Economy

Special Report

Dear Client, With this weekly update on the Chinese economy, we are sending you a Special Report published by BCA Geopolitical Strategy team and authored by my colleague Matt Gertken. Lately we have been getting numerous questions from our clients, on the risk of a significant re-escalation in the US-China conflict. Matt’s report provides timely insights on the topic, and we trust you will find the report very helpful. Best regards, Jing Sima, China Strategist Feature An Update On The Chinese Economy Since mid-April, the speed of resumption in China’s domestic business activity has accelerated. Industrial enterprises appear to be operating at 87% of normal activity levels as of May 11, up from 81.8% one month ago. Small to medium-sized enterprise (SMEs) are estimated to now operate at 87.3% of their normal activity, a vast improvement from 82.3% just two weeks ago. Chart 1Pickup In M1 Still Modest The material easing in monetary conditions and strong flows of local government special-purpose bond issuance in the past two months helped jump start a recovery in the construction sector. But at this early stage of a domestic economic rebound and in the middle of a deep global economy recession, China’s corporate marginal propensity to invest remains muted (Chart 1). Household consumption showed some resilience during last week’s “Golden Week” holiday. The strength in big-ticket item purchases, however, was highly concentrated among consumers in China’s wealthiest urban areas (Chart 2). The COVID-19 pandemic has created a situation resembling a combination of SARS and the global financial crisis. Now the physical constraints on consumption have largely been lifted, consumers’ willingness to spend, after a brief period of compensatory spending, will be suppressed if their expectations of the medium-term job and income security remain pessimistic (Chart 3). Chart 2A Compensatory Rebound In Big-Ticket Item Sales Chart 3The Average Chinese Consumer Remains Cautious Next week we will publish a report, focusing on China’s consumption in a post-pandemic environment. Looking forward, we maintain the view that China’s business activity will pick up momentum in H2, when the massive monetary and fiscal stimuli continue working its way into the economy.  Downside risks to employment and income loom large, which makes it highly unlikely that the authorities will tighten their policy stance any time soon. As such, while we maintain our defensive tactical positioning due to near-term economic and geopolitical uncertainties, our view remains constructive on both the economy and Chinese financial asset prices in the next 6 to 12 months.  (Chart 4). Chart 4Recovery To Gain Traction In H2   Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com     #WWIII The phrase “World War III” or #WWIII went viral earlier this year in response to a skirmish between the US and Iran (Chart 1). Only four months later, the US and China are escalating a strategic rivalry that makes the Iran conflict look paltry by comparison (Chart 2). Chart 1US-Iran Tensions Were Just A Warm-Up Chart 2The Thucydides Trap Fortunately, the two great powers are constrained by the same mutually assured destruction that constrained the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. They are also constrained by the desire to prevent their economies from collapsing further. Unfortunately, the intensity of their rivalry can escalate dramatically before reaching anything truly analogous to the Berlin Airlift or Cuban Missile Crisis – and these kinds of scenarios are not out of the question. Safe haven assets will catch a bid and the recovery in US and global risk assets since the COVID selloff will be halted. We maintain our defensive tactical positioning and will close two strategic trades to book profits and manage risk. In the wake of the pandemic and recession, geopolitics is the next shoe to drop. The War President Over the past 24 hours the White House has taken several steps indicating that President Trump is adopting the “war president” posture in the run-up to the US election: Export controls: Trump has gone forward with new export controls on “dual-purpose” technologies – those that have military as well as civilian applications, in a delayed reaction to China’s policy of civil-military technological fusion. The Commerce Department has wide leeway in whether to grant export licenses under the rule – but it is a consequential rule and would be disruptive if enforced strictly. Supply chain de-risking: Trump is also going forward with new restrictions on the import of foreign parts for US power plants and electricity grid. The purpose is to remove risks from critical US infrastructure. COVID investigation: Trump has hinted that the novel coronavirus that causes the COVID-19 disease may have originated in the Wuhan Institute of Virology. The Director of National Intelligence issued a statement indicating that the Intelligence Community does not view the virus as man-made (not a bio-weapon), but is investigating the potential that the virus transferred to humans at the institute. The State Department had flagged the institute for risky practices long before COVID. Trump avoided the bio-weapon conspiracy theory and is focused on the hypothesis that the laboratory’s investigations into rare coronaviruses led to the outbreak. New tariffs instead of reparations: Director of the National Economic Council Larry Kudlow denied that the US would stop making interest and principal payments on some Chinese holdings of US treasuries. He said that the “full faith and credit of the United States’ debt obligation is sacrosanct. Absolutely sacrosanct.” Trump denied that this form of reparations, first floated by Republican Senator Marsha Blackburn of Tennessee, was under consideration. Instead he suggested that new tariffs would be much more effective, raising the threat for the first time since the Phase One trade deal was agreed in principle in December. Strategic disputes: Tensions have flared up in specific, concrete ways across the range of US-Chinese relations – in the cyber-realm, psychological warfare, Korean peninsula, Taiwan Strait, and South China Sea. These could lead to sanctions. The war president posture is one in which President Trump recognizes that reelection is extremely unlikely in an environment of worse than -4.8% economic growth and likely 16% unemployment. Therefore he shifts the basis of his reelection to an ongoing crisis and appeals to Americans’ patriotism and desire for continuity amid crisis. Bottom Line: Protectionism is not guaranteed to work, and therefore it was not ultimately the path Trump took last year when he still believed a short-term trade deal could boost the economy. Now the bar to protectionism has been lowered. The Decline Of US-China Relations President Trump may still be bluffing, China may take a conciliatory posture, and a massive cold war-style escalation may be avoided. However, it is imprudent to buy risk assets on these reasons today, when the S&P 500’s forward price-to-earnings ratio stands at 20.15. It is more prudent to prepare for a historic escalation of tensions first, buy insurance, then reassess. Why? Because the trajectory of US-China relations is empirically worsening over time. US household deleveraging and the Chinese shift away from export-manufacturing (Chart 3) broke the basis of strong relations during the US’s distractions in Iraq and Afghanistan and China’s “peaceful rise” in the early 2000s. US consumers grew thriftier while Chinese wages rose. Not only has China sought economic self-sufficiency as a strategic objective since General Secretary Xi Jinping took power in 2012, but the Great Recession, Trump trade war, and global pandemic have accelerated the process of decoupling between the two economies. Decoupling is an empirical phenomenon, and it has momentum, however debatable its ultimate destination (Chart 4). Obviously policy at the moment is accelerating decoupling. Chart 3The Great Economic Divorce Chart 4Decoupling Is Empirical The US threat to cease payments on some of China’s Treasury holdings is an inversion of the fear that prevailed in the wake of 2008, that China would sell its treasuries to diversify away from dependence on the US and the greenback. China did end up selling its treasuries, but the US was not punished with higher interest rates because other buyers appeared. The US remains the world’s preponderant power and ultimate safe haven (Chart 5). By the same token, Trump and Kudlow naturally poured water on the threat of arbitrarily stopping payments because that would jeopardize America’s position. Instead Trump is threatening a new round of trade tariffs. Since the US runs a large trade deficit with China, and China is more exposed to trade generally, the US has the upper hand on this front. But it is important to notice that US tariff collections as a share of imports bottomed under President Obama (Chart 6). Chart 5Treasuries Can't Be Weaponized By Either Side... Chart 6... But Tariffs Can And Will Be   The US shift away from free trade toward protectionism occurred in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. President Trump then popularized and accelerated this policy option in an aggressive and unorthodox way. Trade tariffs are a tool of American statecraft, not the whim of a single person, who may exit the White House in January 2021 anyway. The retreat from globalization is not a passing fancy. Today’s recession also marks the official conclusion of China’s historic 44 year economic boom – and hence a concrete blow to the legitimacy of the ruling Communist Party (Chart 7). The more insular, autarkic shift in the Communist Party’s thinking is not irreversible, but there are no clear signs that Xi Jinping is pivoting toward liberalism after eight years in power. Chart 7Recession Destabilizes The 'G2' Powers China’s unemployment rate has been estimated as high as 20.5% by Zhongtai Securities, which then retracted the estimate (!). It is at least at 10%. Moreover 51 million migrant workers vanished from the job rolls in the first quarter of the year. Maximum employment is the imperative of East Asian governments, especially the Communist Party, which has not dealt with joblessness since the late 1990s. The threat to social and political stability is obvious. The party will take extraordinary measures to maintain stability – not only massive stimulus but also social repression and foreign policy distraction to ensure that people rally around the flag. Xi Jinping has tried to shift the legitimacy of the party from economic growth to nationalism and consumerism, the “China Dream.” But the transition to consumer growth was supposed to be smooth. Financial turmoil, the trade war, and now pandemic and recession have forced the Communist Party off the training wheels well before it intended. Xi’s communist ideology, economic mercantilism, and assertive foreign policy have created an international backlash. The US is obviously indulging in nationalism as well. A stark increase in inequality and political polarization exploded in President Trump’s surprise election on a nationalist and protectionist platform in 2016 (Chart 8). All candidates bashed China on the campaign trail, but Trump was an anti-establishment leader who disrupted corporate interests and followed through with his tariff threats. The result is that the share of Americans who see China’s power and influence as a “major threat” to the United States has grown from around 50% during the halcyon days of cooperation to over 60% today. Those who see it as a minor threat have shrunk to about a quarter of the population (Chart 9). Chart 8A Measure Of Inequality In The US Chart 9US Nationalism On The Rise Chart 10Broad-Based Anti-China Sentiment In US As with US tariff policy, the bipartisan nature of US anger toward China is significant. More than 60% of Democrats and more than 50% of young people have an unfavorable view of China. College graduates have a more negative opinion than the much-discussed non-college-educated populace (Chart 10). Already it is clear, in Joe Biden’s attack ads against Trump, that this election is about who can sound tougher on China. The debate is over who has the better policy to put “America first,” not whether to put America first. Biden will try to steal back the protectionist thunder that enabled Trump to break the blue wall in the electorally pivotal Rust Belt in 2016 (Map 1). Biden will have to win over these voters by convincing them that he understands and empathizes with their Trumpian outlook on jobs, outsourcing, and China’s threats to national security. He will emphasize other crimes – carbon emissions, cyber attacks, human rights violations – but they will still be China’s crimes. He will return to the “Pivot to Asia” foreign policy of his most popular supporter, former President Barack Obama. Map 1US Election: Civil War Lite Bottom Line: Economic slowdown and autocracy in China, unprecedented since the Cultural Revolution, is clashing with the United States. Broad social restlessness in the US that is resolving into bipartisan nationalism against a peer competitor, unprecedented since the struggle with the Soviets in the 1960s, is clashing with China. Now is not the time to assume global stability. Constraints Still Operate, But Buy Insurance The story outlined above is by this time pretty well known. But the “Phase One” trade deal allowed global investors to set aside this secular story at the beginning of the year. Now, as Trump threatens tariffs again, the question is whether he will resort to sweeping, concrete, punitive measures against China that will take on global significance – i.e. that will drive the financial markets this year. Trump is still attempting to restore his bull market and magnificent economy. As long as this is the case, a constraint on conflict operates this year. It is just not as firm or predictable. Therefore we are looking for three things. First, will President Trump’s approval rating benefit so much from his pressure tactics on China that he finds himself driven into greater pressure tactics? This raises the risk of policy mistakes. Second, will Trump’s approval rating fall into the doldrums, stuck beneath 43%, as the toll of the recession wears on him and popular support during the health crisis fades? “Lame duck” status would essentially condemn him to electoral loss and incentivize him to turn the tables by escalating the conflict with China. Chart 11Trump May Seek A Crisis ‘Bounce’ To Popularity Presidents are not very popular these days, but a comparison with Trump’s two predecessors shows that while he can hardly obtain the popularity boost that Obama received just before the 2012 election, he could hope for something at least comparable to what George W. Bush received amid the invasion of Iraq (Chart 11). (Trump has generally been capped at 46% approval, the same as his share of the popular vote in 2016.) The reason this is a real risk, not a Shakespearean play, is outlined above: however cynical Trump’s political calculus, he would be reasserting US grand strategy in the face of a great power that is attempting to set up a regional empire from which, eventually, to mount a global challenge. Thus if he is convinced he cannot win the election anyway, this risk becomes material. Investors should take seriously any credible reports suggesting that Trump is growing increasingly frustrated with his trailing Biden in head-to-head polls in the swing states. Third, will China, under historic internal stress, react in a hostile way that drives Trump down the path of confrontation? China has so far resorted to propaganda, aircraft carrier drills around the island of Taiwan, and maritime encroachments in the South China Sea – none of which is intolerably provocative to Trump. A depreciation of the renminbi, a substantial change to the status quo in the East or South China Seas, or an attempt to vitiate US security guarantees regarding US allies in the region, could trigger a major geopolitical incident. A fourth Taiwan Strait crisis is fully within the realm of possibility, especially given that Taiwan’s “Silicon Shield” is fundamentally at stake. While we dismissed rumors of Kim Jong Un’s death in North Korea, any power vacuum or struggle for influence there is of great consequence in today’s geopolitical context. Aggressive use of tariffs always threatened to disrupt global trade and financial markets, but tariffs function differently in the context of a global economic expansion and bull market, as in 2018-19, than they do in the context of a deep and possibly protracted recession. Trump has a clear political incentive to be tough on China, but an equally clear financial and economic incentive to limit sweeping punitive measures and avoid devastating the stock market and economy. If events lower the economic hurdle, then the political incentive will prevail and financial markets will sell. Bottom Line: However small the risk of Trump enacting sweeping tariffs, the downside is larger than in the 2018-19 period. The stock market might fall by 40%-50% rather than 20% in an all-out trade war this year. Investment Takeaways Go tactically long US 10-year treasuries. Book a 9.7% profit on our long 30-year US TIPS trade. Close long global equities (relative to US) for a loss of 3.8%.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Special Report

Highlights COVID-19 & The Economy: Australia is now in its first recession in 30 years, thanks to lockdown measures to contain the spread of COVID-19. Yet the nation’s rates of infection and death from the virus are relatively low, which should allow for a faster reopening of the domestic economy. Policy Responses: The RBA has taken extraordinary measures to cushion the blow from the lockdowns, like cutting policy rates to near-0% and capping shorter maturity bond yields through quantitative easing. The Australian government has also been aggressive in providing fiscal stimulus. These measures give the economy a better chance of seeing a “v”-shaped recovery as the lockdown restrictions are eased. Fixed Income Strategy: Downgrade Australian government bonds to neutral within global fixed income portfolios: the RBA has little room to cut rates, inflation expectations are too low and the structural convergence to global yields is largely complete. Favor inflation-linked bonds and investment grade corporate debt over government debt, as both now offer better value. Feature Chart 1The Australian Bond Yield Convergence Story Is Over Australia has a well-deserved reputation as a wonderful place to live, regularly sitting near the top of annual “world’s most livable countries” lists. A big reason for that is the stability of the economy, which has famously not suffered a recession since 1991. The COVID-19 pandemic has changed that happy economic story, with Australia now in the midst of a deep recession. Yet even during this uncertain time, Australia is living up to its reputation as a livable country, with one of the lowest rates of COVID-19 infection among the major economies. This potentially sets up Australia as an economy that can recover from the pandemic – and the growth-crushing measures used to contain its spread - more quickly than harder-hit countries like the US and Italy. For global fixed income investors, Australia has also been a very pleasant place to spend some time. The local bond market has enjoyed a stellar bull run since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, with policy rates and yields converging to much lower global levels (Chart 1). We have steadfastly maintained a structural overweight recommendation on Australian government bonds since December 2017. Over that time, the benchmark yield on the Bloomberg Barclays Australia government bond index declined -168bps, delivering a total return of +17.6% (in local currency terms). That soundly outperformed the global government benchmark index by 5.7 percentage points (in USD-hedged terms). However, just like the nation’s recession-free streak, Australia’s status as a secular bond outperformer is coming to an end. Just like the nation’s recession-free streak, Australia’s status as a secular bond outperformer is coming to an end. In this Special Report, we take a closer look at the Australian economy and fixed income landscape after the shock of the global pandemic. Our main conclusion is that most of the juice has been squeezed out of the Australian government bond yield global convergence trade. There are, however, some interesting opportunities still available in other parts of the Australian fixed income universe, like corporates and inflation-linked bonds. Yes, Recessions Can Actually Happen In Australia Chart 2A V-Shaped Recovery Is Widely Expected During the record streak of recession-free growth in Australia, the annual growth of real GDP has never dipped below 1.1%. The fact that a recession was avoided in 2009, given the degree of the shock from the Global Financial Crisis, is a testament to the balance within the Australian economy; consumer spending is 55% of GDP, business investment is 12%, government spending is 24% and exports are 25%. This stands out in contrast to more imbalanced economies like the US (where consumer spending is 70% of GDP) and Germany (where exports are 47% of GDP). Yet the unique nature of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has forced shutdowns across the entire economy, has nullified that advantage for Australia. There is no part of the economy that can avoid a major slowdown to help prevent a full-blown recession in 2020. Yet while expectations have adjusted to this new short-term reality, there appears to be a broad consensus that this Australian recession will be a short-lived “V” rather than an extended “U”. That can be seen in the forecasts of the Bloomberg Consensus survey and the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), both of which are calling for a year-over-year decline in real GDP growth of at least -7% in Q2/2020. That will represent the low point of the recession, with growth expected to steadily recover over the subsequent year, with annual real GDP growth reaching +7% by the second quarter of 2021 (Chart 2). The Westpac-Melbourne Institute consumer sentiment index suffered the single greatest monthly decline in the 47-year history of the series in April. Yet there was only a modest decline in the longer-run expectations component of that survey, which remains above recent cyclical lows (bottom panel) This is a message consistent with the RBA and Bloomberg consensus forecasts, where economic resiliency is expected. One reason for that relative optimism among Australian consumers is that COVID-19 has not hit the country as hard as other nations. A recent survey of Australian consumers conducted by McKinsey in April showed that 65% of respondents named “the Australian economy” as their biggest COVID-19 related concern. At the same time, only 33% of those surveyed cited “not being able to make ends meet” as their main worry related to the virus (Chart 3). Other responses to the survey showed a similar divide, with greater concern shown for the state of the overall Australian nation compared to worries about one’s own economic or health outlook. Chart 3Australians Worrying More About The Nation Than Their Own Situation For an economy that has not seen a recession in over a generation, a relative lack of concern over one’s own financial health – even in a global pandemic that has paralyzed the world economy – may not be that surprising. Another reason for that relative optimism is that Australia has, so far, escaped relatively unscathed from the spread of COVID-19 compared to other nations. Australia has, so far, escaped relatively unscathed from the spread of COVID-19 compared to other nations. The number of new daily COVID-19 cases is now only 1 per million people, according to the Johns Hopkins University data on the virus. This is down from the peak of 20 per million people reached on March 28, and substantially below the numbers seen in countries more severely struck by the virus like the US and Italy (Chart 4). Australia has also seen a relatively low fatality rate from the virus, with only 1.4% of confirmed cases resulting in deaths (Chart 5). Chart 4The COVID-19 Wave Has Crested Down Under Chart 5Australia Has Weathered The Pandemic Much Better Than Others Given these low rates of infection and death, it is likely that Australia will be able to reopen its economy faster than other nations. The Australian government has already announced an easing of the COVID-19 lockdown measures, which will include the opening of restaurants (with limited seating) and schools (on a staggered schedule). There is even talk of creating a “trans-Tasman travel bubble” with neighboring New Zealand, which has similarly low rates of COVID-19 infection. Yet even when Australians can begin resuming a more “normal” life, the backdrop for consumer spending will be constrained by relatively low income growth and high consumer debt levels (Chart 6). Real consumer spending has struggled to grow faster than 2-3% over the past decade and, with household debt now up to a staggering 190% of disposable income, a faster pace of spending is unlikely even as the economy reopens. Chart 6Weak Consumer Fundamentals Chart 7Australian Businesses Are Retrenching Among the other parts of the Australian economy, the near-term outlook is gloomy, but there are potential areas where the damage to growth could be more limited. Capital Spending Business fixed investment has been flat in real terms over the past year. With corporate profit growth already slowing rapidly and likely to contract because of the recession, firms will look to cut back on capital spending to preserve cash, leading to a bigger drag on overall growth from investment (Chart 7). According to the latest National Australia Bank business survey conducted in March, confidence has collapsed to lower levels than seen during the Global Financial Crisis, while capital spending and employment expectations have also declined sharply – trends that had already started before the COVID-19 breakout. Chart 8No Rebound In Housing Housing The housing market has long been a source of both strength and vulnerability for the Australian economy. While the days of double-digit growth in house prices are in the past, thanks to greater restrictions on banks for mortgage lending and worsening affordability, Australian housing was showing signs of life before the COVID-19 outbreak. National house prices were up +2.8% on a year-over-year basis in Q4/2019, while building approvals were stabilizing (Chart 8). That nascent housing rebound was choked off by the virus, with the Westpac-Melbourne Institute “good time to buy a home” survey plunging 30 points in April to the lowest level since February 2008. While the RBA’s interest rate cuts over the past decade have helped lower borrowing costs in Australia, the gap between the RBA cash rate and variable mortgage rates has been steadily widening (bottom panel). This suggests a worsening transmission from monetary policy into the most interest-sensitive parts of the economy like housing. Australian banks have been more stringent on mortgage lending standards over the past couple of years, which likely explains some of the widening gap between the RBA cash rate and mortgage rates. However, Australian banks have also seen an increase in their funding costs over that same period, both for onshore measures like the Bank Bill Swap Rate and offshore indicators like cross-currency basis swaps (Chart 9). Those funding costs have plunged in recent weeks, in response to the RBA’s aggressive monetary policy easing measures to help mitigate the hit to growth from COVID-19. The US Federal Reserve’s decision to activate a $60 billion currency swap line with the RBA back in March also helped reduce offshore funding costs for Australian banks. It is possible that the easing of funding costs could make banks more willing to make consumer and mortgage loans in the coming months, at lower interest rates, as the lockdown restrictions ease. This could help improve the transmission from easy RBA monetary policy to economic activity. Exports Demand for Australian exports was already starting to soften in the first few months of 2020. The year-over-year growth in total exports fell to 9.7% in March from a peak of 18.7% in July 2019. Exports to China, Australia’s largest trade partner, have held up better than non-Chinese exports (Chart 10). This was largely due to increased Chinese demand for Australian iron ore earlier in the year. Chart 9Bank Funding Pressures Have Diminished Iron ore prices have been declining more recently, but remain surprisingly elevated given the sharp contraction in global economic activity since March. This may be a sign that China’s reawakening from its own COVID-19 lockdowns, combined with more monetary and fiscal stimulus measures from Chinese policymakers, is putting a floor under the demand for Australian exports to China. Chart 10Australian Exports Will Not Rebound Anytime Soon Summing it all up, a major near-term economic contraction in Australia is unavoidable, but a relatively quick rebound could happen as domestic quarantine measures are lifted – especially given the significant amount of monetary and fiscal stimulus put in place by the RBA and the Australian government. Bottom Line: Australia is now in its first recession in 30 years, thanks to lockdown measures to contain the spread of COVID-19. Yet the nation’s rates of infection and death from the virus are relatively low, which should allow for a faster reopening of the domestic economy. A Powerful Policy Response To The Recession Almost every government and central bank in the world has introduced fiscal stimulus or monetary easing measures in response to the COVID-19 economic downturn. Australia’s policymakers have been particularly aggressive, both on the monetary and (especially) fiscal side. Monetary Policy The RBA has announced a variety of measures since late March to ease financial conditions and provide more liquidity to the economy, including: cutting the cash rate by 50bps to 0.25% the introduction of quantitative easing for the first time, buying government bonds in enough quantity in secondary markets to keep the yield on 3-year Australian government debt around 0.25% introducing a Term Funding Facility for the banking system under which authorized deposit-taking institutions can get funding from the RBA for three years at a rate of 0.25%, with additional funding available to increase lending to small and medium-sized businesses an increase in the amount and maturity of daily reverse repurchase (repo) operations, to support liquidity in the financial system setting up the currency swap line with the US Fed, providing US dollar liquidity to market participants in Australia. The RBA’s decisions on cutting the cash rate the 0.25%, and capping 3-year bond yields at the same level, sent a strong message to the markets that monetary policy must be highly accommodative until the threat of COVID-19 has passed. Fixed income markets have taken notice, with the yield on the benchmark 10-year Australian government bond falling from 1.30% just before the RBA announced the easing measures on March 19th to a low of 0.68% on April 1st. The yield has since rebounded to 0.95%, but this remains well below the level prevailing before the RBA eased. Those low interest rates have also helped to keep monetary conditions easy by dampening the attractiveness, and value, of the Australian dollar. The currency has historically been driven by three factors – interest rate differentials, commodity prices and global investor risk-aversion. With the RBA’s relentless rate cuts over the past decade, capped off by the measures introduced two months ago, the dominant factor on the currency has become interest rate differentials between Australia and other countries (Chart 11). The Aussie dollar has enjoyed a bounce as global equity markets have rebounded since the collapse in March, but remains well below levels implied by the RBA Commodity Price Index. The implication is that the upside in the currency will be capped by the RBA’s interest rate stance, which has taken all the formerly attractive carry out of the Aussie dollar. The RBA will need to maintain an accommodative stance for some time, as inflation – and inflation expectations – are likely to remain well below the central bank’s 2-3% target range. The RBA will need to maintain an accommodative stance for some time, as inflation – and inflation expectations – are likely to remain well below the central bank’s 2-3% target range. The new baseline forecast by the RBA calls for the Australian unemployment rate to double from 5.2% in Q1/2020 to 10% in Q2/2020, before drifting back down to 8.5% by Q2/2021 (Chart 12). The central bank sees the jobless rate returning to 6.5% in Q2/2022, but that will still not be enough to push headline or core CPI inflation back above 2% (middle panel). Chart 11Interest Rates Are The Main Driver Of The AUD Now Chart 12Inflation Is Dormant Down Under Inflation expectations have discounted a similar outcome. The Union Officials’ and Market Economists’ surveys of 2-year-ahead inflation expectations are both now under 2%. Market-based measures like the 2-year CPI swap rate are even more pessimistic, priced at a mere 0.12%! The recent plunge in oil prices is clearly playing a role in that extreme CPI swap pricing, but until there is some recover in market-based inflation expectations, the RBA will be unable to move away from its current emergency policy easing measures. Fiscal Policy The Australian government has been very aggressive in its economic support measures, including1: a so-called “JobKeeper Payment” to allow businesses to cover employee wages direct income support payments to individuals and households allowing temporary withdrawals from superannuation (retirement savings) plans direct financial support to businesses to “boost cash flow” temporary changes to bankruptcy laws to make it more difficult for creditors to demand payment increased financial incentives for new investment providing loan guarantees to small and medium-sized businesses temporarily easily regulatory standards (like capital ratios) for Australian banks, to free up more funds for lending The size of these combined measures is estimated to be 12.5% of GDP, according to calculations from the IMF (Chart 13). This puts Australia in the upper tier of G20 countries in terms of the size of the total government support measures, according to an analysis of fiscal policy responses to COVID-19 from our colleagues at BCA Research Global Investment Strategy.2 When looking at purely the fiscal policy response through tax changes and direct spending, and removing liquidity support and loan guarantees that may not be fully utilized, the Australian government’s stimulus response is 10.6% of GDP - the largest in the G20 (Chart 14). Chart 13Australian Policymakers Have Responded Aggressively To COVID-19 Chart 14Australia’s Planned Deficit Increase Is The Largest In The G20 Chart 15Australia Has The Fiscal Space To Be Aggressive The Australian government can deliver such a large response because it has the fiscal space to do it, with a debt/GDP ratio that was only 41.9% prior to the COVID-19 outbreak (Chart 15). This compares favorably to other countries that have delivered major stimulus packages but from a starting point of much higher levels of government debt. The Australian government can deliver such a large response because it has the fiscal space to do it. We do not see any downgrade risk for Australia’s sovereign AAA credit rating from the fiscal stimulus measures, despite the recent decision by S&P to put the nation on negative outlook. Australia will still have one of the lowest government debt/GDP ratios among the G20, even after adding in the expected increases in deficits for all the countries in 2020 (Chart 16). Chart 16Australia’s AAA Credit Rating Is Safe Net-net, the monetary and fiscal stimulus measures undertaken by Australian policymakers appear large enough to offset the immediate hit to the economy from the COVID-19 recession. This has important investment implications for Australian bond markets. The monetary and fiscal stimulus measures undertaken by Australian policymakers appear large enough to offset the immediate hit to the economy from the COVID-19 recession. Bottom Line: The RBA has taken extraordinary measures to cushion the blow from the lockdowns, like cutting policy rates to near-0% and capping shorter maturity bond yields through quantitative easing. The Australian government has also been aggressive in providing fiscal stimulus. These measures give the economy a better chance of seeing a “v”-shaped recovery as the lockdown restrictions are eased. Investment Conclusions We started this report by discussing the consistent outperformance of Australian government bonds versus other developed market debt over the past decade. After going through a careful analysis of the economy, inflation, monetary policy and fiscal policy, we now view the period of Australian bond outperformance as essentially complete. This leads us to make the following investment conclusions on a strategic (6-12 months) investment horizon. Duration: We recommend only a neutral duration stance for dedicated Australian fixed income portfolios; the RBA has little room to cut policy rates further; inflation expectations are too low; the nation is poised to rapidly emerge from COVID-19 lockdowns; and fiscal stimulus will be more than enough to offset the hit to domestic incomes from the recession. Country Allocation: Within global bond portfolios, we recommend downgrading Australia to neutral from overweight. The multi-year interest rate convergence story is largely complete, both in terms of central bank policy rates and longer-term bond yields. Our most reliable indicator for the future relative performance of Australian government bonds versus the global benchmark – the ratio of the OECD’s leading economic indicator for Australia to the overall OECD leading indicator – is increasing because of a greater decline in the non-Australian measure (Chart 17, second panel). This fits with the idea of the relative economic growth story turning into a headwind for Australian bonds after being a tailwind for the past few years. Within global bond portfolios, we recommend downgrading Australia to neutral from overweight.  Yield Curve: We recommend positioning for a steeper Australian government bond yield curve. The RBA is anchoring the short-end of the curve as part of its quantitative easing program, leaving the slope of the curve to be driven more by longer-term inflation expectations that are too depressed (third panel). Inflation-linked Bonds: We recommend overweighting Australian inflation-linked bonds versus nominal government debt. As we discussed in a recent report, breakevens on Australian inflation-linked bonds are far too low on our fair value models, which include the sharp decline in global oil prices (fourth panel).3 Chart 17Move To Neutral Duration Exposure In Australia, While Favoring Inflation-Linked Bonds Chart 18Australian Corporate Bonds Look More Attractive Now   Corporate Credit: We recommend going overweight Australian investment grade corporate debt versus government bonds. The recent spread widening has restored some value - especially when compared to the more modest increase seen in credit default spreads - while Australian equity market volatility, which correlates with spreads, has peaked (Chart 18). Also, the RBA has just announced that they will now accept investment grade corporates as collateral for its domestic repo market operations, which should increase the demand for corporates on the margin.4   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The full details of the Australian government economic response to COVID-19 can be found here: https://treasury.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/Overview-Economic_Response_to_the_Coronavirus_2.pdf 2 Please see BCA Research Global Investment Strategy Special Report, “The Global COVID-19 Fiscal Response: Is It Enough?”, dated April 30, 2020, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Global Inflation Expectations Are Now Too Low", dated April 28, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 4https://www.rba.gov.au/mkt-operations/announcements/broadening-eligibility-of-corporate-debt-securities.html Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index

Highlights Portfolio Strategy The Fed’s unorthodox monetary policy is aimed at quashing volatility, lifting asset prices and debasing the currency, all of which are equity market bullish. Grim, but backward looking, macro data are already reflected in the significant restaurant relative share price correction. Upgrade to neutral. Book profits in the underweight S&P rails portfolio position and lift exposure to neutral on the back of: a.) already reflected grim ISM services data, b.) resilient industry pricing power, c.) firming railroad profit margin backdrop and d.) encouraging signs from our EPS growth model.   Recent Changes Augment the S&P restaurants index to neutral, today. Upgrade the S&P railroads index to a benchmark allocation, today. Table 1 Feature The SPX made a fresh run to recovery highs last week, cheering forward looking news of reopening of the economy and neglecting backward looking downbeat employment and PMI releases. Extremely easy fiscal and monetary policies remain the dominant macro themes, and underpin our sanguine equity market view for the coming 9-12 months. While Bill Martin’s infamous 1955 portrayal of the Fed as “the chaperone who ordered the punch bowl removed just when the party was really warming up”,1 the Jay Powell led Fed has done the opposite, and rightly so: it has ordered and delivered a bottomless punchbowl. The Fed’s unorthodox monetary policy is aimed at quashing volatility (Chart 1), lifting asset prices and debasing the currency, all of which are equity market bullish. According to Leo Krippner’s shadow short rates (SSR) estimate, the shadow fed funds rate is negative and should continue to support the SPX (SSR shown inverted, Chart 2). Chart 1Vol Will Melt Chart 2Crumbling Shadow Rates Underpin The SPX…   In fact, there are two distinct avenues that declining interest rates underpin equities: First, falling interest rates are a boon to equities via a rising price-to-earnings multiple (SSR shown inverted, Chart 3). While the 12-month forward multiple is above a 20 handle, the highest point since the dotcom bubble era, using second and third fiscal year sell-side profit estimates – which better resemble trend EPS – results in a more tame forward P/E multiple with more upside (Chart 4). Second, while the Fed would never admit to it, it is trying to devalue the US dollar and reflate the global economy, which will indirectly boost S&P 500 revenues. As a reminder, 40% of SPX sales are internationally sourced and thus a falling greenback is a boon to S&P 500 turnover (bottom panel, Chart 5). Chart 3…Via Higher Valuations Keep in mind that most of global trade is conducted in USD and when trade collapses it creates a US dollar shortage (i.e. fewer US dollars are circulating around) that lifts the value of the reserve currency and vice versa. Cognizant of that, the Fed is trying to provide ample US dollar liquidity and aid in pushing the greenback lower (top panel, Chart 5). Chart 4Peer Across The EPS Valley, And Valuations Have Room To Rise Chart 5Depreciating USD Is A Boon For SPX Sales Drilling beneath the SPX’s surface, early-cyclical consumer discretionary equities are the primary beneficiaries of negative SSR. The top panel of Chart 6 shows that over the past three decades relative share prices are the mirror image of interest rates. This cycle, household finances are in order and coupled with generationally low interest rates signal that consumer spending will recover smartly as the economy opens up in coming quarters. Thus, consumer discretionary stocks should sustain their outperformance (middle & bottom panels, Chart 6). A small digression with regard to the reopening of the economy is in order. Pundits have been discussing and showing the three distinct waves of the Spanish flu as the closest parallel with the current pandemic. Chart 7 shows these three waves using UK data, but the UK equity market (and the DOW for that matter) did not really budge back then. Keep in mind this was in the midst of a recession as the Great War was about to end on November 11, 1918 (Remembrance Day). Chart 6Stick With Consumer Discretionary Exposure Chart 7The 1918 UK Parallel, Including Equities   While no one really knows how in the long-term this pandemic will affect the economy, the stock market, society in general and consumer behavior in particular, our sense is that uncertainty will continue to recede in the coming months irrespective of the second and third likely waves. Why? Because not only do governments know more about this invisible enemy, but they (and hospitals) will also be more prepared to deal with any future outbreaks. Moreover, given that there is a race to get a novel coronavirus vaccine (and treatment) the world over, a breakthrough will soon materialize; MRNA’s recent FDA phase II clinical trial for their vaccine candidate is a case in point. Receding uncertainty is great news for stock investors. Meanwhile, in recent research we highlighted that early-cyclical interest rate-sensitive equities do in fact lead the GICS1 sector pack in recessionary recoveries based on empirical evidence.2 As a reminder, in mid-April we lifted the S&P consumer discretionary sector to overweight and this week we are updating our views on a hard hit subindex. We are also upgrading a deep cyclical services industry to neutral. Preparing To Dine Out It no longer pays to be underweight the S&P restaurants index; upgrade to neutral today. Not only the reopening of the economy will, at the margin, bring back diners (take out mostly) to restaurants, but the two heavyweights that comprise 80% of the market cap of the S&P restaurants group are anything but discretionary. In our view, MCD is defensive and SBUX has become a staple. Thus, as the economy slowly reopens and store traffic picks up, these bellwether stocks will lead this index higher. Relative share prices have corrected to the twenty-year uptrend line and hover near the previous two breakout points in 2011/12 and 2015/16 where they should find enough support (top panel, Chart 8). With regard to macro data, most of the restaurant-relevant releases are looking in the rear view mirror. In other words, the trouncing in restaurant retail sales and employment, food-away-from-home PCE and even the collapse in the Restaurant Performance Index were “known knowns” (Chart 8). Therefore, all of this grim news is already reflected in the 30% drubbing in relative performance from peak-to-trough. Chart 8Grim Data Priced In Chart 9Dollar The Reflator Domestic restaurant sales should stabilize in the coming months. If the Fed manages to devalue the US dollar (please see discussion above), then even international revenues in general and Chinese sourced sales in particular will rekindle overall industry turnover (Chart 9). Keep in mind that China’s economy reopening is leading the global economy by about six weeks. Importantly, construction spending on restaurants is falling like a stone and this decline in supply and industry capex will provide a much needed offset to free cash flow generation (middle panel, Chart 10). Nevertheless, three key concerns keep us at bay and prevent us from turning outright bullish. First, net debt-to-EBITDA has taken a steep turn for the worst of late, and while it is mostly driven by the shortfall in cash flow, it is still quite unnerving (bottom panel, Chart 11). Second, there is margin trouble that restauranteurs have yet to work out, and a rising wage bill will continue to weigh on profit growth (second panel, Chart 11). Finally, relative valuations are lofty for our liking. On a 12-month forward P/E basis the S&P restaurants index is trading at 53% premium to the SPX and 26% above the historical mean (third panel, Chart 11). Chart 10Supply Restraint Is Positive Chart 11Watch These Risks Netting it all out, grim but backward looking macro data are already reflected in the significant restaurant relative share price correction. Lift exposure to a benchmark allocation. Bottom Line: Lift the S&P restaurants index to neutral for a relative loss of 13.7% since inception. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5REST – MCD, SBUX, YUMB, CMG, DRI. Upgrade Rails To Neutral Over the past three years we have been mostly on the right side of rails both in bull and bear phases; today we recommend cementing relative gains of 6.4% since inception, and lifting exposure to neutral. Rails are the largest transports subgroup and this services industry is showcasing impressive resilience in times of adversity. True, the latest ISM non-manufacturing survey made for grim reading. Both the headline number and most of the key subcomponents of the survey were tough to digest: the overall survey fell near the GFC lows (bottom panel, Chart 12), the Business Activity Index collapsed to 26%, an all-time low. While this survey can fall anew next month, we deem that extreme pessimism reigns supreme, and as the US economy is slated to reopen some semblance of normality will return in coming months. Tack on the improving export data out of China, and we are cautiously optimistic that rail hauling services will soon stage a comeback (middle panel, Chart 12). Chart 12As Bad As It Gets Chart 13Green Shoots The defensive nature of rails is most evident in industry pricing power (third panel, Chart 13). Railroad selling prices are holding their own despite a sizable drop in volumes. Moreover, CEOs exercised caution and refrained from adding to headcount. Taken together, they are boosting our profit margin proxy, which can serve as a catalyst to lift relative share price momentum out of its recent funk (second panel, Chart 13). Similarly, our 3 factor S&P rail EPS growth model is heralding a pickup in profits in the back half of the year (bottom panel, Chart 13). Despite all these tailwinds, there are some powerful offsets that tame our optimism on railroards. Intermodal rail shipments are a major freight category and thus a key determinant of rail profitability. As consumer confidence remains in freefall, downbeat retail sales will cast a dark shadow on this essential rail freight category (Chart 14). Finally, the industry’s rising debt profile is still a primary concern. Rail executives neglected capex in recent years and instead raised debt in order to retire equity and enhance shareholder value. We continue to view this “investment” backdrop with skepticism and prior to further augmenting exposure to an overweight stance we would want to see an easing on the debt uptake directed at these shareholder friendly activities (Chart 15). Chart 14The Consumer Is A Sore Spot Chart 15Debt Burden Flashing Red In sum, we are compelled to take profits in our underweight S&P rails portfolio position and lift exposure to neutral on the back of: a.) already reflected grim ISM services data, b.) resilient industry pricing power, c.) firming railroad profit margin backdrop and d.) encouraging signs from our EPS growth model. Bottom Line: Lift the S&P railroads index to a benchmark allocation today booking a profit of 6.4% since inception. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5RAIL – UNP, NSC, CSX, KSU.   Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com       Footnotes 1     https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/statements-speeches-william-mcchesney-martin-jr-448/address-new-york-group-investment-bankers-association-america-7800 2     Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Fight Central Banks At Your Own Peril” dated April 14, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.   Current Recommendations Current Trades Strategic (10-Year) Trade Recommendations Size And Style Views June 3, 2019 Stay neutral cyclicals over defensives (downgrade alert)  January 22, 2018 Favor value over growth April 28, 2020  Stay neutral large over small caps  June 11, 2018 Long the BCA Millennial basket  The ticker symbols are: (AAPL, AMZN, UBER, HD, LEN, MSFT, NFLX, SPOT, TSLA, V).

Highlights Ever since the Federal Reserve’s liquidity injections, the dollar has been trading in a bifurcated manner. Historically, this has been a rare event. The main bifurcation has been between developed market and commodity/emerging market currencies. Stability in the USD/CNY exchange rate is a key indicator to watch. Movements in this cross will indicate where the balance of forces are shifting. Feature Chart I-1A Tale Of Two Dollars The Federal Reserve’s dollar liquidity injections have been massive, but two dollars continue to fight a tug of war. The first is the DXY index, which has largely surrendered to the flood of liquidity offered through the Fed’s swap lines and temporary FIMA repo facility. In fact, cross-currency basis swaps in both Japan and the euro area, a measure of offshore dollar funding stress, have eased. As a result, volatility in the DXY index has been crushed, keeping it largely below the psychological 100 level. However, on the other side of the liquidity battle front have been emerging market and commodity currencies, some of which continue to make fresh lows. Remarkably, these have included currencies such as the Brazilian real that also have swap agreements with the US. In short, a rare divergence has opened up between two dollars (Chart I-1). Historically, whenever this has occurred, either the DXY index was on the verge of making new highs, or procyclical currencies were very close to a bottom. In our April 3rd report, we suggested three reasons as to why the dollar could remain well bid in the near term.1 In this report, we explore these reasons further and offer one variable to watch as the key arbiter between the two – the USD/CNY exchange rate. A Tale Of Two Dollars The bifurcated dollar performance has been underpinned by three factors. The 14 developed and emerging market currencies that have swap lines with the Fed2 all bottomed around March 19, when the funding announcement was made. These include currencies of countries that were initially excluded from a prior swap agreement such as Australia, Norway and New Zealand. The exception to this rule has been the Brazilian real. By extension, some currencies currently excluded from the swap agreement such as the Turkish lira and South African rand remain in freefall. The temporary repo facility for foreign and international monetary authorities (FIMA), which allows FIMA account holders to temporarily exchange their Treasury securities held with the Fed for US dollars, has instilled confidence. As such, this has assuaged selling pressure on currencies with ample dollar foreign exchange reserves. However, some currencies with low reserves such as the South African rand or Turkish lira continue to face downside risks. A huge portion of offshore dollar funding has been financed by non-bank entities. Not only does a rising dollar lift the debt burden of borrowers, but it also raises solvency risk for these concerns. Notably, non-banks have limited access to central bank swap lines. Of the US$12 trillion in dollar-denominated foreign debt outstanding, 32% is from emerging markets, a share that has increased massively since the financial crisis (Chart I-2). This might explain why currencies like the Brazilian real, exposed to significant foreign-currency corporate debt obligations, continue to see selling pressure, despite the Fed facilities in place (Chart I-3). Chart I-2Rising EM Dollar Debt Chart I-3Some EM Have High External Debt In short, with the Fed and many other developed-market central banks engaged in active purchases of corporate paper, a line in the sand has been drawn between currencies where the lenders of last resort have stepped in, and others where their central banks are still unwilling to take credit risk. Put another way, certain currency markets are starting to price USD solvency risk, resulting from the broad shutdown in their economies and the rise in the greenback. Unfortunately, there is nothing the Fed can do about this. Dollar liquidity shortages tend to be vicious because they trigger negative feedback loops. As offshore dollar rates among non-banks begin to rise, this lifts the cost of capital for borrowing entities, with debt repayment replacing capital spending. This is where China can step in. The People’s Bank of China has massive foreign exchange reserves, worth about US$3.1 trillion. This means it can provide swap agreements that will almost cover the totality of EM foreign dollar debt. The important distinction from foreign exchange reserves is that swap agreements entail no exchange of currency. As such, it is about confidence. With low external debt and massive FX reserves, the PBoC can instill this confidence in countries that have low and/or falling foreign exchange reserves.  Certain currency markets are starting to price USD solvency risk, resulting from the broad shutdown in their economies and the rise in the greenback.  There has been a precedent to this. Since the global financial crisis, as the PBoC has been engaging in powerful monetary stimulus, the number of bilateral swap lines offered to foreign central banks has also ballooned. Bloomberg no longer publishes swap data for the PBoC, but a recent article suggests that as recent as 2018, the Chinese central bank had bilateral local currency swap agreements with central banks or monetary authorities in 38 countries and regions, with a total amount of around 3.7 trillion yuan (Chart I-4).3 Remarkably, this excluded the US Fed. This means that the USD/CNY exchange rate will become a key arbiter of the divergence between the two dollars. If Asian and Latin American currencies can stabilize versus the RMB and the USD/CNY exchange rate can remain stable, then an informal accord has been established. So far, the RMB appears the arbiter between these two dollars (Chart I-5). Chart I-4Chinese Swaps To The Rescue? Chart I-5USD/CNY As A Dollar Arbiter We understand that geopolitical tensions between the US and China are escalating, and so the probability of such an event – if global growth rebounds earnestly – is low. However, should global growth remain weak, a fall in the RMB will highlight the PBoC is actively using its currency as a weapon. This will suggest all bets are off. Bottom Line: Developed market commodity currencies have a correlation of almost parity with EM FX (Chart I-6). An explicit swap agreement between China and emerging market countries could be the key to assuage dollar funding pressures within emerging markets. This will ease the selling pressure on developed-market commodity currencies. Chart I-6The Risk To Commodity Currencies Market Signals And Signposts Ever since Richard Nixon severed the gold-dollar link in the early ‘70s, there have been three major episodes when some currencies bucked the broad dollar trend. Historically, this has been driven by two major factors (Table I-1):4 Table I-1Summary Of Currency Divergence Episodes De-synchronized global growth A localized debt/economic crisis The first episode occurred in the early 1990s. As the world was exiting a recession in part triggered by tight US monetary policies, lower US interest rates allowed the dollar to fall along with rising global growth. Only the yen, on the back of an economy entering into a debt deflation spiral (where positive real rates begot more currency appreciation), was able to buck this trend. Developed market commodity currencies have a correlation of almost parity with EM FX. The late 1990s saw the capitulation of Asian currencies. As a safe haven, the US dollar started to benefit from repatriation flows. Asean and commodity currencies were under intense selling pressure from pegged exchange rates and a long period of low interest rates that had generated massive imbalances. Remarkably, the euro was the area of shelter..  The world in 2005-2006 was entering a full-blown mania. Procyclical currencies were benefitting from Chinese industrialization and the creation of the euro. Meanwhile, Japan continued to sag under a mountain of debt. This pushed market participants to increasingly use the yen as a funding currency for carry trades, allowing it to depreciate versus the US dollar. Enter 2020. The world today is in a synchronized slowdown, but varying degrees of policy measures suggest we could continue to see a lack of synchronicity in dollar trading over the near term: The euro area appears poised to recover faster than the US in the near term (Chart I-7). If this proves correct, any knee-jerk selloffs in the euro should be bought. This is directly linked to the speed at which European economies reopen, relative to the US. By extension, Asian currencies should do better than those in Latin America. Conclusion: the dollar could fall against the euro, but rise against some emerging market currencies. The easiest way to express this view is to buy the cheapest European currencies, such as the Norwegian krone and Swedish krona. We are long both. The yen, typically used as a funding currency, will be hostage to a sudden stop in funding flows. This is because there is no interest rate advantage anymore between Japanese and US paper, once accounting for hedging costs (Chart I-8). This suggests carry trades in developed markets, using the Japanese yen, are stuck in the barn for now. Meanwhile, as a safe haven currency, the yen will still benefit from a rise in FX volatility. Short USD/JPY hedges make sense. Chart I-7Euro Area Versus##br## US Growth Chart I-8The Yen Is No Longer An Attractive Funding Currency Commodity and emerging market FX will be the outlier against the US dollar for now. These continue to face downward pressure in the near term. In terms of commodities, the sudden stop in demand has been met with an overwhelmingly slow response to curtail supply. Eventually, higher demand will benefit these currencies, but the supply story dominates for now in crude oil and industrial commodities. That said, this week’s rise in Chinese commodity imports was encouraging. Stay tuned.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled “Capitulation?,” dated April 3, 2020, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 2 These include the Bank Of Canada, Bank Of Japan, Bank Of England, European Central Bank, the Swiss National Bank, the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Banco Central do Brasil, the Danmarks Nationalbank (Denmark), the Bank of Korea, the Banco de Mexico, the Norges Bank, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Monetary Authority of Singapore, and the Sveriges Riksbank. 3 Please see The History Of Commerce, China. 4 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, titled “Can There Be More Than One US Dollar”, dated June 08, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the US have been negative: The Markit manufacturing PMI fell to 36.1 in April; the services PMI also slipped to 26.7. ISM manufacturing PMI dropped to 41.5 and non-manufacturing PMI declined to 41.8. The trade deficit widened from $39.8 billion to $44.4 billion in March. Unit labor costs increased by 4.8% quarterly in Q1, while nonfarm productivity fell by 2.5%. Initial jobless claims continued to grow by 3169K last week. The DXY index surged by 1.5% this week. The Senior Loan Officer Survey released this week reported an increasing net percentage of domestic banks tightening standards for most loan types in Q1, including C&I, auto and mortgage loans. On Tuesday, the Fed’s Raphael Bostic said that there are great uncertainties around “V-shape” recovery. Report Links: Capitulation? - April 3, 2020 The Dollar Funding Crisis - March 19, 2020 Are Competitive Devaluations Next? - March 6, 2020 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area have been negative: The Markit manufacturing PMI fell further from 33.6 to 33.4 in April, while the services PMI stayed low at 12. Sentix investor confidence remained low at -41.8 in May. Retail sales contracted by 9.2% year-on-year in March, compared to a 3% increase the previous month.  The euro declined by 0.8% against the US dollar this week. The German court has criticized the ECB bond-buying programme, warning that the ECB’s purchases could be illegal under German law unless the ECB can prove otherwise. Continuing conflicts among Eurozone members and imbalances between countries could add more pressure on the ECB. In addition, the European Commission forecasts the euro zone economy to contract by a record 7.7% this year. Report Links: On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver - October 11, 2019 Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data from Japan have been negative: The manufacturing PMI fell from 43.7 to 41.9 in April. Vehicle sales kept contracting by 25.5% year-on-year in April, following a decline of 10.2% in March. Monetary base increased by 2.3% year-on-year in April, down from a 2.8% increase the previous month. The Japanese yen appreciated by 0.4% against the US dollar this week, despite broad US dollar strength. Since the beginning of the Fed swap lines operation this year, the BoJ has the highest liquidity swaps with the Fed, amounting to US$220 billion as of April 30, helping to ease dollar funding pressure in Japan. Report Links: The Near-Term Bull Case For The Dollar - February 28, 2020 Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 Currency Market Signals From Gold, Equities And Flows - January 31, 2020 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the UK have been mostly negative: The Markit manufacturing PMI fell further to 32.6 from 32.9 in April, while services PMI remained low at 13.4. Nationwide housing prices increased by 3.7% year-on-year in April, up from 3% the previous month. Money supply (M4) surged by 7.4% year-on-year in March. The British pound plunged by 2.7% against the US dollar this week. The Bank of England held interest rates unchanged on Thursday morning, while warning that the coronavirus crisis will push the UK economy into its deepest recession in 300 years. The Bank is now forecasting the output to slip by 3% in Q1, followed by a 2.5% plunge in Q2. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? - Sept. 20, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia have been mixed: Building permits plunged by 4% month-on-month in March, down from 19.4% the previous month. Exports surged by 15.1% month-on-month while imports fell by 3.6% in March. The trade surplus expanded by A$6.8 billion to A$10.6 billion. The Australian dollar fell by 1.5% against the US dollar this week. On Tuesday, the RBA kept its interest rate unchanged at 0.25%. More importantly, the Bank has scaled back the size and frequency of bond purchases, which so far totalled A$50 billion, while stating that they are prepared to scale-up the purchases again should conditions worsen. In addition, the RBA forecasts the output to fall by roughly 10% in the first half of 2020 and by 6% over the year, followed by a rebound of 6% next year. Report Links: On AUD And CNY - January 17, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand have been mixed: Building permits fell by 21.3% month-on-month in March, down from 5.7% increase in February. The unemployment rate ticked up from 4% to 4.2% in Q1, lower than the expected 4.4%. Employment increased by 0.7% quarter-on-quarter. The participation rate increased by 30 bps to 70.4%. In addition, wage rates increased by 2.5% annually. The New Zealand dollar dropped by 1.8% against the US dollar this week. While many may call the Q1 Labour Market Statistics a positive surprise, Statistics New Zealand has indicated that the March data from household labour force survey was interrupted due to the lockdown in March. In a typical quarter, around 25% of the interviews for this survey are carried out face-to-face. We expect the Q2 Labour Survey to show more clearly how the COVID-19 lockdown has changed New Zealand’s labour market. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 USD/CNY And Market Turbulence - August 9, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada have been negative: The Markit manufacturing PMI plunged from 46.1 to 33 in April. Both exports and imports fell notably in March: exports narrowed by C$2.3 billion to C$46.3 billion. Imports decreased by C$1.8 billion to C$47.7 billion. The trade deficit widened from C$0.9 billion to C$1.4 billion. Bloomberg Nanos confidence ticked up from 37.1 to 37.7 for the week ended May 1. The Canadian dollar fell by 0.9% against the US dollar this week. The decline in exports was led by auto manufacturing, aircraft, and energy products. Moreover, a depreciating Canadian dollar has largely impacted the trade values in March. When expressed in US dollar terms, export fall by 9.2% month-on-month and imports by 8.1%, which compares favourably with 4.7% decrease in exports and 3.5% decline in imports in Canadian dollars. Report Links: More On Competitive Devaluations, The CAD And The SEK - May 1, 2020 A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 The Loonie: Upside Versus The Dollar, But Downside At The Crosses Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland have been mostly negative: The manufacturing PMI fell from 43.7 to 40.7 in April, above the expectations of 34.6. Consumer climate plunged from -9.4 to -39.3 in Q2. Headline consumer prices fell by -1.1% year-on-year in April, down from -0.5% in March, also below the expectations of -0.8%.  The unemployment rate increased from 2.8% to 3.3% on a seasonally adjusted basis in April. The Swiss franc fell by 1% against the US dollar this week. With consumer prices decreasing for a third consecutive month, the SNB has stepped up the currency intervention. Total sight deposits have increased by nearly 77 billion CHF this year, compared to only 13.2 billion CHF in 2019 and 2.3 billion CHF in 2018. Report Links: On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Currency Market Signals From Gold, Equities And Flows - January 31, 2020 Portfolio Tweaks Before The Chinese New Year - January 24, 2020 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 There has been no significant data release from Norway this week. The Norwegian krone appreciated by 0.6% against the US dollar this week. On Thursday morning, the Norges Bank delivered a surprise rate cut by 25 bps to a record low of 0 due to the severity of the coronavirus and huge decline in oil prices. However, they also implied that further cuts into negative territory are unlikely. In addition, Governor Øystein Olsen said that they expect the output to drop by roughly 5% this year, a decline of a magnitude that has not been seen since World War II. Report Links: A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 On Oil, Growth And The Dollar - January 10, 2020 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden have been negative: Manufacturing PMI fell from 42.6 to 36.7 in April. Industrial production fell by 0.1% year-on-year in March. Manufacturing new orders contracted by 2% year-on-year in March, down from 5.7% increase in February. The Swedish krona has been more or less flat against the US dollar this week. Like the ECB, the Riksbank might have some legal issues regarding its bond purchases program. The current Riksbank Act does not allow the bank to make outright purchases of corporate bonds or other private securities on the primary or secondary markets. So far, the Riksbank has purchased 5.6 billion SEK of corporate commercial papers to support the economy under the COVID-19. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades