Trade / BOP

Highlights So What? The late-cycle rally still faces non-trivial political hurdles. Why? U.S.-China trade talks, the U.S. threat of tariffs on auto imports, and Brexit continue to pose risks. A shocking revelation from the Mueller report could have a temporary negative impact on equity markets. A bombshell would increase Trump’s chances of removal from office. We give 35% odds to tarrifs on autos and auto parts, and 10% odds to a hard Brexit. Feature In our February 6 report we outlined how a “Witches’ Brew” of geopolitical risks had the potential to short-circuit the late-cycle equity rally. A month later, that brew is still bubbling. President Donald Trump’s approval rating has rebounded but going forward it faces challenges from negative headlines (Chart 1). These include a soaring trade deficit, a large influx of illegal immigrants on the southern border, a weak jobs report for February, a setback in North Korean diplomacy, and an intensification of the scandals plaguing Trump’s inner circle. Chart 1Don't Get Comfortable Just Yet, Mr. President Each of these issues calls into question the effectiveness of Trump’s core policies and the stability of his administration, though in reality they are only potentially problematic. While Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s forthcoming report poses a tail risk, the substantial threat remains Trump’s trade policy.  Indeed, investors face “the persistence of uncertainties related to geopolitical factors” and the “threat of protectionism,” according to European Central Bank President Mario Draghi, who spoke as he rolled out a new round of monetary stimulus for Europe and its ailing banks. What did Draghi have in mind? The obvious culprits are the U.S.-China trade talks, the U.S. threat of tariffs on auto imports, and Brexit. There were other issues – such as “vulnerabilities in emerging markets” – but the first three are the most likely to have turned Draghi’s head. The global economic outlook is likely to improve on the back of Chinese stimulus and policy adjustments by the ECB and Federal Reserve. But growth has not yet stabilized and financial markets face additional volatility due to the fact that none of these “geopolitical factors” is going to be resolved easily. The good news is that Trump, overseeing a precarious economy ahead of an election, has an incentive to play softball rather than hardball.  Mueller’s Smoking Gun? News reports suggest that Mueller will soon issue the final report of his investigation into President Trump’s election campaign links with Russia. There is really only one way in which the Mueller report could be market relevant: it could produce smoking-gun evidence that results in non-trivial impeachment proceedings. Any scandal big enough to remove Trump from office or clearly damage his reelection chances is significant because financial markets would dislike the extreme policy discontinuity (Chart 2). Anything short of this will be a red herring for markets, though admittedly many of our clients disagree. Very little is known about what Mueller will report and how he will interpret his mandate. Mueller’s investigation may or may not make it to the public in full form, at least initially, and he may or may not make any major additional indictments. Congress will strive to get access to the report, which is internal to the Justice Department, while spin-off investigations will proliferate among lower-level federal district attorneys and congressional committees. The legal battle, writ large, will run into the 2020 election and beyond. House Democrats alone can decide whether to bring articles of impeachment against Trump, but the case would be struck down in the Senate if it did not rest on ironclad evidence of wrongdoing that implicated Trump personally. Republican Senators will not jump ship easily – especially not 18 of them. That would require a sea change in grassroots support for Trump. Trump’s approval among Republicans remains the indicator to watch, and it is still strong (Chart 3). If this number crashes in the aftermath of the Mueller report, then Trump could find himself on a Nixonian trajectory, implying higher odds of a Senate conviction (Chart 4). At that point, markets would begin discounting a Democratic sweep in 2020, with business sentiment and risk assets likely to drop at the prospect of higher taxes and increased regulation (Chart 5). Chart 5A 2020 Democratic Sweep Would Dent Business Sentiment After all, if scandals remove Trump from office, then not only is a Democrat likely to win the White House, but any Democrat is likely to win – even a non-centrist like Bernie Sanders or other Democratic candidates like Kamala Harris who have swung hard to the left. Meanwhile, the odds of Democrats taking control of the Senate (while keeping the House) will rise. With Democratic candidates flirting with democratic socialism and proposing a range of left-wing policies, the prospect of full Democratic control of the legislative and executive branches would weigh on financial markets. We doubt that the Mueller report can fall short of a smoking gun while still dealing a fatal blow to Trump. The Democrats control the House, so if the scandal grows to gigantic proportions, they will impeach. Yet if they impeach without an ironclad case, Trump will be acquitted. And if Trump is acquitted, it is hard to see how his chances of reelection would fall. The impeachment of former President Bill Clinton looms large over Democrats, since it ended up boosting his popularity. If Democrats are overzealous to no end, it will help Trump’s campaign. If Trump should then win re-election, he will have veto power and likely a GOP Senate, so his policies will remain in place. The outcome for markets would be policy continuity, though the market-positive aspects of Trump’s first term may not be improved while the market-negative aspects, such as his trade policy and foreign policy, may reboot. Mueller is an all-or-nothing prospect: he either leads us to the equivalent of the Watergate Tapes or not. Lesser crimes are unlikely to have a decisive impact on the election. But volatility is likely to go up as the report comes due, just as it did during the Lewinsky scandal (Chart 6), at least until the dust settles and there is clarity on impeachment. And an equity sell-off at dramatic points in the saga cannot be ruled out, especially if global factors combine with actual impeachment (Chart 7). Chart 6Impeachment Proceedings Likely To Raise Vol... Chart 7… And Potentially Dampen Returns Bottom Line: A specific, shocking revelation from the Mueller report could have a negative impact on equity markets and risk assets, but any such moves would be temporary as long as the growth and earnings backdrop remain positive and Mueller does not drop a bombshell that increases Trump’s chances of removal from office. Separating The Budget From The Border The president faces adverse developments on the southern border after having initiated a controversial national emergency in order to transfer military funds to construct new barriers. The U.S. has seen an abnormally large increase in apprehensions and attempted entries this year (Charts 8A & 8B). Ultimately the influx calls attention to the porous southern border and as such may help to justify Trump’s policy focus. For now it raises the question of why the administration’s tough tactics are failing to deter immigrants. Meanwhile his emergency declaration has divided the Republican Party, with several members likely to join with Democrats in a resolution of disapproval that Trump will veto. Congress will not be able to override the veto, but Trump’s decree also faces challenges in the judicial system. We doubt that the Supreme Court will rule against him but it certainly is possible. The ruling is highly likely to come before the election. Meanwhile Trump is kicking off the FY2020 budget battle with his newest request of $8.6 billion for the border wall and cuts to a range of discretionary non-defense spending. The presidential budget is a fiction – it is based on unrealistic cuts to a range of government programs. Any budget that is passed will bear no relation to the administration’s proposals. Opinion polls referenced above clearly demonstrate that Trump’s approval rating suffered from the recent government shutdown. This does not mean that he will conclude the next budget battle by the initial deadline of October 1 or that a late-2019 shutdown is impossible. He might accept a short shutdown to try to secure defense spending that would arguably legitimize his repurposing of military funds for border construction. But his experience early this year means that the odds of another long-running, bruising shutdown are low. Might Trump refuse to raise the debt ceiling later this year to get his way on the wall? This is even less likely than a shutdown due to the negative impact that a debt ceiling constraint would have on social security recipients and bond markets. Trump also has the most to lose if the 2011 budget caps snap back into place in 2020 due to any failure of the FY2020 negotiations (Chart 9). As such, the debt ceiling – which the Treasury Department can keep at bay until the end of the fiscal year in October – and the 2020 budget may be resolved together this time around. In short, Trump will be forced to punt on congressional funding for the wall later this year and will have to campaign on it again in November 2020, with the slogan “Finish the Wall.” This is a market-positive outcome, as the hurdles to fiscal spending in 2020 are likely to be reduced: Trump will have to concede to some Democratic priorities and abandon his proposed cuts. The Democrats, for their part, are likely to have enough moderates to get the next budget over the line with Republican support. To illustrate, Republicans only need 21 votes for a majority, while no fewer than 26 Democrats were recently chastised by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi for cooperating with Republicans. The implication is that a bipartisan majority can be found. Since Trump cannot get his budget cuts, and does not really even want them, the projected contraction of the budget deficit in 2020 will be reduced or erased (Chart 10). On the margin, this would support higher inflation and bond yields.  The biggest threat to Trump’s reelection is still the risk that the long business cycle will expire by November next year. However, the exceedingly low February payrolls print was misleading – the unemployment rate fell and wage growth was firm (Chart 11). American households are in relatively good shape and that bodes well for Trump, for the time being. Chart 11American Households Are In Good Shape Bottom Line: The economy is relatively well supported and Trump and the Democrats are ultimately likely to cooperate on the budget under the table, reducing the risks of a debt ceiling breach, or an extended government shutdown later this year, or a fall off the 2020 stimulus cliff. The Trade Deficit: Trump’s Pivot To Europe Trade policy is where Trump’s challenges merge with Draghi’s woes. The U.S. trade deficit lurched upwards to a ten-year high of $621 billion in 2018 (Chart 12). The trade deficit is uniquely important to Trump because he campaigned on an unorthodox protectionist agenda in order to reduce it. It will be very difficult for him to evade the consequences if the deficit is higher, as a share of GDP, in November 2020 than it was in January 2017. Chart 12Trade Deficit Jump Is A Blow To Trump The underlying cause of the rising deficit is that a growing American economy at full employment with a relatively strong dollar will suck in larger quantities of imports. This effect is overriding any that Trump’s tariffs have had in discouraging imports. Meanwhile the global slowdown, reinforced by trade retaliation and negative sentiment, are harming U.S. exports (Chart 13). The administration’s policies of fiscal stimulus combined with encouraging private investment are guaranteed to lead to a higher current account deficit, barring an offsetting (and highly unlikely) rise in private saving. The current account deficit must equal the gap between domestic saving and investment and a rising fiscal deficit represents a drop in saving. Chart 13Trade War Hurting U.S. Exports What does the trade deficit imply for the U.S.-China talks? On one hand, the U.S. could put more pressure on China after feeling political heat from the large deficit. On the other hand, China has always offered to reduce the bilateral trade deficit directly through bulk purchases of goods, particularly commodities. It is Trump’s top negotiator, Robert Lighthizer, who has insisted that China make structural changes to reduce trade imbalances on a long-term and sustainable basis.1  In a sign of progress, the U.S. and China have reportedly arrived at a currency agreement. No details are known and therefore it is impossible to say if it would mean a more “market-oriented” renminbi, which could fluctuate and have a variable impact on the trade deficit, or a renminbi that is managed to be stronger against the dollar, which would tend to weigh on the deficit, as Trump might wish. The two negotiating teams are working on the text of five other structural issues that should also mitigate the deficit. Moreover, China’s new foreign investment law, if enforced, could increase American market access by leveling the playing field for foreign firms. However, there is still no monitoring mechanism, the two presidents have not scheduled a final signing summit, and the deterioration in North Korean peace talks also works against any quick conclusion. If Trump concludes a deal, the next question for investors is whether he will impose Section 232 tariffs on auto and auto imports on the EU and other partners (Chart 14). The European Commission’s top trade negotiator, Cecilia Malmstrom, recently met with Lighthizer in Washington to discourage tariffs. She refused to admit agriculture into the negotiations, as per a U.S.-EU joint statement in July 2018, but proposed equalizing tariffs on industrial goods as a way for both sides to make a positive start (Chart 15). She said that the U.S. repealing the Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs are necessary for any final deal. And she reiterated that any new tariffs (e.g., the proposed Section 232 tariffs on autos and auto parts) would prevent a deal and provoke immediate retaliation on $23 billion worth of American exports. Malmstrom also said that the EU would prefer to work with the U.S. on reforming the World Trade Organization and addressing China’s trade violations. This approach fits with that of Japan, which has joined the U.S. and EU in trilateral discussions toward reforming the global trade architecture in a bid to mitigate U.S. protectionism and constrain China. The problem with the EU’s position is that once the U.S. and China make a trade deal, the U.S. will not have as immediate of a need to form a trade coalition against China (other than in dealing with WTO issues). Moreover, Japan will be forced to accept a deal with the U.S. in short order. A rotation of Trump trade policy to focus on Europe is likely. We give 35% odds to tariffs on autos and auto parts. The USMCA will increase the cost of production in North America while Europe is so far excluding cars from negotiations with the U.S., so there is room for a clash. But any tariffs on autos will be less sweeping than those against China. Trump will play softball rather than hardball for the following reasons: The public is less skeptical of trade with Europe and Japan than with China. The auto sector is heavily concentrated in the Red States and many states that are heavily exposed to trade with the EU are also critical to Trump’s reelection (Map 1). Section 232 tariffs that are required to be enacted by May 18 would have plenty of time to impact the U.S. economy negatively by November 2020. Congress and the defense establishment are against a trade war with U.S. allies, while bipartisanship reigns when it comes to tougher actions toward China. The bilateral trade deficit is less excessive with Europe than with China (see Chart 12 above). The U.S. carmaker and auto parts lobby are unanimously against the tariffs – and in fact has called for the removal of the steel and aluminum tariffs in a stance that echoes that of the EU. The existing steel and aluminum tariffs provide Trump with leverage in the negotiations with the EU and Japan, whereas the U.S. has agreed not to impose new tariffs on these partners while trade negotiations are underway. New tariffs would nix negotiations and ensure that the ensuing quarrels are long and drawn out, with a necessarily worse economic impact. To initiate a new trade war in the wake of the U.S.-China war would be to undercut the positive impact on trade, financial conditions, and sentiment that is supposedly driving Trump’s desire for a China deal in the first place. The U.S. eventually will need to build a trilateral coalition to hold China to account and ensure that it does not slide back into its past mercantilist practices. Even limited or pinprick tariffs will have an adverse impact on equity markets, given that they will hit Europe at a time when its economy is decelerating dangerously and when Brexit uncertainty is already weighing on European assets and sentiment (see next section).  This may be why both the U.K. and Germany have recently softened their positions on Chinese telecom company Huawei, which they have been investigating for national security concerns related to the rollout of 5G networks. They are signaling that they are not going to sacrifice their relationship with China if the U.S. is dealing with China bilaterally while threatening to turn around and slap tariffs on their auto exports. If the U.S. goes ahead with tariffs – on the basis that its China agreement allows it to isolate Europe – the EU will not be a pushover, as exports to the U.S. only amount to 2.6% of GDP (Chart 16). The result of the U.S.-China quarrel has been a deepening EU-China trade relationship and that trend is set to continue (Chart 17), especially if the U.S. continues to use punitive measures that increase the substitution effect and the strategic value of the Chinese and European markets to each other. Chart 16The EU Will Not Be A Pushover In Face Of U.S. Tariffs Chart 17EU-China Trade Relationship Deepening Bottom Line: In the wake of any U.S.-China agreement, we give a 35% chance that Trump will impose tariffs on European cars and car parts. Such tariffs are not our base case because they are unlikely to shrink the U.S. trade deficit and would have a negative impact on the Red State economy. But lower magnitude tariffs cannot be ruled out – and the impact on the euro and European industrial sector would clearly be detrimental in the short run. Assuming that global and European growth is recovering, a tariff shock to Europe’s carmakers could present a good opportunity to buy on the dip. Any U.S.-EU trade war will ultimately be shorter-lived and less disruptive than the U.S.-China trade war, which is likely to resume at some point even if Presidents Trump and Xi get a deal this year. The United Kingdom: Snap Election More Likely A series of important votes is taking place in Westminster this week, with the end result likely to be an extension to negotiations over a withdrawal deal at the EU Council summit on March 21. Conditional on that extension, the odds of a new election are sharply rising. The first vote, as we go to press on Tuesday, has resulted in a rejection of Prime Minister Theresa May’s exit plan by 149 votes – the second rejection after her colossal defeat in January by 230 votes. The loss was expected because the EU has not offered a substantial compromise on the contentious Irish “backstop” arrangement, which would keep Northern Ireland and/or the U.K. in the European Customs Union beyond the transition date of December 31, 2020. All that was offered was an exit clause for the U.K. sans Northern Ireland. But Northern Ireland is part of the U.K. and the introduction of additional border checks on the Irish Sea would mark a new division within the constitutional fabric. This is unacceptable to the Conservative Party and especially to the Democratic Union Party of Northern Ireland, which gives May her majority in parliament. On Wednesday, we expect the vote for a “no deal” exit, in which the U.K. simply leaves the EU without any arrangements as to the withdrawal (or future relationship), to fail by an even larger margin than May’s plan. Leaving without a deal would cause a negative economic shock due to the automatic reversion to relatively high WTO tariff levels with the EU, which receives 46% of the U.K.’s exports and is thus vital in the maintenance of its trade balance and terms of trade (Chart 18). It is impossible to see parliament voting in favor of such an outcome – parliament was never the driving force behind Brexit, with most MPs preferring to remain in the EU.     Chart 18No Deal Brexit A Huge Blow To U.K. The risk is that parliament should fail repeatedly to pass the third vote this week, a motion asking the EU for an extension period to the March 29 “exit day.” This is unlikely but possible. In this case, the supreme decision-making body of the U.K. will be paralyzed. A bloodbath will ensue in which the country will either see Prime Minister May ousted, a snap election called, or both. If the extension passes, the EU Council is likely to go along with the decision. It is in the EU’s near-term economic interest not to trigger a crash Brexit and in its long-term interest to delay Brexit until the U.K. public decides they would rather stay after all. The problem is that it will not want to grant an extension for longer than July, when new Members of the European Parliament take their seats after the May 23-26 EU elections. The U.K. may be forced to put up candidates for the election. What good would an extension do anyway? The likeliest possibility is, yet again, a new election. The conditions are not yet ripe for a second referendum, though the odds are rising that one will eventually occur. The Labour Party has fallen in the opinion polls amidst Jeremy Corbyn’s indecisive leadership and a divisive platform change within the party to push for a second Brexit referendum (Chart 19). An election now gives May’s Conservatives an opportunity to build a larger and stronger majority – after all, in the U.K. electoral system, the winner takes all in each constituency, so the Tories would pick up most of the seats that Labour loses. May’s faction might be able to strengthen its hand vis-à-vis hard Brexiters who have less popular support yet currently have the numbers to block May’s withdrawal plan. Chart 19A New Election Would Be Opportunistic Theresa May might be unwilling to call an election given her fateful mistake of calling the snap election of 2017. If she demurs, she could face an internal party coup. There is a slim chance that a hard Brexiter could take the helm, bent on steering the U.K. out of the EU without a deal. Parliament, however, would rebel against such a leader. Ultimately, the economic and financial constraints of a crash Brexit are too hard and we expect that the votes will reflect this fact, whether in an adjusted exit deal or a new election. But both outcomes require an extension.  However, we must point out that the constitutional and geopolitical constraints alone are not sufficient to prevent a crash out: parliament is the supreme lawmaking authority and there is no other basis for the U.K. to leave in an orderly fashion. The United Kingdom has survived worse, as many hard Brexiters will emphasize. A crash is a mistake that can happen. But the odds are not higher than 10%-20% given the stakes (Diagram 1). Diagram 1The Path To Salvation Remains Fraught With Dangers With the EU economy not having stabilized and the U.S. contemplating Section 232 trade tariffs, Brexit is all the more reason to be wary of sterling, the euro, and European equities in the near term, especially relative to the U.S. dollar and U.S. equities. Gilts can rally even in the event of an extension given the uncertainty that this would entail, though the BCA House View is neutral. Bottom Line: Expect parliament to ask for an extension. At the same time, the odds of a new election have risen sharply. The absence of a new election could lead to a power struggle within the Tory party that could escalate the risk of a hard Brexit, though we still place the odds at 10%. A second referendum is rising in probability but will only become possible after the dust settles from the current crisis. Investment Conclusions The ECB’s stimulus measures are positive for European and global growth over a 6-to-12-month time frame. They suggest that financial assets could be supported later in the year, depending in great part on what happens in China. China’s combined January and February total social financing growth reinforces our Feb 20 report arguing that the risk of stimulus is now to the upside. As People’s Bank Governor Yi Gang put it, the slowdown in total social financing last year has stopped. The annual meeting of the National People’s Congress also resulted in largely accommodative measures on top of this credit increase. Nevertheless, stimulus operates with a lag, and for the reasons outlined above we are not yet willing to favor EUR/USD or European equities within developed markets. A 35% chance of tariffs is non-negligible. We expect U.S. equities to outperform within the developed world and Chinese equities to outperform within the emerging world on a 6-to-12 month basis.   Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      Lighthizer now has bipartisan support in Congress, whose members will lambast Trump if he squanders the historic leverage he has built up in exchange for a shallow deal that only temporarily weighs on the trade deficit. 

Highlights Analysis on Indonesia is available below. EM financial markets have diverged from the global growth indicators they have historically correlated with. This raises doubts about the sustainability of this rally. In China, broad bank credit has not accelerated at all, while non-bank credit growth rose sharply in January. The lack of recovery in broad bank credit growth is corroborated by lingering sluggishness in broad money growth. This refutes widespread perception in the global investment community that Chinese banks have re-opened the credit spigots again. Feature The headline news has all been positive for emerging markets over the past two months: The Federal Reserve is going on hold, China is stimulating its economy, the U.S. and China are nearing a trade agreement and risk-on market dynamics are permeating worldwide. Nevertheless, EM stocks have failed to outperform the global equity benchmark (Chart I-1, top panel). Notably, EM relative equity performance rolled over in late December when global share prices bottomed. Chart I-1EM Stocks Have Underperformed DM Ones Since Late December In absolute terms, EM equities have been attempting to break above their 200-day moving average, but have so far failed to do so decisively (Chart I-1, bottom panel). When a market struggles to break out or outperform amid favorable news flows and buoyant investor sentiment, the odds are that it is facing formidable headwinds under the surface, and is at risk of relapsing. We sense EM currently fits this profile. Needless to say, investor consensus is very bullish on EM, and dominated by the above-mentioned narrative, specifically the Fed turning dovish and China stimulating, which is reminiscent of 2016 when EM staged a cyclical rally. Consequently, investors have rushed to pile into EM stocks and fixed-income. Chart I-2 illustrates that asset managers’ net holdings of EM ETF (EEM) futures have doubled since October 2018. Chart I-2Investor Consensus Is Very Bullish On EM As of mid-February, EMs were by far the most overweight region within global equity portfolios, according to the most recent Bank of America/Merrill Lynch survey. The survey states that net 37% of global equity investors - who participated in the survey - were overweight EM. One of our clients that we met with on the road last week summed it up like this: “Investors have ‘recency bias’.” In other words, investors believe that 2019 will resemble 2016, and in turn have no appetite to bet against Chinese stimulus. We are in accord with this interpretation of investor behavior and the EM/China rally. Yet there are some noteworthy differences between today and 2016. First, in 2016, there was massive stimulus for China’s property market. At the time, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) monetized the unsold housing stock in Tier-3 and -4 cities via its Pledged Supplementary Lending facility. At present, there is no stimulus for real estate. Second, by early 2016 EM profits had already contracted substantially. EM profits have yet to shrink in the current downtrend. Our thesis is that EM profits will contract this year for reasons we elaborated on in depth in our previous report, Mind The Time Gap. China’s credit and fiscal impulse leads EM/Chinese profits by about 12 months, and the recent improvement in this indicator, if sustained, suggests that a trough in EM/Chinese corporate earnings will only be reached in late 2019 (Chart I-3). Therefore, as EM profits shrink, investors will likely sell EM risk assets. Chart I-3EM Corporate Earnings Are Beginning To Contract Altogether, these differences with 2016 make us reluctant to chase the current EM rally, and we continue to expect a meaningful reversal in EM risk assets in the months ahead. Monitoring Global Growth We maintain that EM is much more leveraged to global trade and China’s growth than to Fed policy. For a detailed discussion on this matter, please refer to EM: A Replay of 2016 or 2001? report from February 7, 2019. Therefore, the Fed’s dovish turn is not a sufficient reason to buy EM risk assets. To buy EM cyclically, we would need to change our outlook on global trade and Chinese imports. China influences the rest of the world via its imports. A closer look at the indicators that correlate with EM risk assets and commodities do not justify the recent EM rebound. In particular: The import sub-component of China’s NBS manufacturing PMI strongly correlates with EM share prices, excess returns in EM sovereign credit, and industrial metals prices and suggest that investors should fade this rebound (Chart I-4). Chart I-4EM Stocks, EM Credit Markets, As Well As Commodities Prices Are Driven By Chinese Imports The Caixin manufacturing PMI for China was up in February, but the NBS manufacturing PMI fell. In turn, manufacturing PMI indexes in Korea, Taiwan, Japan and Singapore are all plunging, with several of them dropping well below the 50 boom-bust mark (Chart I-5). Chart I-5Asian Manufacturing Is Contracting Korean, Taiwanese, Japanese and Singaporean shipments to China were shrinking in January, while their exports to the U.S. were resilient (Chart I-6). This confirms that global trade has been weak due to China, and that there are no signs of its reversal. Chart I-6Asian Exports To China And U.S. Moreover, Korea released its February export data, and its aggregate outbound shipments are contracting (Chart I-7). Chart I-7Korean Exports: Deepening Contraction Further, China’s container freight index – the price to ship containers – has rolled over again after picking-up late last year due to front-loading of shipments to the U.S. which were induced by the U.S. import tariffs. This signals ongoing weakness in global demand, and does not justify the latest rebound in EM financial markets in general and currencies in particular (Chart I-8). Chart I-8Global Trade Is A Risk To EM Currencies Finally, even in the U.S. where manufacturing has been the most resilient globally, the odds point to notable weakness in this sector. Specifically, the continuous underperformance of U.S. high-beta industrial stocks to U.S. overall industrials beckons a further slowdown in American manufacturing (Chart I-9). Chart I-9U.S. Manufacturing Is In A Soft Spot Bottom Line: Although financial markets are forward-looking, the recent rally has been too fast and has already gone too far. This has created conditions for a material setback as global/China growth will continue to disappoint in the months ahead.  China: Credit Versus Money Growth We have been receiving questions from clients as to whether investors should heed to the message from China’s money or credit data, given they are presently sending contradictory messages (Chart I-10). Chart I-10China: Narrow, Broad Money, And Aggregate Credit Even though narrow money (M1) has historically been an excellent indicator for China/EM business cycles, the most recent (January) print – M1 annual growth rate registered a record low – was distorted due to technical/seasonal factors, and should be ignored. Specifically, deposits by enterprises plunged in January and household deposits surged as companies paid out bonuses to employees in late January ahead of the Chinese New Year that began on February 5 (Chart I-11). Provided enterprise demand deposits are in M1 but household demand deposits are a part of M2, M1 was artificially depressed in January. It will rebound in February. Chart I-11China: Technical Reasons For M1 Plunge In January Broad money provides a more comprehensive picture of money creation in China. As such, it is more relevant to compare broad money with aggregate credit. To compute aggregate credit, we add outstanding central and local government bonds to Total Social Financing (TSF). Chart I-12 illustrates the latest improvement in aggregate credit is not confirmed by either the PBoC’s broad money measure, M2, or our measure, M3 (M3 = M2 plus other deposits plus banks’ other liabilities excluding bonds). We created this M3 measure of broad money supply because in our opinion, M2 has been underestimating the extent of money creation in China in recent years due to financial engineering. Chart I-12The Recent Uptick In Aggregate Credit Is Not Confirmed By Broad Money As discussed in Box I-1 on pages 12-13, lending or purchasing of securities by banks simultaneously creates money. Therefore, bank broad credit acceleration should be mirrored in a broad money upturn. Does the lack of revival in broad money mean the latest uptick in aggregate credit data has been driven by non-bank credit? Our analysis suggests yes – non-bank credit is responsible for the strong rise in the aggregate credit numbers in January. We deconstructed aggregate credit into broad bank credit and non-bank credit (Diagram I-1). Chart I-13 illustrates that broad bank credit has not accelerated at all, while non-bank credit growth rose in January. Chart I-13China: Recent Credit Acceleration Is Due To Non-Bank Credit The lack of recovery in broad bank credit growth is corroborated by lingering sluggishness in broad money (both M2 and M3) growth (Chart I-14). Chart I-14Broad Bank Credit Is Consistent With Broad Money (As It Should Be) Consequently, this refutes the widespread perception in the global investment community that Chinese banks have re-opened the credit spigots. Chart I-15demonstrates the annual growth rate of each component of broad bank credit. While mainland banks’ loan growth to enterprises has accelerated, their lending to non-bank financial institutions has continued to shrink.  Chart I-15Broad Bank Credit And Its Components In sum, broad bank credit and broad money have not revived, and their impulses are rolling over, having failed to break above zero (Chart I-14, bottom panel). Bottom Line: The improvement in aggregate credit growth in January was due to credit provided/bonds purchased by non-banks rather than by banks. This does not tell us whether the credit growth acceleration is sustainable. For a more detailed discussion on the differences between money and credit, please refer to Box I-1 on page 12-13. Investors prefer simple narratives, and have readily embraced the story that China has opened up the credit faucets. Broad bank credit data and broad money supply data do not corroborate this thesis. It may change in the months ahead, but our point is that for the moment there is not yet a simple narrative about China’s credit cycle. Investment Implications Even though China’s aggregate credit impulse ticked up in January, the 2011-‘12 and 2015-‘16 episodes signify that its bottoming can last many months. Critically, EM financial markets have historically lagged turning points in the aggregate credit impulse. These time lags have been anywhere between three to 18 months over the past 10 years. Furthermore, in 2012 there was only a minor rebound in EM share prices – not a cyclical rally – in response to the significant rise in China’s aggregate credit impulse (Chart I-16, top panel). Chart I-16Beware Of The Time Lag Hence, even if January marked the bottom in the aggregate credit impulse – which is plausible in our opinion – EM risk assets will remain at risk based on historical time lags between the aggregate credit impulse and China-related financial markets.1 BOX 1 Why And When Money Supply Differs From Credit The following elaborates on the key differences between broad money supply and aggregate credit.  1. Why and when do broad money and credit diverge?  When commercial banks provide loans to or buy bonds (or any other asset) from non-banks, they simultaneously create new money supply/deposits. Broad money supply is the sum of all deposits in the banking system, which is why we use the terms money and deposits interchangeably. When non-bank financial institutions – in China's case financial trust and investment corporations, financial leasing companies, auto-financing companies and loan companies – as well as enterprises and households make loans or buy bonds, they do not create money. Hence, money supply/deposits is mostly equal to net cumulative broad bank credit creation. The difference between aggregate credit and money supply is due to lending activities of non-bank entities (see Diagram I-1 on page 9). Lending, purchasing of bonds, or any other forms of financing by non-bank entities does not change money supply. Thus, aggregate credit is more relevant than money supply to forecast business cycle fluctuations. Apart from the fact that banks still play a very large role in aggregate financing in China, there are a few other reasons why one should not ignore broad money and rely solely on aggregate credit: Banks can extend credit, but might choose not to classify it as loans on their balance sheet for regulatory reasons. Chinese banks did this in the past by booking loans as non-standard credit assets. In any case, when a bank lends to a non-bank it creates new deposits/money, and it is hard to conceal deposits/liabilities. In these cases, broad money supply gives a better signal about the true extent of credit growth than statistics on loans. If under regulatory pressures banks reclassify their non-standard credit assets as loans, the amount of loans will expand, even though no new lending occurs. Yet, money supply/deposits will not change. In this case, loan numbers will give a false signal and money supply will be a better indicator for new credit origination by banks and, thereby, for economic activity. The true measure of Chinese bank loans and credit data were probably disguised over the past several years because banks and non-bank financial institutions were involved in financial engineering. However, in the past two years, the regulatory clampdown forced Chinese commercial banks to unwind some of these structures and properly reclassify items on their balance sheets. Both the masking of credit assets and the ensuing reclassification could have distorted loan and credit data. This is why we use broad money supply as a litmus test to gauge banks’ broad credit origination. Given TSF includes bank loans but does not include banks’ non-standard credit assets, we believe TSF understates the amount of credit in the economy. As a result, we have not been able to calculate an accurate aggregate level of non-bank credit. Only since mid-2017, when under the regulatory clampdown, banks have stopped classifying loans as non-standard credit assets, can the annual growth rate of TSF serve as a meaningful statistic. Hence, we estimate the annual growth rate of non-bank credit only starting in 2018 (please refer to Chart I-13 on page 9). 2. Does the central bank (PBoC) create money by injecting liquidity into the system? Barring lending to or buying assets from non-banks – which does not typically occur outside of quantitative easing (QE) programs – central banks do not create broad money or deposits. Central banks create banking system reserves, which are not part of the broad money supply in any country. Money supply/deposits, the ultimate purchasing power for economic agents, is created solely by commercial banks “out of thin air,” as we have discussed and illustrated in our series of reports on money, credit and savings. 3. Why do we use impulses (second derivatives of money/credit) rather than growth rates? Our goal is to forecast a change in economic activity/capital spending/imports/enterprise revenues – i.e., a change in flow variables. Money and credit are stock variables. Therefore, a change (the first derivative) in outstanding money and credit produces flow variables. The latter measures new credit and money origination in a given period. These are comparable with flow variables like spending, income and profits. To gauge changes in flow variables, i.e., the growth rate of spending, one needs to calculate a change in new money and credit origination – i.e., change in their net flow. In brief, to do an apples-to-apples comparison, one needs to use the second derivative (a change in change) in money and credit – i.e., changes in their flows – to predict changes in flow variables such as GDP/capital spending/imports/enterprise revenues.   Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Lin Xiang, Research Analyst linx@bcaresearch.com   Indonesia: It Is Not All About The Fed Indonesian stocks have outperformed their emerging market peers significantly in the past few months as the Federal Reserve has turned dovish and U.S. rate expectations have declined. Although U.S. bond yields do strongly and inversely correlate with Indonesian stocks’ relative performance versus the EM equity benchmark (Chart II-1, top panel), we believe there are other factors – such as Chinese growth and commodities prices – that are also important to this market (Chart II-1, bottom panel). Chart II-1Indonesian Stocks: The Fed Versus Commodities In the next several months, slowing Chinese growth, lower commodities prices, and a renewed sell-off in EM markets will take a toll on Indonesian financial markets. Indonesian exports are contracting which will intensify as commodities prices fall and China’s purchases of coal and base metals drop (Chart II-2, top panel). Chart II-2Indonesia: Exports Are Shrinking Indonesia’s current account deficit is already large and will continue widening as the export contraction deepens (Chart II-2, bottom panel). Remarkably, the nation’s commercial banks have been encouraged to keep the credit taps open as the central bank – Bank Indonesia (BI) – has been injecting enormous amounts of liquidity (excess reserves) into the banking system (Chart II-3, top panel). Given these liquidity injections, bank credit and domestic demand growth have remained more resilient than would otherwise have been the case. Chart II-3The Central Bank Is Injecting Liquidity Yet, by injecting such enormous amounts of excess reserves into the system, the central bank has more than negated its previous liquidity tightening, resulting from the sales of its foreign exchange reserves in order to defend the rupiah (Chart II-3, bottom panel). The implications of such policy are that these excess reserves could encourage speculation against the rupiah, especially amid weakening global growth and falling commodities prices. Provided foreigners own large portions of Indonesian stocks and local-currency government bonds, a depreciation in the rupiah will produce a renewed selloff in the nation’s financial markets. A final point on Indonesian commercial banks: their net interest margins have been narrowing sharply (Chart II-4, top panel). Chart II-4Commercial Banks' Profits Will Weaken Moreover, as global growth slows, non-performing loans (NPLs) on the balance sheets of Indonesian banks will rise. In turn, provisioning for bad loans will also increase, and bank earnings will decline (Chart II-4, bottom panel). These dynamics will be bearish for Indonesian commercial banks, which account for 44% of the overall MSCI Indonesia index. Bottom Line: Continue avoiding/underweighting Indonesian stocks and fixed-income markets. We continue shorting the IDR versus the U.S. dollar. Ayman Kawtharani, Associate Editor ayman@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      Please note that this represents the Emerging Markets Strategy team’s view and is different from BCA’s house view on global risk assets and global growth. The key point of contention is the outlook for China’s growth.   Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Special Report

Highlights So What? Optimism over a U.S.-China trade deal is becoming excessive. Why? Presidents Trump and Xi appear to want a deal but their late March summit is not yet finalized. Several news reports supporting the bullish consensus are overrated. The odds of a “grand compromise” that entails China implementing U.S. structural demands are 10%. The odds of trade war escalation are 30%. China’s policy stimulus is a better reason than trade talks to become more constructive on Chinese and China-sensitive risk assets. Feature The Chinese equity market is rallying enthusiastically as the annual “Two Sessions” legislative meeting convenes (Chart 1). The basis for the rally is evidence of greater policy support for the economy along with a general belief that the U.S. and China are close to concluding a trade deal, possibly at a fourth summit between President Donald Trump and Xi Jinping that may be held in late March. The NPC session will build on the optimism with Premier Li Keqiang’s promise of more “forceful” policy support and the passage of a new foreign investment law that promises fair treatment to foreign companies. Chart 1Positive Trade Signals, But Market Getting Ahead Of Itself Our view is that the trade signals are broadly positive – implying a 70% chance that tariffs will either remain frozen or decrease in the scenario analysis below – but that the market is getting ahead of itself both in terms of the likelihood of a “structural deal” and in terms of the positive market impact from any deal. The market impact will depend on the depth of the concessions that China offers the United States. If the concessions are significant, President Donald Trump will be able to roll back tariffs to a considerable extent – trade policy uncertainty will fall, China’s economic outlook will improve, and Trump’s reelection odds (and hence U.S. economic policy continuity) could increase marginally. If China’s concessions are slight, tariff rollbacks will be limited or non-existent and the deal will stand on shaky ground, ensuring elevated policy uncertainty in the aftermath of the agreement and raising the probability of a relapse into trade war ahead of the 2020 election. Trump may feel he has to prove his protectionist credentials anew against a trade critic in the general election. Will the outcome be positive enough to surprise Chinese and global markets that have already discounted a lot of positive news? From where we sit, this is unlikely. More likely, investors will be underwhelmed by a lack of resolution or the shallowness of a deal. The risk to this view is the aforementioned structural deal that involves substantial Chinese concessions combined with a major reduction in U.S. tariffs and sanctions. But even in this case investors will face additional trade uncertainty relating to the U.S. Section 232 investigation into auto imports, on which Trump must decide by May 18, underscoring the point that trade alone is not a firm basis for bullish investment recommendations over the course of H1 2019. The continued strength of the U.S. economy and China’s policy stimulus provide a more realistic basis for global risk assets to rally over the 6-12 month horizon. Presidential Momentum For A Trade Deal We remain pessimistic about U.S.-China relations in general and the prospects for a structural trade deal in particular. This is reflected in our subjective trade-deal probabilities, which hold that an additional extension is as likely as a final deal this month and that the risk of a relapse into trade war remains elevated at 30% (Table 1). Table 1Updated Trade War Probabilities Fundamentally, our pessimism stems from our view that the U.S. and China are locked in the early chapters of an epic struggle for supremacy in Asia Pacific that will reduce their ability to engage cooperatively (Chart 2). Chart 2China, U.S. In Geopolitical Power Struggle Critically, the economic impact of a trade war is not prohibitive for either country. China is not as reliant on exports as it once was. In addition, neither the U.S. nor China is too reliant on trade with the other to make a trade war unthinkable, as was the case with Canada and Mexico (Chart 3). Chart 3Economic Impact Of A Trade War Is Not Prohibitive China is economically vulnerable but is politically centralized, as symbolized by Xi Jinping’s aggressive purge of the Communist Party on the basis of corruption (Chart 4). The ruling party can and will accept the worst international economic outcomes since 1989-91, if it believes this is necessary for regime survival. Chart 4Regime Survival is Paramount Meanwhile the U.S. is economically insulated and performing relatively well (Chart 5), and is not politically divided on the question of China. A bipartisan, hawkish consensus has developed that will be discussed below. Just as we argued correctly that this trade war would occur, so too we believe it has a fair chance of reigniting. This could be due to policy miscalculation, unforeseen events, or the likelihood that Trump will face heat from the left-wing ahead of the election if he gives China as easy of a deal as he gave to Canada. Chart 5The U.S. Economy Is Strong But Softening... Nevertheless we accept that there is top-level momentum in favor of a deal for the time being, and this comes from both Presidents Trump and Xi. In China, delaying tactics are the standard way of coping with an angry Washington, as the perception in Beijing is that economic and technological advancement give it greater leverage over time. Moreover, the economy is weakening on several fronts, private sector sentiment is bearish, and the easing of fiscal and monetary policy is of unclear effectiveness (Chart 6). These are all reasons for Xi to seek at least a temporary reprieve. Chart 6...While the Chinese Economy Is Weak But Stimulating In the United States, Trump faces a difficult election campaign due to his relatively low job approval with voters (Chart 7). His polling has recently improved with the settlement of the FY2019 budget and avoidance of a second government shutdown, and this is despite his controversial decision to press forward unilaterally on southern border security. But he will be running for office late in the business cycle and is vulnerable to an equity bear market and recession. This explains why he has shown risk aversion since October on market-relevant issues ranging from NAFTA, Iran, and China. A trade deal with China offers the possibility not only of satisfying a campaign promise (renegotiating the terrible trade deals of the past) but also of a substantial boost to investor sentiment and key parts of the U.S. economy via Chinese cash. Thus it is reasonable to assess that Trump and Xi can satisfy their political preference for a deal in the short run. If Xi does not gratify Trump’s campaign platform as a great deal-maker, he will give impetus to Trump to form a grand protectionist coalition. Such a coalition could eventually succeed in constricting China’s technological development, as exemplified by the U.S.’s campaign against Chinese telecoms equipment maker Huawei. Fundamentally, China still depends on the West for the computer chips that are essential building blocks for its manufacturing sector (Chart 8). However, while this is a reason for Xi to play ball, it is far from clear that Xi will rapidly implement deep structural changes demanded by the United States. Xi has good reason to fear that Trump will continue the tech war on national security grounds despite any trade deal. Plus, either Trump or a Democratic president could take new punitive trade measures after 2020, given the underlying strategic struggle. For these reasons China is likely to slow-walk any structural concessions. We recognize that our 35% probability that trade talks will be extended cannot last forever. Assuming that Trump and Xi confirm the time and place of a fourth summit, the probability of some kind of deal will rise toward 70%. We doubt very much that Trump and Xi will attend such a summit without a high degree of confidence in the outcome, unlike the Trump-Kim summit in Hanoi, which suffered from inadequate preparation. Yet even if the probability of a deal rises to 70%, we still think there would remain a 30% chance of either an unexpected extension or a disastrous breakdown in negotiations – and we are not yet at that 70% mark. Bottom Line: Until a Trump-Xi summit is finalized in the context of continued progress in trade negotiations, we maintain our pessimistic probabilities for the trade negotiations, with a 30% chance of total collapse and a 35% chance of a further extension of talks beyond March. Remain Vigilant On The Trade Talks It is debatable whether momentum in favor of a U.S.-China trade deal has increased over the past two weeks as much as the news flow suggests. First, Trump’s extension of the tariff deadline – which he originally envisioned as a pause for a month “or less” – could just as easily lead to additional extensions rather than a quick resolution. This will be clear if a Trump-Xi summit does not materialize in late March. A logical time for the two to meet would be at the G20 summit in Osaka, Japan on June 28-29, which would prolong the trade policy uncertainty for nearly four months from today. Second, reports suggest that China, like the EU, is demanding that all Trump’s tariffs be removed as part of any trade deal. If true, this demand is more likely to result in a failure to make a deal than a total tariff rollback. The reason is that the U.S. needs to retain the ability to adjust Section 301 tariffs based on China’s actual degree of implementation of any commitments it makes to reduce forced technology transfers, economic espionage, and intellectual property theft. Several of these commitments are enshrined in the new foreign investment law that would pass through China’s legislature over the next two weeks (Table 2), but the U.S. will want to ensure that the law is actually implemented. Table 2New Foreign Investment Law Would Be A Positive For U.S.-China Negotiations If the U.S. rolls back all Section 301 tariffs it will lose a convenient legal standing from which to dial the tariffs back up if necessary. It is more likely that part or all of the 10% tariff on $200 billion worth of goods will be rolled back (our short-term trade deal scenario with 25% odds) than that the entire Section 301 tariffs will be rolled back (our best-case trade deal scenario with a 10% probability). The degree of rollback will be a critical indicator of the durability of any deal, as it will make a material difference for China’s export-manufacturing outlook (Chart 9). Thus far, China’s economy has counterintuitively benefited from the trade war due to tariff front-running. Chart 9The Degree Of Tariff Rollback Matters Third, the disagreements between President Trump and his hawkish lead negotiator, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer, are likely overstated in their ability to increase the odds of finalizing a deal. There are two arguments for the view that Trump is losing faith in Lighthizer. The first is that he blames Lighthizer’s tough tactics for the equity market selloff. This may not be valid given that stocks continued to sell off after Trump sided with the trade doves and agreed to a trade truce with Xi Jinping. In December the S&P 500 suffered the worst monthly performance since February 2009 and the worst December performance since 1931. The second argument is more substantial and comes from Trump’s public interchange with Lighthizer over the use and value of memorandums of understanding (MOUs). The interchange was awkward and suggests that tensions exist between Trump and his top negotiator.1 However, the episode may have an important implication. Whatever the reason for the disagreement, Lighthizer gained the assent of two Chinese negotiators – Vice Premier Liu He and U.S. ambassador Cui Tiankai – in his declaration, on camera, that the term MOU would be dropped in preference for the term “trade agreement.” The result is that while the deal is still not going to be a “Free Trade Agreement” that requires legislative ratification, the language of the final document will be if anything more, not less, binding. This episode cannot possibly accelerate a final deal. It is hard to believe that Lighthizer is not secretly happy with the result of his dust-up with the president. It is well known – and frequently complained about by Lighthizer and other Trump administration officials – that China has very active diplomacy and makes many international agreements that are more nominal than real in their results. As a simple example, China typically agrees to a larger value of outbound investment than is ultimately realized (Chart 10). In fact, Lighthizer is at the forefront of the administration’s repeated and explicit aim to pin China down to better implementation and enforcement of any agreement. Indeed, in both of Lighthizer’s reports on the Section 301 investigation that motivate the tariffs, he refers to a well-known September 2015 commitment, between President Xi and former U.S. President Barack Obama, not to conduct cyber-espionage against each other’s countries. Lighthizer shares the view of the broader U.S. political establishment that China only temporarily enforced this commitment and later ramped up its hacking to steal trade secrets.2 Chart 10China Known For Overpromising Fourth, Trump’s failure to conclude a peace and denuclearization deal with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in Hanoi, Vietnam does not increase the odds of a U.S.-China deal – it is either neutral or negative for U.S.-China talks. Whether intentional or not, the summit reminded the Chinese that Trump’s “art of the deal” requires the willingness to walk away from a bad deal. As mentioned, we view the odds of Trump walking away from a China deal at 30%. But the deeper problem is that Trump expects China’s assistance with North Korea as a condition of the trade deal. Whenever Trump thinks that China is not providing enough assistance, he threatens to walk away from talks with Kim. This occurred in May 2018 and has apparently occurred again. The failure of the summit is a failure of U.S.-China diplomacy in the sense that China could not or would not convince Kim Jong Un to offer more concrete steps toward denuclearization. This reflects negatively on the trade talks if it reflects anything at all. Bottom Line: Aside from the presidential momentum behind a trade deal, none of the recent news reports or leaks form a basis for upgrading the probability of a final agreement in late March. Will It Be A “Structural Deal”? Lighthizer is not isolated in driving a hard bargain with China: he enjoys the support of both parties in the U.S. Congress. At his recent testimony on U.S.-China trade to the House Ways and Means Committee, bipartisanship was a key theme. Democrats as well as Republicans voiced support for Lighthizer as the top negotiator due to his strict stance on China’s trade practices, while Lighthizer himself praised both Trump and Democrats such as House Speaker Nancy Pelosi for being skeptical about China’s trade practices as far back as 2001. The takeaway is that Trump needs deep concessions from China – what the top Democrat on the committee called “a structural deal” – in order to defend any trade deal against domestic critics and skeptical voters on the campaign trail in 2020. In other words, there is unanimity in Congress, as there was in May 2018, that Trump should not sacrifice his leverage for a deal limited to Boeings and soybeans but should instead obtain victories on core disagreements: national security, foreign exchange rates, market access, and intellectual property. The MOUs – now “agreements” – that are reportedly being drafted address these core disagreements. Therefore signs of progress in producing final drafts should be seen as evidence that the odds of a final deal are improving: Forced tech transfers: Raising equity caps for foreign investment in key sectors is a headline way to reduce the leverage that Chinese companies have used to extract technology (Table 3). There are other arbitrary licensing and permitting practices that could also be curtailed. Table 3Foreign Investment Equity Caps Intellectual property: China’s purchases of U.S. intellectual property are conspicuously small, especially when considering that China is not yet an innovation giant in terms of international IP licensing receipts relative to the amount that it pays out.3 If the U.S.’s IP trade balance with China were equivalent to its balance with South Korea, it would result in a $36.7 billion improvement in the U.S. balance (Chart 11). Services: China is a major growing market for U.S. service exports but Washington frequently complains about denial of market access, for instance in financial and legal services. Services exports also underscore the above point about intellectual property (Chart 12). Foreign exchange: The U.S. is asking China not to maintain a more market-oriented currency but rather to promote a stronger currency relative to the dollar, perhaps referring to the yuan’s undervaluation according to purchasing power parity (Chart 13). It is impossible for Trump to accept a deal that does not include some text on the currency since he has hammered the issue of Chinese currency manipulation on the campaign trail and is trying to talk down the greenback. South Korea agreed to a currency annex and Japan is likely to do the same, and that makes it even less feasible for China to get off the hook. Non-tariff barriers: The U.S. has a long roster of complaints about China’s trade practices, including subsidies to state-owned companies, dumping, and inadequate health, environmental, and labor standards. Changing these practices will raise the costs of production in China. Changes to non-tariff barriers can also increase American market access in a way that goes beyond the simultaneous demands for lower tariffs on U.S. imports (Chart 14). Chart 13China Not Off The Hook On Currency Manipulation If China pledges improvements on these issues then it could justify substantial tariff rollback, perhaps the entire 10% tariff on $200 billion. This scenario, the best version of our 25% trade deal scenario, would comprise a positive surprise for markets in the current environment. It still could fall short of a grand bargain justifying a total tariff rollback, unless implementation is swift and decisive, which is highly improbable. A lesser but still market-positive surprise would be an American agreement to reduce pressure on Huawei (comparable to the deal reached in May 2018 on that other besieged Chinese tech company, ZTE). Still less positive outcomes would be a partial reduction in the tariff rate or an American agreement to expand or expedite exemptions to existing tariffs. The last would indicate relatively low expectations about the depth of China’s concessions. Bottom Line: Until the actual details of any Chinese structural concessions and American tariff relief are known, the durability of any U.S.-China trade deal cannot be assessed. This warrants at best cautious optimism regarding the trade talks: the two sides are working on draft texts about the right things. Investors will not be positively surprised by an agreement that does not include structural concessions of the nature above as well as substantial American tariff rollback, which is needed to verify American confidence in China’s commitments. Investment Implications The outcomes that are currently available to investors leave substantial room for prolonged trade policy uncertainty (Chart 15). Any further extension of trade talks means that uncertainty will persist at current levels. A deal that includes limited structural concessions means that uncertainty will ease but remain elevated relative to pre-2018 levels, due to the persistent threat of Section 301 tariffs that the U.S. will wield in order to secure Chinese concessions. A failure of negotiations means a dramatic escalation in uncertainty; this is our 30% risk due to the geopolitical and technological struggle underway. We allot only a 10% chance to a grand bargain that includes deep structural reforms and full tariff rollback. Chart 15Trade Uncertainty Will Persist As a final consideration, investors should be aware that the better the U.S.-China trade deal, the higher the probability that Trump imposes tariffs on auto and auto part imports pursuant to the Section 232 investigation into the impact of these imports on national security, which concluded February 17. The Commerce Department’s recommendations are still unknown but it is not a stretch to imagine that the administration has discovered a national security threat. However, this determination alone does not require Trump to impose tariffs. If he is to impose, he has until May 18 to do so. The full value of U.S. auto and auto parts imports is larger than the value of Chinese imports that currently fall under Trump’s tariffs. It is very unlikely that the U.S. will match this size of tariffs against the EU (Chart 16). Certainly it will not do so if the U.S.-China conflict remains unresolved, since it seems a stretch to believe the equity market can sustain both trade wars at the same time. The Trump administration has already found that the China tariffs without negotiations were disruptive to the U.S. equity market and economy, and the U.S. has told the European Union and Japan that it will not impose tariffs as long as negotiations are underway. To do so would be practically to foreclose the possibility of a trade agreement prior to the 2020 election, at least in the case of the EU. Thus it is only after any U.S.-China deal that the risk of EU impositions rises. We take the view that Japan is likely to conclude an agreement with the Trump administration quickly, possibly even before the China deal but almost certainly shortly afterwards. Trump administration officials will also likely intervene on behalf of South Korea due to the strategic need to stay on the same page regarding North Korea, which itself led to the successful renegotiation of the two countries’ existing trade agreement last year (which included autos but did not explicitly exempt Korea from Section 232 auto tariffs). This leaves the EU, which is quarreling with the U.S. over a range of issues: trade, Iran, Russia, China, Brexit, Syria, etc. Our base case is that the U.S. will not impose sweeping Section 232 tariffs on the EU due to the negative impact this would have on the U.S. auto industry, which is rooted in the electorally critical Midwest; the aforementioned risk to the equity market and economy; and the fact that neither the U.S. public, nor Congress, nor the corporate lobby are supportive of a trade war with Europe. Tariffs would also harm the Trump administration’s broader attempt to galvanize Western countries against the strategic challenge of China, Russia, and Iran. Nevertheless, the risk of such sweeping tariffs is non-trivial because Trump does not face legal constraints in imposing them – he can act unilaterally, just as he did with the early Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum, which broadly remain in force. A negative trade shock to the EU at a time of economic weakness may not overwhelm the positive trade impact of a U.S.-China deal in the context of China’s policy stimulus, but it would take the shine off of any risk-on exuberance following a China deal. In the end, China’s risk assets are likely to continue benefiting from domestic policy stimulus plus the 70% likelihood that tariffs will not go up. BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy remains cyclically positive Chinese stocks relative to emerging market stocks over a 12-month horizon given China’s more robust stimulus measures and the above trade view. We are shifting our long China Play Index to a trade as opposed to a portfolio hedge. We are also long copper. We would anticipate that the trend for CNY-USD will be flat to up as long as negotiations proceed in a positive manner. BCA’s China Investment Strategy is tactically positive Chinese stocks relative to the global MSCI benchmark on the same basis, but is awaiting more evidence of a stabilization in the earnings outlook before recommending that investors shift to an outright overweight over the cyclical horizon. Still, our China team placed Chinese stocks on upgrade watch in their February 27 Weekly Report, signaling that the next change in recommended allocation is likely to be higher rather than lower.4   Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com     Footnote 1 News reports had indicated that Lighthizer and his Chinese counterparts were negotiating six MOUs – on forced tech transfer and cyber theft, intellectual property rights, services, currency, agriculture, and non-tariff barriers to trade – in pursuit of the March 1 deadline. When asked about the time horizon of the MOUs at a public press conference with the Chinese trade delegation in the White House, President Trump said that MOUs were not the same as a “final, binding contract” that he wanted as an outcome of the talks. Lighthizer spoke up in defense of MOUs, leading the president to publicly disagree with him. Lighthizer then declared that the term “MOU” would no longer be used and instead the two sides would use the term “trade agreement.” 2 This was the same summit at which Xi Jinping declared in the Rose Garden that China had no intention to militarize the South China Sea – an even more frequently cited example of divergence between China’s official rhetoric and policy actions on matters of strategic consequence. 3 Please see Scott Kennedy, “The Fat Tech Dragon: Benchmarking China’s Innovation Drive,” CSIS, August 2017, available at www.csis.org. 4 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report “Dealing With A (Largely) False Narrative,” dated February 27, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com.

Special Report

Highlights So What? China’s January credit data suggest that stimulus is here. Why? January credit growth was a blowout number. Trade uncertainty is likely to be prolonged with an extension of talks. Equity bourses in South Korea and Russia are the most likely to benefit from Chinese stimulus. Industrial metals such as copper will also benefit – with a delay. Feature New credit data for China in January improves the chances that Beijing’s stimulus measures will overshoot this year, causing China’s economy to bottom in 2019 and jumpstart global growth. In our annual outlook for this year we argued that while China was stimulating the economy, the magnitude of stimulus would be the decisive factor for the global macro environment in 2019. We argued that the type of stimulus would remain primarily fiscal – tax cuts for households and small and medium-sized enterprises – and hence that it would be modest as fiscal easing would merely offset relatively weak credit growth. This view stemmed from our assessment of the Xi Jinping administration, highlighted in April 2017, as an “elitist” (not populist) administration. Its policy priorities are to discipline the Chinese economy, and in particular to contain systemic financial risk, which President Xi has cited as a national security threat. This view is not wrong, but the latest data clearly show that Xi has decided to pause these painful efforts at limiting leverage and rebalancing China’s economy. Witness January’s decisive uptick in both total social financing (total private credit) and local government bond issuance (Chart 1). Chart 1Higher Risk Of An Overshoot A massive spike in new credit is the single most important criterion in our “Checklist For A Stimulus Overshoot.” Thus, from a policy perspective, we are now at higher risk of an overshoot (Table 1). Not only credit as a whole but also informal lending saw a surge in January, implying that the government is relenting in its crackdown on the shadow banks. The approval of local government bond issuance for early in the year – and the People’s Bank of China’s announcement of a “Central Bank Bills Swap” program – reinforce this policy shift.1 Table 1Checklist For A Chinese Stimulus Overshoot In 2019   A stimulus overshoot is positive for Chinese demand in the short run but negative for potential GDP in the long run. A “traditional” credit surge of this nature cannot be surgically targeted at SMEs or households. It will go to state-owned enterprises, privileged corporations, property developers, and the like, which have always had the advantage in China’s financial system. SOEs have taken a much larger share of new loans than private companies in recent years,2 and the only silver lining of this trend was the possibility that tighter credit controls would discipline the SOEs. That silver lining is now fading, barring some new and surprising development on the reform front. China needs to create 26 trillion renminbi in new credit over the course of the year to avoid a corporate earnings contraction. These January numbers put China on track to do just that (Chart 2), assuming that President Xi and U.S. President Donald Trump agree to a short-term, framework trade deal this year. Chart 2On Track To Avoid An Earnings Contraction Of course, a few caveats are in order. First, January’s credit number is only one data point and credit growth is always abnormally strong in the first month of the year. Early in the year, banks seek to expand their assets rapidly in a bid to get as much market share as possible before administrative credit quotas kick in. Because of Chinese New Year, it is best to combine January and February data to get a sense of the rate of credit expansion in the first part of the year. To do that, investors will have to wait for mid-March when the February data is out. This year’s January numbers are very strong relative to previous Januaries (Chart 3) and the context is more accommodative than the 2017 January credit surge, when authorities were beginning to tighten rather than ease macroprudential policy. Still a rapid rate of credit expansion will have to be sustained in the coming months in order to meet the 26 trillion RMB requirement highlighted above. Second, there is some risk that China’s households and private businesses will not respond as positively today as in the past. The intensification of Communist Party control over the society and economy, President Xi’s cancellation of term limits, and the strategic confrontation with the United States have created a bearish sentiment in the private sector. Our Emerging Markets Strategy would point out that if the propensity to consume, and money velocity,3 do not accelerate, then a surge in new credit may fail to ignite a reacceleration in China (Chart 4). Chart 4Chinese Are Holding On To Their Money Still, what we now know is that Xi Jinping and his top economic adviser, Vice Premier Liu He, are not initiating the “assault phase of reform” that their predecessors initiated in the late 1990s in order to cleanse China’s economy of bad loans and zombie companies. Instead, they are likely reestablishing the “Socialist Put” in order to reverse the current deceleration, demonstrate China’s continued economic might and face down the United States’ threat of tariffs. Bottom Line: China’s stimulus measures are increasingly likely to overshoot, with positive implications for both Chinese and global growth. China is still facing a corporate earnings recession, but the odds of averting it are increasing.    Trade Deadline More Likely To Be Extended What of the trade war? First, we would warn clients that China’s annual credit origination is a much bigger factor for the global economy than China’s exports to the United States (Chart 5). The trade war can escalate from here and yet, if China’s stimulus works as it has in the past, the results will be manageable for China’s economy save for Chinese companies expressly exposed to the U.S. economy through exports. In reality, both the U.S. and China are now effectively stimulating their economies and in this sense global trade as a whole will benefit regardless of bilateral tariffs. Chart 5Watch China Credit, Not So Much The Trade War But it is possible that just as global equity markets ignored China’s economic slowdown and only sold off when the tariffs were levied (Chart 6), they may not continue to rally much on China’s credit data. Given the already considerable rally in global risk assets since October, markets may not be satisfied merely with one or two months of solid credit data out of China without a clear resolution to the trade conflict. After all, if a collapse in U.S.-China trade talks portends a new Cold War, then institutional investors may be justified in taking a wait-and-see approach despite China’s credit cycle upswing. Chart 6Will Equities Ignore China Data (Again)? In the past, we have highlighted that the U.S. and China are not economically prohibited from engaging in a trade war – the export exposure is too small – and China’s new stimulus reinforces this point. However, President Trump is concerned about causing a sell-off in the tech sector and hence the broad equity market which could translate into a bear market and raise the probability of a recession occurring prior to November 2020. Meanwhile, in China, given Beijing’s reported trade concessions, there is apparently a desire to pacify the relationship and discourage U.S. unilateral tariffs and sanctions that could become seriously destabilizing for the Chinese economy and society. The need to have a happy 2021 centenary celebration for the Communist Party may factor into policymakers’ thinking. The latest news flow is mildly positive for the odds of getting a framework deal sometime this year. President Trump visited the Chinese negotiators in Washington, D.C. while President Xi reciprocated with the American negotiators in Beijing. Trump has signaled that an extension of the March 1 deadline is possible, and a two-month extension is being bandied about in the press. China’s National People’s Congress is likely to pass a new Foreign Investment Law that ostensibly guarantees many of the American demands on forced tech transfer, intellectual property theft, and discriminatory treatment of U.S. companies (Table 2). Even the second Trump summit with Kim Jong Un, this time in Vietnam, should be seen as a mild positive for U.S.-China negotiations. Table 2New Foreign Investment Law Would Be A Positive For U.S.-China Negotiations However, Presidents Trump and Xi have yet to schedule a new summit, which is probably necessary for a final deal. And there are murmurs from the press suggesting that China’s new law and other concessions are not going to satisfy the U.S. negotiators on the critical point of “structural changes” and a verification process. This leaves us inclined to change our trade war probabilities to increase the odds of an extension (Table 3). The improvement in U.S. financial conditions and China’s stimulus, if anything, make it more likely that negotiations will be extended, as both sides feel their economic and financial constraints less acutely. Table 3Updated Trade War Probabilities Bottom Line: Global and Chinese risk assets should rally on China’s credit uptick, but the lack of resolution of the trade war could continue to inhibit animal spirits – and the odds of a March 1 resolution are declining. Who Are The Equity Winners Of China’s Stimulus? China’s strong January credit number is supportive of global equity markets. That much is obvious. But which equity markets will benefit the most? In what follows we examine the relationship between Chinese credit and MSCI equity returns of various countries. We find that Malaysian, Australian, South Korean, and Indonesian equities are the most highly correlated with Chinese credit growth and are thus most likely to benefit from the recent upturn (Chart 7). On the other hand, France and Italy stand out as countries whose bourses are more insulated. Out of the markets that are positively correlated, South Korea and Russia stand out as relatively cheap (Chart 8). Thus we expect these equities to do especially well. By contrast, while Indonesia and the Philippines are highly leveraged to China, these markets are currently relatively expensive. BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy is currently overweight Korean and Russian equities within the EM space, neutral Turkey (although recently upgraded from underweight), and underweight Indonesia and the Philippines. In addition to credit stimulus, we expect Chinese household consumption to also gain support going forward. This will likely be driven by policy stimulus targeting the consumer specifically and is best exemplified by the recently announced tax cuts (Chart 9), which we expect to trickle down to greater consumer demand and growth in retail sales. Our base case calls for 8%-10% growth in household consumption over the coming 12 months, up from the current 3.5%. However, consumer sentiment in China is weak. BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy’s proxy for household marginal propensity to spend ticked up recently, after falling since early last year (see Chart 4 above). A resumption in the decline would highlight that households are increasingly unwilling to spend, which would translate into weaker retail sales despite policy efforts to boost consumption. Such a scenario – in which credit growth accelerates without a substantial uptick in consumer spending – is plausible, given that it occurred between mid-2015 and mid-2016 (Chart 10). In any case, whether Chinese stimulus comes in the form of the traditional credit channel, or instead in the form of fiscal stimulus to household consumption, the same equity markets will generally benefit the most (Chart 11). Chart 10...But Flattish Retail Sales Are Also A Possibility Indeed, global equity markets react the same way regardless of the type of stimulus implemented. For instance, MSCI returns for the Philippines, Sweden, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Turkey are more closely correlated to both Chinese credit growth and retail sales growth compared to Italy, Japan, and France.  The same conclusion is reached when we look at the correlations between Chinese credit growth or consumption growth and individual MSCI sectors such as industrials and consumer discretionary (Chart 12). The relatively stronger correlation between Chinese credit growth and equity returns – as opposed to Chinese retail sales and equity returns – can be put down to the nature of Chinese imports. While industrial goods account for the bulk of China’s purchases of foreign goods, consumer goods excluding autos make up only 15% of China’s imports (Table 4). However, as Chart 12 illustrates, the relationship between China’s retail sales growth and global equities is much tighter in the case of the consumer discretionary sector, whether the latter is compared to global industrials sectors or the overall MSCI index. Table 4Import Composition Of Chinese Imports Equity market exposure to China is not always in line with the extent of each country’s trade exposure to China (Chart 13). There are some clear exceptions – most notably Mexico, which has the highest correlation coefficient with Chinese credit and consumption variables since 2010. However, this is likely due to idiosyncratic factors.4 Correlation does not imply causation, and we cannot conclude with certainty that Mexican equities will outperform amid China’s new round of stimulus. Nevertheless, given that Mexico is a very deeply liquid market that benefits amid EM bull markets, this may not be entirely coincidental. The correlations between global equity markets and Chinese credit peak two months after the stimulus measures are first implemented (Chart 14). This is more or less in line with adjusted total social financing’s correlation versus industrial metals. However BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy has shown that copper’s correlations versus other measures of Chinese money and credit peak after roughly three quarters (Chart 15).5 This is evident in both the 2012 and 2015-16 stimulus episodes in which the bottom in copper prices lagged the bottom in China’s credit growth. Thus we may witness a rebound in equity markets on the back of China’s credit splurge before we see an improvement in annual returns on copper prices.  Chart 15Copper Rallies Lag China Credit Stimulus Bottom Line: South Korean and Russian equities are best positioned to benefit from the positive surprise in China’s credit data. France and Italy are the worst positioned. Copper prices will rebound with a delay.  Investment Implications BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy recommends that investors stay long Chinese equities ex-tech relative to the emerging market benchmark. This is a tactical call initiated in August 2018 that is now becoming a cyclical call on the basis of the credit upswing. We also remain long the “China Play Index,” a basket of China-sensitive assets, and long China’s “Big Five” banks relative to other banks. A rebound in China’s credit data and stronger global growth will support copper demand. Prices are still 15% below the mid-2018 peak and are poised to benefit in this environment, especially given that global inventories are already falling. BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy recommends that investors go long copper. Meanwhile, BCA’s China Investment Strategy recommends (for now) staying only tactically overweight Chinese equities relative to the global benchmark, pending higher conviction that the pace of credit growth will be strong enough to overwhelm the negative ramifications of a continued deceleration in actual activity over the coming few months on sentiment and 12-month forward earnings expectations. Over the long run, Geopolitical Strategy would look to underweight Chinese equities, as we are not optimistic about China’s productivity and potential GDP. This is because of the negative structural consequences of continuing the Socialist Put (i.e., bad loans, zombie companies, trade protectionism).  We would expect CNY/USD to remain relatively buoyant in the context of both trade negotiations with the U.S. and fiscal-and-credit stimulus. The trade talks can hardly succeed if CNY/USD is falling. Depending on whether and how soon China’s stimulus results in a durable economic bottom, global growth could stabilize and the USD could see a substantial countertrend selloff.   Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Roukaya Ibrahim, Editor/Strategist roukayai@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1          Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report titled “China: Prepping A Bazooka?” dated February 14, 2019 available at ems.bcaresearch.com 2      Please see Nicholas Lardy, “The State Strikes Back: The End Of Economic Reform In China?” Peterson Institute For International Economics, January 29, 2019, available at piie.com. 3          Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report titled “Dissecting China’s Stimulus,” dated January 17, 2019 available at ems.bcaresearch.com 4       The 2012 election of President Enrique Peña Nieto caused Mexican equities to outperform their EM counterparts. Similarly in 2015-16, U.S. outperformance relative to EM also supported Mexico relative to EM because Mexico’s economy is highly leveraged to its northern neighbor. In both periods Mexico’s outperformance was not caused by – but instead coincided with – Chinese credit stimulus. These idiosyncratic events biased the correlation between Mexico’s equity markets and Chinese credit growth to the upside. 5      Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled “Trade Wars, China Credit Policy Will Roil Global Copper Markets,” dated June 21, 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com.