Sorry, you need to enable JavaScript to visit this website.
Skip to main content
Skip to main content

Financial Markets

Highlights Risk assets have rallied smartly, yet key indicators like the relative performance of Swedish stocks or the price of kiwi equities are not corroborating these moves. With the Fed now very likely to increase rates in March, the broad-trade-weighted dollar could be about to resume its rally. This would prompt a correction in metals, and EM as well as commodity currencies. We think the tactical correction in the broad-trade-weighted dollar is over, and the cyclical dollar rally can resume. EUR and JPY will not suffer as much as the commodity currencies, go long EUR/AUD, short NZD/JPY. Feature In the Roman calendar, the Ides of March corresponds to the 15th of that month. Consigning that date to posterity in the year 44 BCE, Julius Caesar was assassinated on the floor of the senate in Rome, with his adoptive son Brutus, being among the conspirators. This event prompted yet another round of civil war in the republic, and ultimately a regime shift: the end of the Roman Republic and the Beginning of Imperial Rome under Augustus in 27 BCE. Fast forward 2061 years to the present. March 15th will be the day when the FOMC meeting ends. Will the period around the Ides of March represent a regime shift once again - albeit on a much different scale - where risk assets finally correct? Can the dollar resume its ascent? We believe the answer to both questions is yes. Unusual Market Moves Strange market dynamics have piqued our interest. In recent weeks, DM stock prices, and bond yields have been moving up (Chart I-1). This is consistent with investors pricing in an improving growth outlook and a Fed moving toward a tighter policy. On the other hand, EM stocks, metals, and gold in particular have also been moving up (Chart I-2). This move is more disturbing as it tends to imply an easing in monetary conditions, especially the strength in gold, even if it may have ended yesterday. This strange performance could be explained if the dollar was weakening or inflation expectations were moving up. However, the dollar has been strengthening in recent days and inflation expectations have been flat. Additionally, the U.S. yield curve has flattened, suggesting that the adjustment in the Fed's expected rate path is beginning to have marginally negative implications for future growth (Chart I-3). Chart I-1More Growth, More Hikes Chart I-2More Reflation As Well Chart I-3No Sign Of A Fed Behind The Curve So based on current information, how are these market moves likely to resolve themselves? Let's look at indicators. In the past, we have followed the common-currency performance of Swedish relative to U.S. equities as a gauge for the global growth outlook, and particularly non-U.S. growth relative to U.S. growth. This reflects the fact that U.S. stocks tend to be defensive, while Swedish stocks are very pro-cyclical. This dynamic is accentuated by the nature of the Swedish economy. Sweden is a small open nation that trades heavily with EM. While its biggest trading partner is the euro area, where it tends to export many intermediate goods and machinery, which are then re-exported as finished products to the EM space. Currently, Swedish equities continue to underperform U.S. ones. What is most striking is that this underperformance has happened despite a strong performance in EM stocks and metals, a very rare divergence (Chart I-4). Another worrying signal comes from New Zealand stocks in USD terms. New Zealand is another small open economy with deep trade links to the EM space. It is therefore very sensitive to global growth dynamics. While Kiwi equities did flag the rebound in EM growth and global manufacturing activity that happened in 2016, since late January, they have stopped participating in the rally in global risk assets despite a booming New Zealand economy. They have even begun swooning in recent weeks (Chart I-5). Chart I-4A Strange Divergence Chart I-5Are Kiwi Stocks Telling Us Something? Finally, two other reliable indicators of global growth are also not corroborating any further improvement in global growth from here: Small caps are underperforming large caps and oil is underperforming gold (Chart I-6). Obviously the next question becomes: are all these indicators likely to converge back toward EM equities, the AUD and the BRLs of the world or are the risk assets mentioned above likely to be the ones experiencing a downward adjustment? Here economics should give us a clue. For one, the 2016 rally in EM and risk assets can be explained by the large improvement in economic conditions. G10 and EM surprise indexes have moved up vertically in recent months (Chart I-7). However, this move might reflect the past not the future. Chart I-6Some Growth Indicators Are##br## Not Doing Well Anymore Chart I-7Too Much Of##br## A Good Thing? China has been a key reason explaining why EM assets and economic activity have been so positive. However, the large dose of fiscal stimulus that has supported that economy has dissipated (Chart I-8). Based on the IMF's October Fiscal Monitor, the fiscal thrust in China was 1.7% of potential GDP in 2015 (heavily loaded to the second half of that year), and 0.3% in 2016. It is moving to 0% in 2017. This means that as the lagged effects of the late 2015 fiscal surge dissipate, a key reflationary wind behind the global economy will disappear. The Keqiang index is mirroring these dynamics. After flirting with cyclical highs, and therefore highlighting a sharp improvement in the Chinese industrial sector, it has begun to roll over (Chart I-9). More weakness is likely in the cards. Fiscal dynamics have followed a similar pattern on a global level. The overall EM fiscal thrust was at its strongest in 2015, at 0.6% of EM potential GDP, fell to 0.1% in 2016, and is expected to hit -0.2% in 2017. In the DM, the pattern is slightly different. The high point of fiscal stimulus was 2016, when the fiscal impulse hit 0.4% of potential GDP. However, this measure is moving back to -0.1% in 2017. Chart I-8Losing A Source ##br##Of Reflation Chart I-9Chinese Industrial Activity ##br##May Be Rolling Over Additionally, the monetary environment is not as stimulative as it once was. Bond yields have risen in the whole DM space, with Treasury yields now more than 110bps higher than in July, Bund yields having moved from -0.18% to 0.31%, and JGB yields having adjusted 37bp higher to 0.07%. High-frequency loan data out of the U.S. already shows some strains caused by this rise in borrowing costs (Chart I-10). This combination points toward a deceleration in the growth impulse, especially in the goods sector. As such, we do expect the EM and G10 surprise indexes to roll over in coming weeks. Even if this phenomenon may prove temporary, the market is not priced for this event. Highlighting this vulnerability is the high level of complacency we have already flagged last week, which suggests that global investors are positioned for a continuation of the improvement in the growth outlook (Chart I-11). So high seems the conviction that growth will continue to accelerate that it is outweighing the move toward a tighter Fed going forward. Finally, the implied correlation in the S&P 500 has fallen to post 2010-lows. This could incentivize investors to take on more leveraged bets on portfolios of stocks. A low correlation results into higher diversification benefits and therefore, a lower portfolio volatility (Chart I-12). A rise in correlation would cause volatility to rise and thus a mini-deleveraging and de-risking cycle to take hold amongst investors. Chart I-10Response To Higher Yields Chart I-11Lots Of Complacency Globally Chart I-12Correlation-Induced Derisking On Its Way? Bottom Line: DM stocks are up, yields are up, the dollar is firming, yet EM equities, metals and gold especially have risen as well, and the U.S. yield curve is flattening while inflation expectations have recently been stable. We expect risk assets to end up buckling. Some reliable indicators of the trend in risk assets are pointing south, global investors are expecting further growth improvement in the coming months while global growth may in fact temporarily decelerate, and finally, if the low level of implied correlation in stocks normalizes, a correction may be catalyzed. What About The Fed Because Lael Brainard has been such a reliable dove on the FOMC, when she says that a hike is coming soon, we must listen. The fact that the market has come to price in an 83% probability of a Fed hike in March will only give the FOMC more comfort in increasing interest rate when it meets in two weeks (Chart I-13). While we have been expecting the Fed to move in line with its Summary of Economic Projection's interest rate forecast, and thus increase three times this year, we are surprised by the fast change of tune in recent days. Nonetheless, we are acknowledging this reality. Is this publication moving toward expecting four rate hikes in 2017? Not yet. We want to see how the market handles the coming hike going forward. A correction in risk assets, commodities, and EM is likely to force the Fed to pause again before resuming its hiking path. We are clearly expecting such a development. The broad dollar is likely to be caught in a bullish cross current. However, differentiation between the minors vis-à-vis the EUR and JPY might be essential for investors. Chart I-14 shows that recently, the broad-trade-weighted dollar has not kept pace with the increase in interest rate expectations for the U.S. With our capitulation index for this measure of the dollar moving closer to "oversold" territory, the weeks leading up to the Fed meeting could witness a stronger broad trade-weighted dollar. We are therefore removing our tactical short bias and moving in line with our cyclical bullish dollar stance. Chart I-13The Fed Tends To Telegraph ##br##Its Intention To Hike Chart I-14The Dollar Should ##br##Catch Up We believe that in this process, the dollar will be strongest against EM and commodity currencies. To begin with, the USD is trading near 19, 18, and 17 months lows against the BRL, ZAR, and RUB respectively. As recently as Wednesday, the AUD was also trading near the top of its distribution of the past two years (Chart I-15). Moreover, EM and commodity currencies are heavily geared to global growth. As such, the combination of a tightening Fed, rising bond yields, and a potential roll-over in global economic surprises may weigh especially heavily on them. On the other hand, in 2015 and 2016, the dollar has tended to be softer against the EUR and the JPY in periods of market turbulence. Thus, the call on EM and commodity currencies seems much cleaner than on these two currencies. In this regard, two crosses have caught our eye. One is EUR/AUD. Not only is it at the bottom end of a trading range established since June 2013, it has only traded lower at the apex of the euro area crisis between 2011 and the first half of 2013 (Chart I-16). The recent rollover in French / German bund spreads is potentially a good signal to buy this cross. The picture for JPY is now muddied. While higher interest rates should hurt the JPY, a period of risk-asset selloff should support the JPY. To play the cross-current described above, we are opening a short NZD/JPY position, a cross historically levered to rising volatility (Chart I-17). Chart I-15AUD Is Elevated Chart I-16To Fall From Here, EUR/AUD Needs A Euro Crisis Chart I-17Short NZD/JPY: A Risk-Off Play Bottom Line: The Fed moving forward its planned rate hike to March could be the ultimate catalyst to prompt a correction in risk assets, especially the segment of the market most levered to EM and growth conditions: EM and commodity currencies. We are removing our tactical USD stance and we are moving in line with our bullish cyclical stance. We are also buying EUR/AUD and shorting NZD/JPY. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 2 Recent data paints a healthy picture for the U.S. economy: Fourth quarter annualized GDP came in unchanged from the previous quarter at 1.9%; PCE Price Index increased at a 1.9% annual pace, near the Fed's target; Core PCE remained steady at 1.7% annually and increased to 0.3% monthly, indicative of a robust economy; ISM Manufacturing PMI went up to 57.7. The market is now pricing in an 83% probability of a rate hike. Further enhancing growth prospects were Trump's remarks at his Joint Address to Congress, where he stated that there will be a "big, big cut" in corporate tax, and that he will seek to gain approval for a $1 trillion infrastructure plan. Hawkish comments from the previous FOMC meeting strengthened the dollar in February; Trump's comments may be an additional tailwind to the dollar's upside this month. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Risks To The Cyclical Dollar View - February 3, 2017 Dollar Corrections, EM Outlook, Global Liquidity, And Protectionism - January 27, 2017 The Euro EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 2 Fundamentally, the euro area economy remains resilient: Services sentiment, business climate, and industrial confidence all picked up in February, outperforming expectations; Germany recorded a decrease in unemployed persons of 14,000; German CPI picked up to a 2.2% annual pace, also beating expectations Nevertheless, EUR/USD is unlikely to see any substantive upside in the coming months. With the Dutch elections in around 2 weeks, considerable volatility could rise up, something which has not been priced in. The Euro Stoxx 50 Volatility Index is showing a low reading of 16.55, just above the all-time low of 12. The ECB will meet next week and is likely to display a dovish bias due to potential political turmoil. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 The French Revolution - February 3, 2017 GBP: Dismal Expectations - January 13, 2017 The Yen JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 2 On a cyclical basis we are still bearish on the yen, as the BoJ will continue to pursue radical measures to pull Japan out of its liquidity trap. Recent data seems to indicate that these measures have been somewhat successful: Retail trade YoY growth outperformed expectations coming in at 1%. Housing starts YoY growth also outperformed, coming in at 12.8%. On a tactical basis the picture is more nuanced. While it is very possible that the coming rate hike could lift rate expectations in the U.S., lifting USD/JPY, there is a risks that the hike might trigger a sell-off in risks assets, which could be very positive for the yen. For this reason we are shorting NZD/JPY, as this cross is very vulnerable to an increase in volatility. Report Links: JPY: Climbing To The Springboard Before The Dive - February 24, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Dollar Corrections, EM Outlook, Global Liquidity, And Protectionism - January 27, 2017 British Pound GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 2 The past week has not been kind to the pound, with GBP depreciating by about 2% against both the Euro and the U.S. Dollar. This was in part due to the prospect of a Scottish Independence referendum. On the economic side, data for the U.K. continue to be mixed: House prices annual growth outperformed expectations coming in at 4.5% M4 broad money annual growth continues to climb higher and it is now at 7%. On the other hand manufacturing PMI, although still high, underperformed expectations, coming in at 54.6. Although the cyclical dollar bull market should continue to weigh on cable, we are more bullish on the pound, particularly against the euro, as expectations for the U.K. economy continue to be too pessimistic, while the dark cloud of this year's election cycle looms on the euro. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 Australian Dollar AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 2 AUD lost 1.3% of its value Thursday morning amid disappointing trade data. It seems that the market largely ignored stronger data this week: GDP grew at a 2.4% annual rate Q42016 and both NBS and Ciaxin Chinese Manufacturing PMI beat expectations. Exports, however, contracted at a 3% pace and the surplus missed expectations by 66%, most likely due to the AUD's strength this year, even alongside higher commodity prices. This is also particularly worrying seeing that exports failed to pick up despite a previously strong Chinese PMI reading. Now, alongside a Keqiang Index that is topping out, the future for Australian exports could be limited. Additionally, this outlook is further supported by investment diverting to the non-resource sector. It is difficult to see whether the RBA will respond to this export slump, as the contractionary Q32016 GDP data was largely overlooked and dismissed. Nevertheless, we stand by our bearish outlook on AUD. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Risks To The Cyclical Dollar View - February 3, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 New Zealand Dollar NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 2 The RBNZ continues to assert its neutral bias. On Wednesday, RBNZ Governor Graeme Wheeler stated that "there is an equal probability that the next OCR adjustment could be up or down". This caused the kiwi to come close to reaching 0.71, its lowest point since mid-January. We continue to believe that the RBNZ stance is not hawkish enough, as powerful inflationary forces continue to brew in New Zealand. That being said, it is very likely that the RBNZ will continue with its neutral tone up until the middle of the year, when we start to have a clearer picture about the outcome in European elections. Therefore, given that the Fed is likely to hike in March, diverging monetary policies should continue to weigh on NZD/USD until then. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Risks To The Cyclical Dollar View - February 3, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Canadian Dollar CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 2 The BoC left their overnight rate target unchanged at 0.5% despite a high CPI reading of 2.1% in January. A further surprise was a particularly dovish tone, highlighting that higher energy prices will have a temporary effect on inflation, and indicating "material excess capacity in the economy". Additional weaknesses were highlighted with regards to competitiveness challenges for the export sector and subdued wage growth accompanied by contracting hours worked. Trade developments are an additional headwind for the Canadian economy that the bank is monitoring and will continue to do so until the outlook clarifies. CAD has lost more than 2% of its value against the USD in 3 days due also to a stronger dollar based on Fed rate hike expectations and Trump's potential infrastructure spending and tax cuts. It is unlikely that CAD will see any strength in the near future as the Bank has set forth a rather cautious tone. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It - November 4, 2016 Swiss Franc CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 2 Recent data has been mixed, which indicates that although economic activity in Switzerland is improving, it still is very tepid: The KOF leading indicator outperform expectations coming in at 107.2 Retail sales outperformed expectations. However they are still contracting by 1.4% GDP annual growth was 0.6%, falling significantly from last quarter reading of 1.4% The SNB is currently in a tight spot, as improvements are very marginal and it is evident that the economy is still plagued by strong deflationary forces. Meanwhile EUR/CHF is under 1.065 and has been unable to climb above this level this month, as the SNB continues to fight risk off flows coming into the franc due to the risks of the European election cycle. As these risks increase, the floor in this cross will continue to get tested. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Norwegian Krone NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 2 Risks continue to point for further upside in USD/NOK. Oil is unlikely to rally much further from current levels, even if the OPEC agreement continues. Thus the movements in USD/NOK should be dominated by monetary divergences between the United States and Norway. These are likely to continue to favor the dollar, as the Fed should continue its hawkish tone. Meanwhile the Norges Bank is likely to stay dovish, as their economy has been to be very weak. GDP growth is negative, the output gap is over -2% of GDP and employment and real wages continue to contract. Meanwhile, the high inflation that Norway experiences last year is likely to continue its slowdown, as the effects of the currency depreciation should start to dissipate. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 Swedish Krona SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 2 In past reports, we have argued that the Swedish economy is robust and inflation is picking up. This has been corroborated by strong consumer and business confidence, and high resource utilization and inflation expectations. Recent data has supported this view: Retail sales picked up 2.2% annually; Producer price index was up 8.2% from last year in January; Annual GDP growth came in at 2.3% at the end of last year. Growth and inflation have been supported by expansionary monetary policy. With the Riksbank stating that "there is still a greater possibility that the rate will be cut than... raised in the near future", these conditions are unlikely to falter. Nevertheless, it is important to note that it is this cautionary stance by the Bank that is the reason for the SEK's recent weakness, not fundamentals. It is now the probable case that any upside in the SEK will be noted and limited by the Riksbank, capping the upside on the krona. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 One Trade To Rule Them All - November 18, 2016 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Highlights In this week's report, we update the "Three Controversial Calls"1 we made at BCA's New York Investment Conference held on September 26-27th, 2016. Call #1: "Trump Wins, And The Dollar Rallies." We still see 5% more upside for the greenback. Call #2: "Japan Overcomes Deflation." Inflation expectations have moved higher over the past five months, while the yen has weakened. This trend will persist. Call #3: "Global Banks Finally Outperform." Bank shares have beaten their global benchmark by 14% since we made this prediction. European financials have finally turned the corner. Feature Call #1: "Trump Wins, And The Dollar Rallies" Chart 1From Unrealistic To Even More Unrealistic We never bought into the notion that a Trump victory would cause investors to flee the dollar. On the contrary, we argued that most of Trump's policies were bond bearish/dollar bullish. In particular, we reasoned that Trump's attempts to browbeat companies into moving production back home would help reduce the U.S. trade deficit, boosting aggregate demand in the process. Efforts to curb illegal immigration would also push up the wages of low-skilled workers. Meanwhile, fiscal stimulus would fire up the labor market at a time when it was already approaching full employment. Fiscal Deficit On Upward Path With nearly four months having passed since the election, what have we learned? First, and foremost, a big increase in the budget deficit still looks likely. As Trump's address to the joint session of Congress on Tuesday night underscored, the president has plenty of specific areas in mind where he would like to increase spending (more money for defense, infrastructure, etc.) and a long list of taxes he would like to cut (corporate and personal income taxes, estate taxes, a new childcare tax credit,2 etc.). We do not take seriously Trump's pledge to pay for increased military spending by cutting annual nondefense discretionary spending by $54 billion relative to the existing CBO baseline. Chart 1 shows that under current budgetary rules, nondefense discretionary spending is set to decline from 3.3% of GDP in 2016 - already close to a historic low - to only 2.7% of GDP in 2026. Cutting that portion of the budget above and beyond what has already been legislated is unrealistic. There simply aren't enough programs like the National Endowment for the Arts that Republicans can take to the woodshed without facing a severe political backlash (Chart 2). As long as big ticket entitlement programs such as Social Security and Medicare remain unscathed - which Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin confirmed would be the case earlier this week - overall government spending will rise, not fall. Chart 2Nondefense Discretionary Spending: Where The Money Goes Trump And Trade The one category where Trump would be more than happy to see taxes go up is on imports. The constraint here is political. A unilateral move to legislate large-scale import duties would be in gross violation of WTO rules and could spark a global trade war. Many of Trump's Republican colleagues, as well as a fair number of Democrats, also favor free trade and would resist such an effort. One solution that Trump vaguely alluded to in his speech is to raise duties on imports within the context of a broader tax reform bill. A border adjustment tax, for example, would bring in $1.2 trillion in revenues over ten years.3 As we argued in a Special Report earlier this year, the introduction of a BAT would be highly dollar bullish.4 Pulling Back The Welcome Mat? On immigration, Trump has sent mixed messages. On the one hand, he continues to insist that he will build "the wall" and has maintained his hardline stance on refugee policy. On the other hand, he has backed off his campaign promise to reverse Obama's executive order protecting the so-called "dreamers." This order allows immigrants who came to the U.S. illegally as children to remain in the country indefinitely, provided they do not commit a serious criminal offence. During his speech, Trump signaled a willingness to shift the U.S. immigration system towards one based on merit, similar to what countries such as Canada and Australia already have. This is an excellent idea, but it raises the question of what will happen to the 11 million illegal aliens currently residing in the country, the vast majority of whom are poorly educated. It is important to remember that U.S. immigration laws are already very strict. Trump has given the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE) greater leeway in enforcing these laws, while also pledging to hire 5,000 more border agents and 10,000 additional ICE officers. As such, a "status quo immigration policy" under Trump could prove to be much more restrictive than the one under Obama even if no new legislation is passed. A key implication is that labor shortages in areas such as construction and hospitality services may intensify. Solid U.S. Growth Outlook Favors A Stronger Dollar Meanwhile, the U.S. growth picture remains reasonably bright (Chart 3). This may not be obvious from current Q1 tracking estimates, which are pointing to real GDP growth of below 2%. However, the weak Q1 numbers are mainly due to an unexpectedly large jump in imports and a sharp decline in inventory accumulation. According to the Atlanta Fed's model, taken together these two factors have shaved a full percentage point off growth. Real private final demand is still rising at nearly 3% (Chart 4). If U.S. growth stays solid as we expect, the Fed will raise rates three or four times this year, starting in March. This is slightly more than the market is currently pricing in, which should be enough to ensure that the trade-weighted dollar strengthens by another 5% or so over the remainder of the year (Chart 5). We see the greatest upside for the dollar versus EM currencies, and as we discuss next, against the yen. Chart 3U.S. Economic Data Are Upbeat Chart 4Trade And Inventories Detract From ##br##A Bright Q1 Growth Picture Chart 5Real Rate Differentials Are ##br##Driving UpThe Dollar Call #2: "Japan Overcomes Deflation" Many of the forces that have exacerbated deflation in Japan, such as corporate deleveraging and falling property prices, have run their course (Chart 6). The population continues to age, but the impact that this is having on inflation may have reached an inflection point. For most of the past 25 years, slow population growth depressed aggregate demand by reducing the incentive for companies to build out new capacity. This generated a surfeit of savings relative to investment, helping to fuel deflation. Now, however, as an ever-rising share of the population enters retirement, the overabundance of savings is disappearing. The household saving rate currently stands at 2.8% - down from 14% in the early 1990s - while the ratio of job openings-to-applicants has soared to a 25-year high (Chart 7). Chart 6Japan: Easing Deflationary Forces Chart 7Japan: Low Household Saving Rate ##br##And A Tightening Labor Market Chart 8Investors Still Not Entirely ##br##Convinced Japan Is Eradicating Deflation Government policy is finally doing its part to slay the deflationary dragon. The Abe government shot itself in the foot by tightening fiscal policy by 3% of GDP between 2013 and 2015. It won't make the same mistake again. The Bank of Japan's efforts to pin the 10-year yield to zero also seem to be bearing fruit. As bond yields in other economies have trended higher, this has made Japanese bonds less attractive. That, in turn, has pushed down the yen, ushering in a virtuous circle where a falling yen props up economic activity, leading to higher inflation expectations, lower real yields, and an even weaker yen. Stay Short The Yen Consistent with this narrative, market-based inflation expectations have risen over the past five months. But with inflation swaps still pricing in inflation of only 0.6% over the next 20 years, there is plenty of scope for real rates to fall further (Chart 8). This implies that investors should maintain a structurally short position in the yen. A weaker yen will help boost Japanese stocks, at least in local-currency terms. As a relative play, investors should consider overweighting Japanese exporters versus domestically-exposed sectors. Multinational manufacturers stand to gain the most, as they will benefit from increased overseas sales, while the highly automated, capital-intensive nature of their operations will limit the burden of rising real wages. Call #3: "Global Banks Finally Outperform" Global bank shares have risen by 25% since we made this call, outperforming the MSCI All Country World Index by 14% (Chart 9). The thesis that we outlined five months ago still remains intact (Charts 10 and 11): Chart 9Global Bank Shares Have Bounced Chart 10Factors Supporting Bank Stocks Chart 11Global Banks Are Still Fairly Cheap Improving business and consumer confidence should continue to support credit demand. Stronger economic growth will reduce nonperforming loans. Capital ratios have improved significantly, reducing the risk of further equity dilution. Yield curves have steepened since last summer, which should flatter net interest margins. Despite the run-up in share prices over the past five months, valuations remain attractive. Looking across regions, European banks stand out as being particularly attractive over a cyclical horizon of about 12 months. BCA's European Corporate Health Monitor continues to improve, foreshadowing further progress in mending loan books (Chart 12). The ECB's lending survey indicates that a majority of banks are seeing stronger loan demand (Chart 13). This suggests that credit growth is not about to stall anytime soon. Meanwhile, euro area banks are trading at a miserly 0.8-times book value, which gives valuations plenty of upside. Chart 12Euro Area: Improving Corporate Health Chart 13Euro Area: Banks See Rising Loan Demand Political Risks Chart 14This Will Not Get Le Pen Into The Elysee Palace The risk is that European political developments sabotage this thesis. Our view here is "near-term sanguine, long-term cautious." We continue to think that populism is in a long-term secular bull market. However, unlike in the case of Brexit or Trump, populist leaders in continental Europe will have to wait until the next economic downturn (probably in two or three years) before they seize power. To that extent, the prevailing - though admittedly rather myopic - consensus view is correct: Marine Le Pen will not become president this year. Keep in mind that the National Front underperformed during regional elections in December 2015, just weeks after the terrorist attacks in Paris. Despite a recent uptick in the polls, support for Le Pen is actually lower now than it was back then (Chart 14). As long as the French economy continues to show signs of tentative improvement, the establishment parties will succeed in keeping Le Pen out of power. Peter Berezin, Senior Vice President Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Three (New) Controversial Calls," dated September 30, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Despite the populist sounding nature of this proposal, the Tax Policy Center estimates that 70% of the childcare credits will go to households earning $100,000 and up. See Lily L. Batchelder, Elaine Maag, Chye-Ching Huang, and Emily Horton, "Who Benefits from President Trump's Child Care Proposals?" Tax Policy Center (February 27, 2017) for details. 3 James R. Nunns, Leonard E. Burman, Jeffrey Rohaly, Joseph Rosenberg, and Benjamin R. Page, "An Analysis of the House GOP Tax Plan," Tax Policy Center (September 16, 2016). 4 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "U.S. Border Adjustment Tax: A Potential Monster Issue For 2017," dated January 20, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Feature Dear Client, I am travelling this week so this report is a little different. It is the full transcript and slides of a client presentation I recently gave. The presentation summarises several years of in-house work on applying the Fractal Market Hypothesis to real-life investing. Dhaval Joshi The Efficient Market Hypothesis Is Wrong Good morning In the next 30 minutes or so I want to challenge the way you think about financial markets. You see, at school we are taught the mainstream models of financial markets: Modern Portfolio Theory, the Capital Asset Pricing Model and the Efficient Market Hypothesis. And we are led to believe that these models describe the real world. But I'm sad to say that these mainstream models are deeply flawed. They simply don't describe financial markets as they behave in the real world. And in your heart of hearts, you know it. Take the supposed bedrock of financial market theory, the Efficient Market Hypothesis, and look at the assumptions it makes about markets (Slide 2). Slide 2 One. That economic and market returns follow a Normal - which is to say a standard bell-curve - distribution. Really? Everybody knows that returns exhibit 'fat-tails' in which extreme events happen much more frequently than the bell-curve would suggest. By the way, this also means that a statement such as "the financial crisis was a five standard deviation - five-sigma - event with odds of 3 million to 1" is also complete nonsense. Accounting for the true fat-tails, the likelihood of extreme events is much higher than the flawed bell-curve models would suggest, as we should all now be painfully aware! Two. That the distribution is stationary - its mean doesn't change through time. Again, wrong. We know that economies and markets can and do experience regular regime-shifts or phase-shifts. Three. That markets have no memory - they exhibit no trends. Now this is getting silly! We all know that markets exhibit very strong trends. Four. That markets do not produce repeating patterns at any scale. Untrue. And five. That markets are continuously stable at all scales. Wrong again. I'm sure you'll all agree that none of these assumptions that underlie the Efficient Market Hypothesis describe the markets that we all know and work with. The good news is that there is a model that does describe the financial markets as they behave in the real world (Slide 3). It correctly assumes the return distribution is non-Normal, the mean can change over time, markets can trend, produce repeating patterns, and can generate instabilities at any scale. Slide 3 The model is called the Fractal Market Hypothesis, first proposed by Edgar Peters in 1991. Now I can see some looks of fear at the mention of this intimidating word 'fractal'. But hang in there, there really is nothing to fear. A fractal is just a pattern that repeats over and over at different scales. You come across fractals all the time, perhaps without realizing it. A cloud is a fractal - because a small part of a cloud is just a scaled-down version of the whole cloud. And for those of you who enjoy your vegetables, you will notice that cauliflowers and broccoli are fractals because the florets are just miniature versions of the whole vegetable. But perhaps the most familiar example is a tree (Slide 4). You can clearly see that a tree is just a simple pattern repeating over and over at different scales. Indeed, on this next slide (Slide 5), you see images of the twigs, branches, and trunk structure - and you could not tell them apart. Except that the twigs are on a scale of millimeters, the branches are on a scale of centimeters, and the trunk is on a scale of meters. Slide 4 Slide 5 Let's switch back to financial markets. On this next slide (Slide 6), you see three images of ten successive points on the S&P500. Again, the three images look very similar. In fact, they're very different. The first is on a scale of weeks, the second on a scale of months, and the third on a scale of years. But just like the twigs, branches and trunk, you could not tell them apart without seeing the scale. In other words, financial markets are scale-invariant. They are fractals. Slide 6 But why? And so what? To answer these questions we must now introduce the four basic assumptions of the Fractal Market Hypothesis. One. Investors are not homogeneous. The market is composed of many participants with a large number of different time horizons (Slide 7) - ranging from the milliseconds or seconds for a high frequency trader, through the days or weeks for a hedge fund to the years or decades for a pension fund. Two. These different time horizons interpret the same fundamental information differently (Slide 8). For example, a short-term technical trader interprets a rising price as a buy signal. Whereas a long-term fundamental value investor interprets the same information as a sell signal. Slide 7 Slide 8 Three. The market price reflects the combination of the short-term technical trader's interpretation of the information and the long-term value investor's interpretation of the same information (Slide 9). Crucially, this means the market is not efficient unless all time horizons are active in setting the price. Four. The stability of the market at a given price depends on plentiful liquidity - an adequate balancing of supply and demand at that price (Slide 10). When many different time horizons are active, the market is efficient and liquidity is plentiful. This is because different investors will disagree on the interpretation of the same information, and will trade with each other in volume without moving the price. Slide 9 Slide 10 However, if one time horizon becomes dominant, the market becomes inefficient and liquidity will evaporate. As investors become a 'groupthink herd', the healthy disagreement that is needed to create liquidity disappears. And the market loses its stability. So to answer the question 'why' markets are fractals, it is clear that the short-term investors generate the short-term patterns while long-term investors generate the long-term patterns. And to answer the question 'so what', it is clear that if the fractal structure breaks down, it is a warning sign that liquidity is evaporating and the market is losing its stability. Next we must discuss how we can measure the market's fractal structure, and for this I'm going to digress a little and ask you a famous question. How long is Britain's coastline? This is the question that the grandfather of fractals, Benoit Mandelbrot, first asked in 1967. Actually, it's a trick question. The answer is that there is no answer! You see a coastline is also a fractal. And the more detail you capture and measure, the longer it becomes (Slide 11). The point is that with a fractal structure you cannot measure its length or size. But the good news is that you can measure its extent of 'fractal-ness' using something called a fractal dimension. In fact the next slide (Slide 12) shows how Mandelbrot first defined the fractal dimension of Britain's coastline. Slide 11 Slide 12 Then a couple of years ago we thought why don't we extend this concept to a financial market? After all, a price chart is similar to a coastline, except that distance is replaced with time. In fact, the maths is a little more complicated, but this is how we ended up defining the fractal dimension of a financial market (Slide 13). Bear in mind that you won't find this or any of the following analysis in any textbook because it is our own unique work. Rest assured, you don't need the maths to understand the concept intuitively. Think of it like this (Slide 14). A market that is not trending tends to sweep out 2-dimensional space. So its fractal dimension might be close to 2. But a market that is trending gets less and less fractal and closer and closer to a perfect 1-dimensional line. So its fractal dimension drops close to 1. Slide 13 Slide 14 And now we get to our findings, which are both remarkable and uplifting. When we applied our unique definition of fractal dimension to different financial markets in different historical timeframes, we discovered that the tipping point of instability turned out to be exactly the same across different historical eras, geographies and asset classes. We had come across a universal property of financial markets, irrespective of generation, culture or investment. Financial markets tended to reverse their near-term trend when the fractal structure between the 65-day investment horizon and the 1-day investment horizon disappeared. Specifically, when the 65-day fractal dimension dropped to 1.25. So we called this the "Universal Constant Of Finance". You can see that this universal constant applied to the top and initial bottom of the market during the 1929 Wall Street Crash (Slide 15), and to the top and bottom of the 1987 Crash (Slide 16). It also perfectly picked the tops and bottoms of the 1990 Nikkei Crash (Slide 17), and the 1993 Bond Market Crash (Slide 18). Slide 15 Slide 16 Slide 17 Slide 18 Some financial markets also tended to reverse long-term trends when the fractal structure between the 60-month investment horizon and the 1-month investment horizon disappeared. Specifically, when the 60-month fractal dimension dropped to 1.25. You can see here (Slide 19) how this has perfectly picked many of the structural turning points in the dollar. And when we see the rare star-alignment of a long-term signal coinciding with a near-term signal, it can predict a very strong reversal in a short space of time. This is precisely what we saw ahead of crude oil's sharp bounce in early 2016 (Slide 20 and Slide 21). So to conclude (Slide 22): Slide 19 Slide 20 Slide 21 Slide 22 Financial markets are efficient only when all investment horizons are present and active in setting the price. In other words, when the market has a rich fractal structure. When investment horizons converge to a groupthink herd, the fractal structure breaks down, and the fractal dimension nears its lower bound. This is a warning sign of an impending liquidity-triggered trend reversal, either short-term or long-term. I am now happy to take any questions. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com
Special Report Feature Debt and leverage sit at the core of global investors' concerns over China's macro situation. Our recent conversations with clients confirm that fears of an "imminent" Chinese crash have abated, but investors remain fundamentally uncomfortable with China's seemingly ever-rising debt levels, and are concerned that a proverbial day of reckoning will eventually come, dragging the world into severe recession. Amid these deeply rooted woes, some investors have failed to detect China's cyclical improvement since early last year, and have been caught off guard by the powerful risk-on rally in some asset classes, such as commodities and emerging markets. We have addressed China's debt issue extensively in various reports of late. This week, we add to views articulated in a report penned by my colleague Peter Berezin, chief strategist of our Global Investment Strategy team, titled, "Does China Have A Debt Problem Or A Savings Problem?" Taken together, we intend to shed light on this complicated issue and dispute some commonly held misperceptions. In a nutshell: China's massive buildup of debt is rooted in the country's vast domestic savings and a financial intermediation system that relies heavily on the banking sector. It is wrong to discuss the debt problem without understanding China's basic macro features. (See also China Investment Strategy special report, "Chinese Deleveraging? What Deleveraging!" dated June 15th 2016).1 Therefore, China's rising debt is the mirror image of the accumulation of savings through investment. In this vein, assessing the debt situation essentially boils down to assessing the viability of China's capital spending. In our China Investment Strategy special reports, "How Much Does China Overinvest," dated May 4th 2016, and "The Myth Of Chinese Overcapacity," dated October 6th 2016,2 we found no systemic evidence of massive misallocation of capital, as claimed by many. In fact, the "efficiency" of Chinese capital spending is either comparable or superior to global norms, according to our calculations. While investors and analysts fixated on China's "debt bubble" focus almost entirely on the country's rising debt-to-GDP ratio, we have looked beyond this widely scrutinized conventional indicator by checking corporate financial statements for the true leverage situation at the micro level. In China Investment Strategy special reports, "Rethinking Chinese Leverage," dated October 27th, 2016, and "Rethinking Chinese Leverage, Part II,"3 dated January 5th 2017, we concluded that China's corporate debt situation in terms of both leverage ratios and debt sustainability is far from as precarious as widely perceived. It goes without saying that we are not completely sanguine about the increase in Chinese corporate debt, and we fully appreciate the risk that banks' asset quality would inevitably suffer in an economic downturn. We differ, however, on whether the expected increase in non-performing assets held by banks would degenerate into a financial crisis with chaotic consequences. In our China Investment Strategy special report, "Stress-Testing Chinese Banks," dated July 27th 2016,4 we made the case that Chinese banks would be able to withstand a dramatic increase in non-performing loans without suffering systemic stress, and that the market had priced in a rather extreme situation that in our view was unjustified. Finally, mounting concerns on China's macro debt situation among investors have broad-brushed virtually all Chinese stocks. Almost all Chinese sectors have been trading at steep discounts to their global counterparts, despite comparable leverage and profitability conditions at the micro level. This, in our view, represents market mispricing, and the large valuation gap will eventually be arbitraged away. This is the fundamental reason for our strategically positive assessment on Chinese stocks, especially H shares. Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, “Chinese Deleveraging? What Deleveraging!,” dated June 15, 2016, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, “The Myth Of Chinese Overcapacity,” dated October 6, 2016, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, “Rethinking Chinese Leverage, Part II,” dated January 5, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, “Stress-Testing Chinese Banks,” dated July 27, 2016, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Does China Have A Debt Problem Or A Savings Problem? There is little evidence of a major "credit bubble" in China. Rising debt is largely the consequence of the country's high saving rate. This has mixed implications for global bonds: On the one hand, an exaggerated fear of a hard landing in China has kept global bond yields below where they would otherwise be; on the other hand, high levels of Chinese savings will continue to weigh on real long-term yields. The real trade-weighted RMB will depreciate by a further 3%-to-5% over the next 12 months, with the bulk of the decline coming against the U.S. dollar. Chinese shares are still attractive at current valuation levels. Go long the H-share market versus the MSCI EM index. The China Question Recent Chinese economic data have been fairly solid and our China analysts expect that growth momentum will be sustained over the coming months.5 Nevertheless, there are plenty of clouds on the horizon. Direct fiscal spending has slowed sharply over the past 12 months. In addition, a crackdown on property speculation last year has led to a deceleration in home price inflation, which could adversely affect household spending and construction later this year. Then, of course, there is all that debt. There is no shortage of commentators who argue that China is experiencing a full-blown credit bubble. Others contend that rising debt in China is largely a manifestation of a chronic excess of domestic savings. Knowing which side is correct is critical for investors. If China is in the midst of a massive credit bubble, then it is natural to fear that this bubble will burst fairly soon. This could prove to be devastating to global financial markets. In contrast, if rising debt in China mainly reflects an overabundance of savings, then it is possible that debt will continue rising until those savings dissipate - something that may not happen for many years. We won't beat around the bush. Our view is that rising debt in China has largely been the result of excess savings. This implies that a financial crisis in China is unlikely anytime soon. That does not mean that China will cease being a source of occasional investor angst. But if another major global recession is coming, it will not be because of China. The Debt-Savings Tango Endless ink has been spilled on the question of whether savings create bank credit or bank credit creates savings. In reality, the answer is "both": Just like income can create spending and spending can create income, savings can create debt and vice versa. If an economy is operating at less than full employment, the decision by banks to extend new credit is likely to boost aggregate demand, leading to more hiring. This will raise household disposable income and potentially lift aggregate savings.6 On the flipside, if households decide to save a bit more, this will push down real interest rates. That, in turn, could entice firms to increase how much they borrow and invest. Debt creates savings, and savings create debt; it's a two-way street. Admittedly, thinking through the specific forces underlying the relationship between debt and savings is one of those things that can make your head spin. Thus, it is worthwhile to go through a few simple examples in order to elucidate the principles at work. With this knowledge in hand, we will be able to debunk many of the fallacies that investors routinely succumb to. Cuckoo For Coconuts: How To Think About Debt And Savings Imagine a small island economy consisting of 100 people, each of whom toils away producing 100 coconuts every year, resulting in annual GDP of 10,000 coconuts. Consider the following five examples, summarized in Table 1: Table 1Cuckoo For Coconuts:##br## Debt Creates Savings, Savings Create Debt Example #1: Each person consumes 100 coconuts. As a result, a total of 10,000 coconuts are consumed. Total savings is zero, as is total investment. No debt is created. Example #2: Each person consumes only 75 coconuts, selling the other 25 coconuts to a nearby plantation. The plantation buys these coconuts with the help of a bank loan and plants them, resulting in 2,500 new coconut trees. Total consumption falls to 7,500. Savings and investment equals 2,500 coconuts. 2,500 coconuts worth of bank loans are created. Notice that higher savings have led to more debt. Example #3: Same as Example 2, but now instead of selling the excess coconuts to a nearby plantation, they are exported abroad. Savings equal 2,500 coconuts, investment is zero, and the current account surplus is 2,500. The island accumulates 2,500 coconuts worth of foreign assets. The lesson here is that if a country can export some of its excess savings abroad, debt may not need to rise by as much as if the savings had to be intermediated by the domestic financial system. Note also that this example reveals the famous economic identity: S-I=CA. Example #4: Each person consumes 125 coconuts, made possible by importing 25 coconuts per person. Consumption now equals 12,500 coconuts. Savings equal -2,500 coconuts, investment is zero, and the current account deficit is 2,500. The island takes on 2,500 coconuts worth of external debt. Example #5: Half the island's residents consume 75 coconuts each, while the other half consumes 125 coconuts each. Those who consume 75 coconuts sell their surplus nuts on the open market, placing the proceeds in a bank. The bank lends out these savings to the other half of the population. Net savings and investment is zero. However, 1,250 coconuts worth of new bank loans are created. Debt Puzzles The key idea stemming from these examples is that debt is often formed when there is a persistent divergence between spending and income.7 This is true for the economy as a whole, as well as for its individual constituents (households, firms, and the government). Understanding this point helps resolve a number of seeming puzzles. For instance, it is sometimes alleged that China's debt buildup cannot be the result of the country's high saving rate because U.S. debt also rose rapidly in the years leading up to the financial crisis, an era during which the U.S. national saving rate was very low. Our simple examples demonstrate why this is a misleading argument. Examples 2, 4, and 5 show that debt levels will rise regardless of whether income exceeds spending or spending exceeds income. It is the absolute difference between the two that matters, not whether the residual is positive or negative. In Example 2, which is applicable to China today, households spend less than they earn. The resulting savings are intermediated by the financial system and transformed into investment, creating new debt along the way. In Example 4, which is applicable to the U.S. before the financial crisis, households spend more than they earn, leading them to take on new debt in order to finance imports. The increase in debt may get amplified, as in Example 5, if some households save while others dissave. As discussed in Box 1, Example 5 also helps explain why inequality and debt levels tend to rise and fall together over time. The Future Of Chinese Household Savings Chinese household savings now stand at nearly 40% of disposable income, notably higher than in other major developed and emerging economies. The increase in China's household savings, along with a widening gap between rich and poor, have been important drivers of faster debt growth (Chart 1). As time goes by, China's household saving rate will begin to decline due to the aging of its population, the expansion of household credit, and the emergence of a stronger "consumer culture." Yet, that shift is likely to be a gradual one. Progress in building out a social safety net has been painfully slow. This has forced households to maintain high levels of precautionary savings. The share of China's population in its 'prime savings years' (between the ages of 30-and-59) will also continue to increase over the next 15 years, which should support an elevated saving rate (Chart 2). Chart 1China: Higher Saving Rate And ##br##Inequality Went Hand In Hand With Debt Growth Chart 2China: Share Of Population In Its High Saving Years ##br##Has Not Yet Peaked In addition, sky-high property prices have forced young people to save a large fraction of their incomes in order to have any hope of owning a home. This is particularly true for men. Brides are in short supply in China. The saving rate among single-child households with one son is about four percentage points higher in rural areas and two percentage points higher in urban areas, compared to single-child households with one daughter. One academic study concluded that about half of the increase in China's household saving rate since the late-1970s could be attributed to this factor.8 Unfortunately, this problem is not going to go away anytime soon. The ratio of men between the ages of 25-and-39 and women between the ages of 20-and-34 - a proxy for gender imbalances in the marriage market - will surge from 1.06 at present to 1.35 by the middle of the next decade (Chart 3). What do countries with surplus savings and surplus men tend to do? Historically, the answer is that they have sent them off to fight. China's military spending has grown by leaps and bounds over the past decade (Chart 4). This trend is bound to continue, making East Asia an increasingly likely setting for future military conflicts.9 Chart 3A Shortage Of Chinese Brides Chart 4China: A Lot Of Dry Powder Understanding Chinese Corporate Debt Dynamics Many companies around the world rely heavily on retained earnings and equity sales to finance new investment projects. When this happens, investment can take place without the need for the creation of new debt. China has its fair share of consistently profitable companies that fund capital expenditures using internally generated funds, while tapping the equity markets as necessary to finance larger projects. However, the country is also awash with companies that are in constant need of debt financing. Perhaps not surprisingly, the former tend to be private firms while the latter are often state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Chart 5China: State-Owned Companies Are Not The Only Ones ##br##With Access To Cheap Financing Pundits like to assert that the secret to boosting growth in China is to wean these money-losing public companies off cheap credit, forcing them to cut back on production and capital spending. This will allow scarce economic resources to migrate to better-managed firms that will use them more wisely. But is this really a sensible assumption? What exactly is the evidence that China's well-run private companies have been starved of credit because most of it is flowing to money-losing companies? The data does not fit this "crowding out" story at all (Chart 5). The Japan Analogy A more sensible narrative is that the Chinese government has been prodding state-owned banks into lending money to state-owned companies and local governments in order to support aggregate demand and keep unemployment from rising. The experience of Japan is instructive here. Starting in the early 1990s, Japan entered an extended era where the private sector was trying to spend less than it earned (Chart 6). In order to keep unemployment from rising, the Japanese government was forced to try to export these excess savings abroad via a current account surplus or, failing that, absorb them with dissavings from the public sector. While Japan was able to lift its current account surplus from 1.4% of GDP in 1990 to 3% of GDP in 1998, this was not enough to fully offset the surge in desired private-sector savings. This necessitated the government to run large budget deficits. The same sort of fiscal trap now stalks China. Up until the Great Recession, China was able to export much of its excess savings. The current account surplus hit a record high of nearly 10% of GDP in 2007. In effect, China was doing what the islanders in Example 3 were able to do. The subsequent appreciation of the RMB undermined this strategy, forcing the government to take steps to boost domestic demand. It is no surprise that China's debt stock began to grow rapidly just as its current account surplus started to dwindle (Chart 7). Chart 6Japan Relied On Fiscal Largess And ##br##Current Account Surpluses To Offset The Rise In ##br##Private-Sector Savings Chart 7China: Debt Increased##br## When Current Account Surplus ##br##Began Its Descent Keep in mind that fiscal policy in China entails much more than adjustments to government spending and taxes. Central government spending accounts for a fairly small share of GDP. The vast majority of fiscal stimulus is done via the banking system. This makes Chinese fiscal policy nearly indistinguishable from credit policy. From this perspective, China's so-called "debt mountain" is not much different from Japan's debt mountain once we acknowledge that the bulk of China's corporate debt in China is, in fact, quasi-fiscal debt. As evidence, note that in sharp contrast to the SOE sector, the ratio of liabilities-to-assets among private Chinese companies has actually been trending lower over the past decade (Chart 8). Yes, many of the investment projects undertaken by SOEs and local governments are of questionable economic merit. But that's beside the point. China's money-losing SOEs are the equivalent of Japan's fabled "bridges to nowhere." From the Chinese government's point of view, an SOE that is producing something is still preferable to one that is producing nothing. The ever-rising debt burden that these state-owned firms must carry to cover operating losses and finance new investment is just the price the government must pay to keep the economy afloat. Little Evidence Of A Genuine Credit Bubble Genuine credit bubbles tend to happen during periods of euphoria. U.S., Spanish, and Irish banks all traded at lofty multiples to book value on the eve of the financial crisis, having massively outperformed their respective indices in the preceding years. That's obviously not the case for Chinese banks today, which remain one of the most loathed sectors of the global equity market (Chart 9). Chart 8Chinese Private Firms: Liabilities-To-Assets##br## Trending Lower For A Decade Chart 9Chinese Banks: Unloved And Unwanted The U.S., Spanish, and Irish housing booms also occurred alongside ballooning current account deficits, something that doesn't apply to China (Chart 10). One can debate whether China is in the midst of a property bubble, but even if it is, it looks a lot more like the one Hong Kong experienced in the late 1990s. When that bubble burst, property prices plummeted by 70%. Yet, Hong Kong banks were barely affected (Chart 11). Chart 10Recent Credit Bubbles##br## Developed Amid Widening Current Account Deficits Chart 11Hong Kong##br## Is The Correct Analogy Chart 12Chinese Debt: Not Predominately Tied ##br##To The Property Market There is a lot of debt in China. However, most of it has not been centered on the property market (Chart 12). Rather, just as in Japan, debt has served a fiscal purpose - it has been used to absorb the excess savings of the private sector, so as to keep unemployment from rising. Chart 13 shows that national saving rates and debt-to-GDP ratios are positively correlated across emerging economies. China sits close to the trend line, suggesting that its debt stock is roughly what you would expect it to be. Chart 13Positive Correlation Between National Savings And Indebtedness Investment Conclusions Where does this leave investors? For global bonds, the implications of our analysis are somewhat mixed. On the one hand, the high probability that the Chinese government can maintain the status quo of continued credit expansion for the foreseeable future means that a hard landing for the economy - and the associated drop in safe-haven developed economy government bond yields that this would trigger - is unlikely to occur. On the other hand, high levels of Chinese savings will continue to fuel the global savings glut, keeping real long-term bond yields lower than they would otherwise be. On balance, investors should maintain a modest underweight allocation toward global bonds. Our analysis does not warrant either a very bearish or very bullish stance towards the RMB. Granted, a banking crisis could prompt Chinese savers to look for ways to move more of their money overseas, leading to further capital flight and a tumbling currency. As noted, however, such an outcome is not in the cards. On the flipside, a chronic shortfall of domestic demand will keep the pressure on the government to try to export excess production abroad by running a larger current account surplus. As we foretold in our March 2015 report "A Weaker RMB Ahead," this will push the authorities to weaken the currency.10 We expect the real trade-weighted RMB to depreciate by a further 3%-to-5% over the next 12 months, with the bulk of the decline coming against the U.S. dollar. If China averts a debt crisis, that's good news for global equities. In the developed market universe, Europe and Japan stand to benefit the most, given the cyclical bent of their stock markets. We are overweight both regions (currency hedged). Despite a weak start to the year, both markets have outperformed the U.S. in local-currency terms since bottoming last summer, a trend we expect will resume over the coming months (Chart 14). What about Chinese shares specifically? Clearly, there are many risks facing the Chinese economy that transcend debt worries, a possible trade war with the U.S. being the prominent example. Yet, considering that Chinese stocks trade at fairly cheap valuation levels, our sense is that these risks have been more than fully priced in by investors. With this in mind, we are going long Chinese H-shares relative to the overall EM basket.11 Chart 15 shows that H-shares now trade at a substantial discount to the EM index. Chart 14Euro Area And Japan: Rebound Will Continue Chart 15Chinese Investable Stocks Are Cheap Peter Berezin, Senior Vice President Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com Box 1 Debt And Inequality Chart 16U.S.: Positive Correlation Between ##br##Income Inequality And Debt-To-GDP Income inequality and the ratio of private debt-to-GDP have been positively correlated in the U.S. over the past century (Chart 16). The existence of this relationship is not merely due to a third factor: economic growth. Growth was strong in the 1920 and 1980s/90s - two periods of rapidly increasingly inequality - but it was also strong during the 1960s, a decade when inequality was falling. Our analysis helps shed light on this relationship. Return to Example 5, but this time assume that each resident consumes 100 coconuts, with half the population producing 75 coconuts and the other half producing 125 coconuts. 10,000 coconuts are still produced and consumed in aggregate, resulting in no net savings. But because half the population is borrowing money to acquire coconuts from the other half, debt levels still rise. Higher inequality leads to more debt. To be sure, the correlation between inequality and debt runs in both directions. Rising debt has historically led to an expansion of the financial sector. This has helped enrich Wall Street elites. In this way, rising debt can exacerbate inequality. On the flipside, rising income inequality entails a shift of income from poorer households - with high marginal propensities to consume - to richer ones - who generally save a large fraction of their income. This tends to reduce aggregate demand. Lower aggregate demand, in turn, leads to lower real rates, making it easier for poorer households to load up on debt and live beyond their means. 5 Please see China Investment Strategy, "Be Aware Of China's Fiscal Tightening," dated February 16, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 6 A few technical caveats are in order. Think of a simple closed-economy "Keynesian" model where aggregate demand determines income and where savings (S), by definition, are equal to investment (I). In this model, investment is usually treated as exogenous. Thus, if increased bank credit is used to finance new investment projects, this will also translate into higher savings (i.e., if "I" goes up, "S" must also rise). In contrast, if the credit ends up flowing into consumption, savings will remain unchanged. More plausibly, one can imagine that investment is subject to an "accelerator effect," so that increased aggregate demand prompts firms to increase capital spending. In that case, even if the credit flows into consumption, investment will still rise - and since savings is equal to investment, this means that savings will also go up. Intuitively, this happens because the increase in income derived from higher employment more than offsets the increase in consumption. This leads to higher aggregate savings. 7 The word "persistent" is important here. To see why, suppose that in Example 5, the people who consumed 125 coconuts each had previously been thrifty, which had allowed them to build up large bank deposits. Then they could finance their additional spending by running down their accumulated savings, rather than taking on new debt. Likewise, if those who consumed 75 coconuts had previously lived beyond their means, then instead of adding to their deposits, they would be paying back existing debt. The net result would be less debt, not more. 8 Shang-Jin Wei and Xiao Zhang, "The Competitive Saving Motive: Evidence From Rising Sex Ratios And Savings Rates In China," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 119, No. 3, 2011. 9 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think, Part II," dated November 6, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 10 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "A Weaker RMB Ahead," dated March 6, 2015, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 11 The exact trade is to be long China H-Shares versus the MSCI Emerging Market index, currency unhedged. The corresponding ETFs for this trade are the Hang Seng Investment Index Funds Series: H-Share Index ETF (2828 HK), and the iShares MSCI Emerging Markets ETF (EEM US). The Hang Seng China Enterprise index comprises of China H-Shares (Chinese stocks available to international investors) currently trading on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Highlights Crude-oil fundamentals stand out among commodities because of the active efforts by critical producers to rein in supply since the end of last year. This can be seen in even-higher compliance with the production accord - a supply shock in many ways - negotiated by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia: Last month, Reuters estimated 94% compliance on the 1.2mm b/d in cuts pledged by OPEC states. We expect compliance to remain high, which will strengthen the divergence between oil prices and the USD, as markets look toward the upcoming summer driving season in the Northern Hemisphere. Active supply management and robust demand growth wrought by lower prices could continue to overwhelm a strong USD's influence on oil prices, if this Agreement becomes a durable modus operandi for KSA and Russia going forward. We give a high probability to this outcome, even as the Fed leans into its interest-rate normalization. Energy: Overweight. This past Thursday, we closed our long WTI Dec/17 vs. short Dec/18 backwardation spread at +$0.96/bbl (Dec/17 over); it was initiated February 9 at -$0.11/bbl (Dec/17 under), resulting in a 972.7% gain. We also closed our Dec/19 short WTI vs. long Brent spread, elected February 6 at +$0.07/bbl (WTI over) at -$1.17/bbl (WTI under), for a gain of 1,771.4%. Base Metals: Neutral. Any demand uptick for base metals' coming from U.S. fiscal stimulus will not hit markets until 2H18 at the earliest. We remain neutral. Precious Metals: Neutral. Based on last week's analysis, we are tactically long a Jun/17 gold put spread (long the $1200/oz put vs. short the $1150/oz puts) and call spread (long the $1275/oz call vs. short the $1325/oz calls) at a net debit of $21/oz. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The USDA expects continued demand from China to keep soybeans relatively well bid versus corn and wheat in the 2017/18 crop year. Total planted area for these crops is expected to be the lowest since 2011, keeping ending stocks flat to lower. Feature Prior to the end of the 1990s, crude-oil prices were, to use one of the most popular catch-phrases in finance, mean-reverting: The price of crude oil imported to the U.S. averaged just over $19/bbl from Mar/83, when WTI futures began trading, to 1999 (Chart of the Week). This meant WTI traded at ~ $20/bbl on average over that period. Prices were volatile, but pretty much returned to $20ish/bbl, which allowed traders to take a view on how soon prices would revert to their mean. Whenever prices were too far removed from that level, markets expected producers - OPEC mostly - to adjust output to meet current and expected demand conditions. Since roughly 2000 - maybe a little earlier - oil prices have followed a random walk.1 During this time, oil prices have been negatively correlated with the broad trade-weighted index (TWI) for the USD. One striking characteristic of oil prices and the USD TWI during this time is both followed random walks, which "like the walk of a drunken sailor, wanders indefinitely far, listing with the wind," to borrow Paul Samuelson's well-turned metaphor (Chart 2).2 Chart of the WeekOil's Past As Prelude: ##br##A Return To Mean Reversion? Chart 2Oil Prices And The USD Followed ##br##A Common Long-term Trend Until 1Q16 We believe this was caused by OPEC's decision to become a price-taker at the end of the 1990s - shortly after Dec/98 or thereabouts - after years of unsuccessfully trying to manage oil prices via production adjustments. After the price of oil imports in the U.S. dropped below $10/bbl (nominal), it appears the Cartel took the decision to respond to prices set by market forces (supply, demand, inventories and exchange rates), and to abandon its price-management efforts. The long-term correlation between oil and the USD was due to the fact that while oil prices and the USD followed random walks, they followed a common long-term trend as they wandered indefinitely about. This held up to the end of 1Q16, when a massive sell-off in risky-asset markets globally took oil prices below $30/bbl (Chart 3).3 This came on the heels of a price collapse brought about by OPEC's Nov/14 decision to launch a market-share war. By no means did this high correlation mean oil and the USD were always moving in lock step. The collapse in oil prices at the end of the last century led to a production-cutting agreement among OPEC states, Norway and Mexico, which lifted U.S. import prices from less than $10/bbl at the end of 1998 to $30/bbl by Nov/00. Likewise, export disruptions in Venezuela in 2002 - 2003 and, to a lesser extent, hurricane losses in the U.S. Gulf in 2005 sharply curtailed supply and lifted oil prices above what could have been expected given the USD's level at the time, as the Chart of the Week shows.4 End Of Oil's Random Walk? The price collapse of 1Q16 marked the bottom of the price move begun a few months prior to the Nov/14 market-share war declaration. The subsequent divergence between oil prices and the USD since then has been remarkable (Chart 4). The market-share strategy, which essentially allowed Cartel members to produce full-out and grab as much market share as possible, was engineered by KSA, and, we believe, initially was directed at undermining Iran's efforts to restore oil production lost to nuclear-related sanctions. From time to time, it also appeared OPEC was trying to retard the continued growth of shale-oil production in the U.S., which, by 2014, was increasing at an annual rate of more than 1mm b/d, enough to replace the entire output of Libya. Chart 3Close-up Of USD vs. ##br##Brent Divergence Chart 4The Divergence Between ##br##Oil Prices And The USD Is Remarkable This strategy was a complete failure. The price collapse that ensued brought KSA and Russia - both highly dependent on oil revenues - to the brink of financial ruin, compelling them to find a way to work together.5 After several false starts in 2016, they succeeded late in the year with a negotiated production cut. OPEC pledged to reduce output by as much as 1.2mm b/d, and non-OPEC producers agreed to cut output by close to 600k b/d, half of which is expected to come from Russia. Recent tallies by Reuters indicate 94% of the cuts from OPEC states that signed on to the deal have actually been realized.6 Should KSA and Russia find a way to coordinate their and their allies' production in a way that maintains the backwardation we expect later this year - the result of production cuts (Chart 5), and robust demand growth (Chart 6) - we could see oil prices become mean-reverting once again. Chart 5If KSA And Russia Can ##br##Coordinate Production ... Chart 6... And Demand Continues To Grow, ##br##The Oil-Price Backwardation Could Persist This likely requires the forward curves for WTI and Brent to remain backwardated, so as to moderate the growth in shale production, and for prices to remain between $55/bbl and $65/bbl, so as not to set off another shale boom. Gulf sources have indicated KSA prefers prices this year of ~ $60/bbl, which, we believe would allow it to keep some control over the rate at which shale production revives.7 Chart 7Supply Destruction And Robust Growth ##br##Rallied Oil Despite A Strong USD Investment Implications We are not calling for a return to mean-reversion in oil prices just yet. We are, however, highlighting the possibility for such a sea-change in the market if all the supply-side pieces fall into place - i.e., KSA, Russia and their respective allies find a way to work together to moderate U.S. shale-oil production. That said, we will be watching closely to see whether the KSA - Russia Agreement becomes a durable modus operandi in the oil market, particularly as regards the management of inventories and production in the market generally. If these states are able to keep prices ~ $60/bbl, and gain some control over the forward curve's slope - i.e., literally manage their production for backwardation - then there is a chance oil prices could once again become mean-reverting. In a mean-reverting world with backwardated oil prices, commodity-index exposure is favored, since investors would, once again, earn positive roll yields as the indices are rebalanced monthly in the underlying futures markets. Bottom Line: The persistent negative correlation between oil prices and the USD broke down following the global asset sell-off in 1Q16. Since then, the combination of supply destruction and robust demand growth has allowed oil prices to rally despite a strong USD (Chart 7). If KSA and Russia can continue to cooperate in their production-management deal - i.e., find a way to manage production so that prices remain closer to $60/bbl than not - and Brent and WTI forward curves backwardate, markets could once again become mean-reverting. In such a world, commodity-index exposures are favored - particularly those heavy on crude-oil and refined-products price exposure - for their positive roll yield. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 Technically, oil prices have been I(1) variables (integrated of order 1) since about 2000, meaning they are mean-reverting in first differences (e.g., today's price minus yesterday's price). Please see Geman, Helyette (2007), "Mean Reversion Versus Random Walk in Oil and Natural Gas Prices," pp. 219 - 228, in Advances in Mathematical Finance. Haidar, Imad and Rodney C. Wolff (2011) obtained similar results, reporting crude prices were mean-reverting from Jan/86 - Jan/98, then random-walking since then; please see pp. 3 - 4 of "Forecasting Crude Oil Price (revisited)," presented at the 30th USAEE/IAEE North American Conference in Washington, D.C., during October 2011. Our own research corroborates these results - we find WTI and Brent were mean-reverting from Mar/83, when WTI futures started trading, to Mar/98; and were random-walking I(1) variables after that. 2 Please see Samuelson, Paul A. (1965), "Proof That Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly," in Industrial Management Review, 6:2. 3 This is to say, these variables were cointegrated, and could be expressed in a linear combination using an error-correction model. 4 Our colleague, Mathieu Savary, who runs BCA Research's Foreign Exchange Strategy, addressed these oil-USD divergences in "Party Like It's 1999," published November 25, 2016. It is available at fes.bcareseach.com. 5 We discuss this at length in the feature article of Commodity & Energy Strategy published September 8, 2016, entitled "Ignore The KSA - Russia Production Pact, Focus Instead On Their Need For Cash." Both states were burning through cash reserves, and were trying tap foreign markets for additional funds by selling interests in their most valuable holdings - via the IPO of, and via the sale of just under 20% of Rosneft held by the Russian government. Russia placed its Rosneft shares late last year with Glencore and Qatar's sovereign wealth fund, while KSA is expected to IPO Aramco in late 2018. 6 Please see "OPEC compliance with oil curbs rises to 94 percent in February: Reuters survey," published by the news service online February 28, 2017. 7 Please see "Exclusive: Saudi Arabia wants oil prices to rise to around $60 in 2017 - sources," published by Reuters online February 28, 2016. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016
GAA DM Equity Country Allocation Model Update The GAA DM Equity Country Allocation model is updated as of February 28, 2017. The model has maintained its large overweight in the U.S. Within the non-U.S. level 2 model, Spain and Italy weights have been increased at the expense of Japan and Switzerland. Japan and U.K. remain the two largest underweight countries. (Table 1). Table 1Model Allocation Vs. Benchmark Weights As shown in Table 2 and Charts 1, 2 and 3, both the level 1 and level 2 models outperformed their respective benchmarks in February, resulting in a 39 bps outperformance of the aggregate model vs. the MSCI World. Since inception, the GAA model has outperformed its benchmark by 30 bps. Please see also on the website http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/trades/allocation_performance. For more details on the models, please see the January 29th, 2016 Special Report "Global Equity Allocation: Introducing the Developed Markets Country Allocation Model." http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/articles/view_report/18850. Table 2Performance (Total Returns In USD) Chart 1GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World Chart 2GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level 1) Chart 3GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) GAA Equity Sector Selection Model The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model (Chart 4) is updated as of February 28, 2017. The momentum component has shifted Consumer Discretionary from overweight to underweight. For mode details on the model, please see the Special Report "Introducing The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model," July 27, 2016 available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Chart 4Overall Model Performance Table 3Allocations Table 4Performance Since Going Live Xiaoli Tang, Associate Vice President xiaoli@bcaresearch.com Patrick Trinh, Associate Editor patrick@bcaresearch.com Aditya Kurian, Research Analyst adityak@bcaresearch.com
How Long Is The Sweet Spot? Table 1Recommended Allocation The sweet spot on a baseball bat, scientists find,1 is the small area about two inches (5 cm) long, some six inches from the tip. The sweet spot for global risk assets may not be much bigger. The 22% rise in global equities since February last year has been driven by a "goldilocks" combination of recovering economic activity, quiescent inflation, and still-accommodative monetary policy. But, after such a strong rally, markets must walk a fine line - no slowdown in growth and no surprising tightening of monetary conditions - for prices to rise further. Our analysis suggests that they can, but the risk of a correction is rising. A lot of the better news of the past year has already been priced in. The price-to-sales ratio for U.S. stocks is close to an all-time high, and even the plain-vanilla 12-month forward PE ratio has reached 17.5x, the highest since 2002 (Chart 1). Volatility has fallen to a low level, with the VIX not rising above 12 over the past month, and the S&P500 index going 98 days without a one-day decline of 1% or more, the longest such period since 1995 (Chart 2). To a degree, this is justified by the recent strong pick-up in global growth. Sentiment indicators have accelerated since the election of President Trump, and even hard data is now showing the first signs of recovery (Chart 3) with, for example, U.S. retail sales rising 5.6% year-on-year in January, and core durable goods orders starting to follow the rise in companies' capex intentions (Chart 4). Similar positive economic surprises are visible in Europe, Japan, China and elsewhere. The problem is that further upside surprises are likely to be limited. Regional Fed NowCast surveys for Q1 real GDP growth are already at 2.5-3.1%. Consensus forecasts for S&P500 earnings growth in 2017 look about right at 10.5% but, with a stronger dollar and rising wages, are unlikely to be beaten. Chart 1Historically High Valuations Chart 2Time For A Pull-Back? Chart 3Hard Data Starting To Recover Too Chart 4Orders To Follow Capex Intentions Headline inflation has picked up (to 2.5% in the U.S. and 1.9% in the Eurozone), mainly because of higher oil prices, but core inflation remains sufficiently under control that central banks don't need to slam on the brakes. The rise in unit labor costs in the U.S. suggests that core PCE inflation will gradually move up to 2% during the year (Chart 5). The latest FOMC minutes revealed that members want a further rate hike "fairly soon", and BCA expects the Fed to raise three times this year (to which the futures market ascribes only a 36% probability). But Fed policy remains very accommodative (Chart 6), the European Central Bank is unlikely to end its asset purchases soon on account of political and banking system concerns, and the Bank of Japan remains committed to its 0% yield target for 10-year government bonds until inflation is well above 2%. Absent a powerful fiscal stimulus in the U.S. or a move by the "hard money" advocates in the Trump administration to change the Fed's modus operandi, we think its unlikely that a tightening of monetary policy will drag down asset prices. Chart 5Labor Costs Putting Pressure On Prices Chart 6Fed Policy Still Accomodative Risks certainly abound. The Trump administration could start a trade war with China. Its proposals for corporate and personal tax cuts could disappoint both in terms of their details and the timing of Congress's passing them. European politics remain a concern, with the probability of Marine Le Pen becoming French President increasing recently (though it remains small). But risk markets tend to rise on a wall of worry. Investor sentiment is not particularly bullish at the moment, with the bull/bear ratio among individual investors barely above 1 (Chart 7) and flows into equity funds in recent months not reversing the outflows of last year (Chart 8). Chart 7Retail Investors Not So Bullish Chart 8Equity Flows Are Still Tepid After a year of a strong cyclical risk-on rally, progress from now on will get tougher. A short-term change of direction is quite possible (and has already happened in some assets, with the yen moving back to 112 and the 10-year Treasury yield to 2.3%). But we expect economic growth to remain robust this year - with U.S. real GDP growth likely to come in close to 3% on the back of surprises in capex - which will push the 10-year Treasury yield above 3% by year-end. In this environment, we continue to favor equities over bonds, and maintain our pro-risk tilt in equity sectors, credit and alternative assets. Equities: U.S. equities have outperformed Eurozone ones by 5% year-to-date, mainly because of worries about Europe's political risk and the fragility of its banking sector. Though we think the political risks are overstated (except perhaps in Italy), we continue to prefer the U.S. in common currency terms because of our expectations of further dollar appreciation and because the lower volatility of the U.S. helps reduce the beta of our recommended portfolio. Emerging markets have outperformed global equities by 3% YTD, mainly on the back of stronger commodities prices. But we remain underweight EM because of the risks from a stronger dollar and rising global rates, concerns about protectionism and debt refinancing, and because of the likelihood that China's rebound will run out of steam over the next 12 months (Chart 9). Fixed Income: Rates have pulled back recently: long-term institutional investors have begun to find attraction in the long end of the U.S. Treasury yield curve at 2-3%, though speculative investors remain short (Chart 10). With the Fed likely to raise rates three times this year, inflation expectations to pick up further, and nominal GDP growth in the U.S. to reach 4.5-5%, we expect the U.S. 10-year yield to rise above 3%. We therefore remain underweight duration and prefer inflation-linked over nominal bonds. In the improving economic environment, we continue to like credit, but find valuations more attractive for investment-grade bonds than for high-yield. Currencies: Dollar appreciation has been on hold since January but we think the long-term trend remains in place because of the probable direction of relative interest rates. Neither Japan nor the Eurozone is likely to move towards monetary tightening over the next 12 months. Even if the Trump administration were to want a weaker dollar, a few tweets would not be enough to offset monetary fundamentals. And, while it is true that sentiment towards the dollar is already bullish, this has historically not precluded further appreciation, for example in the late 1990s (Chart 11). Chart 9EM Equities Correlated With China PMIs Chart 10Divergent Views On U.S. Bonds Chart 11Optimism Need Not Stop USD's Rise Commodities: The oil price remains close to its equilibrium level at around $55 a barrel, with the OPEC agreement largely holding but being offset by a production increase from the U.S. shale drillers, whose rig count has doubled since last May. We are neutral on industrial commodities: Chinese demand resulting from last year's reflationary policy is likely to be offset by the stronger dollar. Gold remains a useful portfolio hedge in a world of elevated geopolitical worries and inflation tail-risk, but is also negatively correlated with the U.S. dollar. Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see, for example, "The Sweetspot of a Hollow Baseball or Softball Bat", by Daniel A. Russell, Pennsylvania State University, available at www.acs.psu.edu/drussell/bats/sweetspot.html Recommended Asset Allocation Model Portfolio (USD Terms)
Highlights U.S. Treasuries - Fair Value: The 10-year U.S. Treasury yield now appears 7 bps expensive on our model. Investors should maintain below-benchmark duration and continue to monitor bullish sentiment toward the U.S. dollar for signals about the breadth of the global economic recovery. U.S. Treasuries - Technicals: Large net short bond positions are in the process of being unwound. A more balanced technical picture removes one of the key impediments to the bond bear market and possibly sets the stage for another leg higher in yields. China: Chinese monetary policy that is sufficiently accommodative to spur economic growth, but not so accommodative that it causes undue strength in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar, is the most bearish outcome for U.S. bonds. Feature Bonds rallied strongly late last week without any obvious economic catalyst. Now that the dust has settled we find the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield trading at 2.34%, 7 bps below our estimate of fair value (Chart 1). Chart 12-Factor U.S. Treasury Model Updating Our U.S. Treasury Model That fair value estimate comes from our 2-factor U.S. Treasury model, based on the Global Manufacturing PMI and bullish sentiment toward the U.S. dollar. In our view, these two factors capture the most important macro drivers of U.S. bond yields. Stronger global growth, as proxied by the Global Manufacturing PMI, tends to push yields higher. However, to the extent that stronger global growth coincides with an appreciating U.S. dollar, the amount of monetary tightening that needs to be achieved through higher interest rates is limited. This caps the upside in long-dated U.S. bond yields. Put differently, it is not just the magnitude of the global growth impulse that matters for U.S. bond yields, but also the breadth of the recovery. The more broad-based the recovery, the less upward pressure on the U.S. dollar and the higher U.S. Treasury yields can rise. Last week we received Flash PMI estimates for the U.S., Eurozone and Japan that we can use to estimate the Global PMI for February. According to the Flash estimates, the U.S. PMI declined slightly in February, but this was more than offset by accelerations in both the Eurozone and Japan. Altogether, these three regions account for 48% of the Global PMI and, assuming PMIs in all other countries remain flat, we can calculate that the global PMI will nudge higher from 52.7 in January to 52.9 in February. Of course one month of data is much less important than the longer run trend. Taking a step back, we see that manufacturing PMIs are trending higher in every major economic bloc (Chart 2). Our diffusion index also shows that the global manufacturing recovery is more broadly based than at any time during the past three years (Chart 2, top panel). The synchronized nature of the recovery is also reflected in the behavior of the U.S. dollar, which has not appreciated during the past month even though Fed rate hike expectations have shifted up (Chart 3). The message from the survey of bullish dollar sentiment - the series that is included in our Treasury model - is more mixed. Bullish dollar sentiment plunged from elevated levels in January but has recovered somewhat during the past few weeks (Chart 3, panel 2). Meantime, U.S. Treasury spreads over German bunds and JGBs are also sending mixed signals. Short-maturity spreads have widened alongside increased U.S. rate hike expectations, while long-maturity spreads have been well contained (Chart 3, bottom 2 panels). Chart 2Synchronized Global Recovery Chart 3Keep Watching The Dollar Global bond investors should closely monitor trends in the U.S. dollar, bullish sentiment toward the dollar, and U.S. Treasury spreads over bunds and JGBs. Each of these indicators provides information about the breadth of the economic recovery. If Fed rate hike expectations remain firm, or even move higher, and that trend is not matched by a stronger dollar or wider Treasury spreads, then that would signal that the global recovery is becoming more synchronized, suggesting additional upside for bond yields. Bottom Line: The 10-year U.S. Treasury yield now appears 7 bps expensive on our model. Investors should maintain below-benchmark duration and continue to monitor bullish sentiment toward the U.S. dollar for signals about the breadth of the global economic recovery. Chart 4Positioning Becoming More Balanced Treasury Technicals Less Stretched This brings us back to last Friday's bond rally. Puzzlingly, the 2-year U.S. Treasury yield declined 6 bps and the 10-year yield fell 7 bps on a day without any significant economic or political news. In fact, Treasury yields managed to decline even though rate hike expectations embedded in the overnight index swap curve were unchanged and the probability of a March rate hike priced into fed funds futures actually increased from 31% to 33%! The unusual disconnect between Treasury yields and rate hike expectations is probably related to the expiry of the March bond futures contracts. Last week, traders had to decide whether to let their March contracts expire or roll them over into June. Positioning data show that speculators carried large net short positions into last week (Chart 4), so it is possible that it was the capitulation of these large short positions that drove yields lower on Friday. More timely data from the skew between payer and receiver swaptions show that swaption investors are no longer betting on rising rates (Chart 4, panel 4). Net speculative positions in Treasury futures could follow suit when the data are released later this week. In addition, our composite sentiment indicator has just recently ticked back above the zero line (Chart 4, panel 2). Bottom Line: Large net short bond positions are in the process of being unwound. A more balanced technical picture removes one of the key impediments to the bond bear market, and possibly sets the stage for another leg higher in yields. China's Bond Market Balancing Act Chart 5Easy Money Spurs Chinese Growth In the context of the 2-factor U.S. Treasury model presented above, there are two reasons why developments in China matter for U.S. bond markets. The first is that China accounts for the single largest weighting in the Global Manufacturing PMI, so stronger growth in the Chinese manufacturing sector will pressure bond yields higher, all else equal. But the Chinese economy can also influence U.S. bond yields if changes in the RMB exert meaningful influence on the trade-weighted U.S. dollar. For example, faster Chinese growth pressures U.S. bond yields higher, but some of that upward pressure could be mitigated if that strong growth is engineered through a rapid depreciation of the RMB relative to the U.S. dollar. On the first point, China's manufacturing PMI is in a clear uptrend although the recent contraction in the government's fiscal expenditures is a potential warning sign (Chart 5). Our China Investment Strategy service views the fiscal contraction as a risk but still expects the Chinese economy to remain buoyant this year.1 This is because Chinese monetary conditions remain supportive of further gains in the manufacturing sector, and the rebound in China's PMI that began early last year is more tied to easing monetary conditions - a weaker exchange rate and falling real interest rates - than to increased fiscal spending. On the second point, while a weaker trade-weighted RMB has helped spur the recovery in Chinese manufacturing, the impulse from a weaker RMB has so far not been potent enough to move the needle on the trade-weighted U.S. dollar (Chart 6). From the perspective of U.S. fixed income markets a continuation of this trend would be the most bond-bearish outcome. Chinese monetary policy remains easy enough to spur economic growth but not so easy that it causes the U.S. dollar to spike. For the time being at least, China has been actively selling Treasuries in order to mitigate the extent of its currency depreciation (Chart 7). If China were to suddenly stop selling Treasuries, then the RMB would likely depreciate sharply. This would actually have an ambiguous impact on U.S. Treasury yields since it would probably lead to both a stronger U.S. dollar and faster global growth. Chart 6USD So Far Not Impacted By RMB Chart 7China Is A Treasury Seller More likely, however, is that China will continue to manage the gradual depreciation of its currency unless it is forced to take more dramatic action in the face of a negative growth shock. Our China Investment Strategy team notes that the annual People's Congress in early March should offer some important clues about the Chinese government's growth priorities and policy direction going forward. Bottom Line: Chinese monetary policy that is sufficiently accommodative to spur economic growth, but not so accommodative that it causes undue strength in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar, is the most bearish outcome for U.S. bonds. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Be Aware Of China's Fiscal Tightening", dated February 16, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights Portfolio Strategy The market has quietly adopted a less cyclical sectoral tone since yearend, a trend that could amplify over the coming months, even if overall appreciation persists. Defense stocks have grown into previously extended valuations, warranting ongoing above-benchmark exposure. The opposite is true for aerospace equities. Data processing shares are more likely to roll over than break out and we recommend paring positions to underweight. Recent Changes S&P Data Processing - Downgrade to underweight from overweight. Table 1 Feature The stock market has cheered the broad-based rebound in earnings and improvement in corporate sector pricing power (Chart 1). Unbridled optimism about growth friendly policy tilts including potential tax reform and select regulatory relief combined with an easing in financial conditions have encouraged investors to make large down payments against expected future profit gains. Indeed, extreme economic and earnings bullishness is evident in record setting price/sales (P/S) multiples: Chart 1 shows that on a median basis, the industry group (P/S) ratio is far above the 2000 peak, providing yet another metric in a long list of yardsticks signaling that greed is the overriding market emotion. Nosebleed valuation levels are cause for significant cyclical concern, but as discussed last week, momentum and a valuation-agnostic transition from fixed income to equities are the dominant tactical forces at the moment. Since it is difficult to reconcile valuations at odds with realistic expectations about future earnings growth, we remain focused on sub-surface positioning to indemnify against disappointment. Since late last year, the market has adopted a more defensive than cyclically-oriented tenor. Defensive sectors have troughed at extremely attractive relative valuation levels, based on our models (Chart 2). Conversely, cyclical sectors have rolled over, meeting resistance at very demanding valuation levels of more than two standard deviations above normal (Chart 2). Chart 1Future Growth Has Been Paid For Already Chart 2The Market Tone Is Changing Contrarians should take note. These nascent trend changes have developed even though economic data have generally surprised on the upside, which may be an indication that a more forceful response will occur once the string of upside surprises loses momentum. The global PMI has been very strong, but any hint of a reversal would provide a catalyst for a full-fledged recovery in defensive vs. cyclical stocks (Chart 3). The contraction in U.S. bank lending growth may be heralding slippage in hard economic data (Chart 3), to the benefit of defensive vs. cyclical sectors. Keep in mind that the market is priced for non-inflationary growth nirvana, such that even modest economic disappointment could short circuit the buying binge. The yield curve has stopped widening and financial conditions are no longer easing (Chart 3), providing additional confirmation that the defensive vs. cyclical equity sector trough is more likely a budding trend change than a pause in a downtrend. A trend change is also consistent with the relentless downgrading in emerging market vs. developed country GDP growth expectations (Chart 4). Chart 3Forward Looking Yellow Flags Chart 4No EM Confirmation For Cyclicals The lack of a durable and credible growth thrust in EM is confirmed by regional share price performance, as EM equities have significantly lagged their developed country counterparts (Chart 4). Now that China's fiscal stimulus impulse has rolled over amidst ongoing currency depreciation, EM lacks a catalyst for incremental growth outperformance vs. developed markets. Adding it up, evidence of a sub-surface trend change continues to materialize, even in the face of upward momentum in the broad market. We expect a mostly defensive along with select interest rate-sensitive exposure to provide optimal portfolio performance in the next 3-6 months. Defense Stocks Will Continue To Protect Portfolios... A Special Report sent to clients on October 31 outlined the long-term appeal of defense stocks, prior to the installment of a new, bellicose U.S. Administration. If anything, the latter threatens to exacerbate the decline in globalization that was already in progress (as discussed since 2014 by BCA's Geopolitical Strategy Service), potentially creating a leadership vacuum that will raise the specter of open military conflict. More nationalistic foreign policies in a number of countries, i.e. moving away from collaboration and cooperation and toward isolationism and self-sufficiency, is a recipe for increased geopolitical instability. China's challenge to the status quo is also likely to motivate a boost to defense spending globally. The recent World Economic Forum estimates of global military spending by 2030 cite both China and India planning to quadruple military outlays over this time frame (Table 2). The U.S. Administration is already pressuring other NATO members to boost defense spending after a long contraction (Chart 5), which should eventually spillover into rising defense contractor sales. Reportedly, only 5 out of 28 NATO members reached the targeted goal of spending 2% of GDP on defense. Ergo, there is room for an increase, especially in some larger countries with fiscal room to maneuver. More imminently, the conditions that have created the gap between aerospace and defense relative performance are growing even stronger (Chart 6). Table 2A New Arms Race Underway Chart 5Lots Of Upside Chart 6A Growing Gap While U.S. defense spending has been through a soft patch for the past several years, new orders for defense goods have been one of the strongest components of overall durable goods orders (Chart 6). The unfortunate reality is that the incentive to boost defense and security spending has never been higher. Terrorist activity continues to proliferate around the world (Chart 7), raising a sense of geopolitical uncertainty and mistrust. With defense new orders continuing to make new cyclical highs, factory output should run at levels flattering operating margins. Shipments of defense goods are outpacing inventories by a wide margin, which is consistent with solid pricing power. Even exports of military goods are booming (Chart 7), despite the strong U.S. dollar, reflecting a strong undercurrent of global demand. Domestic defense spending has room to expand. Real defense outlays are only just starting to recover (Chart 8). President Trump ran on a campaign to protect the U.S. from terrorism. That should make it comparatively easy to increase defense spending in the years to come. It is normal for defense stocks to retain momentum as defense spending growth accelerates (Chart 8, top panel). Increased staffing at the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) implies that purse strings may already be loosening in anticipation of heightened activity. DOD employment growth often provides a good leading indication for real defensive spending trends (Chart 8, bottom panel). Thus, while share prices have been on a tear and valuations are not cheap, rapid earnings growth has pushed down forward multiples to manageable, below-market, levels (Chart 9, shown as an average of the companies in the BCA Defense Index). Chart 7Powerful Momentum... Chart 8... With Long-Term Durability Chart 9Growing Into Valuations Prospects for strong multiyear growth should support a move to a premium valuation as margins expand (Chart 9), similar to what occurred during past defense spending booms, as chronicled in our October 31 Special Report. ...But Aerospace Stocks Are Out Of Fuel In terms of aerospace equities, the outlook is more challenging. New orders have been sinking steadily, reflecting a downturn in the commercial aerospace cycle. While long lead times and lengthy delivery schedules offer some earnings protection, dwindling order backlogs will ultimately undermine confidence in the long-term outlook. Chart 10 shows that aerospace unfilled orders are contracting, an environment typically associated with share price underperformance, or at least elevated volatility. Shipments of aerospace goods are falling, a rare occurrence (Chart 10). The implication is that aerospace industrial production is also shrinking (Chart 10). With a heavily unionized labor force, it will be difficult to maintain profitability. Will increased global growth translate into a recovery in aerospace new orders? Doubtful. Aerospace cycles tend to be long and are not always correlated with the business cycle. Aerospace new order growth has little correlation with the global leading economic indicator. In fact, if anything, it is more countercyclical. Ominously, there are signs of excess capacity. Our global airline consumer price index, a composite of airline pricing power in a number of major countries, is in negative territory. A negative CPI reflects excess capacity, and warns of grim prospects for a recovery in new airplane orders (Chart 11). Chart 10Running On Empty Chart 11Too Much Capacity Against this backdrop, aerospace profits will become increasingly reliant on maintenance, repair and consumables activity. However, weak pricing power suggests that this source of revenue is soft (Chart 11). Aerospace valuations are close to a par with those of defense stocks. Divergent profit outlooks imply that the latter should expand while the former get squeezed. Bottom Line: We remain confident that the BCA defense index (LMT, GD, RTN, NOC, LLL) will continue to generate above market returns, whereas the BCA aerospace index (BA, UTX, HON, TXT) exhibits asymmetric downside risk. Data Processors Are Losing Their Allure After a consolidation phase that restored value to a more neutral level, we upgraded the S&P data processing index to overweight in late-September, because it fit into our consumption vs. capital spending theme, outperforms in disinflationary environments and would benefit from a recovery in industry sales growth. While several of those factors still exist, the share price ratio has been unable to gain traction and the window for outperformance may be closing. The economic backdrop is no longer conducive to capital inflows. Data processing companies enjoy hefty recurring revenue and high returns on equity, warranting persistent above market valuations (Chart 12). However, the flipside of predictability is lower operating leverage than many other industries and a pattern of underperformance during periods of rising inflation expectations. Indeed, cyclical share price momentum tends to take its cue, inversely, from inflation expectations (inflation expectations shown inverted, middle panel, Chart 12). Renewed traction in global economic growth, as evidenced by the upturn in the global leading economic indicator (GLEI, shown inverted, top panel, Chart 13), represents a headwind to capital inflows and relative multiple expansion. The improvement in business sentiment has also boosted our capital spending model, albeit we are doubtful as to whether increased animal spirits will translate into much of a capital spending cycle in a world of deficient final demand and soft free cash flow. Still, any rise in capital spending would put the services-based data processing group at a disadvantage, in relative terms. The downturn in the ISM services index compared with the ISM manufacturing index reinforces that the external environment has become more challenging (Chart 13). All of these factors could be overcome if operating trends were set to improve. Data processing revenue trends are tightly linked with consumer spending (Chart 14). The personal savings rate has room to fall, facilitating an increase in outlays, particularly now that the labor market has tightened. Rising job security has buoyed consumer confidence, which has historically augured well for data processing sales growth. Chart 12The Window Has Closed Chart 13Sell Signals Chart 14Margin Squeeze But top-line growth has been in a funk of late, even with firming pricing power (second panel, Chart 14). Companies have made a significant investment to boost marketing, as evidenced by the surge in SG&A, but so far, this has sapped margins more than stoked revenue. Importantly, Visa has recently provided a fee break to retailers, who are increasingly banding together to put pressure on the industry to lower fees. Amidst increased competition on the payments processing side, this trend is likely to be structural and put downward pressure on profit margins. Thus, we are reluctant to embrace the jump in the producer price index, as future readings could be much weaker. The implication is that operating performance will not overcome macro hurdles. Bottom Line: Reduce the S&P data processing index (V, MA, PYPL, ADP, FIS, FISV, PAYX, ADS, GPN, WU, TSS) from overweight to underweight. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor small over large caps. Favor growth over value (downgrade alert).
Highlights Since the 1950s, the trends in margins and earnings growth have been one and the same: as profit margins decline, so does earnings growth. The decline in profit margins that began in early 2015 has gone on hiatus for the past two quarters. But this rebound in margins is unlikely to be sustained. However, even if profit margins turn lower on a sustained basis, there is scope for equity returns to stay positive, based on historical precedent. Similar to a broad-based profit margin decline, further currency strength will be an earnings headwind, but not a show-stopper for profit growth. All in all, with forward multiples now at multi-decade highs, there is lots of room for earnings growth to disappoint, but the conditions for an equity bear market are not in place. Feature Equity prices continue to march higher and the S&P 500 made another all-time high last week. Q4 earnings reporting is now nearly complete, with about two-thirds of companies surprising to the upside. According to FactSet, the share of Q4 surprises is below the 5-year average, while the size of surprises (2.9% above the estimate) is also a smaller margin than the "average surprise" in the past five years (Chart 1). Nonetheless, that has not stopped analysts from getting even more bulled up about 2017 earnings. Analysts' consensus for S&P 500 operating earnings is 10.2% for the calendar year, and the forward multiple now stands at 17.5x, its highest level since 2004 (Chart 2). Chart 1Q4 Earnings Surprises: Better, ##br##But Not That Surprising Chart 2Forward P/E At ##br##Decade Highs A 10% rise in earnings within the year would not be an unprecedented move - there are numerous historical re-accelerations of operating earnings of that size. However, it would be unprecedented for earnings growth to move consistently higher over the next year without an upward trend in profit margins. As Charts 3A and 3B shows, the turning points in earnings growth always correspond with turning points in profit margins. True, there have been 13 minor episodes whereby profit margins have declined but earnings growth accelerated. But these periods were very short-lived, never lasting more than three months at a time. In the majority of these episodes, equity investors saw through the blip down in margins; equity prices continued to rally higher and returns for the year were larger than average. Chart 3AProfit Growth And Margins: An Iron Link Chart 3B There have been far more one-quarter episodes whereby earnings growth decelerates and profit margins continue to rise (39 times since 1951). In these cases, equities exhibit below average returns. Chart 4Slow Growth Will Stay A Profit Headwind The key takeaway is that when profit margins and earnings growth temporarily fail to pull in the same direction, investors have tended to focus on earnings growth. However, the caveat to the above analysis is that we rely on data going back to 1951. The current cycle is unique in that potential GDP growth has never been this low (Chart 4). In a low-growth environment, it is harder for volume expansion to compensate for any fall in margins. We believe that understanding the profit margin backdrop in this environment will remain particularly important. The Outlook For Profit Margins The trend in profit margins is determined largely by the relative growth rates of selling prices, compensation and productivity. Unit labor costs (ULC), which is compensation divided by productivity, account for about 60% of production expenses: the ratio of selling price to unit labor costs is a good proxy for profit margins (Chart 5). In terms of the denominator, unit labor costs have been choppy, but have nonetheless been on a rising trend since the beginning of the recovery. Since the early 1990s, unit labor costs tended to rise throughout the business expansion, and then fall sharply once businesses retrenched during recessions. If this cycle follows historical patterns, then unit labor costs could push higher toward 3%. In other words, labor expenses may not accelerate quickly, but it is highly unlikely that profits will benefit from a fall in ULC growth at this stage of the expansion. In a recent Special Report,1 we made the case that the economy is at full employment and there would be cyclical pressure for wages to rise, despite some structural headwinds. We do not anticipate a surge in labor costs, rather a slow creep higher. Chart 5Can Selling Prices ##br##Catch Up To Labor Cost? Chart 6Businesses Will Find It Hard ##br##To Pass On Price Increases Our major concern is whether or not selling prices (i.e. the numerator in our proxy) can keep up with even mild cost pressures. Traditionally, the conditions that allow companies to raise prices are also associated with rising costs of inputs and labor, and higher inflation prompts the Fed to impose monetary restraint. Thus, profit margins - and therefore equity prices - have generally done better when price inflation is low. However, the concern today is that inflation (corporate selling prices) is too low and that it is difficult for firms to pass on rising input costs, i.e. that a margin squeeze occurs because businesses cannot sufficiently pass on rising labor costs, as consumers have become conditioned to entrenched deflation, particularly at the retail level. We have written extensively in recent publications about inflation. Our bias is to expect broad-based inflation (PCE and CPI measures) as well as corporate selling price inflation (i.e. businesses pricing power) to rise slowly this cycle. The key points are as follows: Inflation expectations are extremely well anchored (Chart 6). True, there is a gap that has opened between survey and market-based inflation expectations. But as we explained in our January 9 Weekly Report, there are several reasons why market-based measures are likely overstating the rise in inflation expectations. Even so, these measures remain well below historic averages and continue to signal that even if the trend is up, the rate of inflation remains very benign. If survey-based inflation expectations are correct, then this business cycle could be a mirror opposite of the 1970s/80s. In that cycle, strong inflation expectations became self-fulfilling/self-reinforcing and lead to higher realized inflation. Today, after a long period of fearing deflation and experiencing massive price discounting at the retail level (Chart 6), consumers have become conditioned to expect prices will never go up. Even once the output gap is fully closed, it could take several years for inflation to gain traction. A strong dollar argues for constant drag on 30% of consumer price inflation (i.e. tradable goods and services). This will keep a lid on inflation for the foreseeable future. Overall, wage costs have outpaced pricing power since 2014, with the exception of the prior two quarters. We do not have a strong view on whether profit margins are finally in a sustained mean-reverting phase, but the above framework suggests that due to a very solid anchoring of inflation expectations, businesses could be faced with a tough pricing backdrop much later than is typical in the business cycle. Flat/falling margins are historically not enough to derail the bull market at this stage of the expansion. However, as we highlighted above, equities are now trading at sky-high forward valuations and have become extremely vulnerable to earnings disappointment. What About The Dollar? A frequent question from clients is about the role of the dollar in U.S. earnings and how enthusiastic can one be about earnings growth if the dollar is rising? As our U.S. Equity Strategy team has pointed out in the past, there are two distinct camps on the impact of U.S. dollar strength on equities.2 Bulls believe that dollar strength will depress commodity and import prices, tamping down inflation pressures and allowing the Fed to avoid monetary tightening. Therefore, the net monetary conditions impact will be positive for the U.S., which is a relatively closed economy. Under these conditions, capital would continue to flow into stocks. Bears see the currency as undermining profitability, given that foreign translation will take a hit along with income from foreign affiliates selling into weaker demand abroad (Chart 7). In other words, the rest of the world is exporting deflationary pressures to the U.S. via currency depreciation. This threatens the earnings outlook, particularly relative to still lofty growth expectations. Chart 7Dollar Headwind Our take is somewhere in between these two extremes. It is certainly true that a strong dollar helps contain inflation pressures, and allows for a prolonged business cycle. But as highlighted above, in an economy still struggling to grow much above 2%, inflation pressures are not an overly large concern to begin with. Meanwhile, hedging means that the currency translation effect on financial performance is not immediate. And the impact of any dollar strength surely depends on the conditions under which it is strengthening: dollar strength in a period of weak global growth will be more detrimental to returns than a dollar that is rising due to exceptionally strong domestic conditions. We are currently at neither one of these extremes (Chart 8). Chart 8U.S. And Global Economy: Not Hot, Not Cold Our Bank Credit Analyst service recently presented a matrix of different scenarios for the dollar and economic growth applied to a model for EPS growth. The key finding was that the effect of even small changes in growth assumptions dominate the effect of much larger moves in the dollar. A 10% dollar appreciation from current levels would shave about 2% from profits, assuming no change to the GDP growth outlook. The bottom line is that the recent improvement in margins has helped earnings recover from last year's profit recession. However, it is unlikely that margins have entered a lasting uptrend; firms lack pricing power and the labor market is now tight enough that unit labor costs will rise on a sustained basis. As profit margins trend lower in the coming years, this will present a headwind for profit growth. Similarly, our expectation that the currency will continue to appreciate over the next 12-18 months is a headwind to earnings growth. Current sky-high equity valuations leave little room for these risks. We expect that disappointments will eventually cause an equity price reset, but timing is uncertain. As we wrote last week, technical indicators do not currently suggest an important pullback is imminent. Looking further out, the overall backdrop of slowly building inflation, a go-slow Fed, and a mild pickup in nominal GDP growth, is a positive backdrop for long-term stocks. Lenka Martinek, Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy lenka@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Special Report "U.S. Wage Growth: Paid In Full?", dated November 28, 2016, available at usis.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Equity Strategy Service Special Report, “Equity Sectors And The Soaring U.S. Dollar,” dated November 3, 2014, available at uses.bcaresearch.com