Currencies

Executive Summary Don’t Try Catching Falling Euros The euro is inexorably moving toward parity. However, many positives could still save EUR/USD, a cheap currency that will benefit if the fears of a global recession recede and if European inflation peaks by the fall. Nonetheless, many fundamental risks still weigh on the euro, including the dollar’s momentum and the continuing ructions in the European energy market. Moreover, technical vulnerabilities are likely to amplify the potential weakness in the euro. There is greater than a 30% chance that EUR/USD will fall to 0.9 or below. As a result, it is preferable to stay on the sidelines and opt for a neutral stance on the EUR/USD. Selling EUR/JPY offers a more attractive reward-to-risk ratio than EUR/USD. The GBP remains under threat. Bottom Line: Don’t be a hero. At this juncture, the EUR/USD outlook remains particularly uncertain. While EUR/USD possesses ample upside over the coming 12 months, there is roughly a 1/3 chance that it will plunge to 0.9 by the winter. Investors should sell EUR/JPY instead.   The euro’s race toward parity continues. From May 12 to July 1, EUR/USD attempted to form a triple bottom at 1.0375 that could have marked the end of this year’s decline. Alas, the euro did not hold that floor and now traders are inexorably pushing the common currency lower. The outlook for the euro is complex. At current levels, it is inexpensive and discounts many negative developments affecting both the global and European economies. However, the EUR/USD’s weakness is also a story of dollar strength, and the deteriorating global economic momentum remains the Greenback’s best friend, to the euro’s detriment. For now, we stick to our mantra of the past few months: don’t be a hero. The euro may soon bottom, but enough risks lie ahead that a move below 0.9 against the dollar should not be discarded. The risk-reward from bottom fishing is therefore poor. Instead, investors should sell EUR/JPY, for which downside remains ample. What We Like About The Euro… Despite the pervasive negativity engulfing the euro, there are plenty of positives that will soon help EUR/USD form a bottom. First, the euro is cheap on most metrics. The Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) model developed by BCA’s Foreign Exchange Strategists adjust for the different consumption baskets in the Eurozone and the US. It currently shows that EUR/USD trades 25% below fair value, its deepest discount since 2001. This degree of undervaluation is associated with a high probability of strong long-term returns for the euro (Chart 1). Based on interest rate parity and risk aversion, the euro also trades well below its fair value. Steep discounts are often followed by an imminent rebound in the currency (Chart 2). However, the euro hit a similar discount in January, but failed to rally because of the problems in the energy markets prompted by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Chart 1Strong Long-Term Returns based on PPP Chart 2Oversold on Many Metrics Second, the euro is oversold. Both BCA’s Intermediate-Term Technical Indicator and the Citi FX Euro PAIN Index are very depressed, which indicates pervasive negative sentiment toward the euro (Chart 2, bottom two panels). This kind of extremes in momentum are often followed by a euro rally. Chart 3Global Recession Fears Hurt EUR/USD Third, global economic pessimism is widespread. EUR/USD is a pro-cyclical pair, which mostly reflects the counter-cyclicality of the dollar and the great liquidity of the euro. It is therefore not surprising that spikes in global recession concerns are associated with a weakening EUR/USD (Chart 3). The recent wave of depreciation happened contemporaneously with a spike in Google searches for the word “recession.” If these fears, which reached extreme levels, subside further in the months ahead, the euro may benefit greatly. Fourth, pessimism toward China may ease, which would lift the euro in the process. Last week, it was announced that Beijing is considering allowing local governments to sell RMB1.5 trillion of special government bonds in the second half of the year to fund infrastructure spending. The news caused a rebound in the AUD, Brazilian assets, and copper. Europe too would benefit from greater activity in China. Chart 4Chinese Salvation? Chinese monetary conditions are also easing, which historically supports industrial activity in Europe relative to the US (Chart 4, top panel). The change in approach in the implementation of the zero-COVID policy is helping Chinese PMIs rebound, which will eventually translate into higher European shipments to China. Moreover, the rate of change of the performance of real estate stocks relative to the broad market has turned the corner, which may facilitate a stabilization of Chinese real estate transactions (Chart 4, second panel). Ultimately, the expanding excess reserves in the Chinese banking system point toward a stabilization of the performance of EUR/USD later this year (Chart 4, bottom panel). Fifth, our expectation that European inflation will peak by the autumn will prove the greatest help to the euro. The EUR/USD’s weakness over the past twelve months has coincided with a surge in European inflation surprises (Chart 5, top panel). This relationship reflects the negative impact on European real rates of both stronger realized and expected inflation (Chart 5, second panel). Investors understand that Europe’s inflation crisis is driven by a relative price shock in the energy market that greatly hurts economic activity in the Eurozone. Hence, even if they expect the ECB to increase interest rates, they believe policy rates will lag inflation because of Europe’s poor growth outlook. This is particularly true when compared to the US Fed. As a result, European real rates continue to lag far behind US ones and the European yield curve is steeper than that of the US, because traders foresee easier policy on the Eastern shores of the Atlantic (Chart 5, panel three and four). Chart 5Inflation Hurts the Euro Chart 6Declining Inflation Expectations? Declining Inflation Expectations? This situation is fluid and inflation expectations have begun to decrease. The recent easing in energy prices has contributed to a decline in long-term inflation expectations (Chart 6). We argued last week that the energy inflation is arithmetically set to decrease over the coming twelve months, which suggests further downside in inflation expectations is likely. Moreover, four of the five largest weights in the Eurozone HICP are running hot, but all are linked to commodity inflation, which confirms our bias that European inflation will soon peak (Chart 7). A top in both headline and core inflation will drag short- and long-term inflation expectations lower, which will help European real rates (Chart 8). Meanwhile, lower imported energy inflation will limit the damage to European economic activity, allowing the ECB to increase rates anyway.   Chart 7Key HICP Components Chart 8A durable Decline In Expected Inflation Depends On Realized Inflation Chart 9Balance Of Payment Support Bottom Line: The euro benefits from important tailwinds that suggest EUR/USD will be higher 12 to 18 months from now. It is cheap and oversold and the pervasive gloom among investors about the state of the global economy indicates that many negatives are already embedded in its pricing. Moreover, the Chinese economy could stabilize in the second half of 2022 and into 2023, which will hurt the dollar and boost the euro. Crucially, a peak in European inflation will allow European real rates to recover and curtail the handicap keeping EUR/USD under pressure, especially as the basic balance of payment remains in the euro’s favor (Chart 9).   … And What We Don’t EUR/USD may benefit from some important tailwinds, but it is still burdened by massive handicaps. The first problem that will place downward pressure on the euro is that its weakness is not unique and that it reflects broad-based dollar strength (Chart 10). This is a problem for the euro because the dollar (and the yen) is the foremost momentum currency in the G10. Its strength begets further strength, and the momentum signal from moving average crossovers remains dollar-bullish.  This headwind for the euro could even intensify in the coming months. JP Morgan EM FX Index is breaking down to new lows, which points to further tightening in EM financial conditions. Historically, tighter EM FCIs translate in both weaker Eurozone stock prices and a weaker EUR/USD, which reflects the closer link between the Euro Area and EM economies than between the US and EM (Chart 11). Chart 10The Dollar's Strength Is Broad-Based Chart 11More Trouble In Store This phenomenon is exacerbated by the underlying weakness in global economic activity. Arthur Budaghyan, BCA’s EM Chief Strategist, often reminds us that Asian exports remain soft. Additionally, the deterioration in US economic activity is likely to continue, as suggested by the weakness in the ISM new orders-to-inventories ratio and by the poor readings from the Regional Fed Surveys. Slowing US growth will generate a further decline in the business-sales-to-inventory ratio, which often coincides in a strong dollar and a weak euro. Chart 12Past Chinese Weaknesses Linger The second problem for EUR/USD is that China’s economic outlook may be improving in the future, but, for now, the impact of the recent Chinese slowdown continues to hamper Europe. More specifically, the recent decline in Chinese import volumes is consistent with a euro-bearish backdrop for the remainder of this year (Chart 12, top panel). In fact, even if the CNY remains stable against the USD, this does not guarantee a positive outcome for the euro as the past weakness in Chinese import volumes is also consistent with a depreciating EUR/CNY (Chart 12, bottom panel) The third euro-negative force is the natural gas market. As we showed last week, Dutch natural gas prices must settle between EUR500-600/MWh this upcoming winter to have the same inflationary impact as they did over the past 18 months. This is unlikely to happen, even according to the direst forecasts of BCA’s Commodity and Energy strategists. However, there is a greater than 30% chance that Europe must ration electricity this winter, which would cause a violent output contraction. As a result, any fluctuation in natural gas flows in Europe will cause the market-based odds of a European recession to swing widely. Consequently, the negative correlation between EUR/USD and TTF prices observed over the past twelve months is likely to remain intact (Chart 13). Related Report  European Investment StrategyQuestions From The Road The fourth issue hurting the euro is the US’s comparative isolation from the energy market’s travails. The US is a haven of relative economic stability today. Yes, its growth will slow further, but it is nonetheless set to outperform the Eurozone. The US is not under threat of rationing energy this winter. Moreover, the US terms of trades benefit from rising energy prices, unlike Europe (Chart 14). Furthermore, the US output gap is closing faster than that of in the Eurozone (Chart 14, bottom panel). As a result, the odds of dovish surprises by the ECB are much greater than those by the Fed. Chart 13Neutral Gas Is Still A Drag Chart 14The US As A Haven Of Stability The US’s relative resilience might also impact equity flows over the next few months in a euro-bearish fashion. US EPS have been stable relative to Euro Area ones, even in local currency terms. Interestingly, because relative EPS reflect broader economic forces, EUR/USD follows them (Chart 15). Thus, if the European economic outlook deteriorates further relative to that of the US, chances are high that Eurozone EPS estimates will be revised down relative to the US, which will coincide with a lower EUR/USD. In fact, the recent underperformance of Eurozone small-cap stocks (which are domestically focused) relative to European large-cap equities (which derive a greater proportion of their sales abroad) and US small-cap shares also confirms the worsening relative economic outlook between Europe and the US, and thus portend significant near-term risks to EUR/USD (Chart 16). Chart 15Follow Earnings Estimates Chart 16Small Caps Indicate More EUR Selling Chart 17An ECB Bungle Would Burden The Euro The last major fundamental risk weighing on EUR/USD is the significant probability that the ECB will disappoint markets with respect to its anti-fragmentation tool to be announced in July. Investor expectations are lofty. However, internal divisions within the ECB Governing Council remain, and, most importantly, the ECB is hamstrung by previous ECJ and German Constitutional Court rulings on bond purchases. Thus, our base case remains that the development of an appropriate bond purchase program will be an iterative process resulting from a back-and-forth between market tensions and ECB responses. As a result, there are risks of further widening in Italian spreads as well as European corporate bond spreads. These developments would further hurt the euro (Chart 17). Chart 18Much Selling To Be Unleashed Sentiment Could Get More Negative These fundamental problems with EUR/USD do not guarantee that the euro will punch below parity. After all, there are also plenty of positives with this currency. However, the risk of a violent selloff is elevated, at around 30%, because of underlying technical vulnerabilities. Global market liquidity has deteriorated in recent years, and this phenomenon is also impacting FX markets, resulting in sudden jumps being more frequent. Most crucially, the odds are high that automatic selling will be triggered if the euro tests parity, which would result in a cascading decline for a euro entering territory that has not been charted for the past 20 years. Specifically, speculators are marginally short the euro (Chart 18, top panel) and 1-month and 3-month risk reversals in the option markets are not yet at a capitulation point (Chart 18, bottom panel). Thus, if panic sets in, the euro could easily fall below 0.9, where the strongest supports lie. In essence, we worry that a sudden crash in the euro is becoming a growing threat. Bottom Line: The combination of the dollar’s momentum, the lagging impact of China’s economic woes, the risks to Europe’s energy supplies, the relative stability of the US economy, and the heightened chance that the ECB underdelivers with respect to its anti-fragmentation tool later next week all point to significant risks to the euro in the coming months. Moreover, the technical vulnerabilities present in the FX market suggest that, if further downside takes place, it will not only be large but also rapid. Investment Conclusions The dilemma between views and strategy is greatest with the euro today. There are many positives highlighted in this report that suggest that the euro has upside on a 12-month basis. However, the risks are abundant, and the potential downside in the coming six months not only carries a large probability, it is also likely to be pronounced if it takes place. As a result of this configuration, we fall back to the strategy we had adopted for European equities earlier this year: don’t be a hero. Even if the euro bottoms tomorrow, the risks are such that capital preservation remains paramount. Consequently, we recommend that investors stay on the sideline and maintain a neutral stance on EUR/USD. It is just as risky to try to bottom fish this pair as it is to chase it lower from current levels. Chart 19Sell EUR/JPY Instead, we follow BCA’s Foreign Exchange Strategists recommendation to go short EUR/JPY as a bet with a lower risk-reward ratio. Global recession worries and weakening commodity inflation are likely to allow for greater downside in global yields, which often results in a lower EUR/JPY (Chart 19). Additionally, investors do not expect much out of the BoJ this year, but if recession risks intensify in Europe because of energy rationing this winter, there is room to curtail the interest rate pricing for the ECB embedded in the €STR curve. Furthermore, the JPY is the cheapest currency in the G10. Finally, investors wanting to build greater exposure to European currencies should do so via the Swiss franc. We argued three weeks ago that the CHF enjoys significant structural tailwinds because of the Swiss economy’s strong productivity. Additionally, the SNB is no longer intervening to limit the CHF upside, as demonstrated by the decline in its current deposits. Instead, a stronger Swiss franc is the most potent weapon in the SNB’s arsenal to combat inflation. Moreover, the CHF offers a hedge against both recession risks in the Eurozone and further widening in European spreads. Bottom Line: Don’t be a hero. EUR/USD’s outlook is uniquely uncertain now. While many factors point to positive returns on a 12-to-18 month basis, if the euro hits parity in response to the many clouds still hanging over Europe, technical factors could plunge this currency to EUR/USD 0.9 into a steep decline. Instead, the clearer call is to sell EUR/JPY. Investors who want to assume a European FX exposure today should do so through the Swiss franc, not the euro. A Few Words On The UK Last week, Prime Minister Boris Johnson resigned. The initial response of the pound was to rebound. This reaction should fade. BCA Geopolitical strategists argue that, even though the person sitting at 10 Downing Street is about to change, the fundamental problems with the UK remain the same. The Labour Party is ascending, but it will still have to deal with the Brexit aftermath, rising populism, and popular discontent across the country. The economy is still fragile and engulfed in an inflationary spiral. Meanwhile, the risks created by a looming Scottish independence referendum are much more significant than was the case in 2014. As a result, the pound is likely to remain under stress over the coming quarters.   Mathieu Savary, Chief European Strategist Mathieu@bcaresearch.com Tactical Recommendations Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations

Executive Summary The Dollar And Volatility The dollar continues to be bid, as volatility rises. The MOVE volatility index is making fresh cycle highs and has pushed the DXY index above our stop level of 107 (Feature Chart). The move in the dollar suggests that we are experiencing a classic breakout pattern. Historically, this means that flows into the USD will continue, until it becomes clear that drivers of USD strength have abated. These include inflation peaking and global growth bottoming. We are moving our recommended stance on USD to neutral. It is becoming clear that the market sees the risk of a nasty recession in Europe to be high. The euro could break below parity, as speculators short the currency en masse. The yen is becoming a winner in the current context. We are reopening our short EUR/JPY trade this week, in addition to our short CHF/JPY position initiated last week.  Our long AUD/USD position was stopped out at 68 cents this week. Given our shift to a neutral view on the dollar, we recommend investors stand aside for now. Bottom Line: We were stopped out of our short DXY position at 107, for a loss of 2.34%. We are moving to a neutral stance on the greenback. While valuation and sentiment are at contrarian extremes, the current environment dictates that further gains in the greenback are likely in the near term. Feature The DXY index has staged a classic breakout and the next technical level is closer to the 2002 highs near 120. Year-to-date, the DXY has been one of the best performing currencies (Chart 1). In last week’s report, we presented a framework for managing currencies, suggesting that while the path of least resistance for the dollar was up, significant headwinds were also building. One of the closest correlations we have seen in recent trading days is with volatility. As Chart 2 shows, the dollar and the MOVE index have been the same line. As markets increasingly price in the probability of a recession, especially in Europe, the dollar will be bought. This puts central banks in a quandary: focusing on growth or inflation? As such bond volatility is shooting up and the dollar is commanding a hefty safety premium. In the next few sections, we go over the important data releases from our universe of G10 countries, and implications for currency strategy. Chart 1The Dollar Remains King Chart 2The Dollar And Volatility US Dollar: A Classic Breakout Chart 3A Clean Breakout In The DXY The dollar DXY index is up 11.3% year-to-date. Over the last month, the DXY index is up 4.7%. Technical forces are still in favor of the greenback as a momentum currency, given the classic breakout pattern. Looking at incoming data from the US, the case for dollar strength remains in place in the near term. The May CPI print came in well above expectations, at 8.6% for headline, versus 8.3% expected. A few days later, the PPI print was also strong at 10.8% year on year. This is happening at a time when consumer confidence is rolling over. The University of Michigan current conditions index fell from 63.3 to 53.8 in May. The expectations component dropped from 55.2 to 47.5. The conference board measure fell from 103.2 to 98.7 in June. After this print, the Fed met on June 15 and increased interest rates by 75bps, a surprise to the market. The current account deficit widened to $291.4bn US, a record low since the end of the Bretton Woods system . Retail sales disappointed in May. Excluding automobile and gasoline, sales were up 0.1% month on month, versus a consensus expectation of a 0.4% rise. It was also flat for the control group, suggesting basket changes were not responsible for the deterioration. The numbers are on a nominal basis, which suggests that retail sales volumes are contracting meaningfully. The rise in interest rates is filtering into the housing market. Mortgage applications fell 5.4% during the week of July 1. Housing starts declined from 1,810K to 1,724K in May, a 14.4% drop. Building permits also fell 7% month on month, in line with the 3.4% drop in existing home sales.  The ISM manufacturing index fell from 56.1 to 53 in June. US economic data is softening, which raises the odds that the US joins Europe and China in a classic slowdown. In such a configuration, the market is pricing in that the dollar will ultimately be the haven asset, as has been the case in recent history. We went short the DXY index at 104.8, with a stop-loss at 107, that was triggered overnight. We are moving to a neutral stance today and will revisit this position once global economic uncertainty subsides.  The Euro: A European Hard Landing Chart 4The Euro Is Pricing In A Deep Recession The euro is down 10.5% year-to-date. Over the last month, the euro is down 4.7%, and recent trading suggests we will probably breach parity versus the dollar in the coming weeks. Recent data from the eurozone continues to suggest it is trapped in stagflation. The preliminary CPI print for June came in at 8.6%, well above the previous 8.1% print. PPI in the euro area is at 36.3%. Meanwhile, consumer confidence (the European Commission’s measure) is approaching a record low. The Sentix investor confidence index peaked in July last year and has been falling ever since. With a mandate of bringing down inflation, the ECB may have no choice but to knock the eurozone economy to its knees. The proximate expression of this view has been via shorting the euro. Most of the incoming data for the euro area have been deteriorating. For example, on a seasonally adjusted basis, the trade deficit widened to -€31.7bn. This is a record since the creation of the euro. This has completely wiped the eurozone current account, meaning the euro is now becoming a borrower nation. The critical question for Europe lies in the adjustment mechanism towards a possible shut-off in natural gas supplies for the winter. European natural gas prices are soaring anew, though well below the peak this year. A cut-off of Russian supplies is becoming a very real possibility. The question then becomes how deep of a European recession the euro is pricing in. Back in 2020, the euro bottomed at 1.06. At the time, quarterly real GDP in the euro area fell 11.9% in the second quarter. That was worse than both during the global financial crisis, and anytime since the creation of the euro. This means that fundamentally, the euro has already priced in a nasty recession in Europe. If it occurs, the euro could undershoot but if it does not, the potential for a coiled spring rebound is immense. A hedged bet on the euro is to sell the EUR/JPY cross. In a risk-off environment, EUR/JPY will collapse. In a Goldilocks scenario, the yen has sold off much more that the euro, that the cross could move sideways.  The Japanese Yen: Now A Safe Haven Chart 5The Yen Is Becoming An Attractive Safe Haven The Japanese yen is down 15.4% year-to-date, the worst performing G10 currency. Over the last month, the yen is down 2.4%. Incoming data in Japan has been mixed with the domestic economy still showing some signs of weakness, while the external sector is faring relatively better. The Bank of Japan kept monetary policy on hold last month, despite a widely held view in markets that it would pivot, following the surprise hike by the Swiss National Bank. Inflation in Japan has been modest, with nationwide CPI at 2.5% in May. The Tokyo CPI release for June showed that inflation remains sticky around this level. Yet the BoJ views a large chunk of inflation in Japan to be transitory, due to rising energy costs, and base effects from the sharp drop in mobile phone prices last year. For inflation to pick up, ultimately wages need to rise. Labor cash earnings for May came in at 1%. For Japan, this is a healthy print compared to recent history, but still pins real cash earnings at -1.8%, suggesting little risk of a wage inflation spiral. The Tankan survey for the second quarter provided a glimmer of hope. While large manufacturers (mainly exporters) sensed a deterioration in the outlook, domestic concerns were more upbeat. The large non-manufacturing index improved from 9 to 13 in the second quarter. The small non-manufacturing index improved from -6 to -1. Notably, capex intentions rose 18.6%, the highest level since the late 80s. The drivers of the yen remain clear and absolute. First, rising global interest rates put selling pressure on the yen and vice versa. Second, energy prices sap the trade balance, which is also negative. Should these factors abate (as they are currently), the yen will benefit. This week, we are reopening our short EUR/JPY trade, in addition to being short CHF/JPY. From a contrarian perspective, the yen is the cheapest G10 currency according to our PPP models. It also happens to be one of the most heavily shorted currencies, according to CFTC data.  British Pound: Sterling Breaks Below 1.20 Chart 6Politics Will Keep Cable Volatile The pound is down 11.1% year-to-date. Over the last month, the pound is down by 4.5% as a combination of economic and political headwinds hit sterling. Politically, the resignation of Prime Minister Boris Johnson is fueling sterling volatility. According to our geopolitical strategists, investors’ focus should be on whether UK national policy will change. This will require an election that replaces the Conservative Party-led government, or at least removes its single-party majority. Boris Johnson’s approval rating had been collapsing in recent days on the back of a series of scandals, so a less unloved leader under the same party will at least assuage public opinion, while keeping existing policies largely the same. The next milestones to watch for are an early election (unlikely since the Conservative Party still has an interest in prolonging until 2025) and a Scottish referendum for independence next year. Labor will also continue to benefit from a tailwind of high inflation and the mishandling of the pandemic by the Tories that has left voters largely frustrated. Economically, data in the UK continues its whiff of stagflation. CPI came out at 9.1% in May, the RPI accelerated to 11.7%, and nationwide housing prices came in at 10.7% in June, while retail sales are tanking, falling 4.7% year on year in June, excluding auto and fuel costs. The GFK Consumer confidence indicator hit a record low of -41 in June. Our report on sterling suggested that headwinds remain likely in the near term, but the pound is becoming more and more attractive for longer-term investors. We are currently long EUR/GBP. This cross still heavily underprices the risks to the UK economy in the near term. However, if recession fears ease, our suspicion is that cable is poised for a coiled-spring rebound.  Canadian Dollar: The BoC Will Stay Hawkish Chart 7The CAD Has Decoupled From Oil Prices The CAD is down 2.5% year-to-date. Over the last month, it is down 3.4%. Incoming data continues to suggest there is little reason for the BoC to change course in tightening monetary policy. The employment market remains strong. In May, 40K new jobs were added, and the details below the surface were notable. 135K full time jobs were swapped for 96K part time roles. Hourly wages rose 4.5% and the unemployment rate dipped to 5.1%. This sort of data is carte blanche for the BoC to keep hiking, since it signals a soft landing in the economy. Housing has been a point of contention for higher rates in Canada (given indebted households), but the Teranet national house price index shows that home prices are still rising 18.3% year-on-year in Canada as of May. This is occurring within the context of widespread price gains. Headline CPI came in at 7.7% in May, with all measures of the BoC’s trimmed estimates (core-common, core-median, core-trim), well above target and expectations. It will be interesting to watch how the BoC calibrates monetary policy given that the closely watched Business Outlook Survey showed a large deterioration in participants’ outlook for the future. In a world where USD strength persists, CAD will trade on the weaker side, but we remain buyers of the CAD once recession fears ebb.   Australian Dollar: A Contrarian Play Chart 8A Jumbo Hike By The RBA The Australian dollar is down 5.8% year- to-date. Over the last month, the AUD is down 5.3% as the price of iron ore declined by over 10% and the Chinese economy remained on lockdown. The RBA raised its interest rate by 50bps for a second month in a row this week. This aggressively shifted market expectations for further rate increases, with pricing in the OIS curve one year out rising from 3.35 to 3.51% today. While the RBA admitted global supply chain issues have contributed to inflation, capacity constraints in certain sectors and a tight labor market are also helping fuel domestic inflation. Particularly, the May employment report was robust, with 69.4K full-time jobs added, and a healthy jump in the participation rate to 66.7%. Job vacancies continued to grow at 13.8%. Rising rates in Australia are having the desired effect. Home price inflation is cooling, especially in places like Sydney. Demand for housing and construction remains robust, suggesting the RBA is achieving a soft landing in the economy. For example, home loan values are growing 1.7% and building approvals are growing by 9.9%. Demand also appears strong as manufacturing PMI came out at 56.2 in June. We are bullish the AUD against the dollar; however, short-term headwinds from Chinese lockdowns do not currently make us buyers of the currency. We are exiting our long AUD/USD position after being stopped out at 0.68 for a loss of -5.67%.  New Zealand Dollar: Least Preferred G10 Currency Chart 9Terms Of Trade Are Waning For NZD The NZD is down 9.7% this year. Over the last month, it is down 4.7%. New Zealand has the highest policy rate in the G10, and that is beginning to take a toll on interest-rate sensitive parts of the economy. REINZ house sales fell 28.4% year on year in May. House price inflation is also rapidly cooling. In June, the ANZ consumer confidence index fell from 82.3 to 80.5. Business confidence deteriorated from -55.6 to -62.6. The external sector is no longer a tailwind for the NZ economy, as grain and meat prices cool off. The price of dairy, approximately 20% of New Zealand’s exports, continues to decline with a 10% drop in June. The 12-month trailing trade balance continues to plummet, hitting -9.5bn NZD in May. The current account for May came in at -6.14 billion NZD versus a consensus -5.5 billion NZD. China is an important economic partner for New Zealand, with circa 27% of Kiwi exports China bound. Restrictions seem to be easing as the latest non-manufacturing PMI from China data came in at 54.7 against a previous 48.4 reading. The number of days required to quarantine on arrival also dropped to 10 days from 21 days in June. If this trend continues, it will be positive for the NZD; however, China does not appear to have an exit strategy for their zero-case COVID-19 policy. Within the G10 currency space, many other currencies appear more attractive than the kiwi, though our view is that NZD will benefit when US dollar momentum rolls over.   Swiss Franc: A Safe Haven Chart 10A U-Turn From The SNB CHF is down 6.4% year-to-date and flat over the past month versus the dollar. Against the euro, the franc is up 4.7% year-to-date and 5.2% over the past month. Our special report on the franc was timely, given the surprise rate hike announcement from the SNB last month. Amidst currency market volatility, EUR/CHF broke below parity. The SNB views currency strength as a virtue in today’s paradigm. As such, it has halted currency interventions, evident through the decline in sight deposits. Markets are pricing in another 50bps hike in September. Inflation continued to accelerate above projections in June. Headline and core CPI were up 3.4% and 1.9% year on year respectively, lower than other G10 countries but high enough to keep the SNB on alert. Inflation remains largely driven by the prices of imported goods which strengthens the case for a strong franc. The labor market is also tight, with unemployment at 2.2% in May. The outlook for the Swiss economy remains positive for the rest of the year, albeit with some signs of slowing activity emerging. The manufacturing PMI at 59.1 and the KOF leading indicator at 96.8 were both down to multi-month lows in June. The trade surplus in May was down to CHF 2bn. The franc is undervalued against the dollar and can serve as a good hedge for spikes in global volatility.  Norwegian Krone: Improving The Current Account Chart 11NOK Has Decoupled From Oil Prices The NOK is down 13.2% YTD and down 6.2% over the last month. Against the euro, the NOK is down 2.4% YTD and 1.3% in over the past month. In June, the Norges Bank raised the policy rate from 0.75% to 1.25%, 25bps higher than broadly anticipated. The rate path was also revised sharply higher and now corresponds to a 25bps hike at each meeting until the rate steadies at around 3% next summer. Governor Ida Wolden Bache left the door open for more half-point hikes but also highlighted the potential risk of overtightening, suggesting a balanced approach. Inflation in Norway is surprising to the upside. In May, CPI came in at 5.7% and 3.4% for core, signaling that price increases are becoming more broad-based. The labor market remains tight. The unemployment rate dipped to 1.7% in June, the lowest reading since 2008. Wages are projected to grow 3.9% this year. Together with a positive output gap, and a weak currency, both domestic and imported inflation could remain sticky for a while. Economic activity remains healthy in Norway. The manufacturing PMI went up to 56.4 in June, private consumption is robust, and business investment is expected to increase around 8% this year. Petroleum investments are also expected to pick up markedly in the years ahead, spurred by elevated energy prices and tax incentives. Recent natural gas production hikes, approved by the government, will further contribute to the healthy trade surplus. The strike started by union workers this week threatened to halt a significant portion of Norway’s oil and natural gas output. However, a resolution was found rather quickly. Despite record energy prices, the krone is one of the worst-performing majors this year. Pronounced global risk-off sentiment in the first half weighed on the currency. Despite potential challenges in the near term, Norway’s trade balance will remain a major tailwind this year. Shorting EUR/NOK on rallies looks attractive.  Swedish Krona: Tracking The Euro Lower Chart 12The SEK Is At Capitulation Lows The SEK is down 14.2% year-to-date and 7.1% over the last month. Inflation is becoming a problem in Sweden. In May, the CPIF increased 7.2% year on year, while the core measure was up 5.4%. In response, the Riksbank raised the policy rate by 50bps to 0.75% at its June meeting. The Riksbank sees the policy rate at around 1.75% by year-end, implying 50bps hikes at the remaining two meetings this year. The bank also announced a faster run-off in its balance sheet. We had anticipated the hawkish pivot by the Riksbank in early June, but that has not helped the Swedish krona much. Like Europe, the Swedish economy is being held hostage by external shocks, the global slowdown and an energy crisis. Signs of economic slowdown are becoming more pronounced. The Riksbank’s GDP forecast for 2022 was revised down by 1% to 1.8% and cut in half to 0.7% for 2023. Industrial production and new order data also point to a cooling in economic activity. Manufacturing and services PMIs remain expansionary zone but are falling rapidly. Notably, export orders have been hovering around the 50 boom/bust line over the last few months. Housing market is also vulnerable, with the Riksbank projecting a more-than-10% decline in prices by next year. That said, the SEK is below the 2020 lows suggesting these risks are well priced in. We are buyers of SEK on weakness.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Artem Sakhbiev Research Associate artem.sakhbiev@bcaresearch.com Thierry Matin Research Associate thierry.matin@bcaresearch.com   Trades & Forecasts Strategic View Cyclical Holdings (6-18 months) Tactical Holdings (0-6 months) Limit Orders Forecast Summary

Executive Summary Global risk assets are oversold, and investor sentiment is downbeat. In this context, a technical equity rebound cannot be ruled out. However, we do not think it will be the beginning of a major cyclical rally. The Fed and the stock market remain on a collision course. An equity rally and easing financial conditions would make the Fed even more resolute to continue hiking interest rates. There are many similarities between dynamics that prevailed in US tech stocks and in previous bubbles. While it is not our baseline view, the odds of a protracted bear market are nontrivial. Resource prices and commodity plays have more downside. The History Of Financial Bubbles: Is This Time Different? Bottom Line: The decline in commodity prices and the relentless US dollar rally will ensure that EM currencies, bonds and stocks continue to sell off even if the US equity market rebounds in the near term. Feature Among the most frequently discussed topics in recent client calls are the upside and downside risks to our baseline view. We elaborate on these risks in this report. To recap, our baseline view is as follows: EM and DM stocks have another 15% downside in USD terms, the US dollar will continue overshooting and commodity prices will fall. Global yields are topping out, and the US yield curve will soon invert. Hence, defensive positioning for absolute-return investors is still warranted, and global equity and fixed-income portfolios should continue to underweight EM. The rationale is that US and EU demand for goods ex-autos, and hence global trade, is about to contract while the Fed is straightjacketed by high and broad-based inflation. China’s economy will be struggling to recover. In EM ex-China, domestic demand will relapse. Chart 1Will The S&P 500's Technical Support Hold? If one believes that the US equity bull market that began in 2009 is still alive (i.e. the March 2020 selloff is a short-lived red herring), odds are that the S&P 500 drawdown is over. The reasoning is that the S&P 500 is already down 23% from its 2021 peak, on par with the selloffs that occurred in 2011, 2015-16 and 2018 (Chart 1). However, if one believes that the structural bull market is over, the magnitude of the current equity selloff is likely to exceed the ones in 2011, 2015-16 and 2018. Hence, a bearish stance is still warranted. As we argue below, after a 12-year bull run, the excesses in the US equity market in general, and US tech stocks in particular, have become extreme. There are many signs of a bubble, or at least of a major top. Even though we risk overstaying in our negative view, our bias is that the global equity market rout is not yet over. A Bullish Scenario A (hypothetical) bullish case would look something like this: Weakening global and US growth and falling commodity prices bring down US inflation and Treasury yields. As US bond yields drop further, the S&P 500 rallies given their negative correlation of the past 18 months or so. As US inflation declines rapidly, the Fed makes a dovish pivot, reinforcing the risk asset rally and reversing the US dollar’s uptrend. Finally, Chinese stimulus produces a robust business cycle recovery in China that propels commodity prices higher and lifts the rest of EM out of the abyss. Chart 2Keep An Eye On Rising US Trimmed-Mean Inflation In our opinion, this scenario has no more than a 25% chance of playing out. Even if there are apparent signs of a US/global slowdown, elevated US core inflation and accelerating wages and unit labor costs would keep the Fed from dialing down its hawkishness Critically, even though US core PCE inflation has rolled over and will likely decline further, its trimmed-mean PCE inflation is rising (Chart 2). The latter means that inflation is broadening even as some volatile items like food, energy and used-auto prices deflate. As we have written extensively, wages and inflation are lagging variables. Despite the ongoing slowdown in the US economy, it will take many months before the underlying core inflation rate drops below 3%. We maintain that the Fed and the stock market remain on a collision course. An equity rally and easing financial conditions would make the Fed even more resolute to hike interest rates. The basis is that even if core inflation falls in the coming months, it would still be well above the Fed’s target of 2%. Notably, the Fed has recently communicated that its commitment to bring down inflation to 2% is unconditional. Chart 3The Anatomy Of The US Equity Bear Market In 2000-2002 This policy stance represents a major departure from the past several decades when the Fed was very sensitive to any tightening in financial conditions and often eased preemptively. In short, with inflation still well above its target, the Fed will, for now, err on the side of hawkishness if financial conditions ease. Importantly, US corporate profits will likely contract even if US real GDP does not shrink. As US corporate top-line growth slows and unit labor costs accelerate, profit margins will shrink. For example, the 2001-2002 recession was very mild – consumer spending did not contract at all, and housing boomed (Chart 3, top two panels). Yet, the S&P 500 operating earnings dropped by 30%, and the S&P 500 fell by 50% (Chart 3, bottom two panels). In brief, a devastating bear market does not necessarily require a hard landing. Concerning China, the recovery will likely be U-shaped rather than V-shaped with risks skewed to the downside. Finally, contracting global trade and falling commodity prices will continue, which are negative for EM currencies and assets. Notably, industry data from Taiwan’s manufacturing PMI suggest that the slowdown in the Asian and global economies is widespread. Taiwan’s substantial trade linkages with mainland China signify that the slowdown is not limited to the US and the EU but includes China too. Taiwanese PMI export orders of both semiconductor and basic material producers have plunged to 40 and 30, respectively (Chart 4). Barring a quick turnaround, global semiconductor and basic materials stocks have more downside. Even as US Treasury yields drop, the dollar will continue firming versus EM currencies, including those of Emerging Asian countries. In such a scenario, EM stocks and bonds will weaken further (Chart 5).  Chart 4A Broad-Based Contraction In Global Trade Is In The Cards Chart 5A Free Fall In EM Ex-China Stocks And Currencies   Bottom Line: The S&P 500 is oversold, and investor sentiment is downbeat. In this context, a technical equity rebound can occur at any moment. However, we do not think it will be the beginning of a major cyclical rally. A Bearish Case: Are US TMT Stocks A Bubble? What is a more bearish scenario than our baseline case? The bursting of bubbles or the unwinding of excesses would entail a more protracted and devastating bear market than the 15% drop in global share prices we currently expect. We can identify two major excesses in the global economy and financial system: In US TMT (Technology, Media & Entertainment and Internet & Catalog Retail) stocks and private equity In Chinese real estate. We have written extensively about property market excesses in China. Below we discuss the recent sharp selloff in commodities, which is partially linked to Chinese property construction. We also present the case for major excesses in US stocks. Chart 6 illustrates the history of bubbles of the past several decades: The Nifty-fifty (involving the 50 US large-cap stocks) bubble occurred in the 1960s and burst in the 1970s (not shown in the chart). The commodity bubble took place in the 1970s and burst in the 1980s. Japanese equity and property prices rose exponentially in the 1980s and deflated in the 1990s. The Nasdaq bubble occurred in the 1990s and was shattered in the early 2000s. Commodities/EM/China were the leaders of the 2000s, and they were devastated in the 2010s. We use iron ore in this chart because its price surged the most in the 2000s. FAANGM stocks, the Nasdaq 100 index and private equity were by far the biggest beneficiaries of the 2010s. No one can be certain about bubbles in real time because there are always superior fundamentals or persuasive stories that justify exponential price appreciation. That said, there are a lot of similarities between dynamics prevailing in US tech and private equity and in previous bubbles: In the past decade, FAANGM stocks, the Nasdaq 100 index and private equity companies registered gains comparable to the bubbles of the previous 60 years. Furthermore, as Chart 6 illustrates, the equal-weighted FAANGM index in inflation-adjusted terms rose 30-fold, much more than the bubbles of the previous decades. The Nasdaq 100 index and share prices of Blackstone, the largest private equity company, have risen by nearly 10-fold in real (inflation-adjusted terms) between 2010 and the end of 2021. Chart 6The History Of Financial Bubbles: Is This Time Different? The final phase of bubbles is often characterized by growing retail investor participation. This is exactly what happened with US tech/new economy stocks. Chart 7US TMT Stocks: Exponential Growth Rarely Ends Well Toward the end of the decade, not only retail but also institutional capital stampedes into the winners of the decade. This played out with US large-cap tech stocks as well as in private equity and private debt spaces. Inflows into private equity and private debt have been enormous. As a result of these inflows into US large-cap stocks, the market cap share of US TMT stocks as a percentage of total US market cap has surpassed 40%, its peak in 2000 (Chart 7). Bubbles often thrive during periods of low interest rates and crash when the cost of capital rises. This is exactly what has been happening in global financial markets since early 2019. The parameters of the overall US equity market were also excessive prior to this bear market. As of last year, the S&P 500 stock prices in real (inflation-adjusted) terms became as elevated relative to their long-term time trend as they were in the late 1960s and the late 1990s − the peaks of previous secular bull markets (Chart 8, top panel).   Chart 8The S&P 500 and Operating Profits: A Long-Term Perspective Chart 9Equity Issuance Marks Market Tops The S&P 500’s operating earnings in real terms have surpassed two standard deviations above its time trend (Chart 8, bottom panel). Some sort of mean reversion to its long-term trend is in the cards. US corporate profits have benefited from fiscal/monetary stimulus, low labor costs and pricing power. All of these are now working against profits.   Finally, new share issuance in the US mushroomed in 2021, another sign of a major top (Chart 9). Bottom Line: We are not entirely convinced that US TMT stocks are a bubble waiting to burst. Yet, the odds of this happening are nontrivial. This time might not be different. A Word On Commodities The selloff in the commodity space has been broad-based. Odds are that it will continue for the following reasons: A global business cycle downtrend is always bearish for commodity prices. In fact, oil prices are often lagging and are typically the last shoe to drop during global slowdowns. US sales of gasoline have started to contract. Besides, Saudi Arabia will likely increase its oil output and shipments following President Biden’s visit to the Kingdom next week. Chart 10Investors Have Been Long Commodity Futures As we have argued in recent months, China’s demand for commodities was contracting and, in our opinion, the rally in resource prices over the past 12 months was supported by investment demand for commodities, i.e., financial inflows into the commodity space. Many portfolios have bought commodities as an inflation hedge. When a hedge becomes a consensus trade and crowded, it stops being a hedge. Chart 10 demonstrates that net long positions in 17 commodities have been very elevated. The speed at which liquidation is taking place corroborates our thesis that it is investors not producers or consumers who have been caught being long commodities. China’s business cycle recovery will be U-shaped at best. Domestic orders point to weaker import volumes in the months ahead (Chart 11, top panel). ​​​​​​​Corporate loan demand has plunged suggesting that liquidity provisions by the PBoC might fail to produce a meaningful recovery in credit growth (Chart 11, bottom panel). Finally, technicals bode ill for commodity prices. As Chart 12 illustrates, copper prices and global material stocks have probably formed medium-term tops, and risks are skewed to the downside.  Chart 11China: The Economy Is Struggling To Gain Traction Chart 12A Major Top In Commodity Prices?   Bottom Line: Commodity prices and their plays have more downside. Investment Strategy The decline in commodity prices and the relentless US dollar rally will ensure that EM currencies, bonds and stocks continue to sell off even if the US equity market rebounds in the near term driven by lower Treasury yields. Global equity and fixed-income portfolios should continue underweighting EM. We also continue to short the following currencies versus the USD: ZAR, COP, PEN, PLN, PHP and IDR; as well as HUF vs. CZK, and KRW vs. JPY. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Strategic Themes (18 Months And Beyond) Equities Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)

Executive Summary Buying a home is now more expensive than renting in many parts of the world. In the US and UK, disappearing homebuyers combined with a flood of home-sellers will weigh on home prices over the next 6-12 months. Falling employment and falling house prices risk becoming a self-reinforcing negative feedback loop that turns a mild recession into a severe recession. To stop such a vicious cycle running out of control, policymakers will eventually bring down mortgage rates. For this reason, on a time horizon of 6-12 months, overweight bonds. A collapse in Chinese property development and construction activity will have negative long-term implications for commodities, emerging Asia, and developing countries that produce raw materials. Structurally underweight. On the other hand, stay structurally overweight the China 30-year government bond. Fractal trading watchlist: US Biotech versus Utilities. Buying A Home Is Now More Expensive Than Renting! Bottom Line: The decade-long global housing boom is over. Feature For the first time since 2018, the number of Brits wanting to buy a home is less than the number of Brits wanting to sell their home. The balance of homebuyers versus homes for sale is the main driver of any housing market. When multiple homebuyers are competing for a home for sale, the subsequent bidding war puts upward pressure on house prices. But when, multiple homes for sale are competing for a homebuyer, the subsequent discounting war puts downward pressure on house prices. The balance of homebuyers versus homes for sale is the main driver of any housing market. This makes the number of homebuyers versus homes for sale the best leading indicator of house prices. The recent collapse of this leading indicator in the UK warns that UK house prices are likely to soften through the remainder of 2022 and into 2023 (Chart I-1). Chart I-1With Fewer UK Homebuyers Than UK Home-Sellers, UK House Prices Are Set To Drop Homebuyers Are Disappearing While Home-Sellers Are Flooding The Market Disappearing homebuyers combined with a flood of home-sellers is also evident in the US. According to Realtor.com: “Weary US homebuyers face not only sky-high home prices but also rising mortgage rates, and that financial double whammy is hitting homebuyers hard: Compared with just a year ago, the cost of financing 80 percent of a typical home rose 57.6 percent, amounting to an extra $745 per month.” Compared with just a year ago, the cost of financing 80 percent of a typical US home rose 57.6 percent, amounting to an extra $745 per month. Unsurprisingly, US mortgage applications for home purchase have recently plunged by a third (Chart I-2) and homebuyer demand has declined by 16 percent since last June.1 Meanwhile, the inventory of homes actively for sale on a typical day in June has increased by 19 percent, the largest increase in the data history. Chart I-2With The Cost Of Financing A US Home Purchase Surging, Mortgage Applications Have Collapsed The flood of new homes on the market means that the dwindling pool of homebuyers will have more negotiating leverage on the asking price (Chart I-3 and Chart I-4). This will balance the highly lopsided negotiating dynamics in the raging seller’s market of the past two years. The shape of things to come can be seen in Austin, Texas, which was one of the hottest markets during the early pandemic real estate frenzy. Chart I-3US Homebuyers Are Disappearing... Chart I-4...While US Home-Sellers Are Flooding The Market “Prices are definitely starting to go down again… last Friday, an Austin home was listed at $825,000. The next day, at the open house, no one came. A few months ago, there would have been 20 or more buyers showing up. The sellers didn’t want to test the market, so on Sunday, they dropped it to $790,000. It sold for $760,000.” Buying A Home Is Now More Expensive Than Renting The nub of the problem for homebuyers is that the mortgage rate is higher than the rental yield. In simple terms, buying a home is now more expensive than renting (Chart I-5). The housing bulls counter that the high mortgage rate will force rental yields to adjust upwards by rents going up, but this argument is flawed. Chart I-5Buying A Home Is Now More Expensive Than Renting! The most important driver of rent inflation is the unemployment rate (inversely). Because, to put it bluntly, you need a steady job to pay the rent! Today, the Federal Reserve’s inflation problem, in a nutshell, is that rent inflation is too high even versus the tight jobs market (Chart I-6). Chart I-6The Fed Needs To Push Up Unemployment To Pull Down Rent Inflation Although the Fed cannot say this explicitly, its mechanism to bring down inflation is to push up unemployment, and thereby to pull down rent inflation, which constitutes almost half of the core inflation basket. In this case, the rental yield (rent divided by house price) would adjust upwards by the denominator – house prices – going down. The most important driver of rent inflation is the unemployment rate (inversely). Yet the housing bulls also argue that the housing boom is the result of a structural undersupply of homes. They claim that as this structural undersupply persists, it will underpin house prices. But this ‘housing shortage’ narrative is another myth, which we can debunk with two simple observations. Through the past decade, home prices have risen simultaneously and exponentially everywhere in the world. Now ask yourself, is it plausible that there could be a structural undersupply of homes everywhere in the world at the precisely the same time? If this doesn’t debunk the housing shortage narrative, then try this second observation. Through the past decade, gross rents have tracked nominal GDP. Theory says that gross rents should track nominal GDP, because the quality of the housing stock improves broadly in line with GDP, and therefore so too should rents. If there really was a structural undersupply of housing, then gross rents would be structurally outperforming nominal GDP. But that hasn’t happened in any major economy (Chart I-7). Chart I-7Rents Have Tracked GDP, So There Is No 'Structural Undersupply' Of Homes As an aside, if rents track GDP, then why do they constitute almost half of the core inflation basket?  The answer is that the rents included in inflation are ‘hedonically adjusted’, meaning that are supposedly deflated for quality improvements – though there is always a niggling doubt whether the statisticians do this adjustment correctly! Pulling all of this together, the synchronized global housing boom of the past decade was not the result of a structural undersupply. Instead, it was the result of a valuation boom – meaning, plummeting rental yields, which in turn were the result of plummeting mortgage rates, which in turn were the result of plummeting bond yields. But now that mortgage rates are much higher than rental yields, this ‘virtuous’ cycle risks turning vicious. Falling employment and falling house prices risk becoming a self-reinforcing negative feedback loop that turns a mild recession into a severe recession. To stop such a vicious cycle running out of control, policymakers will eventually have no other choice than to bring down mortgage rates. For this reason, on a time horizon of 6-12 months, overweight bonds. But The Prize For The Biggest Housing Boom Goes To… China The housing booms in the UK, US and other Western economies, extreme as they are, are small fry compared to the housing boom in China. Chinese real estate, now worth $100 trillion, is by far the largest asset-class in the world. And Chinese rental yields, at around 1 percent, are well below the yield on cash. Begging the question, how can Chinese real estate valuations be in such stratospheric territory, with a yield even less than that on ‘risk-free’ cash? The simple answer is that investors have been led to believe that Chinese real estate is a risk-free investment! Without a social safety net and with limited places to park their money, Chinese savers have for years been encouraged to buy homes, in the widespread belief that property is the safest investment, whose price is only supposed to go up (Chart I-8). Chart I-8Chinese Real Estate Is Perceived To Be A 'Risk Free' Investment With the bulk of Chinese households’ wealth in property acting as a perceived economic safety net, even a 10 percent decline in house prices would constitute a major shock to the household sector’s hopes and expectations of what property is. In turn, the ensuing ‘negative wealth effect’ would be catastrophic for household spending in the world’s second largest economy. Therefore, in contrast to the US housing debacle in 2008, the Chinese government will ensure that its property market adjustment does not come from a collapse in home prices. Rather, it will come from a collapse in property development and construction activity, combined with keeping interest rates structurally low. This will have negative long-term implications for commodities, emerging Asia, and developing countries that produce raw materials. Structurally underweight. On the other hand, Chinese bonds are an excellent investment for those investors who can accept the capital control risks. Stay structurally overweight the China 30-year government bond. Fractal Trading Watchlist Biotech and Utilities are both defensive sectors, based on the insensitivity of theirs profits to economic fluctuations. But whereas Biotech is ‘long duration’, Utilities is ‘shorter duration’. Over the coming months, as the economy falters and bond yields back down, long duration defensives, such as Biotech, are likely to be the winners. This is supported by the recent underperformance reaching the point of fractal fragility that has indicated previous major turning points (Chart I-9). The recommended trade is long US Biotech versus Utilities, setting a profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 20 percent. This replaces our long US Biotech versus Tech position, which achieved its 17.5 percent profit target, and is now closed. Chart I-9Biotech Is Set To Be A Big Winner Chart 1CNY/USD Has Reversed Chart 2US REITS Are Oversold Versus Utilities Chart 3CAD/SEK Reversal Has Started Chart 4Financials Versus Industrials To Reverse Chart 5The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Biotech Has Started To Reverse Chart 6The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Healthcare Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 7FTSE100 Outperformance Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 Is Reversing Chart 8Netherlands Underperformance Vs. Switzerland Has Been Exhausted Chart 9The Sell-Off In The 30-Year T-Bond Is Approaching Fractal Fragility Chart 10The Sell-Off In The NASDAQ Is Approaching Fractal Fragility Chart 11Food And Beverage Outperformance Has Been Exhausted Chart 12AT REVERSAL Chart 13AT REVERSAL Chart 14The Strong Trend In The 18-Month-Out US Interest Rate Future Is Fragile Chart 15The Strong Trend In The 3 Year T-Bond Is Fragile Chart 16A Potential Switching Point From Tobacco Into Cannabis Chart 17Biotech Is A Major Buy Chart 18Norway's Outperformance Could End Chart 19Cotton's Outperformance Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 20Fractal Trading Watch List Chart 21The Rally In USD/EUR Could End Chart 22The Outperformance Of MSCI Hong Kong Versus China Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 23A Potential New Entry Point Into Petcare Chart 24GBP/USD At A Turning Point Chart 25Fractal Trading Watch List Chart 26Fractal Trading Watch List Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Realtor.com gauge homebuyer demand by so-called ‘pending listings’, the number of listings that are at various stages of the selling process that are not yet sold. Fractal Trading System Fractal Trades 6-12 Month Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed   Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

Listen to a short summary of this report.       Executive Summary A Tremendous Inflow Into US Government Bonds Multiple frameworks exist for managing currencies. These include forecasting growth differentials, watching central banks, gauging terms of trade and balance of payment dynamics or even assigning a probability to the occurrence of black swans. For us, the most useful tool has been to simply track portfolio flows. In today’s paradigm, portfolio flows into US equities are rapidly dwindling, while those flowing into fixed income have picked up meaningfully. Gauging what happens next will be critical for the dollar call (Feature chart). The Fed is being viewed as the most credible central bank to curb inflation. As a result, US rates have risen more than in other markets. This has also pushed valuation and sentiment of the dollar to very elevated levels. If inflation peaks and the world economy achieves a soft landing, downside in the dollar will be substantial. On sentiment, being a contrarian can make you a victim, but when the stars are aligned where valuation, sentiment and the appropriate macro analysis point towards a single direction, our framework proves extremely useful. In a nutshell, many currencies, especially the euro, are already pricing in a nasty recession into their respective economies. If a recession does occur, they could undershoot. If one does not, they are poised for a coiled spring rebound. Bottom Line: Tactical investors should be neutral to overweight the dollar in the near term, as the probability of a recession rises. Longer-term investors should be slowly accumulating assets in countries where fundamentals make sense, and their currencies are deeply undervalued. Feature The real neutral rate of interest in the US is difficult to estimate ex ante, but Chart 1 highlights that the real Fed Funds rate is well below many estimates of neutral. In a world where inflation has become a widespread problem, and a few economies (like the US) are overheating, markets have moved to test the credibility of their respective central banks. The consensus has been that the Federal Reserve will be the most credible in taming runaway inflation by being able to raise rates faster than other central banks (Chart 2). This is especially the case as many European economies remain at firing range from the Russia-Ukraine conflict and, as such, face more supply-side driven inflation. Chart 1The Fed Has Scope To Tighten Further Chart 2Interest Rates Have Moved In Favor Of The Dollar The typical pattern for the dollar is that it tends to rise when growth is falling and inflation is also subsiding, which triggers tremendous haven flows into US Treasurys. Right now, inflation remains strong but growth is rolling over, which has historically painted a mixed picture for the dollar (Chart 3). Chart 3The Dollar Rises On Falling Growth What happens next is critical. The dollar tends to rise 10%-15% during downturns. We are already there. The DXY index is up 8.8% this year, and up 16.3% from the trough last year. European currencies like the SEK and the EUR have already priced in a recession as deep as in 2020. If this indeed proves to be the case, commodity currencies will be next, which could push the DXY to fresh highs. But as we outline below, even in a pessimistic scenario, a systematic approach to looking at currencies warns against fresh bets in favor of the dollar. Inflation And Central Banks One of the key themes we outlined in our outlook for this year is that inflation is a global problem, and not centric to the US. So, while supply side factors have had an outsized effect on energy deficient countries like Germany, the UK, Sweden and, to an extent Japan, inflation is also well above target in Canada, Australia, Norway, New Zealand, and many other developed and emerging market countries. In fact, the inflation impulse is slowing in the US, relative to a basket of G10 countries (Chart 4). Related Report  Foreign Exchange StrategyLessons From Fed Interest Rate Hikes Falling inflation will be a welcome relief valve from the tension in markets over much tighter financial conditions. It will also lower the probability of a global recession. For currency markets however, the starting point is that the market has priced the Fed to continue leading the tightening cycle until something breaks. If inflation does subside, then hawkish expectations by the Fed will be heavily priced out of the curve, which will remove a key source of support for the greenback. From a chartist point of view, the dollar has already overshot the level of rates the markets expect from the Fed, relative to more dovish central banks (Chart 5). This suggests a hefty safety premium is already embedded in the dollar. Chart 4US Inflation Is Peaking, Relative To Other ##br##Economies Chart 5The Dollar Has Overshot The Path Implied By Interest Rates The Dollar And Global Growth If the Fed and other central banks tame the inflation genie, then we will have achieved a soft landing. The dollar has tended to track the path of the US yield curve, and a flattening usually underscores longer-term worries about a recession (Chart 6). A steepening curve will signal mission accomplished. In the view of the Foreign Exchange Strategy service, recession risks could be relatively balanced. While major central banks have been tightening policy (the US and most of the G10), China, a big whale in terms of its monetary policy impact, has been easing monetary conditions. Chart 7 highlights that most procyclical currencies have tracked the Chinese credit impulse tick for tick. Bond yields in China are near the lows for the year. Unless China enters another economic down-leg in growth that matches the 2015 slowdown, we might just witness a rotation in economic vigor from the US towards other economies, led by China, allowing the world to achieve a soft landing. Chart 6The Dollar Is Tracking The US Yield ##br##Curve Chart 7Commodity Currencies Are Tracking The Chinese Credit Impulse   In the currency world, typical recessionary indicators are not yet flashing red. Cross-currency basis swaps remain well contained, suggesting dollar funding pressures, or that the ability to service dollar debt abroad remains healthy. The Fed’s liquidity swap lines, which allow foreign central banks to obtain dollar funding, also remain untapped (Chart 8). That said, currency put-call ratios are rising, suggesting the cost of obtaining downside protection has increased. Chart 8The Fed"s Recession Models Are Still Sanguine The Dollar And Portfolio Flows Aside from hedging against downside protection for the EUR, the AUD or even the CAD, one driver of dollar strength has been huge portfolio inflows into US Treasurys (Chart 9). That has occurred while equity inflows have collapsed. Admittedly, this took us by surprise since by monitoring the big Treasury whales (Japan and China), holdings have been rolling over for quite some time (Chart 10). This has also occurred amidst an accumulation of speculative short positions on US Treasurys. Chart 9A Tremendous Inflow Into US Government Bonds Chart 10Japan And China Remain Treasury Sellers Historically, bond inflows are the driver of portfolio flows into the US, but the equity market has also dictated the trend in the dollar from time to time. Overall, the basic balance in the US, sum of all portfolio flows, has done a good job capturing turning points in the dollar. Our focus on equity flows this time around is due to the conundrum the US faces. Relative profits tend to drive the performance of relative stock prices, and US profits tend to be more defensive – rising on a relative basis when bond yields and commodity prices are collapsing and falling otherwise (Chart 11). As such, the rise in bond yields has already derated US equity multiples but profits have held up remarkably well. An underperformance in US equities during a downturn has been unprecedented with a strong dollar since the end of the Bretton Woods system. So should a market shakeout lead to a violent rotation out of US equities, the profile for the dollar could be a mirror image of what we witnessed in 2008 or even 2020. The conundrum for bond inflows is that according to traditional measures, real rates in the US remain deeply negative, but they have improved significantly under the lens of market-based measures (Chart 12). This partly explains the dollar overshoot. A scenario of faster growth outside the US could see real rates improve more quickly abroad. Chart 11US Profits Have Held Up Remarkably Well Chart 12Market-Based Real Yields In The US Have Improved A final point: managing currencies is about anticipating the next macroeconomic driver. In our view, this could be fears about balance of payments dynamics, especially as the world becomes marginally less globalized. Since the 1980s, we have never had a configuration where the dollar is very overvalued, US real rates are extremely low, and the trade deficit is near a record high (meaning it needs to be financed externally). A bet on US exceptionalism has a natural limit, as competitiveness abroad is improving tremendously vis-à-vis many of the goods and services the US exports. Currencies And Valuations Currencies should revert to fair value. The question then becomes "which fair value should they mean-revert to?" In our view, simple works best – purchasing power parity values. A simple chart shows that selling the dollar when it is expensive and buying it when cheap according to its purchasing power generates alpha over the long term (Chart 13). In A Simple Trading Rule For FX Valuation Enthusiasts, we showed that a shorter-term trading strategy also based on valuation adds value. Granted, the dollar started to become overvalued in 2015, but it is now sitting close to a historical extreme. A fair assessment is that currencies will revert to their fair value, but that takes time (3-5 years). As such, longer-term investors should be slowly accumulating assets in countries where fundamentals make sense, and their currencies are deeply undervalued. These include Japan, Australia, Sweden and even Mexico (Chart 14). Chart 13The Dollar Is Overvalued On a PPP Basis Chart 14The Real Effective Exchange Rate For The Dollar Is High The Dollar And Momentum There is quite simply a dearth of dollar bears. Internally at BCA, a lot of strategists who see more downside to US (and global) equities, simply cannot be negative on the dollar. Within the foreign exchange strategy, we have been short the DXY index since 104.8, and are sticking with that bet on a 12-18-month horizon. For risk management purposes, our stop loss is at 107. First, we are seeing record long positions by speculators (Chart 15). Fielding clients, or even the media, no one wants to be a dollar bear when the Fed is clearly an inflation vigilante. If inflation keeps surprising to the upside, then speculators will keep bidding up the dollar. But it is also fair to say that most investors who want to be long the greenback at this point already have that position on.  Our intermediate-term indicator, a combination of technical variables, also warns against initiating dollar-long positions at the current juncture (Chart 16). This series mean-reverts quite quickly, so it does not dictate the trend in the dollar, but warns of capitulation extremes. Chart 15Speculators Are Very Long The Dollar Chart 16Technical Dollar Indicators Are Overbought Finally, the dollar has been used as a bet on rising volatility. The dollar is well above levels that a correction in the S&P 500 index would dictate (Chart 17). It has also moved in tandem with bond volatility (Chart 18). This suggests much of equity downside risk has been priced into the dollar. Chart 17The Dollar Has More Than Compensated For The Drawdown In Equities Chart 18The Dollar Is Tracking ##br##Volatility Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Strategic View Cyclical Holdings (6-18 months) Tactical Holdings (0-6 months) Limit Orders Forecast Summary

In this <i>Strategy Outlook</i>, we present the major investment themes and views we see playing out for the rest of the year and beyond.

Executive Summary Accelerating wages will make core consumer inflation sticky in the US. In addition, inflation is a lagging variable and is still well above the Fed’s target. These dynamics imply that the Fed will not make a dovish pivot imminently. Following the re-normalization of economic activity after reopening, China’s recovery will be U-shaped, rather than V-shaped. Global manufacturing and exports are heading into contraction. Contracting global trade is bullish for the trade-weighted US dollar given that it is a counter-cyclical currency. A hawkish Fed is also positive for the greenback. Hence, the US dollar will likely overshoot. EM equities are unlikely to rally/outperform on a sustainable basis until an EM profit contraction is priced in and the US dollar starts depreciating. Asian Currencies Will Depreciate Bottom Line: Absolute return investors should stay defensive for now. The global equity selloff has entered its final capitulation phase. Feature Global equity and fixed-income portfolios should maintain an underweight allocation to EM. That said, we will likely be upgrading EM versus DM later this year. EM currencies have more downside. Global and EM risk assets will likely continue selling off. Our major macro themes remain intact. Accelerating wages will make core consumer inflation sticky in the US. In addition, inflation is a lagging variable and is still well above the Fed’s target. These dynamics imply that the Fed will not make a dovish pivot imminently. Meanwhile, global growth is slowing rapidly, and global trade volumes are on the verge of contracting. US and EU demand for consumer goods (ex autos) is set to shrink.  EM ex-China domestic demand will be weakening from already very low levels.  Following the re-normalization of Chinese economic activity after the reopening, China’s recovery will be U-shaped, rather than V-shaped. Overall, global profits − including US and EM –will contract. Our bias is that equity markets have not fully discounted a profit contraction. The combination of shrinking corporate profits and a hawkish Fed  that is focused on taming inflationary pressures is bearish for global stocks and risk assets. As long as the Fed maintains its hawkish bias and/or global trade contracts, the US trade-weighted dollar will continue to appreciate. The USD will likely overshoot in the near term. Contracting global trade is bullish for the counter-cyclical greenback. EM currencies will therefore continue to depreciate, weighing on EM bonds and stocks. Typically, EM stocks do not out outperform DM ones when the dollar is strengthening. Even though global risk assets have already sold off significantly and there is a temptation to buy, odds are high that there will be another downleg. Several markets are already breaking down below their technical support lines: The Nasdaq 100 index is slipping below its 3-year moving average which proved to be a major support in past selloffs (Chart 1, top panel). The average exchange rate of AUD, NZD and CAD (which are all cyclical commodity currencies) versus the US dollar has fallen below its 3-year moving average (Chart 1, bottom panel). In the commodity space, we have similar breakdowns. Share prices of gold mining companies, silver prices and the silver-to-gold price ratio have all clearly crossed below their 3-year moving averages (Chart 2). Chart 1Breakdowns in The Nasdaq 100 And Commodity Currencies Chart 2Precious Metal Prices Are Breaking Down Too   Emerging Asian financial markets underscore that growth is relapsing and demand for raw materials is weak. The top panel of Chart 3 illustrates that Korean materials stocks have broken below their 3-year moving average. Further, in China, rebar steel, rubber, cement and plate glass prices are all falling (Chart 3, middle and bottom panels). Chart 3Bearish Signals For Raw Materials From Asia The charts below provide more evidence, supporting our macro themes and investment strategy. Investment Conclusions Absolute return investors should stay defensive for now. The global equity selloff has entered its final capitulation phase. Global equity and fixed-income portfolios should continue underweighting EM. That said, we will likely be upgrading EM versus DM later this year. The US dollar has more upside. EM/Asian FX and commodity currencies are vulnerable. We also continue to short the following currencies versus the USD: ZAR, COP, PEN, PLN, PHP and IDR; as well as HUF vs. CZK, and KRW vs. JPY. A buying opportunity in global and EM risk assets will emerge once US Treasury yields roll over decisively, the US dollar begins its descent and China provides more stimulus. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com The US Equity Bear Market: How Advanced Is It? If this US equity selloff is part of an ongoing bull market that began in 2009, then the drop in share prices is probably over. However, if this same bull market has reached its end, then this selloff has further room to go. Our best guess is that it is the latter, i.e., we might be witnessing the end of the S&P 500 bull market that commenced in 2009. Our S&P 500 Capitulation Indicator is low, but it can drop further. Also, the S&P 500 will likely break below its 3-year moving average, which acted as a support in the 2011, 2015-16 and 2018 selloffs. Chart 4The US Equity Bear Market: How Advanced Is It? US Corporate Credit And Share Prices The US corporate credit market does not yet point to a durable bottom in US share prices. Rising corporate HY ex-energy bond yields, and the underperformance of HY ex-energy corporate credit versus IG credit, point to lower share prices for now. Chart 5US Corporate Credit And Share Prices Chart 6US Corporate Credit And Share Prices The US Inflation Genie Is Out Of The Bottle US labor demand is outstripping labor supply by a record margin since 1950. US wages have accelerated and will remain sticky in the coming months. High wage growth and weaker output entail rising unit labor costs. The latter is a key driver of core inflation. Unless the unemployment rate rises, US core inflation will not drop below 3.5-4%. In fact, median and trimmed-mean CPI have continued rising even though core CPI has rolled over. Chart 7The US Inflation Genie Is Out Of The Bottle Chart 8The US Inflation Genie Is Out Of The Bottle       Chart 9The US Inflation Genie Is Out Of The Bottle Chart 10The US Inflation Genie Is Out Of The Bottle   US Manufacturing Is Downshifting Rapidly Railroad carload is declining, and new orders from the US regional Feds’ manufacturing surveys are in free fall. The ISM new orders index will drop below the critical 50 line. Chart 11US Manufacturing Is Downshifting Rapidly Chart 12US Manufacturing Is Downshifting Rapidly Chart 13US Manufacturing Is Downshifting Rapidly     The US Is Entering A Major Growth Slump US household demand for consumer goods ex-autos will shrink. The basis is excessive goods purchases in the last two years, falling household disposable income in real terms and a shift in preference for services versus goods. US retail inventories of consumer goods ex-autos have surged. Retailers will substantially cut back on their orders. Asian/Chinese exports are set to shrink. US consumption of gasoline is also contracting. Chart 14The US Is Entering A Major Growth Slump Chart 15The US Is Entering A Major Growth SlumpChart 16The US Is Entering A Major Growth Slump       Global Manufacturing And Exports Are Heading Into Contraction The relative performance of global cyclical stocks versus defensives points to a major relapse in global manufacturing. Chinese import volumes have been contracting and EM import volumes will drop too with the deteriorating purchasing power of households across many developing economies. Chart 17Global Manufacturing And Exports Are Heading Into Contraction Chart 18Global Manufacturing And Exports Are Heading Into Contraction Chart 19Global Manufacturing And Exports Are Heading Into Contraction     Contracting Asian Exports Are Negative For Asian Currencies There are already signs of contraction in Asian manufacturing/exports. Downshifting global trade typically leads to Asian currency depreciation. Chart 20Contracting Asian Exports Are Negative For Asian Currencies Chart 21Contracting Asian Exports Are Negative For Asian Currencies       Chart 22Contracting Asian Exports Are Negative For Asian Currencies Chart 23Contracting Asian Exports Are Negative For Asian Currencies   The USD Has More Upside, EM FX More Downside The EM ex-China currency total return index has failed to break above its technical resistance line. This entails a major downside. The underperformance of global cyclicals versus defensives points to lower Asian currencies. The US dollar (shown inverted on Chart 24) will be supported by a deceleration in global US dollar liquidity. Chart 24The USD Has More Upside, EM FX More Downside Chart 25The USD Has More Upside, EM FX More Downside     Chart 26The USD Has More Upside, EM FX More Downside EM Equity Capitulation Our EM Equity Capitulation Indicator has dropped significantly but is still above its 2008, 2015-16 and 2020 lows. Given the global and EM macro backdrops, odds point to an undershoot in EM share prices. Chart 27EM Equity Capitulation EM Equity And Bond Sentiment Investor sentiment on EM stocks and EM USD bonds is downbeat. This is positive from a contrarian perspective. However, as global risk assets continue selling off and the US dollar overshoots, EM stocks and bonds might undershoot. Chart 28EM Equity And Bond Sentiment Chart 29EM Equity And Bond Sentiment EM Equity Valuations And Profits Based on our cyclically adjusted P/E ratio, EM equity valuations have improved to one standard deviation below the mean. Relative to the S&P 500, EM stock valuations are at their record low based on a similar measure. Nevertheless, EM equities are unlikely to rally/outperform on a sustainable basis until an EM profit contraction is priced in and the US dollar starts depreciating. Chart 30EM Equity Valuations And Profits Chart 31EM Equity Valuations And Profits       Chart 32EM Equity Valuations And Profits Chart 33EM Equity Valuations And Profits   Four Large-Cap EM Stocks The four largest EM stocks (by market value) might not be out of the woods. Alibaba is facing resistance at its 200-day moving average. Tencent, TSMC and Samsung will likely drop to their next technical support lines. Chart 34Four Large-Cap EM Stocks Chart 35Four Large-Cap EM Stocks       Chart 36Four Large-Cap EM Stocks Chart 37Four Large-Cap EM Stocks   Chinese And EM ex-China Stocks The rally in the Chinese onshore CSI 300 stock index will probably dwindle at its 200-day moving average. Technical supports have held up for Chinese investable TMT and non-TMT stocks. However, the recent rebound is unlikely to be sustained if the global selloff continues. Finally, EM ex-China stocks have been in a free fall. Chart 38Chinese And EM ex-China Stocks Chart 39Chinese And EM ex-China Stocks       Chart 40Chinese And EM ex-China Stocks Chart 41Chinese And EM ex-China Stocks   Global Cross-Asset Interlinkages Rising US TIPS yields will keep upward pressure on EM local bond yields and downward pressure on EM currencies. The mainstream EM ex-China currencies are not cheap. Without EM currencies rallying, it will be difficult for EM stocks to outperform DM ones. Chart 42Global Cross-Asset Interlinkages Chart 43Global Cross-Asset Interlinkages Chart 44Global Cross-Asset Interlinkages     A Structural Breakdown In Chinese Real Estate The Chinese real estate market is experiencing a structural breakdown, as is illustrated by the collapse in share prices of Chinese property developers and their corporate bond prices. The breakdown in property developers’ financing heralds lower construction volumes with negative implications for raw material prices. Chart 45A Structural Breakdown In Chinese Real Estate Chart 46A Structural Breakdown In Chinese Real Estate       Chart 47A Structural Breakdown In Chinese Real Estate Chart 48A Structural Breakdown In Chinese Real Estate   Chinese Domestic Demand Has Been Absent Over The Past 12 Months Chinese imports of various commodities and goods have been contracting over the past 12 months. The resilience of commodity prices has not been due to China. As investors start pricing in the US economic downturn and the need for inflation protection wanes, commodity prices could gap down. Chart 49Chinese Domestic Demand Has Been Absent Over The Past 12 Months Chart 50Chinese Domestic Demand Has Been Absent Over The Past 12 Months     Will The Pendulum Swing From Inflation To Deflation? The US equity and bond market selloffs of the past 12 months have wiped out about $12 trillion and $3.5 trillion of their respective market value, respectively. This adds up to a combined $15 trillion or about 60% of US GDP, which already exceeds the wipeouts that occurred during the March 2020 crash and all other bear markets. Such wealth destruction and a hawkish Fed could swing the pendulum from inflation to deflation. Commodity prices are currently vulnerable. Stay tuned. Chart 51Will The Pendulum Swing From Inflation To Deflation? Chart 52Will The Pendulum Swing From Inflation To Deflation? Chart 53Will The Pendulum Swing From Inflation To Deflation?     Footnotes Strategic Themes (18 Months And Beyond) Equities Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)

Highlights We now recommend that investors maintain a neutral stance towards stocks versus bonds in a global multi-asset portfolio. We also recommend that investors increase their allocation to government bonds within a global fixed income portfolio (to overweight), at the expense of corporate bonds. We still believe that the US will likely avoid a recession over the coming year, but we are less convinced that this is true than we were a few months ago. The fact that mortgage rates have risen to neutral territory means it is possible that the usual ingredients for a recession – tight monetary policy plus a shock to aggregate demand in the form of a sharp decline in real wages – are currently present or soon will be. In addition, the Fed is now very concerned that long-term household inflation expectations may become unanchored to the upside. Headline inflation has seemingly been a more impactful driver of long-term inflation expectations than core measures, implying that the Fed may have to crowd out demand for goods and services that are comparatively less affected by supply-side constraints in order to contain rising inflation expectations. That would be clearly negative for economic growth and is potentially recessionary in nature. We see no compelling signs of an acceleration in European or Chinese growth that could act as a ballast to support the global economy. The European energy situation is worsening, China’s post-lockdown rebound has so far been tepid, and market-based indicators of Chinese economic growth are deteriorating. The US equity market is not priced for a typical “income-statement” recession induced by monetary policy. We expect the S&P 500 to fall to 3100 in a recession scenario, driven mostly by declining earnings. In a recession scenario, we do not expect long-maturity government bond yields to fall enough to offset a likely increase in the equity risk premium. Financial markets rarely trend sideways over 6-to-12 month periods. We regard a neutral global asset allocation stance as a temporary stepping stone to either a further downgrade of risky assets to underweight, or an increase in risky asset exposure back to a high-conviction overweight. The latter is still possible, especially if we soon see a substantial slowdown in the US headline inflation rate. Thus, additional changes to our recommended cyclical allocation may occur over the coming few months, in response to the incoming data and our assessment of the likely implications for monetary policy. Downgrading Risky Assets To Neutral Every month, BCA strategists hold a house view meeting to discuss the most important issues driving the macroeconomy and financial markets. As highlighted in a recent Special Alert from our Global Investment Strategy service,1 BCA strategists voted at our June meeting to change our House View to a neutral asset allocation stance towards equities, with a slight plurality favoring an outright underweight. Table I-1We Now Recommend More Conservative Positioning Than We Did In May The view of the Bank Credit Analyst service is in line with the consensus of BCA strategists on this issue, and we consequently recommend a neutral stance towards stocks versus bonds in a global multi-asset portfolio. We also recommend that investors increase their allocation to government bonds within a global fixed income portfolio (to overweight), at the expense of corporate bonds (Table I-1). We noted in our April report2 – when the S&P 500 index stood at 4530 – that the outlook for equities had deteriorated meaningfully since the beginning of the year and that investors should maintain at most a very modest overweight toward equities in a global multi-asset portfolio. A formal downgrade to neutral is thus not a large change in our recommended positioning, but it reflects what we view as a legitimate increase in the odds of a US recession over the coming year. It is not yet our view that a US recession is a probable outcome, but it is important to distinguish between one’s forecast of the economic outlook and the appropriate investment strategy. The unique inflationary pressure created by the COVID-19 pandemic has created a large confidence interval around our forecast, underscoring that an aggressive stance towards risky assets is not warranted. Financial markets rarely trend sideways over 6-to-12 month periods. We regard a neutral stance as a temporary stepping stone to either a further downgrade of risky assets to underweight or an increase in risky asset exposure back to a high-conviction overweight. The latter is still possible, especially if we see a substantial slowdown in the US headline inflation rate. But as we will discuss below, that slowdown will have to materialize soon in order for us to recommend an overweight risky asset stance. Reviewing Our Previously Constructive View On US Economic Growth Chart I-1Recessionary Concerns Have Escalated Significantly Since The 2-10 Yield Curve Inverted Concerns about a potential US recession have been growing since the Fed’s hawkish pivot in November, especially following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Previously, these concerns centered around two core issues: the aggressive pace at which the Fed communicated it would raise the policy rate, and the fact that the 2-10 yield curve flattened sharply in the first quarter and finally inverted (based on closing prices) on April 1st (Chart I-1). We had pushed back against those concerns, for several reasons. Our deeply-held view is that recessions typically occur when a significant shock to aggregate demand emerges against the backdrop of tight monetary policy. Sometimes the debt-service and credit demand impact of high interest rates itself is the shock. In other cases, recessions have been triggered in an environment of restrictive monetary policy by a sudden change in key input costs (such as oil prices), the bursting of a financial asset bubble, or a major shift in fiscal spending (typically following a period of war). But the core point is that recessions rarely occur when monetary policy is easy, even when shocks to aggregate demand occur. We abstract here from special cases such as the recession that occurred during the early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic. That event saw the introduction of government policies that purposely arrested economic activity, which in our view would have caused a recession under any conceivable fiscal and/or monetary policy alignment. As a business cycle indicator, the yield curve is significant for investors because it essentially represents the bond market’s assessment of the monetary policy stance. The 2-10 yield curve inversion in early April occurred, in part, because of the speed at which the Fed signaled it would raise interest rates, but also because the 10-year Treasury yield stood just under 2.4% at the point of inversion. This level of long-maturity bond yields reflected the view of both the Fed and most investors that the neutral rate of interest permanently fell following the 2008/2009 global financial crisis (GFC), a view that we have argued against in several previous reports.3 As such, the first reason we pushed back against earlier recessionary concerns is that we believe that the natural/neutral rate of interest is higher than the Fed and investors believe (even though we warned that a recessionary scare was quite likely). Chart I-2A Large Portion Of Currently Elevated Inflation Is Due To Supply-Side And Pandemic-Related Factors The second reason that we had pushed back against recessionary concerns was our view that a meaningful portion of currently elevated US inflation is a function of supply-side and pandemic-related factors that will eventually abate. Chart I-2 highlights credible estimates showing that roughly half of the year-over-year change in the headline PCE deflator is the result of supply-side factors, versus 40-50% for core inflation. It has been and remains our view that a substantial portion of these supply-side and pandemic-related factors will dissipate as the pandemic continues to recede in importance, with several price categories likely to deflate outright. Chart I-3Excess Savings Should Still Support Higher Services Spending Finally, we have argued in several reports that US goods spending has been well above-trend and is likely to slow, but also that services spending is far too low and is likely to rise. Chart I-3 highlights that close to $3 trillion in excess savings have accrued during the pandemic, which formed because of a combination of rising disposable income and falling services spending. We noted that the continued transition of the US and global economies towards a post-pandemic state would boost services spending, providing (an admittedly atypical) source of support for overall aggregate demand.   Why The Odds Of A US Recession Have Increased We still believe that the US will more likely than not avoid a recession over the coming year, but it is true that the strength of all three of the arguments presented above has weakened. Regarding the stance of monetary policy, Charts I-4 and I-5 highlight that it is still true that the Fed funds rate and 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yields remain below our estimate of the neutral rate (nominal potential GDP growth). However, Chart I-6 highlights that the sharp rise in consumer price inflation has caused a substantial reduction in real wage growth, which certainly constitutes a non-monetary aggregate demand shock. Chart I-4The Policy Rate Is Not Yet At Neutral, But Mortgage Rates Are Chart I-5Long-Maturity Government Bond Yields Would Have Room To Move A Lot Higher Absent Any Shocks To Demand...       Chart I-6...Unfortunately, US Consumers Are Clearly Experiencing A Shock In The Form Of Sharply Lower Real Wages Panel 2 of Chart I-4 also shows that the 30-year mortgage rate in the US is now at neutral levels, in contrast to government bond yields and the US policy rate. Chart I-7 highlights that our models for US home sales and starts, featured in last month’s report,4 are still not pointing to a severe slowdown in the housing market. However, the fact that mortgage rates have risen to neutral territory means that it is possible that the usual ingredients for a recession – tight monetary policy plus a shock to aggregate demand – are currently present or soon will be. On the question of services spending acting as a support for US economic growth as goods spending slows, we continue to believe that services spending will recover back towards its pre-pandemic trend – funded by excess savings that accrued during the pandemic. However, Chart I-8, presented by my colleague Arthur Budaghyan in a recent Emerging Markets Strategy report,5 underscores the extent of the wealth destruction that has occurred because of the joint effect of falling stock and bond prices. At least some of the services-boosting effect of excess savings will likely be blunted by a negative wealth effect stemming from these financial market losses, especially since the remaining excess savings in the US are likely held by middle-to-upper income households – who are the disproportionate holders of publicly-traded financial assets. Chart I-7No Sign Yet Of A Sharp Slowdown In The Housing Market, But The Ingredients Of A Typical Recession May Be Present Chart I-8A Significant Wealth Shock May Blunt The Deployment Of The Excess Savings Accrued During The Pandemic   On the inflation front, the May CPI release – and the Fed’s reaction to it – underscores that the US economy is at risk of a recession unless supply-side inflation dissipates quickly. Chart I-9 highlights that the May CPI release directly contradicted the view that the monthly rate of change in inflation has peaked. In addition, Chart I-10 presents a breakdown of the percent change in May’s headline consumer price index, with each bar in the chart representing the contribution of that category to headline CPI rising faster than 4% (annualized). The note next to each bar highlights our view of the main driver of that price category, and the color of the bars denotes how probable it is that we will soon see a significant easing in price pressure. Chart I-9The May CPI Report Was Clearly Inconsistent With A Peak Inflation Narrative Chart I-10Some Elements Of Outsized CPI Will Dissipate Soon. Others May Not.     The chart makes it clear that certain price categories that have been strongly contributing to outsized headline inflation are likely to peak or even turn deflationary over the next few months. Gasoline and fuel oil inflation is clearly being driven by the trend in crude oil prices, which in our view will likely be flat for the rest of the year. In addition, motor vehicles and parts inflation continues to be driven by the impact of supply-chain shortages on vehicle production. Over the past year, the volume of industrial production of motor vehicle assemblies has averaged just 83% of its pre-pandemic level, which we noted in last month’s report now finally seems to be normalizing (Chart I-11). And while airlines have experienced legitimate cost increases due to rising fuel prices and COVID-related labor shortages, panel 2 of Chart I-11 highlights that real airfares have risen well above their pre-pandemic level. This underscores that a moderation in airfares is quite likely over the coming several months. However, Chart I-10 also highlights that there are several price categories that are less likely to ease quickly. Outsized food and energy services inflation has recently been tied to natural gas prices, given that natural gas is used to generate electricity and is a key element used in the production of fertilizer. Chart I-12 highlights that food inflation has been strongly correlated with the producer price index for pesticide, fertilizer, and other agricultural chemicals, and that there is no sign yet of the latter abating. Despite the fact that global wheat prices have recently been falling, the recent increase in European natural gas prices is likely to exacerbate US food inflation, as fertilizer is used to produce all major planted crops. In addition, European energy insecurity has created an even stronger link between the US and European natural gas markets than what prevailed prior to the Ukrainian war, because of what is likely to be permanently higher LNG demand from Europe. Chart I-11Vehicle And Airfare Inflation Is Likely To Ease Soon Chart I-12Food Inflation May Remain Elevated For Some Time   On top of what is likely to be persistent food and energy services inflation, shelter inflation is likely to stay elevated for some time – a point highlighted by my esteemed former colleague, Martin Barnes, in Section 2 of this month’s report. The unemployment rate and house prices are the two main drivers of shelter inflation, and the effect of the latter clearly lags because owner’s equivalent rent is a surveyed measure. The fact that mortgage rates have risen so significantly points to a meaningful slowdown in house price appreciation and possibly even mild deflation, so shelter inflation will eventually slow. The Federal Reserve has made it clear, however, that they are now focused on quickly bringing down consumer prices, even at the cost of a recession. The justification for the Fed’s impatience comes straight from the Modern-Day Phillips Curve, which we discussed in great detail in our January 2021 Special Report.6 Economic theory dictates that inflation should be “normal” when the economy is in equilibrium – defined as economic growth in line with potential growth, no economic/labor market slack, and no supply-side shocks affecting prices. In the minds of many investors, “normal” inflation means the central bank’s target for inflation, but that is not necessarily the case. The experience of the 1970s highlighted that “normal” inflation is the rate that is expected by households and firms, and that the Fed will only succeed at achieving target inflation under normal economic conditions if inflation expectations are consistent with its target. The Fed’s failure to prevent inflation expectations from shifting higher on a structural basis led to two debilitating recessions in the early 1980s, and a prolonged period over which the Fed had to maintain comparatively tight monetary policy. This is a mistake that the Fed does not want to make again. Chart I-13Headline Inflation, Not Core, Is Driving Long-Term Inflation Expectations Consistent with that view, Jerome Powell made it clear during the June FOMC meeting press conference that the Fed is now very concerned that long-term household inflation expectations may become unanchored to the upside. Powell implicitly referenced the University of Michigan’s 5-10 year median household inflation expectations survey during the press conference, which we have described in several previous reports as one of the most important macro data series for investors to monitor. The final reading for June came in materially lower than what was suggested by the preliminary report, but they were already at risk of a breakout even before the June release. In addition, Chart I-13 highlights that it is headline inflation (not core) that appears to be the main driver of rising long-term household inflation expectations, which raises a troubling point. If the Fed decides that inflation expectations need to be quickly reined in even at the cost of a higher unemployment rate, that decision implies that it is headline inflation that needs to return rapidly towards the Fed’s target, not just core. Given that some price categories shown in Chart I-10 are likely to be sticky for some time, and that the chart accounted for deviations in headline inflation from 4% (which itself is above the Fed’s target), the implication is that the Fed may have to crowd out demand for goods and services that are comparatively less affected by supply-side constraints. That would be clearly negative for economic growth, and is potentially recessionary in nature. As a final point, it is not just the potential for future economic weakness that concerns us. The US economy was already slowing prior to the Fed’s hawkish pivot and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and important indicators for economic activity continue to deteriorate. Chart I-14 highlights that the S&P Global US manufacturing and services PMIs fell meaningfully in June, and Chart I-15 highlights that the Conference Board’s US leading economic indicator continues to deteriorate. In fact, the Conference Board’s LEI has now decreased for three consecutive months, and the bottom panel of Chart I-15 highlights that four consecutive month-over-month declines have all essentially been associated with a recession. 2006 seemingly stands out as an exception to this rule, but given the fact that the housing market downturn began two years before the recession officially started, we simply regard this as an early recessionary signal rather than a false one. Chart I-14The US Is Losing Economic Momentum Chart I-15The Conference Board's LEI May Soon Send A Recessionary Signal     No Help From Europe Or China An overweight stance towards global equities might still be warranted in the face of a significant slowdown in US economic activity if economic growth in Europe or China were accelerating. However, the European outlook has been strongly tied to natural gas flows from Russia since the invasion of Ukraine, which tightened meaningfully in June in response to Europe’s oil ban, the looming expansion of NATO, and Europe’s success at replenishing its amount of natural gas in storage. Russia has not fully weaponized its natural gas exports and its actions so far have fallen well short of a complete cutoff, but prices have risen close to 70% over the past month, forcing Germany to trigger the alert level of its emergency gas plan. Aside from the negative impact that higher natural gas prices will have on headline inflation globally, this is obviously incrementally negative for European economic activity. Chart I-16 highlights that the German IFO business climate indexes have led the S&P Global Germany PMI lower over the past few months, and that they imply further manufacturing weakness. And while the services climate index for Germany ticked higher, it remains meaningfully below the levels that prevailed last summer and implies a deterioration in German services activity over the coming few months. In China, we see no compelling signs of a sustainable pickup in economic activity that will provide a ballast to slowing growth in the DM world. We have seen a bounce back in some activity indicators following the significant easing of restrictions in Shanghai and Beijing (Chart I-17). These indicators, however, are still quite weak, and it is likely that China will experience significant further COVID outbreaks over the coming 6-12 months. Chart I-16Europe's Economy Is Likely To Slow Further Chart I-17China's Post-Lockdown 'Recovery' Remains Tepid   While Chinese stocks have been rallying in absolute terms over the past few weeks, Chart I-18 highlights that this is essentially the only positive market-based signal about the pace of economic activity in China. The chart highlights that our market-based China Growth Indicator has experienced a renewed down leg, and that the diffusion index never rose above the boom/bust line earlier this year. The recent decline in industrial metals prices is also not a positive market-based signal for Chinese economic activity (Chart 19). Some investors have argued that weak metals prices reflect growth concerns outside of China, but even if that is the case, it implies that China’s reopening will not be forceful enough to offset slowing global ex-China growth. Chart I-18Market-Based Signals Are Not Pointing To An Improvement In Chinese Economic Activity Chart I-19Metals Prices Are Now Falling, Highlighting Mounting Global Growth Fears   Has The US Equity Market Already Priced In A Recession? One very important question for investors to answer is how much further downside is likely to occur for US equities in the event of a US recession. At its worst point in mid-June, the S&P 500 fell close to 24% from its early January high, and many investors have since questioned whether the US equity market is already priced for a potential contraction in output. Chart I-20The S&P 500 Is Not Currently Priced For A US Recession We disagree with this perspective, and believe that the S&P 500 would fall close to 3100 in a typical recession scenario. Chart I-20 presents a range of estimates for the S&P 500 based on a Monte Carlo approach, using what we believe are feasible ranges for the US equity risk premium, real 10-year government bond yields, and the extent of the decline in 12-month forward earnings per share. The chart shows that the equity market only has a positive return at the 5th percentile, which can be interpreted as just a 5% chance that the US equity market has already priced in the impact of a recession. Charts I-21 and I-22 highlight the range of possible outcomes that we used when modeling the likely decline in stock prices in a recession scenario. We assume that the equity risk premium, defined here as the difference between the S&P 500 12-month forward earnings yield and 10-year TIPS yields, rises on average to its early-March level in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. We assume that both 10-year nominal Treasury yields and 10-year breakeven inflation rates fall to 2%, reflecting an expectation that 10-year TIPS yields will not return to negative territory in a recessionary scenario. Finally, we expect that S&P 500 forward EPS will decline by 15% from current levels, which is in line with the historical average decline in 12-month trailing operating EPS during recessions. Chart I-21We Do Not Expect Real Bond Yields To Fall Back Into Negative Territory In A Typical Recession Scenario Chart I-22We Expect Earnings To Decline Between 10-20% In A Recession     One key takeaway from our analysis is that the likely recessionary equity market decline projected by our approach is fairly close to our estimate of the likely decline in earnings. One potential pushback against our view that earnings will fall in line with what usually occurs during recessions is the fact that nominal revenue growth may only mildly contract or may not contract at all in a recession that is occurring due to high rates of inflation (and thus higher prices charged by firms). Chart I-23 highlights that 12-month trailing S&P 500 sales per share growth never turned negative in the 1970s, even following the 1970 and 1974 recessions. Chart I-23Revenue Growth Did Not Contract In The 1970s, And May Not Contract Significantly If A Recession Occurs Today... There are two counterpoints to this argument. First, the current risk of a recession mostly stems from the Fed’s determination not to repeat the mistakes that it made during the 1970s, meaning that inflation expectations are unlikely to rise to the level that they did during that period in advance of a recession. That implies that actual inflation, and thus corporate pricing power, will come down significantly during a recession. Second, even in a scenario in which a recession occurs and S&P 500 revenue growth contracts less aggressively than it has during previous recessions, Chart I-24 highlights that the mean-reversion risks to earnings from falling profit margins are quite high. The chart shows that even if profit margins were merely to return to their pre-pandemic levels during a recession (which would actually be a comparatively mild decline given the historical behavior of margins during recessions), it would imply close to a 20% contraction in earnings if sales per share growth were flat. Given this, we feel that our assumption of a 10-20% decline in earnings per share in a recessionary scenario is reasonable. Chart I-24But Profit Margins Are At Great Risk Of A Significant Decline If The Economy Contracts There is another important takeaway from our analysis, which is that the decline in bond yields that will occur in a recessionary scenario will likely be more than offset by a rise in the equity risk premium. Another potential pushback against our view that the US equity market has already priced in a recession is focused on our assumption that the 10-year US Treasury yield will only fall back to 2%, and that real 10-year yields will not return to negative territory. For some investors, this assumption seems far too high, given the structural decline in long-maturity bond yields over the past decade and the fact that the 10-year yield stood below 2% at the beginning of the year when the odds of a recession were lower than they are today. In response to this, we offer three points for structurally-bullish bond investors to consider. The first is that the decline in the nominal 10-year US Treasury yield to 0.5% in 2020 was extremely irregular and it occurred because of the extent of the essentially unprecedented economic weakness wrought by the pandemic. This is absolutely the wrong yield benchmark to use in a typical recession scenario, because the Fed’s response to the recession will be much less aggressive. The second point is related to the first, in that negative real 10-year government bond yields have been heavily driven by the secular stagnation narrative and the general view that the natural/neutral rate of interest has permanently fallen. We agree that the neutral rate of interest fell for a time following the global financial crisis, but we believe strongly that it rose in the latter half of the last economic expansion as US households aggressively deleveraged their balance sheets. Academic estimates of R-star, such as that derived from the previously popular (but now discontinued) Laubach-Williams model, continued to point to a low neutral rate from 2015-2019 because of the deflationary impact of an energy-driven decline in long-term inflation expectations on actual inflation, a factor that is clearly no longer present. Chart I-25We Doubt That The Fed Will Resort To QE When The Next Recession Occurs Finally, we agree that the existence of the Fed’s asset purchase program has likely had some impact on the 10-year term premium over the past decade. We doubt that the Fed would resort to QE as a monetary policy tool in response to a conventional recession, implying that the term premium will not fall as low as it has over the past decade when growth slowed or contracted. Chart I-25 highlights one important reason for this. Since 2008, the Fed’s use of asset purchases has been part of a strategy to ease monetary policy further when the policy rate had already fallen to zero, to meet its dual mandate of maximum employment and price stability. The chart highlights that even just prior to the pandemic, a persistent gap existed between the headline and core PCE deflator and the level that would have prevailed if both deflators had grown at a 2% annual rate since the onset of the 2008 recession. The chart makes it clear that this gap will completely disappear within the next 12 months for both the headline and core deflator, if the recent pace of change in prices is sustained. In effect, Chart I-25 highlights that the entire post-GFC missed inflation-target era is almost over, which severely undercuts the idea that the Fed will resort to QE as a monetary policy tool in a recession scenario unless the contraction is very severe as it was in 2008 and 2020. We doubt that this will be the case if a recession does occur, implying that both a deeply negative term premium and a significant decline in the 5-year/5-year forward bond yield in a typical recession scenario is unlikely. Investment Conclusions Wayne Gretsky’s famous quotation, that he “skate[s] to where the puck is going, not where it has been” is often invoked by BCA strategists. Successful active investing requires anticipation rather than reaction, and it is legitimate for investors to ask whether downgrading risky assets at the current juncture represents the latter rather than the former. We are cognizant of that risk, but we are also mindful of the importance of capital preservation. When we wrote our annual outlook last year, we believed fairly confidently that inflation would peak and specifically that supply-side inflation would wane. We still believe that pandemic-related effects on consumer prices will eventually dissipate, and it is still possible that inflation is in the process of peaking. Recent evidence, however, about the pace of price advances, the clear impact that high inflation is having on real wage growth, and the Fed’s desire to see consumer prices fall quickly back toward its target, means that the cyclical economic outlook is now highly dependent on the speed at which prices normalize – not just whether it will occur. To us, that implies that investors need to have a high-conviction view that supply-side inflation will normalize soon in order to stay overweight risky assets, and that the Fed will look through elevated housing-related inflation that is likely to persist for several months. At least in the case of supply-side inflation, we think normalization is probable but we no longer have high conviction about the speed of adjustment. As such, we recommend that investors maintain no more than a neutral stance towards stocks versus bonds in a global multi-asset portfolio. We also recommend that investors increase their allocation to government bonds within a global fixed income portfolio (to overweight), at the expense of corporate bonds, as part of an overall shift towards more defensive positions. In terms of other important asset class allocations, we recommend the following: Within a global equity portfolio, maintain a neutral regional allocation, a neutral stance toward cyclicals versus defensives, and a neutral stance towards small-cap stocks versus their large-cap peers. Modestly favor value stocks over growth stocks, as most of the outsized outperformance of growth stocks during the pandemic has already reversed. Within a fixed-income portfolio, a modestly short stance is warranted over the coming 6- to 12-months. Extremely stretched technical and valuation conditions point to a bearish view towards the US dollar over the coming 6- to 12-months, but USD will likely remain well-bid over the nearer-term. We are only likely to upgrade our cyclical USD call in a scenario in which we recommend underweighting global equities within a multi-asset portfolio. As noted above, financial markets rarely trend sideways over 6-to-12 month periods. We regard a neutral global asset allocation stance as a temporary stepping stone to either a further downgrade of risky assets to underweight or an increase in risky asset exposure back to a high-conviction overweight. Thus, additional changes to our recommended cyclical allocation may occur over the coming few months, in response to the incoming data and our assessment of the likely implications for monetary policy. Stay tuned! Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst June 30, 2022 Next Report: July 28, 2022 II.  Inflation Whipsaw Ahead Dear Client, This month’s Special Report has been written by Martin Barnes, BCA’s former Chief Economist. Martin, who retired from BCA Research last year after a long and illustrious career, discusses the long-run outlook for inflation. The views expressed in this report are his, and may not be consistent with those of the Bank Credit Analyst or other BCA Research services. But Martin’s warning of future stagflation is sobering, and I trust you will find his report both interesting and insightful. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA The Bank Credit Analyst Overly stimulative policies meant that inflation was set to rise even before the disruptions caused by the pandemic and Ukraine conflict. Inflation should decline sharply over the coming year in response to weaker economic growth and an easing in supply problems. But it will be a temporary respite. Central banks will not have the stomach to keep policy tight enough for long enough to squeeze inflation out of the system. Price pressures will return as economies bottom and the environment will become one of stagflation. Financial assets will rally strongly when inflation fears subside but subsequent stagflation will not be bullish for markets. Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan once defined price stability as existing when “households and businesses need not factor expectations of changes in the average level of prices into their decisions”. Until recently, that state of affairs was the case for much of the past 30 years and for many, inflation was quiescent during their entire working lives. But inflation is now back as a huge issue and there is massive debate and uncertainty about whether it will be a temporary or lasting problem. I lean toward the latter view. Major changes in the economic and/or financial environment more often are identified in hindsight than in real time. It is easier to attribute large trend deviations to temporary factors than to make bold predictions about structural shifts. Obviously, the pandemic and conflict in Ukraine have had a significant impact on the near-term inflation picture via massive supply-side disruptions and represent temporary events. Thus, inflation will retreat from current elevated levels as those disruptions diminish. But the conditions for higher inflation were already in place before those two unfortunate events occurred. Specifically, central banks have been erring on the side of stimulus for several years and they will find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to put the inflation genie back into the bottle. Inflation has moved from a non-issue to the most important factor driving markets. Over the next year, the next big surprise might be how fast inflation retreats and investors and policymakers will then breathe a big sigh of relief. However, this will prove to be a temporary respite because it will not take long for inflation to move back up and remain stubbornly above central bank targets. In other words, a whipsaw is in prospect over the next few years as inflation goes from up, to down, and to up again. The Current Inflation Problem The biggest increases in consumer prices have occurred in areas most affected by supply problems, with energy attracting the most attention. Nevertheless, in most countries, inflation has risen across the majority of goods and services. The core inflation rate (i.e. consumer prices excluding food and energy) in the G7 economies climbed from 2% to 4.8% between April 2021 and April 2022 (Chart II-1). Meanwhile, the Cleveland Fed’s trimmed mean measure of US consumer price inflation has spiked dramatically higher, consistent with a broad-based acceleration in inflation.7 The rise in underlying inflation is a bigger problem in the US, UK and Canada than in Japan or the Euro Area. Chart II-2 shows current core inflation rates relative to the target rate of 2% pursued by most central banks. That geographical divergence will be touched on later and in the meantime, the focus will be on the US situation. Chart II-1A Broad-Based Pickup In Inflation Chart II-2The US, UK And Canada Have A Bigger Inflation Problem   The latest US inflation data for a range of goods and services is shown in Table II-1. The table shows the three- and six-month annualized changes in prices because 12-month rates can be affected by a base effect given the impact of pandemic-related shutdowns and disruptions a year ago. Also, a comparison of the three- and six-month rates shows if momentum is building or fading. The trends are not encouraging in that momentum has accelerated, not diminished in many key areas. Table II-1Selected Inflation Rates In The US CPI Even if the data show a moderation in core inflation in the months ahead, it is important to note that rent inflation – the CPI component with the biggest weight – is seriously underestimated. This is one of the few items where prices are collected with a lag and real estate industry reports highlight that rent inflation is running at double-digit rates in the major cities. According to one report, average rents nationally increased by more than 25% in the year to May.8 The CPI data will eventually catch up with reality, providing at least a partial offset to any inflation improvements in other areas. Another problem for inflation is the acceleration in wage growth against the backdrop of an unusually tight labor market. Currently, the number of unfilled vacancies is almost twice the number of unemployed and it is thus no surprise that wage growth has picked up sharply (Chart II-3). The Atlanta Fed’s measure of annual wage inflation has risen above 6%, its highest reading since the data began in 1997. Wage growth is unlikely to suddenly decline absent a marked rise in the unemployment rate. There is much debate about whether the US economy is on the verge of recession, but let’s not get bogged down in semantics. Regardless of whether the technical definition of recession is met (at least two consecutive quarters of negative GDP growth), the pace of activity is set to slow sharply. Plunging consumer and business confidence, contracting real incomes and a peaking in housing activity all point to a significant weakening in growth, even if the labor market stays healthy (Chart II-4). Chart II-3A Very Tight US Labor Market Chart II-4The US Economy Is In Trouble   Softer economic growth eventually will take the edge off inflationary pressures in many goods and services. Combined with an easing in supply-side disruptions, the inflation rate is certain to decline in the coming year, even if oil prices move higher in the short run. Currently, the Fed is talking tough about dealing with inflation and there is little doubt that further rate hikes are on the way. However, policymakers will have little stomach for inflicting enough economic pain to completely squeeze inflation out of the system. Once there are clear signs of a significant economic slowdown, the Fed will back off quickly. What Causes Inflation Anyway? Economics 101 teaches that prices are determined by the interaction of supply and demand. If the demand for a good or service exceeds supply, then prices will rise to bring things back into balance. Seems simple enough but, unfortunately, this leaves many unanswered questions. How much must prices rise and for how long in order to restore balance? What if there are structural impediments to supply? What if there are monopolies in key commodities or services? What if policy interferes with the operation of market-clearing solutions? And, finally, what measure of inflation should we be looking at? Chart II-5Inflation Is A 'Modern' Issue For much of economic history, deflation was just as prevalent as inflation, with the latter only being a problem during periods of war (Chart II-5). As the pre-WWII world pre-dated fiat money, automatic stabilizers (e.g. the welfare state), and counter-cyclical fiscal policy, economies were prone to regular depressions that served to wash out financial and economic excesses and any inflationary pressures. But those days are long gone and free market forces should not be expected to keep inflation under wraps. I rather like the simple explanation of inflation’s roots as being “too much money chasing too few goods”. In that sense, the control of inflation lies firmly at the door of central banks. In the “old days” (i.e. before the 1990s), it was possible to use the growth in the money supply to gauge the stance of policy because there was a fairly stable and predictable relationship between monetary and economic trends. That all ended when financial deregulation and the explosion in non-bank financial activities meant that monetary trends ceased to be a reliable indicator of economic growth and inflation. As a result, the Fed stopped setting monetary growth targets more than 20 years ago and since then, money supply data has rarely been mentioned in FOMC discussions. Chart II-6A Simple Measure Of The Monetary Stance Fortunately, all is not lost. The gap between the federal funds rate and nominal GDP growth is a reasonably good proxy for the stance of monetary policy. Conditions are easy when rates are persistently below GDP growth and vice versa when they are above. As can be seen in Chart II-6, rates were below GDP growth during most of the 1960s and 1970s, a period when inflation rose sharply. And inflation fell steadily in the 1980s into the first half of the 1990s when the Fed kept interest rates above GDP growth. And look at what has happened in the past decade: rates have been significantly below GDP growth, suggesting an aggressively easy monetary stance. It was only a matter of time before inflation picked up, even without the recent supply-side disruptions. The FOMC’s latest projections show long-run growth of 3.8% in nominal GDP while the fed funds rate is expected to average only 2.5%. That implies a continued accommodative stance, yet inflation is forecast to be in line with the 2% target. That all seems very unlikely. Fed policymakers spend a lot of time trying to figure out the level of the equilibrium real interest rate – the level consistent with steady non-inflationary economic growth. It would be very helpful to have this number but coming up with an accurate measure is a largely futile exercise. It cannot be measured empirically and its estimation requires a lot of assumptions, explaining why there is no broad agreement on what the right number is. I think there is a case for the simpler approach of using the nominal growth in GDP as a proxy for where rates should be in normal circumstances. As noted above, that suggests monetary policy was excessively accommodative for an extended period. If US Policy Was Too Easy, Why Was Inflation Low For So Long? The Fed’s preferred measure of underlying inflation is the change in the personal consumption deflator, excluding food and energy. In the 25 years to 2019, inflation by this measure averaged only 1.7%, compared to the Fed’s desired level of 2%. Thus, even though the level of interest rates implied very accommodative policy over that period, inflation remained tame. This leads to an important caveat. The stance of monetary policy plays the key role in driving inflation, but it is not everything. Offsetting forces on inflation (in both directions) can mute or even swamp the impact of policy. There were several disinflationary forces in operation during the past 25 years. Specifically: In the second half of the 1990s, the explosive growth of the internet and accompanying boom in technology spending led to a marked pickup in productivity growth. The entry of China into the World Trade Organization at the end of 2001 unleashed a wave of offshoring and downward pressure on traded goods prices. A series of deflationary shocks hit the US and global economy including the 1998 financial crisis in South-East Asia and Russia, the bursting of the tech bubble after 2000, and of course the global financial meltdown in 2007-09. Unstable economic conditions undermined labor’s bargaining power, keeping a tight lid on wage growth. This was highlighted by the dramatic decline in labor’s share of income after 2000. Importantly, the above forces are no longer in place and in some cases are reversing. The key technological advances of the past decade have not been particularly good for productivity. Indeed, one could argue that the activities of most so-called FANG stocks – especially those involved in social media - have had a negative impact on productivity. Time spent on FaceBook, Twitter and Netflix do not have obvious benefits for increased economic efficiency. Chart II-7Globalization In Retreat Even before the pandemic’s impact on supply chains, there were signs that globalization had peaked (Chart II-7). Indeed, BCA first suggested in 2014 that globalization was running out of steam. More recently, the interruption to supply chains has highlighted the downside of relying excessively on overseas production for key goods such as semi-conductors and pharmaceuticals. Onshoring rather than offshoring will become more common with higher prices being the cost for greater control over supply. Globalization is not dead, but, at the margin, it no longer is a powerful source of disinflation. US import prices from China are back to their highest level in a decade after falling steadily during the eight years to 2020. The inflationary impact of the pandemic and the war in Ukraine via supply-side disruptions are more than offsetting any disinflationary effects of softer economic growth. In other words, they have represented stagflationary rather than deflationary shocks. Finally, with regard to income shares, the pendulum has swung more in favor of labor. Demographic trends (e.g. slow growth in the working-age population) suggest that the labor market will remain relatively tight in the years ahead, notwithstanding short-term weakness as the economy slows. Profit margins are likely to weaken and labor’s share of income will rise. The bottom line is that easy money policies will no longer be offset by a number of powerful external forces that served to keep consumer price inflation under wraps in the pre-pandemic period. And this raises another important point. If monetary policy is too easy, then it will show up somewhere, even if consumer price inflation is under control. There Is More Than One Kind Of Inflation Inflation most commonly refers to the change in the prices of consumer goods and services. That is understandable because consumer spending accounts for more than half of GDP in the major developed economies (and almost 70% in the US). And because consumers are the ones who vote, it is the inflation rate that politicians care most about. However, there are other kinds of inflation. If there are structural impediments to increased consumer prices, then excessively easy monetary policy most likely will show up in higher asset prices. This is a very different kind of inflation because it is welcomed by the owners of assets and by politicians. Nobody is happy to face higher prices for the goods and services they buy, but asset owners love the wealth-boosting effect of higher prices for homes and shares.  Consumer inflation may have been subdued in the pre-pandemic decade, but the same is not true for asset prices. During the period that the Fed ran accommodative policies, there were several periods of rampant asset inflation such as the tech stock bubble of the late 1990s, the housing bubble of the 2000s, and the bond bubble of 2016-2020. And both equity and home prices surged in response to monetary stimulus triggered by the pandemic. Central banks may fret about the potential financial stability implications of surging asset prices, but in practice they do not act to curb them. Policymakers argue that it is hard to determine when an asset bubble exists and even when one is obvious, monetary policy is a crude tool to deal with it. If rising asset prices occur alongside an economy that is characterized by stable growth and moderate inflation, then acting to burst a bubble could inflict unnecessary economic damage. That is an understandable position, but it means ignoring the longer-term problems that occur when bubbles inevitably burst. This was highlighted by the economic and financial chaos after the US housing bubble burst in 2007. The reality is that central banks have been forced to rely more heavily on asset inflation as a source of monetary stimulus. An easing in monetary policy affects economic conditions in three primary ways: boosting credit demand and supply, raising asset prices, and lowering the exchange rate.9 Historically, the credit channel was by far the most important. BCA has written extensively about the Debt Supercycle and the role of monetary policy in fueling ever-rising levels of private sector indebtedness (see the Appendix for a brief description of the Debt Supercycle). Chart II-8No Releveraging Cycle In Household Debt The environment changed dramatically after the 2007-09 financial meltdown. The collapse of the credit-fueled housing bubble drove a stake through the heart of the household sector’s love affair with debt. The ratio of household debt to income peaked in early 2009 and ten years later it was back to the levels of 2001 (Chart II-8). Even an extended period of record low interest rates has failed to trigger a new leveraging cycle. If the Fed can’t persuade consumers and businesses to fall back in love with debt, then it must rely on the other two transmission channels for monetary policy – asset prices and the exchange rate. And the Fed really has limited control over the latter channel given that it also depends on the actions of other central banks. The deleveraging of the household sector in the post-2009 period could have been very bearish for the economy, but the Fed’s easy money policies underpinned the stock market, allowing household net worth to revive. There was an explosive rise in household net worth in 2020-21 as surging house prices added to stock market gains. Between end-2019 and end-2021, the household sector’s direct holdings of equities plus owner’s equity in real estate increased in value by around $20 trillion, equal to more than one year’s personal disposable income. The recent decline in equity prices has reversed some of the gains, but net worth remains elevated by historical standards. The bottom line is that it was wrong to suggest that the Fed’s accommodative stance did not create inflation. Consumer price inflation was tame in the pre-pandemic period, but there was lots of asset inflation and that gathered pace in 2020 and 2021. There was always going to be some leakage of this into more generalized inflation but this was accelerated by the double whammy of the supply disruptions caused by the pandemic and the Ukraine war. The Strange Case Of Japan If higher inflation in the US has seemed inevitable, how can one explain the situation in Japan? In contrast to other developed countries, Japan’s annual core inflation rate was only 0.2% in May. While this was an increase from the average -1.3% rate in the prior six months, it is impressive given the country’s continued highly stimulative monetary policy and the same exposure to supply disruptions as elsewhere. Most importantly, Japan has suffered structural deflation for so long that inflation expectations are totally dormant for both consumers and businesses. In other words, raising prices is seen as a desperate measure and something to be avoided. Japan’s poor demographics may also have played a role. A sharply declining labor force and rapidly aging population are disinflationary rather than inflationary influences and help reinforce the corporate sector’s reluctance to raise prices. While Japan seems an outlier, it is worth noting that core inflation also has remained relatively subdued in many European countries. For the overall Euro area, the latest core inflation rate is 3.8%, well below that of the US and UK. Two common features of the higher inflation countries are that they tended to have more aggressively-easy fiscal policies in recent years and greater asset inflation – especially in real estate. Unfortunately, inflation expectations and business pricing behavior in the US and other Anglo-Saxon economies have not followed Japan’s example. Employees have become more aggressive in demanding higher wages, and most companies have no problem in passing on higher costs to their customers. The UK is facing a wave of public sector strikes over pay the likes of which have not been seen for decades. The Outlook Chart II-9A Peaking In Supply Problems? Inflation may prove sticky over the next few months, but as noted earlier, it should move significantly lower over the coming year. Crude oil prices have risen by around 75% in the past year and that pace of rise cannot be sustained. Meanwhile, while shipping rates remain historically high, they are down sharply from earlier peaks (Chart II-9). Together with a revival in Chinese exports, this suggests some easing in supply chain problems. And as mentioned above, the pace of economic activity is set to slow sharply. But a return to pre-pandemic inflation levels is not in the cards. The Fed currently is talking tough and further rate hikes are on the way. But the tightening will end as soon as it becomes clear that the economy is heading south. A deep recession is not likely because there are not the worrying imbalances such as excessive consumer debt or inventories that typically precede serious downturns. However, policymakers will not take any risks and policy will return quickly to an accommodative stance, even though inflation is unlikely to return to the desired 2% level. On a positive note, inflation may be the highest in 40 years in many countries, but we are not facing a return to the destructive high-inflation environment of the 1970s. Inflation back then was institutionalized and a self-feeding cycle of higher wages and rising prices was deeply embedded. I was working as an economist for BP in London in the 1970s and remember receiving large quarterly pay rises just to compensate for inflation. In the absence of inflation-accounting practices, companies seriously underestimated the destruction that inflation was creating to balance sheets and profitability, making them complacent about the problem. Moreover, there were not the same global competitive pressures that exist today. Inflation in the US likely will form a new base of 3% to 4% over the medium term, with occasional fluctuations to 5% or above. An environment of stagflation is in prospect: growth will not be weak enough to suppress inflation and not strong enough to allow the Fed to maintain a restrictive stance. This puts the Fed in a difficult spot as it will be reluctant to admit defeat by raising the inflation target from its current 2%, even though that level will be out of reach in practical terms. A counter view is that I am too pessimistic by underestimating the disinflationary effects of technological advances. A sustained improvement in productivity would certainly help lower inflation but how likely is this? Technological advances are occurring all the time, but in recent years they largely have been incremental in nature and it is hard to think of any new breakthrough productivity-enhancing technologies. There is a difference between new technologies that simply represent better ways to do existing tasks (3D printing would fall into that category) and general purpose technologies that completely change the way economies operate (e.g. electricity and the internet). While businesses are still exploiting the benefits of the digital world, we await innovations that will trigger a new sustained upsurge in productivity. A game changer would be the development of unlimited cheap energy (cold fusion?) but that does not seem likely any time soon. Nevertheless, I will keep an open mind about the potential for productivity to surprise on the upside, despite my current skepticism. Chart II-10Inflation Expectations Spike Higher What does all this mean for the markets? Not surprisingly, shifts in market expectations for future inflation are highly correlated with the current rate and have thus spiked higher in recent months, hurting both bonds and stocks (Chart II-10). Obvious inflation hedges would be inflation-protected bonds and resources, but neither group currently is attractively priced. The good news is that the current panic about inflation is setting the scene for a buying opportunity in both stocks and bonds. The exact timing is tricky to predict but both stocks and bonds will rally strongly later this year when inflation expectations retreat as it becomes clear that the economy is weakening and the Fed softens its hawkish tones. The bad news is that this bullish phase will not last much more than a year because a re-emergence of inflationary pressures will bring things back to earth. The long-run outlook is one of stagflation and that will be a tough environment for financial assets. Martin H. Barnes Former Chief Economist, BCA Research mhbarnes15@gmail.com   Appendix: A Primer On The Debt Supercycle The Debt Supercycle is a description of the long-term decline in U.S. balance-sheet liquidity and rise in indebtedness during the post-WWII period. Economic expansions have always been associated with a buildup of leverage. However, prior to the introduction of automatic stabilizers such as the welfare state and deposit insurance, balance-sheet excesses tended to be fully unwound during economic downturns, albeit at the cost of severe declines in activity. The pain of the Great Depression led governments to intervene to smooth out the business cycle, and their actions were given legitimacy by the economic theories of John Maynard Keynes. Fiscal and monetary reflation, together with the introduction of automatic stabilizers such as unemployment insurance, were successful in preventing the frequent depressions that plagued the pre-WWII economy, but the downside was that balance-sheet imbalances and financial excesses built up during each expansion phase were never fully unwound. Periodic "cyclical" corrections to the buildup of debt and illiquidity occurred during recessions, but these were never enough to reverse the long-run trend. Although liquidity was rebuilt during a recession, it did not return to its previous cyclical high. Meanwhile, the liquidity rundown during the next expansion phase established new lows. These trends led to growing illiquidity, and vulnerability in the financial markets. The greater the degree of illiquidity in the economy, the greater is the threat of deflation. Thus, the bigger that balance-sheet excesses become, the more painful the corrective process would be. So, the stakes became higher in each cycle, putting ever-increasing pressure on the authorities to reflate demand, by whatever means were available. The Supercycle process was driven over time by the building tension between rising underlying deflationary risks in the economy, and the ability of policymakers to create inflation. The Supercycle reached an important inflection point in the recent economic and financial meltdown, with the authorities reaching the limit of their ability to get consumers to take on more leverage. This forced the government to leverage itself up instead, representing the Debt Supercycle's final inning. III. Indicators And Reference Charts BCA’s equity indicators paint a bearish picture for stock prices. Our monetary indicator is now at its weakest in almost three decades and our valuation indicator highlights that stocks are still overvalued, albeit less so than they were last year. Meanwhile, both our sentiment and technical indicators have now broken down very significantly, and are not yet providing a contrarian buy signal. The odds of a US recession over the next 12 months have recently risen, and we now recommend a neutral stance for stocks versus bonds over the coming year. Forward earnings are no longer being significantly revised up, but bottom-up analysts’ expectations for earnings are still too rosy. Although earnings growth is still likely to be positive over the coming year if a US recession is avoided, it will be in the mid-to-low single-digits. Within a global equity portfolio, we recommend a neutral stance on cyclicals versus defensives, small caps versus large, and a neutral stance on regional equity allocation. Within a fixed-income portfolio, investors should stay modestly short duration. The increase in commodity prices that followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has cooled, and prices are now rolling over significantly on the back of global growth concerns. Our composite technical indicator has dropped meaningfully, indicating that commodities are now no longer overbought. Our base-case view is that oil prices have peaked, but there some risk to that view given the current geopolitical situation. In addition, the recent rise in European natural gas prices suggests that global food inflation could remain elevated, given that natural gas is used in the production of fertilizer. We remain structurally bullish on industrial metals, but metals prices are likely to decline further until recessionary concerns abate. US and global LEIs have rolled over significantly and are now edging towards negative territory. The Conference Board’s LEI has now decreased for three consecutive months, and four consecutive month-over-month declines have historically been associated with a recession. Our global LEI diffusion index has bottomed, but we are not convinced that this heralds a major upturn in the LEI itself. EQUITIES: Chart III-1US Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3US Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4US Stock Market Breadth Chart III-5US Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6US Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9US Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes Chart III-11Selected US Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield ComponentsChart III-13US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Content Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-16US Dollar And PPP Chart III-17US Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18US Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning Chart III-28US And Global Macro Backdrop   ECONOMY: Chart III-29US Macro Snapshot Chart III-30US Growth Outlook Chart III-31US Cyclical Spending Chart III-32US Labor Market Chart III-33US Consumption Chart III-34US Housing Chart III-35US Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-36US Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Gabriel Di Lullo Research Associate Footnotes 1     Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Alert "Hard Or Soft Landing? BCA Strategists Debate The Question," dated June 21, 2022, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 2     Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "April 2022," dated March 31, 2022, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 3    Please see Global Investment Strategy "Revisiting The Neutral Rate Of Interest: A Contrarian View In A Time Of Crisis," dated March 20, 2020, available at gis.bcaresearch.com; The Bank Credit Analyst "R-star, And The Structural Risk To Stocks," dated March 31, 2021, available at bca.bcaresearch.com; The Bank Credit Analyst "Do Excess Savings Explain Low US Interest Rates?" dated March 31, 2022, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 4    Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "Is The US Housing Market Signaling An Imminent Recession?" dated May 26, 2022, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 5    Please see Emerging Markets Strategy "A Conversation With Ms. Mea: Navigating An Inflation Storm," dated June 16, 2022, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 6    Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "The Modern-Day Phillips Curve, Future Inflation, And What To Do About It," dated December 18, 2020, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 7     This trimmed mean measure excludes the top 8% of CPI components with the largest monthly price gains and the bottom 8% with the smallest monthly gains. 8     Rent.com, https://www.rent.com/research/average-rent-price-report/, June 2022. 9    A fourth channel can be via a psychological boost to business and consumer confidence, but this can cut both ways if an easing in policy is interpreted as a sign of worsening economic conditions rather than as a reason for optimism.

Executive Summary There has never been a modern era recession or sharp slowdown in which the oil price did not collapse. In a recession, the massive destruction of oil demand always overwhelms a tight supply. Across the last six recessions, the median collapse in the oil price was -60 percent, with the best case being -30 percent, and the worst case being -75 percent. Hence, in the coming recession, the oil price is likely headed to $55, with the best case being $85, and the worst case being $30. Investors should short oil, or short oil versus copper. Equity investors should underweight the oil sector versus basic resources and/or industrials and/or banks, and underweight oil-heavy equity markets such as Norway. Fractal trading watchlist: Oil versus industrials, and oil versus banks. Oil Didn’t Get The ‘Everything Sell-Off’ Memo Bottom Line: There has never been a modern era recession or sharp slowdown in which the oil price did not collapse, and this time will be no different. Feature We have just witnessed a rare star-alignment. The near-perfect line up of Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn in the heavens is a spectacular sight for the early birds who can star gaze through clear skies. And it is a rare event, which last happened in 2004. But investors have just witnessed an even rarer star-alignment. The ‘everything sell-off’ in stocks, bonds, inflation-protected bonds, industrial metals, and gold during the second quarter has happened in only one other calendar quarter out of almost 200. Making it a ‘1 in a 100’ event, which last happened way back in 1981 (Chart I-1 and Chart I-2). Chart I-1The ‘Everything Sell-Off’ In 2022… Chart I-2...Last Happened In 1981 As we detailed in our previous reports Markets Echo 1981 When Stagflation Morphed Into Recession and More On 2022-23 = 1981-82 And The Danger Ahead, a once-in-a-generation conjugation connects the ‘1 in a 100’ everything sell-offs in 1981 and 2022. The conjugation is inflation fears, exacerbated by a major war between commodity producing neighbours, and countered by aggressive rate hikes, morph into recession fears. The 1981-82 episode is an excellent blueprint for market action through 2022-23. This makes the 1981-82 episode an excellent blueprint for market action through 2022-23, and we refer readers to the previous reports for the implications for stocks, bonds, equity sectors, and currencies. Oil Didn’t Get The ‘Everything Sell-Off’ Memo But one major investment didn’t get the ‘everything sell-off’ memo. That major investment is crude oil. Even within the commodity space, oil is the outlier. In the second quarter, industrial commodity prices have collapsed: copper, -20 percent; iron ore -25 percent; tin, -40 percent; and lumber, -40 percent. Yet the crude oil price is up, +7 percent, and the obvious explanation is the Russia/Ukraine war (Chart I-3). Chart I-3Oil Didn't Get The 'Everything Sell-Off' Memo The Russia/Ukraine war is an important part of the 2022/1981 once-in-a-generation conjugation. In 1981, just as now, the full-scale invasion-led war between two major commodity producing neighbours – Iraq and Iran – disrupted commodity supplies, and thereby added fuel to an already red-hot inflationary fire. When Russia invaded Ukraine earlier this year, the oil price surged by 25 percent. Remarkably, when Iraq invaded Iran in late 1980, the oil price also surged by 25 percent. But by mid-1981, with the global economy slowing, the oil price had given back those gains. Then, as the economy entered recession in early 1982, the oil price slumped to 15 percent below its pre-war level. If 2022-23 follows this blueprint, it would imply the oil price falling to $85/barrel (Chart I-4). Chart I-4If Oil Follows The 1981-82 Blueprint, It Will Tumble To $85 There Has Never Been A Recession In Which The Oil Price Did Not Collapse Everybody knows the narrative for the oil price surge this year. In what is putatively a very tight market, the embargo of Russian oil has removed enough supply to put significant upward pressure on the price. The trouble with this story is that Russian oil will find a buyer, even if it requires a discount. Moreover, with the major buyers being China and India, it will be politically and physically impossible to police secondary sanctions. The bottom line is that Russian oil will find its way into the market. There has never been a modern era recession or sharp slowdown in which the oil price did not collapse. But the bigger problem will come from the demand side of the equation when the global economy enters, or even just flirts with, a recession. Put simply, because of massive demand destruction, there has never been a modern era recession or sharp slowdown in which the oil price did not collapse (Chart I-5 - Chart I-10). Chart I-5In The Early 80s Recession, Oil Collapsed By -30 Percent Chart I-6In The Early 90s Recession, Oil Collapsed By -60 Percent Chart I-7In The 2000 Dot Com Bust, Oil Collapsed By ##br##-55 Percent Chart I-8In The 2008 Global Financial Crisis, Oil Collapsed By -75 Percent Chart I-9In The 2015 EM Recession, Oil Collapsed By ##br##-60 Percent Chart I-10In The 2020 Pandemic, Oil Collapsed By ##br##-75 Percent Furthermore, as we explained in Oil Is The Accessory To The Murder, a preceding surge in the oil price is a remarkably consistent ‘straw that breaks the camel’s back’, tipping an already fragile economy over the brink into recession. Meaning that the oil price ends up in a symmetrical undershoot to its preceding overshoot. The result being a massive drawdown in the oil price in every modern era recession or sharp slowdown. Specifically: Early 80s recession: -30 percent Early 90s recession: -60 percent 2000 dot com bust: -55 percent 2008 global financial crisis: -75 percent 2015 EM recession: -60 percent 2020 pandemic: -75 percent What about the 1970s episode – isn’t this the counterexample in which the oil price remained stubbornly high despite a recession? No, even in the 1974 recession, the oil price fell by -25 percent.  Moreover, the commonly cited explanation for the elevated nominal price of oil through the 70s is a misreading of history. The popular narrative blames OPEC supply cutbacks related to geopolitical events – especially the US support for Israel in the Arab-Israel war of October 1973.  As neat and popular as this narrative is, it ignores the real culprit: the collapse in August 1971 of the Bretton Woods ‘pseudo gold standard’, which severed the fixed link between the US dollar and quantities of commodities. To maintain the real value of oil, OPEC countries were raising the price of crude oil just to play catch up. Meaning that while geopolitical events may have influenced the precise timing and magnitude of price hikes, OPEC countries were just ‘staying even’ with the collapsing real value of the US dollar, in which oil was priced. In terms of gold, in which oil was effectively priced before 1971, the oil price was no higher in 1980 than in 1971! (Chart I-11) Chart I-11Priced In Gold, The Oil Price Was No Higher In 1980 Than in 1971! Shorting Oil And Oil Plays Will Be Very Rewarding For Patient Investors The four most dangerous words in investment are ‘this time is different’. Today, the oil bulls insist that this time really is different because of an unprecedented structural underinvestment in fossil fuel extraction. Leaving the precariously tight oil market vulnerable to the slightest uptick in demand, or downtick in supply. Maybe. But to reiterate, in a recession, the massive destruction of oil demand always overwhelms a tight supply. In this important regard, this time will not be different. Taking the median drawdown of the last six recessions of 60 percent, and applying it to the post-invasion peak of $130, it implies that, in the coming recession, oil will plunge to $55. In a recession, the massive destruction of oil demand always overwhelms a tight supply. Of course, this is the average of a range of recession outcomes, with the best case being $85 and the worst case being $30. Still, this means that patient investors who short oil can look forward to substantial gains. Alternatively, those who want a hedged position should short oil versus copper – especially as oil versus copper is now at the top of its 25-year trading channel (Chart I-12). Chart I-12Oil Versus Copper Is At The Top Of Its 25-Year Trading Channel Equity investors should underweight the oil sector versus basic resources (Chart I-13) and/or versus industrials and/or versus banks, and underweight oil-heavy stock markets such as Norway (Chart I-14). Chart I-13Underweight Oil Versus Basic Resources Chart I-14Underweight Oil-Heavy Stock Markets Such As Norway Suffice to say, these are all correlated trades. They will all work, or they will all not work. But to repeat, this time is never different. Fractal Trading Watchlist Confirming the fundamental arguments to underweight oil plays, the spectacular recent outperformance of oil equities versus both industrials and banks has reached the point of fragility on its 260-day fractal structures that has reliably signalled previous turning points (Chart I-15). Chart I-15The Outperformance Of Oil Versus Industrials Is Exhausted We are adding oil versus banks to our watchlist, with this week’s recommendation being to underweight oil versus industrials, setting a profit target and symmetrical stop-loss of 10 percent, with a maximum holding period of 6 months. Fractal Trading Watchlist: New Additions The Outperformance Of Oil Versus Banks Is Exhausted Chart 1BRL/NZD At A Resistance Point   Chart 2Homebuilders Versus Healthcare Services Has Turned Chart 3CNY/USD At A Potential Turning Point Chart 4US REITS Are Oversold Versus Utilities Chart 5CAD/SEK Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 6Financials Versus Industrials Has Reversed Chart 7The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Biotech Has Ended Chart 8The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Healthcare Has Ended Chart 9FTSE100 Outperformance Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 10Netherlands' Underperformance Vs. Switzerland Is Ending Chart 11The Sell-Off In The 30-Year T-Bond At Fractal Fragility Chart 12The Sell-Off In The NASDAQ Is Approaching Fractal Fragility Chart 13Food And Beverage Outperformance Is Exhausted Chart 14German Telecom Outperformance Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 15Japanese Telecom Outperformance Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 16The Strong Downtrend In The 18-Month-Out US Interest Rate Future Has Ended Chart 17The Strong Downtrend In The 3 Year T-Bond Is Fragile Chart 18A Potential Switching Point From Tobacco Into Cannabis Chart 19Biotech Is A Major Buy Chart 20Norway's Outperformance Has Ended Chart 21Cotton Versus Platinum Has Reversed Chart 22Switzerland's Outperformance Vs. Germany Has Ended Chart 23USD/EUR Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 24The Outperformance Of MSCI Hong Kong Versus China Has Ended Chart 25A Potential New Entry Point Into Petcare Chart 26GBP/USD At A Potential Turning Point Chart 27US Utilities Outperformance Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 28The Outperformance Of Oil Versus Banks Is Exhausted Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System Fractal Trades 6-Month Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations