Disasters/Disease

Highlights Ever since the Federal Reserve’s liquidity injections, the dollar has been trading in a bifurcated manner. Historically, this has been a rare event. The main bifurcation has been between developed market and commodity/emerging market currencies. Stability in the USD/CNY exchange rate is a key indicator to watch. Movements in this cross will indicate where the balance of forces are shifting. Feature Chart I-1A Tale Of Two Dollars The Federal Reserve’s dollar liquidity injections have been massive, but two dollars continue to fight a tug of war. The first is the DXY index, which has largely surrendered to the flood of liquidity offered through the Fed’s swap lines and temporary FIMA repo facility. In fact, cross-currency basis swaps in both Japan and the euro area, a measure of offshore dollar funding stress, have eased. As a result, volatility in the DXY index has been crushed, keeping it largely below the psychological 100 level. However, on the other side of the liquidity battle front have been emerging market and commodity currencies, some of which continue to make fresh lows. Remarkably, these have included currencies such as the Brazilian real that also have swap agreements with the US. In short, a rare divergence has opened up between two dollars (Chart I-1). Historically, whenever this has occurred, either the DXY index was on the verge of making new highs, or procyclical currencies were very close to a bottom. In our April 3rd report, we suggested three reasons as to why the dollar could remain well bid in the near term.1 In this report, we explore these reasons further and offer one variable to watch as the key arbiter between the two – the USD/CNY exchange rate. A Tale Of Two Dollars The bifurcated dollar performance has been underpinned by three factors. The 14 developed and emerging market currencies that have swap lines with the Fed2 all bottomed around March 19, when the funding announcement was made. These include currencies of countries that were initially excluded from a prior swap agreement such as Australia, Norway and New Zealand. The exception to this rule has been the Brazilian real. By extension, some currencies currently excluded from the swap agreement such as the Turkish lira and South African rand remain in freefall. The temporary repo facility for foreign and international monetary authorities (FIMA), which allows FIMA account holders to temporarily exchange their Treasury securities held with the Fed for US dollars, has instilled confidence. As such, this has assuaged selling pressure on currencies with ample dollar foreign exchange reserves. However, some currencies with low reserves such as the South African rand or Turkish lira continue to face downside risks. A huge portion of offshore dollar funding has been financed by non-bank entities. Not only does a rising dollar lift the debt burden of borrowers, but it also raises solvency risk for these concerns. Notably, non-banks have limited access to central bank swap lines. Of the US$12 trillion in dollar-denominated foreign debt outstanding, 32% is from emerging markets, a share that has increased massively since the financial crisis (Chart I-2). This might explain why currencies like the Brazilian real, exposed to significant foreign-currency corporate debt obligations, continue to see selling pressure, despite the Fed facilities in place (Chart I-3). Chart I-2Rising EM Dollar Debt Chart I-3Some EM Have High External Debt In short, with the Fed and many other developed-market central banks engaged in active purchases of corporate paper, a line in the sand has been drawn between currencies where the lenders of last resort have stepped in, and others where their central banks are still unwilling to take credit risk. Put another way, certain currency markets are starting to price USD solvency risk, resulting from the broad shutdown in their economies and the rise in the greenback. Unfortunately, there is nothing the Fed can do about this. Dollar liquidity shortages tend to be vicious because they trigger negative feedback loops. As offshore dollar rates among non-banks begin to rise, this lifts the cost of capital for borrowing entities, with debt repayment replacing capital spending. This is where China can step in. The People’s Bank of China has massive foreign exchange reserves, worth about US$3.1 trillion. This means it can provide swap agreements that will almost cover the totality of EM foreign dollar debt. The important distinction from foreign exchange reserves is that swap agreements entail no exchange of currency. As such, it is about confidence. With low external debt and massive FX reserves, the PBoC can instill this confidence in countries that have low and/or falling foreign exchange reserves.  Certain currency markets are starting to price USD solvency risk, resulting from the broad shutdown in their economies and the rise in the greenback.  There has been a precedent to this. Since the global financial crisis, as the PBoC has been engaging in powerful monetary stimulus, the number of bilateral swap lines offered to foreign central banks has also ballooned. Bloomberg no longer publishes swap data for the PBoC, but a recent article suggests that as recent as 2018, the Chinese central bank had bilateral local currency swap agreements with central banks or monetary authorities in 38 countries and regions, with a total amount of around 3.7 trillion yuan (Chart I-4).3 Remarkably, this excluded the US Fed. This means that the USD/CNY exchange rate will become a key arbiter of the divergence between the two dollars. If Asian and Latin American currencies can stabilize versus the RMB and the USD/CNY exchange rate can remain stable, then an informal accord has been established. So far, the RMB appears the arbiter between these two dollars (Chart I-5). Chart I-4Chinese Swaps To The Rescue? Chart I-5USD/CNY As A Dollar Arbiter We understand that geopolitical tensions between the US and China are escalating, and so the probability of such an event – if global growth rebounds earnestly – is low. However, should global growth remain weak, a fall in the RMB will highlight the PBoC is actively using its currency as a weapon. This will suggest all bets are off. Bottom Line: Developed market commodity currencies have a correlation of almost parity with EM FX (Chart I-6). An explicit swap agreement between China and emerging market countries could be the key to assuage dollar funding pressures within emerging markets. This will ease the selling pressure on developed-market commodity currencies. Chart I-6The Risk To Commodity Currencies Market Signals And Signposts Ever since Richard Nixon severed the gold-dollar link in the early ‘70s, there have been three major episodes when some currencies bucked the broad dollar trend. Historically, this has been driven by two major factors (Table I-1):4 Table I-1Summary Of Currency Divergence Episodes De-synchronized global growth A localized debt/economic crisis The first episode occurred in the early 1990s. As the world was exiting a recession in part triggered by tight US monetary policies, lower US interest rates allowed the dollar to fall along with rising global growth. Only the yen, on the back of an economy entering into a debt deflation spiral (where positive real rates begot more currency appreciation), was able to buck this trend. Developed market commodity currencies have a correlation of almost parity with EM FX. The late 1990s saw the capitulation of Asian currencies. As a safe haven, the US dollar started to benefit from repatriation flows. Asean and commodity currencies were under intense selling pressure from pegged exchange rates and a long period of low interest rates that had generated massive imbalances. Remarkably, the euro was the area of shelter..  The world in 2005-2006 was entering a full-blown mania. Procyclical currencies were benefitting from Chinese industrialization and the creation of the euro. Meanwhile, Japan continued to sag under a mountain of debt. This pushed market participants to increasingly use the yen as a funding currency for carry trades, allowing it to depreciate versus the US dollar. Enter 2020. The world today is in a synchronized slowdown, but varying degrees of policy measures suggest we could continue to see a lack of synchronicity in dollar trading over the near term: The euro area appears poised to recover faster than the US in the near term (Chart I-7). If this proves correct, any knee-jerk selloffs in the euro should be bought. This is directly linked to the speed at which European economies reopen, relative to the US. By extension, Asian currencies should do better than those in Latin America. Conclusion: the dollar could fall against the euro, but rise against some emerging market currencies. The easiest way to express this view is to buy the cheapest European currencies, such as the Norwegian krone and Swedish krona. We are long both. The yen, typically used as a funding currency, will be hostage to a sudden stop in funding flows. This is because there is no interest rate advantage anymore between Japanese and US paper, once accounting for hedging costs (Chart I-8). This suggests carry trades in developed markets, using the Japanese yen, are stuck in the barn for now. Meanwhile, as a safe haven currency, the yen will still benefit from a rise in FX volatility. Short USD/JPY hedges make sense. Chart I-7Euro Area Versus##br## US Growth Chart I-8The Yen Is No Longer An Attractive Funding Currency Commodity and emerging market FX will be the outlier against the US dollar for now. These continue to face downward pressure in the near term. In terms of commodities, the sudden stop in demand has been met with an overwhelmingly slow response to curtail supply. Eventually, higher demand will benefit these currencies, but the supply story dominates for now in crude oil and industrial commodities. That said, this week’s rise in Chinese commodity imports was encouraging. Stay tuned.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled “Capitulation?,” dated April 3, 2020, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 2 These include the Bank Of Canada, Bank Of Japan, Bank Of England, European Central Bank, the Swiss National Bank, the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Banco Central do Brasil, the Danmarks Nationalbank (Denmark), the Bank of Korea, the Banco de Mexico, the Norges Bank, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Monetary Authority of Singapore, and the Sveriges Riksbank. 3 Please see The History Of Commerce, China. 4 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, titled “Can There Be More Than One US Dollar”, dated June 08, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the US have been negative: The Markit manufacturing PMI fell to 36.1 in April; the services PMI also slipped to 26.7. ISM manufacturing PMI dropped to 41.5 and non-manufacturing PMI declined to 41.8. The trade deficit widened from $39.8 billion to $44.4 billion in March. Unit labor costs increased by 4.8% quarterly in Q1, while nonfarm productivity fell by 2.5%. Initial jobless claims continued to grow by 3169K last week. The DXY index surged by 1.5% this week. The Senior Loan Officer Survey released this week reported an increasing net percentage of domestic banks tightening standards for most loan types in Q1, including C&I, auto and mortgage loans. On Tuesday, the Fed’s Raphael Bostic said that there are great uncertainties around “V-shape” recovery. Report Links: Capitulation? - April 3, 2020 The Dollar Funding Crisis - March 19, 2020 Are Competitive Devaluations Next? - March 6, 2020 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area have been negative: The Markit manufacturing PMI fell further from 33.6 to 33.4 in April, while the services PMI stayed low at 12. Sentix investor confidence remained low at -41.8 in May. Retail sales contracted by 9.2% year-on-year in March, compared to a 3% increase the previous month.  The euro declined by 0.8% against the US dollar this week. The German court has criticized the ECB bond-buying programme, warning that the ECB’s purchases could be illegal under German law unless the ECB can prove otherwise. Continuing conflicts among Eurozone members and imbalances between countries could add more pressure on the ECB. In addition, the European Commission forecasts the euro zone economy to contract by a record 7.7% this year. Report Links: On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver - October 11, 2019 Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data from Japan have been negative: The manufacturing PMI fell from 43.7 to 41.9 in April. Vehicle sales kept contracting by 25.5% year-on-year in April, following a decline of 10.2% in March. Monetary base increased by 2.3% year-on-year in April, down from a 2.8% increase the previous month. The Japanese yen appreciated by 0.4% against the US dollar this week, despite broad US dollar strength. Since the beginning of the Fed swap lines operation this year, the BoJ has the highest liquidity swaps with the Fed, amounting to US$220 billion as of April 30, helping to ease dollar funding pressure in Japan. Report Links: The Near-Term Bull Case For The Dollar - February 28, 2020 Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 Currency Market Signals From Gold, Equities And Flows - January 31, 2020 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the UK have been mostly negative: The Markit manufacturing PMI fell further to 32.6 from 32.9 in April, while services PMI remained low at 13.4. Nationwide housing prices increased by 3.7% year-on-year in April, up from 3% the previous month. Money supply (M4) surged by 7.4% year-on-year in March. The British pound plunged by 2.7% against the US dollar this week. The Bank of England held interest rates unchanged on Thursday morning, while warning that the coronavirus crisis will push the UK economy into its deepest recession in 300 years. The Bank is now forecasting the output to slip by 3% in Q1, followed by a 2.5% plunge in Q2. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? - Sept. 20, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia have been mixed: Building permits plunged by 4% month-on-month in March, down from 19.4% the previous month. Exports surged by 15.1% month-on-month while imports fell by 3.6% in March. The trade surplus expanded by A$6.8 billion to A$10.6 billion. The Australian dollar fell by 1.5% against the US dollar this week. On Tuesday, the RBA kept its interest rate unchanged at 0.25%. More importantly, the Bank has scaled back the size and frequency of bond purchases, which so far totalled A$50 billion, while stating that they are prepared to scale-up the purchases again should conditions worsen. In addition, the RBA forecasts the output to fall by roughly 10% in the first half of 2020 and by 6% over the year, followed by a rebound of 6% next year. Report Links: On AUD And CNY - January 17, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand have been mixed: Building permits fell by 21.3% month-on-month in March, down from 5.7% increase in February. The unemployment rate ticked up from 4% to 4.2% in Q1, lower than the expected 4.4%. Employment increased by 0.7% quarter-on-quarter. The participation rate increased by 30 bps to 70.4%. In addition, wage rates increased by 2.5% annually. The New Zealand dollar dropped by 1.8% against the US dollar this week. While many may call the Q1 Labour Market Statistics a positive surprise, Statistics New Zealand has indicated that the March data from household labour force survey was interrupted due to the lockdown in March. In a typical quarter, around 25% of the interviews for this survey are carried out face-to-face. We expect the Q2 Labour Survey to show more clearly how the COVID-19 lockdown has changed New Zealand’s labour market. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 USD/CNY And Market Turbulence - August 9, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada have been negative: The Markit manufacturing PMI plunged from 46.1 to 33 in April. Both exports and imports fell notably in March: exports narrowed by C$2.3 billion to C$46.3 billion. Imports decreased by C$1.8 billion to C$47.7 billion. The trade deficit widened from C$0.9 billion to C$1.4 billion. Bloomberg Nanos confidence ticked up from 37.1 to 37.7 for the week ended May 1. The Canadian dollar fell by 0.9% against the US dollar this week. The decline in exports was led by auto manufacturing, aircraft, and energy products. Moreover, a depreciating Canadian dollar has largely impacted the trade values in March. When expressed in US dollar terms, export fall by 9.2% month-on-month and imports by 8.1%, which compares favourably with 4.7% decrease in exports and 3.5% decline in imports in Canadian dollars. Report Links: More On Competitive Devaluations, The CAD And The SEK - May 1, 2020 A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 The Loonie: Upside Versus The Dollar, But Downside At The Crosses Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland have been mostly negative: The manufacturing PMI fell from 43.7 to 40.7 in April, above the expectations of 34.6. Consumer climate plunged from -9.4 to -39.3 in Q2. Headline consumer prices fell by -1.1% year-on-year in April, down from -0.5% in March, also below the expectations of -0.8%.  The unemployment rate increased from 2.8% to 3.3% on a seasonally adjusted basis in April. The Swiss franc fell by 1% against the US dollar this week. With consumer prices decreasing for a third consecutive month, the SNB has stepped up the currency intervention. Total sight deposits have increased by nearly 77 billion CHF this year, compared to only 13.2 billion CHF in 2019 and 2.3 billion CHF in 2018. Report Links: On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Currency Market Signals From Gold, Equities And Flows - January 31, 2020 Portfolio Tweaks Before The Chinese New Year - January 24, 2020 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 There has been no significant data release from Norway this week. The Norwegian krone appreciated by 0.6% against the US dollar this week. On Thursday morning, the Norges Bank delivered a surprise rate cut by 25 bps to a record low of 0 due to the severity of the coronavirus and huge decline in oil prices. However, they also implied that further cuts into negative territory are unlikely. In addition, Governor Øystein Olsen said that they expect the output to drop by roughly 5% this year, a decline of a magnitude that has not been seen since World War II. Report Links: A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 On Oil, Growth And The Dollar - January 10, 2020 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden have been negative: Manufacturing PMI fell from 42.6 to 36.7 in April. Industrial production fell by 0.1% year-on-year in March. Manufacturing new orders contracted by 2% year-on-year in March, down from 5.7% increase in February. The Swedish krona has been more or less flat against the US dollar this week. Like the ECB, the Riksbank might have some legal issues regarding its bond purchases program. The current Riksbank Act does not allow the bank to make outright purchases of corporate bonds or other private securities on the primary or secondary markets. So far, the Riksbank has purchased 5.6 billion SEK of corporate commercial papers to support the economy under the COVID-19. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades

Highlights Global stimulus efforts are sufficient thus far, but more will need to be done, especially by Europe and emerging markets. Hiccups will not be well-received by financial markets. The net public wealth of countries helps put debt constraints into perspective in a world of zero and negative interest rates. Insufficient fiscal policy is a bigger risk for Europe in the near term than any Germany-mandated withdrawal of ECB quantitative easing. European states remain locked in a geopolitical predicament that prevents them from abandoning each other despite serious differences over fiscal policy, which will persist. We are tactically long defensive plays and safe havens. Stay long JPY-EUR. Feature This week we focus on two questions: Will global stimulus be enough to fill the gap in demand? And will Germany impose a hard limit on European stimulus efforts? Our answers are yes to the first and no to the second. It is impossible for governments to replace private activity indefinitely, but the resumption of private activity is inevitable one way or another. Governments are continuing to provide massive fiscal and monetary support. The near term is cloudy, however, due to the mismatch between uncertain economic reopening and increasing impediments to new stimulus. Weak spots in the global fiscal stimulus efforts arise in Europe and emerging markets excluding China. Europe, at least, is a temporary catch – as Germany has no choice but to help the rest of the EU prop up aggregate demand. But fiscal policy is a greater near-term risk to peripheral European assets than any cessation of monetary support from the ECB. Will Global Stimulus Be Enough? Yes, Eventually Chart 1 shows the latest update of our global fiscal stimulus chart comparing the size of today’s stimulus to the 2008-10 period. Countries that make up 92% of global GDP are providing about 8% of global GDP in fiscal stimulus. Full calculations can be found in the Appendix. Chart 1US Still Leads In Fiscal Stimulus The chief difference between our calculation and that of others is that we include government loans while excluding government loan guarantees. If a government gives a loan to a business or household, funds are transferred to the receiver’s deposits and can be spent to make necessary purchases or pay fixed costs. A loan guarantee, by contrast, is helpful but does not involve a transfer of funds. Our colleague Jonathan LaBerge, has recently written a Special Report analyzing the size of global fiscal stimulus. He provides an alternative calculation in Chart 2, which focuses on “above the line” measures, i.e. only measures affecting government revenues and expenditures. Government loans, guarantees, and other “below the line” measures are left aside in this conservative definition of stimulus. Chart 2Japan Leads In IMF “Above The Line” Account Of Stimulus Chart 3 shows the discrepancies between Jonathan’s version and our own – they are not very large. The major differences are Japan, China, Germany, Italy, and South Africa. Of these only Germany, Japan, and China are significant.1 Chart 3Geopolitical Strategy Estimates Accord Less Stimulus To Japan, More To Germany And China, Than IMF Does In Japan’s case, we include the stimulus measures that Japan passed at the end of 2019 because even though they were not passed in response to the pandemic, they will take affect at the same time as those that were. We do not include private sector complements to government action, which Japan includes in its account, since private responses are hard to predict and we do not include them for other countries. In China’s case, official estimates underrate the easing of credit policy. Credit is a quasi-fiscal function in China since the Communist Party controls the banks. With a large credit expansion the overall stimulus impact will be larger than expected, as long as borrowers still want to borrow. Data thus far this year suggests that they do, if only to cover expenses and debt payments. Our assessment that China’s stimulus will reach about 10% of GDP follows BCA Research’s China Investment Strategy. The UK and especially Italy, Spain, and France are falling short in their stimulus efforts … Is global stimulus “enough” to plug the gap in demand? Chart 4 shows our colleague Jonathan’s narrower definition of stimulus compared with estimates of the drop in demand from social lockdowns and spillover effects. It assumes a fiscal multiplier of 1.1. The result suggests that the US, China, and Australia are clearly doing enough; Germany, Japan, and Canada are arguably doing enough; other countries including Italy, France, and Spain will likely have to do more. Chart 4Which Countries Have Plugged The Gap In Demand So Far? The latest news confirms this assessment. The US Congress is negotiating another phase of stimulus that will provide a second round of direct payments to households, a third infusion of small business loans, and a large bailout of state and local governments. The current total is $2 trillion, and so far this year these totals are only revised upward. This tendency stems from the political setup: Trump needs to stimulate for the election, GOP senators’ fates ultimately hinge on Trump, while the House Democrats cannot withhold stimulus merely to undermine the Republicans. Similarly, there can be little doubt that China and Japan will provide more stimulus to maintain full employment – their different political systems have always demanded it. We are more concerned about Europe. The UK and especially Italy, Spain, and France are falling short in their stimulus efforts, with the last three ranging from 2%-4% of GDP, according to Chart 4 above. They will add more stimulus, but might they still fall short of what is needed? Assuming that the ECB will provide adequate liquidity, and that low bond yields for a long time will enable debts to be serviced, these countries can service their debts for some time. But what then is the constraint? From a long-term point of view, the UK and peripheral European nations have relatively fewer national assets to weigh against their well-known liabilities. They are closer to their constraints in issuing debt, even if those constraints are nearly impossible to establish and years away from being hit. This is apparent from the IMF’s data series on net public wealth, i.e. total public sector assets and liabilities (Chart 5A). These data, from 2016, are a bit stale, but they are still useful because they take account of assets like natural resources, real estate, state-owned companies, and pension plans that retain value over the long run. It does no good to refer to the large debt loads of countries without considering the vast holdings that they command. By the same token, at some point the debt loads look formidable even relative to these huge realms. Chart 5ANet Public Wealth: A Fuller Picture Of The Debt Story These data tend to underrate the sustainability of developed markets, which are highly indebted but have reserve currencies, safe haven status, and large, liquid credit markets. They overrate the sustainability of emerging markets, with large resource wealth and low-debt, but vulnerable currencies and credit markets. This is not only true for emerging markets with the most negative net worth, like Brazil, or with unsustainable fiscal policies, like Turkey and South Africa. China would look a lot worse in net public wealth, if this could be calculated, than it does on the general government ledger (Chart 5B), due to the liabilities of its state-owned enterprises and local governments. It would look more like the US or Japan in net public wealth – yet without a reserve currency. Chart 5BNet Government Debt: Flatters EM, Not DM Nevertheless the European states have a problem that the other developed markets do not have: the Euro Area’s “constitutional” order is still unsettled. Questions are continually arising about whether countries’ liabilities are backstopped by a single currency authority and the entire assets of the Euro Area. These questions will tend to be settled in favor of European integration. But treaty battles in the context of upcoming elections – in the Netherlands, Germany, France, and likely Italy and Spain – will provide persistent volatility. Bottom Line: Fiscal stimulus passed thus far is only “sufficient” in a few economies; it is insufficient in southern Europe and emerging markets. Uncertainty about the pandemic, and the pace of economic reopening and normalization, combined with any hiccups in providing adequate stimulus will create near-term volatility. Will Germany Halt Quantitative Easing? No, Not Ultimately The questions about Europe highlighted above have come to the fore with the reemergence of the “German question,” which in today’s context means Germany’s and northern Europe’s willingness to conduct fiscal policy to help rebalance the Euro Area and monetary policy to ease conditions for heavily indebted, low productivity southern Europe. We have little doubt that Germany will provide more than its current 10.3% of GDP fiscal stimulus given that it has explicitly stated that state lender KfW has no limit on the amount of loans it can provide to small businesses. This accounts for the difference between our fiscal stimulus estimate and the IMF’s, but the fullest count, including “below the line” measures, would amount to nearly 35% of GDP. A sea change in the German attitude toward fiscal policy has occurred, which we have tracked in reports over the years. This shift gives permission for other European states to loosen their belts as well. We also have little doubt that German leaders will ultimately accept the ECB’s need to take desperate measures to backstop the European financial system: The “dirty little secret” of the Euro Area is that debt is already mutualized through the Target 2 banking imbalance, worth 1.5 trillion euros (Chart 6). As our Chief European Investment Strategist Dhaval Joshi has argued, Germany, as the largest shareholder in the ECB, holds a large quantity of Italian bonds, and Italians have deposited the proceeds of these bond purchases in German banks. All of this is denominated in euros. If Italy redenominates into lira, it can make bond payments in lira and the ECB and Germany will suffer capital losses. Germany would then face Italians withdrawing their deposits from German banks that would still be denominated in euros (or the deutschmark). The cause of this predicament is the ECB’s quantitative easing program (Chart 7). Chart 6Europe’s Gordian Knot Thus Chancellor Angela Merkel’s shift in tone to become more supportive of joint debt issuance belies the fact that European debt is already mutualized through the Gordian knot of Target2 imbalances. This is a politically unpalatable reality for Germans, but they generally accept it because it is in Germany’s national interest to maintain the monetary union and broader European integration. Chart 7Quantitative Easing Puts Germans On Hook For Italy However, the market may need reassurances about “the German question” from time to time, as EU institutional evolution is ongoing. Financial markets did not sell off on the German court’s ruling on May 5, which ostensibly gave the Bundesbank three months before withdrawing from the ECB’s quantitative easing program. Since the sovereign debt crisis, investors have come to recognize that there is more undergirding European integration than mere German preference. Namely, geopolitics – which we have outlined many times, originally in a 2011 Special Report. European nations cannot compete globally without banding together, and Germany is not powerful enough to go it alone. Still, there will be more consequences from this week’s ruling. At issue is the budgetary sovereignty of the European member states as well as Article 123 of the Treaty of Europe, which holds that neither the ECB nor the national central banks of member states can directly purchase public debts. The latter is a prohibition on the monetary financing of deficits. It became controversial in the wake of Mario Draghi’s 2012 declaration that the ECB would do “whatever it takes” to preserve the euro and the ECB’s 2015 Public Sector Purchase Program (PSPP) quantitative easing program, which the European Court of Justice deemed legal on December 11, 2018. The controversy is now implicitly shifting to the new Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program. The other principle concerned is that of “proportionality,” which requires that EU entities not take actions beyond what is necessary to achieve treaty objectives. If the ECB acted without regard to the limits of its mandate, the fiscal supremacy of the states, and the broader economic and fiscal consequences of QE, then its actions would violate the principle of proportionality and would require adjustment by EU authorities or non-participation from member state authorities. The German court did not attempt to overrule or invalidate the European court’s decision in favor of QE, or QE as a whole. Rather, it held that this ruling was not “comprehensible,” hence requiring an independent German ruling, and that the larger question of whether QE violates the prohibition against debt monetization is “not ascertainable.” The reason is that the ECB did not explain its actions adequately and the European Court of Justice did not demand an explanation. Presumably once this is done more decisive determinations can be made. Essentially the German court is demanding “documentation” by the ECB Governing Council that it weighed its monetary decisions against larger economic and fiscal consequences. So will the Bundesbank withdraw from the ECB’s QE operations in three months? Highly unlikely! The ECB, whether directly or indirectly, will provide an assessment of the proportionality of its actions to the Bundesbank and the German court will probably conclude, with limitations, that the ECB’s actions were largely within its mandate. If not, however, markets will plunge. Then the Bundestag or the Bundesbank will have to intervene to ensure that Germany does not in fact withdraw support from the ECB. European nations cannot compete globally without banding together, and Germany is not powerful enough to go it alone. How can we be sure? German opinion. Chancellor Merkel and her ruling Christian Democrats have not suffered this year so far from launching a wartime fiscal expansion and backing the ECB and EU institutions in their emergency actions. On the contrary, they have received one of the biggest bounces in popular opinion polls of any western leaders over the course of the global pandemic. While the bounce will deflate once the acute crisis subsides, this polling signals more than the average rally around the flag (Chart 8). Merkel’s approval rating started to rise when her party embraced more expansive fiscal policy in late 2019 in reaction to malaise revealed in the 2017 election. Germany’s handling of today’s crisis, both the pandemic and the expansive fiscal policy, has put the ruling party in the lead for the 2021 elections (Chart 9). Chart 8Germans See Popular Opinion ‘Bounce’ Amid COVID Chart 9Merkel's CDU Revives Amid Global Crisis Chart 10Germans Support Euro, But Lean On ECB Moreover Germans are enthusiastically in support of the euro and the EU relative to their peers – which makes sense because Germany has been the greatest beneficiary of European integration (Chart 10). The ECB, by contrast, does not have strong support – and is losing altitude. But a crisis provoked by the court and centered on the ECB would quickly become a crisis about the euro and European project as a whole. Opinion has broken in this direction despite Merkel’s and Germany’s many compromises over the years. Remember that Merkel’s capitulation to the Mediterranean states on the European Council in June 2011, which paved the way for Draghi’s famous dictum, was initially seen as a failure by her to defend German interests. Merkel and her party have also recovered from the hit they took when she insisted that Germany take in a huge influx of Syrian refugees in 2015. German popular opinion is relevant when discussing the judicial system and rule of law. No court can ignore popular opinion entirely, no matter how independent and austere, because every court ultimately needs public opinion to maintain its credibility. The European Court’s decision is final, as long as Germany remains committed to the EU. Yet German sovereignty still gives German institutions a say. If the German court persists in attempting to block Bundesbank participation in QE, the result will be a bond market riot that pushes up peripheral debt funding costs. This would eventually risk forcing peripheral states out of the Euro Area, which is against German interests. It is very unlikely things will go so far. Rather, the court will back down after receiving due attention and having its legitimate concerns addressed. The imperatives of European integration are as powerful today as they were in 2011. True, other court challenges will open up against the ECB, particularly the PEPP. But bear in mind that it will be even easier to show that ECB actions are proportional – that broader economic consequences have been weighed – in the case of the pandemic relief emergency than with respect to PSPP prior to COVID. Today it is households and small businesses that need protection from an act of God, not banks and bureaucracies that need protection from the consequences of their excesses. As for the size and duration of QE, the court will try to force some limitations to be acknowledged given the risk to fiscal sovereignty. In this sense, the ECB faces a new constraint, albeit one that we doubt will prove relevant in the near term. Ultimately, the consequence of imposing some limits on central bank policy is to restore authority to member state budgets and European fiscal coordination. In the short term, emergency provision can be provided via the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), whose lending conditions can be relaxed, and by the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), which can buy bonds amid a market riot. But beyond the immediate crisis the clash over fiscal policy will persist because at some point countries will have to climb down from their extraordinary stimulus and the attempt to restore limits will be contentious. Germany has already made a huge shift in a more fiscally accommodative direction. Italy, Spain, and France are currently not providing enough, but they will add more. Future governments might demand more than even today’s more dovish Germany is willing to accept. Down the road, if these states do not provide more stimulus, then their recoveries will be weaker and political malaise will get worse. An anti-establishment outcome is already likely in Italy in the coming year or two, due to the ability of the League to capitalize on post-COVID voter anger. The big question after that is France in 2022. Macron’s approval rating is holding up, we expect him to win, but his bounce amid the pandemic is not remarkable. From our point of view the peripheral states have a license to spend, so spend they will. But then fiscal conflicts will revive later. Bottom Line: The German constitutional court is not going to try to force the Bundesbank to withdraw from QE, but it is attempting to lay a foundation for the imposition of at least some limits on this policy. The risk to European assets in the short run is not on the monetary side but the fiscal side. Over the long run, the “German question” will never be settled. But the imperatives of European integration are as powerful today as they were in 2011. Each new crisis exposes the weakness of the peripheral states, their need for European institutions. It also exposes Germany’s need to accommodate them when they form a united front. Investment Takeaways Financial markets have no clarity on economic reopening in the face of the virus or how governments will respond to resurgent outbreaks or a second wave in the fall. Taking into consideration the initial shock of the lockdowns plus spillover effects, the cumulative impact to annual GDP rises to 6%-8% by the end of this year for major economies. If another lockdown occurs, the level of GDP would be 10-12% lower at the end of the year depending on the region. This bare risk suggests that global equities face a relapse in the near term. Eventually economic reopening will proceed, as the working age population will demand it. But the path between here and there is rocky and any hiccups in providing stimulus will create even more volatility. Globally, we continue to argue that political and geopolitical risks are rising across the board as the pandemic and recession evolve into a struggle among nations to maintain security amid vulnerabilities and distract from their problems at home. Rumors that China is about to declare an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea are unverified but we have long expected this to occur and tensions and at least some saber-rattling would ensue. We also expect the US to surprise the market with punitive tech and trade measures against China in the near term and to upgrade relations with Taiwan. We remain long JPY-EUR on a tactical 0-3 month horizon. We are converting our tactical long S&P consumer staples, which is up 6%, to a relative trade against the broad market. Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Appendix Appendix Table 1The Global Fiscal Stimulus Response To COVID-19 Footnotes 1 In the case of Italy, we assume that parliament will pass the latest proposed increase in stimulus from 1.4% to 3.1% of GDP. In the case of South Africa, we expect the IMF to include these measures soon. Germany is discussed below.

Highlights Our baseline view foresees a U-shaped recovery, as economies slowly relax lockdown measures. There are significant risks to this forecast, however. On the upside, a vaccine or effective treatment could hasten the reopening of economies and recovery in spending. On the downside, containment measures could end up being eased too quickly, leading to a surge in new cases. A persistent spell of high unemployment could also permanently damage economies, especially if fiscal and monetary stimulus is withdrawn too quickly. In addition, geopolitical risks loom large, with the US election likely to be fought on who sounds tougher on China. Earnings estimates have yet to fall as much as we think they will, making global equities vulnerable to a near-term correction. Nevertheless, the spread between earnings yields and bond yields is wide enough to justify a modest overweight to stocks on a 12-month horizon. Is It Safe To Come Down? We published a report two weeks ago entitled Still Stuck In The Tree where we likened the current situation to one where an angry bear has chased a hiker up a tree.1 Having reached a high enough branch to escape immediate danger, the hiker breathes a sigh of relief. As time goes by, however, the hiker starts to get nervous. Rather than disappearing back into the forest, the bear remains at the base of the tree licking its chops. Meanwhile, the hiker is cold, hungry, and late for work. Like the hiker, the investment community breathed a collective sigh of relief when the number of cases in Italy and Spain, the first two major European economies to be hit by the coronavirus, began to trend lower. In New York City, which quickly emerged as the epicentre of the crisis in the United States, more COVID patients have been discharged from hospitals than admitted for the past three weeks (Chart 1). Chart 1Discharges From New York Hospitals Have Exceeded Admissions For The Past Three Weeks Deepest Recession Since The 1930s Yet, this progress has come at a very heavy economic cost. The IMF expects the global economy to shrink by 3% this year (Chart 2). In 2009, global GDP barely contracted. Chart 2Severe Damage To The Global Economy This Year The sudden stop in economic activity has led to a surge in unemployment. According to the Bloomberg consensus estimate, the US unemployment rate rose to 16% in April. The true unemployment rate is probably higher since to be considered unemployed one has to be looking for work, which is difficult if not impossible in the presence of widespread lockdowns. Regardless, even the official unemployment rate is the worst since the Great Depression (Chart 3). Chart 3Unemployment Rate Seen Jumping To Levels Not Reached Since The Great Depression   Unshackling The Economy A key difference from the 1930s is that today’s recession has been self-induced. Policymakers want workers to stay home as much as possible. The hope is that once businesses reopen, most of these workers will return to their jobs. How long will that take? Our baseline scenario envisions a slow but steady reopening of the global economy starting later this month, which should engender a U-shaped economic recovery. Since mid-March, much of the world has been trying to compensate for lost time by taking measures that would not have been necessary if policymakers had acted sooner. As Box 1 explains, some loosening of lockdown measures could be achieved without triggering a second wave of cases once the infection rate has been brought down to a sufficiently low level. To the extent that economic activity tends to move in tandem with the number of interactions that people have, a relaxation of social distancing measures should produce a modest rebound in growth. New technologies and a better understanding of how the virus is transmitted should also allow some of the more economically burdensome measures to be lifted. As we have discussed before, mass testing can go a long way towards reducing the spread of the disease (Chart 4).2 Right now, high-quality tests are in short supply, but that should change over the coming months.  Chart 4Mass Testing Will Help Increased mask production should also help. Early in the pandemic, officials in western nations promulgated the view that masks do not work. At best, this was a noble lie designed to ensure that anxious consumers did not deprive frontline workers of necessary safety equipment. At worst, it needlessly led many people astray. As East Asia’s experience shows, mask wearing saves lives. A recent paper estimated that the virus could be vanquished if 80% of people wore masks that were at least 60% effective, a very low bar that even cloth masks would pass (Chart 5).3  Chart 5Masks On! Recent research has also cast doubt on the merits of closing schools. The China/WHO joint commission could not find a single instance during contact tracing where a child transmitted the virus to an adult. A study by the UK Royal College of Paediatrics provides further support to the claim that children are unlikely to be important vectors of transmission. The evidence includes a case study of a nine year-old boy who contracted the virus in the French Alps but fortunately failed to transmit it to any of the more than 170 people he had contact with in three separate schools.4  Along the same lines, there is evidence that the odds of adults catching the virus indoors is at least one order of magnitude higher than outdoors.5 This calls into question the strategy of states such as California of clearing out prisons of dangerous felons in order to make room for beachgoers.6 Upside Risks To The U: Medical Breakthroughs While a U-shaped economic recovery remains our base case, we see both significant upside and downside risks to this outcome. The best hope for an upside surprise is that a vaccine or effective treatment becomes available soon. There are already eight human vaccine trials underway, with another 100 in the planning stages. In the race to develop a vaccine, Oxford is arguably in the lead. Scientists at the university’s Jenner Institute have developed a genetically modified virus that is harmless to people, but which still prompts the immune system to produce antibodies that may be able to fight off COVID. The vaccine has already worked well on rhesus monkeys. If it proves effective on humans, researchers hope to have several million doses available by September. On the treatment side, Gilead’s remdesivir gained FDA approval for emergency use after early results showed that it helps hasten the recovery of coronavirus patients. Hydroxychloroquine, which President Trump has touted on numerous occasions, is the subject of dozens of clinical trials internationally. While evidence that hydroxychloroquine can treat the virus post-infection is thin, there is some data to suggest that it can work well as a prophylactic.7 Research is also being conducted on nearly 200 other treatments, including an improbable contender: famotidine, the compound found in the heartburn remedy Pepcid.8  Downside Risk: Too Open, Too Soon Chart 6The Lesson From The Spanish Flu: The Second Wave Could Be Worse Than The First As noted above, once the number of new cases drops to sufficiently low levels, some relaxation of containment measures can be achieved without reigniting the pandemic. That said, there is a clear danger that measures will end up being relaxed too aggressively and too soon. This is precisely what happened during the Spanish Flu (Chart 6). It has become customary to talk about the risk of a second wave of infections; however, the reality is that we have not even concluded the first wave. While the number of cases in New York has been falling, it has been rising in many other US states. As a result, the total number of new coronavirus cases nationwide has remained steady for the past five weeks (Chart 7). It is the same story globally: Falling caseloads in western Europe and East Asia have been offset by rising cases in countries such as Russia, India, and Brazil (Chart 8). Chart 7The Spread Of COVID-19 Has Not Been Contained Everywhere (I) Chart 8The Spread Of Covid-19 Has Not Been Contained Everywhere (II)   Chart 9Widespread Social Distancing Has Dampened The Spread Of All Flus And Colds At the heart of the problem is that COVID-19 remains a highly contagious disease. Most studies assign a Reproduction Number, R, of 3-to-4 to the virus. As a point of comparison, the Spanish flu is estimated to have had an R of 1.8. An R of 3.5 would require about 70% of the population to acquire herd immunity to keep the virus at bay.9 As discussed in Box 2, the “true” level of herd immunity may be substantially greater than that. At this point, if you come down with a cough and fever, you should assume you have COVID. As Chart 9 shows, social distancing measures have brought the number of viral respiratory illnesses down to almost zero in the United States. Up to 30% of common cold cases stem from the coronavirus family. Just like it would be foolhardy to assume that the common cold has been banished from the face of the earth, it would be unwise to assume that COVID will not return if containment measures are quickly lifted.   Downside Risk: Permanent Economic Damage Chart 10No Spike In Bankruptcies For Now There are a lot of asymmetries in economics: It is easier to lose a job than to find one; starting a new business is also more difficult than going bankrupt.  The good news so far is that bankruptcies have been limited and most unemployed workers have not been permanently laid off (Chart 10 and Chart 11). Thus, for the most part, the links that bind firms to workers have not been severed.   Chart 11Temporary Layoffs Account For Most Of The Recent Increase In Unemployment   Unfortunately, there is a risk that the economy will suffer permanent damage if unemployment remains high and economic activity stays depressed. For some sectors, such as airlines, long-term damage is nearly assured. It took a decade for real household spending on airlines to return to pre 9/11 levels (Chart 12). It could take even longer for the physiological scars of the pandemic to fade. While businesses outside the travel and hospitality sectors will see a quicker rebound, they could still experience subdued demand for as long as social distancing measures persist. Chart 129/11 Was A Big Shock For US Air Travel There is not much that fiscal policy can do to reverse the immediate hit to GDP from the pandemic. If people cannot work, they cannot produce. What fiscal stimulus can do is push enough money into the hands of households and firms to enable them to meet their financial obligations, while hopefully creating some pent-up demand that can be unleashed when businesses reopen. For now and for the foreseeable future, there is no need to tighten fiscal policy. The private sector in the major economies is generating plenty of savings with which governments can finance budget deficits. Indeed, standard economic theory suggests that if governments tried to “save more” by reducing budget deficits, total national savings would actually decline.10   Nevertheless, just as fiscal policy was prematurely tightened in many countries following the Great Recession, there is a risk that austerity measures will be reintroduced too quickly again. Likewise, calls to tighten monetary policy could grow louder. Just this week, Germany’s constitutional court ruled that the EU Court of Justice had overstepped its powers by failing to require the ECB to conduct an assessment of the “proportionality” of its controversial asset purchase policy. The German high court ordered the Bundesbank to suspend QE in three months unless the ECB Governing Council provides “documentation” showing it meets the criteria of proportionality. Among other things, the ruling could undermine the ECB’s newly launched €750 billion Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP). Downside Risk: Geopolitical Tensions Had the virus originated anywhere else but China, President Trump could have made a political case for further deescalating the Sino-US trade war in an effort to shore up the US economy and stock market. Not only did that not happen, but the likelihood of a new clash between China and the US has gone up dramatically. Antipathy towards China is rising (Chart 13). As our geopolitical team has stressed, the US election is likely to be fought on who can sound tougher on China. With the economy on the ropes, Trump will try to paint Joe Biden as too passive and conflicted to stand up to China. Indeed, running as a “war president” may be Trump’s only chance of getting re-elected. Chart 13US Nationalism Is On The Rise Amid Broad-Based Anti-China Sentiment At the domestic political level, the pandemic has exacerbated already glaringly wide inequalities. While well-paid white-collar workers have been able to work from the comfort of their own homes, poorer blue-collar workers have either been furloughed or asked to continue working in a dangerous environment (in nursing homes or meat-packing plants, for example). It is not clear what the blowback from all this will be, but it is unlikely to be benign. Investment Implications Global equities and credit spreads have tracked the frequency of Google search queries for “coronavirus” remarkably well (Chart 14). As coronavirus queries rose, stocks plunged; as the number of queries subsided, stocks rallied. If there is a second wave of infections, anxiety about the virus is likely to grow again, leading to another sell-off in risk assets. Chart 14Joined At The Hip Chart 15Negative Earnings Revisions Will Weigh On Stocks In The Near Term   Earnings estimates have come down, but are still above where we think they ought to be. This makes global equities vulnerable to a correction (Chart 15). Meanwhile, retail investors have been active buyers, eagerly gobblingup stocks such as American Airlines and Norwegian Cruise Lines that have fallen on hard times recently (Chart 16). They have also been active buyers of the USO oil ETF, which is down 80% year-to-date. When retail investors are trying to catch a falling knife, that is usually an indication that stocks have yet to reach a bottom. As such, we recommend that investors maintain a somewhat cautious stance on the near-term direction of stocks. Chart 16Retail Investors Keen To Buy The Dip   Chart 17Favor Equities Over Bonds Over A 12-Month Horizon   Chart 18USD Is A Countercyclical Currency Looking further out, the spread between earnings yields and bond yields is wide enough to justify a modest overweight to stocks on a 12-month horizon (Chart 17). If global growth does end up rebounding, cyclicals should outperform defensives. As a countercyclical currency, the dollar will probably weaken (Chart 18). A weaker greenback, in turn, will boost commodity prices (Chart 19). Historically, stronger global growth and a softer dollar have translated into outperformance of non-US stocks relative to their US peers (Chart 20). Thus, investors should prepare to add international equity exposure to their portfolios later this year.   Chart 19Commodity Prices Usually Rise When The Dollar Weakens Chart 20Non-US Equities Tend To Outperform Their US Peers When Global Growth Is Improving And The Dollar Is Weakening   Box 1The Dynamics Of R Box 2Why Herd Immunity Is Not Enough Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1  Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Still Stuck In The Tree,” dated April 16, 2020. 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Testing Times,” dated April 9, 2020. 3 Philip Anfinrud, Valentyn Stadnytskyi, et al., “Visualizing Speech-Generated Oral Fluid Droplets with Laser Light Scattering,” nejm.org (April 15, 2020); Jeremy Howard, Austin Huang, Li Zhiyuan, Zeynep Tufekci, Vladmir Zdimal, Helene-mari van der Westhuizen, et al., “Face Masks Against COVID-19: An Evidence Review,” Preprints.org, (April 12, 2020); and Liang Tian, Xuefei Li, Fei Qi, Qian-Yuan Tang, Viola Tang, Jiang Liu, Zhiyuan Li, Xingye Cheng, Xuanxuan Li, Yingchen Shi, Haiguang Liu, and Lei-Han Tang, “Calibrated Intervention and Containment of the COVID-19 Pandemic,” arxiv.org (April 2, 2020). 4 “COVID-19 – Research Evidence Summaries,” Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health; and Alison Boast, Alasdair Munro, and Henry Goldstein, “An evidence summary of Paediatric COVID-19 literature,” Don’t Forget The Bubbles (2020). 5 Hiroshi Nishiura, Hitoshi Oshitani, Tetsuro Kobayashi, Tomoya Saito, Tomimasa Sunagawa, Tamano Matsui, Takaji Wakita, MHLW COVID-19 Response Team, and Motoi Suzuki, “Closed environments facilitate secondary transmission of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19),” medRxiv (April 16, 2020). 6 “Coronavirus: Arrests as California beachgoers defy lockdown,” Skynews (April 26, 2020); and “High-risk sex offender rearrested days after controversial release from OC Jail,” abc7.com (May 1, 2020). 7 Sun Hee Lee, Hyunjin Son, and Kyong Ran Peck, “Can post-exposure prophylaxis for COVID-19 be considered as an outbreak response strategy in long-term care hospitals?” International Journal of Antimicrobial Agents (April 25, 2020). 8 Brendan Borrell, “New York clinical trial quietly tests heartburn remedy against coronavirus,” Science (April 26, 2020). 9 In the simplest models, the herd immunity threshold is reached when P = 1-1/Ro, where P is the proportion of the population which has acquired immunity and Ro is the basic reproductive number. Assuming an Ro of 3.5, heard immunity will be achieved once more than 71.4% of the population has been infected (1-1/3.5). For further discussion on this, please refer to Global Investment Strategy, “Second Quarter 2020 Strategy Outlook: World War V,” dated March 27, 2020. 10 It is easiest to understand this point by considering a closed economy where savings, by definition, equals investment. Savings is the sum of private and public savings. Suppose the economy is depressed and the government increases public savings by either raising taxes or cutting spending. Since this action will further depress the economy, private investment will fall even more. But, since investment must equal total savings, private savings must decline more than proportionately with any increase in public savings. This happens because tighter fiscal policy leads to lower GDP. It is difficult to save if one does not have a job. To the extent that lower GDP reduces employment, it also tends to reduce private-sector savings. Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Current MacroQuant Model Scores

Highlights Portfolio Strategy An easy Fed as far as the eye can see and World War-like fiscal easing packages as the Trump administration prepares to slowly reopen the economy, signal that the path of least resistance remains higher for the S&P 500 in the coming 9-12 months. Relative indebtedness and profit margin improvements, extremely oversold technicals and significant relative undervaluation along with an encouraging message from financial market indicators, all suggest that it no longer pays to have a large cap bias. Book gains and step aside. Recent Changes Our long S&P 500/short S&P 600 position was stopped out last Tuesday for a 37% gain since inception.1 Last Wednesday our rolling stop was also triggered on the overweight in the S&P managed health care index – it is now neutral – for a gain of 26% since inception.2 Table 1 Feature The SPX made a run for the technically important 200-day moving average last week, and managed to climb to fresh recovery highs before giving back those gains as profit taking intensified late in the week. Three key drivers underpinned stocks and dominated the newsflow: First, resurfacing of positive news on remdesivir, a GILD drug, in treating the novel coronavirus. Second, the Fed reiterating its commitment to ZIRP and QE5 (Chart 1). And third, the quintuplet tech titans (MSFT, AAPL, GOOGL, AMZN & FB) reporting solid profits and April guidance, thus alleviating investors’ fears of a complete breakdown in tech revenues and EPS. Chart 1Easy Central Bank Monetary Policy Stance… Tack on the World War-like fiscal easing packages (Chart 2) and the path of least resistance remains higher for the S&P 500 in the coming 9-12 months. Chart 2…And An Easier Fiscal Policy Setting Are A Boon For Stocks Granted all of these monies are finding their way into the markets not only via higher asset prices, but also – and most crucially – the Fed’s massive liquidity injection is suppressing volatility. First, Fed actions have crushed the bond market’s vol, as depicted by Bank Of America’s MOVE index, that has now crumbled to a level last seen prior to the equity market drubbing. Similarly, the Fed has also quashed the VIX index which is now hovering near 35, down from a peak of 85 last month. Importantly, volatility petered out prior to the equity market’s trough, and so did different volatility curves (volatilities and volatility curve shown inverted, Chart 3). Turning over to S&P 500 net earnings revisions (NER), this mean reverting series was first tracked by I/B/E/S in 1985, and two weeks ago collapsed to the nadir of the GFC (Chart 4). Every time the NER ratio has hit such depressed levels, stocks have subsequently staged a powerful comeback. This has occurred five distinct times in the past 35 years and the SPX was 15% higher on average in the following twelve months (Chart 4). Chart 3Vols Lead On The Way Up And Down   Chart 4Extremely Depressed Net Earnings Revisions Have Troughed Drilling deeper beneath the surface is revealing. Analysts have been indiscriminately downgrading profits across all sectors. True, last week’s update revealed a tick up, which is an encouraging sign that the avalanche of downgrades may have already hit a climax (Charts 5 &  6). Chart 5Too Much Pessimism… Chart 6…Across The Board Importantly, our in-house calculated SPX sector EPS breadth is probing all-time lows. But, if the Fed manages to devalue the US dollar then a sharp reversal will ensue. Keep in mind, that the greenback and our EPS breadth indicator are inversely correlated as 40% of SPX sales are sourced internationally (Chart 7). Chart 7As Bad As It Gets Finally, a few words on the character of the equity market’s advance since the March 23 lows are in order. Contrary to popular belief, this has been an extremely broad based rally and the stocks that have done the best are not the large/mega caps. Instead the median stock has far outpaced the top market cap ranked constituents. In other words, the stocks that have rebounded the most are the ones that had fallen the most. Using Bloomberg data on SPX constituents from the March 23 lows until April 28, the first mega cap company that makes it to the top return ranks is CVX at the 22nd spot. UNH is 85th, ABT 90th and XOM 132nd. The tech titans start appearing below the 350th mark with MSFT 353rd, AAPL 362nd, FB 370th, AMZN 394th and GOOGL 439th. In other words, both the Value Line Arithmetic and Geometric indexes have been outperforming the SPX since the March 23 lows (top & middle panels, Chart 8). Similarly, small caps have also been besting the SPX (bottom panel, Chart 8). Notably, all three of these hypersensitive indexes have also led the SPX bottom. This week, we update our size view that was stopped out last Tuesday as the rolling stop was triggered for a gain of 37% since inception, and do some housekeeping. Chart 8Broad Based Rally Lock In Profits In the Size Bias And Move To The Sidelines In the spring of 2018 we initiated a size preference of large caps at the expense of small caps. At the time, we went against the grain as the investment community was arguing that small caps would offer the best protection from President’s Trump trade hawkishness. Their reasoning was that small caps are domestically oriented and would benefit from a rising dollar given low export exposure. While we were slightly offside for a quarter, this size preference recouped all the losses by October 2018, and never looked back since then. Our thesis was predicated upon relative indebtedness, relative profitability and relative profit margin outlook, all of which were in favor of large caps. Earlier this year when markets were convulsing we instituted a risk management metric with a rolling 10% stop on this size preference in order to protect profits for our portfolio.3 This past Tuesday our 10% rolling stop was triggered and we are obeying this stop, monetizing 37% gains since inception and we are moving to the sidelines on the size bias (Chart 9). Chart 9Take Profits And Move To The Sidelines Following a near collapse to two standard deviations below the six year mean, small cap performance has returned to the mean and is primed to sustain this reflex rebound. In marked contrast, large caps only corrected to their six year average and are now trading at over one standard deviation above that mean (Chart 10). When the economy was shut down small and medium businesses were clearly the outfits that would hurt the most. Their only rescue came belated in the form of the fiscal package. Thus, investors started pricing in a steep default cycle with SMEs at the forefront of the bankruptcy curve (top panel, Chart 10). In contrast, large caps with access to untapped credit lines, the bond and equity markets as well as their own cash coffers would not suffer as severely (second panel, Chart 10). Chart 10Large Cap Outperformance Reached An Extreme Now that the economy is on the verge of slowly reopening, we do not want to overstay our welcome and refrain from betting on a further jump in the large/small ratio; instead we opt to book profits and move to the sidelines. With regard to profit fundamentals, our relative jobs proxy has peaked and is no longer favoring large caps (second panel, Chart 11). Similarly, profit margins have likely bottomed for small caps while they have maxed out for large caps (third panel, Chart 11). On the relative indebtedness front, small cap net debt-to-EBITDA remains sky high but it has crested which is at the margin positive (bottom panel, Chart 11). Meanwhile, as the Fed has opened up the liquidity spigots, the government is as spendthrift as it can be and committed to slowly reopen the economy, then at some point in the summer the pendulum will swing the opposite way and some semblance of normality will return to the US economy. Therefore, this inflection point will end the threat of deflation and likely serve as a catalyst for a small/large multiple expansion phase (Chart 12). Chart 11Marginal Small Cap Improvements Chart 12When The Economy Turns, So Will Small Caps With regard to the message that financial market variables are sending for the small/large ratio, the collapse of the VIX is a welcome development (VIX shown inverted, Chart 13). Similarly, the yield curve has been in steepening mode again emitting a positive “risk on” signal. Under such a backdrop and given depressed technicals and bombed out valuations it is prudent not to wager against small caps at this juncture (Chart 14). Chart 13Leading Financial Market Indicators Say Do Not Overstay Your Welcome Chart 14Unloved And Undervalued Netting it all out, relative indebtedness and profit margin improvements, the slow reopening of the economy in the coming months, extremely oversold technicals and significant relative undervaluation along with an encouraging message from financial market indicators, all signal that it no longer pays to have a large cap bias. Bottom Line: Move to the sidelines on the size bias and crystalize profits of 37% since inception. Housekeeping Last Wednesday our rolling stop was also triggered on the overweight in the S&P managed health care index – it is now neutral – for a gain of 26% since inception (top panel, Chart 15).4 In addition, we are stepping aside from the COVID-proof basket of stocks we recommended six weeks ago.5 The coronavirus unintended consequences will alter government, business and consumer behaviors and it will most definitely affect consumer tastes, underscoring that the companies that comprise our COVID profit basket will likely be long-term winners. However, this basket has served its purpose and given that the global economy is on the verge of reopening it will be increasingly difficult to outperform the broad market. Thus, we are moving to the sidelines for a modest relative gain of 0.8% (second & third panels, Chart 15). Finally, our freshly minted market-neutral and intra-commodity long S&P oil & gas exploration & production/short global gold miners pair trade has gone parabolic right out of the gate soaring to 20% in a mere week. As a result of this explosive up-move, we are instituting a 10% rolling stop in this pair trade in order to protect profits for our portfolio (bottom panel, Chart 15). Chart 15Housekeeping     Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1    Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Daily Report, “Book Gains In Preferring Large Caps To Small Caps” dated April 30, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2    Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Daily Report, “Take Profits In HMOs And Move To The Sidelines” dated May 1, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3    Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Daily Report, “Closing Out All High-Conviction Calls” dated March 20, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4    Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Daily Report, “Take Profits In HMOs And Move To The Sidelines” dated May 1, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 5    Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Daily Report, “Corona Virus Proof Portfolio” dated March 18, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. Current Recommendations Current Trades Strategic (10-Year) Trade Recommendations Size And Style Views June 3, 2019 Stay neutral cyclicals over defensives (downgrade alert)  January 22, 2018 Favor value over growth April 28, 2020  Stay neutral large over small caps  June 11, 2018 Long the BCA Millennial basket  The ticker symbols are: (AAPL, AMZN, UBER, HD, LEN, MSFT, NFLX, SPOT, TSLA, V).

Highlights The air is thick with denunciations of the Fed’s new round of aggressive interventions … : In financial circles, it’s beginning to sound like the winter of 2008-9 all over again, as respected thought leaders with enviable track records decry bailouts. … but we are firmly resolved to keep judgments about what central banks ought to do out of our analysis of the market impacts of their actions: “Dogmatic” is about the worst thing one BCA researcher can call another. The Fed’s expanded lending remit may simply be the logical evolution of the Debt Supercycle: The Debt Supercycle may have reached its natural limit, but policy makers won’t surrender such a cherished tool without a fight. Capitalism isn’t entirely dead, and the Fed isn’t the Coast Guard or the Forest Service: The new approach is meant to protect society, not individuals who get themselves into idiosyncratic trouble. Feature We will be holding a webcast next Monday, May 11th at 10:00 a.m. Eastern time in lieu of publishing a Weekly Report. Please join us with your questions to make it a fully interactive event. We will resume our regular publication schedule on the 18th. Here we go again. A potentially catastrophic recession has arrived, and the Fed has embarked on a series of unprecedented actions to try to shield the economy from it. Its goal is to stave off hysteresis, whereby a cyclical downturn, left unchecked, gives rise to a structural albatross that weighs on long-run growth. Just how much a central bank ought to interpose itself between the economy and its participants can be a matter of fierce debate, as it was in November 2010, when 23 members of the broader economic community, including three elite investors and a handful of respected economists, signed an open letter to Ben Bernanke, urging him to abandon QE2 (Box 1). Box 1 A Central Bank Can’t Win Open Letter to Ben Bernanke November 15, 2010 We believe the Federal Reserve’s large-scale asset purchase plan (so-called “quantitative easing”) should be reconsidered and discontinued. We do not believe such a plan is necessary or advisable under current circumstances. The planned asset purchases risk currency debasement and inflation, and we do not think they will achieve the Fed’s objective of promoting employment. We subscribe to your statement in the Washington Post on November 4 that “the Federal Reserve cannot solve all the economy’s problems on its own.” In this case, we think improvements in tax, spending and regulatory policies must take precedence in a national growth program, not further monetary stimulus. We disagree with the view that inflation needs to be pushed higher, and worry that another round of asset purchases, with interest rates still near zero over a year into the recovery, will distort financial markets and greatly complicate future Fed efforts to normalize monetary policy. The Fed’s purchase program has also met broad opposition from other central banks and we share their concerns that quantitative easing by the Fed is neither warranted nor helpful in addressing either US or global economic problems.1 Dire forecasts about the effects of the Fed's unconven-tional GFC interventions have not come to pass and have since been emulated by other major central banks. No one bats a thousand when predicting the future, but the authors of the letter could not have been further off the mark when they warned about currency debasement and inflation. Monetary policy has not yet been normalized in the way anyone would have defined it at the time, but other central banks have overcome their aversion to QE, pursuing it as avidly as the Fed (Chart 1). One should also note that some of the author-investors were not disinterested observers. QE signaled an extended period of easy monetary conditions that was likely to narrow distinctions among individual companies, undermining stock-picking processes that had produced outperformance against a conventional monetary policy backdrop. Chart 1What Was Once Unthinkable Has Become Routine Moral Hazard Inflation and the dollar are well down the list in the latest round of denunciations, which are principally occupied with moral hazard. In his outlook last week, Guggenheim Investments’ CIO Scott Minerd warned that the Fed’s purchases of corporate debt establish a new precedent that will have a persistent half-life, if QE is any guide. By socializing credit risk, he asserts, the purchases mark the end of US free-market capitalism as we have always known it. Two weeks before, Howard Marks argued that capitalist principles are being undermined by the Fed’s programs, if not entirely overthrown: Most of us believe in the free-market system as the best allocator of resources. Now it seems the government is happy to step in and take the place of private actors. We have a buyer and lender of last resort, cushioning pain but taking over the role of the free market. When people get the feeling that the government will protect them from unpleasant financial consequences of their actions, it’s called “moral hazard.” There’s an old saying … to the effect that “capitalism without bankruptcy is like Catholicism without hell.” It appeals to me strongly. Markets work best when participants have a healthy fear of loss. It shouldn’t be the role of the Fed or the government to eradicate it. We have never been enamored of the concept of the Fed put because we don’t think it is terribly relevant for any individual investment decision maker, and relying on it could be hazardous to one’s health. First, the Fed put is absolutely not an at-the-money put, or even a put with a strike price that is only slightly out of the money. It doesn’t do an investor much good if the Fed doesn’t ride to the rescue until his/her position is 30% underwater. Second, the Fed doesn’t care if any individual entity fails. It only acts to protect the overall financial system and the broad economy. An individual entity that gets into trouble cannot count on the Fed to throw it a lifeline. The Fed is not the Coast Guard or the Forest Service, which will go to great lengths to rescue a foolhardy or unskilled pilot or hiker who gets in over his or her head in rough weather. It cares only about the collective, and the only way an individual entity can count on receiving aid is if everyone else runs into trouble at the same time. That collective insurance policy may promote some operational risk-taking at the margin, but we wouldn’t want to rely on it. How could an overleveraged company possibly know that a critical mass of other companies will get into trouble at the same time? The Fed put doesn’t apply to the first entity to fail, or to entities in industries that are not seen as critical. It could surely encourage investors to lend to entities of dubious quality, but timing is everything there, too. The less-than-pristine borrower will have to hold on long enough to be somewhere in the middle of the pack of failing entities to qualify for a life preserver. The Trouble With The Austrians We lean to the view that moral hazard, as promoted by Fed policies, is largely in the eye of the beholder. The ability to perceive moral hazard seems to be related to one’s propensity for moral indignation. Austrian School devotees (Box 2) regularly have that propensity in spades. Box 2 An Austrian’s Lonely Lot The Austrian School of Economics most saliently parts company with neoclassical economics in its adamant opposition to government intervention and its fraught relationship with credit. Instead of intervening to counter business cycles, Austrians would prefer to let busts run their course so as to cleanse the economy of the excesses embedded in booms. They occupy the Mellonian, purge-the-rottenness-out-of-the-system end of the continuum in opposition to the Debt Supercycle’s unconditional forgiveness. Austrians regard banking and credit with some measure of suspicion, as Austrian Business Cycle Theory holds that artificially low interest rates are the raw material of destabilizing booms. Encouraged by central bankers seeking to steer an economy out of recession with a bare minimum of discomfort, borrowers take on debt to invest in projects that may not be able to pay their own way were it not for intervention. Once rates rise after policy accommodation fades, the economy slows and the extent of the malinvestment is revealed. The Debt Supercycle prescribes more of the hair of the dog to alleviate the suffering from malinvestment. The debt overhang is thereby never eliminated; it instead continues to silt up, requiring larger and larger interventions. Unchecked, the degree of intervention required to keep the plates spinning will eventually exceed capacity. Austrians despise the existence of such an arrangement, but it is so thoroughly entrenched in the reigning orthodoxy that an investor who becomes emotionally invested in opposing it is at risk of serially tilting at windmills. There is nothing wrong with the Austrian School per se. We rather like its outsider status, and actively seek heterodox inputs and perspectives so as to stay out of the ruts of the well-worn consensus path. Even its pessimistic bent has its uses; investors are surely exposed to enough cheerleading. Its prescriptions are so bracing, however, that a little goes a long way and real-world users should handle them with care. A popular pair of You Tube videos of actors portraying Keynes and Hayek dueling via raps about their respective ideologies (Keynes: I want to steer markets/Hayek: I want them set free!) provide an entertaining example of the Austrian-inspired investor’s dilemma. Keynes, drink after drink in hand, is the exuberant life of the party, while the sallow Hayek stares into the bottom of his glass, unable to capture any other partygoers’ attention. The simple conceit animating the video – Keynesianism is fun; Austrians are dour scolds – resonates deeply with elected officials, even if they never studied Economics. Voters love free drinks, but hate being told to eat their vegetables. There are no atheists in foxholes, and there are no Austrians in crises. When push comes to shove, government officials will do what they can to alleviate economic pain. The Austrian School, therefore, is a poor guide to the path that policy is likely to take. It also has the problematic effect of introducing an element of moral judgment into what should be a purely objective sphere. Investors should maintain a laser-like focus on what is most likely to happen and strive to suppress extraneous notions about what should happen. The Debt Supercycle’s Second Act Chart 3The End Of An Era? Call us jaded, but after 20-plus years in the business, the Austrians, with their fusty rectitude and gold-standard nostalgia, have come to seem like utopians. We prefer to borrow a page from public choice theory, and assume that elected and appointed officials respond to incentives just as surely as individuals outside of government. Legislators will pull fiscal levers to keep the party going and extend their own tenures, while the Fed will do its utmost to preserve its discretion to steer the economy as it sees fit. From that perspective, the Fed’s pull-out-all-the-stops approach to protecting markets and the economy simply looks like a logical evolution of the Debt Supercycle (Box 3). Now that a decade of zero and near-zero rates has failed to stimulate private sector borrowing (Chart 3), our colleague Martin Barnes has written that the Debt Supercycle is played out. Changing consumer preferences (Chart 4) and regulatory measures reining in banks’ lending capacity have impeded the credit channel, sharply degrading the Fed’s conventional policy arsenal. Central bankers want to remain in the thick of the action as much as any other bureaucrats, and it follows that the Fed has expanded its remit with unconventional measures that maintain its relevance. Chart 4Consumer Preferences Have Changed Since The GFC Box 3 The Debt Supercycle Longtime BCA clients are familiar with the Debt Supercycle concept, which holds that postwar Fed stimulus provoked successive waves of household and corporate borrowing to reflate the economy following recessions. Managing the economy with countercyclical fiscal and monetary policy has helped make recessions less frequent and less severe than they had been under the laissez faire prewar approach (Chart 2). Chart 2Intervention Has Helped Tame Cyclical Oscillations The only rub was that serial interventions to promote a quickening in the flow of new credit left the economy with an ever-increasing stock of debt. The prewar recessions were vicious, but bank and business failures allowed for frequent balance sheet resets that purged the economy of its boom excesses. The Debt Supercycle effectively sacrificed modest increments of structural stability for cyclical stability. Structural instability rose in step with the stock of debt, driving up the potential long-run cost of cyclical slumps, making the preservation of the Debt Supercycle increasingly imperative. Investment Implications We do not think investors should adjust to the new central banking orthodoxy by loading their portfolios with risk to embrace the Fed put. That put only applies to markets collectively, and cannot be seen as insurance for any single economic entity or asset portfolio. It would also be a mistake to renounce risk, however, by refusing to participate in a rigged game that violates Austrian principles. Investors should simply recognize that the new monetary orthodoxy calls for central banks to throw the kitchen sink at major economic threats. That suggests that shorts or underweights in risk assets based on macro vulnerabilities should be covered or closed without delay once a preset downside target has been reached. It seems that investors had 2009 in mind when they dove back into risk assets upon the Fed’s March 23rd announcement of its mix of revised and brand-new lending facilities and the March 27th passage of the CARES Act.2 No one wants to miss a big policy-induced bounce. Buy what the Fed is buying, and don't stress over it. Investors should buy what the Fed’s buying while its purchase programs and lending facilities are operating. That subset includes agency CMBS, AAA-rated CMBS, AAA-rated ABS, investment grade corporate debt and newly fallen angels in the BB-rated tier. Though they’ve already had a hearty bounce, agency mortgage REITs offer an equity vehicle for playing the Fed-purchase theme, as do the SIFI banks, which are the biggest indirect beneficiary of reduced default rates. We expect Guggenheim’s admonition that the Fed’s support of corporate borrowers will have a long half-life will prove to be accurate. As our Chief Global Fixed Income strategist put it at last week’s meeting to review long-term virus impacts, “Everyone on this call may be retired before a central banker ever utters the word ‘taper’ again.” That may not be the backdrop this free-markets devotee would choose, but it’s the backdrop all of us will have for the foreseeable future, and we’re determined to make the most of it.   Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1https://www.hoover.org/research/open-letter-ben-bernanke. Accessed April 28, 2020. 2 Please see the April 14, 2020 US Investment Strategy/US Bond Strategy Special Report, "Alphabet Soup: A Summary of the Fed’s Anti-Virus Measures," available at www.bcaresearch.com.

Special Report

Highlights Our COVID Unrest Index reveals that Turkey, the Philippines, Brazil, and South Africa are the major emerging markets most at risk of significant social unrest. China, Russia, Thailand, and Malaysia are the least at risk – in the short run. Stay tactically overweight developed market equities relative to emerging markets. Go tactically short a basket of “EM Strongmen” currencies relative to the EM currency benchmark. Short the rand as well. Feature Chart 1Stimulus-Fueled Markets Ignore Reality With global fiscal stimulus now estimated at 7% of GDP, and central banks in full debt monetization mode, the S&P 500 is at 2940 and rallying toward 3000. It is not only largely ignoring the global pandemic and recession. It is as if the trade war never occurred, China is not shrinking, and WTI crude oil prices have never gone negative (Chart 1). In recent reports we have argued that “geopolitics is the next shoe to drop” – specifically that President Trump’s electoral challenges and the vulnerability of America’s enemies make for a volatile combination. But there are also more mundane geopolitical consequences of the recession that asset allocators must worry about. Such as government change and regime failure. COVID-19 and government lockdowns have exacted a heavy economic toll on households and political systems now face heightened risk of unrest. In many cases emerging market countries were already vulnerable, having witnessed outbreaks of civil unrest in 2019. Fear of contracting the virus, plus various isolation measures, will tend to suppress street movements in the near term. This year’s “May Day” protests will be minor compared to what we will see in coming years. But significant unrest will sprout as the containment measures are relaxed and yet economic problems linger. And bear in mind that the biggest bouts of unrest in the wake of the 2008 crisis did not occur until 2011-13. In this report we introduce our “COVID Unrest Index” for emerging economies, which shows that Turkey, the Philippines, Brazil, and South Africa face substantial unrest that can trigger or follow upon market riots. Introducing The COVID Unrest Index At any point in time, social and political instability depends on economic conditions such as unemployment and inflation, structural problems such as inequality, and governance issues such as corruption. In the post-COVID recessionary environment, additional factors such as health care capacity also carry weight. To identify markets that are most likely to face unrest, we created a COVID Unrest Index (Table 1). The overall ranking is determined by five factors: Table 1Our COVID-19 Social Unrest Index Initial Economic Conditions: A proxy for economic policy’s ability to respond to the crisis. This factor includes the fiscal balance and sovereign debt – which determine "fiscal space" – as well as the current account balance, public foreign currency debt as a percent of GDP, foreign debt obligations as a percent of exports, and foreign funding requirements as a percent of foreign currency reserves. Health Capacity And Vulnerability: A proxy for both a population’s vulnerability to COVID and its health care capabilities. Vulnerability to the pandemic is captured by COVID-19 deaths per million, share of the population over the age of 65, and likelihood of dying from an infectious disease. Health infrastructure is measured by life expectancy at age 60 and health expenditure per capita. Economic Vulnerability To Pandemic: A proxy for the magnitude of the COVID-specific shock to the individual economy. This factor takes into account a country’s dependence on revenue from tourism and its dependence on inflows from remittances. Household Grievances: A proxy for economic hardship faced by households, captured by the GINI index, which measures income inequality, and the “misery index,” which consists of the sum of inflation and unemployment. Governance: A proxy the captures the quality of governance from the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators – specifically the ability to participate in selecting government, likelihood of political instability or politically-motivated violence, and perceptions of corruption. The country ranking for the COVID Unrest Index is constructed by first standardizing the variables, then transforming them such that higher readings are associated with more favorable conditions. Finally, the five factors are averaged for each country to produce individual scores. Turkey: A Shambles On Europe’s Doorstep Turkey is the most likely to face mass discontent in the near future. It has all the ingredients for unrest: poor standing across all factors and the weakest governance score. From an economic standpoint, its foreign currency reserves are critically low while its foreign debt obligations are relatively elevated (Chart 2). This spells trouble for the lira, which will only further add to the grievances of households already burdened by a high misery index. Chart 2AEmerging Markets Face Debt Troubles Even With The Fed’s Help Chart 2BEmerging Markets Face Debt Troubles Even With The Fed’s Help President Erdogan has rejected suggestions of aid from the IMF. Fearing a revival of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), especially in the wake of his party’s losses in the 2019 municipal elections, he has banned cities that are run by the CHP from raising funds toward virus response efforts. This right is reserved only for cities run by his Justice and Development Party (AKP). Given that Erdogan does not face reelection until 2023, the move to suppress the opposition reflects general weakness and portends a long period of suppression and political conflict. Erdogan’s handling of the outbreak has also seen its share of failures. While he has opted for only a partial lockdown, a 48-hour full lockdown was announced on April 10 only hours in advance, resulting in crowds of people rushing to purchase necessities. Interior minister Suleyman Soylu tried to resign, but was prevented by Erdogan, breeding speculation about Soylu’s motives. Soylu may have sought to distance himself from the president’s handling of the crisis to preserve his image as a potential successor to the president, rivaling Erdogan’s son-in-law, Finance Minister Berat Albayrak. The point is that Erdogan is already facing greater political competition. Former ally and minister of foreign affairs and economy Ali Babacan recently launched a new party, the Democracy and Progress Party (DEVA). He has criticized the government’s stimulus package and decision to hold back on requesting IMF aid. Erdogan is also challenged by his former prime minister Ahmet Davutoglu, who broke away from the AKP to form his own Future Party late last year. The obvious risk to Erdogan is that these opposition groups create a viable political alternative that voters can flock to – and they could form a united front amid national economic collapse. Brazil and South Africa have large twin deficits. Erdogan’s response, repeatedly, has been to harden his stance and double down on populist and unorthodox policies. These have not helped his popular standing, as we have chronicled over the past several years. At home his policies are generating excessive money supply and a large budget deficit (Chart 3). Abroad he has gotten the military more deeply involved in Syria, Libya, and maritime conflicts. The result is stagflation with the potential for negative political surprises both at home and abroad. Chart 3Twin Deficits Flash Red For Emerging Markets Chart 4Turkish Political Risk Has Room To Rise Our GeoRisk Indicator for Turkey shows that risks are rising as the lira falls relative to its underlying economic fundamentals (Chart 4). But it will fall further from here. Positive signs would be accepting IMF aid, cutting off the foreign adventures, selling off government assets, and restoring fiscal and monetary orthodoxy. But it is just as likely that Erdogan resorts to even more desperate moves, including a greater confrontation with Greece and Europe by encouraging more refugee flow-through into Europe. Erdogan has always been more popular than his Justice and Development Party, but after ruling since 2003, and now facing a nationwide crisis, his rule is increasingly in jeopardy. His scramble to survive the election in 2023 will be all the more dangerous to governance. Bottom Line: We booked gains on our short lira trade earlier this year but the fundamental case for the short remains intact, so we include it in our short “EM Strongmen” currency basket discussed at the end of this report. The Philippines: Yes, Governance Matters The Philippines is next at risk of instability. It is particularly vulnerable to a pandemic recession due to its dependence on remittance inflows and tourism for foreign currency (Chart 5) as well as its poor health infrastructure (Chart 6). While it is not in a vulnerable position in terms of foreign currency obligations, its double deficit (see Chart 3) means that significant stimulus will come at the expense of the currency. Chart 5Pandemics Hurt Tourism, Recessions Hurt Remittances Chart 6AEmerging Markets Face COVID-19 Without Developed Market Health Systems Chart 6BEmerging Markets Face COVID-19 Without Developed Market Health Systems President Rodrigo Duterte remains extremely popular even though the Philippines is suffering one of the worst outbreaks in Asia. Socioeconomic Planning Secretary Ernesto Pernia has resigned from his post due to disagreement over containment measures. Pernia’s vision of a partial lockdown contrasted with Duterte’s militarized containment approach – which includes the granting of extraordinary emergency powers.1 Meanwhile the lockdowns imposed on the capital and southern Luzon provinces will remain in place until at least May 15 after which Duterte indicated it will be gradually lifted. While Duterte will in all likelihood remain in power until the end of his term in 2022, he is using his popularity to secure a preferred successor. He is less capable of getting through a constitutional amendment that extends presidential term limits – he has the votes in Congress, but a popular referendum is not a sure bet given the economic crisis. He is widely believed to be grooming his daughter Sara or former aide Senator Bong Go for the presidential post, with speculation that he may run as vice president on the same ticket. Turkey and the Philippines have poor governance, putting them alongside international rogue states. Any hit to his popularity that upends his succession plan poses existential risks to Duterte as he has racked up many influential enemies and could face criminal charges if an opposing administration succeeds him. This risk will likely induce him to tighten control further in an attempt to maintain order and crack down on dissent. Autocratic moves will weigh on the Philippines’ governance score which is already among the poorest in our pool of emerging countries (Chart 7). Chart 7Governance Matters For Investors Over The Long Run Chart 8Duterte Signaled Top In Philippine Equity Outperformance Does governance matter? Yes, at least in the case of strongmen in regimes with weak institutions. Look at Philippine equities relative to emerging market equities since Duterte first rose onto the scene, prompting us to go short (Chart 8). Duterte obliterated the country’s current account surplus just as we expected and its currency has suffered as a result. For now, the Philippines’ misery index is not yet at a level that strongly implies widespread unrest (Chart 9), but the general context does, especially if constitutional maneuvers backfire. At 4% of GDP, the proposed COVID-19 stimulus package comes on top of the fact that Duterte’s “build, build, build” infrastructure plan already required massive fiscal spending. But the weak currency and higher unemployment will increase the misery index and chip away at the president’s popularity. If the people turn against Duterte, they will remove him in a “people power” movement, as with previous leaders. Chart 9Inequality, Unemployment, And Inflation Are A Deadly Brew The Philippines is also highly vulnerable to the emerging cold war between the US and China. Administrations are now flagrantly aligned with one great power or the other. This means that foreign meddling should be expected. Duterte could get Chinese assistance, which erodes Philippine sovereignty and its security alliance with the United States, or he could eventually suffer from anti-Chinese sentiment, which invites Chinese pressure tactics. Either course will inject a risk premium over the long run. The US is popular in the Philippines, especially with the military, and overt Chinese sponsorship will eventually trigger a backlash. Bottom Line: The lack of legislative or popular constraints on Duterte makes it more likely that he will undertake autocratic moves to stay in power – economic orthodoxy will suffer as a result. The Philippines will also see a sharp increase in policy uncertainty directly as a consequence of the secular rise in US-China tensions in the coming months and years. Brazil: Will Bolsonaro Become A Kamikaze Reformer? Chart 10Bolsonaro’s Handling Of Pandemic Gets Panned In Brazil, President Jair Bolsonaro’s “economy first” approach and dismissal of the pandemic as a “little flu” has not improved his popularity (Chart 10). His approval rating is languishing in the 30% range, lower than all modern presidents save the interim government of Michel Temer in the previous episode of the country’s ongoing national political crisis. The pandemic, and Bolsonaro’s response, have fractured his cabinet and precipitated a new episode in the crisis. The clash between the president and the country’s state governors and national health officials, who enjoy popular support, has led to the dismissal of Health Minister Luiz Henrique Mandetta and the resignation of the popular Justice Minister Sergio Moro. We have highlighted Moro as a linchpin of Bolsonaro’s anti-corruption credibility and hence one of the three pillars of his political capital. This pillar is now cracking, making Bolsonaro’s administration less capable going forward. Bolsonaro’s firing of the head of the federal police, Mauricio Valeixo, the catalyst for Moro’s resignation, has led to a Supreme Court authorization for an investigation into whether Valeixo’s dismissal can be attributed to corruption or obstruction of justice. A guilty verdict could force Congress to take up impeachment, an issue on which Brazilians are split. Earlier this week the president was forced to withdraw the appointment of Alexandre Ramagem – a Bolsonaro family friend – as the new head of the federal police after a minister of the supreme federal court blocked the appointment due to his close personal relationship with the president. Brazil’s structural reform and fiscal discipline are on the backburner given the need for massive emergency spending to shore up GDP growth. Reforms are giving way to the “Pro-Brazil Plan,” which seeks to restore the economy through investments in infrastructure. The absence of the economy minister, Paulo Guedes, from the unveiling of this plan has led to speculation over Guedes’ future. Guedes is the key reformer in Bolsonaro’s cabinet and as important for the administration’s economic credibility as Moro was for its anti-corruption credibility. Brazil’s macro context is egregious. Its large public debt load – mostly denominated in local currency – raises the odds that the central bank will monetize the debt at the expense of the exchange rate, which has already weakened since the beginning of the year. Moreover, Brazil’s ability to pay near term debt service obligations is in a precarious position as the pullback in export revenues will weigh on its ability to service debt (see Chart 2). Our Emerging Markets Strategy estimates that Brazil is spending 16% of GDP on fiscal measures that will push gross public debt-to-GDP ratio well above 100% by the end of 2020 (Chart 11). Chart 11Highly Indebted Emerging Markets Have Limited Fiscal Room For Maneuver Given that Brazil already suffers from a relatively elevated misery index (see Chart 9), these macro challenges will translate into greater pain for Brazilian households and hence a political backlash down the road. The three pillars of Bolsonaro’s political capital have cracked: order, anti-corruption, and structural reform. The hope for investors interested in Brazil now rests on Bolsonaro becoming a kamikaze reformer. That is, after the immediate crisis subsides, his low popularity may force him to try painful structural reforms that no leader with political aspirations would attempt. So far he is taking the populist route of short-term measures to try to stay in power. Chart 12Bolsonaro's Meltdown Portends Melt-Up In Brazilian Political Risk Another sign of worsening governance is that military influence in civilian politics is partially reviving. This element of the country’s recent political turmoil has flown under the radar but will become more prominent if the administration falls apart and the only officials with sufficient credibility to fill the vacuum are military officials such as Vice President Hamilton Mourão. Financial markets may force leaders to make tough decisions to stave off a debt crisis, but risk assets will sell in the meantime as the lid on the country’s political risk has blown off and currency depreciation is the most readiest way to boost nominal GDP growth. Our political risk gauge will continue spiking – this reflects currency weakness relative to fundamentals (Chart 12). Bottom Line: Last fall we argued that Brazil was “just above stall speed” and that we would give the Bolsonaro administration the benefit of the doubt if it maintained three pillars of political capital: civil order, corruption crackdown, and structural reform. All three are collapsing amid the current crisis. As yet there is no sign that Bolsonaro is taking the “kamikaze reform” approach – that may be a positive catalyst but would require his administration to break down further. South Africa: Quantitative Easing Comes To EM South Africa faces an 8%-10% contraction in growth for 2020 and President Cyril Ramaphosa has overseen a large monetary and fiscal stimulus. The South African Reserve Bank has committed to quantitative easing in a bid to boost liquidity in the local financial market. South Africa’s highly leveraged households and those who mostly participate in the formal economy will find relief in lower debt-servicing costs and better access to credit. However, the large informal economy, and the rising number of unemployed, will not reap the same benefit from accommodative measures. This last group will benefit more from fiscal policy measures, such as social grants to low-income households. Ramaphosa recently announced a fiscal spending package totaling R500 billion, or 10% of GDP. Social grants to the poor and unemployed are all set to increase, which should help reduce the economic burden low-income households will face over the short term. The problem is that South Africa is extremely vulnerable to this crisis. Well before COVID the country suffered from low growth, persistently high unemployment, rising debt levels, and an increasing cost of social grants. The pandemic has increased dependency on these grants. South Africa is the most unequal society in the world (Chart 9 above) and runs large twin deficits on its fiscal and current accounts (see Chart 3). As the government’s financing needs rise, its ability to keep providing to low-income households will diminish. Yet the ruling African National Congress (ANC) is required to keep up social payments to stave off discontent and maintain its voter base – which consists of poor, mostly rural voters. The ANC must decide whether to implement stricter austerity measures after the immediate crisis to contain the fiscal fallout, which will bring unrest forward, or continue on an unsustainable path and face a market revolt. The latter option is clear from the decision to embrace quantitative easing, which further undermines the currency. Political pressure is mostly stemming from the left-wing – the Economic Freedom Fighters – which prevents Ramaphosa from taking a hard line on economic and fiscal policy. Bottom Line: There have been isolated protests across the country against the government’s draconian lockdown, and social grievances have the potential to boil over in the coming years given the long rule of the ANC and the country’s dire economic straits. Investment Implications It is too soon to buy into risky emerging market assets at a time when a deep recession is spreading across the world, extreme uncertainty persists over the COVID-19 pandemic, and the political and geopolitical fallout is transparently negative for major emerging markets. Remain overweight developed market equities relative to emerging market equities, at least over a tactical (three-to-six month) time horizon. Emerging market losers are countries with poor macro fundamentals, weak health care systems, specific competitive disadvantages during a global pandemic, high levels of inflation and unemployment, and ineffective social and political institutions. Turkey, the Philippines, and Brazil rank high on our list both because of their problems and because they are major markets. Chart 13Short Our 'EM Strongman' Currency Basket Not coincidentally these countries each have “strongman” leaders who have pursued unorthodox polices and ridden roughshod over institutional checks and balances. In each case, the leader is doubling down on populism while exacerbating structural weaknesses that already existed. Apparently greater financial punishment is necessary before policies are adjusted and buying opportunities emerge. Thus we recommend investors short our “EM Strongman Basket” consisting of the Turkish lira, the Brazilian real, and the Philippine peso, relative to the EM currency benchmark, over a tactical horizon. These currencies outperformed the EM benchmark until 2016 when they began to underperform – a trend that looks to continue (Chart 13). These leaders could get away with a lot more during a global bull market than during a bear market. It will take time for Chinese and global growth to revive this year. And their policies suggest bad news will precede good news. We would also recommend tactically shorting the South African rand on the same basis. While Russia, China, and Thailand also have strongman leaders, their countries have much better fundamentals, as our COVID Unrest Index shows. However, we do not have a bright outlook for these countries’ political stability over the long run. Russia, like all oil producers, stands to suffer in this crisis, despite its positive score on our index. In a previous report, “Drowning In Oil,” we highlighted how the petro-states face serious risks of government change, regime failure, and international conflict. This is clear with Iran and Venezuela in the above charts, and also includes Iraq, Algeria, Angola, and Nigeria. Our preferred emerging markets – from the point of view of political risk as well as macro fundamentals – are Thailand, Malaysia, South Korea, and Mexico. We warn against Taiwan due to geopolitical risk, although its fundamentals are positive. We are generally constructive on India, but it is susceptible to unrest, which we will assess in future reports. Roukaya Ibrahim Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy roukayai@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 On April 16, Duterte ordered quarantine violators be arrested without warning. According to the UN, over one hundred thousand people have been arrested for violating curfew orders. The Philippines along with China, South Africa, Sri Lanka, and El Salvador were singled out by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights are using unnecessary force to enforce the lockdowns and committing human rights violations in the veil of coronavirus restrictions. Duterte’s greenlight on a “shoot to kill” order against those participating in protests in violation of lockdown followed small-scale demonstrations in protest of Duterte’s handling of COVID-19.

Feature Global equities have seen an astonishing rally since mid-March, rising by 28%. This leaves them only 13% below their level at the beginning of the year. This is particularly remarkable given the unprecedented decline in economic activity with, for example, US GDP shrinking by an annualized 4.8% quarter-on-quarter in Q1, and the consensus forecasting it to fall by as much as 30% in Q2. Given this, risk assets are pricing in a highly optimistic trajectory over the coming months: a rapid return to normalcy, a V-shaped economic recovery, and minimal side-effects from the sudden stop to the world economy. In our Q2 Quarterly, we wrote we would turn more cautious if the S&P 500 moved quickly above 2,750.1 With it now at 2910, we are therefore lowering our recommendation on global equities on a 12-month horizon from Overweight to Neutral. The balance of probabilities – and the possibility of a second wave of the pandemic, rising corporate defaults, and problems among EM borrowers – simply does not justify an outright risk-on stance. Bear markets typically end 3-4 months before the economy bottoms (Table 1). If March was the low for stocks, therefore, this implies that the recession will end in June or July. BCA Research’s view is that the recovery is more likely to be U-shaped than V-shaped. Table 1Stocks Bottom On Average 3-4 Months Before The Recession Ends Chart 1New COVID-19 Cases Have Peaked What triggered the rally? Most notably, it anticipated a peaking of new COVID-19 cases in the world outside China (Chart 1). Several countries, notably Spain and Italy, have already felt able to ease quarantine rules, and others will do so during May. This raises the possibility that the pandemic will largely be over by July (except perhaps in a few developing countries, such as Brazil, where strict containment was shunned). The rally was fueled by unprecedented fiscal and monetary measures taken by the authorities everywhere. In the US, for example, the various new Federal Reserve liquidity programs add up to $4.2 trillion (20% of GDP) (Chart 2). The balance-sheets of major global central banks, particularly the Fed's, have ballooned in just a few weeks (Chart 3). As a result, US money supply and dollar liquidity have soared (Chart 4). Normally, when there is a flood of liquidity over and above what is needed to fund the real economy, that excess liquidity flows into asset markets, weakens the dollar, and boosts commodities and Emerging Markets. But these are not normal times. Liquidity injections amid deteriorating economic conditions cushion the downside but do not necessarily improve the outlook immediately – as we witnessed in 2007-2008.   Chart 2Multiple New Stimulus Programs… Chart 3...Made Central Bank Balance-Sheets Balloon... Chart 4...And Dollar Liquidity Soar Chart 5Pandemics Usually Have Several Waves The biggest risk is that the pandemic lingers. Epidemiologists agree that COVID-19 will not disappear until (1) a vaccine is available, likely to be 12-18 months (if one is possible at all – there is still no vaccine for HIV or SARS), or (2) 65-80% of the population has had the disease, creating “herd immunity”. Maybe a vaccine will be ready sooner, or a therapeutic treatment will drastically lower the mortality rate – but investors should not bet on it. It is worth remembering that the last big pandemic, the Spanish ‘flu of 1918-1919, had several waves, with the second the deadliest (Chart 5). It is possible that each time governments ease containment measures, the number of new cases will rise again. And even if they don’t, how likely is it that consumers will go back to shopping, eating in restaurants, or travelling as before? Big data from China show a general return to work but not to going out for entertainment (Chart 6). This is likely to remain a drag on the economy for a considerable period.   Chart 6Chinese Remain Reluctant To Go Out Moreover, the fiscal and stimulus packages will help to tide over households and companies in advanced economies during the toughest times – replacing lost wages, and providing bridging loans – but they do not solve the fundamental problem for firms that have lost most of their revenues. US corporate debt is at its highest percentage of GDP in recent history – and the ratio is even higher in parts of Europe, Japan, and China (Chart 7). Bankruptcies are likely to rise, which will make banks more cautious about lending, further tightening credit conditions. Moreover, stimulus packages won’t help Emerging Market borrowers, which have around $4 trillion of outstanding foreign-currency-denominated debt. With the sharp rise in EM credit spreads and fall in currencies over the past three months, many will struggle to service and repay this debt (Chart 8). Chart 7Corporate Debt Is At A Worrying Level Chart 8EM Dollar Borrowers Will Struggle     Portfolio construction is about probabilities. The scenario priced into risk assets currently – a rapid return to the status quo ante – could turn out to be correct. But there is a significant probability that it does not. We therefore recommend taking some risk off the table. We would not switch into quality government bonds as a hedge, since current yields would give little return even in a disastrous economic scenario – and could produce very negative returns if inflation picks up. We, rather, recommend Overweights in cash and gold, and a relatively low-beta tilt within equities.  Equities: Valuations, especially in the US, have not hit typical market-bottom levels. The price/book ratio for US equities, for example, troughed only at 2.9 in March, compared to a bear-market low of 1.5 in 2009 (Chart 9). Earnings will probably be revised down further: the consensus still expects only a 12% decline in S&P 500 EPS in 2020 (and a 21% jump next year); earnings revisions are usually closely correlated to stock prices (Chart 10). We, therefore, remain cautious in our regional equity positioning, with an Overweight on US stocks, and a somewhat defensive sector tilt (Overweights in IT and Healthcare, along with Industrials as a play on Chinese stimulus). One factor to watch: any sustained pickup in value and small-cap stocks, which showed some signs of appearing in late April (Chart 11). This has historically signaled the beginning of a bull market. Chart 9US Valuations Are Not At Usual Bottom Lows Chart 10Weak Earnings Can Drag Markets Down Further     Chart 11When Will Value And Small Caps Pick Up? Fixed Income: Quality government bonds look highly unattractive at current yields. Our calculations suggest only an 6.7% return from 10-year US Treasuries and 4.6% from Bunds even if their yields fall to the lowest possible level, 0% and -1% respectively. Inflation-linked bonds, especially in the US, the UK, Australia and Canada, look very undervalued, however.2 US 10-year breakevens have fallen to as low as 1.1% (Chart 12). In spread product, the best strategy at the moment is to buy what central banks are buying. That means investment-grade bonds in the US and Europe, Fallen Angels3  (since both the Fed and ECB will backstop bonds that were downgraded to junk in the past month), US Aaa CMBS and ABS, Agency CMBS, and munis. But the riskier end of the junk-bond universe looks unattractive. Even a moderate default cycle (with a 9% default rate for junk bonds – compared to 15% in the last recession – and a 25% recovery rate) would point to an excess return from B-rated corporate bonds of -20% over the next 12 months (Chart 13). Chart 12TIPS Look Very Cheap Chart 13Avoid The Lower End Of Junk Currencies: The dollar has moved sideways on a trade-weighted basis over the past two months. We remain Neutral, since in the short term the dollar could face upward pressure as a safe-haven play, especially versus Emerging Market currencies, if investors start to worry again about growth. In the longer run, however, the dollar looks expensive relative to purchasing power parity (Chart 14), and interest-rate differentials no longer favor it as they have done over much of the past decade (Chart 15). BCA Research’s FX strategists recommend a barbell strategy in currencies, with Overweights in cheap cyclical currencies such as the Canadian dollar and Norwegian krone, as well as safe havens such as the yen.4 Chart 14Dollar Is Expensive... Chart 15...And No Longer Benefits From Higher Rates     Commodities: After the extraordinary behavior of near-month WTI futures in April, the crude price should settle down. BCA Research’s energy strategists argue that renewed production cuts from Saudi Arabia and Russia, combined with a near-normalization in demand in H2, should push crude-oil balances back into a supply deficit by Q3 (Chart 16). Chart 16Oil Price Should Rise In H2 They forecast Brent to rise to $42 a barrel by the end of 2020, compared to $24 now. Industrial metals prices have generally remained depressed, despite the recovery in risk assets (Chart 17). But the effects of Chinese stimulus, combined with a weaker dollar, should cause them to recover later in the year (Chart 18). Gold remains a good hedge against further economic shocks or an eventual resurgence in inflation. Chart 17Metal Prices Haven't Recovered... Chart 18...But Should Soon Benefit From Chinese Stimulus   Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1  Please see Global Asset Allocation, “Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Playing The Optionality,” dated April 1, 2020. 2  Please see Global Fixed Income Strategy, "Global Inflation Expectations Are Now Too Low," dated April 28, 2020. 3  Bonds that have recently been downgraded from investment grade to sub-investment grade. 4  Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy, "QE And Currencies," dated April 17, 2020. GAA Asset Allocation  

Special Report

Highlights In this Special Report we explore in detail the fiscal response amongst advanced economies, with the goal of judging whether the response is large enough to prevent an “L-shaped” recession. The crisis remains in its early days and new information about the size and character of the response, as well as the magnitude of the economic shock, continues to emerge on a near-daily basis. As such, our conclusions may change over the coming weeks in line with incoming data. Even when narrowly-defined, the announced (or likely) fiscal response of the US, China, and Germany is quite large and appears to be adequate to prevent the direct and indirect effects of the lockdowns from causing an “L-shaped” event. This is not the case, however, in other euro area economies (France, Italy, and Spain), or in emerging markets. Our analysis also suggests that the global fiscal response will need to increase if the global economy faces a W-shaped shock caused by another round of aggressive containment measures later this year. This underscores the importance of ensuring that the “Great Lockdown” succeeds at reducing the spread of the disease to a point that does not necessitate widespread renewed restrictions on economic activity. Feature The global economic expansion that began in 2009 has come to an abrupt end due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Aggressive containment measures necessary to control the spread of the disease and prevent the collapse in health care systems around the world have caused a large and sudden stop in global economic activity, which has prompted unprecedented responses from governments around the world. In this Special Report we explore in detail the fiscal response amongst advanced economies, with the goal of judging whether the response is large enough to prevent an “L-shaped” recession (characterized by a very prolonged return to trend growth). The crisis remains in its early days and new information about the size and character of the response, as well as the magnitude of the economic shock, continues to emerge on a near-daily basis. As such, our conclusions may change over the coming weeks in line with incoming data. But for now, we (tentatively) conclude that the fiscal response appears to be adequate to prevent the direct and indirect effects of the lockdowns from causing an “L-shaped” event. However, there are two important caveats. First, while Germany has provided among the strongest fiscal responses globally, measures in France, Italy, and Spain are still lacking and must be stepped up. Second, the announced fiscal measures will not be sufficient if the global economy faces a W-shaped shock caused by another round of aggressive containment measures later this year – more will have to be done. For policymakers, this underscores the importance of ensuring that the “Great Lockdown” succeeds at reducing the spread of the disease to a point that does not necessitate widespread renewed restrictions on economic activity. In this regard, the gradual re-opening of several US states by early-May, while positive for economic activity in the short-run, is a non-trivial risk to the US and global economic outlooks over the coming 6-12 months. This risk must be closely watched by investors. The Global Fiscal Response: Comparing Across Countries And Across Measures The flurry of policy announcements from national governments over the past six weeks has led to a great degree of confusion about the size and disposition of the global COVID-19 fiscal response. Our analysis is based heavily on the IMF’s tracking of these measures, albeit with a few adjustments. We also rely on analysis from Bruegel, a prominent European macroeconomic think-tank, as well as our own Geopolitical Strategy team and a variety of news reports. Chart II-1 presents the IMF’s estimate of the total fiscal response to the crisis across major countries, as of April 23rd, broken down into “above-the-line” and “below-the-line” measures. Above-the-line measures are those that directly impact government budget balances (direct fiscal spending and revenue measures, usually tax deferrals), whereas below-the-line measures typically involve balance sheet measures to backstop businesses through capital injections and loan guarantees. Chart II-1The Global Fiscal Response Is Huge When Including All Measures Chart II-1 makes it clear that the fiscal response of advanced economies is enormous when including both above- and below-the-line measures. By this metric, the response of most developed economies is on the order of 10% of GDP, and well above 30% in the case of Italy and Germany. However, using the sum of above- and below-the-line measures to gauge the fiscal response of any country may not be the ideal approach, given that below-the-line measures are contingent either on the triggering of certain conditions or on the provision of credit to households and firms from the financial system. Below-the-line measures also likely increase the liability position of the private sector, thus raising the odds of negative second-round effects. Instead, Chart II-2 compares the countries shown in Chart 1 based only on the IMF’s estimate of above-the-line measures, and with a 4% downward adjustment to Japan’s reported spending to account for previously announced measures.8 The chart shows that countries fall into roughly three categories in terms of the magnitude of their above-the-line response: in excess of 4% of GDP (Australia, the US, Japan, Canada, and Germany), 2-3% (the UK, Brazil, and China), and sub-2% (all other countries shown in the chart, including Spain, Italy, and France). Chart II-2The Picture Changes When Excluding Below-The-Line Measures Analysis by Bruegel provides somewhat different estimates of the global COVID-19 fiscal response for select European countries as well as the US (Table II-1). Bruegel breaks down discretionary fiscal measures that have been announced into three categories: those involving an immediate fiscal impulse (new spending and foregone revenues), those related to deferred payments, and other liquidity provisions and guarantees. Bruegel distinguishes between the first and second categories because of their differing impact on government budget balances. Deferrals improve the liquidity positions of individuals and companies but do not cancel their obligations, meaning that they result only in a temporary deterioration in budget balances. Table II-1The Type Of Fiscal Response Varies Significantly Across Countries Table II-1 highlights that Bruegel’s estimates of the sum of above- and below-the-line measures are similar to the IMF’s estimates for the US, the UK, and Spain, but are smaller for Italy and larger for France and Germany (particularly the latter). These differences underscore the extreme uncertainty facing investors, who have to contend not only with varying estimates of the magnitude of government policies but also a torrent of news concerning the evolution of the pandemic itself. Chart II-3 presents our best current estimate of the above-the-line fiscal response of several countries (the measure we deem to be most likely to result in an immediate fiscal impulse), by excluding loans, guarantees, and non-specified revenue deferrals to the best of our ability.2 Chart II-3 is based on a combination of data from the IMF, Bruegel analysis, and BCA estimates and news analysis. Chart II-3When Narrowly Defined, Several Countries Are Responding Forcefully, But Many Countries Are Not Overall, investors can draw the following conclusions from Charts II-1 – II-3 and Table II-1: When measured as the total of above- and below-the-line measures, nearly all large developed market countries have responded with sizeable measures. Emerging market economies are the clear laggards. Excluding below-the-line measures and using our approach, Australia, the US, China, Germany, Japan, and Canada appear to be spending the most relative to the size of their economies. While Japan’s “headline” fiscal number was inflated by including previously-announced spending, it is still decently-sized after adjustment. Outside of Germany, the rest of Europe appears to be providing a middling or poor above-the-line fiscal response. The UK appears to be providing between 4-5% of GDP as a fiscal impulse, whereas the fiscal response in Italy, Spain, and France looks more like that of emerging markets than of advanced economies. Measuring The Stimulus Against The Shock Despite the substantial amount of new information over the past six weeks concerning the evolution of the pandemic and the attendant policy response, it remains extremely difficult to judge what the balance between shock and stimulus will be and what that means for the profile of growth. Nonetheless, below we present a framework that investors can use to approach the question, and that can be updated as new information emerges concerning the impact of the shutdowns and the extent of the response. Our approach involves analyzing four specific questions: What is the size of the initial shock? What are the likely second-round effects on growth? What is the likely multiplier on fiscal spending? Will the composition of fiscal spending alter its effectiveness? The Size Of The Initial Shock Chart II-4 presents the OECD’s estimates of the initial impact of partial or complete shutdowns on economic activity in several countries. The OECD first used a sectoral approach to estimating the impact on activity while lockdowns are in effect, assuming a 100% shutdown for manufacturing of transportation equipment and other personal services, a 50% decline in activity for construction and professional services, and a 75% decline for retail trade, wholesale trade, hotels, restaurants, and air travel. Chart II-4 illustrates the total impact of this approach for key developed and emerging economies. Chart II-4Annual GDP Will Be 1.5%-2.5% Lower For Each Month Lockdowns Are In Effect The OECD’s approach provides a credible estimate of the impact of aggressive containment policies, and implies that annual real GDP is likely to be 1.5-2.5% lower for major countries for each month that lockdown policies are in effect. This implies that output in major economies is likely to fall 3.5% - 6% for the year from the initial shock alone, assuming an aggressive 10-week lockdown followed by a complete return to normal. Estimating Potential Second Round Effects Chart II-5 presents projections from the Bank for International Settlements on the spillover and spillback potential of a 5% initial shock to the level of global GDP from the COVID-19 pandemic (equivalent to a 20% impact on an annualized basis). Chart II-5Additional Lockdown Events Are A Greater Risk Than First Wave After-Effects The chart shows that the cumulative impact of the initial shock rises to 7-8% by the end of this year for the US, euro area, and emerging markets, and 6% for other advanced economies. These estimates account for both domestic second round effects of the initial shock, as well as the reverberating impact of the shock on global trade. Chart II-5 also shows the devastating effect that a second wave of COVID-19 emerging in the second half of the year would have after including spillover and spillback effects, assuming that only partial lockdowns would be required. In this scenario, the level of GDP would be 10-12% lower at the end of the year depending on the region, suggesting that investors should be more concerned about the possibility of additional lockdown events than they should be about the after-effects of the first wave of infections (more on this below). Will Fiscal Multipliers Be High Or Low? When examining the academic literature on fiscal multipliers, the first impression is that multipliers are likely to be extremely large in the current environment. Tables II-2 and II-3 present a range of academic multiplier estimates aggregated by the IMF, categorized by the stage of the business cycle and whether the zero lower bound is in effect. Table II-2Fiscal Multipliers Are Much Larger During Recessions Than Expansions Table II-3Models Suggest The Multiplier Is Quite High At The Zero Lower Bound The tables tell a clear story: multipliers are typically meaningfully larger during recessions than during expansions, and extremely large when the zero lower bound (ZLB) is in effect. However, there are at least two reasons to expect that the fiscal multiplier during this crisis will not be as large as Tables II-2 and II-3 suggest. First, it is obviously the case that the multiplier will be low while full or even partial lockdowns are in effect, as consumers will not have the ability to fully act in response to stimulative measures. This will be partially offset by a burst of spending once lockdowns are removed, but the empirical multiplier estimates during recessions shown in Table II-2 have not been measured during a period when constraints to spending have been in effect, and we suspect that this will have at least somewhat of a dampening effect on the efficacy of fiscal spending relative to previous recessions (even once regulations concerning store closures are removed). Second, Table II-3 likely overestimates the multiplier at the ZLB. These estimates have been based on models rather than empirical analysis, and appear to be in reference to the prevention of large subsequent declines in output following an initial shock. The modeled finding of a large multiplier at the ZLB occurs because increased deficit spending will not lead to higher policy rates in a scenario where the neutral rate has fallen below zero. But it seems difficult to believe that the fiscal multiplier during ZLB episodes, defined as the impact of fiscal spending on the path of output relative to the initial shock (not relative to a counterfactual additional shock), is larger than the highest empirical estimates of the multiplier during recessions. The only circumstance in which we can envision this being the case is an environment where long-term bond yields are capped and remain at zero, alongside short-term interest rates, as the economy improves. The IMF has provided a simple rule of thumb approach to estimating the fiscal multiplier for a given country. The IMF’s approach involves first estimating the multiplier under normal circumstances based on a series of key structural characteristics that have been shown to influence the economy’s response to fiscal shocks. Then, the “normal” multiplier is adjusted higher or lower depending on the stage of the business cycle, and whether monetary policy is constrained by the ZLB. For the US, the IMF’s approach suggests that a multiplier range of 1.1 – 1.6 is reasonable, assuming the highest cyclical adjustment but no ZLB adjustment (see Box II-1 for a description of the calculation). Given the unprecedented nature of this crisis, we are inclined to use the low end of this range (1.1) as a conservative assumption when judging whether fiscal responses to the crisis are sufficient. For investors, this means that governments should be aiming, at a minimum, for fiscal packages that are roughly 90% of the size of the expected shock of their economies, using our US fiscal multiplier assumption as a guide. Box II-1 The “Bucket” Approach To Estimating Fiscal Multipliers The IMF “bucket” approach to estimating fiscal multiplier involves determining the multiplier that is likely to apply to a given country during “normal” circumstances, based on a set of structural characteristics associated with larger multipliers. This “normal” multiplier is then adjusted based on the following formula: M = MNT * (1+Cycle) * (1+Mon) Where M is the final multiplier estimate, MNT is the “normal times” multiplier derived from structural characteristics, Cycle is the cyclical factor ranging from −0.4 to +0.6, and Mon is the monetary policy stance factor ranging from 0 to 0.3. The Cycle factor is higher the more a country’s output gap is negative, and the Mon factor is higher the closer the economy is to the zero lower bound. Table II-B1 applies the IMF’s approach to the US, using the same structural score as the IMF presented in the note that described the approach. The table highlights that the approach suggests a US fiscal multiplier range of 1.1 – 1.6 given the maximum cycle adjustment proscribed by the rule, which we feel is reasonable given the unprecedented rise in US unemployment. We make no adjustment to the range for the zero lower bound. Table II-B1A Multiplier Estimate Of 1.1 – 1.6 Seems Reasonable For The US The Composition Of The Response: Helping Or Hurting? The last of our four questions deals with the issue of composition and whether the form of a country’s fiscal response is likely to alter its effectiveness. We implicitly addressed the first element of composition, whether measures are above-the-line or below-the-line, by comparing Charts II-1 - II-3 on pages 28-31. Our view is that above-the-line measures are far more important than below-the-line measures, as the former provides direct income and liquidity support. Below-the-line measures are also important, as they are likely to help reduce business failure and household bankruptcies. The fiscal multiplier on these measures has to be above zero, but it is likely to be much lower than that of an above-the-line response. The second element of composition concerns the appropriate distribution of aid among households, businesses, and local governments. On this particular question, it remains extremely challenging to analyze the issue on a global basis, owing to a frequent lack of an explicit breakdown of fiscal measures by recipient. Chart II-6Much Of The US Fiscal Response Is Going To Households And Small Businesses For now, we limit our distributional analysis to the US, and hope to expand our approach to other countries in future research. Chart II-6 presents a breakdown of the US fiscal response by recipient, which informs the following observations. Households: Chart II-6 highlights that US households will receive approximately $600 billion as part of the CARES Act, roughly half of which will occur through direct payments (i.e. “stimulus checks”) and another 40% from expanded unemployment benefits. In cases where the federal household response has been criticized by members of the public as inadequate, it has often been compared to income support programs of other countries. The Canada Emergency Response Benefit (“CERB”) is a good example of a program that seems, at first blush, to be superior: it provides $2,000 CAD in direct payments to individuals for a 4 week period, for up to 16 weeks (i.e. a maximum of $8,000 CAD), which seems better than a $1,200 USD stimulus check. However, Table II-4 highlights that this comparison is mostly spurious. First, the CERB is not universal, in that it is only available to those who have stopped or will stop working due to COVID-19. At a projected cost of $35 billion CAD, the CERB program represents 1.5% of Canadian GDP. By comparison, $600 billion USD in overall household support represents 2.75% of US GDP; this number drops to 1.75% when only considering support to those who have lost their jobs, but this is still higher as a share of the economy than in Canada. Moreover, there is little question that Congress is prepared to pass more stimulus for additional weeks of required assistance. The discrepancy between the perception and reality of US household sector support appears to be rooted in the speed of payments. Speed is the one area where Canada’s household sector response appears to have legitimately outperformed the US; CERB payments are received by applicants within three business days for those registered for electronic payment, and in some cases they are received the following day. By contrast, it has taken some time for US States to start paying out the additional $600 USD per week in expanded unemployment benefits, but as of the middle of last week nearly all states had started making these payments. Table II-4US Household Relief Is Just As Generous As Seemingly Better Programs Firms: On April 16th the Small Business Administration announced that the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) had expended its initial budget of $350 billion. While additional funds of $320 billion have subsequently been approved (plus $60 billion in small business emergency loans and grants), the run on PPP funds was, to some investors, an implicit sign that the CARES Act was inadequately structured. However, the fact that the initial funds ran out in mid-April simply reflects the reality that social distancing measures had been in place for 3-4 weeks by the time that the program began taking applications. Table II-5 highlights that $350 billion was large enough to replace nearly 90% of lost small business income for one month, assuming that overall small business revenue has fallen by 50% and that small businesses account for 44% of total GDP. The Table also shows that a combined total of $730 billion is enough to replace almost 80% of lost small business income for 10 weeks, given these assumptions. With loan forgiveness at least partially tied to small businesses retaining employees on payroll for an 8-week period, the PPP is also essentially an indirect form of household income support. Table II-5Help For Small Businesses Will Replace A Significant Amount Of Lost Income Chart II-7Persistent State & Local Austerity Must Be Avoided This Time State & Local Governments: The magnitude of support for state & local (S&L) governments appears to be the least-well designed element of the US fiscal response. The CARES Act provides for $170 billion in support to S&L, which at first blush seems large as it is approximately 25% of S&L current receipts in Q4 2019 (i.e. it stands to cover a 25% loss in revenue for one quarter). However, this does not account for the significant reported increase in S&L costs to combat the pandemic, nor does it provide S&L governments with any revenue certainty beyond June 30th when most of the assistance from CARES must be spent. Unlike households or firms, who also face significant uncertainty, nearly all US states are subject to balanced budget requirements, which prevent them from spending more than they collect in revenue. When faced even with projected revenue losses in the second half of this year and into 2021, states are likely to aggressively and immediately cut costs in order to avoid budgetary shortfalls. Chart II-7 highlights that S&L austerity was a significant element of the persistent drag on real GDP growth from overall government expenditure and investment in the first 3-4 years of the post-GFC economic expansion. A repeat of this episode would significantly raise the odds of an “L-type” recession (and thus should certainly be avoided). This is why Congress is moving to pass larger state and local aid. Our Geopolitical Strategy team argues that neither President Trump nor Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell will prevent the additional financial assistance that US states will require, despite their rhetoric about states going bankrupt.3 A near-term, temporary standoff may occur, but Washington will almost certainly act to provide at least additional short-term funding if state employment starts to fall due to budget pressure. So while we recognize that the state & local component of the US fiscal response is currently lacking, it does not seem likely to represent a serious threat to an eventual economic recovery in the US. Putting It All Together: Will It Be Enough? Chart II-8 reproduces Chart II-3 with an assumed fiscal multiplier of 1.1, and with shaded regions denoting the likely initial and total impact on GDP from aggressive containment measures (based on the OECD and BIS’ estimates). Based on our analysis of the US fiscal response, we make no adjustments for the composition of the measures beyond defining the fiscal response on a narrow basis (i.e. excluding loans, guarantees, and non-specified revenue deferrals). The chart highlights that the narrowly-defined fiscal response of three key economies driving global demand, the US, China, and Germany, is either at the upper end or above the total impact range. Thus, for now, we tentatively conclude that the fiscal response that has or will happen appears to be adequate to prevent the direct and indirect effects of the lockdowns from causing an “L-shaped” event, especially since Chart II-8 explicitly excludes below-the-line measures. However, there are two important caveats to this conclusion. First, Chart II-8 makes it clear that measures in France, Italy, and Spain are still lacking and must be stepped up. Italy and France have provided a substantial below-the-line response, but it is far from clear that a debt-based response or one that only temporarily improves access to cash for households and businesses will be enough to prevent a prolonged fallout from the sudden stop in economic activity and income. Chart II-8Several Important Countries Seem To Be Doing Enough, But More Is Needed In Europe Ex-Germany Second, our analysis suggests that the announced fiscal measures will not be sufficient if the global economy faces a W-shaped shock caused by another round of aggressive containment measures later this year or if these measures remain in place at half-strength for many months. This underscores how sensitive the adequacy of announced fiscal measures are to the amount of time economies remain under full or partial lockdown. As such, it is crucial for investors to have some sense of when advanced economies may be able to sustainably end aggressive containment measures. When Can The Lockdowns Sustainably End? Several countries and US states have already announced some reductions in their restrictions, but the question of how comprehensive these measures can be without risking a second period of prolonged stay-at-home orders looms large. Table II-6 presents two different methods of estimating sustainable lockdown end dates for several advanced economies. First, we use the “70-day rule” that appears to have succeeded in ending the outbreak in Wuhan, calculated from the first day that either school or work closures took effect in each country.4 Second, using a linear trend from the peak 5-day moving average of confirmed cases and fatalities, we calculate when confirmed cases and fatalities may reach zero. Table II-6By Re-Opening Soon, The US May Be Risking A Damaging Second Wave The table highlights that these methods generally prescribe a reopening date of May 31st or earlier, with a few exceptions. The UK’s confirmed case count and fatality trends are still too shallow to suggest an end of May re-opening, as is the case in Canada. In the case of Sweden, no projections can truly be made based on the 70-day rule because closures never formally occurred. But the most problematic point highlighted in Table II-6 is that US newly confirmed cases are only currently projected to fall to zero as of February 2021. Chart II-9 highlights that while new cases per capita in New York state are much higher than in the rest of the country, they are declining whereas they have yet to clearly peak elsewhere. Cross-country case comparisons can be problematic due to differences in testing, but with several US states having already begun the gradual re-opening process, this underscores that US policymakers may be allowing a dangerous rise in the odds of a secondary infection wave. Chart II-9No Clear Downtrend Yet Outside Of New York State Investment Conclusions Our core conclusion that an “L-shaped” global recession is likely to be avoided is generally bullish for equities on a 12-month horizon. However, uncertainty remains extremely elevated, and the recent rise in stock prices in the US (and globally) has been at least partially based on the expectation that lockdowns will sustainably end soon, which at least in the case of the US appears to be a premature conclusion given the current lack of large-scale virus testing capacity. As such, we are less optimistic towards risky assets tactically, and would recommend a neutral stance over a 0-3 month horizon. As noted above, our cross-country comparison of narrowly-defined fiscal measures suggested that euro area countries (excluding Germany) will likely have to do more in order to prevent a long period of below-trend growth. In the case of highly-indebted countries like Italy, this raises the additional question of whether a significantly increased debt-to-GDP ratio stemming from an aggressive fiscal impulse will cause another euro area sovereign debt crisis similar to what occurred from 2010-2014. Chart II-10Italy's Debt Sustainability Hurdle Is Lower Than It Used To Be Government debts are sustainable as long as interest rates remain below economic growth, and from this vantage point Italy should spend as much as needed in order to ensure that nominal growth remains above current long-term government bond yields. Chart II-10 highlights that, despite a widening spread versus German bunds, Italian 10-year yields are much lower today than they were during the worst of the euro area crisis, meaning that the debt sustainability hurdle is technically lower. However, we have also noted in previous reports that high-debt countries often face multiple government debt equilibria; if global investors become fearful that that high-debt countries may not be able to repay their obligations without defaulting or devaluing, then a self-fulfilling prophecy will occur via sharply higher interest rates (Chart II-11). Chart II-11Multiple Equilibria In Debt Markets Are Possible Without A Lender Of Last Resort Chart II-12Italy's Structural Budget Balance Has Improved For now, we view the risk of a renewed Italian debt crisis from significantly increased spending related to COVID-19 as minimal, and it is certainly lower than the status quo as the latter risks causing a sharp gap between nominal growth and bond yields like what occurred from 2010 – 2014. First, Chart II-12 highlights that Italy has succeeded in somewhat reducing its structural balance, which averaged -4% for many years prior to the euro area crisis. Assuming an adequate global response to the crisis and that economic recovery ensues, it is not clear why global bond investors would be concerned that Italian structural deficits would persistently widen. Second, the ECB is purchasing Italian government bonds as part of its new Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program, which will help cap the level of Italian yields. Chart II-13Italy's Debt Service Ratio Won't Go Up Much, If Yields Are Unchanged Third, Chart II-13 shows what will occur to Italy’s government debt service ratio (general government net interest payments as a percent of GDP) in a scenario where Italy’s gross debt to GDP rises a full 20 percentage points and the ratio of net interest payments to debt remains unchanged. The chart shows that while debt service will rise, it will still be lower than at any point prior to 2015. So not only should Italy spend significantly more to combat the severely damaging nature of the pandemic, we would expect that Italian spreads would fall, not rise, in such an outcome. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President Special Reports Footnotes 1  Skeptical economists call Japan’s largest-ever stimulus package ‘puffed-up’, Keita Nakamura, The Japan Times, April 8, 2020. 2  Please note that Chart II-3 differs somewhat from a chart that has been frequently shown by our Geopolitical Strategy service. Both charts are accurate; they simply employ different definitions of the fiscal response to the pandemic. 3 Indeed, McConnell has already walked back his comments that states should consider bankruptcy. President Trump is constrained by the election, as are Senate Republicans, and the House Democrats control the purse strings. Hence more state and local funding is forthcoming. At best for the Republicans, there may be provisions to ensure it goes to the COVID-19 crisis rather than states’ unfunded pension obligations. See Geopolitical Strategy, “Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update),” April 24, 2020, www.bcaresearch.com. 4 School and work closure dates have been sources from the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker.