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Populism/Inequality

Special Report Highlights There are rising odds that Turkey will undertake military action in the Middle East. When and if this occurs, it will severely undermine already fragile investor confidence, and foreign capital inflows will evaporate. Feature As foreign capital inflows dry up, the lira will continue to plunge, pushing up borrowing costs. Yet the authorities' tolerance for higher interest rates is extremely low. The only way to gain control over interest rates and prevent them from shooting up when the currency plunges will be to impose capital controls. The imposition of capital controls would be a political decision, and hence it is impossible to forecast its form or timing with any precision. That said, investors should be mindful of growing odds of capital controls being imposed, and incorporate it into their strategic decision-making. Rising risks of capital controls entail not only closing long positions and taking capital out of the country but also closing short positions because, capital controls, if enacted, mean any capital will be stuck in liras, which will likely depreciate a lot. Turkey's "Two-Level Game" BCA's Geopolitical Strategy's main geopolitical theme since 2012 has been American hegemonic deleveraging.1 This process ushered in an era of multipolarity, a distribution of power where more than one or two countries can pursue their national interests independently. We know from history and formal modeling in political science that a multipolar context is the one most likely to produce military conflict.2 Turkey is today a perfect example of why multipolarity is volatile. Once a staunch U.S. ally and model democracy for the region, Turkey largely toed the American line for the post-World War II era. Over the past five years, however, Turkish policymakers have experienced both the risks and rewards of multipolarity. On the one hand, multipolarity means that Turkey can finally pursue its own interests in the Middle East. On the other, it means that it cannot rely on the U.S. for protection when it does so. Turkey is today the most unpredictable major power. With its foreign policy outsourced to the U.S. for so many decades, Ankara is going through a trial-and-error process of what it can and cannot do on its own. This process is fraught with political risks. Complicating the situation further, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is playing a "two-level game" between international and domestic policy. Since the anti-government protests in 2013, Erdogan has exploited domestic and international crises to rally the people "around the flag" and increase support for his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its planned constitutional reforms. Geopolitical Risks In February 2016, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy noted that direct Turkish involvement in Iraq and Syria could be one of the five "Black Swans" of the year.3 It was clear to us that the days of the Islamic State's pseudo-Caliphate were numbered, and that both Syrian Kurds and Iraqi Kurds stood to gain the most from the terrorist group's defeat. This was unacceptable to Turkey, which therefore intervened militarily to counter Kurdish gains, and may intervene further in the near future. We are particularly concerned about three potential dynamics: Direct intervention in Syria and Iraq: The Turkish military entered Syria in August, launching operation "Euphrates Shield." Turkey also reinforced a small military base in Bashiqa, Iraq, only 15 kilometers north of Mosul. Both operations were ostensibly undertaken against the Islamic State, but the real intention is to limit the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds, who benefit from the collapse of the Islamic State. Map I-1 shows the extent to which Kurds have expanded their control in Syria and Iraq. In Syria, Turkish forces are attempting to prevent Syrian Kurds from connecting their territory in the north of the country, which would create a Kurdish mini-state right next to the Turkish border. In Iraq, it is unclear what Turkish intentions are. Map I-1Kurdish Gains In Syria & Iraq Conflict with Russia and Iran: Syrian and Iraqi Kurds are staunch American allies. As such, Turkey's direct military intervention in both states will anger Washington. However, the real risk to Turkey is not from its NATO ally, but rather from Russia and Iran. Consider that in Syria, Erdogan's stated objective is to remove President Bashar al-Assad from power.4 Yet Russia and Iran are both involved militarily in the country - the latter with its regular ground troops - to keep Assad in power. True, Russia and Turkey cooled tensions recently. Yet the Turkish ground incursion into Syria increases the probability that tensions will re-emerge. Meanwhile, in Iraq, Erdogan has cast himself as a defender of Sunni Arabs and has suggested that Turkey still has a territorial claim to northern Iraq. This stance would put Ankara in direct confrontation with the Shia-dominated Iraqi government, allied with Iran. Turkey-NATO/EU tensions: Turkey is a member of NATO, a collective self-defense alliance. However, the cornerstone Article 5 of the NATO Treaty specifically limits the alliance to attacks that occur in Europe or North America. As such, Turkey would have no recourse to the Treaty's self-defense clause if it were to get into a war with Russia and Iran in the Middle East.5 Furthermore, tensions have increased between Turkey and the EU over the migration deal they signed in March 2016. Turkey claims that the deal has stemmed the flow of migrants to Europe, which is dubious given that the flow abated well before the deal was struck (Chart I-1). Since then, Turkey has threatened to open the spigot and let millions of Syrian refugees into Europe. This is likely a bluff as Turkey depends on European tourists, import demand, and FDI for hard currency (more on Turkey's foreign capital dependence in the sections below) (Chart I-2). If Erdogan acted on his threat and unleashed Syrian refugees into Europe, the EU could abrogate the 1995 EU-Turkey customs union agreement and impose economic sanctions. Chart I-1Turkey's Migration Threat Is Not Credible Chart I-2Turkey Is Heavily Dependent On The EU The Turkish foray into the Middle East poses the chief risk of a "shooting war" that could impact global investors in 2017. While there are much greater geopolitical games afoot - such as increasing Sino-American tensions6 - this one is the most likely to produce military conflict between serious powers. It would be disastrous for Turkey. First, it is not clear what state the Turkish military is in. President Erdogan has purged the military of hundreds of generals and thousands of lower level officers since the July 2016 coup d'état. Second, Turkey would be directly challenging Russia and Iran when both have prepositioned troops and air assets in the Middle East. Third, any Turkish military aggression will further distance Ankara from its Western allies. The U.S. and Europe could impose an arms embargo on Turkey, which would severely limit its ability to prosecute a long military campaign (given its reliance on NATO-compliant armament). Bottom Line: Turkey's increasing involvement in the geopolitical morass that is the Middle East is a clear and definite risk. It has no upside. So why is President Erdogan contemplating it? Domestic Political Risk President Erdogan has used geopolitical and security crises to bolster his popularity and hold on power. We therefore see Erdogan's geopolitical assertiveness as a reflection of his domestic political insecurity. This insecurity began with the mid-2013 Gezi Park protests, which came as a shock to Erdogan. We noted at the time that political volatility has been the norm for Turkey since the Second World War. The anomaly was the decade of tranquility under the AKP rule.7 The anti-government protests came amidst a slumping economy and as Erdogan was trying to enact multiple constitutional changes. The first change was to turn the presidency into a democratically elected position, which Erdogan subsequently contested and won in August 2014 (albeit with only 52% of the vote). The second change, to turn Turkey into a presidential republic and give Erdogan sweeping powers at the expense of the parliament, required a two-thirds majority in the legislature and thus a big win at the scheduled 2015 elections. From that critical moment in mid-2013, Erdogan faced multiple setbacks on the domestic front that stalled his constitutional reforms: December 2013: A corruption scandal embroiled several key members of government, including family members of ministers. June 2015: The ruling AKP failed to win a majority in parliamentary elections, with the pro-Kurdish and liberal People's Democratic Party (HDP) winning an extraordinary 80 seats. July 2015: June elections were immediately followed with renewed violence between Turkish armed forces and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a Kurdish militant group based in Turkey. November 2015: Erdogan campaigned on a law and order platform, charging pro-Kurdish HDP with responsibility for renewed violence. The incumbent AKP won a majority, but fell short of the two-thirds needed to turn the country into a presidential republic. We expect Erdogan to call a constitutional referendum in the spring of 2017, given that his AKP, plus nationalists in parliament, have 60% of the seats needed to call for one. Polls are unreliable, but if we combine public support for AKP and nationalists in the November 2015 election as a proxy for support for a presidential republic, it suggests Erdogan will win the plebiscite. To gain support from nationalists for constitutional amendment, Erdogan will have to agree to their demands that the constitution reaffirm Turkish ethnic identity as the basis for citizenship, as well other anti-Kurdish demands. The referendum could therefore rekindle tensions between the government and Kurds, a conflict that could gain an international dimension with the Kurds in Syria and Iraq ascendant. Erdogan may continue to use geopolitical crises to rally support. Domestic politics is messy in Turkey as the country has competitive and largely free elections. If the liberal, coastal opposition were to unite with the Kurdish population behind a single candidate, Erdogan could conceivably be defeated in a future election. As such, external and internal geopolitical and security crises are useful as they give a popular boost to the president while giving the security apparatus a reason to target political opponents. Unfortunately, this dynamic is likely to increase domestic political risk and encourage Erdogan to sacrifice Turkey's political and economic institutions - including the country's adherence to the principals of the free market - for short-term political gain. It is highly unlikely that this political and geopolitical context will create an environment conducive to difficult, pro-market, choices. Instead, we expect the government to double down on populist policies that boost wages, increase liquidity in the banking system, and erode central bank independence. Bottom Line: President Erdogan is playing a "two-level game," with domestic political insecurity motivating geopolitical assertiveness. This is dangerous as the game could get out of hand. Populist policies will continue. Financial And Economic Constraints Foreign financing has been and remains a major constraint. Turkey is dependent on foreign capital flows to finance its still-large current account deficit of $32 billion, or 4% of GDP (Chart I-3). Therefore Turkish policymakers should, in theory, conduct credible monetary and fiscal policies, as well as provide an investor-friendly political and economic backdrop to attract foreign capital. Yet, in reality, the exact opposite is happening. Macro policies, and monetary policy in particular, have been completely unorthodox. On the one hand, the central bank has been intervening in the foreign exchange market, depleting its already extremely low level of foreign exchange reserves. On the other, it has been injecting liquidity into the financial system via lending to banks and other means (Chart I-4). The central bank's overnight lending to commercial banks has surged (Chart I-4, bottom panel). Chart I-3Turkey: Large Current Account Deficit = ##br##Reliance On Foreign Capital Chart I-4The Central Bank Is Injecting Enormous ##br##Liquidity Into The System In short, the Central Bank of Turkey (CBT) has been conducting "reverse sterilization" by injecting liras into circulation. It is doing so to avoid a rise in market-based interest rates, since rates typically rise when a central bank sells foreign currency and buys (i.e. withdraws) local currency from the system. In addition, the CBT cut interest rates 6 times from March to September. Remarkably, this combination of liquidity expansion and rate cuts has taken place while wages have been skyrocketing - 20% in nominal terms and 10% in real (inflation-adjusted) terms (Chart I-5). Money and credit growth have also boomed at 15-20% (Chart I-6). Wages and unit labor costs are the most critical factors in generating genuine inflation in any economy. We can very confidently state that in recent years Turkey had extremely high inflation. Chart I-5Turkish Wage Inflation Is Explosive Chart I-6Turkey: Money Supply Is Booming In a country where inflationary forces are genuine and intense and the central bank is running very loose monetary policy - i.e. well behind the curve - the currency typically depreciates a lot. Chart I-7Turkey's Net Foreign ##br##Reserves Are Running Low Hence, it is not surprising that the lira has plunged. In fact, without central bank intervention through foreign currency sales, the lira would have plunged much more. The CBT's net international reserves have dropped to a mere $20 billion from $46 billion in 2010 (Chart I-7). Net foreign exchange reserves exclude commercial banks' deposits at the central bank. The often-quoted number by the central bank of $100 billion is gross foreign exchange reserves, which includes commercial banks' foreign currency deposits at the central bank. These are liabilities of the central bank, and they do not belong to the monetary authorities. Net foreign currency reserves are currently equal to only one month of imports, and odds are that the CBT will run out of its own foreign exchange reserves very soon. In such a case, the monetary authorities could choose to use banks' foreign currency deposits to defend the lira, but the CBT would then become liable to commercial banks. Since the government owns the central bank, this would ultimately become the government's liability. Although the monetary authorities could use commercial banks' foreign exchange reserves deposited at the CBT, the act of doing so would further undermine investor confidence, and foreign capital inflows would dry up and probably turn negative. This would also remove the buffer that prevents bank runs on foreign currency deposits from occurring. Furthermore, Table I-1 illustrates the current profile of Turkey's external debt. The high level of external and foreign exchange-denominated debt, as well as elevated foreign funding requirements - $150 billion or 21% of GDP over the next 12 months - mean that debtors and the overall economy have limited tolerance for further currency depreciation. Yet the only credible way to stem the currency's plunge is to hike interest rates. That, in turn, would produce a full-blown credit downturn, pushing the economy into recession. Hiking interest rates is precisely what Turkey did many times in the past when faced with unsustainable exchange-rate levels. However, that was back when the credit-to-GDP ratio was low (Chart I-8) and policymakers were more orthodox and followed IMF prescriptions. Table I-1Turkish External Debt By Sector Chart I-8Turkey's Credit-To-GDP ##br##Ratio Has Risen Considerably At the moment, President Erdogan is not only bashing orthodox monetary policies and blaming foreign speculators for his country's troubles,8 but also pursuing a geopolitical strategy that contradicts that of both the U.S. and the EU, as outlined above. Overall, having no appetite for higher interest rates and a recession, the Turkish authorities will ultimately have no choice but to opt for capital controls to diminish the lira's decline. Bottom Line: To prevent currency depreciation from causing a surge in interest rates and an economic implosion, policymakers will likely end up introducing capital controls. Is The Lira Cheap? Although the nominal exchange rate has depreciated a lot, the lira is not yet very cheap. This is because wages have been skyrocketing in local currency terms, while productivity has been stagnant (Chart I-9). This means Turkey's unit labor costs have swelled (Chart I-9, bottom panel). Consequently, the lira's real effective exchange rate is not yet very cheap (Chart I-10). When expressed in euros, unit labor costs in Turkey have not declined at all, and have not yet improved compared to those of central European countries (Chart I-11). Chart I-9Turkey: Low Productivity, ##br##High Unit Labor Costs Chart I-10Lira Is Not Cheap Chart I-11Turkish Manufacturing ##br##Is Not Competitive... Consistently, Turkey has lagged central European countries in penetrating European markets. Since 2006, Turkey's market share in non-energy European imports has been mostly flat, while it has significantly increased for central European countries (Chart I-12). Even though the rising export penetration of central European countries can also be attributable to factors beyond currency competitiveness, the point remains that Turkey needs further currency depreciation to boost exports. Consistent with the fact that the lira is not yet very cheap, Turkish manufacturing is struggling (Chart I-13) and the country's current account balance, excluding oil, has been deteriorating. Chart I-12...And Is Losing EU Market Share Chart I-13Turkish Industry Needs ##br##A Much Weaker Currency Bottom Line: The lira is not very cheap. It has to depreciate more to boost Turkey's competitiveness and ameliorate the current account deficit. Investment Recommendations Chart I-14Stay Underweight Turkish ##br##Stocks Versus The EM Benchmark Over the past several years, we have been recommending shorting/underweight Turkish assets on the grounds of a dire economic and financial outlook as well as uneasy geopolitics. We have repeatedly warned that the Turkish central bank cannot defy the Impossible Trinity - trying to control the exchange rate and interest rates simultaneously when the country has an open capital account. It seems a final showdown in policymakers' fight to control both the exchange rate and interest rates is looming: the odds of some sort of capital controls being implemented are rising. Dedicated EM equity and fixed-income portfolios (both credit and local-currency bonds) should continue underweighting Turkey (Chart I-14). Absolute-return and non-dedicated EM investors should limit their investments in Turkish financial markets. BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy service's trade of shorting the TRY versus the USD remains intact. However, we recommend investors book profits as the exchange rate approaches USD/TRY 3.9. Similarly, traders should take profits on our trade of shorting 2-year bonds and bank stocks when the lira's exchange rate gets closer to USD/TRY 3.9. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Geopolitical Strategy marko@bcaresearch.com Stephan Gabillard, Research Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Indonesia: Beware Of Excessive Wage Inflation In the very near term, Indonesia, like other EM countries with current account deficits and high equity valuations, is vulnerable to rising U.S. bond yields, an associated relapse in EM currencies, and a simultaneous rise in local bond yields. Heading into 2017, Indonesian financial markets will likely come under pressure from a renewed decline in commodities prices and rising domestic inflation. While the country's structural fundamentals are much better than those of Turkey, South Africa, Brazil, and Malaysia, Indonesia's financial markets are quite vulnerable due to elevated valuations and foreign investor positioning. Indonesia has been one of the darlings of EM investors over the past several years, and any selloff in EM risk assets could trigger an exodus of capital. With foreigners holding some 40% of outstanding domestic bonds, Indonesia is vulnerable to capital outflows. Furthermore, the equity market has formed a major top and a breakdown is likely (Chart II-1). High Wage Inflation Is Bearish For The Rupiah And Local Rates The inflation outlook is deteriorating in Indonesia: Wages are rising briskly across most industries (Chart II-2). Even in recession-hit sectors such as mining, wages grew by a stunning 20% between February 2015 and February 2016. Given the general rise in commodities prices this year, labor will demand even higher wage growth in 2017. Chart II-1Indonesian Equities Formed A Major Top Chart II-2Indonesia's Wage Growth Is High The central government's October 2015 minimum wage regulation - which sets minimum wage increases at the level of nominal GDP growth - is unlikely to be successful in restraining wage growth. Labor unions are extremely powerful in Indonesia, and they are currently staging numerous protests demanding minimum wage increases on the order of 25% in 2017. We therefore believe average wage growth will continue to be higher than nominal GDP growth. Odds are that wage growth will be in the double digits, while nominal GDP is currently 8.4%. Please refer to Box II-1 for more details on the issue of unions and strikes. BOX II-1 Union Protests Against Wage Indexation Labor unions across the Indonesian archipelago are highly dissatisfied with the announced 2017 minimum wage level. As a result of the government's minimum wage reforms adopted last year, pushback by unions was inevitable. The new rules will tie minimum wages to nominal GDP instead of letting it be decided at the district level by unions, businesses, and local governments. Since the unions are now at risk of losing significant influence, they are staging protests: The North Sumatran administration announced an 8.3% increase in 2017 minimum wages, but the region's labor union fiercely objected to it. The latter is now planning major protests and threatening to paralyze the industrial sector if the authorities do not comply. The region is Indonesia's fourth-most populated. Similarly, in East Java, Indonesia's second-most populous province, labor unions are not satisfied by the announced wage rise and are demanding revisions. Meanwhile, the administration in South Sulawesi raised minimum wages for 2017 by 11.1% - above the central government's assigned level - and the business community has voiced major concerns. The provincial administration has nevertheless publicly denied it has violated the central government's policy. The Confederation of Indonesian Workers Unions (KSPI) has grown dissatisfied with the announced increase in Jakarta's minimum wage (8.25%). As a result, the KSPI decided to latch on to Islamist-led protests on December 2, demanding the ousting of Jakarta's Governor "Ahok" (Basuki Tjahaja Purnama). This highlights that labor unions are willing to tap into growing religious tensions in order to make their demands more potent. This could end up being a serious issue, requiring the central government to negotiate a compromise that waters down efforts to reform minimum wages. Strong wage growth has outpaced productivity gains, and will continue to do so. While strong wage gains are good for consumption, mushrooming unit labor costs (Chart II-3) are compressing corporate profit margins and damaging Indonesia's competitiveness. Companies faced with rising wages/labor costs will have to either hike prices or squeeze margins. Both scenarios are bearish for share prices. The central bank has been extremely dovish and has, so far, disregarded rampant wage growth. Odds are that it will be late in addressing rising inflationary pressures. Typically, the exchange rate of a country where its central bank is behind the inflation curve depreciates. We expect the Indonesian rupiah to weaken significantly as Bank Indonesia (BI) will be late to raise interest rates. Although the policy rate and domestic bonds yields appear attractive when compared with the inflation rate,9 interest rates are very low compared with wage growth. We believe wages, and more specifically unit labor costs, are more genuine indicators of underlying inflation dynamics than food or energy prices - even though the latter have large weights in Indonesia's consumer price index basket. In short, interest rates are too low when compared to wage growth. Notably, over the past year or so households and businesses shifted their deposits away from foreign currency and into local currency. It seems the trend is now reversing (Chart II-4). Growing demand for U.S. dollars from residents will also weigh on the rupiah. Chart II-3Unit-Labor Costs Are Soaring Chart II-4Indonesian Residents Will Start Buying Dollars A weaker currency will push up interest rates. Higher interest rates in turn will curtail credit growth. Chart II-5 shows that the local-currency loan impulse is already rolling over and will drag economic growth lower. Indonesian commercial banks are saddled with rising non-performing loans (NPLs). Banks will be forced to increase provisioning for bad assets, leading to slower profit and loan growth. For a detailed analysis on Indonesian banks, please refer to our May 18 Weekly Report.10 Finally, narrow (M1) money growth has rolled over decisively. Historically, this has coincided with a relapse in share prices (Chart II-6). Higher interest rates will ensure a further slowdown in M1, escalating downside risks in share prices. Chart II-5Indonesia: Loan Impulse Is Turning Chart II-6M1 Money Impulse: ##br##A Worrying Signal For Stocks External Vulnerability Next year, we expect commodities prices (especially, industrial metals and coal prices) to decline due to renewed weakness in Chinese demand. This negative terms-of-trade shock will further depress the rupiah, push up interest rates, and extend the equity market selloff. Chart II-7 shows that China's imports of coal from Indonesia have surged. There has been some improvement in final demand for coal and other commodities, but supply cutbacks in China as well as financial demand (investor speculation) explain most of the exponential rise in prices. This vertical move is unsustainable, and prices will drop next year. Importantly, Chinese demand will likely weaken. China's fiscal spending and credit impulses have rolled over, warranting less industrial demand for electricity (Chart II-8). Besides, property construction will contract anew following policy tightening, high leverage among developers and hidden inventories (Chart II-8, second panel). Coal and base metals account for about 15% of Indonesia's total exports. Palm oil makes up another 9%. Given that Indonesia is running both current account and fiscal deficits (Chart II-9), lower commodities prices will weigh on the exchange rate. Chart II-7Positive Terms Of Trade##br## Boost Unsustainable Chart II-8China Growth Relapse In 2017? Chart II-9Indonesia's Twin Deficits Bottom Line: Indonesian share prices and domestic bonds are expensive and over-owned by EM investors. We recommend underweighting/shorting Indonesia relative to EM equity, local bond and sovereign credit benchmarks, respectively. We are also maintaining short positions in the IDR versus the U.S. dollar and the HUF. Ayman Kawtharani, Research Analyst aymank@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Special Report, "Geopolitical Strategic Outlook 2012," dated January 27, 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Multipolarity And Investing," dated April 9, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Scared Yet? Five Black Swans For 2016," dated February 10, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 President Erdogan, speaking at the first Inter-Parliamentary Jerusalem Platform Symposium in Istanbul in November 2016, said that Turkey "entered [Syria] to end the rule of the tyrant al-Assad who terrorizes with state terror... We do not have an eye on Syrian soil. The issue is to provide lands to their real owners. That is to say we are there for the establishment of justice." 5 A risk does exist, however, of Russia retaliating against Turkish actions in the Middle East by attacking Turkey itself. At that point, it would be a legal question whether Article 5 still applied. We are certain that Europe and the U.S. would not come to Turkey's aid, particularly if Turkey was the aggressor in Syria or Iraq. 6 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The Geopolitics Of Trump," dated December 2, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Turkey: Canary In The EM Coal Mine?" in "The Coming Political Recapitalization Rally," dated June 13, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 President Erdogan, speaking at a Borsa Istanbul ceremony on November 23, said "We are heirs to the Ottoman Empire, which had been exploited since 1854 when it took its first external loan by banks, bankers and loan sharks. Some years tax revenues could not cover the interest payment. However, I can't consent to wasting what rightfully belongs to my people through high real interest rate." 9 This is why Indonesia scores as one of the most attractive EM local bond markets in our analysis published in last week. Please refer to our Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Will The Carnage In EM Local Bonds Persist?" dated November 30, 2016; the link to the report is available on page 23. 10 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, titled "EM Bonds: Unloved And Under-Owned?" dated May 18, 2016; available at ems.bcaresearch.com. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Highlights An Italian referendum 'no' is not really revolting. Some people are voting no for no change to the current constitution's vital checks and balances. Lean against any knee-jerk widening of the Italian sovereign yield spread versus France that followed a no vote. Lean against any knee-jerk rally in Italian banks that followed a yes vote. A 50bps spike in the JPM Global Government Bond Yield in just 3 months is normally a bad omen for risk-asset performance. Retain a cautious stance to risk-assets on a 3-month horizon. Feature After shock victories for Brexit and Donald Trump at the polls, a 'no' vote in Italy's December 4 referendum on constitutional reform would be the next worrying sign of a growing grassroots revolt against the establishment. Or would it? An Italian 'No' Is Not Really Revolting The votes for Brexit or Donald Trump were clearly votes for change. At first glance, an Italian no would also look like a revolt, with the potential to trigger political uncertainty and instability in the euro area's third largest economy. Chart of the WeekItalian Banks Are Tracking Japanese 'Zombie' Banks The truth is more nuanced. Clearly, some Italians are voting no to reject Prime Minister Renzi. But others - including former Prime Minister Mario Monti - are voting no for no change. These voters want to leave in place the current constitution's vital checks and balances. If Italians vote yes to constitutional reform, the upper house of parliament - the Senate - would be relegated to an advisory chamber. Meanwhile, an already approved new electoral law for the lower house of parliament - the Chamber of Deputies - hands an automatic 55 percent majority of seats to the largest party. Some people fear that this combination would amount to excessive executive power. So they are voting no to mitigate the danger. Granted, a no vote might also force Renzi to resign, but this would not necessarily trigger new elections. President Sergio Mattarella would likely explore options for a new government - perhaps a technocratic government - which the parties in the current governing coalition have a strong incentive to support until the next elections are due in 2018. Even if there were early elections, it is improbable that they would result in a government led by the populist 5 Star Movement. If 5 Star was the largest party, it would hold a 55 percent majority of seats in the lower house, but only 30 percent in the upper house, in proportion to its popular vote share (Chart I-2). Therefore, it could not form a government. Under the current constitution, the government needs the support of both houses. The irony is that a yes vote - by giving the executive excessive powers - would make it more likely for a populist party like 5 Star to form a government in 2018 or beyond. Still, even this might prove a tall order. Italy's constitutional court is reviewing the electoral law change that gives 55 percent of lower house seats to the largest party. The court will likely demand more proportionality, making it hard for any one party to win an outright majority. This means more coalition governments, which 5 Star rejects. Hence, an Italian no will not be the equivalent of the Brexit vote or U.S. election of Donald Trump. Fears that it will unleash a dangerous phase of populism and political instability in Italy are overblown. Yet in the last three months, the Italian sovereign yield spread has widened sharply versus France (Chart I-3). Note also that the 65-day fractal dimension of the Italy versus France sovereign bond performance is close to its technical limit, indicating excessive pessimistic groupthink. Chart I-2The 5 Star Movement Could Not Form A ##br##Government Under The Current Constitution Chart I-3Italy's Political Risk Premium Has ##br##Increased, But Is It Justified? If December 4 brings a no vote in the Italian referendum combined with the election of a far-right President of Austria - whose role is largely ceremonial - the knee-jerk market response might still be fright. In which case, a further widening in the Italy/France yield spread would be a tactical entry opportunity, given that political risk is overstated. Fixing Italian Banks Needs A 'Deep-V' Or A 'Long-L' The real question in Italy is not about an imminent populist backlash. The real question is what does the cure for Italy's banking malaise look like? The answer is either a 'deep-V', meaning a banking crisis forces a quick workout; or a 'long-L', meaning no banking crisis but a very long struggle back to normal health. As an investor, neither seems particularly appealing. Italy's banking malaise has built up stealthily, generating frequent financial tremors but without an outright crisis. In contrast, the housing-related credit booms in Ireland, Spain, the U.K. and the U.S. did eventually cause housing busts and full-blown financial crises - requiring urgent government-led and central bank-led bailouts. Today, Italian banks' non-performing loans (NPLs) account for 18% of gross lending, and NPLs net of provisions equal 85% of equity capital. A few years ago, Irish banks looked even worse. Irish NPLs peaked at 25% of gross lending in 2013 and net NPLs peaked at 100% of equity capital. Following government bailouts Irish banks have recovered well (Chart I-4 and Chart I-5). Likewise, the Spanish government created a 'bad bank' in 2012 to offload bank NPLs. Subsequently, Spanish banks' NPLs as a share of gross lending has almost halved. Chart I-4Ireland Looked Worse Than Italy##br## For NPLs As A Share Of Loans Chart I-5Ireland Looked Worse Than Italy ##br##For NPLs As A Share Of Capital Compared to Ireland and Spain, Italy's avoidance of outright crisis (thus far) appears a blessing. Unfortunately, it is now a curse. In waiting so long, Italy cannot follow Ireland, Spain, the U.K. and the U.S. in their escapes from their banking woes. The EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), which came into full force on January 1 2016, has blocked the bailout escape route. The BRRD does allow state intervention in a banking crisis. But the overarching aim is to protect banks' critical functions and stakeholders, specifically: payment systems, taxpayers and depositors. Therefore, in a banking crisis "other parts may be allowed to fail in the normal way... after shares in full... then evenly on holders of subordinated bonds and then evenly on senior bondholders." For bank investors, this would constitute the 'deep-V' cure: likely intense pain up-front albeit with much better long-term prospects thereafter. Alternatively, without a crisis, the process to recognise and expunge NPLs would be largely up to the private sector and markets. But a long chain of events from the repossession of assets under bankruptcy law, to valuation, to full divestment from the banks' balance sheets could take years. Indeed, the Chart of the Week shows a striking parallel between Italian bank profits and Japan's 'zombie' bank profits, if we lag the Japanese experience by 17 years. Japan perfectly illustrates this alternative 'long-L' cure: no outright crisis, just a long and seemingly never-ending struggle back to normal health. Either way, absent any further information, we would lean against any knee-jerk rally in Italian banks that followed a yes vote on December 4. What Happens When Bond Yields Spike? Turning to the broader financial markets, a bigger concern is the impact that sharply higher bond yields will have on growth and/or on risk-asset valuations. Higher long-term borrowing costs depress credit growth as captured in the credit impulse (Chart I-6 and Chart I-7). A depressed credit impulse then almost always drags down subsequent GDP growth. The recent spike in U.S. 15-year and 30-year mortgage rates has already caused mortgage refinancing applications to plunge by 40% since July (Chart I-8). Chart I-6Higher Bond Yields Depress##br## Credit Growth In Europe... Chart I-7...And In ##br##The U.S. Chart I-8Mortgage Applications##br## Have Plunged Prior to the current incidence, a 50bps rise in the JPM Global Government Bond Yield in just 3 months has occurred only eight times this century (Chart I-9). Table I-1 lists those eight occasions and the subsequent 3-month performance of the equity market. On three out of the eight occasions, the equity market rose modestly, but on the other five it fell. Chart I-9The Bond Yield Has Spiked Table I-1What Happens When Bond Yields Spike? But perhaps the most interesting finding is that on all eight occasions, the equity market's subsequent 3-month performance consistently deteriorated, on average by -7%, compared to the preceding 3-month performance. For reference, today's preceding 3-month performance is just 0.7%. Given this evidence, it is prudent to retain a cautious stance to risk-assets on a 3-month horizon. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* The Italy versus France sovereign bond underperformance indicates excessive pessimistic groupthink. However, in this instance we would wait until after Italy's December 4 referendum on constitutional reform before initiating the countertrend trade. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations
Special Report My colleague Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President of BCA’s European Investment Strategy, has penned an excellent update on the upcoming Italian constitutional referendum. Dhaval argues that the market is mispricing risks emanating from the referendum. Not all voters who reject the plebiscite are Euroskeptic. In fact, many will vote against the referendum precisely because it removes checks and balances and increases the odds of an anti-establishment party forming a government. Geopolitical Strategy group agrees with Dhaval and has made a similar point in our November Monthly Report. Our September Special Report also posited that Italy cannot easily disentangle itself from European institutions due to its own incomplete unification. This is not to say that Italy is not a risk to the stability of the euro area. There are plenty of reasons to worry, starting with the banking system, which Dhaval addresses in his missive. However, the market’s obsession with the referendum is overdone and thus presents an investment opportunity. I hope you enjoy the European Investment Strategy report and I encourage you to take a look at Dhaval’s research closely, if you are not already a subscriber. Kindest regards, Marko Papic Highlights An Italian referendum 'no' is not really revolting. Some people are voting no for no change to the current constitution's vital checks and balances. Lean against any knee-jerk widening of the Italian sovereign yield spread versus France that followed a no vote. Lean against any knee-jerk rally in Italian banks that followed a yes vote. A 50bps spike in the JPM Global Government Bond Yield in just 3 months is normally a bad omen for risk-asset performance. Retain a cautious stance to risk-assets on a 3-month horizon. Feature After shock victories for Brexit and Donald Trump at the polls, a 'no' vote in Italy's December 4 referendum on constitutional reform would be the next worrying sign of a growing grassroots revolt against the establishment. Or would it? An Italian 'No' Is Not Really Revolting The votes for Brexit or Donald Trump were clearly votes for change. At first glance, an Italian no would also look like a revolt, with the potential to trigger political uncertainty and instability in the euro area's third largest economy. Chart of the WeekItalian Banks Are Tracking Japanese 'Zombie' Banks The truth is more nuanced. Clearly, some Italians are voting no to reject Prime Minister Renzi. But others - including former Prime Minister Mario Monti - are voting no for no change. These voters want to leave in place the current constitution's vital checks and balances. If Italians vote yes to constitutional reform, the upper house of parliament - the Senate - would be relegated to an advisory chamber. Meanwhile, an already approved new electoral law for the lower house of parliament - the Chamber of Deputies - hands an automatic 55 percent majority of seats to the largest party. Some people fear that this combination would amount to excessive executive power. So they are voting no to mitigate the danger. Granted, a no vote might also force Renzi to resign, but this would not necessarily trigger new elections. President Sergio Mattarella would likely explore options for a new government - perhaps a technocratic government - which the parties in the current governing coalition have a strong incentive to support until the next elections are due in 2018. Even if there were early elections, it is improbable that they would result in a government led by the populist 5 Star Movement. If 5 Star was the largest party, it would hold a 55 percent majority of seats in the lower house, but only 30 percent in the upper house, in proportion to its popular vote share (Chart I-2). Therefore, it could not form a government. Under the current constitution, the government needs the support of both houses. The irony is that a yes vote - by giving the executive excessive powers - would make it more likely for a populist party like 5 Star to form a government in 2018 or beyond. Still, even this might prove a tall order. Italy's constitutional court is reviewing the electoral law change that gives 55 percent of lower house seats to the largest party. The court will likely demand more proportionality, making it hard for any one party to win an outright majority. This means more coalition governments, which 5 Star rejects. Hence, an Italian no will not be the equivalent of the Brexit vote or U.S. election of Donald Trump. Fears that it will unleash a dangerous phase of populism and political instability in Italy are overblown. Yet in the last three months, the Italian sovereign yield spread has widened sharply versus France (Chart I-3). Note also that the 65-day fractal dimension of the Italy versus France sovereign bond performance is close to its technical limit, indicating excessive pessimistic groupthink. Chart I-2The 5 Star Movement Could Not Form A ##br##Government Under The Current Constitution Chart I-3Italy's Political Risk Premium Has ##br##Increased, But Is It Justified? If December 4 brings a no vote in the Italian referendum combined with the election of a far-right President of Austria - whose role is largely ceremonial - the knee-jerk market response might still be fright. In which case, a further widening in the Italy/France yield spread would be a tactical entry opportunity, given that political risk is overstated. Fixing Italian Banks Needs A 'Deep-V' Or A 'Long-L' The real question in Italy is not about an imminent populist backlash. The real question is what does the cure for Italy's banking malaise look like? The answer is either a 'deep-V', meaning a banking crisis forces a quick workout; or a 'long-L', meaning no banking crisis but a very long struggle back to normal health. As an investor, neither seems particularly appealing. Italy's banking malaise has built up stealthily, generating frequent financial tremors but without an outright crisis. In contrast, the housing-related credit booms in Ireland, Spain, the U.K. and the U.S. did eventually cause housing busts and full-blown financial crises - requiring urgent government-led and central bank-led bailouts. Today, Italian banks' non-performing loans (NPLs) account for 18% of gross lending, and NPLs net of provisions equal 85% of equity capital. A few years ago, Irish banks looked even worse. Irish NPLs peaked at 25% of gross lending in 2013 and net NPLs peaked at 100% of equity capital. Following government bailouts Irish banks have recovered well (Chart I-4 and Chart I-5). Likewise, the Spanish government created a 'bad bank' in 2012 to offload bank NPLs. Subsequently, Spanish banks' NPLs as a share of gross lending has almost halved. Chart I-4Ireland Looked Worse Than Italy##br## For NPLs As A Share Of Loans Chart I-5Ireland Looked Worse Than Italy ##br##For NPLs As A Share Of Capital Compared to Ireland and Spain, Italy's avoidance of outright crisis (thus far) appears a blessing. Unfortunately, it is now a curse. In waiting so long, Italy cannot follow Ireland, Spain, the U.K. and the U.S. in their escapes from their banking woes. The EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), which came into full force on January 1 2016, has blocked the bailout escape route. The BRRD does allow state intervention in a banking crisis. But the overarching aim is to protect banks' critical functions and stakeholders, specifically: payment systems, taxpayers and depositors. Therefore, in a banking crisis "other parts may be allowed to fail in the normal way... after shares in full... then evenly on holders of subordinated bonds and then evenly on senior bondholders." For bank investors, this would constitute the 'deep-V' cure: likely intense pain up-front albeit with much better long-term prospects thereafter. Alternatively, without a crisis, the process to recognise and expunge NPLs would be largely up to the private sector and markets. But a long chain of events from the repossession of assets under bankruptcy law, to valuation, to full divestment from the banks' balance sheets could take years. Indeed, the Chart of the Week shows a striking parallel between Italian bank profits and Japan's 'zombie' bank profits, if we lag the Japanese experience by 17 years. Japan perfectly illustrates this alternative 'long-L' cure: no outright crisis, just a long and seemingly never-ending struggle back to normal health. Either way, absent any further information, we would lean against any knee-jerk rally in Italian banks that followed a yes vote on December 4. What Happens When Bond Yields Spike? Turning to the broader financial markets, a bigger concern is the impact that sharply higher bond yields will have on growth and/or on risk-asset valuations. Higher long-term borrowing costs depress credit growth as captured in the credit impulse (Chart I-6 and Chart I-7). A depressed credit impulse then almost always drags down subsequent GDP growth. The recent spike in U.S. 15-year and 30-year mortgage rates has already caused mortgage refinancing applications to plunge by 40% since July (Chart I-8). Chart I-6Higher Bond Yields Depress##br## Credit Growth In Europe... Chart I-7...And In ##br##The U.S. Chart I-8Mortgage Applications##br## Have Plunged Prior to the current incidence, a 50bps rise in the JPM Global Government Bond Yield in just 3 months has occurred only eight times this century (Chart I-9). Table I-1 lists those eight occasions and the subsequent 3-month performance of the equity market. On three out of the eight occasions, the equity market rose modestly, but on the other five it fell. Chart I-9The Bond Yield Has Spiked Table I-1What Happens When Bond Yields Spike? But perhaps the most interesting finding is that on all eight occasions, the equity market's subsequent 3-month performance consistently deteriorated, on average by -7%, compared to the preceding 3-month performance. For reference, today's preceding 3-month performance is just 0.7%. Given this evidence, it is prudent to retain a cautious stance to risk-assets on a 3-month horizon. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* The Italy versus France sovereign bond underperformance indicates excessive pessimistic groupthink. However, in this instance we would wait until after Italy's December 4 referendum on constitutional reform before initiating the countertrend trade. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Fractal Trading Model Fractal Trading Model
Special Report Highlights As western society has become increasingly ethnically diverse, identity politics have flourished. Technological developments have facilitated this trend by giving like-minded people the opportunity to live in their own social bubbles. The U.S. median voter is moving to the left, while the median European voter may be set to move rightward. The "Great Transatlantic Political Convergence" is afoot. Structurally favor European over U.S. stocks. Trump's victory means more fiscal stimulus and less regulation, but could also lead to a stronger dollar and a rising threat of protectionism. Feature Lessons From Papua New Guinea As far as first jobs out of college go, one could do worse than being asked to fly first class to various tropical islands around the world. Such was my luck when I joined the IMF 16 years ago. After a brief stint in the Caribbean division, I began to cover the South Pacific, first working as the desk economist for Papua New Guinea. Papua New Guinea is about as close to a Stone Age society as one will find on earth. It has a long history of violence. If two strangers meet while trekking through the mountainous terrain, the custom is to begin the conversation by listing one's relatives until a match is found. Without a common ancestor, there is little reason not to kill the other guy. Due to the country's long history of cannibalism, a portion of the population has developed a genetic resistance to Mad Cow Disease, which is spread through the consumption of infectious prions contained within the brain and other body parts. Like many societies, Papua New Guinea is highly tribal. Not unrelatedly, it is also one of the most corrupt. I once asked a local friend of mine why this was so. His response was both disheartening and revealing. The people did not want to send honest leaders to Parliament, he explained. They preferred to elect someone from their own tribe who would use his influence to extract as much wealth as possible, with the understanding that a portion of the booty would be shared with fellow tribe members. There were no philosophical differences between members of Parliament. It was simply a question of whose team you were on. What makes Papua New Guinea's political system interesting is not that it is unique, but that it is the norm. Politics in most countries is about identity, not ideology. And now the U.S. and much of Europe are moving in that direction. The Return Of Identity Politics If one looks past the vitriol, one of the most striking features of the U.S. presidential campaign was the lack of disagreement between Trump and Clinton over a wide range of substantive issues. Both candidates campaigned on increasing infrastructure spending. Both pledged not to cut sacred entitlement programs such as Medicare and Social Security. Both played up the other's Wall Street connections. Neither championed an aggressively interventionist foreign policy, with Trump, if anything, moving to the left of Clinton on the issue. Where the gulf between the two candidates was most apparent was over classic identity issues, the chief of which was immigration. Young people often assume that the Left has always supported freer immigration policy. Not so. It wasn't that long ago that Bernie Sanders described "open borders" as a "Koch Brothers idea." In 2000, The New York Times penned an editorial opposing efforts to grant amnesty to illegal immigrants on the grounds that it would depress working class wages.1 Why did things change? It wasn't because voting preferences shifted all that much. As Chart 1 shows, Hispanics have preferred Democrats over Republicans by roughly the same 30-to-40 percentage-point margin for the past 40 years. What changed was that the Hispanic share of all eligible voters rose from 4% in 1980 to 13% today, and is expected to increase to 18% in 2032 (Chart 2). For the Democrats, the allure of millions of new supporters has been simply too good to pass up. Chart 1Voting Preferences By Ethnicity ##br##In Presidential Elections Chart 2The Eligible Voters Of The Past,##br##Present, And Future For the Republicans, the transformation of the U.S. into a more ethnically diverse society has led to an existential crisis of sorts. Many top Republican officials, ever focused on the next election campaign, have sought to reach out to Hispanic voters, often by talking up the prospect of passing a comprehensive immigration reform bill. The fact that open borders means lower wages for less-skilled workers has also ensured a steady flow of campaign donations into party coffers from a variety of business interests who rely on cheap labor.2 In contrast, a large chunk of the Republican base has opposed any effort to increase the size of a voting bloc that historically favored the other party, especially if such efforts lead to lower wages. Nationalism Versus Globalism Chart 3The Huddled Masses Keep Coming The U.S. has a long history of successfully integrating immigrants. Consider the once prominent Catholic/Protestant split, which was driven in large measure by the overwhelming tendency for Irish Americans to vote Democrat. Richard Nixon won 63% of the white Protestant vote in 1960, but still lost the election due to the fact that 78% of Catholics voted for John F. Kennedy.3 By the late 1960s, the Catholic/Protestant split began to recede, to the point where few people are now aware that it ever existed. There is a good chance that the current immigration wave will prove to be no different. That being said, full integration can take a long time - the Irish, for example, overwhelmingly favored the Democrats for more than a century. Three other things complicate the picture. First, the current wave is much larger than any previous one (Chart 3). Second, it is much more ethnically, racially, and religiously diverse. Third, and perhaps most importantly, it is coming at a time when government policy has moved away from fostering assimilation towards encouraging multiculturalism. As multiculturalism has gained ascendency, the traditional glue that held countries together - nationalism - has frayed. For many, this has been a welcome development. Nationalism produced two world wars and countless other bloody conflicts. Much better, it is argued, to replace squabbling nation states with regional institutions such as the European Union, or better yet, global bodies such as the United Nations. The problem is that it is very difficult to get people to expand their circle of loyalty by decree. Thomas Friedman famously asked in 2002: "Is Iraq the way it is today because Saddam Hussein is the way he is? Or is Saddam Hussein the way he is because Iraq is the way it is?"4 We now know that the answer was the latter. From this perspective, the rise of religious fundamentalism in the Middle East is a natural reaction to the vacuum created by the collapse of pan-Arab nationalism. Many of today's leaders have a lot of trouble seeing this point. For them, globalism is a natural creed. What they miss is that they themselves have formed a unique subculture that makes this possible. Today's cosmopolitan elite attend the same schools, read the same books, enjoy the same movies, eat at the same restaurants, and in most cases, can easily converse in the same language: English. They are as much at home on the streets of Manhattan as they are on the streets of London and Hong Kong. However, put them in Cynthiana, Kentucky and they become a fish out of water. In short, they are multicultural only in the narrow ethnic sense of the word. In all other respects, they are the same tribe. Political Polarization Is Growing Chart 4Inequality Breeds Polarization This leads us to the crux of the problem. Today's political elites have been trying to subvert nationalist feelings without offering the masses a sufficiently attractive alternative. This has allowed once-dormant tribal cleavages to make a comeback. Technology has exacerbated this trend. When I came to Canada as a young refugee in 1979, there were just a handful of television networks to choose from, all of which were more or less the same. Today, there are hundreds of channels and countless websites. Social media has become ubiquitous. While refreshing in many respects, this trend has allowed people to live in their own social bubbles, leading to the fraying of the cultural bonds that hold society together. In some cases, it has facilitated the radicalization of impressionable youth, often with dire consequences. The polarization in the cultural realm has been mirrored in the political arena.5 According to political scientists Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal, polarization in Congress is currently at its highest level since World War II (Chart 4). Their research shows that the liberal-conservative dimension explains approximately 93% of all roll-call voting choices and that the two parties are drifting further apart on this crucial dimension. Meanwhile, a 2014 Pew Research study documented that the middle ground between Republican and Democratic voters is breaking apart (Chart 5). This has led to growing mutual distrust. Chart 6 shows that 45% of Republicans and 41% of Democrats now regard the other party as a threat to the nation's well-being. Chart 5U.S. Political Polarization: Growing Apart Chart 6Increasing Animosity Gerrymandering, or "redistricting," as it is euphemistically called, has made things worse. Of the 435 seats in the House of Representatives, only about 56 are truly competitive (Chart 7). For most incumbents, the threat is not from the other party, but from their own. As former House Majority Leader Eric Cantor learned the hard way when he lost to primary challenger Dave Brat in 2014, failing to tow the ideological line can carry a heavy price. Needless to say, such a system discourages bipartisan cooperation. Chart 7Gerrymandering Reduces Competitive Seats Trump And The Markets After a brief selloff, risk assets have rallied hard on the heels of Trump's victory. As we discussed in greater detail last week,6 a Trump administration will mean more fiscal stimulus - chiefly in the form of lower taxes and increased infrastructure and defense expenditures - as well as a softer line on energy and financial sector regulation. Republicans are also likely to push for greater private-sector involvement in health care. Equity investors should not rejoice too much, however. Trump's saber rattling over trade issues is bad news for many multinational companies. In addition, larger budget deficits are likely to prompt the Fed to raise rates more aggressively. This will push up bond yields, reducing the relative attractiveness of stocks. Higher rates will also put upward pressure on the dollar. The real broad trade-weighted dollar has appreciated by 3% since the election and 4% since we published "Three New Controversial Calls: Trump Will Win And The Dollar Will Rally" on September 30th.7 We expect the dollar to rise by another 7% from current levels. Chart 8Immigrants Want More Government Services A Leftward Shift In The U.S. Median Voter Perhaps more worrisome, as my colleague Marko Papic discussed in a recent report, Trump's victory signals that America's political center is moving to the left.8 The Republican Party is likely to become increasingly populist. Pro-business Democratic candidates such as Hillary Clinton could also turn out to be a dying breed. The future may belong more to politicians such as Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth Warren and Ohio Senator Sherrod Brown. As Wayne Gretzky likes to say, we need to look at where the puck is going, not where it has been. As noted above, this trend partly reflects demographic factors. Immigrants tend to favor redistributionist policies (Chart 8). As such, it is not surprising that California, a once solid Republican state, has become reliably Democratic. In this sense, the transformation of the U.S. electorate has parallels with the extension of the voting franchise to women in 1920. Economists John Lott and Larry Kenny have shown that this led to a substantial leftward shift in political outcomes.9 Ethnic voting preferences, however, are only one part of the story, and perhaps not even the most important part. As a larger share of the general population approaches retirement, resistance to cutting Social Security and Medicare will increase. To pay for these programs, taxes will rise. In addition, slower productivity growth and high levels of income inequality will make voters less enthusiastic about capitalism. The fact that all of this is happening in the aftermath of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression will only serve to sour free-market sentiment. The Great Transatlantic Political Convergence There are many commonalities in political trends between Europe and the United States, but also a number of critical differences. Unlike those in the U.S., European immigrants still represent a small fraction of the electorate. Their integration into labor markets is also much worse, especially in European countries with generous welfare systems (Chart 9 and Chart 10). This suggests that public support for lavish welfare programs may begin to wane, particularly in northern Europe. As Chart 11 shows, this is already happening in the U.K. Chart 9Low Levels Of Immigrant ##br##Labor Participation In Parts Of Europe Chart 10Immigration Is Straining Generous ##br##European Welfare States Chart 11British Attitudes Towards Welfare ##br##Recipients Have Hardened Other forces will also lead to a partial rollback of the European welfare state.10 The euro crisis brought home the lesson that countries with high levels of public debt are especially vulnerable to speculative attacks when they no longer have their own printing press. Going forward, euro area governments will continue trying to pay back debt in order to keep the bond vigilantes at bay. In an environment of high capital and labor mobility, fiscal tightening is likely to come more from spending cuts than tax hikes. The failure of France's "millionaire tax" to raise significant new revenue illustrates this point. The loss of an independent monetary policy that comes with having a common currency will also make it more difficult for euro area states to maintain generous welfare programs. If a country cannot respond to an adverse economic shock by cutting rates or devaluing its currency, it must perform an "internal devaluation" instead. However, successful internal devaluations require a high degree of wage and price flexibility. Generous unemployment insurance programs, high minimum wages, and strong unions are anathema to that. This is bad news for many European workers, but good news for European corporate interests. The net effect of all these changes is that European politics are likely to move to the right, while U.S. politics will move to the left. The Great Transatlantic Political Convergence is afoot. This suggests that European equities should outperform their U.S. counterparts over the long haul. Peter Berezin, Senior Vice President Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 "Hasty Call For Amnesty," The New York Times, February 22, 2000. 2 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Report, "The Immigration Debate: What It Means For Investors," dated February 27, 2014, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 3 Michael Barone, "Race, Ethnicity, And Politics In American History," in Beyond the Color Line: New Perspectives on Race and Ethnicity in America, Hoover Institution Press (2002): pp. 343-358. 4 Thomas L. Friedman, "Iraq Without Saddam," The New York Times, September 1, 2002. 5 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "U.S. Election: Outcomes And Investment Implications," dated November 9, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Trumpenproletariat Strikes Back," dated November 11, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Three (New) Controversial Calls," dated September 30, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Introducing: The Median Voter Theory," dated June 8, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 John R. Lott and Larry Kenny, "Did Women's Suffrage Change The Size And Scope Of Government?," Journal Of Political Economy, Vol. 107: 6 (part 1), (December 1999): pp. 1163-1198. 10 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The End Of Europe's Welfare State," dated June 26, 2015, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Strategy & Market Trends* Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Special Report Highlights The polls were not wrong in the Brexit and U.S. election cases, pundits were; Marine Le Pen is trailing her likely second round opponent by around 40%; She can win, but her probability of winning has been inappropriately inflated following the U.S. election; Buy EUR/USD if the euro breakup risk premium spikes again; we are not there yet, but may be soon. Feature There are two narratives that have emerged in the financial industry since the Trump victory: Polls are inaccurate and cannot be trusted. Marine Le Pen, leader of the Euroskeptic National Front (FN), has a high probability of winning the 2017 presidential election in France. In this brief Client Note, we want to address both of these narratives as they will be central to investors in 2017 - a year when Europe will hold three (maybe four) crucial elections. The French election - set to take place on April 23 and May 7 - is the most important geopolitical event of 2017. We have already addressed the election in some detail in our November Monthly Report and will continue to follow it closely for our clients.1 Polls Were Not Wrong, Pundits Were The polls did not get Brexit wrong, the pundits did. If anything, the polls were showing the Brexit camp comfortably ahead throughout the first two weeks of June. It was only once MP Jo Cox was tragically murdered on June 16 that polls favored the "Stay" vote for the last week of the vote. But on the day of the vote, the "Stay" camp was ahead by only 4%. That should not have given investors the level of confidence they had in the pro-EU vote. The probability of Brexit, in other words, should have been a lot higher than the 30% imbued by the betting markets (Chart 1). We made a case for alarm early in 2016 based on a fundamental analysis of the British electorate.2 Chart 1AOnline Betting Got Brexit Wrong... Chart 1B... Not The Polls Similarly, the national polls in the U.S. election were not wrong. Rather, the pundits and quantitative models overstated the probability of a Clinton victory. What the modelers missed is the unfavorable structural backdrop for Clinton: the challenges associated with one party holding the White House for three terms, lackluster economic growth, lukewarm approval ratings for Barack Obama, and the presence of third-party challengers. We addressed these, as well as Trump's "White Hype" strategy, early on in the electoral process.3 In addition, the modelers ignored that American polls have a consistent track record of underestimating, or overestimating, performance by about 3% (Chart 2). And crucially, that the 2016 election was different in that the level of undecided voters was nearly triple the average of the previous three elections (Chart 3).4 Chart 2Election Polls Usually##br## Miss By A Few Points Chart 3More Undecided ##br##Voters This Time Around Our quantitative and qualitative models were telling us throughout the election that the race would be close. Our model gave Trump a 41% chance of winning on the day of the election, a very high estimate versus other prognosticators. We used the exact same polls incorporated in the quantitative models of the New York Times, Reuters, and FiveThirtyEight.com. But ours did better. As we said on November 1, a Donald Trump victory would not be some sort of mathematical oddity. It wasn't. Bottom Line: The polls in both the Brexit referendum and the U.S. election were close. Yes, they overstated the establishment probability of victory. But not by an extraordinary figure. Marine Le Pen Can Win, But What Is Priced In? Marine Le Pen is going to face off against an "establishment" candidate in the second round of the French election on May 7. As such, she definitely can win the election. Once Le Pen becomes one of the two candidates contesting the election, her probability of winning is certainly not zero. However, her probability is not over 10% either. At least not yet. She is trailing her likely opponent, Alain Juppé, by around 40% in the polls (Chart 4). And yes, we are aware that Donald Trump trailed Hillary Clinton by 20% in July 2015. But there are significant differences between Trump and Le Pen: Marine Le Pen is not a political "unknown." She was her party's presidential candidate in the 2012 election. Her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, contested elections in 2007, 2002, 1995, and 1988. The National Front has contested elections in France since the 1970s. Voters know what they are getting with Le Pen. As we have repeatedly stressed to clients, Marine Le Pen's personal approval rating peaked in 2012 (Chart 5). She peaked despite the European refugee crisis, multiple terrorist attacks in France, and sluggish economic growth over the past two years, which should have all helped boost her popularity. Why haven't they? France conducts a two-round electoral system, primarily to prevent anyone like Marine Le Pen from coming to power. For Le Pen to win, she has to have millions of French centrist voters swing to her, rather than to her centrist opponent, in the second round. Chart 4Are Polls Underestimating Le Pen By 40%? Chart 5Le Pen's Popularity In A Secular Decline The last point is a critical problem for Le Pen as she refuses to change her rhetoric toward the EU and euro membership. The problem for Le Pen is that 70% of the French support the euro (Chart 6). Leaving the euro area would mean redenomination risk for Baby Boomer retirees, default on sovereign debt, higher interest rates, higher inflation, and an immediate economic recession. Judging by the high level of support for the euro, we suspect that the French population understands these risks.5 We therefore do not doubt that Marine Le Pen is a long-shot to win the French elections. Her subjective probability of winning is around 10%. For it to improve, we would have to see: Dramatic, and immediate upward momentum in her poll figures, particularly relative to likely centrist opponents in the second round. Le Pen's probability of victory would increase if she faced an unpopular centrist politician. For example, if the incumbent President François Hollande wins the late January primary of the French Socialist Party, and somehow manages to get into the second round. Similarly, if ex-President Nicolas Sarkozy wins the November 20-27 primary of the Republicans. Both primary elections are a two-round affair. Investors will know the center-right candidate by the end of November. A re-start of the refugee crisis, which has abated significantly since October 2015 (Chart 7). We expected the crisis to unwind and clients can read our September 2015 report titled "The Great Migration - Europe, Refugees, And Investment Implications," to see why.6 Marine Le Pen changes her stance on EU membership or the currency union. On the other hand, such a rhetorical shift would cease to differentiate her from the other center-right policymakers in France. Chart 6French Support The Euro Chart 7Read Our Chart: Migration Crisis Is Over Bottom Line: Marine Le Pen can win the 2017 election in France. But she remains a long-shot. The only way that Donald Trump and Brexit increase the probability of Marine Le Pen is if the polls are systemically wrong. This is not the case. Marine Le Pen would have to narrow her gap with centrist politicians to 3-5% for us to adjust our probability. Of course, the French could decide to vote for Marine Le Pen because they want to be like Americans and British. We would advise clients not to hold their breath expecting that one. Investment Implications Investors may wake up in mid-2017 to find that the U.K. is firmly on its way out of the EU and that the U.S. is embroiled in deepening political polarization. Meanwhile, France and Spain will be led by reformist governments, Italy will remain in the euro area, and Germany will be mid-way through a rather boring electoral campaign that features pro-euro establishment parties. What is keeping the European establishment in power? In early 2016, we argued that it was its large social welfare state. Unlike the laissez-faire economies of the U.S. and the U.K., European "socialism" has managed to redistribute the gains of globalization sufficiently to keep the populists at bay. As such, European voters are not flocking to populist alternatives, despite considerable challenges such as the migration crisis and terrorism. We encourage clients to re-visit our argument, which we elaborated on in our April Special Report titled, "The End Of The Anglo-Saxon Economy?"7 Populists are gaining votes in Europe nonetheless. To counter that trend, we should expect to see Europe's establishment parties turn more negative towards immigration, positive on fiscal activism, and more assertive towards security and defense policy. But on the key investment-relevant issue of euro area membership and European integration, we see the public consensus continuing to support the status quo. Given our sanguine view, any upward movement in French sovereign debt yields or downward move in the euro could reflect an overstated euro breakup risk premium. We will monitor these assets carefully, since an entry point could develop for investors willing to bet against euro area dissolution. Betting against headline risks has certainly paid dividends in Europe since 2010. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Geopolitical Strategy marko@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "Europe: Election Fever Continues," in Monthly Report, "De-Globalization," dated November 9, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "With Or Without You: The U.K. And The EU," dated March 17, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "U.S. Election: The Great White Hype," dated March 9, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "It Ain't Over Till The Fat Man Sings," dated November 1, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 In other words, we do not understand why the French population would otherwise support the common currency, if it were not for the risks of leaving it. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The Great Migration - Europe, Refugees, And Investment Implications," dated September 23, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The End Of The Anglo-Saxon Economy?," dated April 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights All three of Trump's signature policy proposals - fiscal stimulus, a more restrictive immigration policy, and trade protectionism - are dollar bullish. The implementation of these policies could cause the U.S. economy to overheat, forcing the Fed to raise rates more than it otherwise would. A Trump presidency is unlikely to lead to major institutional changes at the Fed. Trump is okay with a stronger dollar and higher rates, as long as these do not cause growth to stall. Investors have gone from too bearish to too bullish about what a Trump victory means for equities. A tactically cautious stance is still appropriate. Feature Trump Triumphant Chart 1Trumpism Trumps Unfavorability The late film critic Pauline Kael allegedly once said that there was no way that Richard Nixon could have won the 1972 election because she didn't know a single person who voted for him. Kael actually never said this, but the story rings true because one can imagine many people saying something like that. I spent the last few days meeting clients in New York City. The expression on the faces of people while walking down the streets in Manhattan - which went 87%-to-10% for Clinton over Trump - said it all. Most people seemed dazed and confused by what happened on November 8th. Trump did not win because of his personality. He won in spite of it. As I have emphasized over the past 18 months - starting with my presentation at the 2015 BCA New York Conference, which featured the prediction that "The Trumpists Will Win" - Trumpism is a lot more popular than Trump. How else can someone with a 62% unfavorability rating become the next president of the United States (Chart 1)? The reason that Trump won is because he addressed many of the legitimate grievances of blue collar workers in swing states that establishment politicians had long ignored. As we discussed last year in a report entitled "Trumponomics: What Investors Need To Know,"1 trade with China has led to a hollowing out of the U.S. manufacturing base; low-skilled immigration has dragged down blue collar wages; and the flow of drugs into the U.S. from across the southern border is a legitimate problem. Donald Trump And The Markets I will have much more to say about the long-term economic and political consequences of Trump's victory in a special report that I intend to publish next week. For now, however, let me concentrate on the near-term investment implications. Global equities plunged in the immediate aftermath of the election results, while the dollar weakened and Treasurys rallied. This knee-jerk reaction largely stemmed from the fear that a Trump presidency would be highly destabilizing for the global economy. In such an environment, the Fed would not be able to raise rates very much, which is a clear negative for the greenback. Trump's conciliatory victory speech helped soothe frayed nerves, sending both the dollar and Treasury yields higher. This was consistent with our expectations. As we argued in "A Trump Victory Would Be Bullish For The Dollar" and in "Three New Controversial Calls: Trump Wins And The Dollar Rallies," all three of Trump's signature policy proposals - fiscal stimulus, a more restrictive immigration policy, and trade protectionism - are bullish for the dollar and bearish for bonds.2 Fiscal Stimulus On The Horizon Now that Donald Trump has a Republican House and Senate to work with, there is a high probability that he will be able to push through a sizable infrastructure bill (sidebar: I am writing these words from the Kabul-like departure area at LaGuardia airport. My flight to Montreal is delayed because Trump's plane, which he dubs Trump Force One, will be taking off soon). In addition to increasing infrastructure spending, Trump has pledged to raise defense expenditures and enact sizable tax cuts. The Tax Policy Center estimates that Trump's tax plan alone would increase the federal debt by $6.2 trillion over the next ten years (excluding additional interest), representing approximately 2.6% of GDP of fiscal stimulus per year.3 We doubt that Congress will approve anything close to that. Nevertheless, even if he gets one quarter of the revenue and expenditure measures that he is seeking, this would be enough to boost aggregate demand growth by 0.5%-to-1% per year over the next two years. Pulling Back The Welcome Mat Chart 2Trump's Hard Line On Trade ##br##And Illegal Immigration Would##br## Benefit Low-Skilled Workers Immigration policy is one of those areas where the president can do a lot without congressional approval. Existing U.S. immigration laws are already very strict; they just happen to be enforced in a highly haphazard manner. High-skilled workers who want to go through the proper legal channels to gain residency must jump through all sorts of burdensome hoops; in contrast, low-skilled workers who enter the country illegally can generally evade detection and prosecution. This obviously makes for a suboptimal immigration system. Trump's campaign rhetoric has generally focused on combating illegal immigration. Although his official immigration policy paper - allegedly ghost-written by Senator Jeff Sessions - mentions cutting back on high-skill H1-B visas, at times Trump has appeared to disavow that view, stressing his desire to bring in only "the best" immigrants. Our suspicion is that a Trump presidency would generally take a fairly soft stance towards high-skilled immigrants, focusing instead on curbing illegal immigration through increased border security and the rollout of a mandatory national E-Verify system. Since illegal immigrants are generally poorly educated, such an outcome would raise the wages of low-skilled workers. Chart 2 shows that the pool of unemployed low-skilled workers has largely evaporated in recent years. Higher wage growth, in turn, could cause the Fed to hike rates more aggressively than it otherwise would, helping to push up the value of the dollar. Protectionism And The Dollar As with immigration, the executive branch has a lot of discretion over trade policy. There is an ongoing debate about whether sitting presidents can withdraw from trade deals that they do not like without congressional approval. The prevailing legal view is that they can, but even if that turns out not to be the case, they can certainly take other measures that increase import barriers. Such tactics have often been used by Republican presidents who liked to portray themselves as free traders. For instance, Ronald Reagan imposed voluntary export restraints on Japanese automakers and major foreign steel producers, raised tariffs on Japanese motorcycles, and tightened quotas on sugar imports. George W. Bush also increased tariffs on steel imports and imposed quotas on Chinese textiles. It goes without saying that Donald Trump would not be averse to taking similar steps. The threat of punitive measures is likely to dissuade some U.S. companies from moving production abroad. On the flipside, the fear of losing access to the U.S. market might persuade some foreign companies to relocate production to the United States. Such worries were a key reason why Japanese automobile companies began to invest in new U.S. production capacity starting in the 1980s. This could help reduce the U.S. trade deficit. A smaller trade deficit, in turn, would increase aggregate demand. This, in conjunction with the adverse supply-side effects that protectionist measures typically result in, would cause the output gap to narrow further, forcing the Fed to step up the pace of rate hikes. In addition, standard trade theory suggests that higher trade barriers would raise real wages for low-skilled workers. Since such workers tend to have the highest marginal propensity to consume, this, too, would boost aggregate demand. Trump And The Fed While Trump's policy proposals are all dollar bullish and bond bearish, where does Trump himself want the dollar and bond yields to go? The answer will obviously influence his relationship with the Fed and how he responds to any dollar strength. As with many of his policy ideas, it is hard to know exactly where Trump stands. Investors are accustomed to politicians who constantly flip-flop on the issues. Trump takes it a step further. He may be the first "quantum" candidate to run for office: Just like an electron can have a different spin and position at the same time, Trump seems capable of believing multiple things at the same time and spinning any position to his liking. With that caveat in mind, we think that a Trump presidency would not represent a significant departure from existing monetary policy. While Trump has said that he would like to replace Janet Yellen with a Republican once her term expires in 2018, he has also said he has "great respect" for the Fed Chair, and that he is "not a person who thinks Janet Yellen is doing a bad job." As far as the direction of interest rates is concerned, Trump has acknowledged that "as a real estate person, I always like low interest rates," but "from the country's standpoint, I'm just not sure it's a very good thing, because I really do believe we're creating a bubble." Chart 3Still Below Past Peaks He also seemed to acknowledge that there is a limit to how strong the dollar can get. "If we raise interest rates," he said, "and if the dollar starts getting too strong, we're going to have some very major problems." Our conclusion is that Trump would welcome higher rates, so long as any dollar appreciation does not choke off growth. As we discussed last month in a report entitled "Better U.S. Economic Data Will Cause The Dollar To Strengthen," the combination of a rebound in business capex, less inventory destocking, and continued strong personal consumption growth thanks to rising wages could cause aggregate demand growth to rise to 2.5%-to-3% this year.4 Trump's victory increases the risk to these numbers to the upside. Since we published that report, the broad real trade-weighted dollar has gained about 1.5%. We are still comfortable with our view that the dollar will rise by another 8.5% over the next 11 months. As Chart 3 shows, this would still leave the greenback below its previous 1985 and 2001 highs. Trump And Other Central Banks A more difficult issue to handicap is how a Trump presidency will influence policy outside the U.S. Would China, for example, feel the need to prop up the RMB in order to avoid Trump's wrath? Would Japan be less willing to pursue an accommodative monetary policy in an indirect effort to weaken the yen, if this led to the threat of higher tariffs on Japanese exports to the U.S.? Our sense is that yes, a Trump administration will, to some extent, constrain the ability of other nations to weaken their currencies. That said, the impact is unlikely to be especially dramatic. China does manipulate its currency. But lately it has been selling foreign-exchange reserves in an effort to keep the RMB from falling more than it otherwise would. Thus, an end to China's intervention would mean a weaker yuan, not a stronger one. Likewise, as long as the Bank of Japan is not engaged in direct foreign asset purchases, the ability of the Trump administration to cry foul is limited. Equity Implications We must admit that we are surprised that global equities were so quick to shrug off their losses. Our expectation had been that stocks would weaken somewhat in the wake of a Trump victory. What happened? A few things come to mind. First, there has probably been a fair amount of short-covering from investors who had bought insurance against a Trump win. Second, investors, like all humans, tend to draw on analogies in making their decisions. The best analogy for what happened on November 8th is what occurred after the Brexit vote. The lesson from that episode is that one should buy stocks after a supposedly negative voting outcome. That is exactly what investors did Wednesday morning. Third, there are in fact some legitimate reasons why President Trump may be good for stocks. In addition to the prospect of lower corporate tax rates and fiscal stimulus, a Trump administration is likely to go soft on financial regulation. This, in tandem with a steeper yield curve, could prove to be a positive development for banks. A Trump administration is also good news for energy companies, particularly coal. Defense contractors should benefit from increased military expenditures. The implications for health care stocks is harder to gauge. While the potential repeal of the Affordable Care Act could hurt some companies, it may benefit others. Our hunch is that the net effect for health care earnings will be positive. Even if Obamacare is repealed, it is likely to be replaced with something that looks a lot like the existing legislation, just with more subsidies and giveaways for health care providers and drugmakers (think of Medicare Part D). Having said all this, investors now seem to be a bit too complacent about what a Trump presidency means for stocks. The risk of a trade war is still present. And even if Trump pulls in his protectionist horns, a tighter labor market, exacerbated by a potential shortage of immigrant workers, is likely to eat into corporate profit margins. Higher rates and a stronger dollar will also hurt. As such, we are maintaining our tactically cautious stance on global equities. Peter Berezin, Senior Vice President Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Trumponomics: What Investors Need To Know," dated September 4, 2015, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "A Trump Victory Would Be Bullish For The Dollar," dated June 3, 2016, and Special Report, "Three (New) Controversial Calls," (Call #1: Trump Wins, And The Dollar Rallies), dated September 30, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Jim Nunns, Len Burman, Ben Page, Jeff Rohaly, and Joe Rosenberg, "An Analysis Of Donald Trump's Revised Tax Plan," Tax Policy Center, October 18, 2016. 4 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Better U.S. Economic Data Will Cause The Dollar To Strengthen," dated October 14, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Special Report Dear Client, I am on the road visiting clients in Toronto, Chicago, and Wisconsin this week, and as such there will be no regular Weekly Report. Instead, we are sending you a Special Report written by my colleague Marko Papic, Chief Strategist of BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service. In this report, Marko argues that Hillary Clinton has not yet sealed the election, despite her high odds of winning. I hope you will find this report both interesting and informative. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Senior Vice President Global Investment Strategy Highlights Clinton has a 65.5% chance of winning the presidency. A Trump win requires a surprise - such as in voter turnout. Still, we doubt Trump can punch more than 3% above his polling. Regardless of the outcome, multinational corporate profits will suffer. Go long the USD. Feature With the conclusion of the final presidential debate on October 19, the U.S. election is now in its final inning. Donald Trump's chances of mounting a comeback are slipping away (Chart 1). Could there be a Brexit-like surprise for the markets on November 8? And what are the investment implications of this year's unprecedented election? How Trump Can Still Win... Paddy Power, one of the world's biggest bookies, has begun to pay out bets to people who had wagered on Secretary Hillary Clinton winning the election. Meanwhile, according to Nate Silver, America's statistical Geek-in-Chief, Donald Trump has a meager 13.7% chance of winning the election.1 While our own model gives Clinton a 65.5% chance of winning, we have not forgotten Yogi Berra's wisdom: "It ain't over till it's over." There are three reasons why we would have held onto the pay-outs if we ran Paddy Power: Turnout assumptions could be wrong: Silver's quant model - and ours - is based on the assumption that the publically available opinion polls are high-quality data points. To iron-out the noise of an occasional bad poll, political analysts aggregate the polls to create a "poll-of-polls." The problem is that this method is mathematically the same as combining bad mortgages into securities. The idea is that each individual object (mortgage or poll) may be flawed, but if you get enough of them together, the problems will all average out and you have a very low risk of something bad happening.2 If there is a bias that is common to a large part of the data, then you are in real trouble. And why would there be a bias in election polls? For one, polling is not a science. It is an art. To extrapolate the results of an opinion survey of ~1,000 individuals to the general election of ~130 million people, polling professionals have to make turnout assumptions that are based partly on previous elections and partly on guesswork. This year, these assumptions are notoriously difficult to make as both candidates are extremely unpopular (Chart 2). This is bound to throw off pollsters' assumptions and may partially explain the regular gyrations that can be gleaned in Chart 1. For Secretary Hillary Clinton, the problem is compounded by the fact that she requires a high turnout to win. She needs the "Obama Coalition" of minorities and Millennial voters to show up as they did for President Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012. But we know that she struggled with the latter, with Senator Bernie Sanders picking up 70% of the youth vote in the Democratic primaries (Chart 3). If the 2016 turnout resembles the turnout from mid-term elections - which Republicans have generally won this century - then Trump could still have a chance. People may be lying: Another concern for Clinton is that she may be the 21st century Tom Bradley. Bradley was an African-American Mayor of Los Angeles who lost the 1982 California governor's race despite being ahead in the polls right up until election day. The "Bradley effect" theory goes that white voters lied when answering the polls in 1982 for fear of appearing racially prejudiced. Today, voters may be telling pollsters what they think is "politically correct," thus favoring Clinton in the polls. In the same vein - but ideologically opposite - the former Imperial Wizard of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, David Duke, outperformed expectations in both the 1996 U.S. Senate election and the 1999 special election for Louisiana's First Congressional District. He lost both elections, but he managed to garner double-digit support both times. More recently, the June 23 Brexit vote surprised markets. In our view, investors and betting markets underestimated Brexit largely in spite of polls, which had been close throughout the campaign stage (Charts 4 and 5). BCA's Geopolitical Strategy outlined the case for why the probability of Brexit was much higher than the market assumption as early as March.3 Our concerns began to manifest in the polls with the "Leave" camp comfortably ahead throughout June. And then, from June 16 (one week before the vote) to June 23, the "Stay" vote surged ahead in the polls, garnering a 4% lead the day before the election. This surge in the last week was clearly false, as the "Leave" camp won by a 3.8% margin, a 7.8% swing on the day of the election. So, what happened? The vertical line in Chart 5 shows the day that Member of Parliament Jo Cox was murdered by a British ultra-nationalist. Our guess is that the stunning political assassination - an extremely rare event in the U.K. - created a "Cox effect" in the Brexit polling. Those who were polled may have mourned for Cox, or resisted being associated with the extreme views of a self-professed neo-Nazi, yet they silently stuck to their legitimate concerns regarding EU membership on the day of the referendum. Chart 4Online Betting Got Brexit Wrong... Chart 5...So Did Prominent Opinion Polls The Brexit example illustrates that lying to pollsters is not something that only happens in the past. It has happened as recently as June. Given Donald Trump's controversial statements - and particularly his misogynist rants going back to 2005 - American voters may be lying to pollsters when it comes to their choice for president. Chart 6Media Narratives Are Cyclical Media narratives: As our geopolitical team has stressed throughout this election, the news media work through narratives (Chart 6). These narratives appear to have influenced polls, leading to regular gyrations in support levels for the two candidates. Will the media have another "comeback kid" narrative for Trump in store ahead of the election? It cannot be discounted. And if the polls tighten to the 0-3% range again, the turnout concerns and the "Bradley/Cox effect" from above could be enough to swing the election for Trump. Bottom Line: Clinton remains the favorite to win the election, but her probability of winning is closer to 65.5% than the 85% that appears to be "priced in the market." ...And Why He Will Not Win While we are not comfortable calling the election a "done deal," we do believe that Clinton is a favorite. The BCA Geopolitical Strategy quantitative model predicts that she has about a 65.5% probability of winning.4 And the team's qualitative analysis of Trump's electoral strategy suggests that the hurdles to his victory are considerable, particularly in swing states Virginia and Colorado. Before we introduce the quantitative and qualitative models that underpin our election forecast, let us address the above concerns about turnout and the "Bradley/Cox effect" head on. In our view, the polls are telling the truth. We concede that Trump's support level may be underestimated by approximately 3%, which would not be out of line with the last five presidential elections (Chart 7). However, a Clinton lead greater than ~3% the day of the election will be insurmountable for four reasons: GOP primary: It was not the polling that got Trump wrong during the Republican primary race, but the pundits. The polls were generally accurate, particularly those in the swing states where polls tend to be frequent and sophisticated (Chart 8). Polls only underestimated Trump by more than 3% in Illinois, Massachusetts, New York and Pennsylvania. Some of Trump's most controversial statements were made in late 2015 and early 2016 and yet they prompted no shame from his supporters when answering pollsters' questions. Turnout seesaw: Trump's strategy - which we dubbed "The Great White Hype" back in March - is a serious and mathematically viable electoral strategy.5 The effort focuses on boosting the GOP share and overall turnout of the white, blue-collar voter. The problem with this strategy, as executed by Trump, is that its effect could be a seesaw. Trump's rhetoric and policy proposals may appeal to less-educated, lower-income white voters, but may also reduce his support among well-educated, upper-income voters. This is a serious problem for Trump given that the 2012 exit polls indicate that Romney won college graduates by 4 points and voters earning $100k or above by 10 points. In other words, upper-income, well-educated voters are a key constituency of the Republican Party. And just as Clinton may have trouble getting Millennials and minorities to vote for her by the same margin as they did for Obama, Trump could be struggling to get key conservative constituencies out as well. Debates: All scientific polls taken after the debates have Hillary Clinton as a clear winner (Chart 9). This may seem surprising given the reaction of many pundits that Trump outperformed the very low expectations for him in the debates. Many analysts scored the debates close, but voters did not. Why? Because independent and undecided voters are just now tuning into the election and want to see candidates discuss serious policy issues and show leadership. Political science research shows that the direct influence of party identification decreases in presidential elections over time, but issues gain importance, especially after the presidential debates.6 As such, voters tuning into the debates were not discounting Trump's fiery rhetoric and behavior, they were appalled by it. We can't say we were surprised, as we have been showing Chart 10 to clients since February. Senate: If voters are hiding their true support level for Donald Trump, then their genuine preference should be revealed in Senate races where less controversial Republicans are contesting close elections. Instead, Republicans are on a path to lose four of their Senate seats, with another three in play (Democrats need four to take the Senate, assuming that Clinton wins the presidency, since Vice-President Tim Kaine would then cast the tie-breaking vote in that body). Democrats are ahead in Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Colorado. Nevada is also expected to stay blue. Missouri, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania are all still in contention, despite the GOP incumbent advantage in all three. Bottom Line: Despite the challenges that this election presents - two highly disliked candidates, questions about turnout, and concerns about polling quality - we doubt that Donald Trump can surprise his poll numbers by more than ~3%. With Hillary Clinton up by 6.4% in the latest RealClearPolitics poll of polls, this means that Trump has to start rallying now if he is going to have a chance on November 8. What Do Our Quantitative & Qualitative Models Say? Our geopolitical team's quantitative model predicts that Hillary Clinton will win the election with 335 electoral votes. The model, built using historical macroeconomic and election data since 1980, has been projecting a strong Clinton victory for some time.7 It currently shows that Clinton already has 279 electoral votes from states where she has more than a 70% chance of winning (Chart 11). These results mean that even under the unlikely scenario in which the GOP wins all the remaining swing states (North Carolina, Arizona, Florida, Ohio, and Iowa), Clinton will still win the election, all other things being equal. Meanwhile, our qualitative model relies on testing Trump's electoral strategy - boosting the share of the white vote accruing to the GOP - in the real world. We concluded in March that Trump did have a path to victory, albeit a very narrow one. Our research showed that Trump's strategy is mathematically viable, at least in 2016 when the white share of the total population remains large enough. We specifically showed that Trump would only need to increase white voters' support by 1.7% and 2.9% in Florida and Ohio, respectively, to flip those states, which seems quite reasonable. We also pointed out that getting a 5.7% swing in Iowa could be feasible. On the other hand, we showed that "flipping" Midwest states like Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin would require a very large swing of white voters in Trump's favor: 13.9%, 7.8%, and 8.1%, respectively. With those numbers, Trump would have to win nearly 70% of Michigan's white voters, 65% of Pennsylvania's, and 58% of Wisconsin's. Of the three, Wisconsin looks the most achievable. On the other hand, the GOP only managed to pick up 52% of the state's white share in 2004, the last time a Republican candidate for president won an actual majority of the popular vote since 1988. So, getting to 58% is a high bar given Wisconsin's recent electoral history. How did our qualitative model hold up in terms of state-by-state polling? It did really well! As we predicted, Trump has led the race or nearly led the race in Iowa, Florida, and Ohio (Chart 12). In Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, Clinton's lead has remained higher than 5% through most of the election cycle, even when the media narrative shifted against her (Chart 13). Chart 12The 'White Hype' Model Works Here Chart 13White Hype' Does Not Work Here If Trump were to win all the states that our White Hype model predicts as competitive, he would still be short of the necessary 270 electoral votes. Map 1 shows the ideal distribution of states for Trump, one that ignores the polls and assigns swing states to Trump or Clinton based on whether the White Hype model is feasible or not. Notice that the two remaining major states are Virginia and Colorado. For Trump to win this election, we believe that he needs to win one of the two (Colorado in combination with either Nevada or New Hampshire), in addition to all of Florida, Ohio, North Carolina, and Iowa. This is a tall order! Particularly given that his polling in Virginia and Colorado is poor (Chart 14). Chart 14Two Critical Swing States Bottom Line: BCA's Geopolitical Strategy quantitative and qualitative models both show that Hillary Clinton is a clear favorite to win the election, a view we have held since December 2015.8 Investment Implications: MNCs Vs. SMEs Our colleague Peter Berezin has already discussed the implications of a Trump victory: a stronger USD and a sell-off in stocks.9 We agree and would add that a rally in Treasurys would be likely in the event of a surprise Trump win (Chart 15). Chart 15Trump's Success Helps Safe-Haven Assets The rally in safe-haven assets would eventually give way, however, to a bear market in Treasurys as investors realized that Trump has no intention of controlling public spending or reining in the (already growing) budget deficit. Growth, and likely inflation, would surprise to the upside, allowing the Fed to hike rates beyond the 48 bps expected by the market through the end of 2018. We do not foresee that a Republican-held Congress would stand in Trump's way, despite the clear dislike between the Speaker of the House, Representative Paul Ryan, and Trump. Ryan would not go against a sitting president from the same party who just pulled off a revolutionary election. The entire House will face re-election in 2018 and moderate Republicans will be wary of standing up to Trump, lest he campaign against them in GOP primaries in a short two years. Investors are putting way too much faith in America's checks-and-balances to keep Trump from enacting his policies, at least in the short term. These are constitutional, legal, and technical checks, and political expediency often overrules all three. In case of a Clinton win, we would expect the House to remain controlled by the GOP. There are only about 38 truly competitive electoral districts in this race, according to The Cook Political Report.10 Given that the Republicans have a 60-seat majority in the House, a Democratic takeover would require Democratic candidates to defeat Republican Representatives in 30 out of 38 competitive districts. At best, this means that the current, market- bullish status quo of divided government will continue. With the House remaining in Republican hands, and Democrats clinging to a potential razor-thin control of the Senate (vulnerable to a post-Trump Republican comeback in 2018), the Clinton White House would be constrained on some of its most left-leaning policies.11 And what are the chances of cooperation on modest reforms? We think they are actually quite good. Unlike Obama, Clinton's victory will not be a popular sweep. She will not control Congress, she will likely receive less than 50% of the popular vote (due to the presence of two notable third-party candidates), and she will be the first candidate ever elected that has more voters saying they dislike her than like her. Therefore, the odds are slim that Clinton will come to power with the same level of confidence and agenda-setting vision as Obama did in 2008. Instead, we see two potential avenues for modest cooperation with the GOP-controlled House: Chart 16Corporate Taxes Have Bottomed Corporate tax reform: It is unlikely that we will see reform that lowers the already historically-low effective tax rates (Chart 16). However, broadening the tax base by closing various loopholes could be feasible. This will hurt S&P 500 multi-national corporations that have been able to lobby for special treatment over the past three decades. However, it will benefit America's SMEs, which are the backbone of employment and growth. Fiscal spending: Paul Ryan and moderate Republicans understand that there is a paradigm shift in America and that the median voter is moving to the left.12 After all, Donald Trump won the GOP primary with an unorthodox economic message that combined both left- and right-wing economic policies. As such, we would expect House Republicans to give in to a modest infrastructure spending plan from Clinton, in exchange for corporate tax reform. Even a modest plan could make a substantive difference for the economy given the high fiscal multipliers of infrastructure spending in an economy with low interest rates. This in turn would allow the Fed to surprise the markets with more than two rate hikes by the end of 2018 and thus sustain the USD bull market. If there is one trend that we are certain will end with the 2016 U.S. election, it is the dominance of American economic policy by the S&P 500, or perhaps the S&P 100. What Trump and Senator Bernie Sanders have shown is that challenging for the presidency no longer requires a cozy relationship with either Wall Street or the large multinational corporations (MNCs). We therefore do not expect a Clinton-Ryan coalition to care as much about the concerns of America's large corporations as otherwise might be the case. Policies that lead to higher effective corporate tax rates on major S&P 500 corporations, a dollar bull market, and higher wages are likely over the course of the next four years. The political pendulum is shifting in the U.S. and it should marginally favor growth, inflation, the USD, and SMEs.13 Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Geopolitical Strategy marko@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see FiveThirtyEight, "Who Will Win The Presidency?" dated October 20, 2016, available at fiverthirtyeight.com. 2 "You mean like the 2008 Global Financial Crisis?" Yes. Like that. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "With Or Without You: The U.K. And The EU," dated March 17, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "U.S. Election: Final Forecast & Implications," dated October 12, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "U.S. Election: The Great White Hype," dated March 9, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see Andreas Graefe, "Issues and Leader Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections,"Electoral Studies 32:4 (2013), pp.644-657. 7 For the assumptions underpinning our model, we encourage clients to read BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "U.S. Election: Final Forecast & Implications," dated October 12, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Strategy Outlook, "Stuck In A Rut," dated December 17, 2015, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Three (New) Controversial Calls," dated September 30, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 10 Please see "House: Recent Updates," accessed October 20, 2016, available at cookpolitical.com 11 We believe that it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for the Democrats to retain a razor-thin majority in the Senate if they get one in November. First, Democrats will have to defend 25 Senate seats (including two allied independent seats) out of 33 in contention in 2018. Second, Democrats always see a drop-off in voter turnout and enthusiasm in mid-term elections. 12 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Introducing: The Median Voter Theory," dated June 8, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 13 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "King Dollar: The Agent Of Righteous Retribution," dated October 12, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Special Report

Hillary Clinton has a 65% chance of winning the election; she receives 334 electoral college votes according to our model. Trump still requires an exogenous shock to win. Meanwhile, the USD is poised to rally - and leftward-moving policymakers will applaud its redistributive effects while MNCs suffer the consequences.

Hillary Clinton has a 65% chance of winning the election; she receives 334 electoral college votes according to our model. Trump still requires an exogenous shock to win. Meanwhile, the USD is poised to rally - and leftward-moving policymakers will applaud its redistributive effects while MNCs suffer the consequences.

The median voter moving to the left has spurred paradigm shifts. These new regimes are giving way to transformational leaders who seek change by breaking convention. As they test their constraints and pursue their preferences, a cautious stance towards risk assets is warranted. In this Monthly Report, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy discusses Trump's recent comeback, rising EM political risk, and Italy's upcoming constitutional referendum.