Developed Countries

Highlights The current mini-upswing in the global mini-cycle started in May and is likely to end around January. On a 6-month horizon, lean against the rally in industrial metals. Equity investors should underweight Basic Resources, and especially Industrial Metals and Mining. The contrasting economic fortunes of Spain and Italy may switch. The peak bank credit impulse for Spain is almost certainly behind it, while for Italy it likely lies ahead. On this hope, we will dip our toes into a small pair-trade: long Italian BTPs versus French OATs. Feature Key to the medium-term behaviour of markets is the existence of what we call 'mini-cycles' in global activity. The evolution of these perpetual mini-cycles explains much of what has happened, what is happening, and what will happen, to financial markets both in Europe and more broadly. Chart of the WeekExpect A Trend-Reversal In The Metals Market Mini-cycles are not a hypothesis. They are an indisputable empirical fact. Just look at the global bond yield (Chart I-2), metal price inflation (Chart I-3), global inflation (Chart I-4), and the bank credit impulse (Chart I-5 and Chart I-6). The regular mini-cycles shout out at you! Furthermore, given that these clearly observed mini-cycles show the same half-cycle length of about 8 months, Investment Reductionism strongly suggests that there is a common over-arching driver. Chart I-2The Global Bond Yield Exhibits Mini-Cycles Chart I-3Metal Price Inflation Exhibits Mini-Cycles Chart I-4Inflation Exhibits Mini-Cycles Chart I-5The Global Credit Impulse Exhibits Mini-Cycles Chart I-6Individual Credit Impulses Exhibit Mini-Cycles Explaining Mini-Cycles Previously,1 we explained that the distinct mini-cycles are interconnected parts of the same never-ending feedback loop. A lower bond yield accelerates bank credit flows... which boosts economic growth... which pushes up commodity inflation and overall inflation... causing the bond market to raise the bond yield, at which point the cycle reverses. And then the alternate cycles repeat ad perpetuam (see Box I-1). Box I-1The Mathematics Of Mini-Cycles One common question we get is: why focus on bank credit analysis and not on bond-intermediated credit analysis too? The simple answer is that bank credit expands the broad money supply whereas bond-intermediated credit usually does not. When a bank issues a new loan, fractional reserve banking allows it to create money 'out of thin air'. In contrast, when a company or government issues a new bond, no new money is created, unless the primary issue is financed by the central bank - which is generally forbidden. Usually, when a bond is issued, existing money just moves from one account - that of the bond buyer - to another account - that of the bond issuer. This means that bond-intermediated credit cannot increase demand by creating new money, but only by increasing the velocity of existing money. Whereas bank credit can increase demand by increasing both the amount of money and its velocity. Therefore, changes in bank credit are the much bigger driver of the mini-cycle in economic activity. If a bank issues 100 euros of credit today, then we know that this new money will be spent in the coming days and weeks - because nobody borrows money just to sit on it. If, in the previous period, the bank had issued 90 euros which was spent, it means that economic activity in the coming period will grow by 10 euros. But if the bank had previously issued 110 euros, it means that economic activity in the coming period will contract by 10 euros. In this way, the cycles in credit and activity are interconnected. Mini-upswings in the credit impulse mini-cycle tend to signal mini-upswings in commodity inflation (Chart I-7), overall inflation and bond yields. So if we can identify turning points in the credit impulse then we can correctly position the cyclical stance of our investment strategy. Chart I-7The Same Mini-Cycle: The Global Credit Impulse And Metal Price Inflation The problem is that the bank credit data is slow to come out. For example, although we are in the middle of November, the last bank credit data for the euro area refers to September. This means that if the mini-cycle is turning now, we might not find out until January. Nevertheless, we can still use the mini-cycle framework. We know that the current mini-upswing started in May and that mini-upswings have an average length of 8 months. Hence, we can infer that the mini-upswing is likely to end around January. That said, upswing lengths do have some degree of variation: the current upswing might be longer or shorter than the average. How to avoid being too early or too late? Combining Mini-Cycles With Fractal Analysis To optimise our proprietary mini-cycle framework, we propose combining it with our proprietary fractal analysis framework. As regular readers know, fractal analysis measures whether herding in a specific investment has become excessive, signalling the end of its price trend. The combined mini-cycle and fractal framework works best if we use a 130-day herding indicator (fractal dimension), as it broadly aligns with the mini half-cycle length. Excessive herding signals that an investment's trend is approaching exhaustion because the liquidity that has fuelled the trend is about to evaporate. Liquidity is plentiful when the market is split between different herds - say, short-term momentum traders and long-term value investors. This is because the herds disagree with each other. If the price fluctuates up, the momentum trader wants to buy while the value investor wants to sell; and vice-versa. So the herds trade with each other with plentiful liquidity. But liquidity starts to evaporate when too many value investors join the momentum herd. Instead of dispassionately investing on the basis of value, value investors get sucked into chasing a price trend, and their buy orders add fuel to the trend. The tipping point comes when all the value investors have joined the momentum herd. If a value investor then suddenly reverts to type and puts in a sell order, he will find that there are no buyers left. Liquidity has evaporated, and finding new liquidity might require a substantial reversal in the price to attract a buy order from an ultra-long-term deep value investor. Earlier this year, our combined frameworks signalled that the aggressive rise in bond yields was likely to reverse (Chart I-8). Therefore, on February 2 we correctly advised: "Lean against the rise in bond yields and bank equities." Chart I-8Excessive Herding In Bonds Always Signals A Trend Reversal Today, we see the same dynamic in parts of the commodity rally - and specifically the move in the LME Index (Chart of the Week). Hence, on a 6-month horizon, lean against the rally in industrial metals. Equity investors should underweight Basic Resources, and especially Industrial Metals and Mining. Could Italy Be A Good Surprise? Returning to the concept of the bank credit cycle, the evolution of longer-term impulses also explains the contrasting recent fortunes of Spain and Italy. In 2013, Spain recapitalized its banking system and ring-fenced bad assets within a 'bad bank'. In effect, it finally did what other economies - most notably the U.S., U.K. and Ireland - had done several years earlier in response to their own housing-related banking crises. As Spanish banks' aggressive deleveraging ended, the bank credit impulse rebounded very sharply and has remained positive for several years. This undoubtedly explains why Spanish real GDP has grown by 13% since mid-2013 (Chart I-9). In contrast, Italy's banking system remained dysfunctional - which meant that its own credit impulse stayed much more muted and barely positive over the past four years (Chart I-10). But now, the Italian banking system is slowly recuperating. Italian banks' equity capital is rising, their solvency is improving, and the share of non-performing loans has fallen sharply this year. Chart I-9Spain's Peak Credit Impulse##br## Is Probably Behind It Chart I-10Italy's Peak Credit Impulse##br## Is Likely Ahead Of It So the contrasting economic fortunes of Spain and Italy may switch. The peak bank credit impulse for Spain is almost certainly behind it, while for Italy it likely lies ahead. On this hope, we will dip our toes into a small pair-trade: long Italian BTPs versus French OATs. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report 'Credit Slumps While Animal Spirits Soar. Why?' March 30, 2017 available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* There are no new trades this week, leaving us with six open positions. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-11 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch -##br## Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - ##br##Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch -##br## Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch -##br## Interest Rate Expectations

U.S. home sales have been soaring, with new single-family homes reaching a 10-year high in September, driven by still-low financing costs and peaking consumer sentiment. This surging housing demand which includes temporary hurricane rebuilding related sales, has already shown up in earnings; HD reported a 7.9% same store sales increase in Q3 yesterday, a stunning number relative to the current malaise in the overall retail landscape. This elevated demand, coupled with the impact of countervailing duties on Canadian imports, has pushed lumber to the stratosphere. High lumber prices benefit home improvement retailers' top lines (third panel), but serve to crimp builders' margins. With a much better profit outlook and a still reasonable valuation (bottom panel), we think the best way to gain exposure to the healthy domestic housing market is via the S&P home improvement retail index, not the S&P homebuilders. Accordingly, we reiterate our respective overweight and neutral recommendations. The ticker symbols for the stocks in these indexes are: BLBG: S5HOMI - HD, LOW and BLBG: S5HOME - PHM, DHI, LEN.

Special Report

Highlights Clients frequently ask us what long-term returns they should assume when constructing strategic portfolios. In this report, we use a range of methodologies to arrive at reasonable return assumptions for bonds, equities, alternative assets, and currencies on a 10-15 year investment horizon. We conclude that global bonds are likely to return around 1.5% in nominal terms (compared to 5.3% over the past 20 years), and global equities 4.6% (compared to 6.1%). Alternative assets look rather more attractive with, for example, private equity projected to return 9% and real estate 7.1%. Nonetheless, the typical pension fund portfolio, consisting of 50% equities, 30% fixed income, and 20% alts, will be unable to achieve its return target (still typically 7% or higher). Feature Pension plan sponsors and wealth managers need realistic assumptions about the likely returns from different assets in order to construct strategic portfolios, for example when calculating the efficient frontier using a mean-variance optimizer (MVO). Using historical data is the simplest way to do this, but can be very misleading: for example, global bonds have delivered an annual nominal return of 5.3% over the past 20 years but, with bond yields currently so low, it is almost mathematically impossible for them to return anything close to that over coming years (our estimate for future returns is 1.5%). This Special Report is our attempt to produce long-run return assumptions for strategic portfolios, something that GAA clients frequently ask us for. We want to emphasize that these are reasonable assumptions, not forecasts. The value of forecasting the world economy over the next decade or more is questionable. Consider if we had carried out this exercise in 2002: how likely is it that we would have predicted the rise and fall of emerging markets, the U.S. housing crisis, and the subsequent "secular stagnation"? Our analysis, therefore, is mostly based on the philosophy that long-run historical relationships (for example, credit spreads, or the excess return of small cap stocks) are fairly constant, and that most variables (profit margins, valuation, productivity) mean revert over the long term. Our time horizon is 10-15 years. We chose this - rather than the five or seven years that is perhaps more common in such analyses - because it is closer to the investment horizon of pension funds and most individual investors. It also allows us to avoid making a call on where we are currently in the cycle, and how long the next recession and expansion will last. It is likely we are close to the peak of the current economic expansion and equity bull market (the "X" on Chart 1): choosing a shorter time horizon would mean making judgements about the timing of the cycle. Conceptually, we prefer to forecast the trend line on the chart. Chart 1Stylized Trend Versus Cyclical Movements Our assumptions are inevitably approximate. In many cases (particularly for equity returns), we use multiple methodologies and take the average result. Does it matter that the estimation error of our assumptions is likely to be large? Most academic evidence finds not.1 The reason is that, for closely correlated assets, errors in the return estimates (and therefore the optimal weights in a portfolio) will not greatly affect a portfolio's risk and return; while, for assets that are very different, errors in the estimates will not have much effect on the optimal portfolio weights. Rough estimates, therefore, are sufficient for portfolio construction purposes. In any case, using common-sense projections is better than unrealistic historical averages, and investors do need some assumptions to work with when constructing portfolios. How To Forecast Economic Growth A key input (especially when considering earnings growth, which is one factor driving equity returns) is the likely rate of economic growth in various countries and regions over our time horizon. Our simplified way of deriving this is to assume that GDP growth is a factor of (1) demographics (specifically, the growth in the population of working age), and (2) productivity growth. (We assume that capital intensity is steady.) For the demographic assumptions, we use the United Nations' median forecast of the annual growth in population aged 25-64 between 2015 and 2030 (Table 1). Productivity growth is harder to estimate. Productivity has been poor in recent years compared to history (Chart 2). There is significant uncertainty about whether this is caused by cyclical factors (the Great Recession, for example) or structural factors (the end of positive effects from the IT revolution etc.), and whether a potential new wave of technology (artificial intelligence, self-driving vehicles) will raise productivity in future. Table 1Demographic Assumptions Chart 2Productivity Growth Our approach is to assume that productivity in the U.S. will return to its 40-year average, and that productivity growth in the main European economies will be 50 bp lower than the U.S. and in Japan 80 bp lower (in line with recent averages). The estimate is harder for emerging markets, so we use two scenarios: one in which structural reforms, particularly in China, bring productivity growth back up to the average of the past 10 years, 3.5%; and a second scenario in which governments fail to reform, and therefore productivity growth continues to fall to only 1%. For inflation, we assume that central banks over the long-term largely achieve their current inflation goals. The results of our assumptions for GDP growth are shown in Table 2. Table 3 shows the summary of our results: the 10-15 year return assumptions for all the assets in our analysis. We also show historic returns and volatility for comparison (for the past 20 years, where data is available). Below, we describe in detail how we arrived at these numbers. Table 2GDP Growth Assumptions Table 3BCA Assumed Returns All our results are shown in nominal terms and in local currencies. While strictly speaking, it might be theoretically better to estimate real returns, in practice most investors and advisers tend to work on a nominal basis. Moreover, since we have made assumptions for inflation in each region, it is simple to translate our nominal returns into real ones. There is also a trade-off between inflation and currency movements (and interest rates). At the end of the report, we consider the impact of relative inflation rates on currency returns, allowing investors to work the returns back into their own currencies. 1. Fixed income We start from a base that is known: the return on long-term government bonds. If an investor today buys a 10-year U.S. Treasury bond, his or her annual nominal return over the next 10 years will almost certainly be 2.3% (today's yield). The only uncertainties come from (1) reinvesting coupons at the future rate of interest, but the impact of this is small, and (2) the (presumably minimal) risk of a U.S. government default. Of course, investors do not own just 10-year bonds, and indeed the average duration of U.S. Treasuries is currently 5.7 years. But changes in interest rates make relatively little difference to future returns: a rise in interest rates causes a capital loss but a higher yield on rolled-over positions after bonds mature (though, admittedly, the convexity effect is greater when rates are low, as they are now). Even if interest rates were to double over the next decade, the return from U.S. Treasuries would fall only to around 1.5% and, if interest rates fell to 0%, the return would be only about 3%. Moreover, the effect diminishes over time as more bonds are redeemed at par. Empirically, we can see that there is a strong correlation between starting yield on 10-year bonds and long-term returns from U.S. Treasuries (Chart 3). Chart 3Government Bond Returns Driven By The Starting Yield For our cash assumption, we first calculate a proxy for the current cash yield using the average spread between 10-year government bonds and three-month bills over a long-run history (using data from Dimson, Marsh and Staunton which goes back to 1900 and covers a range of countries, Table 4).2 While it is true that the yield curve steepens and flatten along with the cycle, the average yield curve shape should be a good proxy for long-term future expected returns. Of course, this assumes that the term premium comes back. It may not if bonds now are a good hedge against recession risk. However, we also need to take into account that interest rates and inflation are likely to change over the next 10-15 years. We assume that both will rise to an equilibrium level over that time. Our assumption is that central banks will get close to hitting their inflation targets (in the U.S., 2% on PCE inflation, which translates into 2.5% on CPI; in Europe, "around but below 2%"; and in Japan, 2%). For the equilibrium real rate, we take BCA's current estimate (Chart 4) and assume a small rise over the next decade as some of the after-effects of the Great Recession and secular stagnation wear off: to 0.4% in the U.S., -0.1% in the euro area, and -0.2% in Japan. Table 4Historic Spread Government Bonds To Bills (1900-2016) Chart 4Current Equilibrium Real Rates Our calculation of the return from cash over the 10-15 year horizon is based on a steady rise from the current cash return to that implied by the inflation and equilibrium real rate assumptions (Table 5). Table 5Calculation Of Assumption For Cash Return For other fixed-income instruments, we make the following assumptions: Government bonds. We assume that the spread between 10-year and 7-year bonds and 3-month bills will be similar to the historical average (Chart 5), and calculate the return from the government bond index based on this and our estimate for 10-year returns, adjusted by the duration of outstanding bonds in the index: 5.7 years for the U.S., 7.1 for Europe and 8.6 for Japan. For U.S. investment-grade and high-yield corporate bonds, we take the average spread, default rate, and recovery rate in history (Table 6). Obviously, spreads and default rates, especially for high-yield bonds, also jump around massively over the cycle (Chart 6), but we think it is reasonable to assume in our long-term projections that they revert to the mean. Reliable data for European and Japanese credit has a short history but, over the past 10 years, spreads and default rates have been similar to the U.S., so we use the U.S. assumptions for these markets too. Chart 5Yield Curves Table 6U.S. Corporate Credit Assumptions Chart 6Credit Spreads And Default Rates Move With The Cycle Government-related bonds and securitized bonds (MBS, ABS etc.) are an important part of the Barclay's Aggregate Bond indexes: in the U.S., for example, securitized bonds comprise 31% of the index, and government-related ones 7%; in Europe, the weights are 8% and 17% respectively. For our projections of government-related bonds, we assume historic average spreads will continue (Table 7). For securitized bonds, we assume that the historic average spread in the U.S. will continue, and will be the same in Europe and Japan (where historic data is less readily available). Inflation-linked bonds. We assume that the average real yield of the past 10 years, 0%, will continue in future (Chart 7). Table 7Spreads Over Government Bonds Chart 7Real Yield On U.S. TIPs 2. Equities There are a number of ways to think about forward equity returns, all with a high degree of uncertainty. These could be based on starting valuations (but which valuation measure to use?); related to likely earnings growth in future years (hard to forecast); or based on a reversion to the mean of valuations and profits. We decided to take a range of different measures, and average the results. In practice, the results are similar, except for emerging markets (see below for more on EM). Table 8 summarizes the equity return calculations. Table 8Equity Return Calculations AVERAGE EQUITY The thinking behind the six measures we use is as follows. Equity risk premium (ERP). The most obvious methodology: historically, over the long run equities have returned more than government bonds. But which risk premium to use? Dimson, Marsh and Staunton's work includes the excess performance of equities over bonds since 1900 for a range of countries (Table 9). We decided not to choose a different ERP for each developed region, as the historical data would suggest, since it is difficult to argue that the U.S. is likely to be riskier in future than Europe and since, for parts of this history, Japan and the U.S. were essentially emerging markets. We, therefore, take a rounded average of world ERP over the past 116 years, 3.5%. For emerging markets, we multiply this by the average beta of EM relative to global equities over the past 30 years, 1.2, to give an ERP of 4.2%. Growth model. Think of a Gordon Growth Model, which defines the return from equities as the starting dividend yield plus future earnings growth (strictly speaking, dividend growth; we are assuming that the payout ratio will stay constant). We need to make a couple of adjustments to this. First, earnings growth has historically been correlated to nominal GDP growth but has lagged it - in the U.S. by 1.5 percentage points in the period 1918-2016 - although, since 1981, earnings have grown significantly faster than GDP (Chart 8). For the future, we assume that the long-run lag returns. Second, we need to add share buybacks to the dividend yield since, in some countries, such as the U.S., for tax reasons companies prefer to buy back shares rather than increase dividends. However, we should do this on a net basis since equity holders are penalized by companies that issue new shares. In the U.S. net equity withdrawal has been 0.3% over the past 10 years, but in both Europe and Japan, annual net new equity issuance has averaged 1.6% (Chart 9). In EM, the dilution has been even more extreme, averaging 6% over the past 10 years (and much more over the past 25 years). We subtract this dilution from future returns. Table 9Equity Excess Return Over Bonds Chart 8U.S. EPS Growth Versus Nominal GDP Growth Chart 9Net Equity Issuance Growth plus reversion to the mean. This takes the Gordon Growth Model but adds to it an assumption that PE multiples and profit margins revert to the historical mean. We again use dividend yield adjusted by net equity issuance. We assume that the current trailing PE and profit margin revert to the average since 1980 (see Table 8 above for the data) over the next 10 years. In the U.S., PE and margins are currently somewhat higher than history, but this is less the case in Europe or Japan (Charts 10 and 11). Additionally, assuming that the mean reversion happens over 10 years means that the effect on annual returns is not especially large, even for the U.S. Chart 10Net Profit Margin Chart 11Trailing PE History Earnings yield (EY). The simplest of the three valuation measures we use, the assumption is that companies reward shareholders either by paying them a dividend this year, or by reinvesting retained earnings to pay dividends in future. If you assume (admittedly a rash assumption) that the future return on investment will be similar to the current return on investment, it should be immaterial how the company pays out to shareholders. Therefore, the trailing earnings yield (1/PE ratio) should be a good proxy for future returns. Empirically, the relationship between earnings yield and 10-year future returns has been quite strong (Chart 12). However, returns have been somewhat higher on average than the EY would indicate (between 1900 and 2006, 9.7% versus an average EY of 7.5%) mainly because of rising PE multiples since 1980 (Chart 13). We think it unlikely that valuations will continue to rise, and so the EY should be a reasonable guide to future returns. Chart 12Earnings Yield And 10-Year Future Returns Chart 13Trailing Price/Earnings Multiple S&P500 Shiller PE. The cyclically-adjusted price/earnings ratio (CAPE, or Shiller PE) - the current share price divided by the 10 year average of historic inflation-adjusted earnings - has historically had a good correlation with future long-term returns (Chart 14). A regression model of this indicates that the current Shiller PE points to long-run forward returns for the U.S. of 4.9%, for Japan 3.6%, Europe 8.5% and EM 10.8%. Valuation composite. The Shiller PE has some flaws, for example in using a fixed 10-year period for earnings when the length of cycles varies. It has not necessarily mean-reverted in history (perhaps because of long-term trends in interest rates, which it doesn't take into account). It may be more reasonable, then, to use a mixture of different valuation metrics. BCA's Composite Valuation Indicator has had a good correlation with long-run future returns (Chart 15).3 A regression model of this indicator against 15-year returns currently points to returns from the U.S. of 5.2%, Europe of 4.1%, Japan 5.1% and EM 11.0%. Small-cap stocks. We take the 2.4% excess annual return of small cap stocks over large caps in the U.S. for 1926-2016, as calculated by Dimson, Marsh & Staunton. Chart 14Shiller PE Versus ##br##15-Year Equity Return Chart 15Composite Valuation Measure Versus ##br##Long-Run Future Returns Emerging Markets The return assumption for emerging market equity returns has a much higher degree of uncertainty. On our three valuation measures, EM equities look attractive: the average return expectation of the three valuation indicators points to an annual return of 9.4%. However, the growth outlook is murky: as described above, a wave of structural reform in emerging markets, especially China, would be necessary to keep productivity - and, therefore, earnings growth - up, in order for returns to be as good as the current valuation level suggests. Another worry is the degree of equity dilution: it has averaged 6% a year over the past 10 years, and is unlikely to fall much unless corporate governance improves significantly. The range of expected returns derived from our various methodologies, therefore, varies from -1% to +11% a year. Moreover, as described in the currency section below, investors should expect a depreciation in some EM currencies over the next decade, which will also eat into returns. However, due to the influence of China, where the currency is projected to appreciate almost 2% a year against the USD, the EM equity index will see an overall boost to USD-based returns due to the currency effect. 3. Alternative Assets We consider the likely future returns for nine of the 10 alternative assets that Global Asset Allocation regularly covers (we omit wine, which is hard to value on the basis of fundamental macro factors and, anyway, is owned by few institutional investors).4 Alts are harder to forecast than public securities since data is less easily available (and may be only quarterly and based on estimated values), and since some alternative assets have not existed in their current form for very long (venture capital, for example). Moreover, alternative assets tend to have non-normal returns with skewed distributions. Table 10 shows the historical returns and volatility of the nine alternative asset classes both over the longest period for which we have data, and since 1997, when we have data for all of them. Table 10Returns And Volatility For Alternative Assets We, therefore, take a more ad hoc approach, projecting each asset class differently. Generally, we assume that future returns will look similar to historical ones. Specifically, the assumptions we use are as follows. Hedge funds. We assume a return of cash + 3.5%. Hedge fund returns have trended down over time (Chart 16), as more entrants have arbitraged away alpha. We choose to use the average return over cash of the past 10 years, 3.5% (net of fees). It is unlikely that hedge funds returns will rise back anywhere close to earlier levels, for example that of the 1990s when they returned cash +14%. Chart 16Hedge Fund Historic Returns U.S. Direct real estate. We find reasonably good results (R2 = 24%) from regressing U.S. nominal GDP growth against real estate returns. The regression equation is 1.25 x nominal GDP growth + 1.9%. Conceptually, this probably represents a cap rate plus growth of capital values slightly higher than economic growth due to supply shortages in certain key locations. We project real estate to return 7.2% annually. One risk to this assumption, however, is that commercial real estate prices are already above the previous peak from 2007; high valuations may dampen future returns. U.S. REITs. We find only weak correlations with direct real estate investment, although REITs have outperformed real estate over time (perhaps because of the inbuilt leverage of REITs). Over time, REITs have become increasingly correlated with equities. We, therefore, use a regression against U.S. equity returns (R2 = 42%), with REIT returns 0.49 x equity returns + 7.7%. This indicates 10.1% annual return from REITs in the long run. U.S. Private equity (PE). In the past, returns from private equity have been 5 or 6 percentage points higher than from public equities. This is most likely due to their higher leverage, bias towards small-cap companies, and stronger shareholder control over the companies they invest in; it can also be thought of as an illiquidity premium. However, it seems likely that excess returns will be lower in future given the bigger size of the PE industry now and relatively high valuations currently. Moreover, the PE industry currently has almost USD 1 Trn in dry power (uninvested capital), a sign that investment opportunities are limited. We assume, therefore, a slightly lower premium over public equities in future of 4 ppts. This results in a total annual return of 9.5%. U.S. Venture capital (VC). Historically (using data since 1986) VC returns have been 0.6 ppts higher than for PE (probably representing a premium for greater risk and smaller size of the companies invested in). We assume 0.5 ppt higher return in future. This leads to a return assumption of 10%. U.S. Structured products. As discussed in the fixed income section above, we use the 20-year average spread over the aggregate bond index of 0.7 ppt. Total assumed return, therefore, is 3.3%. U.S. Farmland. The value of farmland has risen by an average of 4.4% a year since 1920, a period which included five agricultural cycles. We assume that the value of land will continue to rise at the same rate. We think this is a reasonable assumption since, although nominal GDP growth in the U.S. may be lower in future than in the past, global demand for food is likely to continue to grow rapidly. The total return from investment in farm land, using a regression, produces: growth of farm land value x 1.81 + 0.64% = 8.6%. Chart 17Long-Term Commodity Prices U.S. Timberland is more defensive than farmland since trees can be stored "on the stump" and don't need to be harvested each year in the way that crops do even when prices are unattractive. Historically, timberland has returned about 1 ppt less a year than farmland, and we assume that this will continue. Commodities move in long-run cycles, with a commodity super-cycle of around 10 years, in which prices rise by 3-4x, followed by a bear market of 20 or 30 years in which they fall or stagnate (Chart 17). This is driven by a build-up of excess supply, because of the capex done during the super-cycle, and often by a structural shift on the demand side too. We see no reason why this pattern should change, with China's re-engineering of its economy away from dependence on infrastructure spending likely to be a particularly important factor over the next decade. We assume that commodity prices will, over the current bear market (now about five years old), fall by the same amount and over the same number of years as the average of previous bear markets since the 19th century. This means they have 16% further to fall over 200 months, giving a return of -1% a year. 4. Currencies Most investors are unable or unwilling to fully hedge currency exposure over very long periods. So, a consideration of how returns from different countries' assets might be affected by relative currency movements over the next 10-15 years is an important element in calculating likely returns. Fortunately, for developed market currencies at least, there is a simple, and historically fairly reliable, way to make assumptions of currency movements: reversion to purchasing power parity. As shown in Chart 18, major currencies have fairly consistently reverted to their PPP over the long run. So we can forecast likely future currency movements as a combination of 1) how far away the currency is currently from PPP against the U.S. dollar, and 2) the likely change in the PPP over the period. The latter we calculate from the IMF's forecasts of relative consumer inflation between each country and the U.S. (the IMF makes this forecast only for the next five years, but we assume that the differential continues at the same rate after 2022). Table 11 shows that most major currencies are expected to rise against the U.S. dollar over the coming decade or so. Except for Australia, they are likely to have slightly lower inflation. And - again with the exception of Australia - they all look a little undervalued currently relative to the USD. Table 11Assumed Annual Change Versus U.S. Dollar Over Next 10-15 Years Unfortunately, this approach does not work for EM currencies. They have historically traded at a level consistently well below PPP. This is mainly because, while tradable goods prices tend to be driven by international prices movements and relative unit labor costs, local services prices (which cannot be arbitraged across borders) do not. Also, inflation in emerging markets has historically been much higher than in the U.S. (Chart 19), meaning that their PPP has shifted significantly lower over time. However, China's inflation is now not dissimilar to that of the U.S. (the IMF forecasts it will be only 50 basis points a year higher over the coming five years). And China has shown some tendency for the currency to move towards PPP - 20 years ago the RMB was 190% below PPP; now it is "only" 97% below. Chart 18Reversion To PPP Chart 19U.S. And Emerging Market Inflation We, therefore, take an alternative approach to estimating currency returns for EM economies. We run a regression analysis of the annual change in each country's exchange rate versus the U.S. dollar against its CPI inflation relative to the U.S. We find mostly acceptable r-squared scores (ranging from 57% for Turkey to 1% for Taiwan). For most countries, the intercept is positive (suggesting the currency is trending over time towards PPP) and the coefficient for CPI is, as expected, negative (Table 12). Table 12Calculations For EM Currency Moves A number of EM currencies, on this analysis, would be expected to depreciate against the U.S. dollar over coming years, including Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey. But, weighting the countries by their weights in the MSCI ACWI index, on average the EM universe would be expected to see a currency appreciation against the U.S. dollar of around 2% a year. This is largely due to the influence of China, which has a 29% weight in the EM index. This would be a much better result than the past 10 years when, for example, the Brazilian real has depreciated by 12% a year, the Indonesian rupiah by 16% and the Turkish lira by 37%. This could be because the IMF forecasts of future inflation (4.9% for India, 4.5% for Brazil and 4.1% for Russia), are too optimistic. They are certainly much better than these countries have achieved in the past 10 years (8.0% in India, 6.2% in Brazil, and 9.2% in Russia). Conclusion Arriving at assumptions for future returns is as much an art as a science. Our analysis is based principally on the concept that the future will be similar to long-term history (but not necessarily to the history of the past 30 years, which in many ways were abnormal for financial markets with, for example, a continuous decline in interest rates and inflation). Obviously, therefore, a very different macro environment over the next 10-15 years (for example, one in which inflation spiked, or secular stagnation deepened) would produce a very different results for economic growth and interest rates. However, it will be clear from our analysis that a great deal of the long-term return for equities and bonds is derived from the valuation at the start. Given that current valuations in almost all asset classes are expensive relative to history, this implies that future portfolio returns will be poor compared to recent, and long-term, history. Based on our return assumptions, a typical global portfolio (with 50% equities, 30% bonds, and 20% alternatives) will produce a nominal return of only 4.1% a year over the next decade or so, and a similar U.S. portfolio only 4.6%. This compares to 6.3% and 7.0% over the past 20 years. For pension funds which assume an 7.5% or 8% annual return (as many in the U.S. do), or individual investors planning their retirement on the basis of, say, a 5% annual real return, that outcome would come as a nasty shock. Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com 1 For the best summary of the evidence on this, please see A Practitioner's Guide To Asset Allocation, by William Kinlaw, Mark Kritzman and David Turkington, Wiley 2017. 2 Please see Credit Suisse Global Investment Returns Yearbook 2017 by Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh and Mike Staunton, February 2017 3 BCA's Composite Valuation Indicator comprises, for the U.S.: market value of equities / non-financial gross value added adjusted for foreign revenues, trailing PE, Shiller PE, and price to sales. And for other regions: divided yield, market Cap/GDP, trailing PE, price to book, forward PE, price to cash flow, price to sales, and enterprise value/total assets. 4 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, "Alternative Assets: More Important Than Ever", dated 11 March 2016, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com Appendix Correlation Matrix

Managed health care stocks have performed exceptionally well since our early-April 2016 overweight recommendation, besting the market by roughly 24%. This begs the question: Is the time ripe to lock in impressive profits and move to the sidelines or is there more upside left? Leading profit indicators suggest that more gains are in store for the relative share price ratio. After petering out in 2016, our managed care cost proxy has plummeted by over 350bps from the recent peak (shown inverted, second panel). Given that premiums are set on a trailing cost basis, profit margins should surprise to the upside. Further, drug price deflation should prove a boon to managed care providers' bottom lines and the pharmaceutical sector's pain this year will be the managed health care industry's gain (bottom panel). Bottom Line: Melting input costs should augment managed health care profits, supporting a durable valuation expansion phase. Stay overweight and see this week's Weekly Report for more details. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5MANH - UNH, AET, ANTM, CI, HUM, CNC.

Highlights Question 1: Why is U.S. inflation still so low? Question 2: How important is the upcoming change in Fed leadership? Question 3: What are the implications of the U.S. tax cuts? Question 4: What is the outlook for the ECB next year, and how will this impact the U.S. dollar versus the euro? Question 5: Are markets underestimating the potential impact from slower growth of central bank balance sheets? Question 6: How much longer can this powerful rally in Emerging Markets continue? Question 7: What are other investors worried about? Feature I have just returned from an extended two-week trip visiting clients in the Asia-Pacific region. The meetings were all very well attended, with even many non-dedicated fixed income investors turning up to ask tough questions about global bond markets. My impression was that given the powerful returns earned in virtually all risk assets this year (equities, credit, Emerging Markets), our clients are growing more concerned about the potential risks from tighter global monetary policy and rising interest rates than they have been for some time. Oddly enough, this is despite not fearing either a serious rise in inflation or a major growth slowdown next year. If such a thing as "nervous complacency" can exist, it seemed widely evident in most of my meetings. This week, I am taking a more personal tone than in a typical Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report to summarize the key client questions from ten days of meetings, spread across six cities in five countries on two continents. Why is U.S. inflation still so low? Chart 1Tightest Global Labor Market##BR##Since The Mid-2000s Almost all of the meetings began with a discussion of the current situation in the U.S., particularly the lack of inflation. The current BCA view that U.S. inflation will accelerate in 2018 was met with some skepticism, particularly when framed in the context of the uncertain unemployment/inflation trade-off. In one meeting, outright laughter actually broke out when the term "Phillips Curve" was mentioned! Clearly, the burden of proof is on the inflation data itself. On that note, I presented several of the best BCA charts from recent months that show how the backdrop is ripe for a turnaround in global inflation. Clients were impressed when shown that nearly ¾ of the countries in the OECD had unemployment rates below the full-employment NAIRU, a level not seen since the period of strong coordinated global growth and rising inflation in the mid-2000s (Chart 1). Yet when I then presented a chart showing the actual inflation/unemployment data in the U.S. over the past 20 years, with a clear "kinked" Phillips Curve and the latest data point well on the steeper portion of that curve (Chart 2), the majority of clients were less convinced. The most cited reason was that the U.S. inflation data simply did not accelerate in 2017 when it was supposed to given the steady fall in unemployment over the preceding few years. Perhaps most surprising was that, rather than believe that the NAIRU rate may simply be lower now than in past business cycles, so many people that I met were willing to discard the entire Phillips Curve concept as a useful framework to forecast inflation. When presented with charts showing non-Phillips Curve reasons to expect higher inflation, however, there was far less skepticism. Perhaps the most compelling chart showed the typical 18-month lag between U.S. economic growth and the "momentum" of U.S. inflation (Chart 3). Upon seeing this, clients were more convinced that inflation would pick up next year in response to the current U.S. growth upturn. Chart 2U.S. Economy Has Moved Into##BR##The "Steep" Part Of The Phillips Curve Chart 3Inflation Typically Follows Economic Growth With A Long Lag I was also able to break down some of the skepticism on the U.S. inflation outlook even more after discussing the bullish oil forecast from our colleagues at Commodity & Energy Strategy. Admittedly, their view that the benchmark Brent oil price will average $65/bbl in 2018 sounds far less dramatic given that the current spot price has risen to nearly that level in the aftermath of the recent political turmoil in Saudi Arabia. Yet clients did appreciate that our bullish oil call was driven more by a view of improving global oil demand and continued production discipline by oil producers (especially for the so-called "OPEC 2.0" nations of Russia and Saudi Arabia). When shown our chart describing how oil prices persistently in the mid-$60s next would put some upward pressure on the inflation expectations component of global bond yields (Chart 4), there was virtually no disagreement from any clients that I met. There was a bit more pushback on the view that, if the BCA forecast of higher U.S. inflation and rising oil prices in 2018 comes to fruition, there is room for a substantial rise in U.S. Treasury yields from current levels. When presented a chart showing that market-based inflation expectations (both using TIPS breakevens and CPI swaps) could rise by 50-60bps just to get back to levels consistent with the Fed's inflation target (Chart 5), most clients politely nodded and basically said "show me the actual inflation first." Although there was widespread agreement with our view that it would take that kind of move in inflation expectations to prompt the Fed to fully deliver on the 100bps of rate hikes it is currently projecting to occur over the next year. Chart 4A Boost To Inflation Expectations##BR##From Higher Oil In 2018 Chart 5The Normalization Of U.S. Inflation##BR##Expectations Will Continue How important is the upcoming change in Fed leadership? The vast majority of clients that I met asked about the BCA view on the nomination of Jerome Powell as the new Fed Chair, replacing Janet Yellen. My impression was that there was not a lot of concern over the potential for serious alterations to the future path of U.S. monetary policy under new leadership. Yet it was still potentially a big enough change to ask questions about it. Most clients agreed with the BCA view that a Fed Chair Powell will not act much differently than Yellen. His voting history has aligned with hers and, by his own admission, he is a very data dependent central banker given that he is not a formally-trained economist. Only by knowing the ins and outs of the data has he been able to debate successfully with the Ph.D economists on the FOMC. Powell will likely be a data-driven Fed Chair that would not look to hike rates without higher inflation (and vice versa). Chart 6A Communications Problem##BR##For Jerome Powell? One point that I raised in all the meetings was that the Fed's communication strategy on future rate increases is the more worrisome issue for financial markets at the moment. The U.S. money market curve is still priced for only 50bps of rate increases over the next year, while the Fed "dots" are signaling 100bps of hikes. We think the Fed will deliver on its projections, which is one of the reasons we are recommending a below-benchmark duration stance in the U.S. (the upside in inflation expectations is the other reason). More importantly, the Fed's so-called "terminal rate" projection is at 2.75%, while our proxy for the market pricing of that rate - the 5-year U.S. Overnight Index Swap rate, 5-years forward - is hovering just above 2% (Chart 6). The persistent disagreement between the market and the Fed over the appropriate level of the terminal rate will become a problem later in 2018 if the Fed does indeed raise the funds rate to over 2% and continues to signal that more rate hikes will come to get the funds rate up to "neutral" (the terminal rate). If the Fed is not able to change the market's mind about the appropriate neutral level of the funds rate, then a move to the Fed's estimated terminal rate of 2.75% would push U.S. monetary policy into what will would be perceived a restrictive stance. This would have implications for the shape of the U.S. Treasury curve (a lot flatter) and for future growth expectations (a lot slower) heading into 2019. My impression from my meetings was that this possibility - that the Fed could engineer what would look to the markets like a policy mistake simply by sticking to its forecasts - was not at the forefront of clients' thinking at the moment. Yet there was no disagreement with the logic of how that could play out. The new Fed leadership under Jerome Powell may have its hands full clearly explaining their policy decisions in 2018, which could create some turbulence in global financial markets later in the year. What are the implications of the U.S. tax cuts? The details of the tax plans from the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate were a very hot topic in all of my client meetings. Considering all the ideas being proposed, from cuts in corporate tax rates to changes in the tax treatment of debt interest costs to removing the disincentive to repatriate profits earned abroad, it is no surprise that both equity and fixed income clients had a lot of questions on future U.S. tax policy. It is difficult right now to judge the net impact of the tax changes, as not all of the proposals in the two Congressional tax plans will likely be implemented. There will be plenty of horse trading between the Republicans and Democrats (and between the Republicans themselves) before the final tax deal is done. Yet there was a lot of concern among clients in my meetings over the likelihood that the tax cuts will be implemented at all. After seeing President Trump lose the battle on health care reform earlier this year, many clients were worried that a repeat could happen for the Trump tax cut agenda. This would have negative implications for U.S. equity markets, the U.S. dollar and future Fed policy moves. I explained the views from our colleagues at Geopolitical Strategy, who strongly believe that a tax cut will eventually pass (likely in early 2018) given the need for Congressional Republicans to have something positive to present to voters heading into the 2018 U.S. midterm elections. The tax cuts will have a moderate stimulative effect on the U.S. economy that the markets were not yet fully discounting. I also presented the chart from Global Fixed Income Strategy showing that wider U.S. budget deficits usually coincide with a steeper U.S. Treasury curve, almost always because the U.S. economy is slowing down, prompting looser fiscal policy and also Fed rate cuts (Chart 7). This time is different, however, since the Trump tax cuts will be stimulating an economy currently at full employment (middle panel). This has the potential to trigger more inflation through faster economic growth and even tighter labor markets which could prompt the Fed to move more aggressively on interest rate increases next year and eventually flatten the UST curve (bottom panel). Chart 7A Full-Employment Fiscal Stimulus Will Bear-Steepen The UST Curve The idea of a "steeper, then flatter" Treasury yield curve in response to U.S. fiscal policy stimulus generated a lot of discussion in my meetings. Some even noted that the recent flattening of the curve was a sign that the markets were discounting a lower probability of a tax deal being reached in D.C. I described the flat curve as a consequence of inflation expectations remaining too low, as the Treasury curve was much flatter than implied by the low level of the real fed funds rate, which is one of the most reliable relationships in the bond markets (higher real rates = a flatter curve, and vice versa). My conclusion from these meetings (and from the current market pricing) is that clients are a bit skeptical that a tax deal will be reached. This suggests there is room for bond yields to rise, and the Treasury curve to bear-steepen, if our political strategists are right and the tax cuts will happen. What is the outlook for the ECB next year, and how will this impact the U.S. dollar versus the euro? While most of the questions in my meetings focused on the U.S. outlook, several clients asked about the next move from the European Central Bank (ECB). This was both from a fixed income perspective and, perhaps even more importantly, with an eye on the future direction of the euro versus the U.S. dollar. I made the straightforward argument that with Euro Area economic growth showing strong momentum that is unlikely to slow much in 2018, and with headline Euro Area inflation likely to surprise to the upside based on our bullish oil call (Chart 8), the ECB would likely be forced to signal a tapering of its asset purchase program to zero by the end of next year. The oil view was especially important, as the ECB is expecting a slowing of headline Euro Area inflation to 1% in early 2018 based on the base effects from comparisons to the rise in oil prices seen in early 2017. If our house view on oil prices plays out, then there is potential for inflation to catch the ECB by surprise in 2018. The key will be how core inflation plays out as oil prices rise further. Core Euro Area inflation has dipped lower in recent months, even as wage growth has accelerated (bottom panel). Given tightening Euro Area labor markets, and robust domestic demand, the recent dip in core inflation is likely to bottom out sometime in the first few months of 2018. But until that happens, there is more potential for higher U.S. bond yields through faster increases in inflation expectations and Fed rate hikes (Chart 9). This will support a higher U.S. dollar versus the euro through wider interest rate differentials (bottom panel). Chart 8ECB Will Fully Taper##BR##By The End Of 2018 Chart 9UST-Bund Spread Will Widen Next Year,##BR##Supporting The USD Clients were generally in agreement with that view on relative interest rates, but the views on the direction of EUR/USD were far more mixed. My impression is that if the Fed delivers the rate hikes that we expect in 2018, EUR/USD has room to move lower as investors were not prepared for this. Are markets underestimating the potential impact from slower growth of central bank balance sheets? I received many questions on the potential impact of central banks either shrinking balance sheets (the Fed) or slowing their expansion (the ECB and Bank of Japan). The chart showing how the growth in central bank money printing since 2015 (when the ECB began buying bonds) has correlated strongly with the bull markets in virtually all global risk assets garnered a lot of attention (Chart 10). This was especially true when I showed the chart that converted the level of the major central bank balance sheets to a growth rate and plotted that versus the returns on global equities and credit markets (Chart 11). The implication - expect lower returns on global equity markets, and MUCH lower returns from corporate bond markets next year. Chart 10CB Liquidity Has Supported Risk Assets... Chart 11...But That Tailwind Will Fade Next Year On this point, there was almost no disagreement from clients. There is widespread awareness that this era of puny interest rates, spurred on by central banks buying up huge quantities of government bonds and other financial assets, was forcing investors to take on far more risk in their portfolios to achieve acceptable returns. The key is when this will all turn around. Clients were generally in agreement with my view that the final leg of this liquidity-driven global bull market in risk assets will best be played through equity markets over corporate credit. These stable, earnings-driven rallies seen in global equity markets have not yet reached a "blowoff" phase that would suggest a larger correction is imminent. Perhaps it will take a final asset allocation decision to move more money out of bonds into equities to trigger that final run-up in equity prices before tighter monetary policies and slower growth expectations begin to damage returns later in 2018 into 2019. How much longer can this powerful rally in Emerging Markets continue? This is a topic that generated a healthy amount of debate in my meetings, particularly given the bearish views on Emerging Market (EM) assets from my colleagues at Emerging Markets Strategy. Here again, clients were generally looking at EM as a way to achieve acceptable returns in their portfolios while also participating in the global economic upturn through growth-sensitive assets. The previous chart showing the impact of diminished central bank liquidity on EM credit markets got some clients a bit nervous about the outlook for EM markets. What also spooked them were the charts from our EM strategists showing accelerating Chinese inflation (Chart 12) and slowing Chinese money growth. There is obviously a connection between the two, as China's policymakers are being forced to tighten monetary policy, and clamp down on excess credit creation, in response to accelerating inflation and very high debt levels. The chart showing how our "China M3 Impulse" had turned negative this year and was pointing to slower growth in industrial metals prices and China capital goods imports (Chart 13) was particularly unnerving for even the most bullish of EM clients. Chart 12This Is Why China Is Tightening Monetary Policy Chart 13Prepare For Slower Chinese Growth In 2018 My impression is that the clients I met were fully loaded up on EM assets but were comfortable holding those positions based on expectations of solid Chinese economic growth and continued inflows into EM assets from yield-starved global investors. If BCA's view that Chinese growth will slow next year comes to fruition, combined with rising U.S. interest rates and a stronger U.S. dollar as the Fed tightens more than currently discounted by the markets, then there is potential for outflows from EM markets to accelerate, to the detriment of EM returns. What are other investors worried about? This is a question that comes up a lot at BCA meetings, as clients are always curious as to what we are hearing from other investors. Perhaps this can be chalked up to a version of "confirmation bias", where investors like to hear that their own views are shared by others in the markets. In my meetings over the past two weeks, however, I got the sense that clients are heavily exposed to risk assets, which have performed beyond their expectations, and are growing more worried about how things can go wrong. Like an end to the current low volatility regime, for example. Given the BCA views on the likelihood of global inflation increasing next year, triggering a more hawkish response from policymakers, I noted that I did not believe that clients were prepared for that outcome. This suggests that the beginning of the end of the current low volatility regime, which is seen across all asset classes (Chart 14), will occur through a pickup in bond volatility. This will take place from a rise in inflation expectations first, and a rise in policy rate expectations later. My advice to clients was that if realized bond volatility picks up, this is the signal to reduce exposure to credit and equity markets. We anticipate making such a recommendation sometime during 2018. Chart 14The Low Market Volatility Backdrop Will End When Bond Volatility Rises Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Special Report

Highlights A Quick Primer: Convertible bonds have a risk/reward profile that falls somewhere between B-rated and Caa-rated high-yield bonds. The key difference is that convertible bonds are less exposed to credit spreads than junk bonds and more exposed to the equity market. Performance Vs. Junk: Convertibles tend to outperform junk bonds in the late stages of bull markets. Junk spreads tend to trough prior to the peak in equities, and rising Treasury yields also favor convertibles. The Value Proposition: Convertible bonds appear somewhat cheap relative to equities, but equities are fairly valued compared to junk bonds and convertible bonds currently offer an unattractive investment premium. Valuation is by no means compelling, but it should not prevent convertibles from outperforming junk bonds in the late stages of the recovery. Feature From time to time we are asked whether convertible bonds have a place in U.S. fixed income portfolios, and this is the question we consider in today's Special Report. Being a hybrid credit/equity investment, it is clear that convertibles are a fairly high-risk proposition for U.S. bond funds. In fact, we find that the historical risk/reward profile of the sector falls somewhere between B-rated and Caa-rated High-Yield corporate debt (Chart 1). So while not for every investor, we do find compelling reasons for why, in the current macro environment, U.S. bond funds should consider replacing some high-yield debt with an allocation to convertible bonds. Chart 1Fixed Income Universe - Risk Vs. Return* (1990s To Present) This report proceeds as follows. The first section provides a quick primer on convertible bonds, with a focus on the risk factors that drive the sector's performance. The second section takes a look at the historical performance of convertibles in different macro environments. The last section considers valuation in the sector. A Quick Primer Convertible bonds are much like traditional corporate bonds in that they pay periodic fixed coupons and have a maturity date. However, convertibles also give bondholders the option to convert the bond into a pre-specified number of shares of common stock. Investors obviously pay a premium for this option but have the potential to realize large gains if the firm's stock price rises. Convertibles are typically issued by smaller firms with low credit ratings. Fifty percent of the face value of the Bloomberg Barclays U.S. Convertibles index comes from small-cap and mid-cap firms. In addition, 58% of the Convertibles index face value comes from non-rated firms. For comparison, only 0.22% of the Bloomberg Barclays High-Yield bond index is un-rated. Technology firms make up 35% of the Convertibles index, which should not be surprising since the convertibles market appeals to small issuers with large financing demands who may have limited access to traditional debt and equity markets. The Convertibles index also has a large concentration in Healthcare & Pharmaceuticals (19%) and Financials (15%). In contrast, the largest sectors in the High-Yield bond index are Communications (20%), Consumer Cyclicals (15%) and Energy (14%). Chart 2Convertible Bond Value Illustrated The value of a convertible bond is illustrated in Chart 2. This chart shows how the price of a convertible bond (the line labeled "Convertible Bond Value Curve") evolves relative to the firm's stock price (shown on the x-axis). It also helps define a few key terms: Parity: Also called the "conversion value" of the security. This represents the value of the security if the conversion option is exercised. It is the 45 degree line passing through the origin of Chart 2. Conversion Premium: This is the difference between the price of the convertible bond and its parity value. In other words, it is the extra price an investor must pay for a convertible bond relative to simply buying the firm's equity. It can be thought of as the cost of downside protection for an equity investor. Chart 2 shows that this cost is larger when the firm's equity price is low. Investment Value: Also called the "bond floor". This is the value of the security if the conversion option is never exercised. It is the thick dashed line in Chart 2. Investment Premium: This is the difference between the price of the convertible bond and its investment value. In other words, it is the extra price an investor must pay for a convertible bond relative to simply buying a corporate bond. It can be thought of as the cost a convertible bond investor must pay to get potential equity exposure. Chart 2 shows that this cost is greater when the firm's stock price is high. We can use the concepts of conversion premium and investment premium to define three types of convertible bonds. A convertible bond is called "credit sensitive" when its underlying stock price is low. This type of convertible bond is valued very similarly to a corporate bond because there is only a low chance that the conversion option will be exercised. It therefore has a large conversion premium and a small investment premium. Conversely, an "equity sensitive" convertible bond is valued similarly to an equity. This is a convertible bond with an elevated underlying stock price, one that would make it beneficial to exercise the conversion option. These securities have high investment premiums and very low conversion premiums. "Balanced" convertible bonds fall between the other two categories. The stock price has not quite reached the value that makes the conversion option attractive, but it is close enough that the security trades at a significant investment premium. Risk Factors & Performance Drivers Based on the historical risk/reward relationship shown in Chart 1, it is clear that if convertible bonds should be included in U.S. fixed income portfolios it is in place of B-rated and Caa-rated junk bonds. We must therefore consider what factors determine the relative performance between high-yield bonds and convertibles. Chart 3Risk Decomposition, 1999-Present To do that we performed regressions of monthly total returns for both an index of convertible bonds and an index of B-rated and Caa-rated high-yield bonds on three risk factors: Interest rate risk: proxied by the yield on the Treasury Master index Credit risk: proxied by the change in the high-yield bond spread Equity risk: proxied by monthly returns from the S&P 600 The top panel of Chart 3 shows the betas from the regressions. It shows that junk bonds have greater sensitivity to interest rate risk and credit risk, but are less sensitive to equity risk. However, to perform a complete risk attribution we need to consider both the sensitivity of returns to each risk factor and the volatilities of the risk factors themselves. The second panel of Chart 3 shows the variance of each of the three risk factors and the covariance between each pair of risk factors. With that information we are able to calculate the exposure of both junk bond and convertible bond returns to each risk factor by multiplying the squared beta by the variance of each risk factor.1 The results of this complete risk accounting are presented in the bottom panel of Chart 3. It shows that both convertible bond and junk bond total returns have small exposures to interest rate risk, with junk bonds having a somewhat larger exposure. However, the big difference between the two assets is that junk bond returns are mostly determined by credit risk while convertible bond returns are mostly determined by equity risk. This means that we can boil the decision of whether to invest in junk bonds or convertible bonds down to the question of whether junk spreads are likely to outperform equities. It is this question that we address in the next section. Convertible Bond Performance: Equities Vs. Credit Chart 4 shows that the history of relative total returns between convertible and high-yield bonds has gone through five distinct phases since the early 1990s. Chart 4Five Phases Of Convertible Bond Performance In the first phase, which culminated in the 1999/2000 tech boom, convertibles significantly outperformed junk. This is because junk spreads widened while equities performed exceptionally well. The fact that convertible bonds were a popular financing choice for small-cap tech companies also helped the sector's returns in 1999. The second phase, between 2000 and 2005, was characterized by falling Treasury yields and tighter credit spreads. Equities also performed well during this period, but not by enough to offset the impact of falling yields and tighter spreads. Junk bonds outperformed convertibles. Convertibles then outperformed junk from 2005 until the peak of the stock market in 2007. Junk spreads widened prior to the peak in the stock market, and this caused convertibles to outperform junk. Junk outperformed convertibles from 2007 until the mid-2012 trough in Treasury yields. This period was somewhat unique in that both equities and junk spreads were relatively flat. It was the greater impact of falling Treasury yields on junk bonds that drove the relative performance. Finally, convertibles have outperformed sharply since 2012, due to much higher equity prices. Junk spreads are also tighter but did experience a large widening in 2014/15. Higher Treasury yields during this time have also favored convertibles over junk. The Outlook For Convertibles The above framework gives us a way to qualitatively assess whether convertibles are likely to outperform junk going forward. First, with the Fed likely still not passed the mid-point of its rate hike cycle, Treasury yields will probably continue to rise. This will favor convertible bonds over junk bonds. Second, we have previously shown that junk bond spreads are fast approaching historically tight levels.2 In fact, we can calculate that B-rated junk spreads can only tighten another 180 bps before reaching all-time expensive valuations and Caa-rated spreads can only tighten another 375 bps. This represents only four months and five months of average monthly spread tightening, respectively. Further, junk spreads have a history of starting to widen before equity bear markets. The 2008 and 2002 bear markets being the most obvious examples (Chart 4, bottom 2 panels). If this pattern is repeated it will help convertibles outperform junk in the late stages of the current recovery. On the equity side, although valuations are also expensive, prices should continue to rise as long as inflation stays low enough for the Fed to maintain an accommodative policy stance. Our U.S. Investment Strategy service also thinks that small cap equities will outperform large caps in the coming months.3 As discussed above, convertible bonds are mostly issued by small cap firms. Our Cyclical Capitalization Indicator is above the zero line, indicating a favorable macro environment for small caps, and our valuation indicator shows that small caps are relatively cheap (Chart 5). However, arguably more important is that small caps remain a strong high-beta equity play (Chart 5, bottom panel). As long as the equity bull market is maintained, then small caps should outperform. One final factor that should drive the relative outperformance of small cap equities is the potential for Congress to pass tax legislation in the first half of next year. The relative small cap trade has been strongly correlated with other trades that are likely to benefit from proposed tax legislation and right now the market is probably assigning too low a probability to the chance that such legislation will pass (Chart 6). The biggest near-term risk for convertible bond returns relative to junk stems from the Technology sector. Chart 7 shows that divergences in performance between convertible bond sectors and high-yield bond sectors tend to be short lived. It also shows that Technology convertible bonds have strongly outperformed their high-yield counterparts in recent months. It is almost certain that convertible Technology bonds are due for a period of underperformance, much like what happened to Healthcare & Pharmaceutical convertibles in 2014/15 (Chart 7, bottom panel). Given the size of the convertible Technology sector, any period of sector-specific underperformance would also exert a meaningful drag on the overall index. Chart 5Small Caps Poised For Outperformance Chart 6The Trump Trades Are Back On Chart 7Tax Cuts Will Help Small Caps In general, traditional late-cycle dynamics - rising Treasury yields and junk spreads widening before equities sell off - should favor convertible bonds over junk between now and the end of the economic recovery. We expect this will also be the case in the current cycle, although the recent outperformance in the technology sector makes us cautious in the near-term. The best strategy is probably to replace some low-rated high-yield bonds with convertibles, while avoiding the technology sector, and then subbing out even more junk for convertibles once Technology convertibles have come back down to earth. Bottom Line: Convertibles tend to outperform junk bonds in the late stages of bull markets. Junk spreads tend to trough prior to the peak in equities, and rising Treasury yields also favor convertibles. This pattern will likely be repeated in the current cycle, although lofty valuations in the Technology sector make us cautious in the near-term. The Value Proposition The final question worth considering is whether convertible bonds appear fairly valued relative to history and investment alternatives. Specifically, we consider valuation from three different perspectives: Are equities fairly valued relative to high-yield bonds? If equities are cheap relative to high-yield bonds then it is reasonable to expect that convertible bonds are also cheap. Are convertible bonds fairly valued relative to equities? Are convertible bonds fairly valued relative to themselves? To answer the first question we use the BCA S&P 500 Valuation Indicator as our measure of equity valuation (Chart 8, top panel) and the 12-month high-yield breakeven spread as our measure of junk bond valuation (Chart 8, bottom panel). Both indicators are at relatively expensive levels. According to our chosen valuation metrics, equity valuation was only more expensive than it is today during the late 1990s tech boom, but in that period it reached much more expensive levels before changing course. In contrast, there have been several periods when junk breakeven spreads have been tighter, but even the all-time low is not that far below current levels. To create a true relative value indicator we standardized both our equity valuation indicator and the 12-month breakeven junk spread, and then subtracted one from the other. The result is shown in the middle panel of Chart 9 and it suggests that equities look a tad cheap compared to junk. However, relative valuation is nowhere near an extreme, and a more reasonable conclusion would be that equities and junk bonds appear fairly valued relative to each other. Chart 8Equity, Convertible & Junk Valuation I Chart 9Equity, Convertible & Junk Valuation II To answer the second question, whether convertible bonds look cheap relative to equities, we compare the parity (or conversion value) of the Convertible Bond index to our equity valuation indicator. The parity of the Convertible index is shown in the middle panel of Chart 8, and it shows that convertible bonds are quite expensive, but not as expensive as they were between 2013 and 2015. In contrast, our equity valuation indicator is at its most expensive levels of the current cycle. Once again, we standardize both our equity valuation indicator and the Convertible Bond index parity and take the difference. The result is shown in the bottom panel of Chart 9, and unsurprisingly, it suggests that convertible bonds appear relatively cheap compared to equities. To answer the final question, how convertibles are valued relative to themselves, we turn to Charts 10 and 11. Chart 10 shows the conversion premium of the Convertible Bond index relative to its parity. In essence, this chart shows how much extra an investor is being charged for convertible bonds relative to a similar equity portfolio. For a given parity level, a low conversion premium would suggest a more attractive valuation, and vice-versa. At the moment, Chart 10 shows that the index conversion premium is almost exactly in line with its expected value given the level of parity. Chart 10Conversion Premium Vs. Parity Chart 11Investment Premium Vs. Parity Chart 11 shows the Convertible Bond index's investment premium relative to parity. This chart shows how much extra an investor must pay for convertible bonds relative to a similar basket of corporate bonds. Once again, a low investment premium would suggest a more attractive valuation, but at the moment the investment premium appears quite elevated. For the given parity level, investors are paying a bit too much for convertibles relative to a similar basket of corporate bonds. In summary, while convertible bonds do appear somewhat cheap relative to equities, on balance, there is not much of a pure valuation case for the asset class. Equities appear fairly valued relative to junk bonds, and convertibles are trading at an elevated investment premium. We do not think that valuation will be a significant headwind to the typical late-cycle outperformance of convertibles versus junk. Bottom Line: Convertible bonds appear somewhat cheap relative to equities, but equities are fairly valued compared to junk bonds and convertible bonds currently offer an unattractive investment premium. Valuation is by no means compelling, but it should not prevent convertibles from outperforming junk bonds in the late stages of the recovery. Alex Wang, CFA, Research Analyst alexw@bcaresearch.com Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Jeremie Peloso, Research Assistant jeremiep@bcaresearch.com 1 We also use beta weights to attribute the covariance risk to each individual risk factor and calculate the unexplained risk as the variance of the bond returns less the risk exposure from each of our three factors. 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed Will Fall Behind The Curve", dated October 24, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Small Cap Surge", dated October 9, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com

Highlights The BCA earnings model shows that S&P 500 EPS growth is peaking and should decelerate through 2018. Synchronous global growth remains in place in 2017 and will persist into 2018, providing a tailwind for U.S. growth, equity markets and, ultimately, inflation. The labor market continues to tighten, which suggests that wage pressures should accelerate soon. Is another "Great Moderation" at hand? Feature Uncertainty around the GOP tax plan led to a weaker dollar last week, but U.S. equities and Treasuries were little changed. The tax plan could fail if enough Republican voters turn against it. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy team notes1 that as long as President Trump remains more popular with Republican voters than his Republican peers in Congress, he will be able to force the tax plan through both the Senate and the House. Moreover, we could even see some Democrats in the Senate supporting these tax changes. Ahead of the OPEC meeting on November 30, the weaker dollar along with the ongoing political turmoil boosted oil prices. Closer to home, corporate profits for Q3 2017 and guidance for Q4 2017 and beyond remains supportive for risk assets, although BCA expects S&P 500 earnings growth to peak in the next couple of quarters on a 4-quarter moving average basis. Global growth remains supportive for S&P 500, U.S. economic growth, and ultimately, higher inflation. Meanwhile, investors are still asking when price and wage inflation will turn higher toward the Fed's 2% forecast. BCA's answer: Be patient. In the final section of this week's report, we examine whether the recent period of low economic and financial market volatility will persist and herald a return to the Great Moderation. Q3 Earnings Season: Margins Still Expanding EPS and sales growth in Q3 ran well ahead of consensus expectations as forecasted in our October 2 preview. Moreover, the counter-trend rally in profit margins is still in place. Over 90% of companies have reported results so far, with 72% beating consensus EPS projections, just above the long-term average of 69%. Furthermore, 67% have posted Q3 revenues that topped expectations, which exceeded the long-term average of 55%. The surprise factor for year-over-year results in Q3 stands at 5% for EPS and 1% for sales. These compare favorably with the average EPS (4%) and sales (1%) in the past five years. We anticipate the secular mean-reversion of margins to re-assert itself in the S&P data, perhaps beginning early in 2018. Margins tend to peak halfway through late-cycle periods.2 Nonetheless, the results imply that Q3 will be another quarter of margin expansion. Earnings growth (Q3 2017 versus Q3 2016) is solid at 8%, and in revenues, 5%. Strength in earnings and revenues is broad based (Table 1). Earnings per share increased in Q3 2017 versus Q3 2016 in 8 of the 11 sectors. The 7.3% year-over-year drop in the financial sector is attributed to the impact of the hurricanes on the insurance and reinsurance industries. Excluding those industries, financial EPS is up by 6% from a year ago. EPS results are particularly impressive in energy (162%), and strong in technology (24%), healthcare (8%), and materials (7%). These sectors likewise experienced significant sales gains (17%, 10%, 4%, and 9%, respectively). Corporate managements are more focused on the message in Washington than on the President (Chart 1). Trump's name was mentioned only twice in the Q3 earnings calls held through November 10, doubling the total in Q2. CEOs and CFOs have cited Trump's name at least once in each earnings season since Q2 2016. The zenith in mentions occurred immediately after Trump took office in early 2017. Table 1S&P 500:##BR##Q3 2017 Results* Chart 1Managements Focused On The Message##BR##Not The Man In DC In contrast, "tax" and "reform" have appeared 13 times so far in Q3 conference calls, most often in a positive light. There were only five mentions in Q2 when investors were skeptical that a tax plan would pass this year. In the Q4 2016 reporting season following the November election, tax and reform were cited 16 times. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service has consistently expected a tax package to pass by the end of Q1 2018.3 We are encouraged by the upward trajectory of EPS estimates for 2017 and 2018 (Chart 2). It is odd that the recent downtick in 2017 EPS is mirrored by an uptick in the 2018 projection. The divergence can be explained by the effect of the hurricanes on the financial sector's earnings in 2017 and the probable snapback in early 2018. Analysts expect 2019 EPS growth to slow from the anticipated 2018 clip, which matches BCA's view. However, unlike estimates for 2017 and 2018, we anticipate that EPS estimates for 2019 will move lower throughout 2018 and 2019, ahead of a recession in late 2019.4 Bottom Line: The BCA earnings model shows that S&P 500 EPS growth is peaking and should decelerate through 2018 to a level commensurate with 3 ½-4% nominal GDP growth (Chart 3). Margins will crest in 2018. Accordingly, BCA believes that the earnings backdrop will remain a tailwind for the equity market, albeit a smaller tailwind. This forecast excludes any encouraging effect on growth from tax cuts, which would be positive for EPS and the S&P 500 price index in the short term, but would bring forward Fed rate hikes. BCA expects growth outside the U.S. to remain robust, an additional support for EPS growth in the coming quarters. Chart 2Stability In '17 & '18 EPS Estimates, But '19 Likely To Move Lower Chart 3Strong EPS Growth Ahead,##BR##Will Start To Slow Soon Global Growth Update Synchronous global growth remains in place in 2017 and will persist into 2018,5 providing a tailwind for U.S. growth, equity markets and, ultimately, inflation. Global real GDP estimates continue to move higher, a welcome departure from the past when estimates slid relentlessly lower (Chart 4). Since the start of 2017, GDP estimates for this year have increased from 2.6% to 3.2%, while 2018 forecasts have accelerated from 2.8% to 3%. The 2019 growth projection is steady at 2.9%. This upward trajectory for 2017 and 2018 has occurred despite a recalibration by many major central banks away from accommodative policies. The improving growth forecasts could be short-circuited by aggressive central bank actions, a worldwide trade war, or escalating tensions in Northeast Asia (or a combination of all three). Falling oil prices would also challenge a quickening of world growth, but BCA's stance is that oil prices will move up significantly in the coming year.6 Chart 4Global Growth Estimates Accelerating Global leading indicators are on the upswing. The most recent update of our Global Leading Indicator (excluding the U.S.) was the strongest since 2010 when it slowed after a sharp rebound from the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Moreover, the global LEI diffusion index turned positive after a worrisome dip below 50% earlier this year. It will be a warning sign for wide-reaching growth if the diffusion index moves back below 50% (Chart 5). Industrial production (IP) overseas is expanding at nearly three times the U.S. rate (Chart 6). This suggests that U.S. economic activity will be pulled up by foreign demand. Additionally, G3 capital goods orders are climbing at the fastest pace since 2014. A stronger dollar may dampen U.S. exports and earnings, but this will be a modest offset, rather than something that derails the recovery in U.S. industrial production. Chart 5Global LEI's Pointing Higher Chart 6Supports For Global Growth In Place Global growth is important to large cap U.S. equities because 43% of S&P 500 sales in 2016 came from outside the U.S. (Table 2). Remarkably, this figure moved lower in the past 5 years and 10 years. In 2012, 47% of S&P 500 sales came from outside the U.S.; in 2007, it was only 1% less. The drop in overseas sales since 2012 masks shifts by region. In 2016, 8% of S&P 500 sales were to Asia, up 100 bps from 2012. Europe, excluding the U.K., accounted for 6% sales in 2016 and the U.K., a mere 1%. These numbers dropped from the 2012 figures of 10% and 2% respectively. While Standard and Poor's does not separate out sales to China, that country represents a large portion of sales to Asia, which makes China and Europe the two most important regions for overseas sales. In contrast, only 3% of S&P 500 sales are made in Canada and Mexico. Table 2Most S&P 500 Sales Go To Asia And Europe While BCA's European strategists remain upbeat about growth prospects in the Eurozone,7 our outlook on China is more sanguine. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service notes that Chinese politics have shifted from tailwind to headwind for global growth in the wake of China's 19th National Party Congress.8 Meanwhile, BCA's China Investment Strategy states that the weak external demand environment faced by China in 2015 was a function of severe dislocations in the commodity and currency markets that probably will not recur in the coming 6-12 months. While Chinese export growth will moderate in the coming year, the absence of these shocks is an important factor supporting a gradual deceleration.9 Moreover, China's economic momentum is on the upswing. Real-time measures of economic activity such as electricity production, excavator sales, and railway freight traffic, all are expanding at double-digit rates, albeit down from recent peaks (Chart 7). Various price indexes also show a broadly based pickup in inflation to levels that will unnerve the authorities. Nonetheless, economic growth will slow in 2018 as policymakers continue to pare back stimulus. BCA does not foresee a substantial downturn in growth next year, but it could be hard on base metals prices. Bottom Line: Improving economic activity outside the U.S. is a tailwind for both domestic economic growth and profits of U.S. firms with significant foreign business. Moreover, surging world growth is a precondition for higher inflation. BCA's Global Fixed Income Strategy service notes10 that 68% of OECD nations have unemployment rates under the organization's assessment of "global NAIRU", which has not occurred since before the Great Recession when inflation expanded in both the goods and service sectors (Chart 8). Solid foreign demand will help the economy hit the Fed's GDP target and support the central bank's additional but gradual tightening stance. Stay overweight U.S. equities and remain short duration. BCA's view that inflation is poised to turn higher also supports our duration call. Chart 7China: Healthy Growth Indicators Chart 8NAIRU Is Not Dead Yet Still Waiting For Wage Inflation Table 3Inflation Reacts With A Lag The labor market continues to tighten, which suggests that wage pressures should accelerate soon. Given that inflation is a lagging indicator, investors must remain patient. Table 311 illustrates the time lag from when full employment is reached to the turning point for consumer price inflation. During long expansions, the gap is 26 months. The U.S. unemployment rate dipped below NAIRU 12 months ago in November 2016. The implication is that investors (and the Fed) are too eager as they wait for inflation's inflection point. BCA approaches wage growth - or the lack of it - in another way. Like inflation, wage growth takes time to materialize in protracted recoveries. Charts 9 and 10 provide updates on inflation and its leading indicators that we published in August 2017. These charts reiterate that price pressures take time to emerge in "slow burn" expansions. Chart 11 shows that the ECI has trended higher since 2009, matching increases in quit rates, NFIB compensation plans, and the Conference Board's measure of jobs hard to get less jobs easy to get. Moreover, the top panel of Chart 11 shows that the ECI gains are widespread and at 73%, the percentage of states reporting unemployment rates below NAIRU suggests that wage gains are imminent (Chart 12). Chart 9In the 80s And 90s Wage Growth Did Not##BR##Provide And Early Warning On Inflation Chart 10Patience Is Required On##BR##Inflation In Long Cycles Chart 11Labor Market Is Tight Enough##BR##To Push Up Inflation Chart 1270%+ Of States Have Unemployment Rates Below NAIRU The Atlanta Fed Wage Tracker,12 which is not compromised by compositional shifts in the labor market, stabilized in the past few months after rolling over in the spring and early summer. Moreover, the Tracker remains in a distinct uptrend; at 3.6% year-over-year, it is at the lower end of the 3.3% to 4.3% year-over-year range in place before the global financial crisis (Chart 13, panel 2). Chart 13Wage Pressures Mounting Bottom Line: Wage inflation is on the upswing as the output gap turns positive for the first time in a decade and the unemployment rate moves even further below NAIRU. A persistent buildup in wages will allow the Fed to bump up rates in December and three times again next year. This supports BCA's underweight stance on duration. That said, a sudden surge in consumer price or wage inflation would trigger a more aggressive response from the Fed, and a signal of "the beginning of the end" for the recent return of the Great Moderation. Great Moderation, Interrupted? The Great Recession was eight years ago, but investors are now ruminating about the return of the Great Moderation era (mid-1980s to mid-2007), when subdued macroeconomic volatility often coincided with low market volatility. Then, as now, inflation was muted and stable, but unlike today, economic growth was much faster in a long expansion phase with two mild recessions (Chart 14). There have been many studies rationalizing the Great Moderation, which was observed in most advanced economies (G7 countries and Australia) roughly at the same time though not fully synchronized (Chart 15).The phenomenon13 was initially forged in 2002 by Stock and Watson and then publicized by former Fed Chair Bernanke14 in a 2004 speech.15 Chart 14Return Of The Great Moderation? Chart 15The Great Moderation: A Global Phenomenon Too! Three main causes were identified: Structural changes in the economy: improvement in inventory management as the U.S. moved away from a manufacturing-based economy towards a service-based economy, the latter less volatile. Financial innovations, for example, increased credit availability to households through the rise of securitization, allowing consumption to be more balanced; Higher efficacy of monetary policy: increased transparency and predictability of FOMC actions, which augmented the Fed's credibility to tame inflation (price stability) and foster full employment; Good Luck (smaller shocks): post mid-1980s (and up to the global financial crisis-GFC), the economy did not experience outsized shocks such as the surge in oil prices in the 1960s and the 1970s. Most investors and/or economists agree that structural changes and better monetary policy were significant drivers of the decline in macroeconomic volatility. Good luck also seems to have been a factor and there is empirical research to support it. The persistence and length of the current expansion is an indication that good luck still plays a role, with investors taking on risk and becoming complacent. That said, there does not seem to be a consensus on the single most important driver of the "Great Moderation". Interestingly, complacency in the financial markets creates vulnerability at the late stage in this expansion. It has caught the Fed's attention as evidenced in the September 19-20 FOMC minutes: "Broad U.S. equity price indexes increased over the intermeeting period. One-month-ahead option-implied volatility of the S&P 500 index - the VIX - remained at historically low levels despite brief spikes associated with increased investor concerns about geopolitical tensions and political uncertainties." Since Chair Yellen took office in February 2014, this is the most direct reference about low volatility and therefore, complacency in the financial markets. Chart 16Back To Low Correlations Among Stocks The November 2017 Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Report16 discussed complacency in the context of a return of the Great Moderation. BCA believes significant complacency is signaled by the good news already discounted in equity prices, the depressed level of the VIX and the decline this year in risk asset correlations. Moreover, large institutional investors are reportedly selling volatility and thus, dampening implied volatility across asset classes. The "Great Moderation" in macro volatility is also contributing to low correlations among stocks (Chart 16). The idea is that low perceived macroeconomic volatility during the "Great Moderation" had diminished the dispersion of growth and inflation forecasts, thereby trimming the variance of interest rate projections. This allowed equity investors to focus on alpha rather than beta, given less uncertainty about the macro outlook. The focus on alpha contributed to the decline in stock price correlation. Today, dispersion in the outlooks for growth and interest rates have returned to pre-Lehman levels, helping to explain the low levels of implied volatility and correlation in the equity market (Chart 17). Some of the reduced dispersion can be justified by the fundamentals. The onset of a broadly based global expansion has calmed lingering fears that the world economy is constantly teetering on the edge of the abyss. Investor uncertainty regarding economic policy has also moderated (bottom panel). Historically, implied volatility tended to fall when global industrial production was strong and global earnings were rising in a broad swath of countries (Chart 18). Our U.S. Equity Sector Strategy service points out that, during the later stages of the cycle, equity sector correlations tend to drop. The lower correlations occur as earnings fundamentals become more important performance drivers, and sector differentiation generates alpha.17 Similarly, the VIX can fluctuate at low levels for an extended time when global growth is broadly based. Chart 17A Less Uncertain Macro Outlook? Chart 18Broad-Based Growth Lowers Implied Volatility Still, the current readings of equity market correlation and the VIX are unnerving given a plethora of potential geopolitical crises and the pending unwinding of the Fed's balance sheet. Moreover, any meaningful pickup in inflation would upset the 'low vol' applecart. Table 4 shows the drop in the S&P 500 index during non-recessionary periods when the VIX surges by more than 10% in a 13-week period. The equity price index fell by an average of 7% during those nine episodes, with a range of -3.6 to -18.1%. Table 4Episodes When VIX Spiked Bottom Line: Longer expansions and shorter recessions, alongside the decline in market volatility, may stay for a while, the result of the perceived return to the Great Moderation. Risk assets are thus vulnerable because a lot of good news is discounted. Nonetheless, we would view any pullback in equities as a healthy correction rather than the beginning of a bear market. If the next recession is not expected before 2019 (our base case), then it is too early for the equity market to begin to discount the next bear market because profits will continue to expand well into 2018. Stay overweight stocks versus bonds in the next 12 months. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com Jizel Georges, Senior Analyst jizelg@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Tax Cuts Are Here... So Much for Populism," November 8, 2017. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Late Cycle View," October 16, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Xi Jinping: Chairman Of Everything," October 25, 2017. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Research's Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Strategy Outlook Fourth Quarter 2017: Goldilocks And The Recession Bear," October 4, 2017. Available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Synchronicity," September 25, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Still Some Upside In The Nickel Market," November 2, 2017. Available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Research's European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Great Resynchronization," September 21, 2017. Available at eis.bcaresearch.com 2017. 8 Please see BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Party Congress Ends ... So What?," November 1, 2017. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Research's China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China's Economy - 2015 Vs. Today (Part I): Trade," October 26, 2017. Available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 10 Please see BCA Research's Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Have Bond Yields Peaked For The Cycle? No," September 12, 2017. Available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 11 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Report, November 2017. Available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 12 https://www.frbatlanta.org/chcs/wage-growth-tracker.aspx?panel=1 13 Peter M. Summers, "What Caused the Great Moderation" Some Cross-Country Evidence", 2005, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City www.kansascityfed.org/ROkYZ/OcgaZ/Publicat/econrev/PDF/3q05summ.pdf 14 James H. Stock and Mark W. Watson, "Has the Business Cycle Changed? Evidence and Explanations", August 2003 https://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/2003/pdf/Stockwatson2003.pdf 15 Governor Ben S. Bernanke, "The Great Moderation," Washington, DC, February 20, 2004, https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/20040220/ 16 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Report, November 2017. Available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 17 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Later Cycle Dynamics," published October 23, 2017. Available at uses.bcaresearch.com.

Dear Client, Next week on November 20th instead of our regular weekly publication you will receive our flagship publication "The Bank Credit Analyst" with our annual investment outlook. Our regular publication service will resume on November 27th with our high-conviction trades for 2018. Kind Regards, Anastasios Avgeriou Highlights Portfolio Strategy Melting medical care input costs, sustainable enrollment gains and even modest tax relief would augment managed health care profits. Stay long health care insurers. Pharma and biotech stocks suffer from declining pricing power. Continue to avoid both. As a result, the S&P health care index remains in the underweight column. Recent Changes There are no changes to our portfolio this week. Table 1 Feature Equities consolidated recent gains as earnings season drew to a close last week. Recent election results coupled with the revealing of the Senate tax bill raised fresh concerns, unwarranted according to our geopolitical strategists, about the likelihood of a bill passage. While such heightened fiscal policy uncertainty is disquieting, solid EPS growth on the back of synchronized global economic and capex growth should sustain the overshoot phase in stocks. Q3 EPS vaulted to a fresh all-time high (Chart 1) and, were it not for two financials sector sub-indexes - reinsurers and multi-line insurers that were severely hit by the one off hurricane catastrophes - financials EPS growth would have been nil from -7.3%, pushing the overall SPX EPS number to 9.2% from 8.1%. Chart 2 shows that the positive EPS surprise factor remained close to the recent average. Going into earnings season, Q3 EPS growth forecasts collapsed to 4.1%, but actual results ended up 400bps higher. Chart 1Earnings-Led Advance Continues Chart 2Surprise Factor In Line With Recent Average While EPS growth cannot stay in the high teens forever, settling down close to 10%/annum EPS growth rate is possible in the near run. The softness in the U.S. dollar along with the basic resource sector commodity-related comeback, synchronized global economic and capex growth and financials contributing more than sell side analysts expect to overall EPS, suggest that such profit growth is attainable in 2018. Tack on the possibility of fiscal easing and sustained lift in animal spirits (bottom panel, Chart 1), and the odds of low double-digit EPS growth increase further. Meanwhile on the monetary policy front, news of Powell's nomination to take the helm at the Fed barely budged the equity market, but some cracks are appearing in the bond market (Chart 3). Keep in mind that going back to Volcker's late-1970s nomination, Fed Chair transitions have been volatile. In fact, the market has tested the resolve of all four previous Fed leaders (Chart 4). As soon as Volcker come into power he had to deal with the early-1980s recession (and the LatAm crisis in 1982) that saw the market fall by 17% from peak to trough. When Greenspan was confirmed Chairman in August of 1987, two months into his tenure Black Monday happened and he had to step in and reiterate the Fed's function as a lender of last resort. In 2006 Bernanke took over from the Maestro, and a recession hit by the end of 2007 that morphed into the Great Recession. Finally in early-2014, Yellen become the Fed Chairwoman and in late-2015 a global manufacturing recession had taken hold resulting in a 14% drawdown in the SPX. Chart 3Watching The Bond Market Chart 4Testing Times Inevitably, the market will test the new Fed Chairman. This expansion has been long in the tooth and given BCA's 2019 recession view, this testing time is at least a year away. This week we reiterate our underweight stance in a defensive sector and highlight its key sub-components. Stick With Managed Health Care Exposure Following a two year hiatus, managed health care stocks broke out in 2017 and the juggernaut has now resumed (Chart 5). While the recent unsuccessful intra-industry M&A attempts (breakdown of both AET/HUM and ANTM/CI deals) were a mild setback, CVS's latest announcement, to take over AET and further vertically integrate, has brought euphoria back to this health care subgroup. We have added alpha to our portfolio as relative performance is up smartly, roughly 24% since our early-April 2016 overweight recommendation, begging the question: Is the time ripe to lock in impressive profits and move to the sidelines or is there more upside left? Leading profit indicators suggest that more gains are in store for the relative share price ratio. After petering out in 2016, our managed care cost proxy (comprising physician and hospital services and medical care commodity inflation) has plummeted by over 350bps from the recent peak (shown inverted, second panel, Chart 5). Given that premiums are set on a trailing cost basis, profit margins should surprise to the upside, i.e. the industry's medical loss ratio has room to fall. Not only is our medical care input cost proxy melting, but the latest employment cost index release revealed that managed health care wage inflation is also steadily decelerating (third & bottom panels, Chart 6). Taken together, these two cost categories are heralding a solid industry EPS growth backdrop in the coming months (total cost proxy shown inverted, second panel, Chart 6). Chart 5Melting Costs Are A Boon To Margins... Chart 6...And EPS Importantly, health care insurers are also set to benefit from the Trump administration's push toward lowering drug prices and the proliferation of generic drugs. While drug inflation is positive for the pharma/biotech space, it is an expense incurred by managed care providers and vice versa. The upshot is that the pharmaceutical sector's pain will be the managed health care industry's gain (bottom panel, Chart 5). On the legislative front, the failed attempts to repeal and replace the ACA is positive as the newly enrolled will likely remain insured and underpin recurring industry revenues. As long as costs stay in check, the implication is ongoing earnings improvement. Tack on any relief related to a tax bill passage (the managed care index has a 47% effective tax rate or 24% higher than the overall S&P health care sector, see Table 2) and the path of least resistance is higher for profits. Table 2Tax Relief Potential Despite all of these positives, relative valuation remains muted, hovering near the neutral zone. On a forward P/E basis the S&P managed care index is trading on a par with the S&P 500 (Chart 7). If our thesis of sustained earnings outperformance materializes in the coming quarters, then a valuation re-rating phase looms. In sum, melting input costs, sustainable enrollment gains and even modest tax relief would augment managed health care profits. This is a recipe for a durable valuation expansion phase. Bottom Line: While we are underweight the broad health care index, our sole overweight remains the S&P managed health care index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5MANH - UNH, AET, ANTM, CI, HUM, CNC. Ailing Pharma We downgraded pharma to an underweight stance on July 31 on the back of weak pricing power fundamentals, soft spending backdrop, a depreciating U.S. dollar and deteriorating industry operating metrics. The S&P pharmaceuticals index relative performance is down 5% since then as our bearish profit thesis is validated. Our dual synchronized global economic and capex growth themes bode ill for defensive pharmaceutical stocks. Nondiscretionary health care outlays jump in times of duress and underwhelm during expansions. Currently, the soaring ISM manufacturing index is signaling that pharma profits will remain under pressure in the coming months as the most cyclical parts of the economy flex their muscles (the ISM survey is shown inverted, middle panel, Chart 8). A depreciating currency is also synonymous with pharma profit ails (bottom panel, Chart 8). Historically, a soft U.S. dollar has been closely correlated with global growth, whereas greenback strength tends to slowdown the global economy. In that context, pharma exports should at least provide some top line growth relief during depreciating U.S. dollar phases. However, pharma exports are contracting at an accelerating pace (top panel, Chart 8) despite the U.S. dollar's year-to-date softness, warning that global pharma demand is sick. Importantly, the news on the pricing power front is disconcerting. Both in absolute terms and relative to overall PPI, pharma selling prices are steadily losing steam. In the context of a bloated industry workforce, the profit margin outlook darkens significantly (Chart 9). If the Trump administration also manages to clamp down on the secular growth of pharma selling price inflation, then industry margins will remain under chronic pressure. Worrisomely, were pharma prices to continue to trail overall corporate sector price inflation, as we expect, then the de-rating phase in the S&P pharmaceuticals index has a long ways to go (bottom panel, Chart 9). Finally, even on the operating metric front, the news is mostly grim. Pharma industrial production is nil and our pharma productivity proxy remains muted, warning that profits will likely underwhelm. Industry retail sales growth is also flirting with the zero line and pharma inventories have resumed growing on a short-term rate of change basis across the supply channel. Pharma shipments offer the only ray of hope. But the recent acceleration in the latter may be the result of the hurricane-related catastrophes (Chart 10). Chart 8Counter Cyclical With##br## No Export Relief Chart 9Weak Pricing Power And Bloated##br## Cost Structure Weighs On Margins Chart 10Operating Metrics ##br##Are Also Feeble Netting it out, pharma profit growth is on track to continue to disappoint as the confluence of synchronized global growth, softening U.S. dollar, pricing power losses and deteriorating operating metrics are all profit headwinds. Bottom Line: We reiterate our late-July downgrade in the S&P pharma index to underweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5PHAR - JNJ, PFE, MRK, BMY, AGN, LLY, ZTS, MYL, PRGO. A Few Words On Biotech Biotech stocks are another casualty of weakening pharmaceutical wholesale price inflation, and given that the industry's profits move neck-and-neck with their pharma siblings, revenue and EPS growth are bound to continue to surprise to the downside (Chart 11). We expect such profit woes will weigh on the S&P biotech index relative performance, and re-iterate our high-conviction underweight status. Chart 11Biotech Equities Hate Higher Rates Chart 12Technicals Say Sell Not only are biotech firms modestly concealed Big Pharma, i.e. they manufacture multi-billion dollar blockbuster drugs, and the Trump administration's scrutiny of drug price inflation is a profit negative, but also a rising interest rate backdrop is working against this health care sub-index. Historically, rising interest rates have been inversely correlated with biotech stocks. High flying valuations tend to gravitate back to earth when the Fed embarks on a tightening cycle. The opposite is also true. BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy view remains that in the coming 12 months interest rates will be higher, moving closer to the 3% mark on the 10-year Treasury yield front. If such a selloff materializes in the bond market, then investors will abandon biotech stocks in a heartbeat (Chart 11). Chart 13Heed The EPS Growth Model Signal Meanwhile, according to empirical evidence since the mid-1990s, relative momentum in biotech stocks is nearly perfectly inversely correlated with the global credit impulse (Chart 11). This negative correlation has become more pronounced in the past decade underscoring the non-discretionary/defensive nature of large biotech outfits. In other words biotech stocks behave like counter-cyclicals similar to their pharma brethren. Given BCA's view of a recession hitting some time in 2019, we recommend investors still avoid biotech stocks. Finally, technicals are also waving a red flag. Chart 12 shows that a head-and-shoulders formation has taken root and were the neckline to give way in the coming weeks, relative performance would suffer a substantial setback. Bottom Line: Biotech stocks remain a high-conviction underweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5BIOTX - ABBV, AMGN, GILD, CELG, BIIB, VRTX, REGN, ALXN, INCY. Health Care Sector Implications What does all this mean for the broad S&P health care sector? Our relative profit growth model best encapsulates these forces and is signaling that profits will remain downbeat into 2018 (Chart 13). Managed health care stocks (overweight) comprise 13% of the index, while pharma (underweight) and biotech (underweight) market capitalization weights both add up to 54% of the total. As a result of our intra-sector positioning and given our neutral weightings in the remaining health care sub-indexes, we continue to recommend a below benchmark allocation in the S&P health care index. Bottom Line: Stay underweight the S&P health care sector. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor small over large caps and stay neutral growth over value.

The S&P household products index story in 2014-15 was that a firm U.S. dollar had sapped top-line growth from the key export market and a turnaround in the former would provide a lift in the latter. While that thesis has proven correct (second panel) and consumer goods exports have substantially recovered, earnings growth remains flat and trails the broad market (third panel). In the most recent quarter, organic domestic growth concerns weighed on household products stocks. Further, hurricane-driven input price hikes have temporarily crimped margins. The result is that the S&P household products are at their cheapest level this decade (bottom panel). With compelling valuations and the makings of an export-led EPS recovery, we maintain our overweight recommendation. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: PG, CL, KMB, CLX, CHD.

Highlights A growing list of indicators is pointing to a potential slowdown to the strong global growth. However, the key deflationary anchors in the global economy - U.S. deleveraging, Europe's crisis, and Chinese excess capacity - have been mostly slayed. Any slowdown is likely to be brief and shallow, generating a buying opportunity in risk assets. In the meantime, commodity currencies, especially the AUD, could suffer. EUR/JPY is also at risk. Buy CAD/SEK. Feature Chart 1-1Global Growth Has Boomed Global growth has continued to fire on all cylinders, and global industrial activity is at its strongest in 13 years (Chart I-1). However, five weeks ago, we highlighted three yellow flags that we believe are pointing toward a period of cooling in the global economy.1 One month later, it is time to look at the data and evidences to see if these yellow flags are being followed by additional symptoms. We posit that yes, a temporary and mild slowdown will materialize. But the global economy remains fundamentally sound. Yet, this cooling of growth could have implications for commodity currencies and EM assets. The Original Worries The key original worry that we highlighted in early October was that global money growth had been decelerating, which has historically presaged a slowdown in global industrial production, global trade and commodities prices (Chart I-2). This deceleration in money growth has only deepened since, adding further saliency to our original concern. Moreover, Chinese monetary and fiscal conditions are being tightened. The Chinese economy continues to hum at a healthy pace, and deflation has been vanquished as producer prices are expanding at a nearly 7% pace and core CPI continues to accelerate to its highest levels since 2010. This is giving Chinese policymakers an opportunity to tighten policy. Chinese monetary condition indices (MCI) are becoming less supportive of industrial activity and fiscal spending has decelerated. These policy moves potentially explain the recent rollover in the Keqiang index - which approximates industrial growth -- and the contraction in new capex projects (Chart I-3). Chart I-2Money Growth Points To A Pause Chart I-3China Is Tightening Policy Bottom Line: Global money growth continues to decelerate, and Chinese monetary and fiscal conditions are tightening. This could create a dent in global industrial activity. The Additional Worries Some other key growth indicators are also raising the alarm bell: The average of Korean and Taiwanese exports growth decelerated sharply. After having hit a peak of 32% in September, they have now decelerated to 5%. Additionally, Swedish and Australian manufacturing PMIs have also rolled over (Chart I-4). Korean and Taiwanese exports as well as Swedish and Australian PMIs are highly sensitive to global trade and the global industrial cycle. Our global growth indicator has rolled over. This indicator did forecast the rebound in industrial production in 2016 and 2017. It is now pointing toward a slowdown in global activity (Chart I-5). Likewise, our boom/bust indicator has rolled over, further highlighting the risks to global industrial production (Chart I-6). Chart I-4Key Barometers Have Turned Significantly Lower Chart I-5One Growth Indicator Slowing... Chart I-6...And Another One Too BCA's German industrial production model has turned down (Chart I-7). Germany is at the forefront of the global industrial cycle, and its own industrial production is highly geared to global trade. This is because manufacturing represents 23% of Germany's output and Germany's exports account for 38% of GDP. Furthermore, 30% of German exports are destined to EM economies, the epicenter of the global secondary sector. Thus, if German IP weakens, it will reflect an ebbing in the global industrial cycle. The global yield curve has continue to flatten in recent weeks (Chart I-8). This could be a reflection of the deceleration in global money growth. The weakness of banks across the world in recent days suggests the message from the yield curve should not be ignored. Chart I-7Manufacturing-Sensitive Germany Set To Slow Chart I-8Global Yield Curve Still Flattening Bottom Line: Beyond the slowdown in global money growth and tightening in Chinese policy, additional signs of softness have begun to emerge. Korea and Taiwanese exports as well as Swedish and Australian PMIs have weakened, our global growth indicator has rolled over, our boom/bust indicator is also softening. Likewise, our German IP model is pointing south and the global yield curve is flattening. A deceleration in global activity is likely in the cards. Reading Market Tea Leaves A few market developments are likely to be reflecting some of the underlying shifts in growth pinpointed by the set of worries highlighted above. First, commodity currencies have begun to soften, which normally herald a period of softening growth (Chart I-9). What is very interesting is the context in which this currency weakness has begun to emerge: The Australian dollar has weakened despite strengthening metals prices (Chart I-10); Chart I-9The Message From Commodity Currencies Chart I-10Why Is The AUD Weak? The Canadian dollar has weakened despite Brent breaking out above US$60/bbl; The Norwegian krone has weakened against the euro despite the same rise in oil prices and despite a 12% surge in industrial production. Chart I-11Global High Yield Experiencing Weakness Second, the breadth of EM equities has rolled over and is falling below the zero line, indicating that more stocks within EM have begun weakening than appreciating, pointing toward a very narrow participation in the current rally. Third, junk bond prices have started to fall in the U.S., with the JNK ETF breaking significantly below its 200-day moving average, the first time since September 2014. EM high yield bond prices have also broken below their moving average, and have further punched below a key upward sloping trend line that had been in place since the beginning of 2016 (Chart I-11). The EM bond ETF (EMB) is also testing its 200-day moving average. The last point bears particular significance. If EM bonds continue to weaken, this will represent a significant tightening in EM financial conditions. EM financial conditions have eased since 2016, which was a key factor underpinning the improvement in global IP. If EM financial conditions begin deteriorating now, a crucial support to the global economy will dissipate. Moreover, falling EM bond prices tend to be synonymous with falling EM exchange rates. In fact, the Russian ruble, the Turkish lira, the South African rand, the Brazilian real and the Mexican peso have all been weakening since the end of the summer. This suggests outflows out of these markets have begun. As investors pull money out of these markets, liquidity conditions in these economies will tighten, which will hurt their economic activity. This could be the mechanism that catalyzes the softening in global industrial activity highlighted above. All these developments are also emerging at a time when new, untested leadership will soon take hold of the Federal Reserve. Now that U.S. President Donald Trump has selected Jay Powell to helm the Fed, he still has three seats to fill on the board. Historically, transition periods at the Fed can be associated with market volatility. This time around may not be an exception. Bottom Line: Commodity currencies are weakening, market breadth in EM equities is deteriorating rapidly and junk bonds as well as various EM fixed income products are experiencing weakness. Not only do these developments tend to foreshadow ebbing global industrial activity, the weakness in EM bonds could in of itself tighten financial and liquidity conditions. The latter has been a key driver of the global industrial cycle. This represents a potentially dangerous environment. How Dangerous Exactly? Chart I-12Global Utilization Not##br## Deflationary Anymore All of this sounds very dire, but the reality is more nuanced. This softness in economic activity is unlikely to be very pronounced. As we argued last week, the three key factors that have created a strong deflationary anchor in the global economy seem to have been vanquished: U.S. deleveraging is over, the euro area has healed as banks have been cleaned up, and Chinese excess capacity has been purged.2 As a result of these developments, global capacity utilization is in a much better spot than it was in 2015 (Chart I-12). This means the deflationary impulse likely to emerge out of the dynamics described above should be much more muted than it was two years ago. Moreover, commodities markets are not as oversupplied as they once were; in fact, oil inventories are falling as the OPEC 2.0 setup is proving stable. This implies that commodities prices are unlikely to weaken as much as they did back then. This obviously corroborates the idea that the deflationary impact of this slowdown is likely to be smaller and also suggests that the impact on global capex should be more muted. Thus, since growth and inflation are likely to prove more resilient than in 2015, the impact on asset prices of the slowdown is likely to be short lived. If anything, it is likely to provide a buying opportunity in risk assets. Some markets are more out of line with fundamentals than others, which implies that they will suffer more. Below, we discuss key tactics that could be used to navigate this environment. Bottom Line: Because the U.S. deleveraging is over, the euro area has healed and because Chinese excess capacity has been curtailed, the global economy is less prone to deflationary tendencies than two years ago. This means that any growth slowdown will be shallow and brief. Thus, only in the assets most mispriced or most exposed to the risks above will there be playable moves that we will seek to exploit. The relevant currency market implications are explored below. Investment Implications The most mispriced asset in the face of this potential slowdown in global growth seems to be EM equities. EM stocks are very sensitive to the global industrial cycle and EM financial conditions. Both are set to deteriorate. Moreover, since 2008, EM stocks have traded closely with junk bonds, but currently EM equity prices seem very pricey relative to U.S. high yield bonds (Chart I-13). Weakening EM stock prices continue to be a negative for commodity currencies, as it implies a slowdown in global industrial activity. Moreover, commodity currencies remain over-owned. As Chart I-14 illustrates, speculators are very long "risky currencies" versus "safe currencies," implying that a slowdown in global growth, however minute it may be, is likely to be a negative shock for these investors. When these relative net speculative positions roll over, it tends to be associated with violent weakness in commodity currencies. Thus, the recent bout of weakness could only be the first innings. We think the AUD is the worst-placed commodity currency right now. Not only are speculators very long the Aussie, but as we have shown in recent weeks, the AUD is expensive against the USD, the NZD and the CAD. Its premium is so pronounced relative to other commodity currencies that, at current levels, valuations alone warrant shorting the AUD against the CAD or NZD. We are already short these crosses. It therefore follows that if we anticipate commodity currencies in general to weaken, AUD/USD also has downside. Chart I-15 makes this case. Australian equities relative to U.S. equities have historically led AUD/USD. Nearly half of the Australian equity market is financials, and Australian equities have been underperforming. This suggests investors continue to foresee a negative output gap in Australia both in absolute terms and relative to the U.S. - and thus a dovish Reserve Bank of Australia relative to the Fed, which hurts AUD/USD. Moreover, AUD/USD has overshot the mark implied by relative equity prices. Additionally, AUD/USD is expensive relative to interest rate differentials at both the short- and long-end of the yield curve. Chart I-13EM Stocks Offer##br## No Cushion Chart I-14Speculators In Commodity ##br##Currencies Are Not Ready Chart I-15AUD Is Most ##br##Vulnerable The euro could also experience some weakness. We have argued that as European financial conditions tighten relative to the U.S., this will hurt euro area inflation relative to the U.S., pointing to an environment where investors will likely once again price in monetary divergences in favor of the USD.3 Growth dynamics between Europe and the U.S. could also be affected by the tightening in China. As Chart I-16A and Chart 16B illustrates, tightening Chinese MCI or slowing Chinese M1 relative to M2 - which proxies a faster growth in savings deposits than checking deposits, and thus a rising marginal propensity to save tends to translate into slowing PMIs and industrial production in the euro area relative to the U.S. This is because Europe has a larger manufacturing sector and export sector as a share of GDP than the U.S. German exports, Europe's growth locomotive, are also highly geared to the Chinese industrial sector. Thus, when Chinese investment slows, Europe feels it more acutely than the U.S. With investors still very long the euro relative to the USD, a negative relative growth surprise on top of a negative relative inflation surprise will hurt EUR/USD. Chart I-16AEuro Area Versus U.S. Growth: ##br##Don't Ignore China (I) Chart I-16BEuro Area Versus U.S. Growth: ##br##Don't Ignore China (II) The picture for the yen is more complex. Falling EM assets and a temporary growth slowdown are positive for the yen. But bond yield differentials remain the key driver of USD/JPY. Since we anticipate the global growth slowdown to be shallow and brief, any weakness in U.S. bond yields will also be shallow and brief. Since we expect U.S. bond yields to regain vigor fast, and we doubt the global slowdown will affect the Fed's path much, the effect on USD/JPY will also be quick. Thus, we are keeping our cyclical long bet on USD/JPY. In fact, a positive U.S. inflation surprise is a growing risk that could cause bonds to sell off, hurting global liquidity conditions in the process. Chart I-17EUR/JPY: Ripe For A Correction Instead, we will hedge our long USD/JPY exposure by tactically shorting EUR/JPY. Japan will also suffer from a slowdown in global industrial activity, especially as 43% of its exports are shipped to emerging markets. Moreover, Japan has a very large manufacturing sector. However, Japanese yields have no downside from here. This means the deflationary impact of a global growth slowdown, however small it may be, will weigh on Japanese inflation expectations more than it will hurt nominal rates, resulting in higher Japanese real rates.4 This support for the JPY is likely to get magnified in EUR/JPY. Currently, speculators have been massive buyers of the euro against the yen, betting on growing monetary divergence between Europe and Japan. This has pushed net speculative positions in the euro versus the yen to levels historically associated with a reversal in this cross (Chart I-17). This pair is thus a coiled spring in the face of the risk that Japanese real rates rise against European ones, especially if investors begin pushing back expectations surrounding the first ECB rate hike. Investors have already given up hope of any tightening of policy in Japan in the foreseeable future, implying a very minimal chance of them pricing in any easing by the Bank of Japan in response to a temporary global growth slowdown. The last factor supporting shorting EUR/JPY is that Japan has a net international investment position of 60% of GDP, while Europe's NIIP stands at -3% of GDP. Also, Japanese investors have been aggressive buyers of European assets, especially since Emanuel Macron secured the French presidency, causing a positive reassessment of European political risk. In an environment where global volatility increases, Japanese investors are likely to retreat to their home market, accentuating EUR/JPY selling. Finally, CAD/SEK is likely to benefit in this environment as well, as Sweden is more exposed to EM conditions than Canada is. We are buying this cross this week, but we'll explore the reasoning behind it in greater detail next week. Bottom Line: Commodity currencies are likely to be the main casualty of the slowdown we expect to occur over the next 3 to 6 months. The AUD seems particularly vulnerable as it is expensive and investors are still very long this currency. USD/JPY could experience some downside, but we do not anticipate the growth slowdown to be strong enough to permanently knock Treasury yields off their course toward 3%. Instead, we will short EUR/JPY to protect our gains in our long USD/JPY. CAD/SEK has upside. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Melanie Kermadjian, Senior Analyst melanie@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled "The Best Of Possible Worlds?" dated October 6, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Reverse Alchemy: How To Transform Gold Into Lead" dated November 3, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "All About Credit" dated October 20, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com and Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Are Central Banks Behind the Curve Or Ahead of It?," dated July 21, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 4 For a more detailed discussion of the interplay between growth and the yen, please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Down The Rabbit Hole" dated April 15, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 U.S. data was mixed: Initial and continuing jobless claims underperformed expectations coming in at 1.901 mn and 239,000 respectively; JOLTS job openings climbed to 6.093 mn, beating expectations of 6.091 mn, and more than the previous 6.09 mn openings; Consumer credit increased to USD 20.83 bn from USD 13.14 bn, also beating expectations of USD 18 bn. The DXY enjoyed an up week, but a large spike in German Bund yields on Thursday caused the DXY to weaken. This is most likely a temporary event prompted by the unwinding of dovish ECB trades. We expect the greenback to continue its climb alongside stronger U.S. data. Report Links: It's Not My Cross To Bear - October 27, 2017 Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 European data has generally been upbeat: The German trade balance and current account improved to EUR 21.8 bn and EUR 25.4 bn, but this first and foremost reflected a 1% contraction in imports; French trade balance also improved to EUR -4.668 bn, beating expectations of EUR -4.8 bn; European retail sales increased by 3.7% on a yearly basis, and 0.7% monthly; However, German industrial production growth slowed to 3.6%. This allowed the euro to regain some of its lost value. However, we believe that euro area inflation will disappoint going forward - especially relative to the U.S. This will limit any appreciation in the euro as investors will begin pricing in a tightening of the Fed's policy relative to the ECB. Report Links: Market Update - October 27, 2017 Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent Japanese data has surprised to the downside: Core machinery orders massively underperformed expectations, as they contracted by 8.1% on a month-on-month basis and by 3.5% on an annual basis. Moreover, bank lending yearly growth also underperformed, coming in at 2.8%, and declining from last month's reading. Moreover, the leading economic indicator came below expectations, at 106.7. It also declined from last month's number. After 2 years into the recovery from the 2015 commodity/ EM carnage, global growth seems prime for some slowdown. Indeed, many indicators like high yield and EM bond yields have started to break down. This is could be positive for the yen, given its risk-off currency status. However we prefer to not play this strength though USD/JPY. Instead we are shorting EUR/JPY, a cross which cancels the exposure to the dollar. Report Links: Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 10 Charts For A Late-August Day -August 25, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. has been mixed Markit Services PMI outperformed expectations, coming at 55.6. It also increased from 53.6 last month. Halifax House Prices Month-on-Month growth also outperformed, coming in at 0.3%. However, the RICS Housing Price Balance underperformed expectations, coming in at 1%. The pound has been relatively flat after plunging following the "dovish" hike by the Bank of England. Overall, we see very little upside from here on for cable, as the BoE has little incentive to hike beyond what is priced into the SONIA curve, as both consumer confidence and real retail sales yearly growth are near 3-year lows. Meanwhile, the Fed will likely surprise the market by following its projected path. This will increase rate differentials between these two countries, and put downward pressure on GBP/USD. Report Links: Reverse Alchemy: How To Transform Gold Into Lead - November 3, 2017 Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 It has been quite an uneventful week for the AUD, as it has stayed flat relative to the USD. The following data came out: TD Securities Inflation increased to 2.6% from 2.5% on a yearly basis, and 0.3% on a monthly basis; ANZ Job Advertisements increased by 1.4% in September; AiG Performance of Construction Index declined to 53.2 from 54.7; Home loans contracted b 2.3%. The RBA rate decision and statement were in line with expectations, and the AUD saw little to no movement. Governor Lowe identified several capacity issues with the economy, noting that "In underlying terms, inflation is likely to remain low for some time, reflecting the slow growth in labour costs and increased competitive pressures", and that inflation is only being boosted by tobacco and electricity. Report Links: Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 10 Charts For A Late-August Day - August 25, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 On Wednesday, New Zealand decided to keep its reference rate unchanged at 1.75%. The kiwi rose after the announcement, as the Reserve Bank of New Zealand brought forward their expectations for a hike from the third quarter of 2019 to the second quarter of 2019. Furthermore, the RNZ now expects inflation to hit the mid-point of its target range by the second quarter of 2018, nine months sooner than before. The RBNZ also toned down its rhetoric on the currency as governor Grant Spencer stated that "the exchange rate has eased since the August statement, and if sustained, will increase tradable inflation and promote more balance growth". Overall we expect the NZD to outperform the AUD. Report Links: Reverse Alchemy: How To Transform Gold Into Lead - November 3, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Data in Canada has been positive: Ivey PMI moved up to 63.8 from 59.6, also outperforming the expected 60.2; Housing Starts increased by 222,800 annually, beating expectations of 210,000; Building permits also increased by 3.8% on a monthly basis; The most recent Business Outlook Survey report indicates that more than 40% of the surveyed businesses believe the shortage of labor has become worse, which is usually a reliable indicator of wage growth. This will allow the BoC to continue on its hiking path next year, which will mean that CAD will outperform other G10 currencies. NAFTA negotiations remain the greatest risk to the BoC view and the CAD. Report Links: Market Update - October 27, 2017 Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland has been mixed: Headline inflation underperformed expectations, coming in at 0.7%. It stayed constant from last month's number. Meanwhile, unemployment was unchanged from last month at 3.1%. This number was in line with expectations. After peaking in late October, EUR/CHF has depreciated slightly, mainly due to the weakness in the euro. However, betting for CHF strength still means fighting against the SNB. Inflation in Switzerland is still too tepid for the SNB to stop their interventions in currency markets. Meanwhile, real retail sales yearly growth is still in negative territory. Thus, until we see a significant improvement in economic activity in the alpine country, we are reluctant to bet against the SNB. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway has been mixed: Registered unemployment declined from 2.5% in September to 2.4% in October However, industrial production surged to more than 12% on an annual basis Since the Norges Bank policy statement at the end of October, USD/NOK has been flat. This has been because this cross has been squeezed between two conflicting forces: On one hand, oil has gone up nearly 5% just this month. On the other hand, the rise in the dollar has counteracted any downside that rising oil prices could provide to USD/NOK. Although we continue to be bullish on oil, we are bullish on USD/NOK, as this cross is more correlated to real rate differentials than it is to oil. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 10 Charts For A Late-August Day - August 25, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Swedish data was positive this week: Industrial production's monthly growth increased to 2.2% from a 1.6% contraction; the yearly measure is growing at a 4.5% pace, albeit less than the previous 7.5%; New orders are increasing at a very high 11.2% annual pace, a good forward-looking indicator for industrial production. While the Swedish economy remains robust, the SEK will see some downside against the USD and the EUR due to the Riksbank's dovishness. Also, the recent dip in EM high yield bonds could be a risk for the Swedish economy. We are therefore opening a long CAD/SEK trade. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades