Equities
We raised the S&P air freight & logistics group to overweight earlier this year based principally on the index being a chief beneficiary should green shoots in global trade proliferate. Since then, global export expectations have shot higher and global ton miles have staged the best recovery since the GFC (second panel). Anecdotally on its earnings call this week, FedEx called this year the "best year for global trade in years". Despite the overwhelmingly positive backdrop, the air freight & logistics index has barely budged. The result is that valuation multiples have collapsed to a fifteen year low (bottom panel). We continue to think the positive earnings momentum in this index can be ignored for only so long; the air freight & logistics group should see a long-overdue rerating. We reiterate our high-conviction overweight recommendation. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5AIRF - UPS, FDX, CHRW, EXPD.
Highlights EM EPS growth is set to decelerate significantly and will likely turn negative in 2018 based on the China/EM money/credit indicators. All measures of Chinese broad money growth have fallen to a record low signifying a major growth slump. The two pillars of the EM currency rally - strong growth in China that manifests in higher commodities prices and lower U.S. bond yields- are set to reverse. EM equities and credit markets relative performance versus their DM peers is about to relapse. A new fixed-income trade: receive 2-year swap rates in Mexico / pay 2-year swap rates in the U.S. Feature Last week we were on the road, meeting with some of our U.S. East Coast clients. This week we address some of the common questions we received. Q: Why do you think EM profits will relapse in the next six-to-nine months, given both global and EM growth continue to show strength? A: Our reluctance to change our view on EM risk assets in general and equities in particular has to do with EM/China business cycle/corporate profit indicators. Several indicators for EM profits - which have exhibited very good track records - presently forecast a material slowdown and possibly a contraction in EM EPS starting late this year and well into next year. In particular, China's broad and narrow money impulses lead EM EPS by about nine months, and are currently signaling that EPS growth is set to peak and begin to decline in the next nine months (Chart I-1). What's more, a few business cycle indicators from Korea and Taiwan, such as nominal manufacturing production and manufacturing shipments-to-inventory ratios, corroborate a peak in EM EPS growth (Chart I-2). Chart I-1EM EPS Is Set to Decelerate ##br##And Probably Contract Chart I-2More Signs Of Relapse##br## In EM EPS Growth Importantly, the EM corporate earnings slowdown will not occur in a vacuum. It will transpire amid a slowdown in Asian trade and lower commodities prices. In particular: China's broad money M3 impulse leads domestic industrial orders, nominal manufacturing production and imports (Chart I-3). Even though Asian export data were strong in August, China's container freight index signals a slowdown in Asian trade lies ahead (Chart I-4). Chart I-3China: M3 Impulse And Domestic Demand Chart I-4Asian Export Growth To Slow The Chinese broad money impulse also points to a rollover in Korean, Taiwanese, other EM as well as DM countries' shipments to the mainland (Chart I-5). This is how the slowdown in China's money/credit will hurt corporate profits in EM as well as in DM sectors with substantial exposure to Chinese growth. Besides, China's broad money impulse leads industrial metals prices in general and iron ore prices in particular (Chart I-6). This signifies downside risks to commodities producers. Finally, China's yield curve suggests that mainland manufacturing PMI will roll over after its recent ascent (Chart I-7). Chart I-5Shipments To China Are At Risk Chart I-6Industrial Metals Prices Have Peaked Chart I-7China: The Yield Curve And Manufacturing PMI In short, China has been gradually tightening monetary policy, which has already manifested in record-low broad money growth. The next phase is evidence of a material deterioration in sales and profits among China-exposed plays. The EM stock markets are unlikely to ignore it. Q: It seems you are putting a lot of emphasis on China's broad money M3 measure. Why do you look at your version of Chinese broad money M3 and not at official M2 and total social financing (TSF)? A: Over the past several months we have done a lot of research and analysis on China's money and credit, and believe that our broad money M3 measure and private and public credit aggregate calculated by BIS are presently better measures of money and credit than official broad money M2 and TSF: First, the TSF data have become distorted because of the local government financing vehicles (LGFV) debt swap program. Specifically, according to the LGFV debt swap mechanics, starting in 2015 provincial governments began issuing bonds that have been purchased by banks. The amount of bonds issued was RMB 3.2 trillion in 2015, RMB 4.9 trillion in 2016 and expected to be RMB 4.8 trillion in 2017. This amounts to total issuance of RMB 12.9 trillion since the commencement of the program. As the next step, local governments were supposed to transfer the proceeds from these bond issuances to their LGFVs, with the latter using the money to pay down their debt. The ultimate goal of the program is to shift the debt from LGFVs to provincial governments, as the latter's creditworthiness is much better than the former. This has also reduced interest rates on the debt as provincial governments borrow at lower interest rates than LGFVs. All that said, it is unclear how much of their debt LGFVs have repaid. The main problem with using TSF data is knowing the amount of proceeds from the issued debt swap bonds that were used to pay down LGFV debt. If the entire amount of these bonds issued by provincial governments was used to pay down LGFV debt, there would not be an impact on economic activity, and only a very short-term impact on money supply. When banks buy bonds from non-banks (including governments), they create new money. When debtors (including governments and their entities) pay down debt to banks, money is destroyed. Nevertheless, both official M1 growth and our measure of broad money (M3) were too strong in 2015 and 2016 – i.e., they remained strong much longer than would have been justified by the LGFV debt swap. Furthermore, private and public credit, M2 and M3 money measures have decoupled from TSF since the middle of 2015 (Chart I-8A). TSF adjusted for the LGFV debt swap – the latter is added to TSF – has also diverged from official M2, our broad money M3 and BIS’s private and public credit measures (Chart I-8B). This corroborates that TSF data can no longer serve as a reliable measure of credit/money origination. Chart I-8AChina: TSF Has Diverged From ##br##Other Money/Credit Measures Chart I-8BChina: TSF Adjusted For LGFV Debt Swap Has Also Decoupled From Money/Credit Measures Markedly, paying down debt by LGFVs should have reduced corporate debt outstanding by RMB 12.9 trillion, which would represent a 12% drop from the RMB 112 trillion outstanding at the end of 2015. However, corporate debt has continued to expand rapidly, even as government debt has surged. Given all of the above, we doubt all of the proceeds from bonds issued within the LGFV debt swap program were immediately used to repay LGFV debt. Instead, we suspect the proceeds from the bond issuance might have been at least partially invested into the economy in 2016, in defiance of the rules of LGFV debt swap operation. We played down the rise in M1 in late 2015 and early 2016 because we regarded it as temporary, reflecting the LGFV debt swap program. In retrospect, it was a mistake - this was one of the main reasons we did not heed the message from recovering money growth in early 2016 to turn cyclically positive on China's growth, and consequently on commodities and broader EM. Provided we do not know what portion of LGFV debt was repaid and when, corporate credit and total social financing data have become difficult to interpret. Chart I-8A and Chart I-8B demonstrate that TSF with and without the LGFV debt swap has diverged from private and public debt since the middle of 2015 when the LGFV debt swap program commenced. Apparently, one no longer can rely on TSF or adjust it by the amount of LGFV debt swap to gauge money and credit creation in China. In this context, the aggregate of private and public credit is a much more appropriate measure of credit provision and debt creation than TSF. The basis is because it includes both private and public debt. Indeed, the reshuffling of debt between local governments and LGFVs (the latter are treated as enterprises in China's banking statistics), does not affect either aggregate borrowing or amount of debt held in the economy. Second, when credit numbers are distorted, one needs to resort to money supply measures to judge credit dynamics. The reason is because financial engineering and, in the case of China, the LGFV debt swap program, can obscure the amount of outstanding credit, but they cannot conceal the amount of money banks create when they lend or purchase bonds or any other asset. Money is created when a bank originates claims on non-banks, and money is destroyed when a debt is paid back to the bank. Accordingly, money traces debt creation by banks. Banks can disguise their assets, and corporations and governments can conceal their liabilities, but none of them can camouflage the amount of money in circulation. In short, we trace money to gauge the amount of private and public sector borrowing from banks. This is why we have calculated various measures of money in China to overcome the shortcomings of the TSF. Specifically, we have calculated broad money M3 (see details of our calculation below) and credit-money. The latter is the sum of commercial banks' assets such as claims on non-financial institutions, claims on other financial institutions, claims on government and claim on other resident sectors and commerical banks' as well as the central bank's foreign currency assets. Chart I-9 demonstrates various measures of broad money and outstanding credit: official M2, our measure of broad money M3, our credit-money measure, and private and public debt (source BIS). Importantly, all measures of money and private and public credit suggest that credit origination/money creation was very strong in 2015 and 2016, and that it has slowed substantially in 2017. In brief, the message from various measures of money/credit is consistent. Chart I-9China: Money/Credit Growth Has Decelerated To New Lows Interestingly, broad money M3 rose by RMB 21 trillion in 2015, RMB 20 trillion in 2016 and by only RMB 16.5 trillion in the past 12 months through end of August. This is why the M3 impulse - a change in money flows - has turned negative since early this year. Third, we prefer our broad money measure M3 to official M2 because it is more consistent with the BIS's measure of private and public credit. It has also served as a better tool in forecasting the 2016-2017 recovery in Chinese growth. As can be seen in Chart 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 on previous pages, the M3 impulse - its second derivative - has a great track record in forecasting China's business cycle dynamics. The acceleration in M2 growth in 2015-16 was milder than one would expect in order to achieve meaningful acceleration in nominal economic activity. M2 growth was more subdued than a rise in both private and public debt (Chart I-9). We suspect that M2 is no longer an encompassing measure of broad money in China, and therefore we have calculated other measures of broad money to gauge true money/credit creation. Chart I-10China: Consumer Price Inflation Is Rising Broad money consists of various liabilities of commercial banks. While the official M2 includes many of their liabilities such as corporate demand deposits, corporate time deposits and personal deposits. It does not include some others. We have added the following commercial banks' liabilities - transferable deposits and other deposits which are not included in M2, liabilities to other financial corporations and other liabilities - to M2 to produce a more all-inclusive measure of broad money M3. Q: Why can't the Chinese authorities stimulate and revive growth again, like they have done many times in the past? A: Of course, they can. However, if the authorities begin easing monetary/credit and fiscal policies now, it will affect growth six to nine months down the road. Based on money and credit indicators shown in the charts above, growth is set to slow over the next nine months because of the time lag that money/credit has on the economy. In the next six to nine months, economic activity and corporate profits are likely to decelerate considerably, based on the monetary/credit tightening that has already occurred in China. Provided China-related financial markets in general and EM risk assets in particular have so far not discounted the slowdown suggested by China's money/credit indicators, they are very vulnerable. Finally, the magnitude of the impending growth slump is likely to be large, as evidenced by the substantial decline in these money and credit indicators that has already occurred. In brief, policymakers have been tightening credit/money creation, and it has not yet impacted financial markets. Furthermore, inflation is rising in China (Chart I-10) and policymakers are unlikely to start easing before they witness a major growth slump. Until the latter becomes visible in economic data and on the ground, financial markets leveraged to mainland growth will sell off notably. Q: There is no indication that the Federal Reserve will turn hawkish. This will be especially true if global growth slows - as you argue it will because of China. Why do you expect the EM currency rally to peter out amid a dovish Fed? Historical empirical evidence suggests that EM currencies are often driven by commodities prices, not the interest rate differential over U.S. rates. Let's take the BRL and the ZAR as examples. Charts I-11A and Chart I-11B illustrate that the BRL and ZAR exchange rates versus the U.S. dollar have historically been closely correlated with commodities prices, not the level of or change in their interest rate differential over the U.S. Chart I-11ABrazil: What Drives The Currency? Chart I-11BSouth Africa: What Drives The Currency? This has also been true over the past 18 months. The rally in EM currencies since early 2016 can be largely attributed to the rise in commodities prices. As and when commodities prices roll over - as we expect to occur - the trade balances of commodities-producing nations will deteriorate, as will their currencies. Remarkably, there are tentative signs that the drop in U.S. bond yields and the greenback's depreciation are late and overdone. Two-year U.S. bond yields have bounced from their 200-day moving average (please refer to the middle panel of Chart II-1 in the Mexican section). Typically, such a technical profile leads to new highs. Our sense is that U.S. bond yields will rebound in the coming months, which will also weigh on EM currencies. Importantly, one of the drivers behind the U.S. dollar selloff since early this year has been the rise in banks' excess reserves at the Fed (Chart I-12). The latter was due to the debt ceiling, as the U.S. Treasury was running down its account at the Fed by issuing less paper. In short, since the beginning of this year the U.S. Treasury did not issue bonds/bills and deposit them at its Treasury General Account (TGA) at the Fed - meaning it was not destroying banking system reserves as it typically does. This boosted the supply of U.S. dollars - banks' excess reserves at the Fed rose by US$ 300 billion. More dollar supply depressed both the exchange rate and U.S. interest rates. Chart I-12 demonstrates that in the post-QE era, banks' excess reserves at the Fed have correlated with the U.S. dollar's exchange rate. The debt ceiling has been resolved for now, and the Treasury will now begin accumulating dollars in its TGA account again. It has already announced that its TGA will rise from $73 billion now to $400 billion at the end of this year. The Treasury will issue more paper, and deposit U.S. dollars in the TGA. This will shrink banks' excesses reserves. This, in tandem with the reduction in the Fed's balance sheet, will diminish banks' excess reserves. The latter will reduce U.S. dollar supply in off-shore markets and will likely trigger a U.S. dollar rebound. On the whole, the two pillars of the EM currency rally - strong growth in China that manifests in higher commodities prices and lower U.S. bond yields - are set to reverse. In turn, a potential EM currency selloff along with deteriorating EM corporate profits will likely weigh on EM equities and EM sovereign and corporate debt. Q: Does this mean EM stocks will relapse in absolute terms, or simply underperform the DM equity markets? Our strongest conviction at the moment is on EM relative equity performance versus DM equity markets. Odds are that a relapse in relative performance is imminent as and if U.S. bond yields rise (Chart I-13). Chart I-12U.S. Banks' Excess Reserves ##br##And The U.S. Dollar Chart I-13U.S. Stocks Outperform EM Ones When ##br##U.S. Bond Yields Are Rising In addition, U.S. stocks' underperformance versus the global equity index in common currency terms is at a technical support (Chart I-14, top panel), and will likely reverse as the dollar firms up. Historically, when U.S. stocks outperform the global benchmark in common currency terms - denoted by shaded periods in Chart I-14, EM stocks typically underperform the global equity index. The dynamics of EM equity absolute performance depends on investor's risk appetite. It will be hard for EM share prices to drop meaningfully as the DM rally persists. Global stocks are still trading well, and it is very difficult to pinpoint any trigger that will lead to a reversal. As our readers well know, we do not forecast triggers for the simple reason that the chances of getting it right are much lower than a coin toss. That said, in the medium term, the reason for a correction in DM stocks could well be EM/China growth, as it was in 2015. In such a scenario, EM risk assets will sell off first. As to timing, it is hard to find indicators that lead share prices, but aggregate EM narrow (M1) money growth has historically been coincident or leading with EM share prices - and it presently points to a considerable drop in EM equity prices (Chart I-15). This EM M1 aggregate is equity market-cap weighted making it relevant to investors. Chart I-14EM And U.S. Equites Typically Do Not Outperform Global Stocks Simultaneously Chart I-15EM M1 Growth And EM Share Prices Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com A New Trade: Receive Mexican / Pay U.S. 2-Year Swap Rates Mexico's 2-year bond yield has recently fallen through a technical support line while the U.S. 2-year bond yield has recently bounced off a major support level (Chart II-1). Our bias is that the 2-year yield in Mexico will fall relative to 2-year U.S. yield (Chart II-1, bottom panel). We recommend a new trade: receive 2-year swap rates in Mexico and pay U.S. 2-year swap rates. Historically, the domestic demand cycle in Mexico was synchronized with the business cycle in the U.S., mainly due to the fact these two economies are heavily integrated. However, the two economies have recently become desynchronized. This is evident by the fact that the Mexican export sector - which is leveraged to U.S. - is booming while the domestic demand in Mexico is slowing down (Chart II-2). Chart II-12-Year Bond Yields: Mexico And U.S. Chart II-2Divergence Within Mexican Economy The culprit behind this desynchronization is the previous collapse in the peso. Falling oil prices and excessive money/credit expansion in Mexico led to a major peso depreciation in 2014 and 2015. The election of Trump pushed it off the cliff in 2016. Inflation in Mexico spiked due to the massive currency depreciation. Consequently, the Mexican central bank has hiked interest rates by 400 basis points since the end of 2015. This, along with fiscal tightening, has choked domestic demand growth in Mexico. At this point, our bias is that the short-term interest rate differential between Mexico and the U.S. is unjustifiably wide and is about to narrow. Going forward, we expect inflation to fall in Mexico and interest rate expectations will at minimum not rise. Inflation in Mexico will roll over soon and moderate because of the following: A large part of the rise in inflation was caused by the depreciation in the peso. The peso's material appreciation this year will reduce the inflation rate (Chart II-3). Consumer spending and capital expenditure are set to continue slumping as the impact of higher interest rates continues filtering through the economy (Chart II-4, top and bottom panel). Chart II-3Mexico: Exchange Rate And Core Inflation Chart II-4Mexico: Domestic Demand To Disappoint Further Domestic vehicle sales are shrinking signifying no revival in interest rate-dependent sectors. Fiscal policy has been tightening and this will continue to be a headwind on economic growth (Chart II-5). Hence, despite flourishing exports to the U.S., very weak domestic demand will dampen inflation in Mexico. Finally, there were several one-off effects to inflation such as the gasoline subsidy removal that took place at the end of last year, and the minimum wage hike that was implemented at the beginning of the year. As the base effect of these fade, the inflation rate will moderate. In the U.S., our bias is that interest rate expectations are too low given the tight labor market, reasonably strong growth, and the U.S. dollar depreciation this year. Odds are that the U.S. interest rate expectations will rise as core inflation moves up (Chart II-6). Chart II-5Mexico: A Major Improvement In Fiscal Position Chart II-6U.S. Core Inflation To Rise Investment Recommendations We recommend fixed-income traders to receive Mexican / pay U.S. 2-year swap rates. The main risk to this trade lies in the event of an abrupt sell-off in the peso against the U.S dollar that could push up the 2-year swap rate differential. While we expect EM currencies, including the peso, to depreciate, this trade is still favorable in terms of risk-reward because of the starting point in interest rate differential and peso valuations: Despite the rally this year, the peso is still cheap (Chart II-7). Furthermore, its current account and fiscal balances have improved dramatically. So, the peso should depreciate less than many other EM currencies. Chart II-7The MXN Is Still Cheap In fact, the interest rate spread between Mexico and the U.S. is already historically high, and the peso depreciation might not push it much higher. We would not be recommending this trade if the peso was fairly or overvalued, or if interest rates in Mexico were not this high. Entering this position under these current circumstances reduces the downside risk and, therefore, makes the risk-reward attractive. As to Mexican financial markets in general, we remain constructive on the peso versus other EM currencies. More specifically, we continue to recommend long positions in MXN versus ZAR and BRL. Mexican local currency bonds and sovereign credit offer good value relative to their EM counterparts. Fixed income investors should continue to overweight Mexican local currency and sovereign credit within their respective EM benchmarks. Finally, the outlook for Mexican stocks in absolute terms is poor as domestic demand will slump, further hampering corporate profits. Within an EM equity portfolio we recommend neutral allocation to this bourse mainly due to our expectations of the peso outperforming other EM currencies. Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
The National Association of Home Builders released their housing market index (HMI) which, while still high, took a step downward. Importantly, the softness in the HMI had already commenced earlier in the summer prior to the hurricane season (second panel). Moderating housing starts confirm the weaker industry sentiment (third panel). This is hardly surprising given lumber prices, currently bumping up against five year highs (bottom panel), which will cut materially into profit margins. As a result, the S&P homebuilders index has been tightly range bound since our early summer downgrade to neutral. Conversely, home improvement retailers benefit from high lumber prices as retailers typically earn a fixed spread such that a high dollar value sold will boost profitability. With hurricane-related rebuilding driving lumber demand (and prices) higher in the near-term, the margin spread between home improvement retailers and homebuilders should be amplified in the back half of 2017. Accordingly, we reiterate our neutral homebuilders and high-conviction overweight home improvement retailers recommendations. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the S&P homebuilders index are: BLBG: S5HOME - DHI, LEN, PHM. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the S&P home improvement retailers index are BLBG: S5HOMI - HD, LOW.
Neutral Software stock relative performance has returned to its long-term uptrend, but remains far from the two standard deviations above the mean peak reached during the tech bubble (top panel). The structural pull from the proliferation of cloud computing and software-as-a-service has served as a catalyst to raise the profile of this more defensive and mature tech subsector. Beyond this constructive backdrop, cyclical forces are also painting a brighter picture for software equities. Importantly, there is tentative evidence that a fresh capex upcycle has commenced, and if software commands a larger slice of the overall spending pie, industry profits should enjoy a healthy rebound (middle panel). Supply reduction presents a bullish backdrop for software selling prices that have exited deflation at a time when overall corporate sector inflation is decelerating. The upshot is that revenue growth will likely reaccelerate (bottom panel). Adding it up, enticing structural software forces aside, a cyclical capex recovery is a boon for software outlays and, coupled with reviving animal spirits, signal that it no longer pays to underweight this tech sub-sector. Bottom Line: The S&P software index does not deserve an underweight. Lift exposure to a benchmark allocation, and refer to yesterday's Weekly Report for additional details. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5SOFT - MSFT, ORCL, ADBE, CRM, ATVI, EA, INTU, ADSK, SYMC, RHT, SNPS, CTXS, ANSS, CA.
Underweight This year has been a good one to be overweight the S&P hotels, resorts and cruise lines index which has outperformed the S&P 500 by a wide margin. The index's strength has been most pronounced since the beginning of the summer and, unsurprisingly given the cyclical rotation into highly discretionary stocks, has been exclusive to the cruise line operator segment of the index. Cruise line operators' margins have climbed to 10-year highs (second panel), justifying soaring stock prices. Profit gains have come on the back of improving passenger growth and constrained capacity i.e.: incremental passengers per room come with much higher incremental margin. As cruise lines cannot increase their occupancy ad infinitum further margin gains of this magnitude seem doubtful. The outlook is even less bright for hotels as cutthroat competition is pricing power negative with industry selling prices sinking into outright deflation (third panel). Hoteliers are trying to compensate for low prices with huge capacity additions. Our S&P hotels, resorts and cruise lines EPS model does an excellent job encompassing all these moving parts and confirms our bearish industry profit stance, pointing to significant relative declines vis-à-vis the S&P 500 (bottom panel). Putting it together, shrinking margins and increased capital deployment mean lower return on capital and hence lower valuation multiples. Take some chips off the table and reduce exposure to the S&P hotels, resorts & cruise lines index to underweight. Please see yesterday's Weekly Report for additional details. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HOTL- MAR, CCL, RCL, HLT, WYN.
Highlights Portfolio Strategy The S&P hotels, resorts and cruise lines index will suffer from a profit margin squeeze, which should weigh on valuations. Cut exposure to underweight. A cyclical capex recovery is a boon for software outlays and coupled with reviving animal spirits, signal that it no longer pays to underweight the S&P software index. Augment positions to a benchmark allocation. Recent Changes Downgrade the defensive/cyclical portfolio bias to neutral. Downgrade the S&P hotels, resorts and cruise lines index to underweight today. Lift the S&P software index to neutral. Table 1 Feature Chart 1Weak Dollar Positive Contributor##br## To EPS Growth Equities broke out in a bullish fashion last week, as geopolitical fears subsided and the backlash from hurricane Irma was less severe than initially feared. Beneath the surface, non-inflationary synchronized global growth remains the dominant macro theme. While the latest U.S. CPI print was better than anticipated the Fed would have to see a couple more perky inflation reports before an uptrend is established, cementing the December hike. Until then, the path of least resistance is higher for equities. In our last Weekly Report, we noted that our four-factor S&P 500 operating EPS model has recently accelerated.1 This week, Chart 1 isolates the U.S. dollar as the sole regression variable on SPX earnings and the fitted value suggests that profits will likely surprise to the upside in the back half of the year despite difficult comparisons. Importantly, as we posited earlier this summer, irrespective of where the trade-weighted U.S. dollar ends the year, delayed FX translation effects will act as a tonic for S&P 500 profits. Since late-December's peak, the broad trade-weighted dollar has deflated by 9%. Regression analysis shows that a 1% fall in the U.S. dollar boosts operating EPS by 0.98%, with our dataset going back to the early 1970s. If, however, we narrow the interval of estimation starting in 1994 when NAFTA come into effect then the greenback's sensitivity on SPX EPS increases to 1.6%. While every cycle is different, a fresh all-time high in quarterly EPS - driven by a weak dollar - would not surprise us in Q3 and Q4. At some point, the deflating currency should show up in selling price inflation, again as a lagged effect (middle panel, Chart 2). This is encouraging for our firming operating leverage thesis, as a modest inflationary backdrop would reinforce top line growth (bottom panel, Chart 2). The implication of a sustainable revenue growth outlook is a profit margin-led flow through to EPS, especially for high fixed cost businesses. Already, sell side analysts' overall S&P 500 net earnings revisions are benefitting from the U.S. dollar's decline, and so is sector EPS breadth (trade-weighted dollar shown inverted, Chart 3). Chart 2Will The Dollar's Fall Show Up In Inflation? Chart 3EPS Breadth Improvement Moreover, U.S. dollar-based liquidity (defined as the sum of the Fed's balance sheet and foreign central bank U.S. Treasury holdings) has finally arrested its fall and has recently ticked higher above the zero line. This even mild increase in U.S. dollar-based liquidity represents a de facto easing in global monetary conditions, and historically has been synonymous with S&P 500 EPS acceleration (Chart 4). The upshot is that profits are on a solid upward trajectory. Chart 4Dollar Based Liquidity Also On The Rise The equity market's sensitivity to the greenback has been increasing as the percentage of foreign sourced earnings has been rising over the decades. Globally-exposed goods-producers are in the driver's seat. This raises the question: what to do with our long held preference for defensives versus cyclicals? We are taking our cue from the U.S. dollar-induced shifting macro backdrop, and locking in gains of 11% since the mid-2014 inception in our defensive over cyclical sector tilt, and moving to the sidelines. As a reminder, since the beginning of the spring we have been tweaking our portfolio adding cyclical exposure and, at the margin, removing defensive protection.2 Thus, a defensive over cyclical sector preference is no longer in place. Synchronized global growth, reviving emerging markets, a stable China, and a deflating U.S. dollar are all giving us confidence that it no longer pays to play defense (Chart 5). Finally, following a sling shot recovery, relative valuations are on a more even keel, as is our relative Technical Indicator which is hovering in the neutral zone (Chart 6). Chart 5Book Gains And Move##br## To Neutral Chart 6Valuations And Technicals##br## In The Neutral Zone This week we are making an early cyclical downshift and deep cyclical upshift to our portfolio. Hotels Update: Check Out Time This year has been a good one to be overweight the S&P hotels, resorts and cruise lines index which has outperformed the S&P 500 by a wide margin. However, earnings expectations have moved broadly in line with the market in 2017, meaning that the index's outperformance has been entirely valuation multiple driven. Normalizing earnings to smooth out profit volatility reveals a more severe picture with valuation multiples at decade highs, above the historical mean and at a 40% premium to the broad market (Chart 7). The index's strength has been most pronounced since the beginning of the summer and, unsurprisingly given the cyclical rotation into highly discretionary stocks, has been exclusive to the cruise line operator segment of the index. The two relevant stocks (RCL and CCL) now represent nearly half of the S&P hotels, resorts and cruise lines index's market capitalization. Cruise line operators' margins have climbed to 10-year highs (top panel, Chart 8), justifying soaring stock prices. Profit gains have come on the back of healthy unit revenue as unit costs have remained mostly unchanged (third panel, Chart 8). Chart 7Very Expensive Beneath The Surface Chart 8Cruise Lines Leading The Pack Cruise line occupancy rates corroborate this firm demand backdrop. They have risen in line with margin gains (second panel, Chart 8), a result of improving passenger growth and constrained capacity (bottom panel, Chart 8). This has been the industry's largest margin lever, i.e.: incremental passengers per room come with much higher incremental margin. As cruise lines cannot increase their occupancy ad infinitum (occupancy rates above 100% already imply more than two occupants of a double-occupancy berth), further margin gains of this magnitude seem doubtful. In fact, if cruise operators are to continue growing profits, a capacity growth cycle will eventually have to begin anew, meaning margin contraction rather than expansion. Thus, extrapolating profit growth far into the future is fraught with danger, warning that sky-high valuation multiples are vulnerable to even a modest de-rating. The outlook is even less bright for hotels, an industry that has been losing its share of the consumer's wallet for some time (Chart 9, second panel). Specifically, the low/non-corporate end of the market seems increasingly exposed to competition from Airbnb and other room share competitors; cutthroat competition is pricing power negative with industry selling prices sinking into outright deflation (Chart 9, third panel). Hoteliers are trying to compensate for low prices with huge capacity additions, adding a sense of permanence to recent pricing power declines. However, just as pricing has fallen, the accommodation related employment cost index has gone vertical (bottom panel, Chart 9). The implication of soft pricing power and a rising wage bill is a profit letdown. Our newly introduced S&P hotels, resorts and cruise lines EPS model (comprising the U.S. dollar, employment, PCE and confidence measures) does an excellent job encompassing all these moving parts and confirms our bearish industry profit stance. In fact, it is pointing to significant relative declines vis-à-vis the S&P 500 (Chart 10). Chart 9Mind The Deflationary Impulse Chart 10EPS Model Says Rush For The Exits Putting it together, shrinking margins and increased capital deployment mean lower return on capital and hence lower valuation multiples. This implies that the index's relative gains are in the past. Bottom Line: Take some chips off the table and reduce exposure to underweight in the S&P hotels, resorts and cruise lines index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HOTL - MAR, CCL, RCL, HLT, WYN. Software: A Capex Upcycle Winner? Software stock relative performance has returned to its long-term uptrend, but remains far from the two standard deviations above-the-mean peak reached during the tech bubble (top panel, Chart 11). The structural pull from the proliferation of cloud computing and software-as-a-service has served as a catalyst to raise the profile of this more defensive and mature tech sub-sector. Traditional hardware tech sectors, like communications equipment, are also suffering from the "virtualization" threat as software is making inroads into hardware and blurring the lines between the two. Beyond this constructive backdrop, cyclical forces are also painting a brighter picture for software equities. Importantly, there is tentative evidence that a fresh capex upcycle has commenced (see Chart 3 from last Monday's Weekly Report 3), and if software commands a larger slice of the overall spending pie, industry profits should enjoy a healthy rebound (second panel, Chart 11). Small business sector plans to expand have returned to a level last seen prior to the Great Recession, underscoring that software related outlays will likely follow them higher. Recovering bank loan growth is also corroborating this upbeat spending message: capital outlays on software are poised to accelerate based on rebounding bank loans. The latter signals that businesses are beginning to loosen their purse strings anew (third & fourth panels, Chart 11). Reviving animal spirits also suggest that demand for software upgrades will stay elevated. CEO confidence is pushing decade highs. Such ebullience is positive for a pickup in software investments (second panel, Chart 12). It has also rekindled software M&A activity, with the number of industry deals jumping in recent months (bottom panel, Chart 13). Chart 11Back To Trend Chart 12Capex Upcycle... Chart 13... And Reviving Animal Spirits Are Key Drivers Supply reduction presents a bullish backdrop for software selling prices that have exited deflation at a time when overall corporate sector inflation is decelerating. The upshot is that revenue growth will likely reaccelerate (middle panel, Chart 14). But before getting too carried away, there is some cause for concern. The S&P software index is priced to perfection fully reflecting most, if not all, of the positive drivers (bottom panel, Chart 14), warning that any sales/profit mishaps will likely knock relative performance over. Moreover, productivity dynamics are waving a yellow flag. Business sector productivity growth troughed in early 2017. Historically, this output per hour worked metric has been inversely correlated with software outlays (productivity shown inverted, third panel Chart 15). Importantly, even shown as a deviation from the long-term trend, productivity gains have troughed, suggesting that relative profit growth will likely remain muted (productivity shown inverted, bottom panel Chart 15). Keep in mind that, historically, software spending has been countercyclical (second panel, Chart 15) and given that we are not at the end of the line yet, relative outlays on software may not rebound to the same extent as our other aforementioned indicators suggest. Chart 14Impressive Pricing Power, ##br##But Fully Priced Chart 15Productivity Dynamics##br## Are A Sizable Offset Adding it up, enticing structural software forces aside, a cyclical capex recovery is a boon for software outlays and, coupled with reviving animal spirits, signal that it no longer pays to underweight this tech sub-sector. Bottom Line: The S&P software index does not deserve an underweight. Lift exposure to a benchmark allocation. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5SOFT - MSFT, ORCL, ADBE, CRM, ATVI, EA, INTU, ADSK, SYMC, RHT, SNPS, CTXS, ANSS, CA. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy & Global Alpha Sector Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Chart 5 of the U.S. Equity Strategy Report titled "Still Goldilocks", on September 11, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see the August 14, 2017 U.S. Equity Strategy Report titled "Three Risks" for a quick recap of most of our portfolio moves, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see the September 11, 2017 U.S. Equity Strategy Report titled "Still Goldilocks", available at uses.bcaresearch.com. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor small over large caps and stay neutral growth over value.