Developed Countries

Highlights The yield curve has inverted: The 10-year Treasury bond yield fell below the 3-month T-bill rate following the March FOMC meeting and has remained there since. We never say it’s different this time, but there is not yet sufficient evidence to change course: The yield curve is almost always early as a standalone signal, and the depressed term premium may make it less sensitive right now. Monetary policy still looks decidedly accommodative to us, … : Our estimate of the equilibrium fed funds rate says policy’s easy, and that it’ll stay that way until the Fed gets serious about hiking rates again. … so asset allocation should continue to favor risk assets: There are global forces restraining Treasury yields, but the fed funds rate cycle is only partway through a stretch that has been uniformly unfavorable for Treasuries. Feature Last week’s data were soft, as the U.S. economy continues to show signs of decelerating. The consumer confidence survey disappointed hopes for an extended bounce back from January’s shutdown-shadowed release, housing starts were uninspiring, and the Case-Shiller index revealed that home-price gains continue to sag. Beyond the U.S., the message from manufacturing PMIs is glum, although the services sector seems to be holding up just fine. Our traveling colleagues report that investors around the world have developed a decided aversion to European assets. We remind our clients that deceleration is nothing new. It’s been the story so far this year, as the incremental decline in fiscal thrust ensured it would be. The inversion of the yield curve is new, however, and it’s commanding attention from the financial media and from investors drawn to a leading indicator that consistently works. We like the yield curve, too, and it’s one of the three components of our recession indicator, but it’s only one. The other two components have yet to confirm its message, and the way things look now, it may well be awhile before they do. The Yield Curve Has Inverted, The Yield Curve Has Inverted The 3-month-to-10-year segment of the yield curve inverted after the March FOMC meeting, and it dipped a little further into negative territory last week as the 10-year Treasury yield continued to melt. An inverted curve is one of the three components of our simple recession indicator,1 and we believe it can send an important signal about the economy’s vigor and the state of monetary policy. By itself, however, an inverted curve is not a sufficient precondition for a recession. It has also been something less than a timely guide to asset allocation, inverting a year ahead of a recession, on average, and six months before the S&P 500 peaks (Table 1). The yield curve has been a reliable recession warning signal, but it tends to be too early to serve as a practical guide to money management and asset allocation. Table 1Inverted Yield Curves, 1968 - 2018   An inverted yield curve has called eight of the seven recessions that have occurred over the last 50 years, making it a dependable leading indicator (Chart 1). Year-over-year contraction in the Conference Board’s Leading Economic Index (LEI) has compiled the same enviable track record, calling all seven of the last half-century’s recessions with just one false positive (Chart 2). LEI tends to be timelier, however, sounding the alarm an average of five months after the curve inverts (Table 2). For our recession indicator, we also add a comparison of the fed funds rate to our estimate of the equilibrium fed funds rate, because recessions have only occurred when the fed funds rate has exceeded our estimate of the equilibrium rate (Chart 3). Chart 1The Yield Curve Has Been Reliable, Albeit Early Chart 2LEI Has Been Timelier Table 2LEI Contractions, 1968 - 2018   The cycle is extended, and the inverted curve has made us even more alert for trouble in the economy and financial markets, but we do not think trouble is imminent. The LEI is clearly decelerating, but it has yet to contract. We currently peg the equilibrium fed funds rate at about 3⅛%, and project that it will rise to 3⅜% by the end of the year. We can’t know the equilibrium rate with exact precision in real time, but our estimate has been a reliable guide to financial market performance, and the fact that the fed funds rate is four 25-basis-point hikes from crossing the line gives us some comfort that neither a recession nor a bear market is waiting just around the corner. Chart 3Recessions Only Occur When Policy Is Tight Bottom Line: We are not dismissing the inverted yield curve, but our other recession-indicator inputs are not confirming its warning. Given the Fed’s new guidance, we expect that the next recession will not arrive before mid-to-late 2020. It’s A Little Bit Anomalous This Time At its best, an inverted yield curve is a signal from the bond market that the Fed has tightened monetary policy too much, heralding future rate cuts and a sharp slowdown. Anything affecting yields at the long end, however, has the potential to skew the curve’s signal. If long yields were somehow inflated, the curve would be less prone to invert and the signal would be delayed. If long yields were restrained, the curve would be prone to invert sooner and the signal might come especially early. Rate hikes invert the curve once the bond market decides they’re unnecessary, or expects that they’re going to be reversed soon. We believe that the yield curve currently has a bias to invert even earlier than it otherwise would. The question of how much the Fed’s asset purchases have affected the term premium,2 if at all, is far from settled within either the Fed or BCA, and is beyond the scope of this report. Nonetheless, we do think that QE1, QE2, and QE3 must have made some contribution to the decline in the term premium on long-term bonds (Chart 4). The bottom line is that we think the curve was disposed to invert earlier this time around. Its signal is still worth incorporating into our analysis, but we will seek confirmation from our other recession indicators before revamping our asset-allocation recommendations in line with an approaching inflection point in the business cycle. Chart 4The Curve Inverts More Easily When The Term Premium Is Negative The Fed And The Yield Curve We subscribe to the idea that the Fed induces recessions by removing monetary accommodation in an attempt to keep the economy from overheating. It’s simply too difficult to achieve a soft landing with policy tools that influence activity indirectly and with long and variable lags, given that the dual-mandate metrics are themselves lagging indicators. Compared to the path by which the Fed influences the economy, the path by which it inverts the curve is simple and straightforward. It raises short rates, and the long end rises as well, as the bond market discounts higher inflation and/or stronger growth, until investors no longer believe that inflation or growth prospects merit tighter policy, and long rates fall behind short rates. We reviewed moves in 10-year yields and 3-month rates across the different phases of the fed funds rate cycle (Chart 5) to see how the process has unfolded empirically. As the mechanics of yield curve inversion imply – short rates rise, long rates rise less or fall – the curve bear flattens when the Fed hikes the fed funds rate, and bull steepens when it cuts it (Table 3). The outcome fits the intuition: if the Fed’s attempt to slow the economy with higher short rates is successful, real interest rates will decline, inflation pressure will ease and bond yields should fail to keep pace with bill rates, especially if investors associate tightening campaigns with recessions. Conversely, if the Fed successfully boosts the economy with lower short rates, bond yields should fall less than short rates as the real component of rates rises, and the curve should steepen. Table 3The Yield Curve And The Fed Funds Rate Cycle Depicting our stylized fed funds rate as a bell curve makes for an appealing picture, but it obscures the fact that the Fed often pauses for a while after hiking rates to their cyclical peak, or cutting them to their cyclical trough. Phase II doesn’t end until the beginning of the next rate-cutting campaign, and Phase IV doesn’t end until the beginning of the next series of rate hikes. A stricter representation of the fed funds rate cycle would have two phases of active hiking, followed by a state of limbo between the last hike and the first cut, then two phases of active cutting, followed by a lull during which the Fed waits for signs that it should remove accommodation. The expanded fed funds rate cycle is therefore composed of active hiking in Phase I and Phase II(a), pre-easing in Phase II(b), active easing in Phase III and Phase IV(a), and pre-hiking in Phase IV(b). Table 4 shows the average monthly changes in the yield curve and its components in the expanded fed funds rate cycle. There is quite a difference between Phase II(a), when the curve aggressively bear flattens, and Phase II(b), when the curve modestly bull flattens. Phase IV(a) features a sharp bull steepening, while the long end drifts higher in Phase IV(b) and short rates barely budge. Ultimately, the real action happens when the Fed is actively adjusting monetary policy, and the duration positioning implications are quite sensitive to the transitions into and out of the active phases. Table 4The Yield Curve And The Expanded Fed Funds Rate Cycle Bonds And The Fed Funds Rate Cycle An inverted yield curve has provided a reliable early-warning signal about recessions, but it can be too early to drive asset-allocation decisions for a manager judged on relative returns. The curve moves in Tables 3 and 4 offer more timely implications for duration positioning within fixed-income portfolios across the fed funds rate cycle. It comes as no surprise that Treasuries perform better when the Fed is cutting rates (Phases III and IV) than they do when the Fed is hiking them (Phases I and II). Their returns should be inversely correlated with the direction of rates, and longer-maturity instruments should exhibit greater sensitivity to changes in the fed funds rate (Table 5). Table 5Treasuries And The Fed Funds Rate Cycle Overweight duration within bond portfolios from when the Fed stops hiking rates until it stops cutting them; underweight duration when it’s actively hiking. Expanding the fed funds rate cycle to account for active hiking, active easing, and the pre-hiking/pre-cutting limbo periods makes the duration-positioning road map clearer. Treasuries lose ground in real terms when the Fed is actively hiking, with longer-maturity instruments bearing the brunt (Table 6). They deliver in a big way when the Fed is actively easing (Phase III and Phase IV(a)), with the Barclays Bloomberg Long Treasury Index posting double-digit annualized total returns. Longer Treasuries shoot out the lights once the Fed stops hiking (Phase II (b)), and they generate real total returns that compare favorably with bull-market equities when aggregating Phase II(b)’s pre-easing results with active-easing Phases III and IV(a). Table 6Treasuries And The Expanded Fed Funds Rate Cycle Our terminal and equilibrium fed funds rate estimates are admittedly far from the consensus. Markets are skeptical of the FOMC’s one-more-hike projection, much less our three, four, or more terminal-rate call. With “secular stagnation” searches ascendant on Google Trends (as of Friday morning, the partially complete March 24-30 period already had the most searches of any week over the last twelve months), our equilibrium estimate is also surely out of step with the herd. If the Fed is not done, however, history says it’s not yet time to overweight duration. If we’re right, Treasuries still have the full Phase II(a) ahead of them, and won’t be a buy until the Fed desists, sometime in 2020 or beyond. Investment Implications We have taken note of the inverted yield curve, but we will not overreact to it. While it has been a reliable recession indicator for the last half-century, it consistently sounds the alarm too early to merit immediate investment action. Neither the LEI nor our equilibrium fed funds rate model has yet corroborated its warning, and the bombed-out term premium may have biased it to inverting even sooner than it otherwise would. There’s no need for Paul Revere to ready his horse just yet. We did not anticipate that the 10-year Treasury yield would decline as much as it has. The extent of the Fed’s dovishness caught us off guard, and the 10-year Treasury is having a very hard time escaping the gravity of the decline in major-economy sovereign yields around the world. Our Global Fixed Income Strategy service (GFIS) points out that the global yield decline has become extended (Chart 6), and it contends that global bond prices incorporate too much pessimism about global economic momentum. The GFIS team also notes that there’s no guarantee stock prices will fall to align with bond yields – over the last couple years, stocks and bonds have recoupled following yield scares via bond, not equity, sell-offs (Chart 7). Chart 6Enough Is Enough Chart 7Equities Have Been Smarter Than Bonds The Last Few Years We therefore remain constructive on the economy and financial markets, and advise that balanced portfolios should still maintain exposure to riskier assets. Much of that view depends on Chinese authorities relaxing their deleveraging campaign, global trade tensions easing, and some hint of green shoots appearing in the rest of the world. If those elements of our base-case scenario fail to materialize, we will likely become more cautious. We are not happy that the vindication of our high-conviction view on the terminal fed funds rate has been indefinitely delayed, but the silver lining of the Fed’s dovish surprise is that the bull market in equities and other risk assets has been granted an open-ended extension.   Doug Peta, CFA Chief U.S. Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Please see the U.S. Investment Strategy Special Report, “How Much Longer Can The Bull Market Last?,” published August 13, 2018. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Long-term bond yields can be decomposed into the expected path of short-term rates and a term premium, which compensates an investor for the uncertainties that can arise over the extended time period that s/he is locking up his/her money by buying a longer-maturity instrument.

Underweight When we last updated the S&P telecom services index, it had been enjoying a modicum of relative outperformance against the broad market. However, this rally has faltered as pricing power, an excellent predictor of relative performance (second panel), has collapsed back into deflation. The upcoming deployment of 5G networks (and resulting premium pricing) may provide a lift to sales, though we think the likely T-Mobile – Sprint tie-up and the evolution of another competitor with the ability to invest in parallel means any incremental sales gains will rapidly be competed away. The sell side shares our bearish view; though the rate of change of earnings underperformance has stabilized, analysts continue to expect the sector to undergrow the broad market (third panel). Contrarian investors may look at the severe derating the S&P telecom services index has faced as a bargain shopping opportunity (bottom panel). However, we caution the structural top line challenges, compounded by persistently low earnings growth, likely make this derating a value trap. Stay underweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5TELSX - T, VZ, CTL.

Special Report

Highlights Currency markets continue to fight a tug-of-war between deteriorating global growth and easing global financial conditions. Meanwhile, history suggests that the trade-weighted dollar should have been 10-15% higher, based on portfolio flows and interest rate differentials. The more-muted bounce is a cause for concern. As the battle unfolds, likely winners in the interim will be safe-haven currencies such as the yen. Watch the gold-to-bond ratio for cues on where the balance of forces are shifting, with a rising ratio negative for the dollar. We expect a day of reckoning to eventually arrive for the U.S. dollar, once investors shift their focus towards the rising twin deficits, de-dollarization of the global economy and low expected returns for U.S. assets. Feature The recent calm in developed currency markets seems very eerie, given the storm that has gripped global financial markets over the past week. Dismal manufacturing PMI readings from Europe and Japan last week sent equity markets into a tailspin. The closely watched U.S. 10-year versus 3-month spread inverted, triggering panic selling among investors who favor this spread as their most reliable recession indicator. Equity markets in Asia are off the year’s highs, while regional bond yields are holding close to trading lows. Outside of oil, commodity markets have also been soft. Despite these moves, the trade-weighted dollar has been relatively stable. Over the last few months, most currency pairs have been narrowly trading towards the apex of very tight wedge formations. This has severely dampened volatility (Chart 1). Over the longer term, the stability of these crosses relative to gold has spooky echoes of a fixed exchange rate regime a la Bretton Woods (Chart 2). Chart 1An Eerie Calm In Currency Markets Chart 2Fixed Exchange Rates Versus Gold?   In physics, centripetal systems tend to stay in equilibrium, while centrifugal forces can explode in spectacular fashion. In the post-Bretton Woods world, it has been very rare for periods of extended currency stability to persist. This means constantly monitoring both the trend and magnitude of imbalances between economies to gauge where the pressure points are, and in what direction the corresponding exchange rates might eventually give way. The balance of forces driving the dollar outlook seems like a natural starting point for this exercise.  Global Liquidity And The Dollar Judging by most measures of relative trends, the dollar should be soaring right now. The March Markit manufacturing PMI releases last week showed that while both Japan and the euro area remain in contraction territory, the U.S. reading of 52.5 puts it solidly above the rest of the world. It is true that the momentum of this leadership has been rolling over recently, but historically such large growth divergences between the U.S. and the rest of the world have generated anywhere from 10-15% rallies in the greenback over a period of six months (Chart 3). So far, the DXY dollar index is up 1.9% since October. Every time this measure has severely contracted in the past, the shortage of dollars has triggered a blowup somewhere. Until the U.S. Federal Reserve’s recent volte-face on monetary policy, relative yields also favored the greenback. The 2-year swap differential between the U.S. and the rest of the world pinned the DXY dollar index at 105, or 8% above current levels (Chart 4). Meanwhile, relative policy rates also suggest the broad trade-weighted dollar should be 6% higher. And even today, unless the Fed moves towards outright rate cuts, the dovish shift by other central banks around the world remains an immediate tailwind for the U.S. dollar. Chart 3USD Should Be Higher Based On Growth Divergences   Chart 4USD Should Be Higher Based On Swap Differentials   Internationally, the Fed’s tapering of asset purchases has been a net drain on dollar liquidity, despite a widening U.S. current account deficit. The Fed’s balance sheet peaked a nudge above US$4.5 trillion in early 2015 and has been falling ever since. This has triggered a severe contraction in the U.S. monetary base (Chart 5), and severely curtailed commercial banks’ excess reserves, which are now contracting by over 20% on a year-on-year basis. One of BCA’s favorite key measures of international liquidity is foreign central bank reserves deposited at the Fed. This is contracting at its worst pace in over 40 years. Every time this measure has severely contracted in the past, the shortage of dollars has triggered a blowup somewhere, typically among countries running twin deficits. Chart 5A Liquidity Squeeze Of Dollars To cap it off, last year’s change in the U.S. tax code to allow for repatriation of offshore cash helped the dollar, but not to the extent that might have been expected. On a rolling 12-month basis, the U.S. has repatriated back a net of about $US400 billion in assets, or close to 2% of GDP. Historically, this is a very huge sum that would have had the potential to set the greenback on fire – circa 10% higher (Chart 6). Chart 6USD Should Be Higher On Repatriation Flows Dollar liquidity shortages tend to be vicious due to their ability to trigger negative feedback loops. As the velocity of international U.S. dollars rises, offshore dollar rates begin to rise, lifting the cost of capital for borrowing countries. Debt repayment replaces capital spending and consumption once this reaches a critical threshold. The drop in output, prices, or a combination of the two, only exacerbates the debt-deflation problem.  The bottom line is that looking at historical trends, the dollar should be much higher than current levels. Practical investors recognize the need to pay heed to correlation shifts. Either our favorite liquidity indicators have stopped working outright or more realistically other forces are at play, explaining the relative stability in the greenback. A Counter-Cyclical Currency The first possibility is that the recent stability in the U.S. dollar has been in anticipation of better economic data in the second half of this year. We have shown many times in the past that the greenback is a countercyclical currency that tends to do poorly when global economic momentum picks up. Many investors are now fixated on China – specifically, whether the latest credit injection will be sufficient to turn around the Chinese economy, let alone the rest of the world. Meanwhile, as the U.S.-China trade talks progress, it will likely include a currency clause to prevent depreciation of the RMB versus the dollar. In reality, there is still scant evidence to support a bottoming in global growth, making it difficult to loop this back to dollar stability.  In reality, there is still scant evidence to support a bottoming in global growth, making it difficult to loop this back to dollar stability. Typical reflation indicators such as commodity prices, emerging market currencies and industrial share prices are off their lows but rolling over. March export data remained weak globally, even though compositionally there were some green shoots. Exports to China from Singapore jumped by 34% year-on-year, and those to emerging markets by 22% year-on-year. Japanese machine tool orders from China also showed some stabilization. Historically, these are necessary but not sufficient conditions to gauge whether we are entering a bottoming process (Chart 7). Another contradiction is at play: If the dollar rally is being held back by prospects of improvement in global growth, then gold should fare poorly and most currencies should be outperforming both gold and the greenback. Until yesterday’s sell off in gold, this was not the case. Suggesting some other explanation might be tempering the U.S. dollar’s rise. Chart 7Tentative Green Shoots In Global Trade?   Regime Shift? While U.S. residents have been repatriating capital domestically, foreign investors have been fleeing U.S. capital markets at among the fastest pace in recent years. On a rolling 12-month total basis, the U.S. saw an exodus of about US$200 billion in equity from foreigners, the largest on record (Chart 8). In aggregate, both foreign official and private long-term portfolio investment into the U.S. has been rolling over, with investor interest limited only to agency and corporate bonds. Foreigners are still net buyers of about $450 billion in U.S. securities, but the downtrend in purchases in recent years is evident. Interestingly, gold has also outperformed Treasurys over this period. The U.S. dollar remains the reserve currency of the world today, but that exorbitant privilege is clearly fraying on the edges. Vis-à-vis official flows, China has risen within the ranks to be the number one contributor to the U.S. trade deficit. At the same time, Beijing has been destocking its holding of Treasurys, if only as retaliation against past U.S. policies, or perhaps to make room for the internationalization of the RMB (Chart 9). In a broader sense, the fall in dollar deposits at the Fed might just represent an underlying shift in the global economy away from dollars and towards a more diversified basket of currencies. This makes sense, given a growing proportion of trading – be it in crude, natural gas, bulk commodities or even softs – is being done outside U.S. exchanges. Chart 8Foreigners Are Dumping U.S. Equities   Chart 9China Has Stopped Recycling Surpluses Into Treasurys   Data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) shows that the global allocation of foreign exchange reserves towards the U.S. dollar peaked at about 72% in the early 2000s and has been in a downtrend since. Meanwhile, allocation to other currencies, notably the British pound, Swiss franc and the yen have been surging (Chart 10). At the same time, foreign central banks have been amassing tremendous gold reserves, notably Russia and China, almost to the tune of the total annual output of the yellow metal (Chart 11). This further helps explain why the dollar may not be as strong as it should be. It also explains the stability of these currency pairs relative to the price of gold. Chart 10The World Is Diversifying Away From Dollars Chart 11Central Banks Are Absorbing Most Gold Production The U.S. dollar remains the reserve currency of the world today, but that exorbitant privilege is clearly fraying on the edges as the balance-of-payments dynamics are heading in the wrong direction. Over the next five years, the U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the U.S. budget deficit will swell to 4.5% of GDP. Assuming the current account deficit widens a bit then stabilizes, this will pin the twin deficits at 8.1% of GDP. This assumes no recession, which would have the potential to swell the deficit even further (Chart 12). Chart 12A Twin Deficit Cliff For The Dollar The U.S. saw its twin deficits swell to almost 13% of GDP following the financial crisis, but the difference then was that in the wake of the commodity boom the dollar was cheap (and commodity currencies overvalued). The subsequent shale revolution also greatly cushioned the U.S. trade deficit. Shale productivity remains robust and U.S. output will continue to rise, but the low-hanging fruit has already been plucked. For one reason or another, foreign central banks are diversifying out of dollars. If due to the changing landscape in trade, this is set to continue. If it is an excuse to shy away from the rapidly rising U.S. twin deficits, this will continue as well. And if the U.S. dollar cannot sufficiently rally on “good news,” expect it to sink when the bad news eventually starts rolling in. That said, the timing remains uncertain.   Private Capital Flows Foreign official flows might have been fleeing the U.S. dollar because it has lost some luster as a reserve currency, but private capital will begin stampeding toward the exits when the return on invested capital (ROIC) for U.S. assets falls below their cost of capital. For investors with a long horizon, this may already be happening. Take 10-year government bonds for example. For the Japanese or German investor, borrowing in local currency and investing in the U.S. might seem like the logical course of action given negative domestic rates and a 10-year Treasury yield of 2.4%. However, this positive carry suddenly evaporates when one factors in hedging costs (Chart 13). Chart 13JGBs More Attractive Than Hedged Treasuries During bull markets, countries that have negative interest rates are subject to powerful outflows from carry trades. The impact of these are difficult to measure, but it is fair to assume that periods of low hedging costs (which tend to correspond to periods of lower volatility) can be powerful catalysts. As markets get volatile and these trades get unwound, unhedged trades become victim to short-covering flows. With many yield curves around the world inverting, the danger is that the frequency of this short-covering implicitly rises, since long-bond returns are falling short of spot rates. One winner as volatility starts to rise is the yen. Investors should consider initiating short USD/JPY positions today as a hedge. Outside the fixed-income space, what matters is that relative ROICs are higher than the cost of capital. Both are difficult to measure for many emerging or even developed economies across asset classes. However, for the equity market, a good starting point has always been valuations as exchange rates tend to move to equalize returns across countries. The forward P/E on the MSCI U.S., Europe and Japan indexes is 16.5x, 12.6x and 12.3x. The skew towards the U.S. is because market participants expect U.S. profits to keep outperforming, the U.S. currency to keep appreciating, or a combination of the two. However, empirically, current U.S. valuations suggest future earning streams have already been fully capitalized today (Chart 14). Chart 14AReturn On Capital Could Be Lowest In The U.S. (1) Chart 14BReturn On Capital Could Be Lowest In The U.S. (2) Chart 14CReturn On Capital Could Be Lowest In The U.S. (3) The expected 10-year annualized return for MSCI U.S. is 3.1%, versus 5.5% for MSCI Europe and 9.6% for MSCI Japan. If we assume the U.S. dollar is overvalued, as some models suggest, this will further erode future U.S. returns. Net equity portfolio flows into the U.S. are already negative, as shown in a previous chart. This means the day of reckoning for the U.S. dollar may not be far off when current tailwinds eventually fade.   Chester Ntonifor, Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

Highlights Global equities and other risk assets will trade sideways with elevated volatility over the coming weeks before grinding higher for the remainder of the year, as global growth finally accelerates after a series of false starts.  We now see the Fed raising rates more slowly than we had previously envisioned, but ultimately having to scramble to hike rates in order to quell inflation. The fed funds rate will probably plateau at 4% in 2021, implying nine quarter-point hikes more than the market is currently discounting.   Over a 12-month horizon, investors should overweight global equities, underweight government bonds, and maintain a neutral allocation to cash. The dollar will peak in the second quarter and then weaken over the remainder of the year and into 2020, before starting to strengthen again late next year. Investors should prepare to temporarily upgrade EM and European stocks over the coming weeks, while increasing exposure to cyclical equity sectors. Industrial metals and oil will strengthen over the course of the year. Gold should be bought on any dip. Investors should begin to de-risk their portfolios in late-2020 in anticipation of a recession in 2021.   Feature Here We Go Again? After having become more defensive last June, we turned bullish on stocks following the December post-FOMC meeting plunge. As stocks continued to rebound, we tempered our optimism. In the beginning of March, we wrote that “having rallied since the start of the year, global stocks will likely enter a ‘dead zone’ over the next six-to-eight weeks as investors nervously await the proverbial green shoots to sprout.”1 Last Friday’s release of disappointing European PMI data poured some herbicide on the green shoots thesis. Germany’s manufacturing PMI hit a six-year low, with the new orders component registering the weakest reading since the Great Recession. This took the 10-year German bund yield into negative territory for the first time since 2016. The U.S. 10-year Treasury yield also fell to a 15-month low, causing the 3-month/10-year curve to invert. Historically, an inverted yield curve has been a reliable predictor of U.S. recessions (Chart 1). Chart 1Yield Curve Inversions, Recessions, And The Term Premium President Trump’s decision to appoint TV commentator Stephen Moore to the Fed’s Board of Governors did not help matters. Recommended by fellow supply-side “economist” Larry Kudlow, Moore is best known for dismissing concerns over the state of the housing market in 2007, his spot-on 2010 prediction that QE would cause hyperinflation, and his belief that the Trump tax cuts would lead to a smaller budget deficit. Global Growth Will Accelerate In The Second Half Of The Year Given all these worrisome developments, is it time to turn cyclically bearish on the economic outlook and risk assets again? We do not think so. While the next few weeks could be challenging for equities – a risk that our MacroQuant model is currently flagging – sentiment should improve as global growth finally accelerates after a series of false starts.  Indeed, some positive signs are already visible: The diffusion index of our global leading economic indicator, which tracks the share of countries with rising LEIs, has moved higher (Chart 2). It leads the global LEI. Service sector PMIs have also generally improved, suggesting that the weakness in global growth remains concentrated in trade and manufacturing. And even on the trade front, a few forward-looking indicators such as the Baltic Dry Index and the weekly Harpex shipping index, which measures global container shipping activity, have bounced off their lows. We would downplay the signal from the yield curve, as it currently is severely distorted by a negative term premium. If the 10-year Treasury term premium were back to where it was in 2004, the 3-month/10-year slope would be more than 200 bps steeper, and nobody would be talking about this issue. In fact, given today’s term premium, the curve would have almost certainly inverted in 1995. Anyone who got out of stocks back then would have missed out on one of the greatest bull markets in history. It should also go without saying that some of the decline in the U.S. 10-year yield reflects a positive development: The Fed has turned more dovish! If one looks at the 10-year/30-year portion of the yield curve, it has actually steepened. This is a sign that the market is seeing the Fed’s actions as being reflationary in nature. There is no clear causal mechanism by which an inverted yield curve slows economic activity, apart from it potentially becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy where the yield-curve inversion scares investors, thereby leading to a tightening in financial conditions (Chart 3). Such “doom loops” are conceptually possible, but as we discussed earlier this year, they are unlikely to occur in the current environment.2 At any rate, financial conditions have eased since the start of the year. This should boost growth in the coming months.   Chart 2Global Growth May Be ##br##Starting To Stabilize Chart 3Easier Financial Conditions Since The Start Of The Year Bode Well For Global Growth Chinese Credit Growth Set To Rise Global growth has been weighed down by a slowing Chinese economy. Last year’s deleveraging campaign led to a significant deceleration in investment spending, which had negative repercussions for capital equipment and commodity producers all over the world (Chart 4). Historically, China has loosened the reins on the financial sector whenever credit growth has fallen towards nominal GDP growth (Chart 5). It appears we have reached this point. Despite a weak seasonally-distorted February print, credit growth has finally accelerated on a year-over-year basis. Chart 4China: The Deleveraging Campaign Had Adverse Effects On Investment Spending Chart 5Historically, China Has Scaled Back On Deleveraging When Credit Growth Has Fallen Close To Nominal GDP Growth We do not expect Chinese credit growth to rise as much as in past releveraging cycles. However, this is because the economy is in better shape, not because there is some intrinsic constraint to increasing debt from current levels. China’s elevated savings rate has kept interest rates well below trend nominal GDP growth, which is the key determinant of debt sustainability (Chart 6).3 As long as the central government maintains an implicit guarantee on most local and corporate debt, as it is currently doing, default risk will remain minimal. In any case, given that total debt stands at 240% of GDP, even a one percentage-point increase in credit growth would generate a hefty 2.4% of GDP in credit stimulus. The Chinese credit impulse leads imports by about six-to-nine months (Chart 7). This bodes well for global trade in the second half of the year. Chart 6China's High Savings Rate Has Kept Interest Rates Well Below Trend Nominal GDP Growth Chart 7Global Trade Will Benefit From A Chinese Reflationary Impulse   A Lull In The Trade War? A de-escalation in the trade war would help matters. As a self-professed master negotiator, Donald Trump needs to secure a deal with China before next year‘s presidential election, while also convincing American voters that the agreement was concluded on favorable terms for the United States. Reaching a deal with China early on in his term would have been risky for Trump if it had failed to bring down the bilateral trade deficit – an entirely likely outcome given how pro-cyclical U.S. fiscal policy is. At this point, however, Trump could crow about making a great deal with China while reassuring voters that the product of his brilliance will be realized only after he has been re-elected. Thus, the likelihood that Trump will seek to strike a deal has risen. For their part, the Chinese want as much negotiating leverage as they can muster. This means being able to convincingly demonstrate that their economy is strong enough to handle the repercussions from turning down a trade deal that fails to serve their interests. Since the credit cycle is the dominant driver of Chinese growth, this requires putting the deleveraging campaign on the backburner. Faster Global Growth And Stronger Domestic Demand Will Benefit Europe Stronger Chinese growth will help the European export sector later this year. The export component of the Chinese Caixin PMI has moved up from its lows. It leads the euro area PMI by about three months. Meanwhile, euro area domestic demand will benefit from a more accommodative fiscal policy and lower bond yields. The decline in bond yields will be especially helpful to Italy. The spike in yields and loss of business confidence following the election of a populist government last March plunged the economy into recession (Chart 8). Now that the 10-year BTP yield has fallen more than 100 bps from its highs, the Italian economy should start to perk up. The ECB will not raise rates this year even if domestic growth speeds up, but the market will probably price in a few rate hikes in 2020 and beyond. This will allow for a modest re-steepening of yield curves in core European bond markets, which should be positive for long-suffering bank profits. Brexit remains a concern. The ongoing saga has reached the farcical stage where: 1) The U.K. has voted to leave the EU; but 2) Parliament has voted to stay in the EU unless it reaches a satisfactory deal with Brussels; while 3) rejecting the only deal with Brussels that was on offer. Given that most British voters no longer want Brexit (Chart 9), we think that the government will kick the proverbial can down the road until a second referendum is announced or a “soft Brexit” deal is formulated. Either outcome would be welcomed by markets. Chart 8Italian Bond Yields Are A Headwind No More Chart 9U.K.: In The Case Of A Do-Over, The Remain Side Would Likely Win   What Will The Fed Do? Last year’s “Christmas Crash” clearly shifted the Fed’s reaction function in a more dovish direction. We do not expect Jay Powell to raise rates over the next few months, but a reacceleration in global growth is likely to prompt the Fed to tighten anew in December. The Fed will continue raising rates once per quarter in 2020, before accelerating the pace of tightening in 2021 in response to rising inflation. In all, we see the fed funds rate increasing to around 4% by the end of this cycle. This represents nine quarter-point hikes more than the market is currently discounting (Chart 10). We were stopped out of our short fed funds futures trade, but we recommend that clients short the June-2021 fed funds futures or a similar instrument. The U.S. Economy: Great Again Fundamentally, the U.S. economy is on solid ground and can handle higher interest rates. Unlike a decade ago, the housing market is in good shape (Chart 11). The homeowner vacancy rate stands near a record low. Judging by FICO scores, the quality of mortgage lending remains high. The labor market is also firm, with job openings hitting another record high in February (Chart 12). The combination of a healthy housing and labor market is invariably good for consumers. Chart 11U.S. Housing Fundamentals Are Solid Chart 12The U.S. Labor Market Is Firm The personal savings rate currently stands at 7.6%, notably higher than one would expect based on the ratio of household net worth-to-disposable income (Chart 13). A decline in the savings rate would allow consumer spending to increase more quickly than income. With the latter being propped up by rising wages, this will be bullish for consumption. Capital spending intentions have dipped over the past few months, but remain elevated by historic standards (Chart 14). The real nonresidential capital stock has grown by an average of only 1.7% since the start of the recovery, down from 3% in the pre-recession period (Chart 15). A cyclical upswing in productivity growth, rising labor costs, and low levels of spare capacity should all motivate businesses to invest in new plant and equipment. Chart 14Capital Spending Intentions Have Softened, But Remain Elevated Chart 15There Is Room For More U.S. Capital Investment   Corporate Debt: How Much Of A Risk? Chart 16U.S. Corporate Debt Is Not Extreme By Global Standards Corporate debt levels have increased significantly in recent years, while underwriting standards have deteriorated, as evidenced by the proliferation of covenant-lite loans. Nevertheless, the situation is far from dire. Relative to other countries, U.S. corporate debt is quite low (Chart 16). At 143% of GDP, corporate debt in France is twice that of the United States. This is not to suggest that everything is fine in the French corporate sector; but the fact is that France has not had a corporate debt crisis. This signals that the U.S. is not at imminent risk of one either. Netting out cash, U.S. corporate debt as a share of GDP is at the same level it was in 1989, a year in which the fed funds rate was close to nine percent. The ratio of corporate net debt-to-EBITD remains reasonably low. The interest coverage ratio is above its historic average. In addition, corporate assets have also risen quite briskly over the past few years, which has kept the corporate debt-to-asset ratio broadly stable (Chart 17). The corporate sector financial balance – the difference between corporate income and spending – is still in positive territory at 1% of GDP. Every recession in the past 50 years began when the corporate sector financial balance was in deficit (Chart 18). Chart 17U.S. Corporate Debt: How High? Chart 18Corporate Sector Financial Balance Still In Surplus Unlike mortgages, which are often held by leveraged institutions, most corporate debt is held by unleveraged players such as pension funds, insurance companies, mutual funds, and ETFs. Bank loans account for only 18% of nonfinancial corporate sector debt, down from 40% in 1980 (Chart 19). The share of leveraged loans held by banks has declined from about 25% a decade ago to less than 10% today. Moreover, banks today hold much more high-quality capital than in the past (Chart 20). This makes corporate debt less systemically important for the economy.   Chart 19Banks Have Reduced Their Exposure To The Corporate Sector Chart 20U.S. Banks Are Well Capitalized One of the reasons we turned more bullish on risk assets in December was because stocks had plunged and corporate spreads widened without much follow-through in financial stress indices. For example, the infamous TED spread barely budged (Chart 21). Chart 21TED Spreads Are Well Behaved, Indicating No Major Signs Of Financial Stress Everyone Agrees With Larry Given the lack of major imbalances in the U.S. economy, why do investors believe that the Fed cannot raise rates further even though the Fed funds rate in real terms is barely above zero? The answer is that investors appear to have bought into Larry Summers’ secular stagnation thesis, which posits that the neutral rate of interest is much lower today than it was in the past. We have some sympathy for this thesis, but it is important to remember that it is a theory about the long-term determinants of interest rates such as productivity and demographic trends. The theory says little about the cyclical drivers of interest rates, including the amount of spare capacity in the economy, the stance of fiscal policy, credit growth, and wage trends. Earlier this decade, when we were still very bullish on bonds, one could have plausibly argued that the economy needed extremely low interest rates: The output gap was still large; the deleveraging cycle had just begun; home and equity prices were depressed; wage growth was anemic; and fiscal policy had turned restrictive after a brief burst of stimulus during the Great Recession. Far From Neutral? All of the forces mentioned above have either fully or partially reversed course over the past few years. Take fiscal policy as one example. The IMF estimates that the U.S. structural budget deficit averaged 3.3% of GDP in 2014-15. In 2019-20, the IMF reckons the deficit will average 5.6% of GDP. To what extent has easier fiscal policy raised the U.S. neutral rate of interest? Let us conservatively assume that every $1 of additional fiscal stimulus adds $1 to aggregate demand. In this case, fiscal policy has added 2.3% of GDP to aggregate demand over the past five years. Suppose that a one-percentage point increase in aggregate demand raises the neutral rate of interest by 1%, which is in line with the specification of the Taylor Rule that former Fed Chair Janet Yellen favored. This implies that fiscal policy alone has raised the neutral rate by over two percentage points. The discussion above suggests that cyclical factors may have pushed up the neutral rate considerably, even if long-term structural factors are still dragging it down. Since the Fed is supposed to set interest rates with an eye on what is appropriate for the economy over the next year or two, rates may end up staying too low for too long. This will cause the economy to overheat, eventually leading to a surge in inflation. The Inflation Boogeyman The good news is that none of our favorite indicators point to a major imminent inflationary upswing (Chart 22): Despite higher tariffs, consumer import price inflation has slowed; core intermediate producer price inflation has decelerated; the prices paid components of the ISM and regional Fed surveys have plunged; inflation surprise indices have rolled over; and both survey and market-based measures of inflation expectations remain below where they were last summer. In keeping with these developments, BCA’s proprietary Pipeline Inflation Indicator has fallen to a two-and-a-half-year low. Wage growth has accelerated, but productivity growth has increased by even more. As a result, unit labor cost inflation has been coming down since the middle of last year. Unit labor costs lead core CPI inflation by about 12 months (Chart 23). This implies that consumer price inflation is unlikely to reach uncomfortably high levels at least until the second half of next year. Chart 22No Symptoms of An Imminent Major Inflationary Upswing In The U.S. ... Chart 23... And Decelerating Unit Labor Costs Will Dampen Inflationary Pressures For The Time Being At that point, risks are high that inflation will move up. This could force the Fed to start raising rates aggressively in early-2021, a course of action that will push up the dollar and cause equities and spread product to sell off. The resulting tightening in financial conditions will probably plunge the U.S. and the rest of the world into recession in mid-to-late 2021.   Stay Bullish Global Equities For Now, Turn Defensive Late Next Year Chart 24Analyst Expectations Are Quite Muted The two-stage Fed tightening cycle discussed above – gradual rate hikes starting in December and continuing into 2020, and more aggressive hikes thereafter in response to rising inflation – shapes our investment views over the next few years. The Key Financial Market Forecasts Chart at the beginning of this publication provides a rough sketch of where we think the main asset classes are heading. We suspect that equities and other risk assets will be able to digest the first stage of rate tightening, albeit with heightened volatility around the time when the Fed starts preparing the market for another hike later this year. Unlike last September, earnings estimates are much more conservative. Bottom-up estimates foresee EPS rising by 3.9% in the U.S. and 5.4% in the rest of the world in 2019 (Chart 24). The combination of faster growth, easier financial conditions, and ongoing share buybacks implies some upside to these numbers. Perhaps more importantly, unlike in September, the Fed will only start hiking rates if the economy is performing well. Powell erred in saying that “rates were a long way from neutral” just when the U.S. economy was starting to slow. Had he uttered those words when U.S. growth was still accelerating, investors would have probably disregarded them. Jay Powell won’t make the same mistake again. Rather, he will make a different one: He will let the economy overheat to the point where the Fed finds itself clearly behind the curve and forced to scramble to catch up. The resulting stagflationary environment – where growth is slowing due to a shortage of available workers and inflation is on the upswing – will be toxic for equities and other risk assets. While it is difficult to be precise about timing, we recommend that investors maintain a modestly pro-risk stance over the next 12-to-18 months. However, they should pare back exposure to equities and spread product late next year before the Fed ramps up the pace of rate hikes. Prepare To Temporarily Upgrade International Stocks The U.S. stock market tends to be “low beta” compared to other bourses. If global growth accelerates in the second half of this year, international stocks will outperform their U.S. counterparts. We sold our put on the EEM ETF for a gain of 104% on Jan 3rd, and now recommend being outright long EM equities. We will be looking to upgrade both EM and European equities to overweight in the coming weeks in currency-unhedged terms once we see more confirmatory evidence of a global growth revival. We have mixed feeling about Japanese stocks. Stronger global growth will benefit Japanese multinationals, but firms focused on the domestic market may suffer if the government goes ahead and raises the sales tax in October. We would hold off upgrading Japanese stocks for the time being. At the global sector level, we pared back our defensive tilt earlier this year, after having turned more cautious last summer. We recommend that investors overweight energy and industrials. We are also warming up to financials and materials. The former will benefit from a steepening in yield curves later this year as well as from faster credit growth. The latter will gain from a more robust Chinese economy. We would maintain a neutral allocation to health care, info tech, and communication services. Real estate and utilities will both suffer once bond yields start moving higher. Classically defensive sectors such as consumer staples will also underperform.  Global Bond Yields Likely To Rise Global bond yields are likely to rise over the next 12-to-18 months as growth surprises on the upside. Yields will continue rising into the first half of 2021 as inflation accelerates. Unlike in past risk-off episodes, Treasurys will not provide much of a safe haven in the lead up to the next recession. As noted above, one of the reasons that bond yields are so low today is because the term premium is very depressed. The cumulative effect of Fed bond purchases has probably depressed the term premium, but the bigger impact has stemmed from the fact that investors see Treasurys as an insurance policy against various macro risks. Investors are accustomed to thinking that when an economy slides into recession, equity prices will fall, the housing market will deteriorate, wage gains will recede, job prospects will worsen, but at least the value of their bond portfolio will go up! The problem with this reasoning is that it is only valid when the Fed is hiking rates in response to stronger growth. If the Fed is hiking rates because inflation is getting out of hand, Treasury yields could end up rising while stocks are falling. This was actually the norm between the late-1960s and early-2000s (Chart 25). Chart 25Treasury Yields Could Rise While Stocks Fall If Treasurys lose their safe-haven status, the term premium will move higher. A vicious circle could develop where rising bond yields weaken the stock market, causing investors to flood out of both stocks and bonds and into cash, leading to even higher bond yields and lower equity prices. Investors should maintain a modest short duration stance towards Treasurys over the next 12 months, and then move to maximum underweight duration in mid-2020 as inflation starts to break out. Going long duration will only make sense once the Fed has raised interest rates into restrictive territory and the economy slides into recession. That is not likely to occur until the second half of 2021. Regionally, we favor European, Canadian, Australian, New Zealand, and especially Japanese government bonds over the next 12 months relative to U.S. Treasurys. The U.S. economy is at the greatest risk of overheating. In currency-hedged terms, the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield is among the lowest in the world (Table 1). Japanese 10-year bonds, for example, offer 2.72% in currency-hedged terms, while German bunds command 2.94%. Table 1Bond Markets Across The Developed World   The U.S. Dollar: Heading Towards A Soft Patch Gauging the outlook for the U.S. dollar is a bit tricky. Even though the Fed will only be raising rates gradually over the next 12 months, it will still hike more than what is discounted by markets. With most other central banks still sitting on the sidelines, short-term rate differentials are likely to move in favor of the greenback. That said, aside from Japan, stronger global growth will likely prompt investors to price in a few more rate hikes in other developed economies in 2020 and beyond. Consequently, long-term yield differentials may not widen by as much as short-term differentials. Perhaps more importantly, the U.S. dollar is a countercyclical currency, meaning that it moves in the opposite direction of global growth (Chart 26). This countercyclicality stems from the fact that the U.S. economy is more geared towards services than manufacturing compared with the rest of the world (Chart 27). As such, when global growth accelerates, capital tends to flow from the U.S. to the rest of the world, translating into more demand for foreign currency and less demand for dollars. Chart 26The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency Chart 27The U.S. Is A Low-Beta Play On Global Growth If global growth picks up in the back half of this year, the dollar will likely peak in the second quarter and weaken over the remainder of 2019 and into 2020. The dollar’s trajectory may thus follow a similar course to the one in 2017, a year in which the Fed raised rates four times, but the broad trade-weighted dollar nevertheless managed to weaken by 7%. Chart 28The Yen Is A Risk-Off Currency As was the case in 2017, the euro will probably gain ground later this year against the U.S. dollar as will most EM and commodity currencies. However, just as the Japanese yen failed to participate in the rally that most currencies experienced against the dollar in 2017, it will struggle to gain much traction against the greenback. The yen is a “risk-off” currency and thus tends to fall whenever global risk assets rally (Chart 28). In addition, the yen will suffer if global bond yields move up relative to JGB yields later this year, as will likely be the case if the BoJ is forced to prolong its yield curve control regime in the face of tighter fiscal policy. We would go long EUR/JPY on any break below 123. After First Weakening, The Dollar Will Rally Again Late Next Year As the U.S. economy encounters ever more supply-side constraints in 2020, growth will slow and inflation will accelerate. The Fed will respond by hiking rates more quickly than inflation is rising. The resulting increase in real interest rates will put upward pressure on the dollar. In this stagflationary environment, equities will tumble and credit spreads will widen. Tighter U.S. financial conditions will reverberate around the world, causing global growth to decelerate even more than it would have otherwise. This will further turbocharge the dollar. The greenback will only peak once the Fed starts cutting rates in late-2021. Commodities: Getting More Bullish A weaker dollar later this year, along with stronger global growth led by a resurgent China, will be bullish for commodities. BCA’s commodity strategists recommend going long copper at current prices. They are also maintaining their bullish bias towards oil. They expect Brent to average $75/bbl this year and $80/bbl in 2020. Higher U.S. shale output will be offset by delays in building out deepwater export facilities, which will keep supply fairly tight. In past reports, we discussed the merits of buying gold as an inflation hedge. However, we held back from doing so because of our bullish dollar view. Now that we see the dollar peaking over the next few months, we would be buyers of gold on any break below $1275/ounce.   Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Gretzky’s Doctrine,” dated March 1, 2019. 2      Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Low Odds Of An FCI Doom Loop,” dated January 4, 2019. 3      Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Is There Really Too Much Government Debt In The World?” dated February 22, 2019. Strategy & Market Trends MacroQuant Model And Current Subjective Scores Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights Just when it looked like the agricultural complex was starting to perk up, it was slapped down again. After crawling its way back from a mid-2018 crash – retracing more than half of its decline – the CCI Grains and Oilseeds index plummeted in February, declining by nearly 9% (Chart Of The Week). The decline was broad-based, but was led by wheat, which was dragged down by muted demand and accounted for most of the index’s decline. Looking forward, we expect U.S. financial conditions and developments on the trade-war front to remain the main forces driving ag prices. Ample inventories will provide the cushion necessary to moderate the impact of potential supply-side shocks. Highlights Energy: Overweight. Venezuela suffered another power outage earlier this week, indicating the deterioration of its infrastructure is accelerating. While officials claim to have restored power, we expect more such outages going forward, which will severely reduce the country’s production and export capacity. Separately, Aramco announced it will buy 70% of Sabic, a Saudi state-owned petchem producer, for $69 billion, according to the Wall Street Journal. Base Metals: Neutral. China’s MMG Ltd was set to declare force majeure following protests at its Las Bambas mine in Peru earlier this week. The mine produces ~ 385k MT p.a., most of which goes to China. Precious Metals: Neutral. The inversion of the U.S. yield curve put a bid into the gold market this week, as investors sought a safe-haven refuge. Continued weakness in bond yields, and accommodative central banks responding to low inflation expectations globally will continue to support gold. Agriculture: Underweight. A more patient Fed will be supportive of ag prices in 2H19, as we discuss below. Feature Chart of the WeekWheat Had A Rough Start To 2019 A Patient Fed Will Support Ags In 2H19 While differences across ag markets will arise due to idiosyncratic supply shocks and targeted trade policies, a common determinant of ag price movements more generally is U.S. financial conditions. Since our last assessment of global ag markets, Fed policymakers have adopted a much more patient approach to monetary policy.1 In line with the pause in the Fed’s rates-normalization policy, financial conditions have eased considerably (Chart 2). We believe this will, ceteris paribus, bring relief to commodity markets in general, ags in particular, in the second half of this year. Chart 2Easier Financial Conditions Bode Well For Ags The bulk of this relief will be transmitted through the impact of a weaker dollar. Since the dollar is a countercyclical currency, its weakness implies an improvement in global growth. This more solid economic backdrop is associated with greater aggregate demand, particularly in EM economies, as well as demand for agricultural products. The lagged effects of financial tightening, weak Chinese credit growth and the trade war will persist in 2Q19. Furthermore, when the USD weakens against the currencies of ag exporting countries, farmers there are incentivized to hoard or cut exports – thus reducing supply – awaiting periods when a stronger greenback will raise their profits. At the same time, ags priced in USD become relatively more affordable for importing nations, incentivizing them to raise consumption. The net impact of this contraction in supply amid greater demand will pull up prices – illustrated by the relatively tight inverse relationship between ag prices and the dollar (Chart 3). Chart 3A Weaker USD Will Be A Tailwind In 2H19 Going into mid-2019, we expect global economic indicators to continue to be uninspiring. The lagged effects of financial tightening, weak Chinese credit growth and the trade war will persist in 2Q19. However, as these factors fade and give way to an improvement in global economic conditions and easier financial conditions, we expect the dollar to peak around mid-year. As such, a resurgence in global growth in the second half of the year will be reflected in an improvement in the value of the currencies of major ag exporters ex-U.S. (Chart 4). Ceteris paribus, this also benefits ag prices. Chart 4Weak Local Currencies Supporting Farm Profits, Incentivizing Production China’s Economy Remains Central Our outlook hinges on developments in the Chinese economy. Peter Berezin – our Chief Global Investment Strategist – expects Chinese authorities to not only stabilize credit growth, but also increase it, creating room for improvement in the world’s second largest economy.2 This combination of supportive global growth and a softer dollar bodes well for ag prices in 2H19. The Fed pause and associated easing in U.S. financial conditions will support global growth, causing the U.S. dollar to weaken – a bullish force for ag markets. Apart from the currency impact, easy financial conditions are supportive of global growth. A rise in income levels of emerging economies will support demand for goods and services generally, and agricultural commodities specifically.3 The market now expects 36 and 51 basis points of rate cuts over the coming 12 and 24 months, respectively. Similarly, following last week’s FOMC meeting, the median Fed dot indicates no rate hikes this year from the U.S. central bank, and only one in 2020. While our Global Investment Strategists would not be surprised to see a hike this year, the noticeably less hawkish tone in the Fed’s forward guidance and dot plots are positive for ag markets.4 Looking beyond that into late-2020 or early 2021, a potential pick-up in inflation will force the Fed to take a more hawkish stance, and once again support the U.S. dollar. This will weigh down on ag prices over the strategic time horizon. Bottom Line: The Fed pause and associated easing in U.S. financial conditions will support global growth, causing the U.S. dollar to weaken – a bullish force for ag markets. However, this is unlikely to occur before mid-year. In the meantime, a stronger dollar on the back of the lagged effects of growth dampening events in 2018, will remain a headwind. Ample Inventories Will Cushion Against Supply Shocks Putting aside the more or less uniform impact of U.S. financial conditions, individual supply-demand fundamentals will manifest as idiosyncratic risks and opportunities. The USDA has been revising its projections for ending stocks higher in its monthly World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (WASDE) across the board since it released the first projections for the 2018/2019 crop year last May. However, we find that solely on the back of fundamentals, soybeans are more likely to resist upward pressure from easier U.S. financial conditions in 2H19 vs. wheat and corn. The USDA’s latest projections for the current crop year indicate that global bean markets are well supplied. Expectations of a global surplus this crop year – for the seventh consecutive year – will add to the growing cushion (Chart 5). Chart 5Beans Surplus Will Add To the Glut Since May, global ending bean stocks have been revised higher by a total of 20.47mm MT. The change in projections comes on the back of upward revisions to production and beginning stocks, compounded by downward revisions to consumption. The latter will likely contract further if the U.S. and China do not reach an agreement on the trade front (see below). Consequently, unless a weather disruption weakens supply, we expect soybean inventories to stand at record highs relative to consumption at the end of the current crop year. In the case of wheat, the impact on prices will likely be marginal. The global balance is expected to shift to a deficit in the current marketing year, following five years of surplus (Chart 6). While this is a positive for wheat prices, given that global inventory levels are relatively elevated – capable of supporting 37% of consumption – and the current deficit is relatively small, we do not expect the deficit to pressure prices in the near term. Chart 6Elevated Wheat Inventories Will Cushion Against Minor Deficit Despite continued downward revisions to the USDA’s wheat production projections, expectations of ending stocks have actually risen on the back of downward revisions to consumption. Similarly, corn fundamentals are also unlikely to sway prices much. The grain is expected to remain in deficit for the second consecutive year, which will pull inventories down off their 2016/17 peak to be capable of covering ~27% of global consumption (Chart 7). Despite this contraction in availability, global supplies remain relatively elevated, especially compared to the 2003 to 2012 period. Thus unless there is a significant supply shock, we don’t expect much support from fundamentals. Chart 7A Global Corn Deficit ... Unlike wheat demand, which has been downgraded, the USDA has revised corn consumption up relative to the first projections for the crop year released last May. Nevertheless, stronger expectations of consumption have been overwhelmed by upward revisions to production and beginning inventory levels. Given that world inventories already are bloated, we do not expect the likely deficit in wheat and corn supplies this crop year to pressure prices much to the upside. Since the mid-1990s, U.S. farmers had been planting more corn and wheat at the expense of soybean acreage (Chart 8). On a global level, while wheat remains more popular in terms of acreage, it is generally trending downwards, while corn and soybean plantings are trending up. However, over the longer term, U.S. farmers are expected to dedicate more land to corn relative to soybeans. Chart 8... Will Be Met By Rising U.S. Acreage Bottom Line: Given that world inventories already are bloated, we do not expect the likely deficit in wheat and corn supplies this crop year to pressure prices much to the upside. Similarly, a global glut in soybean supplies will only add to swelling inventories. The Trade War And Soybeans: It Ain’t Over Till It’s Over Aside from U.S. financial conditions and supply-demand balances, U.S. trade policy has also been roiling ag markets since China slapped U.S. soybeans with 25% tariffs in mid-2018. In fact, since the escalation of the trade dispute, soybean prices have been moving largely in response to developments on the trade front (Chart 9). As developments since the G20 Summit in Buenos Aires last December have been more favorable, soybean markets are on the path to recovery. Chart 9Markets Optimistic Of A Trade War Resolution So far, even though U.S. soybean exports to China picked up over the past two months, total U.S. exports still lag levels typical for this time of year (Chart 10). This comes despite U.S. efforts to raise shipments to other trading partners. Furthermore, U.S. exports will now be in direct competition with the Brazilian crop, which usually dominates trade flows at this time of year (Chart 11). While the U.S. tariff hike from 10% to 25% on $200bn of Chinese goods has been postponed, a resolution to the trade war has yet to occur. The path to a resolution is fraught with risks. While the U.S. tariff hike from 10% to 25% on $200bn of Chinese goods has been postponed, a resolution to the trade war has yet to occur. The path to a resolution is fraught with risks. The Trump-Xi meeting that was expected to occur in late-March was postponed; the next most likely date for a meeting is at the G20 summit in end-June. This leaves another 3 months of trade uncertainty. Nevertheless, our models indicate that soybeans are now priced at fair value, based on U.S. financial variables – absent a trade war (Chart 12). Furthermore, the premium priced into Brazilian beans above those traded on the CBOT has returned to its historical average (Chart 13). Thus, we do not expect a further reduction in the premium in the event Sino-U.S. trade negotiations are successful. Chart 13Premium For Brazilian Beans Has Normalized Rather, markets will be disappointed if the U.S. and China are unable to conclude a deal. This would put CBOT prices at risk and support the premium on those traded in Brazil. Given that our geopolitical strategists assign a non-negligible 30% probability that the trade war escalates further, we believe markets are overly optimistic that a deal will be concluded.5 If the trade war drags on and turns into a multi-year conflict, soybean markets will likely take a more meaningful hit. According to the USDA’s latest long-term projections released earlier this month, China’s soybean imports were projected to rise 32.1mm MT during the 2018-28 period – a massive downward revision from the 46mm MT expected for the 2017-2027 period contained in the previous long-run projections. Furthermore, outbreaks of African swine fever in China may put demand there at risk. Over 100 cases have so far been reported in China, with several cases already reported in Vietnam as well. This threatens to depress China’s need for soybean as animal feed, regardless of what happens on the trade front. Bottom Line: A positive outcome from the U.S.-China trade negotiations is not a given. Nevertheless, soybean markets are treating it as such. Our geopolitical strategists assign 30% odds that a final deal falls through. This non-negligible probability threatens to cause soybean prices to relapse anew, should Sino-U.S. trade negotiations break down.   Roukaya Ibrahim, Editor/Strategist Commodity & Energy Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see “2019 Key Views: Policy-Induced Volatility Will Drive Markets,” published by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy December 13, 2018.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research’s Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report titled “What’s Next For The Dollar,” dated March 15, 2019, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled “Global Financial Conditions Will Drive Grain Prices In 2018,” dated November 30, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Research’s Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report titled “Questions From The Road,” dated March 22, 2019, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy Special Report titled “China-U.S. Trade: A Structural Deal?,” dated March 6, 2019, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table   Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Trades  

Special Report

Highlights So What? It makes sense for long-term investors to buy the GBP. However, short-term investors should instead buy the 2-year call while selling 3-month ones. Why? The U.K. electorate is not staunchly Euroskeptic. In fact, Bregret has already set in. Volatility is the only sure bet over the tactical and strategic time horizons. The most likely scenario is that Theresa May either resigns and is replaced by a soft-Brexit Tory, or that she agrees to a long-term extension to give the U.K. time to call a new election. Brexit is unsustainable over the secular time horizon. Our low-conviction view is that in the long term, the U.K. will remain inside the European Union. Feature The hour is late in the ongoing Brexit saga. The original deadline, once spoken of with religious reverence, will be tossed aside for one, potentially two, extensions. In this analysis, we attempt to consider the state of Brexit from multiple time horizons. First, we offer our tactical view, what will happen in the next several weeks and months. Second, we offer our strategic view, surveying the Brexit process to the end of the year. Third, we consider the secular view and attempt to answer the question of whether the U.K. will ever fully exit the EU. We then assign investment recommendations across the three time horizons. The Conservative Party has wrapped itself into an intellectual pretzel trying to deliver on a referendum that the pro-Brexit Tories promised would not mean losing access to the Common Market. How Did We Get Here? In March 2016, three months ahead of the fateful June referendum, BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy and European Investment Strategy published a joint report on the topic that drew three conclusions: The probability of Brexit was understated by the market. “According to our modeling results, roughly 64% of Tory undecided voters would have to swing to the “Stay” camp in order to ensure that the vote crosses the 50% threshold in favour of continued EU membership … Conventional wisdom suggests that the probability of Brexit is around 30%, anchoring to the 1975 referendum results. Our own analysis of current polling data suggests that it is much closer to 50%, as in too close to call.” The biggest loser of Brexit, domestically, would be the Conservative Party. “The risk is that the British populace realizes that leaving the EU was a sub-optimal result and that little sovereignty was recovered. As such, there could be a backlash against the Tories in the next general election. In this scenario, the winner would not necessarily be UKIP, but rather the Jeremy Corbyn-led Labour Party – as close to the Michael Foot-led opposition in the early 1980s as any Labour Leadership.” The EU would survive, intact, with no further “exits.” “European integration is therefore a gambit for relevance by Europe’s declining powers. Brexit will not create centrifugal forces that tear the EU apart, and could in fact enhance the sinews that bind EU member states in a bid for 21st century geopolitical relevance.” Thus far, all three predictions have proven prescient. Not only was the probability of Brexit understated, but the electorate actually voted to exit the EU.1 The Conservative Party has wrapped itself into an intellectual pretzel trying to deliver on a referendum that the pro-Brexit Tories – a minority in the party – promised would not mean losing access to the Common Market. And the EU has not only seen no other “exits,” but has held firm and united in the negotiations with the U.K. while witnessing an increase in the support for its troubled currency union, both in the Euro Area in aggregate as well as in crisis-ridden Italy (Chart 1). Chart 1The Euro Area Stands Unified The net assessment we conducted in 2016 correctly gauged what the Brexit referendum was about and what it was not about. Our view was that behind the angst lay factors too general to be laid at the feet of European integration. Decades of supply-side reforms combined with competition from emerging economies led to a sharp rise in U.K. income inequality (Chart 2), the erosion of its manufacturing economy (Chart 3), and the ballooning of the country’s financial sector (Chart 4). As a result, the U.K.’s income inequality and social mobility were, in 2016 as today, much closer to those of its Anglo-Saxon peer America than to those of its continental European neighbors (Chart 5). Chart 2Brits Saw Inequality Surge Chart 3Manufacturing Jobs Collapsed Chart 4The Financial Bubble Burst The underlying economic angst has continued to influence British politics since Brexit. Campaigning on an anti-austerity platform in the summer of 2017, the Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn nearly won the general election, only underperforming the Conservative vote by 2% (Chart 6). The election was supposed to politically recapitalize Theresa May and allow her to lead the U.K. out of the EU. But the failure to secure a single-party majority created the political math in the House of Commons that is today preventing the prime minister from executing on Brexit. There are simply not enough committed Brexiters in Westminster to deliver on the relatively hard Brexit – no access to the EU Common Market or customs union – that Prime Minister May has put on offer (Chart 7). The decision not to pursue a customs union arrangement with the EU is particularly disastrous. As our colleague Dhaval Joshi – Chief Strategist of BCA’s European Investment Strategy – has pointed out, remaining in the customs union would have protected the cross-border supply chains that are vital to many U.K. businesses and would have avoided a hard customs border on the island of Ireland.2 However, the slim margin of the Tory victory in 2017 has boosted the influence of the 20-to-40 hard-Brexiters in the party. They pushed Theresa May to the extreme, where a customs union arrangement – let alone access to the Common Market – became politically unpalatable. The underlying economic angst has continued to influence British politics since Brexit. Had the British electorate genuinely wanted “Brexit über alles,” or the relatively hard Brexit on offer today, the margin of victory for Leave would have been greater. Furthermore, the electorate would not have come so close to giving the far-left Corbyn – who nonetheless supports the softest-of-soft Brexits – a majority in mid-2017. The slim margin of victory effectively tied May’s hands in her subsequent negotiations with both the EU and her own party. But there was more to the 2016 referendum than just general malaise centered on the economy and inequality. There were idiosyncratic events that provided tailwinds for the Leave campaign. Or, as we put it in 2016: Certainly, a number of ills have befallen the continent in quick succession: the euro area sovereign debt crisis, Russian military intervention in Ukraine, rampant migrant inflows from Africa and the Middle East, and terrorist attacks in France. It is no surprise that the U.K. populace wants to think twice about tying itself even more closely to a Europe apparently on the run from the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse. The two issues we would particularly focus on were the migrant crisis and terrorist attacks in Europe. Data ahead of the referendum clearly gave credence to the view that the influx of migrants was raising “concerns about immigration and race.” This angst was primarily focused on EU migrants who came to the U.K. legally (Chart 8), but the influx of millions of migrants into the EU in 2015 – peaking at 172,000 in the month of October – certainly bolstered the anxiety in the U.K. (Chart 9).3 Chart 8EU Migrants A Source Of Anxiety In 2016 Chart 9The Refugee Crisis Boosted Brexit Vote Terrorism was another concern. In the 18 months preceding the referendum, continental Europe experienced 13 deadly terror attacks. Two were particularly egregious: the November 2015 Paris terror attack that led to 130 deaths, and the March 2016 Brussels terror attack that led to 32 deaths. The idiosyncratic events that provided tailwinds behind Brexit … were the migrant crisis and terrorist attacks in Europe. Both the migration and terror crises, however, were temporary and caused by idiosyncratic variables with short half-lives. BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy argued that both would eventually abate. The migration crisis would subside due to firming European attitudes towards asylum seekers and the exhaustion of the supply of migrants as the Syrian Civil War drew to its tragic close. The extremist Islamic terror attacks would dwindle due to the decrease in the marginal utility of terror that has been observed in previous waves of terrorism (Chart 10). Neither forecast was popular with our client base, but both have been spot on. Chart 10Fewer Attacks Due To Declining Marginal Utility Of Terror The point is that the British electorate was never as Euroskeptic as the Euroskeptics cheering on Brexit thought. Support for EU integration has waxed and waned for decades (Chart 11). Instead, a combination of macro-malaise caused by the general plight of the middle class – the same factors that have given tailwinds to populist policymakers across developed markets – and idiosyncratic crises in the middle of this decade created the context in which the public voted to leave the EU. Whatever the vote was for, we can say with a high degree of certainty that it was not in favor of the current deal on offer, a relatively hard Brexit. After all, the pro-Leave Tories almost universally campaigned in favor of remaining in the Common Market post-Brexit.4 Chart 11Data Does Not Support Euroskeptic U.K. Today, Bregret has clearly set in. Not only on the specific issue of whether the U.K. should leave the EU – where the gap between Bremorseful voters and committed Brexiters is now 8% (Chart 12), a 12% swing since just after the referendum – but also on the more existential question of whether U.K. citizens feel European (Chart 13). Chart 12Bregret Has Set In... Chart 13...And Brits Feel More European The political reality of Bregret is the most important variable in predicting Brexit. Not only is it difficult for Prime Minister May to deliver her relatively hard Brexit in Westminster due to the mid-2017 electoral math, but it is especially the case when the electorate does not want it. Yes, the mid-2016 referendum is an expression of a democratic will that must be respected. But no policymaker wants to respect the referendum at the cost of disrespecting the current disposition of the median voter, which is revealed through polls. Doing so will cost them in the next election. The British electorate was never as Euroskeptic as the Euroskeptics cheering on Brexit thought. Reviewing “how we got here” is essential in forecasting the tactical, strategic, and secular time horizons in the ongoing Brexit imbroglio. To this task we now turn. Bottom Line: The U.K. electorate is not staunchly Euroskeptic: data clearly support this fact. The Brexit referendum simply came at the right time for the Leave vote, as the secular forces of middle-class discontent combined with idiosyncratic crises of migration and terror. Three years following the referendum, the discontent remains unaddressed by British policymakers while the idiosyncratic crises have abated. As such, Bregret has set in, creating a new reality that U.K. policymakers must respond to if they want to retain political capital. Where Are We Going? The Tactical And Strategic Time Horizons The EU has offered a two-step delay to the Article 50 deadline of March 29. The first option is a delay until May 22, but only if Theresa May successfully passes her Brexit plan through Westminster. The second option is a delay until April 12. This would come in effect if the House of Commons rejects the deal on offer. The short time frame is supposed to pressure London to come up with the next steps, which the EU has inferred would either be to get out of the bloc without a deal or to plan for a long-term extension. Although there are no official conditions to awarding a long-term extension, it is clear that the EU only envisages three options: Renegotiate the terms of Brexit, to include either a customs union or full Common Market membership (a softer Brexit); Hold a general election to break the impasse; Hold another referendum. The EU is suggesting that it could deny the U.K. an extension if London does not come back with a plan. There are two reasons why we would call the EU’s bluff. First, it is likely an attempt to help May get the deal through the House of Commons by creating a sense of urgency. Second, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled in December 2018 that the U.K. could “revoke that notification unilaterally, in an unequivocal and unconditional manner, by a notice addressed to the European Council in writing.”5 The only requirement is that the notification be sent to Brussels prior to March 29 (or, in the case of a mutually agreed upon extension, prior to April 12). It is increasingly likely that, after the deal on offer fails, Theresa May will have to go “hat-in-hand” to the EU to ask for a much longer extension. She will have until April 12 to ask for that extension, but it would require participation in the European Parliamentary (EP) elections on May 23. Prime Minister May has said that the U.K. will not hold those elections. We beg to differ. Not holding the election would allow the EU to end the U.K.’s membership in the bloc, which would by default mean contravening the Parliament’s will to reject a no-deal Brexit (which it did in a rebuke to the government in March). As such, the U.K. will absolutely hold an EP election in May. Yes, it will be a huge embarrassment to the Conservative government. And we would venture that the election would turn out a huge pro-EU majority from the U.K., given that it is the Europhile side of the aisle that is now excited and activated, further embarrassing the ruling government. The most likely scenario is that Theresa May either resigns and is replaced by a soft-Brexit Tory, or that she agrees to a long-term extension to give the U.K. time to call a new election. The most likely scenario, therefore, is that Theresa May either resigns and is replaced by a soft-Brexit Tory, or that she agrees to a long-term extension to give the U.K. time to call a new election. As we have been arguing throughout the year, the only way to break the impasse without calling a referendum – is to call a new election. A new election would be contested almost exclusively on the issue of Brexit – unlike the 2017 election, which Jeremy Corbyn managed to be almost exclusively contested on the issue of austerity. As such, the winner would have a clear political mandate to pursue the Brexit of their choice. If it is Jeremy Corbyn, this would mean a second referendum, given his recent conversion to supporting one. If Theresa May remains prime minister, it would be her relatively hard Brexit option; if another Tory replaces her, it would potentially be a softer Brexit. Intriguingly, Theresa May is coming up to the average “expiry date” of a “takeover” prime minister, which is 3.3 years (Chart 14). Why do we think that Theresa May would be replaced with a soft Brexit Tory? Because there are simply not enough members of parliament in the Conservative Party caucus to elect a hard Brexiteer. Furthermore, the current deal on offer, which is a form of hard Brexit, clearly has no chance of passing in the House of Commons. Theresa May herself did not support the Leave campaign, but she converted into a hard Brexiteer due to the pressures in the Conservative Party caucus. If, on the other hand, we are wrong and the Conservative Party elects a hard Brexit Tory as leader, the odds of losing the election to the Labour Party would increase. Furthermore, the impasse in the House of Commons would not be resolved as Theresa May would be replaced by a prime minister with essentially the same approach to Brexit. Confused? You are not alone. Diagram 1 illustrates the complexity of the tactical (0-3 months) and strategic (3-12 months) time horizons. There are so many options over the next six months alone that we ran out of space in our diagram to consider the consequences of the general election. Diagram 1Confused? You Are Not Alone Needless to say, an election would induce volatility in the market as it would put Jeremy Corbyn close to the premiership. While he has now promised a second referendum, his government would also implement policies that could, especially in the short term, agitate the markets. Our forecasts of the currency moves alone suggest that volatility is the only sure bet over tactical and strategic time horizons. We do not have a high-conviction view on a directional call on the pound or U.K. equities. However, global growth concerns, combined with political uncertainty, should create a bond-bullish environment. Bottom Line: Over the course of the year, political uncertainty will remain high in the United Kingdom. A general election is the clearest path to breaking the current deadlock. However, it is not guaranteed, as Labour’s recent decline in the polls appears to be reversing since Jeremy Corbyn finally succumbed to the demands that he support a new referendum (Chart 15). Chart 15Labour Party Revives On Referendum Support The Secular Horizon BCA Geopolitical Strategy believes that the median voter is the price maker in the political market place. Politicians are merely price takers. This is why Theresa May’s notion that the sanctity of the 2016 referendum cannot be abrogated is doubly false. First, she cannot truly claim from the slim 52%-48% result that U.K. voters want her form of Brexit. The referendum therefore may be a sacred expression of the democratic will, but her “no customs union” Brexit option is not holy water: It is an educated guess at best, pandering to hard Brexit Tories (a minority of the electorate) at worst. Given that 48% of the electorate wanted to remain in the EU and that a large portion of Brexit voters wanted a Common Market membership as part of Brexit, it is mathematically obvious that the softest of soft Brexit options was the desire of the median voter in June 2016. An election would induce volatility to the market as it would put Jeremy Corbyn close to the premiership. Furthermore, polling data (presented in Chart 12 and Chart 13) now clearly show that the median voter is migrating away from even the softest of soft Brexit options to the “Stay” camp. Bregret has set in and a strong plurality of voters no longer supports Brexit. The question behind Chart 12 is unambiguous. It clearly asks, “In hindsight, do you think Britain was right or wrong to vote to leave the EU?” What does all of this infer for the long term, or secular, horizon? First, an election this year could usher in a Labour government that delivers a new referendum. At this time, given the polling data and the geopolitical context, sans terror and migration crises, we would expect such a referendum to lead to a win for the Stay camp. Second, an election that produces a soft Brexit prime minister or negotiated outcome would allow the U.K. to leave the EU in an orderly fashion. A new Tory prime minister, pursuing a soft Brexit outcome, could even entice some Labour MPs to cross the aisle and support such an exit from the bloc. However, over a secular time horizon of the next two-to-three years, we doubt that a soft Brexit outcome would be viable. Investors have to realize that the vote on leaving the EU does not conclude the U.K. long-term deal with the bloc. That negotiating phase will last during the transition phase, over the next two-to-three years, and would conclude in yet another Westminster vote – and likely crisis – at the end of the period. If this deal entails membership in the Common Market, our low- conviction view over the long term is that it will ultimately fail. Take the financial community’s preferred soft Brexit option, the so-called super soft “Norway Plus” option. A Norway Plus option would entail the highest loss of sovereignty imaginable, given that the U.K. would essentially pay full EU membership fees with no ability to influence the regulatory policies that London would have to abide by. There is also a debate as to whether London would be able to constrict immigration from the EU under that option over the long term, a key demand of Brexiters.6 As such, the only viable option would be to switch to a customs union relationship. However, we fear that even this option may no longer be available to U.K. policymakers. Conservative Party leaders have wasted too much time and lost too much of the public’s good will. With only 40% of the electorate now considering Brexit the correct decision, it is possible that even a customs union arrangement will be unacceptable by the end of the transition period. Aside from the electorate’s growing Bregret, there is also the economic logic – or lack thereof – behind a customs union. A customs union would ensure the unfettered transit of goods between the U.K. and the continent, but not of services. This arrangement greatly favors the EU, not the U.K., as the latter has a wide (and growing) deficit in goods and an expanding surplus in services with the bloc (Chart 16). Chart 16Services Are Key For The U.K. The only logic behind selecting a customs union over the Common Market is that a customs union would allow the U.K. to conclude separate trade deals with the rest of the world. While that may be a fantasy of the few remaining laissez-faire free traders in the U.K. Conservative Party, the view hardly represents the desire of the median voter. Other than a potential trade deal with the U.S., it is practically inconceivable to expect the U.K. electorate to support a free trade agreement with China or India, both of which would likely entail an even greater loss of blue-collar jobs. Even a trade deal with the U.S. would likely face political opposition, given that the U.K. is highly unlikely to be given preferential treatment by an economy seven times its size.7 The Conservative Party has wasted its window of opportunity to push a hard, or moderately hard, Brexit through Parliament. The fact of the matter is that the Conservative Party has wasted its window of opportunity to push a hard, or moderately hard (customs union), Brexit through Parliament. Bregret has set in, as the doyens of Brexit increasingly pursued an unpopular strategy. On the other hand, a Brexit that retains the U.K. membership in the Common Market has never had much logic to begin with. Where does this leave the U.K. in the long term? Given the time horizon and the uncertainty on multiple fronts, our low-conviction view is that it leaves the U.K. inside the European Union. Bottom Line: The combination of increasing Bregret, lack of economic logic behind a customs union membership alone, and the lack of a political logic behind a Common Market membership, suggests that Brexit is unsustainable over the secular time horizon. This imperils the ultimate deal between the U.K. and the EU, which we think will not be able to pass the House of Commons in two-to-three years when it comes up for approval. This is a low-conviction view, however, as political realities can change. Support for Brexit could turn due to exogenous factors, such as a global recession that renews the Euro Area economic imbroglio or a major geopolitical crisis. Both are quite likely over the secular time horizon. Investment Implications Today, cable is cheap, trading at an 18% discount to its long-term fair value as implied by purchasing-power parity models (Chart 17). The growing probability that the U.K. may, down the road, remain in the European Union means that, at current levels the pound is indeed attractive, especially against the U.S. dollar. Chart 17Cable Attractive On Higher Odds Of Bremain However, when it comes to short-term dynamics, the picture is much murkier. The low probability of a no-deal Brexit implies limited downside. However, the path to get the U.K. to abandon the current relatively hard Brexit is also one that involves a new election. This implies that before a resolution is reached, multiple scenarios are possible, including one where Corbyn becomes the next prime minister. Jeremy Corbyn could be the most left-of center leader of any G-10 nation since Francois Mitterrand in France in the early 1980s. Mitterrand’s audacious nationalization and left-leaning policies were met with a collapse in the French franc (Chart 18). Chart 18A Left-Wing Leader Bodes Ill For The Currency Global growth also has an impact on cable. Despite all the noise around Brexit, the reality remains that exports constitute 30% of U.K. GDP, a larger contribution to output than in the euro area. This means that if global growth deteriorates, GBP/USD will face another headwind. If, however, global growth improves, then cable would face a new tailwind. Since BCA is of the view that global growth will likely trough by the summer, we are inclined to be positive on the pound. It makes sense for long-term investors to buy the GBP … short-term investors should buy the 2-year call while selling 3-month ones. Netting out all those factors, it makes sense for long-term investors to buy the GBP, using the dips along the way to build a larger position in this currency. Even on a six-to-twelve-month basis, the path of least resistance for cable is likely upward. The problem is that risk-adjusted returns are likely to be poor as volatility will remain very elevated. We therefore recommend that short-term investors instead buy the 2-year call while selling 3-month ones (Chart 19). Chart 19Volatility Will Be A Challenge For Short Term Investors Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Mathieu Savary, Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst mathieu@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 At the time of publication of our March report, we still had a low-conviction view that the vote would swing towards Stay at the last moment. 2 Please see BCA Research European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Important Message From The Currency Markets,” dated March 14, 2019, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Trying to play up the threat of unchecked migration, the U.K. Independence Party ran a famous campaign poster showing hundreds of refugees on a road under the title of “Breaking Point – The EU has failed us all.” Despite the fact that the U.K. accepted only around 10,000 Syrian refugees since the 2015 crisis. Germany has accepted over 700,000 while Canada – which is located across the Atlantic Ocean on a different continent – accepted over 40,000. Even the impoverished Serbia has accepted more Syrian refugees than the U.K. ­4 One of the most prominent Leave supporters, Boris Johnson, famously quipped after the referendum result that “There will continue to be free trade and access to the single market.” 5 Please see The European Court of Justice, “Judgement Of The Court,” In Case C-621/18, dated December 10, 2018, available at curia.europa.eu. 6 Proponents of the Norway Plus option point out that Article 112(1) of the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement allows for restriction of movement of people within the area. However, these restrictions are intended to be used in times of “serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties.” It certainly appears to be an option for London to restrict EU migration, but it is not clear whether Europe would agree for this to be a permanent solution. Liechtenstein has been using Article 112 to impose quantitative limitations on immigration for decades, but that is because its tiny geographical area is recognized as a “specific situation” that justifies such restrictions. 7 President Donald Trump may want to give the U.K. preferential trade terms on the basis of the filial Anglo-Saxon relationship alone, but it is highly unlikely that the increasingly protectionist Congress would do the same. There is also no guarantee that President Trump will be around to bring such trade negotiations across the finish line.