEK. The SEK's appreciation has been the result of an aggregate strengthening in Swedish data, especially on the inflation front, which has prompted a hawkish switch in the Riksbank's rhetoric. Report Links: Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Highlights Strengthening income growth is apparent in DM and EM trade volumes, real wages in the U.S., and industrial commodity prices, chiefly oil and copper. This indicates inflation at the consumer level will move higher in the near future, most likely in 2H2018. We believe 10-year U.S. Treasury Inflation-Indexed securities (TIPS) trading below 0.52 do not reflect the risk of higher inflation and are, therefore, going long at tonight's close. Energy: Overweight. Crude oil prices rallied 4.6% this week, following the OPEC 2.0 meeting in St. Petersburg. Although ministers did not announce additional cuts to the 1.8mm b/d agreed at the end of last year, Saudi Energy Minister Khalid al-Falih said the Kingdom would reduce August exports to 6.6mm b/d, which is more than 300k b/d below May's level, the latest month for which data are available from JODI. Given strong global demand, if this export reduction persists - and if others join the Kingdom - it would speed the drawdown in global inventories. Base Metals: Neutral. Copper pushed through $2.80/lb on the COMEX, a level not seen since May 2015. Underlying strength in EM economic activity - seen most recently in global trading activity (discussed below) - and a weaker USD are supporting base metals. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold fell below $1,257/oz earlier this week, and was trading ~ $1,250/oz going to press Wednesday. We remain long gold as a portfolio hedge; the position is up 1.7% since it was initiated on May 4, 2017. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Harsh weather is impacting grains. The USDA rated 62% of the U.S. corn crop in the 18 states comprising 92% of total output good or excellent last week, down from 76% in 2016. For beans, the split was 58% last week vs. 71% last year. Feature The expansion in global trade that began toward the end of last year continues, which, based on our modeling, indicates inflation at the consumer level likely will move higher in the short run (Chart of the Week). Trade expansion, particularly in EM economies, is consistent with rising incomes, which, all else equal, will keep industrial commodities - oil and copper, in particular - well supported, given income and demand for these commodities are closely aligned.1 These fundamentals dovetail with other indications of stronger growth, particularly in DM economies, where trade volumes also are growing (Chart 2). In the U.S., for example, wage growth continues to outpace inflation, and monetary conditions remain benign (Chart 3). Our colleagues at BCA Research's Global Investment Strategy believe the Fed actually may be behind the curve in reacting to nascent inflationary pressures emerging in the U.S.2 Chart of the WeekRising EM Trade Volumes Consistent##BR##With Higher U.S. CPI Inflation Chart 2DM Trade Volumes Are Expanding##BR##At ~ 5% Pace ... Chart 3U.S. Labor Market Tightening,##BR##Financial Conditions Remain Loose Trade Growth Supports Higher Inflation U.S. CPI is highly correlated with EM trade volumes (imports and exports) as shown in the Chart of the Week. In recent research into inflation and trade, we also showed EM oil demand and world base metals demand are highly correlated with EM trade volumes.3 Chart 4EM Trade Volumes##BR##Continue To Strengthen Growth EM import growth continues to expand at a faster pace than DM growth (Chart 4). Year-on-year (yoy) EM import growth came in at 7.7%, a full 2 percentage points above DM growth. This is not to minimize DM growth - it finally broke out of its lethargy in May with a sharp advance of close to 6%, which will lift the trend rate of growth (the 12-month moving average, or 12mma) higher going forward. EM export growth in May was only slightly above DM growth for the month - 5.4% yoy vs. 5.2% yoy. These stout monthly trade performances will, in the next few months, offset the lethargic growth seen in EM and DM prior to the expansion begun at the end of 2016, as weaker monthly performance falls off the trend calculations. Over the year ended in May, within EM markets the annual trend in imports (the 12mma to May 2017) has barely grown more than 1% yoy, dragged down by a 6% contraction in the Middle East and Africa (MEA) and a 2.1% contraction in Latin American growth. The trend in EM - Asia's imports is up, rising 3.2% over the same period. For the year ended in May, imports into central and Eastern Europe were mostly flat; however, since November 2016, the trend turned sharply positive with 3.3% yoy growth. The trend in export volumes is expanding for in MEA and Latin America economies - 3.5% yoy trend growth (12mma) in MEA, and 4.4% growth in Latin America, which is slightly higher than the overall 2.2% rate of trend growth in EM exports. Still, lower oil and commodity prices, along with reduced volumes are curtailing an income recovery in these regions. Central and Eastern Europe's rate of export expansion leads EM generally at close to 4% yoy trend growth. Favor Gold And TIPS Ahead Of Higher Inflation As the labor market tightens and real-wage growth continues to outpace productivity growth, we expect U.S. inflation to pick up. Growth in trade volumes also will support growth in EM oil demand and world base metal demand, as noted above. This will feed into U.S. core PCE, the Fed's preferred inflation gauge (Chart 5). As we've highlighted in the past, there is very strong co-movement among these variables: We've found that, all else equal, a 1% increase in the non-OECD oil demand implies an increase in the core PCE of slightly less than 50bp. If the trend in overall EM trade volumes persists, the likelihood we will be increasing our estimate of non-OECD oil consumption for 2H17 and 2018 increases. U.S. CPI and EM trade volumes show similar co-movement properties, as the Chart of the Week shows. A 1% increase in EM import volumes translates into a 0.53% increase in the U.S. CPI, while a 1% increase in EM export volumes implies a 0.49% increase in the CPI. EM import volumes over the January - May 2017 interval have been growing at slightly more than 8% yoy, while exports have been growing at slightly more than 3%. Continued strength in the EM trade data implies U.S. CPI could grow well above what's currently being priced in inflation markets and by Fed policymakers. This leads us to favour gold and TIPS as inflation hedges. If we do get a larger-than-expected move in the U.S. CPI, gold should respond well. The modelling depicted in Chart 6 shows a 1% increase in the CPI translates into a 4.1% increase in gold. Chart 5Core PCE Will Pick Up##BR##As Commodity Demand Grows Chart 6Gold Will Pick Up##BR##Larger-Than-Expected CPI Moves For this reason we recommend getting long U.S. Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS), which will appreciate as the U.S. CPI moves higher.4 We will be getting long as of tonight's close. We remain long low-risk calls spreads in Dec/17 WTI and Brent - long $50/bbl strikes vs. short $55/bbl strikes. We are up 39.3% and 32.9% on the Brent and WTI positions, respectively, from last week, and 47.2% and 89.2% since inception. U.S. Monetary Policy Remains A Huge Risk To EM Trade As we've noted in the past, U.S. monetary policy can have an outsized effect on EM trade volumes. In an update of an earlier model using U.S. M2 and the broad trade-weighted USD (TWIB), we find a 1% increase in the broad trade-weighted USD translates into a 1.1% drop in EM imports, while a 1% increase in U.S. M2 (broad money) implies an 85bp increase in EM imports (Chart 7).5 Chart 7EM Trade Volumes Highly Sensitive##BR##To U.S. Monetary Policy This demonstrates the feedback loop we've identified between U.S. monetary policy and EM trade. EM trade volumes affect inflation at a global level. We've found inflation in the U.S., EU and China to be co-integrated - i.e., these price gauges all follow the same long-term trend. Inflation and inflation expectations drive Fed policy, which drives the price formation of the USD - i.e., the FX rates included in the USD TWIB - and affect Fed policy on M2. These U.S. monetary variables, in turn, affect EM trade volumes. And so it goes ... Too-aggressive a tightening by the Fed as it normalizes its interest-rate policy regime could destabilize EM economies - either via too-sharp an appreciation in the USD TWIB, a larger-than-expected deceleration in M2 growth, or both - and negatively affect trade flows. At the end of the day, this would redound to the detriment of the U.S. economy, as the different feedback mechanisms kick in. This says the Fed's policy doesn't just affect the U.S. economy, or that EM economies essentially are on their own in the policy tools they deploy to adjust to Fed innovations. Like it or not, the Fed has to consider these types of feedback loops in its decision-making, since the Open Market Committee will be dealing with the fallout of its earlier policies. Bottom Line: EM trade volumes continue to grow yoy, continuing the trend that began at the end of last year. This performance, coupled with a tightening labor market in the U.S. and a still-loose financial backdrop, raises the odds inflation will exceed what's currently priced into market and Fed expectations. We are getting long U.S. 10-year TIPS at tonight's close, and remain long gold as a strategic portfolio hedge. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 The income elasticity for industrial commodities in EM economies is ~ 1.0, according to the OECD. Please see "The Price of Oil - Will It Start Rising Again?" OECD Economics Department Working Paper No. 1031, p. 6 (2013). 2 Please see BCA's Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report titled "Are Central Banks Behind The Curve Or Ahead Of It?," published on July 21, 2017. It is available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Among other things, the Global Investment Strategy team notes labor-market slack is dissipating, real wages are increasing, and easier financial conditions are spurring credit growth. Our colleagues note, "The prospect of stronger growth over the next few quarters implies that the unemployment rate is likely to fall below 4% early next year, possibly breaking through the 2000 low of 3.8%." BCA's Global Investment Strategy believes U.S. inflation could move higher by 2H18. 3 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Reports titled "EM Trade Volumes Continue Trending Higher, Supporting Metals" and "Strong EM Trade Volumes Will Support Oil," published June 29, and June 8, 2017. Both are available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 U.S. TIPS increase in value as the Consumer Price Index (CPI) rises, and fall in value as the index declines. Please see "TIPS: Rates & Terms" on the UST's TreasuryDirect web page (https://www.treasurydirect.gov/indiv/research/indepth/tips/res_tips_rates.htm). 5 This model covers 2000 to the present, using monthly data. The R2 for the cointegrating regression is 0.96. These variables do not explain EM exports, which are not cointegrated with U.S. monetary variables. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016
Highlights To shed light on the dichotomies that have surfaced in China's money and credit variables, we have calculated a new credit-money. This new measure is currently corroborating a very downbeat outlook for Chinese growth and China-related plays. We do not mean that investors should put all of their faith in this new measure. Yet, other measures of money and credit such as M1, M2 and banks' total assets all point to an impending deceleration in economic growth in China. While many global investors take for granted that the central government will underwrite credit risk in the entire economy, the top leadership in Beijing is sending the opposite message, at least for now. A new fixed income trade: pay Czech / receive Polish 10-year swap rates. Feature Chart I-1China: A Business Cycle Top Is In The Making Typically, the phrase 'Follow The Money' is used in the investment community to advise in favor of chasing investment flows. Today, we use this phrase in the context of not following investor crowds, per se, but money growth - especially in China. Judging from market actions and elevated inflows into EM assets and investable Chinese stocks, we can infer that investor consensus on China/EM is rather bullish. In the meantime, China's money/credit growth is sending a bearish signal. Investors should heed the downbeat message from Chinese money/credit and not chase EM risk assets higher. To reconcile the different messages from various measures of Chinese money and credit aggregates (more on the differences below), we calculated a new measure of money/credit creation - commercial banks' total credit (referred to below as banks' credit-money). Banks' credit/-oney is the sum of commercial banks' claims on companies, households, non-bank financial institutions, and all levels of government, as well as commercial banks'' and PBoC's foreign assets. Also, we deduct government deposits at the central bank (see below for the rationale). This measure, a de-facto aggregate of credit/money originated by banks and the PBoC, is computed using the asset side of banks' balance sheets. The key message from this report is that mainland banks' credit-money growth has already decelerated meaningfully, and points to a considerable slump in China's business cycle and imports in the months ahead (Chart I-1). Notably, banks' credit-money growth is at the lowest level of the past 10 years, excluding the Lehman crisis. It is also well below 2015 lows when the economy was acutely struggling. Exploring Money And Credit Dichotomies In China There has lately been a puzzling divergence between the growth rates of banks' credit-money, M2, and total social financing (TSF) (Chart I-2). Chart I-2Dichotomy Among Various Credit And Money Aggregates In China In 2016, banks' credit-money growth accelerated to 20%, while the pick-up in M2, and bank loan growth was modest. At the same time, TSF and corporate and household credit growth was largely flat. Lately, M1 growth has slowed, M2 and banks' total asset growth have dropped to all-time lows, while banks' loan and total social financing have remained flat. So, what is the true picture of money and credit growth in China? What are these critical variables telling us about the growth outlook? Our measure of banks' credit-money should by and large match broad money (M2) because the former is calculated by adding up various assets, and the latter by aggregation of various liabilities. Indeed, both were correlated well in the past, but decoupled in 2013 (Chart I-3, top panel). There has been another money/credit paradox: banks' credit-money on the one hand, and TSF and banks' RMB loans on the other, also have decoupled since 2013 (Chart I-3, middle and bottom panels). Overall, neither M2 nor TSF and banks' RMB loans mirrored the surge in banks' money-credit origination in 2015 and 2016, as portrayed in Chart I-3. We have been relying on the M2 and TSF aggregates published by China's central bank. Their tame readings in 2016 were the main reason we underestimated the duration and magnitude of China's economic recovery in the past year or so, as well as its impact on the rest of EM and commodities. As to components of banks' credit-money, Chart I-4 demonstrates that the deceleration has been due to the claims on non-financial organizations (companies), non-bank financial institutions and government. In brief, the slowdown has been broad-based; only claims on households continue expanding at a robust rate of 25% from a year ago (Chart I-4, bottom panel). Chart I-3M2 And Total Social Financing Have Not ##br##Reflected Money Created by Banks Chart I-4Individual Components Of Commercial ##br##Banks' Money Origination We suspect burgeoning financial engineering in China, credit shenanigans, and the non-encompassing nature of the People's Bank of China's broad money (M2) calculation along with the local government debt swap conducted in 2015 have all distorted credit and money data in recent years, producing the above dichotomies. To shed light on these dichotomies and calculate what has been true money/credit origination in China, we have revisited the basics of money and credit creation and have attempted to make sense of the data and the underlying trends. Overall, we have the following observations and comments: New nominal purchasing power in any economy is created by banks when they originate new loans. Hence, measuring properly the amount of new credit/money origination is of paramount importance to forecasting business cycle dynamics in any country. As we argued in our trilogy of Special Reports on Money, Credit and Savings, banks do not need savings or deposits to originate loans.1 They simultaneously create an asset (a loan) and a liability (a deposit) when extending credit to a borrower, which creates purchasing power in the economy. Importantly, there is no need for someone to save (i.e., forego consumption) in order for a bank to create a new loan / originate new money. In the case of China, commercial banks have an enormous amount of deposits - not because households and companies save a lot but because the banking system altogether has originated a lot of credit/money. The household and national savings rates quoted by economists refer to excess production/overcapacity in the real economy and not deposits in the banking system. We have discussed this issue in the past2 and will revisit it in future reports. The restraining factors for banks to originate new credit/money are their capital, regulations, loan demand, and liquidity - but not deposits. Liquidity is banks' excess reserves at the central bank. Commercial banks create deposits but they cannot engender reserves at the central bank, i.e., liquidity. Only the central bank can expand or shrink the amount of liquidity/reserves commercial banks hold with it. Finally, commercial banks do not lend their reserves; they use the reserves to settle transactions with other banks. In turn, central banks do not create new money/purchasing power unless they lend to or buy assets from governments and non-bank entities or issue currency. Central banks have a monopoly over the creation of bank reserves and currency in circulation - high-powered money. A liquidity crunch at a bank occurs when a bank runs out of excess reserves at the central bank, and it cannot borrow/attract additional reserves. Nowadays, many central banks targeting interest rates supply reserves and lend to commercial banks unlimited amounts of reserves on demand to assure interbank rates stay close to their policy target rate. Therefore, in such settings one can infer that banks are not restrained by liquidity to produce new money/expand their assets. In the case of China, the PBoC's claims on banks have skyrocketed - they have surged by 4.5-fold since 2014 (Chart I-5) - entailing that the former has supplied a lot of liquidity to commercial banks. Such liquidity expansion by the PBoC has in turn allowed banks to create tremendous amounts of new money (new purchasing power). To put the amount of money/credit originated by Chinese commercial banks in context, we have calculated the ratio of their credit/money stock to China's nominal GDP and global nominal GDP (Chart I-6). Chart I-5The PBoC Has Injected A Lot Of##br## Liquidity/Reserves Into The System Chart I-6Chinese Banks' Colossal ##br##Money Creation The broad measure of banks' credit/money created presently stands at 250% of Chinese GDP and 32% of global GDP, or US$29 trillion. The latter compares with the U.S. Wilshire 5000 equity market cap of US$ 26 trillion at a time when American share prices are at all-time highs, and the median P/E ratio is at a record high as well. In 2016 alone, Chinese banks' originated RMB 21 trillion, or US$1.7 trillion in new money-credit. Since January 2009, when the credit boom commenced, mainland commercial banks have cumulatively generated RMB 141 trillion, or US$21.12 trillion, of new money/credit. Banks create new money/deposits when they lend or acquire assets. Exceptions are when banks lend to the central bank or to other commercial banks. In those circumstances, a bank draws on its reserves at the central bank, and no new money - and by extension purchasing power - is created. Fluctuations in reserves/liquidity affect purchasing power in an economy indirectly rather than directly. Expanding reserves/liquidity encourage banks money/credit creation and vice versa. In China, commercial banks' excess reserves at the PBoC are presently contracting and stand at historically low level relative to outstanding stock of credit/money (Chart I-7). This is one of the reasons why banks have been scaling back their credit/money origination. Chart I-7China: Banks' Liquidity/##br##Excess Reserves Are Thin The fiscal authorities play a unique role in money creation. Because of the authorities typically have accounts at both the central bank and commercial banks, they can alter the money supply by shifting deposits back and forth between their accounts at the central bank and commercial banks. By transferring deposits from a commercial bank to the central bank, the fiscal authorities can destroy money; by the same token, they can create money by doing the opposite. This is why when computing Chinese banks' credit-money aggregate we have deducted from the credit/money aggregate government deposits at the PBoC. Finally, there is a difference between credit-money originated by banks, and non-bank credit. Non-banks are financial intermediaries that transfer existing deposits into credit. By doing so they do not create new purchasing power. When banks lend or acquire various assets, they do generate new purchasing power - i.e., they create new deposits that did not exist before. This is why banks are not financial intermediaries. This is true for any country and financial system. For more detailed analysis on the difference between banks and non-banks, please refer to the linked paper.3 When examining leverage in the system, one should consider bank and non-bank credit. Yet, when looking to gauge the outlook for growth and inflation, one should consider new credit/money originated by banks. The purpose of this report is to examine and compute new credit-money that determine nominal economic growth in China rather than discuss leverage even though they are often interlinked. Therefore, we are focused on new credit-money originated by banks, and not on the amount of and changes in leverage in the economy. Bottom Line: Whether one prefers M2, banks' total assets or our new measure of banks' credit/money, the message is by and large the same: money-credit growth is slowing and is very weak. Credit-Money And Business Cycle Chart I-8Comparing Two Impulse Indicators How good is the bank credit-money in terms of being an indicator for China's business cycle? We have one caveat to mention before we illustrate its relevance: Banks' credit-money is a stock variable, and our goal is to gauge business cycle trends - i.e., changes in flow variables such as output, capital spending, profits and imports. Also, the first derivative of a stock variable is a flow, while the second derivative of a stock variable is a change in its flow. Therefore, we have calculated credit/money impulse as the second derivative of outstanding credit/money, or a change in annual change, to align it with the growth rate of flow variables. The following illustrates that banks' credit-money impulse has been an extremely good leading indicator for many economic and financial variables. The new impulse of banks' credit-money has since 2014 diverged from the nation's credit and fiscal impulse (Chart I-8). Nevertheless, the new credit-money impulse leads numerous business cycle variables such as nominal GDP, producer prices, electricity output, machinery sales, freight volumes, and manufacturing PMI (Chart I-9A and Chart I-9B). Chart I-9AChina's Growth To Decelerate A Lot (II) Chart I-9BChina's Growth To Decelerate A Lot (I) Not surprisingly, this impulse also leads property sales and starts as well as construction nominal GDP (Chart I-10). This impulse often precedes swings in the LMEX industrial metals index and iron ore prices (Chart I-11). Further, it is also a reasonably good indicator for EM EPS growth (Chart I-11, bottom panel). As discussed above, banks' new credit-money creation determines nominal - not real - growth. Chart I-10China: Property / Construction ##br##Are At A Major Risk Chart I-11Downbeat Message For Industrial ##br##Metals And EM Profits By expanding their assets, banks generate new purchasing power, but they do not have any control over whether this new purchasing power is used to boost real output or prices. The recovery of the past 12 months have in some cases boosted prices more than volumes. It might be that China is inching closer to an inflation inflection point. We are not saying that China has runaway inflation at the moment, but persistent enormous overflow of money-credit will inevitably produce higher inflation. If inflation does indeed rise materially, policymakers will have no choice but to tighten. Monetary tightening will be devastating for an economy with already high leverage. Bottom Line: The new measure of banks' credit-money is currently corroborating a very downbeat outlook for Chinese growth and China-related plays. Beijing's Priorities And Investment Implications It is generally believed in the global investment community that China's authorities will not allow the economy to slump - they will boost credit/money growth and fiscal spending to ensure solid growth. It is true that no government wants to see their economy crumble, and China is no exception. However, there are several reasons to expect growth to slump considerably before the government responds: The central bank has been guiding interest rates higher across the entire yield curve. Short-term interbank rates (7-day Interbank Fixing Rate) and 5-year AA domestic corporate bond yields have risen by about 100 and 200 basis points, respectively, since November 2016. In addition, financial regulators are clamping down on off-balance-sheet and fancy financial engineering practices of banks and other financial institutions. Monetary policy works with a time lag, and the current tightening along with the government's regulatory clampdown will impact economic growth in the months ahead. The sharp deceleration in banks' credit/money confirms this. Even though interest rates have recently stopped rising, the damage to banks' credit/money growth has been done as shown in Chart I-12. Business activity is lagging money/credit and will be next to suffer. The central government in Beijing has largely lost control over credit creation/leverage build-up since 2009. The top leadership in Beijing did not want credit to explode and speculative behavior to profligate. Two recent articles by Caixin news agency (links are in footnote4) corroborate that Beijing is unhappy with credit creation and allocation practices prevailing in the financial system as well as among SOEs and local governments. The top leadership appears decisive, at least for now, in clamping down on ballooning credit/money growth and the ensuing misallocation of capital and bubbles. Interestingly, while many global investors take for granted that the central government will underwrite credit risk in the entire economy, or at least among state-owned companies, Beijing is sending the opposite message for now. True, when an economy and financial system crumbles, the central government will undoubtedly step in. However, investors do not want to be on the long side of China-related markets when this occurs. Buying opportunities may occur at that point, but for now the risk-reward profile is extremely poor. The authorities in Beijing tolerated colossal money/credit creation and misallocation of capital when growth in the advanced economies was extremely feeble. Now, with DM economies expanding at a solid pace and China's growth having recovered, they are comfortable tightening. As for the resulting investment strategy conclusions, it is too late to chase this rally in EM risk assets and other China-related assets. We do not mean that investors should put all of their faith in our new measure of China's credit/money. Yet, other measures of money and credit such as M1, M2 or banks' total assets all point to an impending deceleration in economic growth in China. In EM ex-China, narrow (M1), broad money and private credit growth have been and remain lackluster (Chart I-13). As China's growth and imports slump, the majority of EM economies will be materially affected. Chart I-12China: Interest Rates And Money Creation Chart I-13EM Ex-China: Subdued Money / Credit Growth There is no change in our overall investment strategy. Specific country recommendations and positions across all asset classes are always presented at the end of our reports, presently on pages 18-19. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Caitlynn Qi Zeng, Research Assistant caitlynnz@bcaresearch.com Central Europe: A New Fixed-Income Trade In a Special Report titled Central Europe: Beware Of An Inflation Outbreak from June 21st 2017 - the link is available on page 20, we argued that labor shortages in central Europe have been pushing up wage growth, generating genuine inflationary pressures. The Polish, Czech and Hungarian economies are overheating, warranting imminent monetary policy tightening. We elaborated on the reasons why this is happening in that report and as such we will not go through it in detail again here. Based on this theme, our primary investment recommendation was in the currency market: go long the PLN and CZK versus the euro and/or EM currencies. This recommendation remains intact. Today we recommend a new trade based on the same theme: pay Czech / receive Polish 10-year swap rates (Chart II-1). The negative 143 basis points yield gap between Czech and Polish 10-year swap rates is unsustainable and it will mostly close for the following reasons: The relative output gap between the Czech Republic and Poland is showing that the Czech economy is overheating faster than in Poland (Chart II-2). This will eventually lead to inflation rising faster in Czech Republic than in Poland as per Chart II-2. Markedly, relative trend in headline inflation warrants shrinking swap spread between Czech and Polish swap rates (Chart II-3). In effect, the Czech National Bank (CNB) will be forced to hike rates at a faster pace and more than the National Bank of Poland (NBP). The CNB has been artificially depressing the value of its exchange rate by pegging it to the euro since November 2013. Despite the fact that the CNB abandoned its peg in April of this year, the CNB continues to artificially suppress the exchange rate by printing money and accumulating foreign exchange reserves. Chart II-1Pay Czech / Receive Polish ##br##10-year Swap Rates Chart II-2Czech Economy Will Overheat ##br##Faster Than Poland's Chart II-3Inflation Dynamics Warrant ##br##Smaller Swap Spread Foreign exchange reserves, measured in euros, in the Czech Republic are growing at an astronomical 60% annually while growth and inflation are already in full upswing (Chart II-4, top panel). Due to the ongoing foreign currency accumulation - accompanied by insufficient sterilization - the CNB has generated an overflow of liquidity and money/credit in the Czech economy (Chart II-4, middle panels). Chart II-4Monetary Conditions Are Easier In ##br##Czech Republic Relative To Poland In turn, this liquidity overflow has led a real estate boom and has super-charged overall growth (Chart II-4, bottom panel). On the contrary, the NBP has been much less aggressive in easing monetary conditions. The policy rate in Poland is at 1.5% while it is 0.05% in Czech Republic. Therefore, any potential upside in inflation and bond yields will be more limited in Poland than in the Czech Republic. Even though both Czech and Polish economic growth are robust, the Czech economy is showing more imminent signs of overheating and inflationary outbreak than Poland. The CNB is further behind the curve than the NBP. When a central bank is behind the curve, its yield curve should be steeper than a central bank that is not. However, the 10/1-year swap curve is as steep in Poland as it is in the Czech Republic. With the policy rate at a mere 0.05%, the Czech economy is sitting on the verge of an inflationary precipice. The longer the CNB maintains such a low policy rate, the higher long-term bond yields will rise. The basis being that the longer policymakers wait, the more they will have to tighten to slow growth and bring down inflation. Finally, this relative trade offers a hefty 143 basis points carry and is thus very attractive. Investment Conclusions In the fixed income and currency space in central Europe, we have been and continue recommending the following relative positions: A new fixed income trade: pay Czech / receive Polish 10-year swap rates Continue betting on yield curve steepening in Hungary: Receive 1-year / paying 10-year Hungarian swap rates Long Polish and Hungarian 5-year local currency bonds / short South African and Turkish domestic bonds. Long PLN and CZK versus EM currencies and/or the euro - we are long the following crosses: PLN/HUF, PLN/IDR, CZK/EUR For dedicated EM equity investors, we continue to recommend overweighting central Europe within an EM equity portfolio. Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Reports titled, "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses", dated October 26, 2016; "China's Money Creation Redux And The RMB", dated November 23, 2016; "Do Credit Bubbles Originate From High National Savings?", dated January 18, 2017; links available on page 20. 2 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report titled, "Do Credit Bubbles Originate From High National Savings?", dated January 18, 2017; link available on page 20. 3 Werner, R. (2014b), "How Do Banks Create Money, and Why Can Other Firms Not Do the Same?", International Review of Financial Analysis, 36, 71-77. 4 Please see, "Local Officials Now Liable for Bad Debt-Management Decisions for Life", July 17th 2017, Caixin Global, available at http://www.caixinglobal.com/2017-07-17/101117307.html Please see, "Local Governments Find New Ways to Play Debt Game", July 14th 2017, Caixin Global, available at http://www.caixinglobal.com/2017-07-14/101116048.html Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Highlights The "Trump Put" rumbles on, spurring equities, driving U.S. Treasury yields down, and hurting the dollar; White House incompetence, which underpins the "Trump Put," is about quantitative and qualitative staffing decisions, not the Russia collusion investigation; Tax reform will happen, but Congress is now in charge; Watch for the next Fed Chair nomination, more dollar downside could be ahead; China has preempted the next financial crisis with new regulatory oversight; The death of Abenomics is overstated. Feature We introduced the "Trump Put" in a recent report as a risk to our view that President Trump would get his populist economic agenda through Congress.1 The Trump Put posits that White House disarray and congressional incompetence will combine with decent earnings growth and steady global growth to produce Goldilocks conditions for U.S. equities, while simultaneously weakening the USD and supporting Treasuries. Thus far, the Trump Put continues to be in effect (Chart 1). Our House Views of further yield-curve steepening and a stronger USD have suffered from the ongoing "gong show" that is the Trump administration. The saving grace has been our high-conviction bullish equity view (Chart 2).2 Chart 1The Trump Put: Good For Equities,##br## Bad For Everything Else Chart 2S&P 500 Does Not##br## Care About Russia That said, we maintain our high-conviction view that the GOP will pass tax legislation in Q1 2018. Why? First, the failure to repeal Obamacare means that congressional Republicans will enter the midterm election season with no legislative wins. That is extraordinary given Republican control of both chambers of Congress and the executive. The House GOP members will not want to face an angry electorate in primary elections a year from now, or the general election, without a single major accomplishment. Second, Trump's low popularity will be an albatross around the neck of GOP candidates in the November 2018 elections, with potentially ominous results (Chart 3). Trump needs to pass a major piece of legislation; GOP congressmen have an interest in lifting Trump's popularity. Third, the House has passed the FY2017 budget resolution, which includes reconciliation instructions for tax reform. Given that only one budget resolution can be effective at any one time, the Obamacare replacement effort will end with the current fiscal year, on October 1.3 Chart 3GOP Is Running Out Of Time While we remain confident that some form of tax legislation will ultimately pass - either watered down tax reform or mere tax cuts - we are far less confident that it will be stimulative. In other words, it will be done according to the congressional, not the White House, blueprint. House Speaker Paul Ryan has long demanded revenue-neutral reform. The just-passed budget resolution calls for $203 billion in spending cuts in order to make tax cuts revenue-neutral. This is a reversion to form after the period earlier this year in which several fiscal conservatives, like Representatives Kevin Brady and Mark Meadows, intoned that they would be comfortable with tax reform that was not revenue-neutral. At the beginning of the year, it looked like Trump would be able to use his bully pulpit to cajole the Congressional Republicans into stimulative tax reform or tax cuts. Previous Presidents, including Obama with the Affordable Care Act, have been able to punish overly ideological legislators for the sake of pragmatism and/or expediency. Certainly Trump remains popular with GOP voters (Chart 4), suggesting that he might be able to do so as well. Chart 4Trump Retains Political ##br##Capital With GOP Voters Six months into his presidency, however, Trump remains a no-show in terms of leadership. This is not merely the result of distraction with the "Russian collusion" charges against his campaign team and inner circle. The White House is simply not playing its traditional coordinating role to shepherd key bills through Congress. Political insiders, even the ones close to Trump, are signaling privately and via the media that the White House is in disarray and understaffed both quantitatively and qualitatively. It is in no shape, in other words, to coordinate the legislative process and play the role of peacemaker between the different congressional factions. At the heart of the disarray is an elite dispute within the White House itself between what we call the "Goldman" and "Breitbart" factions of the administration. The Goldman Clique: Donald Trump has staffed his administration with several financial sector luminaries whom he met while building his business empire. At the head of this faction is Gary Cohn, Director of the National Economic Council and leading candidate for the next Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (more on that later). Other members are Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, and the most recent addition to the administration, the new White House Communications Director Anthony "the Mooch" Scaramucci. This faction is pragmatic, un-ideological (Cohn and "the Mooch" are essentially Democrats), and focused on passing tax reform and pro-business regulation. They prefer tax reform to mere tax cuts, and want middle class tax cuts to be balanced with pro-business corporate tax reform. The Breitbart Clique: Most commentators see the Goldman clique as the more powerful of the two White House factions, but Trump owes his electoral victory to a campaign molded along the ideological bent in line with the Breitbart faction. This group is led by Chief Strategist Steven Bannon and policy advisor Steven Miller.4 Behind the scenes, Bannon and Miller have managed to staff the White House with several Breitbart alumni, such as presidential advisors Sebastian Gorka and Julia Hahn, and (until her departure this month) Security Council Deputy Chief of Staff Tera Dahl. Factional fighting is not new to the White House. For example, the Obama administration was divided between foreign policy hawks - Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates - and doves - National Security Advisor Susan Rice and Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power. White House policy is often a product of compromise between different factions, producing sub-optimal outcomes. The problem with the Trump administration, however, is that the Breitbart faction is severely outmatched and unqualified for the job of coordinating legislative policy. Putting aside its ideological zealotry, this faction consists mainly of journalists without policy experience. This inexperience came to light with Trump's original executive order banning entry into the U.S. of nationals of several countries, penned by Bannon and Miller, which would have barred green card holders from entry. While that order may or may not have been constitutional, it was clearly impractical and aggressive. Another clear problem for the Trump administration is that its current Chief of Staff, former RNC Chairman Reince Priebus, is weak and ineffective. Priebus was a compromise candidate between the two factions and someone seen as acceptable to Republicans in Congress. Since his appointment, however, he has been a no-show. It was his idea to focus on replacing Obamacare ahead of tax reform (despite the absence of a GOP blueprint for the former and the existence of a blueprint for the latter), and it was his idea to give the overmatched Sean Spicer the role of managing the press. The chief of staff should be a force of nature, capable of instilling fear into the president's congressional allies in order to get legislation moving and reduce cliquish in-fighting. A successful chief of staff is usually a controversial and abrasive figure, such as Rahm Emanuel at the beginning of President Obama's first term. He bullied and cajoled Democrats into passing Obamacare with legendary brutality. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy rarely delves into personality-driven analysis. It is too idiosyncratic, not systematic. However, as a country's political leadership becomes more "charismatic"5 - driven by personality rather than institutions - individuals, factions, and court intrigue matter more. What does all of this mean for investors? First, the White House is failing in its coordinating role. As such, Republicans in the House will take the lead on tax reform. Revenue neutrality will be emphasized. For this to change, the White House would have to reshuffle its personnel more extensively, including replacing Priebus. Second, if fiscal policy fails to take off, Trump will put greater stock in monetary policy. Our colleagues - who are economists, not political analysts - believe that the U.S. is likely to enter into recession in 2019, as the 2020 electoral campaign heats up. However, folks like Gary Cohn and Steve Mnuchin can see the same writing on the wall, and will probably try to avoid such a badly timed recession. Chart 5 shows that household debt has continued to decline as a share of disposable income; the share of national income going to labor has increased; and wage growth among lower-income workers who tend to spend most of their paychecks has accelerated. All of this should give consumers the wherewithal to spend more, warranting higher interest rates. Meanwhile, financial conditions have significantly eased due to USD weakness and declining bond-yields, which should boost growth in the second half of this year (Chart 6). Chart 5Households Have The ##br##Wherewithal To Spend More Chart 6Financial Conditions##br## Have Eased With Congress increasingly in charge of fiscal policy and a recession possible in 2019, we would expect Trump to do everything he can to ensure that the Fed retains its dovish bias when Chair Janet Yellen's term expires on February 3. This means that he is likely to favor a non-economist and a loyal adviser, like Gary Cohn, over any of the more traditional, and hawkish, Republican candidates. While there is some speculation regarding Cohn's policy preference, we are yet to find an insider (either of the FOMC or the White House) who denies that he is a dove. The intrigue should not last long. Both Yellen and Bernanke were nominated with considerable lead time: 114 days before the end of her predecessor's term for Yellen, and 91 days for Bernanke (Chart 7). We would therefore expect the next Fed Chair to be known by Thanksgiving. Is Cohn a controversial pick? Not really. As our colleague John Canally of BCA's U.S. Investment Strategy has pointed out, lack of Fed experience does not make Cohn particularly unique as a candidate. Since the late 1970s, presidents have tended to select the Fed Chair based on their relationship with a candidate, not previous central banking experience (Table 1).6 Cohn would only break the orthodoxy by being the first candidate to be appointed from across the ideological aisle, given that he is a Democrat. (Although several chairs have been reappointed by presidents from opposing political parties.) Chart 7How Long Does It Take To Confirm The Fed Chair? Table 1Characteristics Of Fed Chairs Since 1970 A number of previous Fed chairs were selected for loyalty over academic merit or central banking experience. President Nixon's pick for the chair, Arthur Burns (Chair from 1970-1978), was the head of President Eisenhower's Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) and was a special counselor to Nixon before being appointed. William Miller (Chair from 1978-1979), although having served as an outside director for the Boston Fed, was appointed largely because of his work on the political campaigns of Hubert Humphrey and Jimmy Carter. Alan Greenspan (1987-2006) served as Chair of President Reagan's Social Security Commission in the early 1980s, Chair of President Ford's CEA, and advised Nixon's campaign in 1968. Only Volcker, Bernanke, and Yellen had previously held posts in the Federal Reserve System. The market cares about the appointment of the Fed chair. In 2013, for example, Larry Summers and Janet Yellen were in the running for the position, with Summers viewed as the more hawkish of the two. When he withdrew from the race on September 15, the market's expected pace of rate hikes plunged and long-dated TIPS breakevens surged on the expectations of a more dovish Fed (Chart 8). Given that the market is currently discounting just 27.4 bps of rate hikes during the next 12 months, down from the recent peak of 36 bps (Chart 9), there may not be much room to get more dovish.7 Chart 8Yellen Vs. Summers Drove Markets In 2013 Chart 9Market May Be Right? Nonetheless, President Trump may not want to gamble with his Fed appointments. If we are right to assume that he is an economic populist, and that his fiscally stimulative agenda is slipping away, then we would expect the White House to err on the side of Fed appointments that would be behind the proverbial curve. In addition to Yellen, Trump will have the opportunity to appoint a new Vice Chairman of the Fed in place of Stanley Fischer on June 12, 2018 (Diagram 1), as well as another candidate for the Board of Governors (after already having nominated Marvin Goodfriend and Randal Quarels). By mid-2018, the Fed will start to take on a new composition altogether. Diagram 1Federal Reserve Board Of Governors Calendar Staffing the Fed with doves fits at least two of President Trump's campaign promises. First, if the Fed were to fall behind the curve, nominal GDP would likely surprise to the upside. Second, the USD would continue its downward trajectory, helping rebalance America's trade deficit. As such, we take the potential nomination of Gary Cohn seriously. And we expect the market will as well. That said, a Cohn-led Fed would not be a fundamental break with the past. In fact, Yellen has herself intoned that the Fed may want to let inflation run above 2% in past speeches. In addition, Trump's first two nominees to the Fed do not fit a dovish mold. Conservative economist Marvin Goodfriend is a hawk and favors rule-based policymaking. Randal Quarels will focus on regulating the financial sector, or rather deregulating it, although his policy orientation is largely unknown. Furthermore, other potential Fed Chair nominees, such as Kevin Warsh and Richard Fisher, would be more hawkish than Yellen. And if they are not selected to replace Yellen, they could replace the current Vice-Chairman Fischer. As such, investors should not overreact to a Cohn appointment. However, currency markets might, given that the Trump White House has been highly unorthodox. Bottom Line: There is likely more downside to the USD over the rest of the year. China: A Preemptive Dodd-Frank Last week we argued that China is likely to escalate financial regulation considerably over the next 6-12 months.8 Essentially, the "financial crackdown" or "deleveraging campaign" seen in H1 of this year was just a dress rehearsal for what is to come. The larger policy shift will exert downward pressure on economic growth in H2 2017 and throughout 2018, essentially putting a cap of about 7% on China's growth rate. True, the Chinese government will strive to avoid letting the new regulatory push lead to a sharp slowdown, i.e., shattering its preexisting commitment to an average GDP growth rate of 6.5% per year through 2020. However, the risks lie to the downside over the next 18 months due to the combination of unaddressed structural imbalances, cyclically fading economic tailwinds, and further policy tightening. We have outlined the structural flaws before. In brief, they include: Demographics: The working-age population is declining, yet the social systems to improve productivity are not yet adequate. Economic model: The investment-led model has become inefficient, requiring China to add more and more debt in order to generate the same amount of growth, in a manner reminiscent of South Korea prior to the Asian Financial Crisis (Chart 10). The transition to consumer-led growth is incomplete, with households still reluctant to take over from corporates in driving spending. Financial transmission: China's banking sector has expanded quickly, leading to a rise in bad loans and "special mention" assets, as losses from large companies remain elevated (Chart 11). The shadow banking sector is highly leveraged, poorly regulated, and extremely risky, and has mushroomed since 2008. Fiscal system: Local governments lack stable sources of funding and therefore rely on SOE debt and manipulation of the land market in order to fund their 85% share of China's fiscal spending. The government's recent fiscal reforms (the VAT extension) have actually further deprived local governments of revenues. Inequality and social ills: Wealth inequality, social immobility, regressive taxation (Chart 12), and an inadequate social safety net have hindered the development of the consumer society as well as innovation and entrepreneurship. Centralized authoritarianism: The political system perpetuates the above ills by disallowing free speech, free association, free movement, and other freedoms that would encourage innovation and total factor productivity. Chart 10More And More Reliant On Debt For Growth Chart 11Bad Loans Rising Chart 12Communism Fails To Redistribute Income Meanwhile, we have several reasons for anticipating a larger, less accommodative policy shift over the next six-to-twelve months: Policy drift: China's economic policy has been adrift over the past year and a half, as reflected by elevated economic policy uncertainty. While President Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign is no longer relevant in a macroeconomic sense - and this theoretically opens the way for him to pursue his ambitious economic reform agenda - he has so far chosen stimulus over restructuring due to the instability of 2015-16. Now, as the latest stimulus measures fade (Chart 13), the question of how to go forward is pressing, since to re-apply the same policy mix in 2018 would be to forgo his reform agenda until 2019 ... and probably once and for all. Warning signs: The central government's launch of a deleveraging campaign this year was risky and surprising. It was risky because central financial authorities in any country threaten a liquidity squeeze when they tighten financial conditions into large and rapidly growing leverage. It was surprising because the authorities chose to do so when a mistake could have upset political stability in advance of the midterm party congress. The implication is: (1) authorities intended a limited campaign from the beginning; (2) the newly appointed leaders of financial regulatory bodies are no-nonsense people.9 They take very seriously, as we do, China's systemic financial risks. They believe risky measures are necessary to prevent the dangerous credit excesses. The National Financial Work Conference: The conference concluded with Xi putting his imprimatur on a renewed policy focus on the financial sector: Reducing systemic risk, reducing speculation (lending to the real economy), and eventually putting the sector back on the path of liberalization. The specific outcomes amount to something like a preemptive Dodd Frank: The People's Bank of China will take on a larger role in identifying and monitoring systemically important institutions; it will also host a new inter-agency body - the Financial Stability and Development Committee (FSDC) - that will ostensibly ensure better cooperation and coordination between the regulators of banks, stock markets, insurance, etc. Finally, the meeting signaled that this year's deleveraging campaign would expand (beyond shadow banking, insurance companies, and private companies roving overseas) to affect over-leveraged SOEs and local government financing vehicles. Significantly, local government officials will be made accountable for excessive debt. This last point should not be underrated. At the height of the anti-corruption campaign, in late 2014, fiscal spending numbers remained depressed and government agency cash deposits continued rising even after the central government tried to encourage faster growth (Chart 14), suggesting that local officials were refraining from spending due to fears that they would be punished for it.10 We consider these announcements to be substantive - i.e., not the usual propaganda - even if they take some time to get off the ground. The financial conference was frowned upon by much of the mainstream media because some interpret the FSDC as failing to live up to the rumor that China would create a new "financial super-ministry." But the rise of super-ministries under the Hu Jintao administration resulted in very little substantive change to Chinese policy. By contrast, Xi Jinping signaled that the PBoC would be the chief instrument of the new financial regulatory push, and he has already shown he can operate exceedingly effectively through existing institutions - namely the Central Discipline and Inspection Commission (CDIC), which went from being an ineffective intra-party corruption watchdog to a nationwide vehicle for the party's most aggressive corruption investigations and personnel purges in recent memory. We are willing to bet that the PBoC's new powers, including the new financial stability committee, will be more aggressive than the merely status quo multiplication of administrative functions that the financial media and markets apparently expect. The changing of the PBoC's Guard: It is not a coincidence that greater regulatory powers are being planned for the PBoC in the final months of Governor Zhou Xiaochuan's term. Zhou has been in office since late 2002. He has been a cornerstone figure in China's financial stability and reform throughout this period, including during the global crisis and the various financial panics from 2010-16. He has allegedly desired a more muscular central bank to tackle the country's ballooning credit risks. By handing off the baton, he clears the way for a new, ambitious governor to succeed him, one who will maintain policy continuity while also taking the opportunity of the transition to implement a new and tougher regulatory framework. Consider that after Xi put the ambitious Guo Shuqing in charge of the China Banking Regulatory Committee in February, Guo immediately launched a notable crackdown on shadow banking.11 Guo is a possible contender for the central banker position; the other likely contenders have strong credentials in regulatory oversight as well as banking. The 19th National Party Congress: The midterm leadership reshuffle will mark Xi's consolidation of power, which will enable him to pursue his policy preferences more effectively in 2018-22. He could still be prevented by exogenous events, but domestic politics should be less of an obstacle for him going forward. Chart 13China's Economic##br## Tailwinds Fading Chart 14Anti-Corruption Campaign Hindered##br## Local Government Spending What about Xi's political capital within the top Communist Party bodies? We are in the thick of major decisions as we go to press. The highest level of leadership - the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) - is expected to have its members chosen, in secret, in August when the current PSC and other party heavyweights will likely convene at Beidaihe to settle the list. The fall of Chongqing Party Secretary Sun Zhengcai in mid-July gives a few hints as to what might occur. Sun was ostensibly sympathetic with Xi, and until now the likeliest candidate for Premier Li Keqiang's replacement in 2022. His ouster means that four of the top five candidates on the PSC come from the rival camp to President Xi, i.e., the "Hu Jintao faction," which is rooted in the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) (Diagram 2). Diagram 2Lineup Of New Politburo Standing Committee Yet To Take Shape - Factions Evenly Balanced? There are two likely pathways from here: either Sun's fall is part of a bargaining process and other CCYL members will soon be removed from the running for the PSC; or they will not be removed, which would mean that Xi gets along much better with the top CCYL members than is generally believed. The latter is unlikely, but possible, given that Xi and former President Hu Jintao did cooperate on critical power arrangements in the 2012 leadership transition. However, the most recent reports suggest that several CCYL members who were seen as rising stars (for 2022 leadership and beyond) have not received invitations to the party congress, including the current party secretary of the CCYL.12 If this proves to be the case, then it strongly suggests that Xi is continuing to undercut the CCYL. That, in turn, suggests that Xi will not tolerate the current scenario in which he stands to be outnumbered four-to-one on a five-member PSC. Instead, we should expect at least one major CCYL contender for the PSC to be removed in the coming months. This would enable Xi to gain the balance on a seven-member PSC. If the PSC is to be reduced to five members, then he would have to oust two major CCYL members - a more dramatic power play, but presumably within his reach given what he has achieved so far. Ultimately it is impossible to predict the PSC (and broader Politburo) membership precisely. All we can point out is that a failure by Xi to consolidate control on the top bodies - which is no longer our baseline view - would have bullish short-term but bearish long-term implications for growth. It would suggest, first, that Xi is weaker than he appears; second, that the aggressive financial regulatory drive outlined above, as well as other painful but necessary reforms, will be watered down as a result of resistance at top levels; third, that China is increasingly resisting the "creative destruction" that Xi threatens to bring about in the pursuit of making China more efficient. Bottom Line: A number of signs suggest that Chinese politics will become a headwind, rather than tailwind, to growth after the party congress. Xi's move to undercut the opposing CCYL faction ahead of the party congress confirms this view. His new policy will focus on deleveraging and financial sector restrictions. The commitment to stability will remain in place, however. Japan: Abe Is Not Yet Dead, Long Live Abenomics Shinzo Abe's approval rating has plummeted since June (Chart 15). His Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has also seen its popularity fall. This has been notable in relation to the flat polling of the LDP's main coalition partner, New Komeito (Chart 16). Chart 15Abe's Luck Runs Out? Chart 16Ruling LDP Also In Trouble Abe has been buffeted by a combination of spiraling corruption scandals and the loss of the Tokyo Metropolitan legislature in the local election of July 2. As if this were not bad enough, the Japanese economy is set to slow down (Chart 17).13 Chart 17A Slowdown In Japan Our readers will recall that we think there is a deeper cause for Abe's sudden loss of popularity: his proposed constitutional revisions, which he laid out in detail in May. Ever since he secured a virtual two-thirds supermajority in the House of Councillors (the Upper House) in July 2016, we have maintained that he would push ahead with controversial constitutional revisions that aim to enshrine the Japanese military. We expected that these changes would sap Abe's support - as did the debate over the new national security law in 2015 (Chart 18), only bigger this time because the matter is constitutional.14 However, the Tokyo election loss does not portend the death of Abe, and regardless, Abenomics itself will survive. Why? Because it is Abe's constitutional and security agenda that is unpopular, not Abenomics. Understood as economic reflation with elements of restructuring, like wage growth, Abenomics will actually intensify over the next year and a half as a result of the new threats to Abe's and the LDP's popularity and agenda, to which they will respond. Abe is more deeply committed to this constitutional mission than to Abenomics. It is his most ambitious plan and his economic policy supports it. Revising the constitution is about Japan seizing its own destiny again as a sovereign nation and also locking in the American alliance by offering greater military assistance to the U.S. Hence, at this point, economic reflation is not only an end in itself but also a means to a constitutional end. First, note that Abe's coalition in the upper house is not as "super" of a super-majority as is widely believed. He needs the support of smaller right-wing parties that are sympathetic toward his constitutional revisions to cross the 162-seat threshold for a two-thirds vote in the upper House of Councillors to approve constitutional reforms. But the LDP's three partner parties that are in favor of revision, as well as at least one independent, could raise objections and that would sink the revisions (Diagram 3). There are others with misgivings. Economic slowdown is not a recipe for Diet members to make big political sacrifices on Abe's account, so we expect monetary and fiscal policy to remain easy. Chart 18Abe Loses Support When He Talks ##br##Security Instead Of Economy Diagram 3Super-Majority ##br##Barely Within Reach Second, if the constitutional changes pass the upper and lower houses of the Diet by two-thirds votes, they must pass a nationwide referendum. While there is majority support for revisions of some sort, there is a roughly 50-50 division on the question of altering Article 9 (Chart 19), the article that forbids Japan to maintain military forces. This is the bullseye of Abe's proposal. The need for 50% of the nation to vote "yes" is an even bigger reason for Abe to pull policy levers to keep the economy humming before a potential referendum date in December 2018. Finally, even in the unlikely scenario that Abe's approval rating drops into the mid-20s or below and the LDP ousts him, we do not expect the next LDP leader to alter Abenomics in any significant way. The frontrunners for Abe's replacement in the September 2018 LDP party leadership poll, such as Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida, would likely soften their predecessor's policy on remilitarization and constitutional revision, but would also launch a substantively similar economic policy that the media would promptly dub "Kishidanomics," "Ishibanomics," or "Asonomics." Thus, on fiscal policy, the focus will remain on fiscal support and lifting wages and social spending. Rules calling for fiscal restraint will be relaxed. On monetary policy, BoJ Governor Haruhiko Kuroda is eligible for reappointment on April 8, 2018. So are his two deputies. Furthermore, the monetary policy committee members appointed since Kuroda have also been ultra-dovish like him.15 In short, the BoJ underwent a regime change in 2012 and will not revert back to the norms that prevailed before the global financial crisis, before the LDP lost power to a serious opposition party (2009), and before the shock to the national psyche that occurred during the 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear crisis. Further, Japanese households are only hardly net savers anymore (Chart 20), and have for five years voted for a more reflationary policy. And aside from the current path of stealth debt monetization, there is no other way of managing the nation's debt other than fiscal austerity, which is not an option for an increasingly elderly population dependent on government social spending. The era of BoJ unorthodoxy is here to stay, at least as long as the LDP is in power (December 2018), if not longer. Chart 19Revise The Constitution? Yes.##br## End Pacifism? Maybe. Chart 20Japanese No Longer ##br##Savers Who Fear Inflation Bottom Line: Abe's downfall is not assured, and would portend the end of Abenomics in name only. The next LDP government would maintain Abenomics, as it is driven by structurally limited options. Fade any selloff in Japanese equities. However, in the long run, Abenomics may prove a failure in terms of defeating deflation. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "How Long Can The 'Trump Put' Last?" dated June 14, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Buy In May And Enjoy Your Day!" dated April 26, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Reconciliation And The Markets - Warning: This Report May Put You To Sleep," dated May 31, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 As a reminder to the uninitiated readers, Breitbart is a conservative magazine that has been a platform for a slew of unorthodox right-wing views more in line with modern nationalist European political movements than the American conservative movement. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Global Monetary Policy Recalibration," dated July 17, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Every Which Way But Loose," dated July 18, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress," dated July 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets," dated May 24, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 10 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Reports, "Questions From The Road," dated July 1, 2015, and "Policy Mistakes And A Silver Lining," dated October 7, 2015, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 11 Please see Gabriel Wildau, "China bank overseer launches 'regulatory windstorm,'" Financial Times, April 18, 2017, available at www.ft.com. 12 Please see Jun Mai, "Guess who's not invited to China's key Communist Party congress," South China Morning Post, July 23, 2017, available at www.scmp.com. 13 Please see BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "A Soft-Spoken Yellen," dated July 14, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 14 Please see footnote 11 above. 15 The last two dissenters, Takehiro Sato and Takehide Kiuchi, stepped down when their terms expired on July 23, 2017. They were replaced by Goshi Kataoka and Hitoshi Suzuki, who are expected to support Governor Haruhiko Kuroda's dovish approach. Now all nine policy board members have been appointed by the Abe administration. Please see "Two new Bank of Japan policymakers join board," Japan Times, July 24, 2017, available at www.japantimes.co.jp.