BCA Indicators/Model
Highlights Butterflies & Yield Curve Models: With bond market volatility now back to the subdued levels seen prior to the COVID-19 market turbulence earlier in 2020, it is a good time to update our global yield curve valuation models to look for attractive butterfly trade ideas. Valuations: The models generally indicate that flattener trades offer better value across all countries. Our medium-term strategic bias, however, is towards steeper yield curves with policy rates on hold and depressed global inflation expectations likely to continue drifting higher over the latter half of the year. Yield Curve Trades: We are initiating the first set of yield curve trades within our rebooted Tactical Trade Overlay: going long a 7-year bullet vs. a 5-year/10-year barbell in the US; long a 2-year/30-year barbell vs. a 5-year bullet in France; long a 5-year/30-year barbell vs. a 10-year bullet in Italy; and long a 3-year/20-year barbell vs. a 10-year bullet in the UK. Feature In a Special Report published back in February of this year, we dusted off our model-based framework to find value in trades focused on the shape of government bond yield curves.1 By comparing the market-implied short-term interest rate expectations extracted from our curve models to our own macro views, we are able to come up with actionable buy or sell signals across the yield curve in nine developed markets: the US, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the UK, Japan, Canada, and Australia. Table 1Most Attractive Butterfly Trades Given the extreme market turbulence around the time we published that report, as the full scope of the COVID-19 pandemic was becoming evident, we chose not to recommend any curve trades from our models until global volatility subsided to acceptable levels. The vigorous action from central banks to manipulate bond yields since then - quantitative easing, aggressive forward guidance, outright yield curve control in Japan and Australia, and other unconventional monetary policy measures - introduced another layer of difficulty in implementing successful curve trades using models estimated in more normal times. With global bond market volatility now back down to pre-COVID levels, we feel that the time is right to use our curve models to help identify opportunities. Specifically, we are implementing new recommended yield curve trades in the US, France, Italy, and the UK. Table 1 shows the most attractive butterfly trades across all the markets covered in this analysis. Note that three of the four trades we are initiating include very long-dated bonds where yields are less susceptible to direct central bank influence. The only exception is our US long 7-year bullet vs. 5-year/10-year barbell trade, the reasoning for which we outline later in this report. Three of the four trades we are initiating include very long-dated bonds where yields are less susceptible to direct central bank influence. The only exception is our US long 7-year bullet vs. 5-year/10-year barbell trade. Before delving into our analysis proper, a quick note: in the interest of brevity, we will limit ourselves to a simple explanation of butterfly strategies and our yield curve models in this report. For those interested in a deeper explanation of the curve modeling framework, please refer to our February 25, 2020 Special Report. A Recap On Butterflies And An Update On Our Yield Curve Models A butterfly fixed income strategy involves two main components: a barbell (a weighted combination of long-term and short-term bonds) and a bullet (a medium-term bond that sits within the yield curve segment selected in the barbell). To implement a butterfly strategy, a bond investor would go long (short) the barbell while simultaneously going short (long) the bullet. By weighting the combination of the long- and short-term bonds in the butterfly such that the weighted sum of their duration equals the duration of the medium-term bond in the bullet, we achieve immunization to parallel shifts in the yield curve. At the same time, due to the relatively higher duration of the longer-term component of the butterfly, we get exposure to specific changes in the slope of the yield curve. In general, the barbell will outperform the bullet in a flattening yield curve environment, and vice-versa. Chart of the WeekButterfly Spreads & Yield Curves To actually decide how, and on which parts of the yield curve, to implement our butterfly strategies, we make use of our yield curve models. These models rely on the positive relationship typically observed between the butterfly spread and the slope of the yield curve. When the curve steepens, the butterfly spread widens, and vice-versa (Chart of the Week). This has to do with mean reversion: as the curve steepens, it increases the odds that the curve will flatten in the future since it cannot steepen indefinitely. Consequently, investors will ask for greater compensation to enter a curve steepener trade when the curve is already steepening. As a result, we can create simplified models of the yield curve by regressing any butterfly spread on its corresponding curve slope. Deviations from these fair value models indicate which butterfly strategies are cheap or expensive. However, the model output does not by itself constitute a buy or sell signal and must be integrated with our macro view on the slope of the curve. For example, a butterfly strategy with an expensive bullet implies that there is already a certain amount of steepening discounted in the yield curve. If the yield curve flattens, or even steepens by an amount smaller than what is discounted in the yield curve over the investment horizon, the barbell will outperform, as expected. However, if we see more steepening than is discounted in the yield curve, the bullet will outperform, even though it was already at relatively expensive levels. Therefore, it is crucial to integrate our macro view on how much the curve will steepen or flatten over the investment horizon into our curve trade selection framework. In recent reports, we have emphasized our high-conviction view that global inflation expectations will drift higher in the coming months, driven by reflationary fiscal and monetary policy and a continued rebound in global commodity prices (most notably, oil).2 However, a rise in inflation expectations does not necessarily translate to a “one-to-one” rise in nominal yields if it is offset by a compression in real bond yields. To disentangle this, we look at the 3-year rolling betas of nominal 10-year government bond yields to the corresponding 10-year breakeven inflation rates using inflation-linked bonds (Chart 2). The data suggest a currently weaker relationship between inflation expectations and nominal yields, with all betas well below their post-crisis maxima. Our overall macro bias is towards a global steepening in yield curves, but given our strong belief in a rebound in inflation expectations, we would be more willing to enter steepener trades in higher-beta regions such as Germany, Canada, the US, and Australia where it is more likely that a rise in inflation expectations will translate to higher nominal yields. Conversely, we are less hesitant to enter flatteners in the lower-beta regions such as the UK, France, Italy, and Japan. Chart 2The Link Between Nominal Yields And Inflation Expectations Has Weakened When we said earlier this year that we were “dusting off” our yield curve models, that was not just a figure of speech. The models date back originally to 2002, meaning that they are old enough to vote—perhaps even for a popular rapper. Even though we have been refining and updating it along the way, one of our concerns was that this model was estimated for a pre-crisis sample period before near-zero rates became ubiquitous in developed markets. Our overall macro bias is towards a global steepening in yield curves, but given our strong belief in a rebound in inflation expectations, we would be more willing to enter steepener trades in higher-beta regions such as Germany, Canada, the US, and Australia. To test that the curve relationships within our models are maintained when global central banks are pinning policy rates near 0%, we have re-estimated all the regressions for the post-financial crisis period from 2009 to 2017 when most central banks kept rates near the zero bound. Chart 3 shows the results for the representative 2-year, 5-year and 10-year portions of the yield curve. On the whole, the coefficients are weaker but still positive with the exception of Japan, where many years of zero rates and quantitative easing have caused the 2-year/5-year/10-year butterfly spread to become largely unmoored from the 2-year/10-year slope. Chart 3Looking For Structural Shifts In Our Yield Curve Models Therefore, we still see value in our curve modeling approach, even in the current environment where central banks are likely to be on hold for a period measured in years, not months. Bottom Line: Butterfly strategies are an effective way to position for changes in the slope of the yield curve without exposure to shifts in the curve. Our current strategic bias is to expect steepening of developed market yield curves through rising longer-term inflation expectations, but our global yield curve models indicate better value in most flattening trades. Thus, we need to be extremely selective in recommending trades based on the results of our yield curve models. Yield Curve Models And Trades By Region In the remaining pages of this report, we present the current read-outs from of our yield curve models for each of the major developed markets. More specifically, we provide the deviations from fair value for different combinations of bullets and barbells and highlight the most attractive butterfly strategy. The deviations from fair value shown in Tables 2-10 are standardized to facilitate comparisons between the different butterfly combinations. In addition, for each country we provide a quick assessment of the performance of these butterfly strategies over time by applying a simple mechanical trading rule. Every month, we enter the most attractive butterfly strategy, i.e. the one with the highest absolute standardized deviation from its model fair value. The overall message from the models is that barbells appear attractive relative to bullets across all the countries shown. However, we will only initiate trades in cases where the model output and our macro outlook complement each other. US Looking solely at our model output, US Treasury curve flatteners appear most attractive, with the long 3-year/30-year barbell vs. 5-year bullet trade displaying the greatest deviation from fair value with a residual of -1.55 (Table 2). However, we are inclined to agree with our colleagues at BCA Research US Bond Strategy on how to interpret Treasury curve valuation in the current environment. They argue that even though steepeners in the US are currently expensive, valuations can become even more overstretched with the Fed signaling no rate increases for at least the next two years and the market priced for an extended period of near-zero rates.3 Table 2US: Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals Our fundamental bias is towards US Treasury curve steepening, with the Fed locking down the front end of the curve and rising inflation expectations putting upward pressure on longer-term yields. Thus, we are entering into the long 7-year bullet vs. 5/10 barbell trade which has a small but positive model residual of +0.17. That represents a better valuation starting point than the other US butterfly spreads, and is therefore a more efficient and profitable way to position for steepeners becoming even more expensive going forward. As highlighted earlier, nominal yields in the US are also more sensitive to rising inflation expectations—another reason to enter into a curve steepener. The specific securities used to execute this trade, as well as the weights for the barbell component used to the make both legs of the trade duration-equivalent, can be found on Page 27 within our Tactical Trade Overlay table. Nominal yields in the US are also more sensitive to rising inflation expectations—another reason to enter into a curve steepener. The 7-year bullet appears just 1bp cheap according to our model and would only underperform its counterpart given a flattening in the 5-year/10-year Treasury slope greater than 22bps, which we believe is unlikely given the reasons outlined above (Chart 4A). Chart 4AUS 5/7/10 Spread Fair Value Model Chart 4BUS Butterfly Strategy Performance Following the mechanical trading rule has delivered steady returns with only a few periods of negative year-over-year returns (Chart 4B). Germany The most attractively valued butterfly combination on the German yield curve is going long the 1-year/30-year barbell and shorting the 5-year bullet, which is almost one standard deviation above its model-implied fair value, with a standardized residual of -0.97 (Table 3). Table 3Germany: Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals The 5-year bullet appears 29bps expensive according to our model and would only outperform its counterpart given a steepening in the 1-year/30-year German curve slope greater than 50bps (Chart 5A). Chart 5AGermany 1/5/30 Spread Fair Value Model Chart 5BGermany Butterfly Strategy Performance Following the mechanical trading rule has been quite profitable, delivering consistently positive year-over-year returns for all but the initial period of our sample (Chart 5B). France The most attractively valued butterfly combination on the French OAT yield curve is going long the 2-year/30-year barbell and shorting the 5-year bullet (Table 4). This combination is a little less than one standard deviation over its model-implied fair value with a standardized residual of -0.84. Nominal yields in France are also relatively less correlated with inflation expectations, which makes this a prime candidate for a flattener trade. The specific securities used to execute this trade, as well as the weights for the barbell component used to the make both legs of the trade duration-equivalent, can be found on Page 27 within our Tactical Trade Overlay table. Table 4France: Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals The 5-year bullet appears 21bps expensive according to our model and would only outperform its counterpart given a steepening in the 2-year/30-year French curve slope greater than 48bps (Chart 6A). Chart 6AFrance 2/5/30 Spread Fair Value Model Chart 6BFrance Butterfly Strategy Performance As with Germany, following the mechanical trading rule in the French OAT market has also been profitable, with only three periods of negative year-over-year returns in our sample period (Chart 6B). Italy And Spain In Italy, the most attractively valued butterfly combination is going long the 5-year/30-year barbell and shorting the 10-year bullet – a combination with a standardized residual of -0.79 (Table 5). In Spain, going long the 3-year/30-year barbell and short the 5-year bullet seems most attractive with a standardized residual of -0.83 (Table 6). Of the two peripheral euro area countries, we are choosing to put on a trade in the relatively larger and more liquid Italian government bond market. As with France, Italian nominal yields also display a relatively low beta to inflation breakevens. The specific securities used to execute this trade, as well as the weights for the barbell component used to the make both legs of the trade duration-equivalent, can be found on Page 27 within our Tactical Trade Overlay table. Table 5Italy: Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals Table 6Spain: Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals In Italy, the 10-year bullet appears 22bps expensive according to our model and would only outperform its counterpart given a steepening in the 5-year/30-year Italian curve slope greater than 153bps (Chart 7A). Following the mechanical trading rule in Italy has yielded strong excess returns, with only one very short period of negative year-over-year returns in our sample period (Chart 7B). As with Italy, following the mechanical trading rule in Spain has yielded some of the strongest excess returns on a cumulative and year-over-year basis. Chart 7AItaly 5/10/30 Spread Fair Value Model Chart 7BItaly Butterfly Strategy Performance In Spain, the 5-year bullet appears 14bps expensive according to our model and would only outperform its counterpart given a steepening in the 3-year/30-year Spanish curve slope greater than 47bps (Chart 8A). As with Italy, following the mechanical trading rule in Spain has yielded some of the strongest excess returns on a cumulative and year-over-year basis (Chart 8B). Chart 8ASpain 3/5/30 Spread Fair Value Model Chart 8BSpain Butterfly Strategy Performance UK On the UK Gilt yield curve, the most attractive butterfly combination is holding a 3-year/20-year barbell versus a 10-year bullet, which currently displays a standardized residual of -1.08 (Table 7). As with France and Italy, not only is this flattener trade attractively valued, the UK is also one of the countries where inflation breakevens are relatively less correlated with nominal yields, making this another excellent candidate for our Tactical Trade Overlay. The specific securities used to execute this trade, as well as the weights for the barbell component used to the make both legs of the trade duration-equivalent, can be found on Page 27. Table 7UK: Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals The 10-year bullet appears 13bps expensive according to our model and would only outperform its counterpart given a steepening in the 3-year/20-year Gilt curve slope greater than 52bps (Chart 9A). Chart 9AUK 3/10/20 Spread Fair Value Model Chart 9BUK Butterfly Strategy Performance Following the mechanical trading rule in the UK has produced consistent returns on a year-over-year basis (Chart 9B). Canada The most attractively valued butterfly combination on the Canadian yield curve is favoring the 5-year/30-year barbell versus the 7-year bullet, which currently displays a standardized residual of -1.41 (Table 8). Table 8Canada: Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals The 7-year bullet appears 7bps expensive according to our model and would only outperform its counterpart given a steepening in the 5-year/30-year Canadian curve slope greater than 42bps (Chart 10A). Chart 10ACanada 5/7/30 Spread Fair Value Model Chart 10BCanada Butterfly Strategy Performance Following the mechanical trading rule in Canada has historically been a good strategy, but we do note two periods of minor losses in 2013 and 2019 (Chart 10B). Japan The most attractively valued butterfly combination on the JGB yield curve is the 5-year/20-year barbell versus the 7-year bullet, which currently has a standardized residual of -1.03 (Table 9). As we noted earlier, however, valuations in the JGB market are likely distorted due to the Bank of Japan’s long-running programs of quantitative easing, zero policy rates and Yield Curve Control that aims to keep the 10-year JGB yield around 0%. Table 9Japan: Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals The 7-year bullet appears 6bps expensive according to our model and would only outperform its counterpart given a steepening in the 5-year/20-year Japan curve slope greater than 23bps (Chart 11A). Following our mechanical trading rule has produced decent returns, especially given the dormant nature of the JGB market, with only a couple minor periods without positive year-over-year returns. Chart 11AJapan 5/7/20 Spread Fair Value Model Chart 11BJapan Butterfly Strategy Performance Following our mechanical trading rule has produced decent returns, especially given the dormant nature of the JGB market, with only a couple minor periods without positive year-over-year returns (Chart 11B). Australia The most attractively valued butterfly combination on the Australian yield curve is going long the 2-year/10-year barbell versus the 7-year bullet, displaying a standardized residual of -1.73 (Table 10). Table 10Australia: Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals The 7-year bullet appears 15bps expensive according to our model and would only outperform its counterpart given a steepening in the 2-year/10-year Australian curve slope greater than 101bps (Chart 12A). Chart 12AAustralia 2/7/10 Spread Fair Value Model Chart 12BAustralia Butterfly Strategy Performance Compared to the other markets in our analysis, following the mechanical trading rule in Australia has not produced stellar returns (Chart 12B). However, excess returns on a year-over-year basis have been positive barring two periods. Shakti Sharma Research Associate ShaktiS@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "Global Yield Curve Trades: Follow The Butterflies", dated February 25, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "How To Play The Revival Of Global Inflation Expectations", dated June 23, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Take A Look At High-Yield Technology Bonds", dated June 23, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
Highlights Our intermediate-term timing models suggest the US dollar is broadly overvalued. We are maintaining a modest procyclical currency stance (long NOK, GBP and SEK), but also have a portfolio hedge (short USD/JPY). Go long a basket of petrocurrencies versus the euro. Stay short the gold/silver ratio. Feature Our fundamental intermediate-term timing models (FITM) are one of the toolkits we use in currency management. These simple models enable us to time shifts in developed-market currencies using two key variables. Real Interest Rate Differentials: G10 currencies tend to move with their real rate differentials. Under interest rate parity, if one country is expected to have high interest rates versus another, its currency will rise today so as to gradually depreciate in the future and nullify the interest rate advantage. Risk factor: The ebb and flow of risk aversion affects the path of currencies, as it does their domestic capital markets. Procyclical currencies tend to perform better during risk-on periods. We use high-yield spreads and/or commodity prices as a gauge for risk. For all countries, the variables are highly statistically significant and of the expected signs. These models help us understand in which direction fundamentals are pushing the currencies we look at. These models are more useful as timing indicators on a three-to-nine month basis, as their error terms revert to zero quickly. For the most part, our models have worked like a charm. On a risk adjusted-return basis, a dynamic hedging strategy based on our models has outperformed all static hedging strategies for all investors with six different home currencies since 2001.1 The US Dollar Chart I-1USD Is Overvalued By 4.4% The dollar is a sell, according to the model, with a fair value that is falling much faster than the DXY index itself. Going forward, the Federal Reserve’s dovish stance should keep real interest rate differentials moving against the dollar. This will especially be the case if the authorities move to some form of yield curve control. The wildcard is how risk aversion gyrates as we navigate the volatile summer months, especially given rising geopolitical tensions and the potential for an equity market correction (Chart I-1). One of the factors holding up the dollar is that US domestic growth has been relatively strong, with the Citigroup economic surprise index at the highest level since the inception of the series. For the dollar to decline meaningfully, these positive surprises will need to be repeated abroad. On the data front this week, pending home sales rose 44.3% month-on-month in May, following a 21.8% decline the previous month. House prices are rebounding, to the tune of 4%. The ISM manufacturing index broke out to 52.6 in June from 43.1 the prior month. Job gains for the month of June came in at 4.8 million versus expectations of 3.23 million, pushing the unemployment rate down to 11.1%. These strong numbers provide a high hurdle that non-US growth will need to overcome in order for dollar weakness to continue. The Euro Chart I-2EUR/USD Is Undervalued By 3.8% The euro is not excessively undervalued versus the US dollar (Chart I-2). Usually, strong buy signals for the euro have been triggered at a discount of about 10% or so relative to the greenback. That said, the euro can still bounce towards 1.16, or about 3%-4% higher, to bring it back to fair value. The biggest catalyst for the euro remains that interest rate differentials with the US are quite wide and can continue to mean revert. The Treasury-bund spread peaked at 2.8%, and has since lost around 1.7%. Yet, a gap of 100 basis points remains wide by historical standards. On the data front, the CPI numbers from the euro area this week were quite instructive. German inflation came in at +0.8% versus a decline of -0.3% in Spain. In a general sense, inflation in Germany has been outperforming that in the periphery for a few months now, which is a sea-change from the historical trend in eurozone inflation, where both the core and periphery have seen CPI tied at the hip. If rising competitiveness in the periphery is a key driver, then the fair value of the Spanish “peseta” is rapidly catching up to that of the German “Deutsche mark,” which is positive for the euro. The Yen Chart I-3USD/JPY Is Overvalued By 10.3% The yen’s fair value has benefited tremendously from the plunge in global bond yields, making rock-bottom Japanese rates relatively attractive from a momentum standpoint (Chart I-3). This has pushed the yen to undervalued levels, supporting our tactically short USD/JPY position. The data out of Japan this week suggest that deflationary forces remain quite strong, which will continue to boost real rates and support the yen. The jobs-to-applicants ratio, a key barometer of labor market health, plunged to 1.20 in May from a cycle high of 1.63. Industrial production fell 25.9% year-on-year in May, the worst since the financial crisis. Meanwhile, the second quarter all-important Tankan survey suggests small businesses will continue to bear the brunt of the economic slowdown. With most of the increase in the Bank of Japan’s balance sheet coming from USD swaps with the Fed rather than asset purchases, it suggests little ammunition or appetite for more stimulus. Fiscal policy remains the wild card that could help lift domestic demand. The British Pound Chart I-4GBP/USD Is Undervalued By 5.9% Our model shows the pound as only slightly undervalued, putting our long cable position at risk. The drop in UK real rates since the Brexit referendum has prevented our model from flagging the pound as being much cheaper. Given the potential for added volatility this summer, we are looking to book modest profits on long cable (Chart I-4). Data out of the UK remains grim. Mortgage approvals fell to 9.3K in May, well below expectations. Consumer credit is falling much faster than during the depths of the financial crisis, suggesting all the BoE’s liquidity measures are still not filtering down to certain pockets of the economy. Meanwhile, the trend in the trade balance suggests that the pound has not yet started to reflate the economy. The Canadian Dollar Chart I-5USD/CAD Is Overvalued By 8.1% The Canadian dollar is undervalued by about 8% (Chart I-5). Going forward, movements in the Canadian dollar will be largely dictated by interest rate differentials and crude oil prices, which remain supportive for now. We are going long a petrocurrency basket today, one that includes the Canadian dollar. Canadian data have been slowly improving, with housing starts up 20.2% month-on-month in May and existing home sales up 56.9% month-on-month. House prices have also remained resilient. More importantly, foreign investors have used the plunge in oil prices to deploy some fresh capital into Canadian assets. International security transactions in April stood at C$49 billion, the highest on record, and will likely continue to improve as oil prices recover. The Swiss Franc Chart I-6USD/CHF Is Undervalued By 20.6% Our models suggest the Swiss franc is tactically at risk (Chart I-6). The main reason is that the franc has remained strong, despite the pickup in risk sentiment since March. Even if strength in the franc is sniffing market turbulence ahead, the yen remains a better and cheaper hedge. The Swiss National Bank continues to intervene in the foreign exchange market, but this week’s data shows that growth in sight deposits is rolling over. This is happening at a time when the economy remains weak. The June PMI came in at 41.9, well below expectations. Deflation has returned to Switzerland, with the CPI print for June at -1.3%, in line with the May number. While this is boosting real rates, the strength in the franc is an unnecessary headache for the SNB, especially against the euro. The Australian Dollar Chart I-7AUD/USD Is Undervalued By 7.3% Despite the 20% rally in the Aussie dollar since March, it still remains 7%-8% cheap, according to our FITM (Chart I-7). Typical reflation indicators such as commodity prices and industrial share prices are showing nascent upturns. This suggests that so far, policy stimulus in China has been sufficient to lift commodity demand. Meanwhile, 10-year Aussie government bonds sport a positive spread vis-à-vis 10-year Treasurys. Recent data in Australia have been holding up. The private sector is slowly releveraging, the CBA manufacturing PMI went to 51.2 in June, and the trade balance continues to sport a healthy surplus, at A$8 billion for the month of May. Meanwhile, LNG is a long-term winner from China’s shift away from coal and will continue to benefit Australian terms of trade. We are currently in an LNG glut due to Covid-19, but should electricity generation in China, Japan, and other Asean countries recover to pre-crisis peaks, this will ease the glut. The New Zealand Dollar Chart I-8NZD/USD Is Overvalued By 4.9% Unlike the AUD, our FITM for the NZD is in expensive territory. This favors long positions in AUD/NZD (Chart I-8). The New Zealand economy will certainly benefit from having put Covid-19 mostly behind it. Both the ANZ business confidence and activity outlook indices continue to rebound strongly from their lows, with the final print for June released this week. However, the hit to tourism will still impact national income. Meanwhile, the adjustment to housing, especially given the ban to foreign purchases, will continue to constrain domestic spending, relative to its antipodean neighbor. In terms of trading, long CAD/NZD and AUD/NZD remain attractive positions. The Norwegian Krone Chart I-9USD/NOK Is Overvalued By 16.9% Our fundamental model for the Norwegian krone shows it as squarely undervalued. This favors long NOK positions, which we have implemented via multiple crosses in our bulletins (Chart I-9). The Norwegian economy remains closely tied to oil, and the negative oil print in April probably marked a structural bottom in prices. With inflation near the central bank’s target and our expectation for oil prices to grind higher, the Norwegian currency will likely fare better than a lot of its G10 peers. In terms of data, the unemployment rate ticked higher in April, but at 4.8%, it remains much lower than other developed economies. Our bet is that once the global economy stabilizes, the Norges Bank might find itself ahead of the pack, in any hiking cycle. The Swedish Krona Chart I-10USD/SEK Is Overvalued By 10.6% Like its Scandinavian counterpart, the Swedish krona is also quite cheap and is one of our favorite longs at the moment (Chart I-10). Meanwhile, since the Fed extended its USD swap lines, SEK has lagged the bounce in AUD, NZD, and NOK, suggesting some measure of catch up is due. The export-driven Swedish economy was hit hard by Covid-19, despite no widespread lockdowns being implemented. As such, the Riksbank expanded its QE program this week, boosting asset purchases from SEK 300 billion to SEK 500 billion, until June 2021. In September, it will start purchasing corporate bonds in addition to government, municipal, and mortgage bonds. While the repo rate was left unchanged at zero, interest rates on the standing loan facility were slashed 10 basis points and on weekly extraordinary loans by 20 basis points. These measures should provide sufficient liquidity to allow Sweden to recover as economies open up across the globe. Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy / Global Asset Allocation Strategy Special Report titled, "Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? – A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors (Part II)", dated October 13, 2017. Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades
The GAA DM Equity Country Allocation model is updated as of June 30, 2020. The model has added another 6 points to the US overweight at the expense of the euro area, mainly Germany, Netherlands, and Spain. The driving force for this change is from the relatively favorable momentum and liquidity indicators, despite an unfavorable valuation indicator. Now the top four overweight countries are the US, Spain, Australia, and Sweden, while the biggest four underweight countries remain Japan, the UK, France, and Switzerland, as shown in Table 1. Table 1Model Allocation Vs. Benchmark Weights As shown in Table 2 and Charts 1, 2 and 3, the overall model outperformed the MSCI World benchmark in June by 49 bps. The Level 2 model outperformed its benchmark by 162 bps, thanks largely to the underweight in Japan and the UK, as well as the overweight in Australia and Spain. The Level 1 model underperformed slightly by 3 bps due to the slight overweight in the US. Since going live, the overall model has outperformed its MSCI World benchmark by 260 bps, with 463 bps of outperformance from the Level 2 model, and 29 bps of outperformance from the Level 1 model. Table 2Performance (Total Returns In USD %) Chart 1GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World Chart 2GAA US Vs. Non US Model (Level 1) Chart 3GAA Non US Model (Level 2) For more on historical performance, please refer to our website https://www.bcaresearch.com/site/trades/allocation_performance/latest/G…. For more details on the models, please see Special Report, “Global Equity Allocation: Introducing The Developed Markets Country Allocation Model,” dated January 29, 2016, available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Please note that the overall country and sector recommendations published in our Monthly Portfolio Update and Quarterly Portfolio Outlook use the results of these quantitative models as one input, but do not stick slavishly to them. We believe that models are a useful check, but structural changes and unquantifiable factors need to be considered as well when making overall recommendations. GAA Equity Sector Selection Model The GAA Equity Sector Model (Chart 4) is updated as of June 30, 2020. Chart 4Overall Model Performance The model’s relative tilts between cyclicals and defensives have changed compared to last month. The model maintains its cyclical stance driven by an improvement in its global growth proxy. The model reversed its overweight position on the only defensive sector where it was previously overweight, Healthcare, given a deterioration in its momentum component. Over the past month, the model outperformed its benchmark by 42 basis points. Year-to-date, the model has outperformed its benchmark by 109 basis points, and 108 basis points since inception. Table 3Overall Model Performance Table 4Current Model Allocations The model’s global growth proxy improved – driven by EM currencies and rising metal prices, and therefore continues to remain positive on cyclical sectors. Global monetary easing and low rates should keep the liquidity component favoring a mixed bag of cyclical and defensive sectors. The valuation component remains muted across all sectors except Energy. However, multiple sectors continue to be near the expensive and cheap zones – mainly Info Tech and Consumer Discretionary (expensive), and Real Estate and Consumer Staples (cheap). The model awaits confirming momentum signals to change recommendations for those sectors. The model is now overweight four cyclical sectors in total. These are Information Technology, Consumer Discretionary, Communication Services, and Materials. For more details on the model, please see the Special Report “Introducing the GAA Equity Sector Selection Model”, dated July 27, 2016, as well as the Sector Selection Model section in the Special Alert “GAA Quant Model Updates,” dated March 1, 2019, available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Xiaoli Tang Associate Vice President xiaoliT@bcaresearch.com Amr Hanafy Senior Analyst amrh@bcaresearch.com
Highlights In the short run, extreme policy uncertainty is problematic for risk assets. In the long run, gargantuan fiscal and monetary stimulus continues to support cyclical trades. Equity volatility always increases in the lead-up to US presidential elections. Trump has a 35% chance of reelection. The US-China trade deal is intact for now but the risk of a strategic crisis or tariffs is about 40%. Our Turkish GeoRisk Indicator is lower than it should be based on Turkey’s regional escapades. Feature US equities fell back by 2.6% on June 24 as investors took notice of rising near-term risks to the rally. With gargantuan global monetary and fiscal stimulus, we expect the global stock-to-bond ratio to rise over the long run (Chart 1). However, we still see downside risks prevailing in the near term related to the pandemic, US politics, geopolitics, and the rollout of additional stimulus this summer. Chart 1Risk-On Phase Continues - But Risks Mounting Chart 2Policy Uncertainty Hitting Extremes Global economic policy uncertainty is skyrocketing – particularly due to the epic the November 3 US election showdown. Yet Chinese policy uncertainty remains elevated and will rise higher given that the pandemic epicenter now faces an unprecedented challenge to its economic and political order. China’s economic instability will increase emerging market policy uncertainty (Chart 2). Only Europe is seeing political risk fall, yet Trump’s threats of tariffs against Europe this week highlight that he will resort to protectionism if his approval rating does not benefit from stock market gains, which is currently the case. The COVID-19 outbreak is accelerating in the US in the wake of economic reopening and insufficient public adherence to health precautions and distancing measures. The divergence with Europe is stark (Chart 3). Authorities will struggle to institute sweeping lockdowns again, but some states are tightening restrictions on the margin and this will grow. Chart 3US COVID-19 Outbreak The divergence between daily new infection cases and new deaths in the US, as well as countries as disparate as Sweden and Iran, is not entirely reassuring. The US is effectively following Sweden’s “light touch” model. Ultimately COVID is not much of a risk if deaths are minimized – but tighter social restrictions will frighten the markets regardless (Chart 4). President Trump’s election chances have fallen under the weight of the pandemic – followed by social unrest and controversy over race relations. But net approval on handling the economy is holding up well enough (Chart 5). Chart 4Divergence In New Cases Versus New Deaths Chart 5Trump’s Lifeline Is The Economy Our subjective 35% odds of reelection still seem appropriate for now – but we will upgrade Trump if the financial and economic rebound is sustained while his polling improves. His approval should pick up in the face of a collapse of law and order, not to mention left-wing anarchists removing or vandalizing historical monuments to America’s Founding Fathers and some great public figures who had nothing to do with the Confederacy in the Civil War. Equity volatility will increase ahead of the US election. Chart 6Volatility Always Rises Before US Elections Equity volatility always increases in the lead up to modern American elections (Chart 6) and this year’s extreme polarization, high unemployment, and precarious geopolitical environment suggest that negative surprises could be worse than usual, notwithstanding the tsunami of stimulus. So far this year the S&P 500 is tracing along the lower end of its historical performance during presidential election years. This is consistent with a change of government in November, unless it continues to power upward over the next four months – typically a change of ruling party requires a technical correction on the year. Our US Equity Strategist, Anastasios Avgeriou, also expects the market to begin reacting to political risk – and he precisely timed the market’s peak and trough over the past year (Chart 7). We suspect that the positive correlation between the S&P and the Democratic Party’s odds of a full sweep of government is spurious. The reason the S&P has recovered is because of the economic snapback from the lockdowns and the global stimulus. The reason the odds of a Blue Wave election have surged is because the pandemic and recession decimated Trump and the Republicans. Going forward, the market needs to do more to discount a Democratic sweep. At 35%, this scenario is underrated in Chart 8, which considers all possible presidential and congressional combinations. Standalone bets put the odds of a Blue Wave at slightly above 50%. We have always argued that the party that wins the White House in 2020 is highly likely to take the Senate. Chart 7Market At Risk Of Election Cycle Chart 8Market Will Soon Worry About 'Blue Wave' True, the US is monetizing debt and this will push risk assets higher regardless over the long run. But if former Vice President Joe Biden wins the presidency, he will create a negative regulatory shock for American businesses, and if his party takes the Senate, then corporate taxes, capital gains taxes, federal minimum wages, liability insurance, and the cost of carbon (implicitly or explicitly) will all rise. The market must also reckon with the possibility that Trump is reelected or that he becomes firmly established as a “lame duck” and thus takes desperate measures prior to the election. His threat to impose tariffs on Europe this week underscores our point that if Trump’s approval rating stays low, despite a rising stock market, then the temptation to spend financial capital in pursuit of political capital will rise. This will involve a hard line on immigration and trade. Bottom Line: Tactically, there is more downside. Strategically, we remain pro-cyclical. Stimulus Hiccups This Summer One reason we have urged investors to buy insurance against downside risks this month is because of hurdles in rolling out the next round of fiscal stimulus. The four key drivers of the global growth rebound are liquidity, fiscal easing (Chart 9), an enthusiastic private sector response, and the large cushion of household wealth prior to the crisis. This is according to Mathieu Savary – author of our flagship Bank Credit Analyst report. Mathieu argues that it will be harder for investors to overlook policy uncertainty after the stimulus slows, i.e. the second derivative of liquidity turns negative. Chart 9Gargantuan Fiscal Stimulus The massive increase in budget deficits and the quick recovery in activity amid reopening have reduced politicians’ sense of urgency. We fear that the stock market will have to put more pressure on lawmakers to force them to provide more largesse. Ultimately they will do so – but if they delay, and if delay looks like it is turning into botching the job, then markets will temporarily panic. Why are we confident stimulus will prevail? In the United States, fiscal bills have flown through Congress despite record polarization. Democrats cannot afford to obstruct the stimulus just to hurt the economy and the president’s reelection chances. Instead they have gone hog wild – promoting massive spending across the board to demonstrate their fundamental proposition that government can play a larger and more positive role in Americans’ lives. Their latest proposal is worth $3 trillion, plus an infrastructure bill that nominally amounts to $500 billion over five years. President Trump, for his part, was always fiscally profligate and now wants $2 trillion in stimulus to fuel the economic recovery, thus increasing his chances of reelection as voters grow more optimistic in the second half of the year. He also wants $1 trillion in new infrastructure spending over five years. Yet Republican Senators are dragging their feet and offering only a $1 trillion package. In the end they will adopt Trump’s position because if they do not hang together, they will all hang separately in November. The debate will center on whether the extra $600 in monthly unemployment benefits will be continued (at a cost of $276bn in the previous Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act). Republicans want to tie benefits to returning to work, since this generous subsidy created perverse incentives and made it more economical for many to stay on the dole. There will also be a debate over whether to issue another round of direct cash checks to citizens ($290bn in the CARES Act). Republicans want to prioritize payroll tax cuts, again focusing on reducing unemployment (Chart 10). Chart 10US Fiscal Stimulus Breakdown Our US bond strategist, Ryan Swift, has shown that the cash handouts present a substantial fiscal “cliff.” Without the original one-time stimulus checks, real personal income would have fallen 5% since February, instead of rising 9% (Chart 11). If Republicans refuse to issue a new round of checks, yet the extra unemployment benefits stay, then over $1 trillion in income will be needed to fill the gap so that overall personal income will end up flat since February. In other words, an ~8% increase in income less transfers from current levels is necessary to prevent overall personal income from falling below its February level. China and the EU will eventually provide more largesse. Republican Senators will capitulate, but the process could be rocky and the market should see volatility this summer. China may also be forced to provide more stimulus in late July at its mid-year Politburo meeting – any lack of dovishness at that meeting will disappoint investors. European talks on the Next Generation recovery fund could also see delays (though they are progressing well so far). Brexit trade deal negotiations pose a near-term risk. There is also a non-negligible chance that the German Constitutional Court will raise further obstructions with the European Central Bank’s quantitative easing programs on August 5. European risks are manageable on the whole, but the market is not discounting much (Chart 12). Chart 11Will Congress Takeaway The Money Tree? Bottom Line: We expect the S&P 500 to trade in a range between 2800 and 3200 points during this period of limbo in which risks over pandemic response and political risks will come to the fore while the market awaits new stimulus measures, which may not be perfectly timely. Chart 12European Risks Are Getting Priced Has The Phase One China Deal Failed Yet? President Trump’s threat this week to slap Europe with tariffs, if it imposes travel restrictions on the US over the coronavirus, points to the dynamic we have highlighted on the more consequential issue of whether Trump hikes broad-based tariffs on China, and/or nullifies the “Phase One” trade deal. Our sense is that if Trump is doing extremely poorly, or extremely well, in terms of opinion polls and the stock market, then the roughly 40% odds of sweeping punitive measures of some kind will go up (Diagram 1). Cumulatively we see the chance of a major tariff hike at 40%. Diagram 1Decision Tree: Risk Of Significant Trump Punitive Measures On China In 2020 White House trade czar Peter Navarro’s comments earlier this week, suggesting that the Phase One trade deal was already over, prompted Trump to tweet that he still fully supports the deal. Negotiations between Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Chinese Politburo member Yang Jiechi also nominally kept the lid on tensions. However, China may need to depreciate the renminbi to ease deflationary pressures on its economy – and this would provoke Trump to retaliate (Chart 13). Chart 13Chinese Depreciation Would Provoke Trump We have always argued against the durability of the Phase One trade deal. Investors should plan for it to fall apart. Judging by our China GeoRisk Indicator, investors are putting in a higher risk premium into Chinese equities (Chart 14). They are also doing so with Korean equities, which are ultimately connected with US-China tensions. Only Taiwan is pricing zero political risk, which is undeserved and explains why we are short Taiwanese equities. After China’s imposition of a controversial national security law in Hong Kong and America’s decision to prepare retaliatory sanctions, reports emerged that Chinese authorities ordered state-owned agricultural traders to halt imports of soybean and pork – and potentially corn and cotton. These reports were swiftly followed by others that highlighted that state-owned Chinese firms purchased at least three cargoes of US soybeans on June 1, in spite of China’s decision to stop imports.1 Thus this aspect of the deal has not yet collapsed. But we would emphasize that the constraints against a failure of the deal are not prohibitive this year. The $200 billion worth of additional Chinese imports over 2020-2021 promised in the deal included $32 billion worth of additional US farm purchases – with at least $12.5 billion in 2020 and $19.5 billion in 2021 over 2017 imports of $24 billion. However, to date, US agricultural exports to China suggest that China may not even meet 2017 levels (Chart 15). Chart 14GeoRisk Indicators Show Rising Risk Chart 15Trade Deal Durability Still Shaky Soybeans account for roughly 60% of US agricultural exports to China. While Chinese imports are up so far this year relative to 2019, they remain well below pre-trade war levels. Although lower hog herds on the back of the African Swine Flu and disruptions caused by COVID-19 may be blamed, they are not the only cause of subdued purchases. The share of Chinese soybean imports coming from the US is also still below pre-trade war levels (Chart 16). Chart 16China Still Substituting Away From US New Chinese regulation requiring documents assuring food shipments to China are COVID-19 free adds another hurdle – China already banned poultry imports from Tyson Foods Inc. plants. Although the US’s share of China’s pork imports has picked up significantly, it will not go far toward meeting the trade deal requirements. China’s pork purchases from the US were valued at $0.3 billion in 2017, while soybean imports came in at $14 billion. Bottom Line: Trump’s only lifeline at the moment is the economy which pushes against canceling the US-China deal. But if he becomes a lame duck – or if exogenous factors humiliate him – then all bets are off. The passage of massive stimulus in the US and China removes economic constraints to conflict. Will Erdogan Overstep In Libya? We have long been bearish on Turkey relative to other emerging markets due to President Tayyip Erdogan’s populist policies, which erode monetary and fiscal responsibility and governance. Turkey’s intervention in Libya has marked a turning point in the Libyan civil war. The offensive to seize Tripoli on the part of General Khalifa Haftar of the Tobruk-based Libyan National Army (LNA) has been met with defeat (Map 1). Map 1Libya’s Battlefront Is Closing In On The Oil Crescent Foreign backing has enabled the conflict. Egypt, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Russia are the Libyan National Army’s main supporters, while Turkey and Qatar support Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj of the UN recognized Government of National Accord (GNA). The GNA’s successes this year can be credited to Turkey, which ramped up its intervention in Libya, even as oil prices collapsed, hurting Haftar and his supporters. Now the battlefront has shifted to Sirte and the al-Jufra airbase – the largest in Libya – and is closing in on the eastern oil-producing crescent, which contains over 60% of Libya’s oil. The victor in Sirte will also have control over the oil ports of Sidra, Ras Lanuf, Marsa al-Brega, and Zuwetina. With all parties eying the prize, the conflict is intensifying. Tripoli faces greater resistance as its forces move east. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s June 6 ceasefire proposal, dubbed the Cairo Initiative, was rejected by al-Sarraj and Turkey. Instead, the Tripoli-based government wants to capture Sirte and al-Jufra before coming to the table. The recapturing of oil infrastructure would bring back some of Libya's lost output (Chart 17). Nevertheless, OPEC 2.0 is committed to keeping oil markets on track to rebalance, reducing the net effect of a Libyan production increase on global supplies. However, the GNA’s swift successes in the West may not be replicable as it moves further East, where support for Haftar is deeper and where the stakes are higher for both sides. This is demonstrated by the GNA’s failed attempt to capture Sirte on June 6. The battlefront is now at Egypt’s red line – GNA control of al-Jufra would pose a direct threat to Egypt and is thus considered a border in Egypt’s national security strategy. A push eastward risks escalating the conflict further by drawing in Egypt militarily. In a televised speech on June 20, al-Sisi threatened to deploy Egypt’s military if the red line is crossed. The statement was interpreted by Ankara as a declaration of war, raising the possibility that Egypt will go to war with Turkey in Libya. On paper, Egypt’s military is up to the task. Its recent upgrades have pulled up its ranking to ninth globally according to the Global Fire Power Index, surpassing Turkey’s strength in land and naval forces (Chart 18). However, while Turkey’s military has been active in other foreign conflicts such as in Syria, Egypt’s army is untested on foreign soil. Its most recent military encounter was the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Even after years of fighting, it has yet to declare victory against terrorist cells in the Sinai Peninsula. Thus Egypt’s rusty forces could face a protracted conflict in Libya rather than a swift victory. Chart 17GNA/Turkish Success Would Revive Libyan Oil Production Chart 18Egypt Is Militarily Capable … On Paper Other constraints may also deter al-Sisi from following through on his threat: Other Arab backers of the Libyan National Army – the UAE and Saudi Arabia – are unlikely to provide much support as their economies have been hammered by low oil prices. Egypt’s own economy is in poor shape to withstand a protracted war, with public debt on an unsustainable path. Not coincidentally, Egypt faces another potential military escalation to its south where it has been clashing with Ethiopia over the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile. The dam will control Egypt’s water supply. The latest round of negotiations failed last week. While Cairo is hoping to obtain a bilateral agreement over the schedule for filling the dam, Addis Ababa has indicated that it will begin filling the dam in July regardless of whether an agreement is reached. Al-Sisi’s response to the deadlocked situation has been to request an intervention by the UN Security Council. However, as the July filling date nears, the Egypt-Ethiopia standoff risks escalating into war. For Egypt, there is an urgency to secure its future water supplies now before Ethiopia begins filling the dam. And while resolving the Libyan conflict is also a matter of national security – Egypt sees the Libyan National Army as a buffer between its porous western border and the extremist elements of the GNA – the risks are not as pressing. Thus a military intervention in Libya would distract Egypt from the Ethiopian conflict and risk drawing it into a war on two fronts. Moreover, Egypt generally, and al-Sisi in particular, risk losing credibility in case of a defeat. That said, Egypt has high stakes in Libya. A GNA defeat could annul the recent Libya-Turkey maritime demarcation agreement – a positive for Egypt’s gas ambitions – and eliminate the presence of unfriendly militias on its Western border. Thus, if the GNA or GNA-allied forces kill Egyptian citizens, or look as if they are capable of utterly defeating Haftar on his own turf, then it would be a prompt for intervention. Meanwhile Turkey’s regional influence and foreign policy assertiveness is growing – and at risk of over-extension. Erdogan’s interests in Libya stem from both economic and strategic objectives. In addition to benefitting from oil and gas rights and rebuilding contracts, Ankara’s strategy is in line with its pursuit of greater regional influence as set out in the Mavi Vatan, its current strategic doctrine.2 There are already rumors of Turkish plans to establish bases in the recently captured al-Watiya air base and Misrata naval base. This would be in addition to Ankara’s bases in Somalia and in norther Iraq. Erdogan is partly driven into these foreign policy adventures to distract from his domestic challenges and keep his support level elevated ahead of the 2023 general election (Chart 19). However, his growing assertiveness threatens to alienate European neighbors and NATO allies, which have so far played a minimal role in the Libyan conflict yet have important interests there. For now, the western powers seem focused on countering Russian intervention in Libya and the broader Mediterranean. Prime Minister al-Sarraj and General Stephen Townsend, head of US Africa Command (AFRICOM), met earlier this week and reiterated the need to return to the negotiating table and respect Libyan sovereignty and the UN arms embargo, with a focus on stemming Russian interference. However, Turkish relations with the West may take a turn for the worse if Erdogan oversteps. Turkey continues to threaten Europe with floods of refugees and immigrants if its demands are not met. This pressure will grow due to the COVID-19 crisis, which will ripple across the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. Ankara also continues to press territorial claims in the Mediterranean Sea, ostensibly for energy development.3 Turkey has recently clashed with Greece and France on the seas. In sum, the Libyan conflict is intensifying as it moves into the oil crescent. The Turkey-backed GNA will face greater resistance in Sirte and al-Jufra, even assuming that Egypt does not follow through on its threat of intervening militarily. Erdogan’s foreign adventurism will provoke greater opposition in Libya and elsewhere among key western powers, Russia, and the Gulf Arab states. Bottom Line: The implication is that a deterioration in Turkey’s relationship with the West, military overextension, and continued domestic economic mismanagement will push up our Turkey GeoRisk Indicator, which is a way of saying that it will weigh on the currency (Chart 20). Chart 19Erdogan’s Fear Of Opposition Drives Bold Policy Chart 20Foreign And Domestic Factors Will Push Up Turkish Risk Stay short our “Strongman Basket” of emerging market currencies, including the Turkish lira. Investment Takeaways We entered the year by going strategically long EUR-USD, but closed the trade upon the COVID-19 lockdowns. We have resisted reinitiating it despite the 5% rally over the past three months due to extreme political risks this year, namely the US election and trade risks. Trump’s threat of tariffs on Europe this week highlights our concern. We will wait until the election outcome before reinstituting this trade, which should benefit over time as global and Chinese growth recover and the US dollar drops on yawning twin deficits. Throughout this year’s crisis we have periodically added cyclical and value plays to our strategic portfolio. We favor stocks over bonds and recommend going long global equities relative to the US 30-year treasuries. We are particularly interested in commodities that will benefit from ultra-reflationary policy and supply constraints due to insufficient capital spending. This month we recommend investors go long our BCA Rare Earth Basket, which features producers of rare earth elements and metals that can substitute for Chinese production (Chart 21). This trade reflects our macro outlook as well as our sense that the secular US-China strategic conflict will heat up before it cools down. Chart 21Position For An Escalation In The US-China Conflict Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Roukaya Ibrahim Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Karl Plume et al, "China buys U.S. soybeans after halt to U.S. purchases ordered: sources," Reuters, June 1, 2020. 2 The Mavi Vatan or “Blue Homeland Doctrine” was announced by Turkish Admiral Cem Gurdeniz in 2006 and sets targets to Turkish control in two main regions. The first region is the three seas surrounding it – the Mediterranean Sea, Aegean Sea, and Black Sea with the goal of securing energy supplies and supporting Turkey’s economic growth. The second region encompasses the Red Sea, Caspian Sea and Arabian Sea where Ankara has strategic objectives. 3 Ankara’s gas drilling activities off Cyprus have been a form of frequent provocation for Greece and Cyprus. Ankara has also stated that it may begin oil exploration under a controversial maritime deal with Libya as early as August. Section II: Appendix : GeoRisk Indicator China Russia UK Germany France Italy Canada Spain Taiwan Korea Turkey Brazil Section III: Geopolitical Calendar
Highlights In this Weekly Report, we present our semi-annual chartbook of the BCA Central Bank Monitors. All of the Monitors are now below the zero line, indicating the need for continued easy global monetary policy to help mitigate the COVID-19 recession (Chart of the Week). Central bankers have already responded in an intense and rapid fashion to the crisis, delivering a series of rate cuts, increased asset purchase programs and measures to support bank lending to businesses suffering under quarantines. All of these vehicles have helped trigger a powerful rally in global bond markets that helped revitalize risk assets as well. After the coordinated global easing response of the past few months, the optimal policy choices now differ from country to country. This creates opportunities to benefit from country allocation decisions even in a world of puny government bond yields. The overall signal from our Central Bank Monitors is still bond bullish, however – at least over the next few months until there is evidence of how fast global growth is rebounding from the COVID-19 lockdowns. An Overview Of The BCA Central Bank Monitors Chart of the WeekUltra-Accommodative Monetary Policies Are Still Required Chart 2A Bond-Bullish Message From Our CB Monitors The BCA Central Bank Monitors are composite indicators designed to measure the cyclical growth and inflation pressures that can influence future monetary policy decisions. The economic data series used to construct the Monitors are not the same for every country, but the list of indicators generally measure the same things (i.e. manufacturing cycles, domestic demand strength, commodity prices, labor market conditions, exchange rates, etc). The data series are standardized and combined to form the Monitors. Readings above the zero line for each Monitor indicate pressures for central banks to raise interest rates, and vice versa. Through the nexus between growth, inflation, and market expectations of future interest rate changes, the Monitors do exhibit broad correlations to government bond yields in the Developed Markets (Chart 2). All of the Monitors are indicating intense pressure to maintain very easy monetary policies in response to the global COVID-19 recession. While the bad economic and inflation news is largely discounted in the depressed level of bond yields worldwide, there are still opportunities to position country allocations within a government bond portfolio based on the message from our Monitors (overweighting the US, the UK and Canada, underweighting Germany and Japan). All of the Monitors are indicating intense pressure to maintain very easy monetary policies in response to the global COVID-19 recession. In each BCA Central Bank Monitor Chartbook, we include a new chart for each country that we have not shown previously. In this edition, we show the components of the Monitors, grouped into those focusing on economic growth and inflation, plotted alongside our estimate of the appropriate level of central bank policy interest rates derived using a Taylor Rule. Fed Monitor: Policy Must Stay Accommodative Our Fed Monitor has collapsed below the zero line to recessionary levels (Chart 3A) in response to the coronavirus crisis. The Fed has already delivered a series of aggressive policy responses since March to help support an economy ravaged by the virus, including: interest rate cuts; quantitative easing (QE), including buying corporate and municipal debt; and setting up lending schemes for small businesses. The lockdown of almost the entire country has helped “flatten the curve” of the spread of COVID-19, but at a painful economic cost. The unemployment rate rose to 14.7% in April, the highest level since the Great Depression, and is expected to peak at levels above 20%. The result is unsurprising: a massive increase in spare economic capacity with a threat of deflation as headline CPI inflation plummeted to 0.3% in April (Chart 3B). Chart 3AUS: Fed Monitor Chart 3BUS Realized Inflation Flirting With 0% Within the components of our Fed Monitor, weakening growth has been the main driver of the decline (Chart 3C). Our Taylor Rule estimate suggests a deeply negative fed funds rate is “appropriate”, although the Fed is likely to pursue other avenues of easing like yield curve control before ever attempting a sub-0% policy rate. Chart 3CNegative Rates Are 'Required' In The US, But The Fed Has Other Options The fall in US Treasury yields over the past few months has been in line with the decline in our Fed Monitor (Chart 3D). While the US economy is slowly awakening from lockdowns, consumer and business confidence are likely to remain fragile given the numerous risks from a second wave of COVID-19, worsening US-China relations and, more recently, social unrest. Thus, we continue to recommend an overweight strategic allocation to the US within global government bond portfolios. The fall in US Treasury yields over the past few months has been in line with the decline in our Fed Monitor Chart 3DTreasury Yields Fully Reflect Pressure For More Fed Easing BoE Monitor: Negative Rates On The Horizon? Our Bank of England (BoE) Monitor has collapsed to the lowest level in its history on the back of the severe COVID-19 recession (Chart 4A). The BoE already cut the Bank Rate to 0.1% in March, ramped up asset purchases, and introduced a Term Funding scheme to support business lending. Any additional easing from here might entail negative policy rates, which markets are already discounting. The UK unemployment rate is expected to peak around 8%, with the BoE projecting the economy to shrink by -14% this year, which would be the worst recession in modern history. Inflation has dropped sharply on the back of the dual collapse of energy prices and economic growth, ending a period of currency-fueled inflation increases (Chart 4B). Chart 4AUK: BoE Monitor Chart 4BUK Realized Inflation Is Slowing Rapidly The components of our BoE Monitor fully reflect the dire economic situation (Chart 4C), with weak growth – led by sharp falls in business confidence – driving the collapse of the Monitor more than falling inflation pressures. Our Taylor Rule estimate of the policy rate is not yet calling for negative rates, but that is because we are using the New York Fed’s estimate of r* as the neutral real rate, which is a relatively high 1.4% (by comparison, r* in the US is estimated to be 0.5%). Chart 4CNegative Rates Are Not Yet Required In The UK The sharp fall in the BoE Monitor suggests that Gilt yields will remain under downward pressure in the coming months (Chart 4D). New BoE Governor Andrew Bailey has stated that a move to negative rates is not imminent, but markets will continue to flirt with the notion of sub-0% interest rates until the economy and inflation stabilize. We maintain an overweight stance on UK Gilts. Chart 4DBoE Monitor Suggests Continued Downward Pressure On Gilt Yields ECB Monitor: Continued Monetary Support Is Needed Our European Central Bank (ECB) Monitor is now well below the zero line, signaling a strong need for easier monetary policy to fight the COVID-19 downturn (Chart 5A). The ECB has delivered multiple measures to ease monetary conditions, including a new €750bn bond-buying vehicle and liquidity operations to help banks maintain lending to European businesses. The recession has hit the region hard, with real GDP declining by -3.8% in Q1, the sharpest fall since records began in 1995. Unemployment rates have climbed higher, although to much lower levels than seen in the US thanks to more generous government labor support programs that have helped to limit layoffs. The sharp downturn has resulted in both a surge in spare economic capacity and plunge in headline inflation to 0.3% in April (Chart 5B). Chart 5AEuro Area: ECB Monitor Chart 5BEurope Is On The Edge Of Deflation Within the individual components of our ECB Monitor, both weaker growth and near-0% inflation have both contributed to the Monitor’s decline (Chart 5C). Our Taylor Rule measure shows that the ECB’s current stance of having policy rates modestly below 0% is appropriate. Chart 5CThe ECB Needs To Keep Its Foot On The Monetary Accelerator Despite the ECB’s easing measures, and in contrast to the message from our ECB Monitor, the downward momentum in core European bond yields has been fading (Chart 5D). With the ECB reluctant to push policy rates deeper into negative territory, and with reliable cyclical indicators like the German ZEW and IFO surveys showing signs that euro area growth is starting to recover from the lockdowns, the case for even lower core European yields in the coming months is not strong. We maintain our recommended underweight stance on German and French government bonds. We maintain our recommended underweight stance on German and French government bonds. Chart 5DNo Pressure For Higher German Bund Yields BoJ Monitor: What More Can Be Done? Our Bank of Japan (BoJ) Monitor has fallen further below zero, indicating easier policy is required (Chart 6A). The BoJ has already introduced additional easing measures in the past couple of months: extending forward guidance (inflation is projected to remain below the BoJ’s 2% target for the next three years), increasing asset purchases and enhancing loan programs to small and medium sized companies. New cases of COVID-19 have slowed sharply in Japan, prompting an end to the national state of emergency last week. Importantly, the virus did not hit Japan's labor market as severely as in other developed countries. The unemployment rate did reach a two-year high in April, but is still only 2.6% (Chart 6B). Fiscal stimulus and measures to protect job losses have played a major role in preventing a bigger spike in joblessness. Even with those measures, growth remains weak and realized inflation is heading back towards deflation. Chart 6AJapan: BoJ Monitor Chart 6BJapan Nearing Deflation Once Again Looking at the components of our BoJ Monitor, contracting growth, more than weakening inflation pressures, is the bigger driver of the fall in the Monitor below zero (Chart 6C). However, our Taylor Rule estimate does not suggest that the current level of the policy rate is out of line. Chart 6CBoJ Needs More Easing (Somehow) Until The Economy Revives The BoJ’s current combined policies of negative rates, QE and yield curve control are keeping JGB yields at near-0% levels. Those policies are also suppressing yield volatility and preventing an even bigger fall in JGB yields (with larger capital gains) as suggested by our BoJ Monitor (Chart 6D). We continue to recommend a maximum underweight in Japanese government bonds in a yield-starved world. Chart 6DJGB Yields Will Be Anchored For Some Time BoC Monitor: Deflationary Pressures Intensifying Our Bank of Canada (BoC) Monitor has collapsed into “easier policy required” territory, reaching levels last seen during the 2009 recession (Chart 7A). The central bank has already introduced several easing measures to help boost the virus-stricken economy, including cutting the Bank Rate to a mere 0.25% and starting a QE program to buy government bonds for the first time ever. Before the COVID-19 outbreak, some softening of the economy was already underway. Now, after the imposition of nationwide lockdowns to limit the spread of the virus, the unemployment rate has spiked to 13% - a level last seen in the early 1980s. The result is a massive deflationary output gap has opened up (Chart 7B), with realized headline CPI inflation printing at -0.2% in April. Chart 7ACanada: BoC Monitor Chart 7BOutright Headline CPI Deflation In Canada The fall in our BoC Monitor has been driven by both collapsing economic growth and weakening inflation pressures (Chart 7C). Our Taylor Rule estimate suggests that one of new BoC Governor Tiff Macklem’s first policy decisions may need to be a move to negative interest rates. Macklem and other BoC officials have not played up the possibility of cutting rates below 0%. However, the fact that the BoC provided no economic growth forecasts in the most recent Monetary Policy Report highlights the extreme uncertainties surrounding the economic impact from COVID-19 – even with the Canadian government providing a large fiscal response to the pandemic. Chart 7CBoC Monitor Plunging Due To High Unemployment & Low Inflation We upgraded our recommended stance on Canadian government debt to overweight back in March, and the collapse of the BoC Monitor suggests continued downward pressure on Canadian yields (Chart 7D). Stay overweight. The collapse of the BoC Monitor suggests continued downward pressure on Canadian yields. Chart 7DCanadian Yield Momentum In Line With The BoC Monitor RBA Monitor: Rate Cutting Cycle Is Done Due to a slump in export demand and a weakening housing market, our Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) monitor has been consistently calling for rate cuts since April 2018 (Chart 8A). Australia began its easing cycle early, having delivered a total of 125bps of stimulus since June 2019, with the two most recent cuts coming directly in response to the COVID-19 crisis. As in other developed markets, the unemployment gap in Australia has widened dramatically, owing to job losses concentrated in tourism, entertainment, and dining out (Chart 8B). Although inflation briefly breached the low end of the RBA’s 2-3% target band in Q1, this will not be a lasting development. The RBA sees headline CPI deflating by -1% year-on-year in Q2/2020 and, even as far as 2022, only sees it growing at 1.5%. Chart 8AAustralia: RBA Monitor Chart 8BInflation Will Remain Stuck Below RBA 2-3% Target Although both the growth and inflation components of our RBA Monitor are below zero, the former drove the most recent decline (Chart 8C) led by consumer confidence almost touching the 2008 lows. The RBA has already responded by cutting rates to near 0%, well below the Taylor Rule implied estimate, and initiating yield curve control with a cap on 3-year government bond yields at 0.25%. Chart 8CNo Pressure For The RBA To Go To Negative Rates Overall, Australian bond yields have accurately priced in the dovish signal from our RBA Monitor (Chart 8D). With COVID-19 relatively well contained in Australia, there is less pressure on the RBA to ease further. Governor Lowe has also ruled out negative rates, which will put a floor under yields. Owing to these factors, we confidently reiterate our neutral stance on Australian government debt within global fixed income portfolios. Australian bond yields have accurately priced in the dovish signal from our RBA Monitor. Chart 8DAustralian Bond Yields Are Unlikely To Move Much Lower RBNZ Monitor: Cause For Concern After a resurgence late last year, our Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) Monitor has declined to a level slightly below zero (Chart 9A). The RBNZ responded to the pandemic by delivering a massive -75bps cut in March, but has since left the policy rate untouched, preferring to deliver further stimulus by doubling the size of its QE program. Forward guidance is signaling that the policy rate will remain at 0.25% until 2021, but the central bank has not ruled out negative rates in the future. Although the actual unemployment numbers do not yet capture the impact of the pandemic, both consensus and RBNZ forecasts call for a blowout in the unemployment gap (Chart 9B). The RBNZ expects the steady improvement in inflation seen up to Q1/2020 to be wiped out, with headline CPI projected to remain below the 1-3% target range until mid-2022. Chart 9ANew Zealand: RBNZ Monitor Chart 9BRealized NZ Inflation Was Drifting Higher, Pre-Virus Surprisingly, the inflation component of our RBNZ Monitor is actually calling for tighter monetary policy, owing to significant strength in the housing market (Chart 9C). However, this trend is likely to reverse - the RBNZ foresees a -9% decline in house prices over the remainder of 2020. Meanwhile, growth components such as consumer confidence and employment will remain depressed, holding down our RBNZ monitor. Chart 9CGrowth, Now Inflation, Has Driven The RBNZ Monitor Lower Overall, the momentum in New Zealand bond yields seems to have overshot the message from our RBNZ Monitor (Chart 9D). However, with so much uncertainty about business investment and cash flows from key sectors such as tourism and education, it is too early to bet on an improvement in yields. We therefore maintain a neutral recommendation on NZ sovereign debt. Chart 9DNZ Bond Yields Are Unlikely To Move Lower Riksbank Monitor: Worries For The Coronavirus Mavericks Amid the global pandemic, our Riksbank Monitor has collapsed to all-time lows (Chart 10A). In its April monetary policy decision, the Riksbank opted for continued asset purchases and liquidity measures to support bank lending to companies over a move to negative rates. One of the primary concerns for the Riksbank is headline CPI inflation, which fell into mild deflation (-0.4% year-over-year) in April on the back of lower energy prices and weaker domestic demand (Chart 10B). This could spill over into a lasting decline in long-term inflation expectations if the economy does not quickly improve. Chart 10ASweden: Riksbank Monitor Chart 10BSwedish Realized Inflation Back To 0% Both the growth and inflation components of our Riksbank Monitor are calling for further easing, with the growth component now at post-crisis lows (Chart 10C). The collapse on the growth side can be attributed to historic falls in retail confidence, the manufacturing PMI and employment while the inflation component remains depressed due to low headline numbers and inflation expectations. Chart 10CThe Riksbank Hates Negative Rates, But Could Still Need Them If The Economy Worsens The sharp downward move in our Riksbank Monitor suggests Swedish bond yields should remain under downward pressure in the coming months (Chart 10D). The key factor for yields will be the effect of the relatively lax measures implemented by Sweden to combat the pandemic. Sweden saw positive GDP growth in Q1/2020 due to fewer restrictions on the economy. However, infection and mortality rates are much higher in Sweden than in neighboring countries and, as a result, Denmark and Norway excluded Sweden from their open border agreement. Continued restrictions of the sort are bearish for growth – and bullish for bonds – in this trade-dependent economy. Chart 10DSwedish Bond Yields Will Remain Under Downward Pressure Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, CFA Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com Shakti Sharma Research Associate ShaktiS@bcaresearch.com Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
The GAA DM Equity Country Allocation model is updated as of May 29, 2020. The model has not made any significant change this month. It has kept the same order for the top four overweight countries (Spain, Australia, Sweden, and the US) as well as the four large underweight countries (Japan, the UK, France, and Switzerland), as shown in Table 1. Table 1Model Allocation Vs. Benchmark Weights As shown in Table 2 and Charts 1, 2 and 3, the overall model outperformed the MSCI World benchmark in May by 29 bps. The Level 1 model outperformed 2 bps because of the overweight in the US. The Level 2 model outperformed by 85 bps thanks to the overweight of Sweden, Germany and the Netherlands, as well as the underweight in the UK and Switzerland. Since going live, the overall model has outperformed its MSCI World benchmark by 180 bps, with 246 bps of outperformance from the Level 2 model, and 33 bps of outperformance from the Level 1 model. Table 2Performance (Total Returns In USD %) Chart 1GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World Chart 2GAA US Vs. Non US Model (Level 1) Chart 3GAA Non US Model (Level 2) For more on historical performance, please refer to our website https://www.bcaresearch.com/site/trades/allocation_performance/latest/G…. For more details on the models, please see Special Report, “Global Equity Allocation: Introducing The Developed Markets Country Allocation Model,” dated January 29, 2016, available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Please note that the overall country and sector recommendations published in our Monthly Portfolio Update and Quarterly Portfolio Outlook use the results of these quantitative models as one input, but do not stick slavishly to them. We believe that models are a useful check, but structural changes and unquantifiable factors need to be considered as well when making overall recommendations. GAA Equity Sector Selection Model Chart 4Overall Model Performance The GAA Equity Sector Model (Chart 4) is updated as of May 29, 2020. The model’s relative tilts between cyclicals and defensives have changed compared to last month. The model reversed its defensive stance implemented throughout March and April and is now tilted towards cyclical sectors. However, the semi-defensive tilt led the model to outperform its benchmark by 21 basis points during May. Year-to-date, the model has outperformed its benchmark by 88 basis points, and 86 basis points since inception. The model’s global growth proxy improved – mostly driven by EM currencies and commodity prices, and therefore turned positive on various cyclical sectors and reversed its defensive stance implemented in March. Global monetary easing and low rates should keep the liquidity component favouring a mixed bag of cyclical and defensive sectors. The valuation component remains muted across all sectors except Energy. However, multiple sectors are approaching expensive and cheap territories – mainly Info Tech (expensive), and Real Estate (cheap). The model awaits confirming momentum signals to change recommendations for that component. The model is now overweight five sectors in total, four cyclical sectors versus one defensive sectors. These are Information Technology, Consumer Discretionary, Communication Services, Materials and Health Care. Table 3Overall Model Performance For more details on the model, please see the Special Report “Introducing the GAA Equity Sector Selection Model”, dated July 27, 2016, as well as the Sector Selection Model section in the Special Alert “GAA Quant Model Updates,” dated March 1, 2019 available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Table 4Current Model Allocations Xiaoli Tang Associate Vice President xiaoliT@bcaresearch.com Amr Hanafy Senior Analyst amrh@bcaresearch.com
Highlights China is taking advantage of global chaos to solidify its sphere of influence – beginning with Hong Kong. The crisis is also motivating the European Union to link arms more tightly through a symbolic step toward fiscal solidarity and transfers. US, Chinese, and European stimulus measures are cyclically positive but near-term risks abound. Hiccups in stimulus rollout are to be expected – and China’s disappointing stimulus thus far may cause market turmoil before policymakers do what we expect and add greater oomph. US-China relations are breaking down as we outlined, as renminbi depreciation coincides with Trump approval depreciation. The risks of the UK failing to agree to a trade deal with the EU are higher than prior to COVID-19. Stay defensive tactically – the risk-on rally is not yet confirmed by major reflation indicators yet geopolitical risks are spiking. Feature Chart 1Will Geopolitics Stunt The Early Bull's Growth? After wavering at the 2,900 level, the S&P 500 broke above 3,000. As we go to press, it is holding the line, despite a surge in geopolitical risk emanating from the efforts of the Great Powers to consolidate their spheres of influence at the expense of globalization. Key cyclical indicators are on the verge of breaking out. Our “China Play Index,” which consists of the Australian dollar, Swedish equities, Brazilian equities, and iron ore prices, is reviving smartly. The copper-to-gold ratio, however, is not really confirming the rally (Chart 1). Nor are Asian currencies. We recommend a tactically defensive stance. We are not dogmatic, but are not convinced that the rally will overcome near-term risks. We expect explosive political and geopolitical events throughout the summer. Near-Term Geopolitical Risks To The Rally Our reasons for near-term caution are as follows: Global stimulus hiccups: China’s National People’s Congress over the weekend disappointed expectations on the size of economic stimulus. This is a short-term risk, we argue below, but nevertheless a risk. The US Congress may not pass stimulus until July 2 and the final law will fall short of the House bill of $3 trillion. The European “Next Generation EU” recovery fund is only 750 billion euros in size and may not be agreed until July, or even September if the financial market does not impose urgency. We elaborate below. Ultimately policymakers will keep doing “whatever it takes” but there will be hiccups first and they will trouble the market in the near term (Chart 2). Chart 2Stimulus Tsunami Will Peak This Summer Sino-American conflict: The “phase one” trade deal was never going to bring durable comfort to markets about US-China cooperation, and the outbreak of COVID-19 prompted our March 13 argument that US-China tensions would erupt sooner than we thought. So far the market is grinding higher despite the materialization of this risk. Mega-stimulus and the equity rally enable the US and China to clash. At some point escalation will upset the market. Domestic stimulus is substituting for a collapse in globalization and risk markets are cheering. But increased domestic support will enable political leaders to clash with each other and keep upping the ante. The higher the market goes the more willing President Trump will be to expend some ammunition on China and other political targets. But if you play with sticks, somebody always gets hurt. The market is betting that Trump is a typical US president, typically bashing China in an election year. We are arguing that he is atypical, that this is an atypical election year, and that China’s own ambition cannot be left out of the equation. Wild cards: Jokers, one-eyed jacks, suicidal kings, and aces are all wild in this deck. Emerging markets like Russia (Chart 3) – and rogue regimes like Iran – pose non-negligible risks of upsetting the global rebound this year. Chart 3ARussian Risk To Rise Further On Libya, US Tensions Chart 3BRussian Risk To Rise Further On Libya, US Tensions Chart 4Equity Investors Wise To Erdogan's Mischief Investors cannot focus on tail risks all the time, but not all geopolitical risks are tail risks. This is particularly the case because of the US election, which heightens Washington’s willingness to retaliate to any provocations. Geopolitics in the Mediterranean are verifiably unstable, particularly in Libya where Russia looks to make a major intervention yet Turkey is also involved (Chart 4). This affects North African and European security. Iran is under historic stress and will attempt to undermine the Trump administration as it has no downside to Democratic victory in November. In a recent event we hosted with the CFA Institute in India and Asia Pacific, only 4% of participants highlighted Russia and 2% Iran as a significant source of political risk this year, while 93% highlighted the US and China. Clearly the US-China competition is the great game. But other risks are underrated, especially Russia. Stimulus hiccups this summer are likely to be overcome in the US, EU, and China, so perhaps the market will look through this risk while economies reopen and leading indicators inevitably improve. US-China tensions could remain bound within Trump’s desire to keep the stock market up during his election campaign and China’s desire not to incur Trump’s unmitigated wrath if he happens to be reelected. Russian, Iranian, and emerging market risks, if they materialize, may have merely localized and ephemeral market effects. However, Trump’s falling approval rating and executive decree to open the social media companies to litigation supports our thesis that he is not enslaved by the stock market. The market is expecting “the Art of the Deal” to lead to positive outcomes but that assumption is not as reliable in a recessionary context as it is in an economic boom. The Atlanta Fed’s second quarter real GDP growth estimate stands at -40.4%. Any state that provokes the US over the next five months risks a massive or unpredictable retaliation. China will ultimately bring stimulus to 15.5% of GDP. Deflation and unemployment are a massive constraint. We do not mention the well-known risks of weak consumer activity and business investment amid the pandemic, which itself is expected to revive in the fall with no guarantee of a vaccine by then. Bottom Line: In the near term, maintain safe haven trades such as long Japanese yen, US Treasuries, and defensive equity sectors. China Stimulus Hiccups Won’t Last, But Will Sow Doubt The most important question in China is the implication of the National People’s Congress with regard to the size of stimulus. After the stimulus blowout of 2015-16, Xi Jinping consolidated power and launched a deleveraging campaign. His administration is determined to keep a lid on systemic risks, especially the money and credit bubble. Chart 5China's Stimulus Faces Doubts But Will Prove Huge In The End Beijing’s targets for central and local government spending disappointed market observers. In Chart 2 above, we revised Beijing’s fiscal stimulus from 11% of GDP to 4.3% of GDP as a result of lower-than-expected targets for local government special bonds and central government special treasury bonds, as well as a corrected calculation of the fiscal relief for small and-medium-sized enterprises. This 4.3% understates the real size of China’s stimulus because it includes only fiscal elements. Since the Communist Party and state bureaucracy control the banks and many large enterprises, one must also include credit growth – it is a quasi-fiscal factor. Total social financing (total private credit) is usually the biggest element of China’s periodic bouts of stimulus. While Chinese authorities showed restraint in their fiscal measures, they announced that credit growth would “significantly” exceed nominal GDP growth, which has collapsed due to the virus lockdowns. Our Emerging Markets Strategy estimates that credit growth will accelerate to 14% this year, making for an 11.2% of GDP increase in total credit, and a combined fiscal and credit impulse that will reach 15.5% of GDP (Chart 5). The dramatic global economic shock and the hit to China’s labor market ensure that additional stimulus will be applied as needed to plug the output gap. Soaring unemployment is a fundamental risk to social stability and hence to single-party rule. This means that the fiscal impulse will in the end likely exceed 4.3% as new measures are rolled out later this year. It also means that credit growth will surprise to the upside, as the regime loosens the reins on shadow banks as well as state-controlled lenders. Nevertheless, accepting our Emerging Market Strategy’s base case of 15.5% of GDP fiscal and credit impulse, we would note that China’s economy is much larger as a share of the global economy today than it was in previous rounds of stimulus. Thus while the stimulus may be smaller than that in 2008 as a proportion of China’s economy, it is larger as a proportion of the world’s (Table 1). China-linked asset prices, such as industrial metals, will see rising demand over time. Table 1China Fiscal+Credit Impulse Will Be Big Relative To World The Xi administration’s preference is not to overstimulate and exacerbate its problems of imbalanced growth, falling productivity, and excessive indebtedness. But its constraint is deflation, unemployment, and social instability. Insufficiently loose policy in the midst of a very deep global recession could prove to be the biggest policy mistake of all time. To refuse to loosen as needed, or to re-tighten policy too soon, would be to make a cruel joke out of the new policy slogan, “the Six Stabilities and Six Guarantees” and jeopardize Xi Jinping’s ability to reconsolidate power ahead of the twentieth National Party Congress in 2022. Rather the constraint will force policymakers to alter any hawkish preferences if growth looks to relapse. Bottom Line: Doubts about the sufficiency of China’s fiscal and monetary stimulus pose a near-term risk to global risk assets since investors face disappointing stimulus promises on the surface, combined with lack of certainty about Beijing’s willingness to increase stimulus going forward. We are confident that Beijing will ultimately do whatever it takes to stabilize employment and try to ensure social stability. But this implies near-term challenges and possibly a market riot prior to resolution. Before then, many market participants, including in China, will believe that the Xi Jinping administration will be hawkish and resistant to re-leveraging. China’s Sphere Of Influence Global geopolitical risk stems from the Xi Jinping regime at least as much as from the Donald Trump regime, as we have long pointed out. The scenario unfolding as we go to press is precisely the one we outlined back in March in which Beijing depreciates its currency to ease its economic woes while President Trump’s approval rating falls due to his own woes, prompting him to retaliate. The CNY-USD exchange rate is largely pricing out the phase one trade deal, which is marked by the peak in renminbi strength in Chart 6. Chart 6Phase One Trade Deal Priced Out Of Renminbi Already Chart 7China's Warning To Trump Could Scrap Trade Deal This depreciation is not merely the effect of market moves – though weakness in global and Asian trade and manufacturing certainly reinforce it. The People’s Bank of China’s fixing rate has been guiding the currency to its lowest point since 2008 amid the spike in US-China tensions over the past month (Chart 7). China says it will adhere to the phase one deal as long as it is mutual. It is buying more soybeans, cotton, pork, and beef from the United States relative to last year. Demand has collapsed. Unless China decides to dictate purchases as a subsidy to keep the agreement alive, its purchases will fall short of the huge expansion envisioned in the deal. US actions could nullify the deal anyway. President Trump and his Economic Director Larry Kudlow have both suggested that the administration no longer cares about maintaining the deal. China was fast becoming unpopular in the US and this trend has skyrocketed as a result of COVID-19. China’s other notable decision at the National People’s Congress was to state that it would impose a new national security law on Hong Kong SAR, after the autonomous financial center’s long reluctance to do so. Beijing has sought greater direct control of the city since early in Xi’s term, in contravention of the promise of 50 years of substantial autonomy enshrined in the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984. Beijing’s action comes after Hong Kong’s widespread civil unrest last year and ahead of the city’s Legislative Council elections in September, which will likely become a major geopolitical flashpoint. The United States is retaliating by removing Hong Kong’s designation as an autonomous region. This entails higher tariffs, tougher export controls, stricter visa requirements, and likely sanctions directed at mainland entities that will enforce the national security law in various ways, including eventually some Chinese banks. The US also accelerated sanctions against China for its civil rights abuses in Xinjiang – sanctions that target tech and security companies – and is moving forward with a bill to threaten Chinese companies that hold American Depository Receipts (ADRs) with delisting from American stock exchanges if they do not meet the same auditing requirements as other foreign companies. This potentially affects $1.8 trillion in market capitalization over a 3-4 year period. China’s power grab in Hong Kong initiates a market-negative Sino-American dynamic that will last all year. It cannot be assumed that Trump will accept Beijing’s implicit offer of swapping phase one trade deal implementation for China’s historic encroachment on Hong Kong’s autonomy. The imposition of legislative dependency on Hong Kong should not have been a surprise to investors given recent trends, but it was, as Hong Kong equities fell by 6% at first blush. There is more downside, judging by our China GeoRisk Indicator, which is in a clear uptrend for all of these reasons and correlates reasonably well with the Hang Seng index (Chart 8). Chart 8Hong Kong Equities Face More Downside From Geopolitics While the US will retaliate over Hong Kong, the question for global investors is whether the conflict spills over into the rest of China’s periphery. This would highlight the systemic nature of the geopolitical risk and make it harder for the market to swallow the new cold war. Our Taiwan Strait GeoRisk Indicator (Chart 9) is pricing zero political risk despite the clear risk that Beijing will eventually resort to economic sanctions to penalize the mainland-skeptic government there; that the US will seek to shore up the diplomatic and defense relationship in significant ways in what may be the final five months of the Trump administration; and that Taiwan may seek to draw the US into granting greater economic and security assurances. Chart 9Taiwan Equities Pricing ZERO Geopolitical Risk ... Huge Mispricing Our Korea GeoRisk Indicator (Chart 10) has also fallen drastically. This risk indicator deviates from Korean equities frequently due to North Korean risks, which equity investors tend (usually correctly) to ignore. This year is different, however, because Kim Jong Un’s decision whether to give Trump a diplomatic win, or frustrate him with the test of a nuclear device or intercontinental ballistic missile, actually has a bearing on Trump’s election odds and the pace of US-China escalation. If Kim humiliates Trump then we expect Trump to make a major show of force in the region that would draw China into a strategic standoff. Chart 10North Korea Is Relevant In 2020 Due To Trump China is attempting to solidify its sphere of influence, first in Hong Kong but later in Taiwan and the Korean peninsula. The United States is pushing back and the US election cycle combined with massive stimulus means that push will come to shove. Bottom Line: Investors should steer clear of Chinese, Taiwanese, and Korean currencies and risk assets in the near term. We recommend playing the cyclical China recovery via Korean equities over the long run. The European Sphere Of Influence The European Union is also attempting to strengthen and expand its sphere of influence – namely with steps in the direction of a fiscal union. Our GeoRisk Indicators are generally flagging a huge drop in political risk for Germany, France, Italy, and Spain (Charts 11A & 11B). The reason is that the economies have collapsed yet the equity market has bounded back on ECB quantitative easing and huge promises of fiscal support. In the coming months these risk indicators will rise even as economies reopen because the debate over fiscal and monetary policies is heating up. Our base case is that both the debate over EU recovery funds and the German constitutional court’s objections to QE will resolve in dovish compromises. Chart 11AEurope’s Not-Quite Hamiltonian Moment Chart 11BEurope’s Not-Quite Hamiltonian Moment At issue on the fiscal front is the EU Commission’s “Next Generation EU” recovery fund. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is offering to create a 750 billion euro relief fund (500 billion in grants, 250 billion in loans). The decision is contentious because it would entail the EU Commission issuing bonds – essentially joint bonds among the EU states – to raise funds that would then be distributed through the EU Commission seven-year budget (2021-7). Joint issuance would be a symbolic step toward greater solidarity. This proposal began with an agreement between French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel to launch the 500 billion in grants. Merkel signaled earlier this year that she was prepared to accept joint bond issuance focused on the immediate crisis. When more fiscally hawkish or euroskeptic states objected that loans should be used instead of grants, von der Leyen simply added their proposal to the total, despite the fact that the ECB and European Stability Mechanism (ESM) already offer emergency loans to help states through the global crisis. The proposal marks a victory of the fiscally dovish Mediterranean states (once called “Club Med”) over the frugal Germans, with Macron prevailing on Merkel to foist yet another major compromise onto her conservative German power base in the name of European integration and solidarity before she exits the chancellorship in 2021. But it is not as if German elites like Merkel and von der Leyen are running amok: German public opinion is Europhile and supportive of bolder actions to share burdens, save the union, and shore up the continental economy. The market is not pricing any political risk in Taiwan despite clear dangers. Stay short Taiwanese equities. The recovery fund itself is limited in size, relative to overall stimulus actions thus far. But it would plug an important gap for states like Italy and Spain, which are constrained by large public debt loads and have not provided enough stimulus as yet. The “Frugal Four,” the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, and Denmark, are leading the opposition to the use of grants rather than loans and any effort to establish a track leading to European fiscal union. But they are also willing to negotiate. Estonia and other nations are also objecting, with the eastern Europeans seeking to ensure that southern Europe does not take the lion’s share of the funds, while the core European states will use the funds to pressure populist and euroskeptic eastern states that have defied the European Court of Justice and other institutions (Chart 12). Chart 12Europe: Distribution Of ‘NextGen EU’ Fund A final decision may not be settled by the time of a special summit in July but some compromise should be expected by the fall or (latest) end of year. The proposal would do the very thing that its opponents resist: pave the way toward jointly issued bonds in future that do not have a time limit or a single purpose (today’s sole purpose being pandemic relief). Hence the negotiations will be intense and it will likely require a return of financial instability to bring them to a conclusion. The global financial crisis and its aftermath provoked a higher degree of integration among the EU member states despite the tendency of the mainstream media to assume that the dissonance between monetary and fiscal policy would create an unbridgeable rupture. COVID-19 is now supporting this pattern of Brussels not letting a good crisis go to waste. Chart 13Europe Fends Off Latest Doubts About Solidarity The reason is that the EU is a geopolitical project. As Russia revived, the US began to act unilaterally and unpredictably, and China emerged as a global heavyweight, European powers were forced to huddle together ever more tightly to create economies of scale and improve their security against various external and unconventional threats. Influential German Finance Minister Olaf Scholz has compared the new recovery fund to the work of American founding father Alexander Hamilton in mutualizing the early American states’ war debt so as to create a tighter fiscal union among the states. For that very reason the more Euroskeptic member states oppose the proposal – long rejecting the idea of a “United States of Europe.” Today’s proposals are more symbolic, less substantial, than Hamilton’s famous Compromise of 1790. Nevertheless we would not underrate them as they highlight the way the European states continually turn crisis moments that worry the markets about European break-up into new opportunities to combine more closely. As such it is fitting that the European break-up risk premium has fallen, signifying a drop in peripheral bond spreads (Chart 13). The battle over debt mutualization is not over yet so spreads could widen again, but the trend will be down as the bloc develops new tools to combat the latest crisis. The United Kingdom obviously marks a major exception to this reinforcement of the European sphere of influence. The Brits are historically and geopolitically opposed to a unified continental political power. Having decided to leave, they lack the ability to obstruct from within. But they are also not necessarily more likely to yield in their trade negotiations. British political risks are understandably low because Prime Minister Boris Johnson and his Conservative Party won a strong mandate in December and technically do not have to face voters again until 2024. The major limitation on a “no trade deal” outcome in talks with Brussels was a recession – yet that has already occurred. London could ultimately bite the bullet and accept that outcome if the trade talks turn acrimonious. The GBP/EUR is not pricing a full “no deal” exit. Stimulus and economic recovery suggest that it is a good time to go long sterling but we will pass on this trade in the short run due to resilient dollar strength and the reduced barrier to exiting without a trade deal (Charts 14A & 14B). Chart 14ABrexit Trade Talks Not Globally Relevant Chart 14BBrexit Trade Talks Not Globally Relevant Bottom Line: We do not yet recommend reinstituting our long EUR/USD trade, which we initiated late last year as part of our annual forecast. The COVID-19 crisis has created such a spike in geopolitical and political risk that we expect the US dollar to remain surprisingly strong throughout the coming months and for US equities to outperform global equities beyond expectation. Nevertheless we will look to reinitiate this long-term trade at an appropriate time, as it fits squarely with our “European Integration” theme since 2012. Investment Takeaways Our contention that “geopolitics is the next shoe to drop” has materialized. This has negative near-term implications for global risk assets. However, thus far, market positives have outweighed negatives for global investors faced with the reopening of economies and wartime-magnitude fiscal and monetary stimulus. Buying risky assets makes sense for investors with a long-term investment horizon – and we recommend cyclical plays like commodities, corporate bonds, infrastructure stocks, and defense stocks in our strategic portfolio. We also recognize that if key cyclical and reflation indicators break out from here, then a cyclical bull market could take shape. Yet our analytical framework reveals that recession and mega-stimulus have diminished the financial and economic constraints that would normally deter geopolitical actors from ambitious actions on the international stage. Most notably, the US election dynamic has turned upside-down. President Trump is the underdog and will need to develop a reelection bid that does not hinge on the economy. Doubling down on “America First” foreign policy and trade policy makes the most sense and the ramifications are negative for the markets over the next five months. This is the key dynamic that makes US-China, US-North Korea, US-Russia, and US-Iran tensions more market-relevant than they would otherwise be. It also will dampen an otherwise positive story for the euro, in the short run. Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Section II: Appendix : GeoRisk Indicator China: Russia: UK: Germany: France: Italy: Canada: Spain: Taiwan: Korea: Turkey: Brazil: Section III: Geopolitical Calendar