Fixed Income

Highlights We are reviewing our recommendations. We are also introducing recommendation tables to monitor these positions. Overall, our main recommendations have generated alpha and have a positive batting average. Feature The end of the month of August offers an opportunity to review the positions recommended in this publication. We introduce three tables corresponding to three investment horizons—tactical, cyclical, and structural—which summarize our main views. Each table is subdivided by asset class, namely equities, fixed income, and currencies. The tables can be found on page 12 and 13 and will be available at the end of future strategy reports. Tactical Recommendations Short Equity Leaders / Long Laggards This position is down 1.4% since inception. The idea behind this bet was that the easy money in the market had been made, and investors needed to become more discerning, although the big-picture economic backdrop continued to favor a pro-cyclical, pro-risk bias in a portfolio. To achieve this goal, we opted to buy cyclicals sectors that had lagged the broad market and to sell the ones that had already overtaken their pre-COVID highs, in the hope of creating a portfolio hedge. Practically, this meant buying sectors such as Industrials, Banks and Energy, while selling sectors such as Capital goods, Autos and Consumer services (Chart 1). This position has not worked out well as yields fell. Chart 1Leaders vs Laggards UK Mid-Cap And Small-Cap To Outperform This position is up 3.4% since inception. We initially favored the more domestically-oriented mid- and small-cap indices in the UK as a bet on the re-opening trade, following the lead taken by the UK in the global vaccination campaign. A faster re-opening would not only boost the ability of smaller domestic firms to generate cash flows, it would also elevate the pound, which would hurt the profit translation of the multinational dominating the UK large-cap indices. By mid-May, we opted to move small cap back to neutral, as the positive story was well discounted and we expected the GBP to correct, which would help large-cap stocks. Favor European Banks Relative To US Ones This position is up 4.1% since inception. It is mainly a value trade. The European economy has lagged behind that of the US, and European yields remain well below US ones. As a result, European financials have greatly underperformed their US counterparts. However, this performance differential has left European banks trading at an enormous discount relative to their US peers. Hence, as continental European economies were catching up to the US on the vaccination front, we expected European banks to regain some ground. This trade has further to go, as valuation differentials remain excessive, especially since European banks are not as risky as they once were. Underweight / Short Norway As Hedge To Swedish Stocks This position is down 1% since inception. We have a cyclical overweight on the Swedish equity market (see page 9), which is extremely sensitive to the global industrial cycle. Thus, we were concerned by the potential near-term impact of the Chinese credit slowdown on this position. Selling Norway remains an appropriate hedge, because this market massively overweight materials stocks, which are even more exposed to the Chinese credit cycle than industrials are. Positive European Small-Cap Stocks This position is up 0.2% since inception. This was a bet on the economic re-opening taking place in the wake of the accelerating pace of vaccination in Europe. However, the weakness in the Euro since May has caused the large-cap European stocks to perform almost as well as their more-domestically focused counterparts. Neutral Stance On Cyclicals Relative To Defensives Chart 2The Cause Of Our Cautious Tactical Stance This trade is up 2.3% since inception. While we like cyclical plays on an eighteen to twenty-four months basis, we became concerned this spring about a tactical pullback. Globally, cyclical stocks had become extremely expensive and overbought relative to defensive sectors (Chart 2). Moreover, the rapid deceleration of the Chinese credit impulse pointed toward a period of negative economic surprises and was historically consistent with a period of underperformance of cyclical names. Now that China is stepping off the brake pedal, this trade is becoming long in the tooth. Neutral Stance On Europe Relative To The Rest of The World This trade is down 0.3% since its inception. This position is a corollary to the neutral view on cyclicals, as European equities possess a high beta. This bet did not pan out; European equities did underperform US stocks, but weaknesses in China and EM undid this benefit. Favoring Industrials Over Materials This trade is up 0.6% since inception. Industrial equities are less exposed to the Chinese credit slowdown than materials, but are more direct beneficiaries of the large infrastructure spending packages being rolled out across advanced economies. Industrials are also a direct bet on a capex recovery, which we expect to intensify over the next two years as companies address supply side issues. The tactical element of this trade may soon dissipate as China’s policy tightening ends, which would warrant booking profits. However, the industrials versus materials theme remains attractive as a cyclical bets on capex. Financials Over Other Cyclicals This trade is down 1.6% since inception. This was another trade aiming to keep some cyclical exposure on the book (long financials), while diminishing the exposure to the Chinese credit slowdown. The fall in yields and the weakness in the euro prevented this trade from working out. We now close this position. Long / Short Basket Based On Combined Mechanical Valuation Indicator This trade is flat since inception. This market-neutral trade uses the methodology developed in our May 31st Special Report in which we introduced our Combined Mechanical Valuation Indicator (CMVI). We bought the most undervalued sectors and sold the most overvalued. We will look to rebalance this portfolio in the coming months. Short Euro Area Energy Stocks / Long UK Energy Stocks Chart 3UK Energy Stocks As A Bargain This trade is up 7.5% since inception. This market neutral trade was fully based on the results from our CMVI (Chart 3). We are taking profits today. Short Consumer Discretionary / Long Telecommunication In Europe This trade is up 10.6% since inception. It is our favored way to express our tactical worries toward cyclical equities and the resulting preference for defensive stocks. Moreover, this trade is attractive from a valuation perspective, as the CMVI gap between discretionary and telecommunication equities is at a record high despite the higher RoE offered by telecom equities (Chart 4). Short Tech / Long Healthcare In Europe This trade is up 9.3% since inception. It is a low-octane version of the short discretionary / long telecommunications position. While it is a short cyclicals / long defensive trade, it does not have the long value / short growth overlay as its higher-octane cousin. However, it is also supported by attractive valuation differentials (Chart 5). Chart 4An Extreme Version Of Short Cyclicals / Long Defensives... Chart 5...and A Lower Octane Expression Favor Spain Over France This trade is down 2% since inception. Based on sectoral composition, the Spanish market is more defensive than that of France, which was an appealing characteristic considering our tactical worries for cyclical bets. Moreover, Spanish equities were more attractively priced. However, the Spanish economy has proven less resilient to the Delta variant than that of France. As a result, Spanish financials, which represent a large share of the national benchmark, have suffered. Underweight French Consumer Discretionary Equities Relative To Global Peers This trade is up 0.6% since inception. French discretionary stocks, led by beauty and luxury names, remain attractive structural plays. However, they have become expensive and risk temporarily underperforming their foreign competitors. Buy Swiss Equities / Sell Eurozone Defensive This trade is up 0.5% since inception. Due to their sectoral bias toward consumer staples and healthcare, Swiss equities are extremely defensive. However, they often outperform their Euro Area counterparts when Swiss yields rise relative to those of Germany. We do expect such widening to take place over the coming months. The ECB will continue to expand its balance sheet, which will force the SNB to become increasingly active about putting a floor under EUR/CHF. Historically, these processes boost Swiss stocks relative to Eurozone defensives. Buy European Momentum Stocks / Sell European Growth Stocks Chart 6The Recovery In Momentum Stocks Can Run Further This trade is up 1.7% since inception. In Europe, momentum stocks are exceptionally oversold relative to growth stocks (Chart 6). As yields stabilize, momentum stocks are well placed to outperform growth equities. Moreover, this trade is a careful attempt to begin to move away from our defensive tactical stance as China backs away from policy tightening. More Value Left In European IG This trade is up 0.9% so far. European IG bonds have low spreads, but their breakeven spreads may narrow further as policy remains extremely accommodative and European growth continues to recover, even in the face of the Delta variant. In this context, we see the modest yield pick-up offered by these products as attractive, especially compared to the meagre yields generated by European safe-haven securities. Despite the modest success of the overall recommendation, the country implication did not work out as well. Overweight Italian And Spanish Bonds In Balance Portfolios This trade is up 0.2% since inception. Italian and Spanish government bonds are expensive in absolute terms, but compare well relative to French, Dutch, or German bonds. In a backdrop in which the ECB continues to purchase these instruments, where the NGEU funds create an embryo of fiscal risk-sharing within the EU and where growth is recovering, risk premia in the European periphery have room to decline further. Buy European Steepeners And US Flatteners As A Box Trade Chart 7Buy European Steepeners and US Flatteners This trade is up 63 bps since inception. The ECB will lag behind the Fed, but market pricing already reflects this future. Meanwhile, the terminal policy rate proxy embedded in the EONIA and US OIS curves overstates how high the neutral rate is in the US compared to that of Europe (Chart 7). Thus, as the Fed begins to remove accommodation in the US, the US yield curve should flatten compared to that of Europe. Favor The GBP Over The EUR This trade is up 0.6% since inception. The pound is cheaper than the euro, and the domestic UK economy is well supported by the more advanced re-opening process. This combination will continue to hurt EUR/GBP. Sell EUR/NOK This trade is down 2.6% since inception. The NOK is cheaper than the EUR, and the Norges Bank will lead DM central banks in raising interest rates. Moreover, higher oil prices create a positive term of trade shock in favor of Norway. However, this trade has not worked out so far. Among G-10 currencies, the NOK (along with the SEK) is the most sensitive to the USD’s fluctuations. The rebound in the Greenback since March has therefore hurt this position significantly. Cyclical Recommendations Overweight Stocks Vs Bonds This position is up 7% since inception. European equities follow the global business cycle; while we warned a slowdown would take shape, growth is slated to remain above trend for the foreseeable future. Consequently, while we may adjust tactical positioning to take advantage of these gyrations in growth relative to expectations, our core cyclical view remains to overweight stocks within European balanced portfolios. Overweight Bank Equities Chart 8Euro Area Banks Are Not As Risky Anymore This position is up 2.4% since inception. We have espoused the near-term decline in yields, but our big picture cyclical view remains that yields have more upside globally. An environment in which yields increase is one in which bank profit margins expand, which will in turn boost the relative return of cheap financial equities. Even though the long-term growth rate of bank cash flows warrants a discount, these firms’ valuations also reflect the perception that they carry elevated risks. However, if European NPLs have greatly improved, capital buffers have expanded significantly (Chart 8), and the ECB is unwilling to precipitate a crisis as it did ten years ago. In this context, the risk premia embedded in European bank valuations have room to decrease, which will boost the relative performance of these equities. Bullish German Equities (Absolute) This position is up 3.9% since inception. German stocks are a direct bet on the global economy, as a result of their heavy weighting in industrials and consumer discretionary stocks. Moreover, the German economy continues to fare well, boosted by a cheap euro and a low policy rate. Finally, we expect German fiscal policy to remain accommodative after the upcoming federal election weakens the power of the CDU. This combination will allow German stocks to generate further upside over the coming years. Favor Swedish Equites Over Eurozone And US Benchmarks Since inception, this position is up 0.9% on its European leg and is up 0.3% on its US leg. Sweden is a particularly appealing market despite its demanding valuations. The Swedish benchmark overweighs industrials and financials, two of our favorite sectors for the coming eighteen months. Moreover, the Swedish corporate sector’s operating metrics are robust, with wide profit margins, elevated RoEs, and comparatively healthy levels of leverage. Finally, the SEK is one of our favored currencies on a twenty-four-month basis, because it has a strong beta to the USD, which BCA expects to depreciate on a cyclical time frame. Buying Sweden versus the Eurozone has worked out, but selling the US market has not, because yields experienced a countertrend decline. Once global yields begin to rise anew and Chinese credit growth begins to recover, Swedish equities should also beat their US peers. Long Swedish Industrials / Short Eurozone And US Industrials Chart 9Favor Swedish Industrials This position is up 3% on its European leg and 8.5% on its US one. This market neutral position narrows in on the very reason to favor Swedish equities: industrials. As is the case for the overall market, Swedish industrials offer stronger operating metrics than their counterparts in both the Eurozone and the US (Chart 9). Additionally, the early positioning of Sweden in global supply chains adds some operating leverage to these firms, which gives them an advantage in an environment of continued inventory rebuilding, infrastructure spending, and capex plans around the world. Underweight German Bunds Within European Fixed-Income Portfolios German bund yields have declined 15bps since inception. German Bunds suffer from their extremely demanding valuations versus other European fixed-income securities. As long as global and European growth remains above trend, German yields should underperform other European fixed-income assets, even if the ECB stands pat for the foreseeable future (which would force greater spread compression across European markets). Weakness In EUR/USD Creates Long-Term Buying Opportunities Earlier this spring, we expected the dollar to experience a counter-trend bounce as a result of skewed positioning and the potential for a decline in global growth surprises. However, BCA’s cyclical view calls for a weaker USD because of the US balance of payments deficit, the greater tolerance of the Fed for higher inflation, and the overvaluation of the Greenback. Based on these diverging forces, we continue to recommend investors use the current episode of weakness in EUR/USD as an opportunity to garner more exposure to the euro. Short EUR/SEK This position is down 0.6% since inception. The SEK is even more sensitive to the dollar’s gyration than the euro. Moreover, beyond some near-term disappointment in global economic activity, we expect global growth to remain generally robust over the coming eighteen months. This combination will allow the SEK to appreciate versus the EUR, especially when Sweden’s domestic economic activity and asset markets are stronger than that of the Eurozone. Structural Recommendations A Structural Underweight On European Financial Chart 10Too Much Capital This long-term position is at odds with our near-term optimism about the sector. However, Europe has an excessively large capital stock, which, relative to GDP, dwarves that of the US or China (Chart 10). This phenomenon hurts rate of returns across the region and will remain a long-term structural handicap for the financial industry. Hence, investors with long investment horizons should use the expected rebound in European financials over the next year or two to diminish further their exposure to that sector. Norwegian Equities Remain Challenged As Long-Term Holdings Norwegian stocks overweight the financials, materials, and energy sectors. While materials face a bright future as electricity becomes an even more important component of the global energy mix, financials and energy face deep structural headwinds. Moreover, the krone faces its own structural challenges (see below). This combination augurs poorly for the long-term rates of return of Norwegian stocks. Overweight French Industrials Relative To German Ones This position is a bet on the continuation of the reform efforts of the French economy. BCA expects Emmanuel Macron to win a second mandate next year, which should result in additional reforms to the French economy. As a result, the French unit labor costs should remain contained relative to those of Germany. This process will help the profit margins of French industrial firms relative to that of their competitors across the Rhine. Overweight French Tech Equities Relative To European Ones French tech stocks will benefit from the greater R&D subsidies and budgets promoted by the French government. The Euro Will Underperform Pro-Cyclical European Currencies The Swedish krona and the British pound are particularly attractive versus the euro on a long-term basis. They benefit not only from their cheaper valuations, but also from the fact that the Riksbank and the Bank of England will tighten policy considerably ahead of the ECB. Additionally, the SEK and the GBP are now both more pro-cyclical than the euro. The Norwegian Krone Faces Structural Challenges The NOK is cheap and may even benefit in the coming month from its historical pro-cyclicality. However, Norway suffers from declining productivity relative to that of its trading partners, which creates a strong long-term handicap for its currency. As a result, long-term investors should withdraw from the NOK.   Mathieu Savary, Chief European Strategist Mathieu@bcaresearch.com   Tactical Recommendations Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations ​​​​​​​ Currency Performance Fixed Income Performance Equity Performance  

Special Report

Highlights The US dollar’s reserve status will remain intact for the foreseeable future. While this privilege is fraying at the edges, there are no viable alternatives just yet. There is an overarching incentive for any country to hold onto its currency’s power. For the US, it is still well within their ability to keep this “exorbitant privilege.” That said, there will be rolling doubts about the ability of the US to maintain its large currency sphere. This will create tidal waves in the currency’s path, providing plenty of trading opportunities for investors. China is on track to surpass the US in economic size, but it is far from dethroning the US in the military realm. However, it is gradually gaining the ability to deny the US access to its immediate offshore areas and may already be capable of winning a war over nearby islands like Taiwan. Watch the RMB over the next few decades. From a macro and cyclical perspective, the dollar is likely to decline as global growth picks up and the Fed lags market expectations in raising rates. From a geopolitical perspective, however, the backdrop is neutral-to-bullish for the dollar over the next three to five years. Feature Having the world’s reserve currency comes with a few advantages, which any governments would be loath to give up. The most important advantage is the ability to settle one’s balance of payments in one’s own currency. This not only facilitates trade for the reserve nation, it also reinforces the turnover of the reserve currency internationally. The value of this privilege is as much symbolic as economic. This “first mover advantage” or adoption of one’s currency internationally automatically ordains the resident central bank as the world’s bank. The primary advantage here is being able to dictate global financial conditions, expanding and contracting money supply to address domestic and global funding pressures. As compensation for this task, the world provides one with non-negligible seigniorage revenue. Being the world’s central bank also comes with another crucial advantage: being able to choose which international projects will be funded, while using cheaply issued local debt to finance these investments. Of course, any sensible society will earn more on its investments than it pays on the debt issued. There is a geopolitical angle to having the world’s reserve currency. A nation’s currency is widely held because of strategic depth—its ability to secure the people who trade in that currency and the property denominated in it. Deposits and transactions can be monitored, secured, or even halted at the behest of the sovereign. Holding the currency means one can maintain one’s purchasing power, given that it is backed by the most powerful country in the world. As the reserve currency becomes the de facto international medium of exchange, having stood the test of time through various crises, this allows the resident country to alter its purchasing power to achieve both national and international goals. Throughout history, having the world’s reserve currency has been the pursuit of many governments and kingdoms. In the current paradigm, the US enjoys this privilege. But could that change? And if so, how and when? Our goal in this report is threefold. First, why would any country want to maintain reserve status? Second, does the US still possess the apparatus to keep the dollar as a reserve asset over the next decade? And finally, are there any identifiable threats to the US dollar reserve status beyond a ten-year horizon? The Imperative To Maintain Status Quo Global trade is still largely conducted in US dollars. According to the BIS triennial central bank survey, 88.3% of transactions globally were in dollars just before the pandemic, a percentage that has been rather resilient over the last two decades (Chart I-1). It is true that currencies such as the Chinese renminbi have been gaining international acceptance, but displacing a currency that dominates almost 90% of global transactions is a herculean task. Surprisingly, the world has been transacting less often in euros and Japanese yen, currencies that also commanded international appeal in recent history. Chart I-1The US Dollar Still Dominates Global Transactions The big benefit for the US comes from being able to settle its balance of payments in dollars. This not only lowers transaction costs (by lowering exchange rate risk), but it also provides the ability to cheaply borrow in your own currency to pay for imports. Having global trade largely denominated in US dollars also establishes a network of systems that make it much easier to settle trade in that currency. It is remarkable that, despite running a persistent current account deficit, the US dollar has tended to appreciate during crises, a privilege other deficit countries do not enjoy (Chart I-2). Strong network effects make the US dollar the currency of choice during crises. Chart I-2Despite Running A Current Account Deficit, The Dollar Tends To Rise During Crises Chart I-3The US Generates Non-Negligible Seignorage Revenue Being at the center of the global financial architecture comes with an important benefit beyond trade: the ability to dictate financial conditions both domestically and globally. Consider a scenario in which the US and the global economy are facing a downturn. In this scenario, the Federal Reserve can be instrumental in turning the tide: To stimulate the US economy, the Fed lowers interest rates and/or runs a wider fiscal deficit. The central bank helps finance this fiscal deficit by expanding the monetary base (benefitting from seigniorage revenue). As the Fed drops interest rates, the yield curve steepens. Banks use the positive term structure to borrow at the short end of the curve and lend at the longer end. This boosts the US money supply. As firms borrow to invest, this increases demand for imports (machinery, commodities, consumer goods), widening the US current account deficit. US trade is settled in dollars, increasing the international supply of the greenback. To maintain competitiveness, other central banks purchase these dollars from the private sector, in exchange for their local currency. As global USD reserves rise, they can be reinvested back into Treasuries and held in custody at the Fed. In essence, the US can finance its budget deficit through a strong capital account surplus. The seigniorage revenue that the US enjoys by easing both domestic and international financing conditions is about $100 billion a year or roughly 0.5% of GDP (Chart I-3). But the goodwill from being able to dictate both domestic and international financial conditions is far greater. At BCA, one of our favorite measures of global dollar liquidity is the sum of the Fed’s custody holdings together with the US monetary base. Every time this measure has severely contracted in the past, the shortage of dollars has triggered a financial crisis somewhere, typically among other countries running deficits (Chart I-4), a highlight of the importance of the US as a global financier. Chart I-4US Money Supply And Global Liquidity Chart I-5Despite A Liability Shortfall, US Assets Generate A Net Profit Beyond seigniorage revenue, the US enjoys another advantage—being able to earn much more on its international investments than it pays on its liabilities. The US generates an excess return of 1% of GDP from its external assets, despite having a net liability shortfall of 67% of GDP (Chart I-5). The ability to issue debt that will be gobbled up by foreigners, and in part use these proceeds to generate a higher overall return on investments made abroad, does indeed constitute an “exorbitant privilege.” In a nutshell, there is a very strong incentive for the US to keep the dollar as the world’s reserve currency. One short-term implication is that the Fed might only taper asset purchases and/or raise interest rates in an environment in which both global and US growth are strong, or it could otherwise trigger a global liquidity crisis. This will be particularly the case given the Delta variant of COVID-19 is still hemorrhaging global economic activity. An Overreach In The Dollar’s Influence There is a political advantage to the US dollar’s reserve status that is often overlooked: transactions conducted in US dollars anywhere in the world fall under US law. In simple terms, if a company in any country buys energy from Iran and the transaction is done in US dollars, the Treasury has powers to sanction the parties involved. Since most companies across the world cannot afford to be locked out of the US financial system, they will tend to comply with US sanctions. Even companies that operate under the umbrella of great powers, such as China and Russia, still tend to adhere to US sanctions, because they do not want to jeopardize their trade with US allies, such as the European Union. Of course, China, Russia, and Iran are actively seeking alternative transaction systems to bypass the dollar and US sanctions. But they do not yet trust each other’s currencies. Chart I-6A Deep And Liquid Pool Of Treasurys The euro is the only viable alternative; however, the euro’s share of global transactions has fallen, despite the EU’s solidification as a monetary union over the past decade and despite the unprecedented deterioration of US relations with China and Russia. The EU could do great damage to the USD’s standing if it joined Russia’s and China’s efforts wholeheartedly, but the EU is still a major trading partner of the US and shares many of the same foreign policy aims. It is also chronically short of aggregate demand and runs trade and current account surpluses, depriving trade partners of euro savings or a debt market to recycle those savings (Chart I-6). Historically, having the world’s reserve currency allows the US to conduct international accords that serve both domestic and foreign interests. The Plaza Accord, signed in the 1980s to depreciate the US dollar, served both US interests in rebalancing the deficit and international interests in financing global trade. The 1980s were golden years for Japan and the Asian tigers on the back of a weak USD, allowing entities to borrow in greenbacks and profitably invest in Asian growth. Once the US dollar had depreciated by a fair amount, threatening its store of value, the US engineered the Louvre Accord to stabilize exchange rates. Ultimately, when various Asian bubbles popped, investors thought of nowhere better to flee than to the safety of the US dollar. The same thing happened after the emerging market boom of the 2000s and the eventual bust of the 2010s. Today, the US may not be able to organize an international intervention, if one should be necessary in the coming years. Past experience shows that countries act unilaterally and coordinated interventions lack staying power. Neither Europe nor Japan is in the position today to allow currency appreciation, as they were in the past. And the US has shown itself unable to combat its trading partners’ depreciation, as in the case of China, whose renminbi remains below 2014 levels. The bottom line is that there is nothing to stop the US from attempting to stretch its overreach too far, which would create a backlash that diminishes the dollar’s status. This is especially the case given trust in the US government is quite low by historical standards, which for now points to a lower dollar cyclically (Chart I-7). Chart I-7Trust In The US Government And The Dollar This is not to say that other countries with reserve aspirations can tolerate sustained appreciation. China has recommitted to manufacturing supremacy in its latest five-year plan, as it fears the political consequences of rapid deindustrialization. As such, the renminbi will be periodically capped to maintain competitiveness. Can The US Maintain Status Quo? Chart I-8A Lifespan Of Reserve Currencies Over the last few centuries, reserve currencies have tended to have a lifespan of about 100 years (Chart I-8). The reason is that global wars tend to knock the leading power off its geopolitical pedestal, devaluing its currency and giving rise to a new peace settlement with a new ascendant country whose currency then becomes the basis for international trade. Such was the case for Spain, France, the UK, and the United States in a pattern of war and peace since the sixteenth century. Granting that the US dollar took the baton from sterling in the 1920s and that the post-World War II peace settlement is eroding in the face of escalating geopolitical competition, it is reasonable to ask whether or not the US might lose its grip on this power. To assess this possibility, it is instructive to revisit the anatomy of a reserve currency: Typically, a reserve currency tends to be that of the “greatest” nation. For the same reason, the reserve nation tends to be the wealthiest, which ensures that its currency is a store of value and that it can act as a buyer of last resort during crisis (Chart I-9). This reasoning is straightforward when a global empire is recognizable and unopposed. But in the current context of multipolarity, or great power competition, the paradigm could start to shift. Global trade is slowing globally, but it is accelerating in Asia (Chart I-10). China is a larger trading partner than the US for many emerging markets and is slated to surpass the US economy over the next decade. The renminbi has a long way to go to rival the dollar, but it is gradually rising and its place within the global reserve currency basket is much smaller than its share of global trade or output, implying room for growth (Chart I-11). Chart I-9Wealth And Reserve Currency Status Go Hand-In-Hand Chart I-10Trade In Asia Is Booming Chart I-11Adoption Of The RMB Has Room To Grow To maintain hegemonic power (especially controlling the vital supply routes of prosperity), the reserve nation needs military might above and beyond everyone else. It helps that US military spending remains the biggest in the world, in part financed by US liabilities (Chart I-12). China is far from dethroning the US in the military realm. But it is gradually gaining the ability to deny the US access to its immediate offshore areas and may already be capable of winning a war over nearby islands like Taiwan. Moreover, its naval power is set to grow substantially between now and 2030 (Table I-1). Already, over the past decade, the US stood helplessly by when Russia and China annexed Crimea and the reefs of the South China Sea. It is possible to imagine a series of events that erode US security guarantees in the region, even as the US loses economic primacy. Chart I-12The US Still Maintains Military Might Table I-1China’s Economic And Naval Growth Slated To Reduce American Primacy In Asia Pacific The reserve currency nation needs to run deficits to finance activity in the rest of the world. That requires having deep and liquid capital markets to absorb global savings. There is considerable trust or “goodwill” that makes the US Treasury market the most liquid debt exchange pool in the world. This remains the case today (previously mentioned Chart I-6). Even so, this trend is shifting. The growth in euro- and yen-denominated debt is exploding. This mirrors the gradual shift in the allocation of FX reserves away from dollars into other currencies. If the US began to use the dollar as a geopolitical weapon recklessly, foreign entities may have no other choice but to rally into other currency blocks, including the euro (and perhaps eventually the yuan). This will take years, but it is worth noting that global allocation to FX reserves have fallen from around 80% toward USDs in the 70s to around 60% today (Chart I-13). Chart I-13The Dollar Reserve Status Has Been Ebbing On the political front, there is some evidence that public opinion on the dollar is fading, although it is far from damning. A Pew survey on the trust in the US government is near decade lows and has tracked the ebb and flow of changes in the dollar (previously shown Chart I-7). Trust in government will probably not get much worse in the coming years, as the pandemic will wane and stimulus will secure the economic recovery, but too much stimulus could conceivably ignite an inflation problem that weighs on trust. True, populism has driven the US government under two administrations into extreme deficit spending. With the pandemic as a catalyst, US deficits have reached WWII levels despite the absence of a war. However, the Biden administration’s $3.5 trillion spending bill will be watered down heavily – and the 2022 midterms will likely restore gridlock in Congress, freezing fiscal policy through at least 2025. In other words, fiscal policy is negative for the dollar in the very near term, but the fiscal outlook is not yet so extravagant as to suggest a loss of reserve currency status. After all, there is some positive news for the US. The US demonstrated its leadership in innovation with the COVID-19 vaccines; it survived its constitutional stress test in the 2020 election; it is now shifting from failed “nation building” abroad to nation building at home; and its companies remain the most innovative and efficient, judging by global equity market capitalization (Chart I-14). China, meanwhile, is facing the most severe test of its political and economic system since it marketized its economy in 1979. Investors should not lose sight of the fact that, since the rise of President Xi Jinping and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, global policy uncertainty has tended to outpace US policy uncertainty, attracting flows into the dollar (Chart I-15). Given that China and Russia are both pursuing autocratic governments at the expense of the private economy, it would not be surprising to see global policy uncertainty take the lead once again, confirming the decade trend of global flows favoring the US when uncertainty rises. Chart I-14American Primacy Still Clear In Equity Market Chart I-15Higher Policy Uncertainty Good For Dollar The bottom line is that the US dollar is gradually declining as a share of the global currency reserve basket, just as the US economy and military are gradually declining as a share of global output and defense spending. Yet the US will remain the first or second largest economy and premier military power for a long time, and the dollar still lacks a viable single replacement. A major war or geopolitical crisis is probably necessary to precipitate a major breakdown. The Iranian Revolution and September 11 attacks both had this kind of effect (see 1979 and 2001 in Chart I-13 above). But COVID-19 is less clear. If China and Europe emerge as more stable than the US, then the post-pandemic aftermath will bring more bad news for the dollar. Investment Implications From a geopolitical perspective, the backdrop is neutral for the dollar beyond the next twelve to eighteen months. An escalating conflict with Iran—which is possible in the near term—would echo the early 2000s and weigh on the currency. But a deal with Iran and a strategic pivot to Asia would compound China’s domestic political problems and likely boost the greenback. Chart I-16US Twin Deficits And The Dollar From a macro and cyclical perspective, however, the view is clearly negative for the dollar. Over the next five years, the U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the U.S. budget deficit will shrink and then begin expanding again to -5% of GDP. If one assumes that the current account deficit will widen somewhat, then stabilize, the twin deficits will be pinned at around -10% of GDP. Markets have typically punished the dollar on rising twin deficits (Chart I-16). This suggests near-term pressure on the dollar’s reserve status is to the downside. EM currencies may hold a key to the performance of the dollar. While most EM economies remain hostage to the virus, a coiled-spring rebound cannot be ruled out as populations become vaccinated. China’s Politburo signaled in July that it will no longer tighten monetary and fiscal policy. We would expect policy easing over the next twelve months to ensure the economy is stable in advance of the fall 2022 party congress. If the virus wanes and China’s economy is stimulated, global growth will improve and the dollar will fall.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com

Highlights Confidence vs. Inflation: Global bond yields are lacking direction at the moment. The variant is setting a near-term ceiling on bond yields while the medium-term floor is established by inflation. The inflation pressures – fueled by tightening global labor markets and persistent supply chain disruptions - will linger for much longer than the Delta surge. Investors should position for higher global bond yields, led by the US, on a medium-term basis. Canada: The Canadian economy is performing strongly as the nation is finally reopening after a poor initial vaccine rollout earlier this year. Next month’s federal election will likely result in a re-election of Justin Trudeau’s Liberals and a continuation of expansive fiscal policy. The Bank of Canada is on track to begin interest rate hikes in 2022 with inflation likely to remain higher for longer than the central bank projects. Remain underweight Canadian government bonds within global (USD-hedged) fixed income portfolios. A Tug Of War For Bond Yields Chart of the WeekThe Delta Surge Is Not That Bond Bearish Global bond yields are currently trapped in narrow ranges, pulled in opposing directions by two powerful forces. The spread of the Delta variant is raising worries about future economic growth. Yet central banks cannot signal dovish bond-bullish guidance in response because of persistently high inflation and rich financial asset valuations. The result is that real bond yields cannot decline deeper into negative territory because central banks are unable to signal easier future monetary policy. At the same time, inflation expectations cannot fall either because of high realized inflation and overly accommodative monetary settings. With global supply chains still disrupted by the pandemic and labor markets in many major developed countries tightening rapidly, the inflation side of this tug of war on bond yields will remain strong. This leaves the Delta variant as being most important in determining which side wins the war. The variant is proving to be much less deadly (so far) than past COVID waves on an aggregate global basis (Chart of the Week) thanks to vaccinations. However, there are notable differences in economic growth momentum that have opened up between countries where the variant has spread aggressively, especially if economic restrictions have been imposed. The preliminary services PMIs for August showed big monthly declines in the US and UK, where case numbers have surged, and Australia, where half of the population is under some form of lockdown to fight the spread of the variant. Delta-stricken Japan also saw a sharp drop in services activity in August. The services PMIs in Europe, however, dipped very modestly, in line with the subdued spread of the variant in euro area countries. Chart 2No Major Changes On Bond Markets From The Delta Variant While the variant appears to be having a noticeable impact on relative economic growth in the near-term, the relative performance of government bond markets in the developed world is a different story. When looking at the 2021 year-to-date relative returns of the major bond markets versus the Bloomberg Barclays Global Treasury index - in USD-hedged and duration-matched terms - the outperformers have been Germany (and euro area bonds, in general), Japan and Australia while the laggards have been the US, UK and Canada (Chart 2). Over the past month, however, when the global spread of the Delta variant has become front page news, there has been very little change in the relative bond returns outside of a modest pickup in the outperformance of Australia - one of our current overweight recommendations. A big reason why relative returns have remained stagnant is that monetary policy expectations have not changed much in response to the variant. Our 24-month discounters, which measure the amount of interest rate hikes over the next two years currently priced in overnight index swap (OIS) curves, are essentially at the same levels that prevailed in early July in the US, Europe, the UK, Canada, Australia and Japan. With little change in future interest rate expectations between countries, amid stable inflation expectations, there is no impetus driving changes in relative government bond market performance. Other financial markets are also taking the spread of the variant in stride, especially in the US. Forward looking US economic sentiment measures like the University of Michigan consumer expectations index and the Philadelphia Fed Business Outlook survey all showed sharp declines in the preliminary August readings. Yet US equity markets continue to hover near all-time highs, US high-yield spreads remain near pandemic lows and the VIX index is below 20 (Chart 3). Perhaps one reason why risk assets are holding in well despite the worries over the variant is that the news outside the US has been more upbeat. Consumer confidence in Canada and the UK remains solid (Chart 4), with the latter also seeing a huge upside surprise in retail sales volumes in August according to the Confederation of British Industry’s survey of retailers. Even in Australia, with widespread lockdowns, consumer confidence remains well above the 2020 pandemic lows. Chart 3Delta Variant Hitting US Economic (Not Market) Confidence Chart 4Lockdowns Are Bad For Confidence (And Vice Versa) Delta developments in China are also turning more positive, with new reported cases now at zero after a surge that began in July. There are even reasons for optimism in the US, where COVID-19 reproduction rates in most of the Southern states – the epicenter of the US Delta surge – have fallen below 1, suggesting a declining pace of transmission of the virus.1 The overall hit to global growth from the Delta variant will likely be modest, leaving the inflation side of the tug of war on global bond yields as the winner, particularly in countries that are seeing a broad-based increase in inflation that will be difficult for central bankers to ignore. In the US, UK, Canada and New Zealand – our least-preferred bond markets within the developed world - both realized consumer price inflation and the growth of house prices are soaring at the same time (Chart 5). Unsurprisingly, the central banks in those four countries have either tapered bond purchases – all the way to zero in the case of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) – or are preparing the markets for tapering as the US Federal Reserve has been doing in recent weeks. Policymakers in those four countries will be watching to see if the latest uptrend in inflation starts to drive up longer term inflation expectations by enough to warrant a monetary policy response. In the US, the University of Michigan consumer survey shows that one-year-ahead expected inflation has climbed to 4.6%, compared to a more subdued 3.% expected inflation rate over the next five years (Chart 6). In Canada, the Q2/2021 Survey of Consumer Expectations produced by the Bank of Canada (BoC) shows that both one-year and five-year inflation expectations are 3.1% - just above the upper limit of the BoC inflation target range – although the longer-term measure is off the highs seen in 2020 (we discuss Canada in greater detail later in this report) Chart 5Difficult For Central Banks To ##br##Ignore This Chart 6Will Short-Term Inflation Expectations Bleed Into The Long-Term? Inflation expectations in the UK, according to the YouGov/Citigroup survey, are 3.1% in the short-term (and rising) and a higher 3.4% in the longer term. In New Zealand, the RBNZ’s inflation survey shows both short-term (1-year) and longer-term (5-year) inflation expectations have increased to 3% and 4%, respectively. Chart 7Inflation Expectations Still Moderate In Europe, Japan & Australia Importantly, market-based expectations extracted from breakevens on 10-year inflation-linked bonds in those four countries are somewhat more subdued than the survey-based expectations measures. This means that central bankers can be patient on moving towards tapering and eventual interest rate hikes until the concerns over the Delta variant have passed. However, lingering global supply chain disruptions, alongside tightening labor markets, represent inflationary risks that will force the Fed, the Bank of England (BoE), the BoC and RBNZ to begin dialing back monetary accommodation over the next year. We still anticipate that the RBNZ will hike rates this fall in response to booming New Zealand house prices, while the Fed will begin tapering its bond buying next January and will start hiking rates in Q4/2022. Both the BoC and BoE will fully taper QE and lift interest rates in 2022, with the BoC likely to move first in the first half of the year. In the euro area, Japan and Australia – where we are currently recommending overweight government bond allocations on a USD-hedged basis – the latest uptrends in both house prices and realized inflation have not translated into overshooting inflation expectations (Chart 7). The ECB, Bank of Japan and Reserve Bank of Australia are not expected to tighten policy in any form (taper or rate hikes) through at least the end of 2022. Net-net, we do not see the spread of the Delta variant as a reason to make changes to our strategic recommended country allocations on global government bonds. Bottom Line: Global inflation pressures – fueled by tightening labor markets and persistent supply chain disruptions - will linger for much longer than the Delta surge. Investors should position for higher global bond yields, led by the US, on a medium-term basis. Also, favor countries where inflation pressures are less entrenched (Europe, Japan and Australia) versus nations with more broad-based inflation visible in both consumer prices and house prices (the US, UK, Canada and New Zealand). Canada: The BoC Is Still On The Path To Tighten Perhaps no country has suffered greater extremes with regards to COVID-19 in 2021 than Canada. A slow vaccine rollout at the start of 2021 placed Canada behind the US and other developed market countries in terms of dialing back pandemic restrictions imposed last year. The low rate of vaccinations allowed a harsh third wave of COVID to take place this past spring, further delaying Canada’s exit from lockdowns. Since then, Canada has flipped the script with a spectacularly rapid vaccination campaign. Two-thirds of the population is now fully inoculated and the country has rapidly emerged from lockdowns, spurring a stronger economy much more resilient to the rapid spread of the Delta strain seen in Canada’s southern neighbor. Our view on Canadian fixed income markets has also evolved alongside pandemic developments over the course of this year. In a Special Report published back in February, we concluded that the BoC would likely need to begin withdrawing the extraordinary monetary easing measures put in place in response to the pandemic sooner than most other developed market central banks.2 This would justify cutting our recommended stance on Canadian government debt from neutral to underweight. The slow initial vaccine rollout delayed that decision until late April, when we pulled the trigger on that downgrade.3 Chart 8The Economic Future Looks Bright In Canada At the time, our shift to a bearish stance on Canada rested on several pillars: Better news on the vaccination front, which would give a lift to consumer and business confidence Booming house prices, fueled by negative real interest rates, raising financial stability risks in a country with an already overheated housing market Additional fiscal stimulus announced by the ruling Liberal government, dramatically reducing the fiscal drag that was expected in 2021. Since our downgrade, the BoC has already cut the pace of its quantitative easing (QE) asset purchases in half, after allowing other pandemic emergency liquidity programs to expire earlier in the year. Interest rate markets are now pricing in a full 25bp rate hike in Canada by August 2022, with 115bps of cumulative hikes discounted by the end of 2024. Only Norway and New Zealand are expected to lift rates sooner, and by more, than the BoC within the developed markets universe. Yet that is still a very slow and shallow expected path for Canadian interest rates, given the substantial tailwinds to economic growth in Canada (Chart 8). Canadian consumers have a strong base to support spending. Nominal household disposable income growth remains solid at 9% on a year-over-year basis and the household saving rate is still elevated at 13% after peaking at 27% during the COVID recession in 2020. The BoC’s Q2 Survey of Consumer Expectations noted that 40% of respondents reported that their savings were higher than usual because of pandemic, and that those that did accumulate excess savings planned to spend 35% of those funds over the next two years. This implies that Canadian consumers still hold plenty of cash to spend, and that pent-up demand coming out of lockdowns will support a solid pace of consumption. Moreover, continuously recovering labor market conditions will also contribute to a solid pace of domestic demand. Even though the recovery of employment to date has been uneven across different sectors and worker backgrounds, Canadian firms are reporting robust hiring plans and increased intensity of labor shortages - leading firms to plan for wage increases - according to the BoC’s Q2/2021 Business Outlook Survey. This indicates that the Canadian labor market will likely tighten further over the next 6-12 months, further supporting consumer incomes, confidence and spending. The Business Outlook Survey also reported that overall business sentiment was at the highest level in the history of the series, with a net 36% of firms– just off the record high of 40% in Q1/2021 – reporting stronger capital spending intentions. Thus, business investment catching up after the COVID pause will also help boost overall Canadian economic growth. Importantly, the Delta variant does not pose the same near term risk to growth as is the case in the US and other countries. The number of new COVID cases and related hospitalizations is a fraction of what was seen as recently as the third pandemic wave earlier this year (Chart 9). The rapid pace of vaccinations is clearly providing a buffer to the spread of the variant in Canada, with 74% of Canadians having had at least one vaccine dose and 66% of the population fully vaccinated. While there is solid upward momentum in Canadian growth, the same can be said for Canadian inflation. Headline CPI inflation climbed to 3.7% in July, while core inflation jumped to 2.8% (Chart 10), both the highest pace seen since 2003. Not all of that increase is due to base effect comparisons versus a year ago, as the monthly increases in both headline (+0.6%) and core (+0.4%) were strong. Chart 9Vaccinations Have Made A Huge Difference In Canada Chart 10Canadian Inflation Momentum Is ##br##Not Slowing As discussed earlier in this report, survey-based measures of Canadian consumer inflation expectations show that this surge in inflation is perceived to be temporary, with shorter-term expectations rising but longer-term expectations slowing. There is a lack of worry in the Canadian inflation-linked bond markets, as well, with breakeven inflation rates hovering near the midpoint of the BoC’s 1-3% inflation target range. This presents a potential problem for the BoC, and the Canadian bond market, if the current surge in inflation does not prove to be temporary. The BoC’s August Monetary Policy Report (MPR) included a detailed breakdown of the contribution to Canadian inflation by spending category (Chart 11). While energy costs were a major driver of the year-over-year increase in inflation, components that were exposed to supply constraints – like motor vehicles and other durable goods – accounted for nearly one-half of the level of year-over-over inflation over the past three months. The CPI elements that were linked to increased demand as the economy reopened from lockdowns – like spending in restaurants – represented a much smaller share of current inflation. Chart 11Lingering Supply Constraints Are A Major Upside Inflation Risk Thus, while energy price inflation is likely to cool off somewhat on a year-over-year basis over the next 6-12 months, Canadian inflation could remain surprisingly sticky at levels above the BoC target band if supply disruptions persist for longer. Canadian businesses are already facing higher input costs, and it is inevitable that firms will offer higher wages in order to attract workers while demand keeps rising in a tightening labor market. In the end, all these increased costs will continue to be passed on by firms to consumers, putting upward pressure on Canadian Dollar – especially with both the BoC and IMF projecting Canada’s output gap to steadily narrow and be fully closed in the second half of 2022. Risks from the upcoming federal election Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has called a snap federal election for September 20. The timing of the election seems odd on the surface, given Trudeau’s poor approval ratings and the lingering uncertainties of COVID-19. The Canada Geopolitical Risk Indicator constructed by our colleagues at BCA Research Geopolitical Strategy shows that there is a high level of domestic political risk in Canada, largely due to the underperformance of the Canadian dollar versus improving Canadian economic variables (Chart 12). However, in the current context of the pandemic, with all the associated uncertainty, this high risk is translating in favor of the incumbent Liberal Party, rather than calling for regime change. Chart 12An Interesting Time To Call An Election In Canada The likely reason is that the COVID crisis was exogenous and polling shows that voters are at least content with ruling party’s handling of the situation. Current polls have the Liberals with a modest lead over the opposition Conservatives (Chart 13). The far-left New Democratic Party (NDP) is in third place, even though its leader has the highest approval rating of the three major party leaders. Chart 13Trudeau Is Taking A Calculated Risk Trudeau is taking a gamble with this election to try and retake the parliamentary majority he lost in the 2019 election that resulted in a minority Liberal government. Trudeau has framed the election as a chance to “finish the fight” against COVID-19, and as a referendum on his government’s handling of the pandemic. Yet the broad Liberal party platform is also positioned well, based on Canadian voter preferences. Current opinion polls show that the most important issues among Canadian voters are climate change, health care and housing (Chart 14). COVID-19 itself is actually well down the list, as are government deficits and taxes – issues that the Conservatives are relentlessly focused on. Trudeau has skillfully read the tea leaves and positioned his party well on issues most Canadians care most about, unlike his main opposition party (Table 1). Furthermore, Trudeau has co-opted many of the policy planks of the NDP, allowing the Liberals to gain potential votes from more left-leaning voters. At a time when voters want to reassert the role of government in tackling collective challenges, this is a favorable place to be. Chart 14Canada: Most Important Issues Facing The Country Table 1The Liberal Agenda Lines Up With Top Voter Priorities The likely election result will be another Liberal victory, with the party expanding its minority and having a legitimate shot at winning a majority. This also means that the Canadian fiscal policy is likely to remain supportive for growth over the next few years. Stay Underweight Canadian Government Debt Given all the positive momentum and upside risks to economic growth, house prices, inflation and government spending, the BoC is likely to continue on its current path towards fully tapering asset purchases and eventually starting to lift interest rates as soon as mid-2022 (Chart 15). This would be faster than the liftoff date currently discounted in the Canadian OIS curve. The pace of rate hikes discounted is also very shallow, and the risks are tilted towards the BoC doing more tightening than the market is expecting over the next couple of years. We continue to recommend a below-benchmark duration stance in Canada, and a strategic underweight allocation to Canada within global government bond portfolios with the BoC likely to be one of the more hawkish developed market central banks over the next 12-18 months (Chart 16). We also advocate positioning for a bearish flattening of the Canadian yield curve given the potential for hawkish surprises from the BoC. Chart 15The BoC's Policy Stance Has Already ##br##Turned Chart 16Stay Cautious On Canadian Government Bond Exposure Bottom Line: The Canadian economy is performing strongly as the nation is finally reopening after a poor initial vaccine rollout earlier this year. Next month’s federal election will likely result in a re-election of Justin Trudeau’s Liberals and a continuation of expansive fiscal policy. The Bank of Canada is on track to begin interest rate hikes in 2022 with inflation likely to remain higher for longer than the central bank projects. Remain underweight Canadian government bonds within global (USD-hedged) fixed income portfolios.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, CFA Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Estimates of the COVID-19 effective reproduction rate in US states, calculated by public health researchers at Harvard and Yale universities, can be found here: https://covidestim.org/ 2 Please see BCA Research Foreign Exchange Strategy and Global Fixed Income Strategy Report, " Will The Canadian Recovery Lead Or Lag The Global Cycle?", dated February 12, 2021, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Report, "Some Bond Bearish Tales From Both Sides Of The 49th Parallel", dated April 20, 2021, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Dear Client, I will be on vacation next week. In lieu of our regular report, we will be sending you a Special Report written by my colleagues Chester Ntonifor, BCA Research’s Chief Foreign Exchange Strategist, and Matt Gertken, Chief Geopolitical Strategist. Their report discusses the threat to the dollar’s reserve status over the next decade. This week, Matt published a timely report entitled “Afghanistan? Watch Iran And China,” examining the global macro significance of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. I trust you will find both reports insightful.   Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights Over the next 12 months, US inflation will decline fast enough to allow the Federal Reserve to maintain its accommodative monetary stance, but not as fast as investors are expecting. A number of structural forces were becoming inflationary even before the pandemic began. The pandemic will only buttress the tide. Even if the virus is eventually vanquished, the pandemic could prop up inflation by permanently reducing labor supply, hastening the retreat from globalization, and keeping fiscal policy looser than it otherwise would have been. Fixed-income investors should maintain a short duration stance. We expect the US 10-year Treasury yield to rebound to about 1.8% by early next year. Long-term bond yields in the other major economies will also rise, although not as much as in the US. In and of itself, higher inflation is not necessarily bad for equities. What makes higher inflation toxic for stocks is when it forces central banks to raise rates to punitive levels. Fortunately, such an outcome is still a few years away, justifying an overweight equity position for now. Upside Risks To Inflation In our July 23rd report, we argued that investors were asking the wrong question about inflation. Rather than asking whether higher inflation is transitory, they should be asking whether inflation will decline faster or slower than what the market is discounting. Chart 1Investors Expect Inflation To Fall Rapidly From Current Levels Chart 1 shows that investors expect inflation to fall rapidly from current levels and to remain subdued thereafter. The widely followed 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate currently stands at 2.12%, below the Fed’s comfort zone of 2.3%-to-2.5% (Chart 2).1 Chart 2Below-Target Inflation Expectations And A Low R* Have Restrained Bond Yields Downbeat long-term inflation expectations and the market’s perception that the neutral rate of interest is very low are the two main reasons why bond yields are so depressed. QE programs have also dampened yields, although not nearly as much as widely believed. Chart 3Outside Of A Few Pandemic-Related Sectors, The CPI Has Yet To Return To Trend In our report, we contended that US inflation would come down fast enough over the next few quarters to allow the Federal Reserve to maintain its accommodative monetary stance, but not as fast as investors are expecting. On the one hand, the evidence clearly shows that most of the recent increase in US inflation has been driven by just a few pandemic-related sectors (Chart 3). On the other hand, high levels of excess household savings, the need for firms to expand capacity and rebuild inventories, and continued policy support will boost output and prices. The Long-Term Inflationary Consequences Of The Pandemic We also argued that a variety of structural forces, including the exodus of baby boomers from the labor market, a retreat from globalization, and increasing social unrest, would drive up inflation over the long haul. A key question is how the pandemic will shape these structural forces going forward. As we discuss below, there are three main overlapping channels through which the pandemic could have a lasting impact on inflation: Labor market scarring: Even if the virus is eventually vanquished, the pandemic could still permanently reduce the labor supply. Widespread worker shortages would fuel inflation. Deglobalization: Globalization has historically been a deflationary force. The pandemic could accelerate the retreat from globalization by prompting firms to bring more production back home, while exacerbating geopolitical tensions. Fiscal policy: Big budget deficits could persist in the post-pandemic period. Debt-saddled governments may turn to inflation to erode their debt burdens. Let us assess these three channels in turn.   Channel #1: Labor Market Scarring Despite July’s blockbuster employment report, there are still nearly 4% fewer Americans employed than was the case in January 2020. Yet, US businesses are struggling to hire workers (Chart 4). Nationwide, the job openings rate stands at a record 6.5%, up from 4.5% on the eve of the pandemic (Chart 5). Chart 4US Companies Are Facing A Labor Shortage Chart 5There Are Plenty Of Jobs Available Generous unemployment benefits, less immigration, and the reluctance of many workers to expose themselves to the virus have all helped to reduce labor supply. A marked shift in the composition of spending has increased the demand for workers in some sectors while reducing demand in other sectors (Chart 6). Since labor is not perfectly fungible across sectors, this has caused overall unemployment to rise. Chart 6Which Sectors Have Gained And Which Have Lost Jobs Since The Pandemic? Looking out, labor supply should increase as emergency unemployment benefits expire, immigration picks up, and more people are vaccinated. The mismatch of workers across sectors should also diminish as goods and services spending rebalances. Nevertheless, there is considerable uncertainty over how quickly all this will happen. According to Indeed, an online job posting site, unemployed workers cited having a “financial cushion” as the most popular reason for not looking for a job in July (Chart 7). Given that American households are sitting on $2.4 trillion in excess savings, it may take some time for this cushion to deflate (Chart 8). Chart 7Americans Are Not Desperate To Find Work Chart 8A Lot Of Excess Savings Chart 9No Jab, No Job Wider vaccine mandates could also impact labor market participation. A host of major companies, ranging from Google to Citigroup, are requiring their employees to be inoculated before returning to the office (Chart 9). The Pentagon has laid out a plan endorsed by President Biden obliging members of the military to get the COVID-19 vaccine. Earlier this week, the Las Vegas Raiders became the first NFL team to require fans to produce proof of vaccination to gain entry to home games. On the one hand, vaccine mandates could encourage more people to get the jab, which should help curb the pandemic and boost employment in the service sector. While the numbers have improved in recent weeks, only 57% of Americans between the ages of 18 and 64 are fully vaccinated (Chart 10). On the other hand, some people might opt for unemployment over a vaccine. According to a recent YouGov poll, about half of all unvaccinated Americans believe that the government is using COVID-19 vaccines to microchip the population (Chart 11). The threat of losing one’s job is unlikely to sway many of them. Chart 10Many Workers Remain Unvaccinated Chart 11One In Five Americans Believes The US Government Is Using The Covid-19 Vaccine To Microchip The Population Pandemic-induced shifts in work-life preferences could also reduce labor supply. According to Ipsos, a polling firm, most employees would prefer to work remotely at least part of the time, with 25% indicating they do not want to return to their workplace at all (Chart 12). The same poll found that 30% of workers would consider looking for another job if their employer required them to work away from home full time (Chart 13). Chart 12Let’s Chat Around The Water Cooler On Tuesdays And Wednesdays Chart 13What Is The Opposite Of A “One Size Fits All” Work Environment? Chart 14Number Of Retired People Jumped During The Pandemic If remote working boosted productivity, as some have claimed, this would not be such a bad thing. However, it is far from clear that this is the case. A recent University of Chicago study of 10,000 skilled professionals from an Asian IT company revealed that work-from-home policies decreased productivity by 8%-to-19%. Early retirement has also reduced labor supply. The share of retirees in the US population rose by 1.3 percentage points between February 2020 and July 2021, with most of the increase occurring early in the pandemic (Chart 14). Based on pre-pandemic demographic trends, the retirement rate should have risen by only 0.5 percentage points over this period.  The good news, as discussed in a recent study by the Kansas City Fed, is that most of the increase in the retirement rate was driven by fewer people transitioning from retirement back into employment. The share of people transitioning from employment to retirement did not change much (Chart 15). This led the authors to conclude that “More retirees may rejoin the workforce as health risks fade, but the retirement share is unlikely to return to a normal level for some time.” Chart 15Increased Retirees: A Closer Look Bottom Line: Labor supply will recover as the pandemic recedes. Nevertheless, the available pool of workers will likely be lower in the post-pandemic period than it would have otherwise been. A shortage of workers will prop up wage growth, helping to fuel inflation.   Channel #2: Deglobalization Globalization was on the back foot even before the pandemic began. Having steadily increased between 1991 and 2008, the ratio of global trade-to-output was basically flat during the 2010s (Chart 16). Ironically, the pandemic has revived global trade by shifting the composition of spending away from non-tradable services towards tradable goods. This shift in spending is the key reason why shipping costs have soared in recent months (Chart 17). Chart 16Globalization Plateaued Over A Decade Ago Chart 17Shipping Costs Have Soared In Recent Months The rebound in trade will not endure. Already, we are seeing companies moving production back home to establish greater control over their supply chains. The pandemic has exacerbated geopolitical tensions between China and the US. Recriminations about how the pandemic began and what China could have done to stop it will not go away anytime soon. Trade bloomed during Pax Britannica, when Great Britain ruled the waves, and then again during Pax Americana, when the US controlled the commanding heights. As BCA’s geopolitical team has long stressed, the shift to a multi-polar world is likely to restrain globalization.2 Historically, globalization has been a deflationary force. Trade has allowed countries such as the US that consistently run current account deficits to satiate excess demand for goods with imports, thereby forestalling inflation. Trade has also raised productivity by allowing countries to specialize in those areas in which they have a comparative advantage, while providing a mechanism to diffuse technological know-how around the world. Standard trade theory predicts that less-skilled workers in developed economies will suffer a relative decline in wages in response to rising trade with developing countries. A number of studies have documented that this is precisely what happened after China entered the global trading system.3  Poor workers tend to spend more of their paychecks than either rich workers or the owners of capital. To the extent that deglobalization shifts the balance of economic power back towards blue-collar workers in advanced economies, this will raise overall aggregate demand. Against the backdrop of muted productivity growth, inflation could increase as a consequence. Bottom Line: Globalization is deflationary, while deglobalization is inflationary. The pandemic is likely to reinforce the trend towards deglobalization.    Channel #3: Fiscal Policy There was once a time when governments trembled in fear of the bond vigilantes. Those days are long gone. After briefly rising to 4% in June 2009, the US 10-year Treasury yield trended lower over the subsequent decade, even though unemployment fell and government debt rose. The pandemic sent the bond vigilantes scurrying for cover. Negative real yields allowed governments to run budget deficits of previously unimagined proportions during the pandemic. Budget deficits will decline over the next few years, but the aversion to deficit spending will not return. Not anytime soon at least. The IMF expects the cyclically-adjusted primary budget deficit in advanced economies to average 2.6% of GDP between 2022 and 2026, up from 1% of GDP in the 2014-19 period (Chart 18). Even that is probably too conservative, since the IMF’s projections do not include pending legislation such as President Biden’s $550 billion infrastructure package and $3.5 trillion reconciliation budget bill. Chart 18Fiscal Policy: Tighter But Not Tight If the growth rate of the economy exceeds the interest rate on government debt, then governments with high debt-to-GDP ratios could run larger budget deficits than governments with low ratios, while still achieving a stable debt-to-GDP ratio over time.4  The problem is that these same governments would face an exponential increase in debt-servicing costs if interest rates were to rise above the growth rate of the economy. This is not a risk for any major developed economy at the moment but could become an issue as spare capacity recedes. At that point, central banks could face political pressure to keep rates low, even if their economies are overheating. The result could be higher inflation. Higher inflation, in turn, would boost nominal GDP growth, putting downward pressure on debt-to-GDP ratios. Bottom Line: While budget deficits will come down over the next few years, governments in developed economies will still maintain looser fiscal policies than before the pandemic. High debt levels could incentivize policymakers to permit higher inflation. Investment Conclusions US inflation will decline over the next 12 months, but not as quickly as markets are discounting. A number of structural forces were becoming inflationary even before the pandemic began. The pandemic will only reinforce the inflationary tide. Fixed-income investors should maintain a short duration stance. We expect the US 10-year Treasury yield to rebound to about 1.8% by early next year as the Delta variant wave fades. Long-term bond yields in the other major economies will also rise, although not as much as in the US. In and of itself, higher inflation is not necessarily bad for equities. What makes higher inflation toxic for stocks is when it forces central banks to raise rates to punitive levels. Fortunately, such an outcome is still a few years away, justifying an overweight equity position for now. The second quarter earnings season was a strong one. Back on July 2nd, analysts expected S&P 500 companies to generate about $45 in EPS in Q2. In the end, they generated at least $52. Analysts expect earnings to decline in absolute terms in Q3 and remain below Q2 levels until the second quarter of next year, when they are projected to grow by a meagre 3.5% year-over-year (Table 1). Table 1US Earnings Estimates Have Upside Earnings estimates usually drift lower over time (Chart 19). BCA’s US equity strategists think there is scope for earnings estimates for the second half of this year to rise materially from current levels. This should support US stocks. Along the same lines, above-trend global growth and attractive valuations should buoy stock markets outside the US. Chart 19Analysts Have Been Revising Up Earnings Estimates This Year Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The Federal Reserve targets an average inflation rate of 2% for the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) index. The TIPS breakeven is based on the CPI index. Due to compositional differences between the two indices, CPI inflation has historically averaged 30-to-50 basis points higher than PCE inflation. This is why the Fed effectively targets a CPI inflation rate of about 2.3%-to-2.5%. 2 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report “Hypo-Globalization (A GeoRisk Update),” dated July 30, 2021; and Special Report, “The Apex Of Globalization - All Downhill From Here,” dated November 12, 2014. 3 For example, economists Katharine Abraham and Melissa Kearney have estimated that increased competition from Chinese imports cost the US economy 2.65 million jobs between 1999 and 2016, almost double the 1.4 million jobs lost to automation. Similarly, David Autor and his colleagues found that increased trade with China has led to large job losses for blue-collar workers in the US manufacturing sector. 4 The steady-state debt-to-GDP ratio can be expressed as p/(r-g), where r is the interest rate, g is trend GDP growth, and p is the primary (i.e., non-interest) budget balance. Thus, for example, if the government wanted to achieve a stable debt-to-GDP ratio of 50% and r-g is -2%, it would need to run a primary budget deficit of 0.5*0.02=1% of GDP. However, if the government targeted a stable debt-to-GDP ratio of 200%, it could run a primary budget deficit of 2*0.02=4% of GDP. See Box 1 in our February 22, 2019 report for a derivation of this debt sustainability equation. Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores

Highlights The baht will depreciate further, given the state of the economy and external accounts. Domestic demand was already relapsing, even before the latest surge in COVID-19 cases. Now, the recovery will be delayed more. The authorities have little to offer by way of fiscal or monetary support. Credit to the job-intensive SME sector has collapsed. The balance of payment dynamics remains negative for the currency. Investors should stay short the baht. Dedicated EM asset allocators should continue to be neutral on Thailand within respective equity and domestic bond portfolios. Feature Chart 1Thai Stocks Are Facing Several Headwinds Our negative view on the baht has played out as expected.1 The Thai currency is down 10% versus the dollar since its peak in February of this year. It has also been the worst performer in Asia. The country’s stock market is struggling and going down in both absolute terms and relative to their EM counterparts (Chart 1). Going forward, odds are that the baht will remain weak. A weak currency will continue to stifle both Thai stocks’ and local currency bonds’ relative performance. Investors should stay short the baht and remain neutral Thai equity and local currency bonds within their respective EM portfolios. Relapsing Growth Chart 2Surging New COVID-19 Cases... The latest spike in new COVID-19 cases has dashed hopes for any early recovery of the Thai economy (Chart 2). Earlier this month, the central bank revised down their GDP forecast for 2021 from 1.8% to 0.7%. We concur with this bearish outlook: Private consumption in real terms was languishing as of June this year at 10% below 2019 levels. Car sales, both personal and commercial, are even more downbeat (Chart 3). After the latest surge in new COVID-19 cases, those numbers must have weakened further. Incidentally, the country’s vaccination rate, at 26% of total population (7.5% fully vaccinated), remains low. It could be, therefore, several months before any meaningful recovery in consumer demand takes place. Faced with low demand, the country’s manufacturing and shipment volumes are also weak. They are both breaking down anew from well below the 2019 levels (Chart 4, top panel). Chart 3...Will Further Delay Domestic Demand Recovery Chart 4Manufacturers Are Saddled With High Inventory Amid Weak Orders...   Weak demand also means that businesses are stuck with high inventories. Indeed, there is a widening disparity between inventory levels and shipments (Chart 4, middle panel). Furthermore, order books have slipped back to levels not seen since the height of the COVID-19 scare early last year. The combination of high inventories and tumbling orders does not portend a manufacturing recovery anytime soon (Chart 4, bottom panel). Notably, jobs and wages are also weak. Employment in the manufacturing sector is well below pre-pandemic levels (Chart 5). This trend, in turn, is hurting household income and consumer demand, completing a vicious cycle of depressed demand, weak production, falling employment and household income, and further reduced demand. The softness of the economy is accentuating the disinflationary pressure that was already entrenched. Headline and core CPI in Thailand have stayed mostly below 1% over the past five years — the lower band of the central bank’s inflation target. Now, they are flirting with outright deflation. In fact, if the impact of food and oil prices is excluded, the prices are actually deflating (Chart 6). Chart 5...Which Is Hurting Jobs And Wage Growth Chart 6Thailand Is Flirting With Outright Deflation...   Outright deflation makes it harder for borrowers to service their debts, which then discourages both borrowing and spending — making the recovery much harder. Notably, the banks’ prime lending rates remain high at 5.4%, which means real prime lending rates are quite steep at 5% (deflated by core CPI). This is at a time of very low household income and business revenue growth expectations. This trend is a strong disincentive for borrowing and consuming /capital spending. Little Policy Support What is more concerning for the economy is that policymakers can offer little to boost the economy. Fiscal stimulus has waned: government expenditure, after a surge last year, is now contracting (Chart 7). The budget proposal for the next fiscal year (October 2021 - September 2022) that was passed by the parliament in June 2021 (first reading)2 stipulates a 5.7% cut in nominal spending. Part of the reason is that fiscal deficits have already ballooned to a staggering 8% of GDP — from an average of 2.5% in the past ten years. The IMF estimates that the fiscal thrust will be zero this year, and a negative 2.4% of GDP in 2022 (Chart 7, bottom panel). The monetary policy transmission is also paralyzed. Despite easing by the Bank of Thailand — the policy rate is at an all-time low of 0.5% since May last year — credit growth is dismal. Lenders are wary of rising NPLs and are holding back new credit: The share of impaired loans (NPLs plus Special Mention Loans) of total bank loans has dramatically increased to 10%. In the case of small and medium enterprises (SMEs), that ratio is 20%. By comparison, loss provisions are much lower, at just 5.2% as of June of this year (Chart 8, top panel). Chart 7...Yet, The Government Is Planning To Cut Fiscal Spending Chart 8Sharp Rise In Banks' Stressed Loans Amid Tanking Profits...   Notably, both operating and net profits of banks had already halved (as a % of assets) by June 2021 — as both interest and non-interest incomes dropped. Profits are slated to contract further, since banks will have to make greater provisions in the future as the recent surge in new cases will produce more loan delinquencies (Chart 8, bottom panel). The specter of rising NPLs has prompted banks to retrench loans. In particular, bank credit to SMEs has plunged by a massive 34% from 2019 levels (Chart 9). Before the pandemic, banks’ SME loans made up a significant 30% of GDP. Now, they are down to 21%. Credit retrenchment of this order to the job-intensive SME sector is going to have a significant negative ripple effect. Employment will shrink further as small businesses go bust. Shrinking jobs will dent household income, and, in turn, consumer demand. Incidentally, loans to other business segments are also not rising much. Bank loans to all non-financial corporates are growing rather minimally, at 1.5% year-over-year. Going into the pandemic, the Thai household sector was already highly leveraged. Over the past two decades, banks and other financial institutions have been lending ever more to households, shunning non-financial corporates. Households’ borrowing from banks have now risen to 40% of GDP; and those from other institutions another 50%. These loans had helped boost consumer demand all those years, but now, at a time when incomes are uncertain, households have very limited appetite to borrow more to spend. This means a consumer debt-fueled demand recovery is not in the cards (Chart 10). Chart 9...Induced Banks To Massively Reduce Credit To The Job-Intensive SME Sector Chart 10Thai Households Are Too Indebted To Borrow More And Spend   In brief, Thai businesses are in the middle of a toxic combination of contracting sales, absent fiscal support, slashed credit facilities, and rather high borrowing costs in real terms. Chart 11 shows that corporate profit margins of non-financial firms are struggling at a low level. It is no wonder that businesses are reluctant to invest, expand, and hire. The message is similar when we examined all companies included in the MSCI Thailand stock index. On the one hand, their EPS has fallen to 10-year lows. Thai stock prices, on the other hand, have not yet fallen as much as the shrinking EPS would imply (Chart 12, top panel). The consequence is that the valuations are remarkably stretched—near a 20-year high (Chart 12, bottom panel). Chart 11Low Margins Are Discouraging Thai Firms To Borrow, Invest, Or Hire Chart 12Thai Profits, At A Decade-Low, Are Also A Headwind For Stock Prices   All in all, for Thai share prices to stage a sustainable rally, an economic recovery is essential. The first indications of that usually come from an improving order book. The latter currently shows little glimmer of hope. But investors should keep an eye on this indicator, as Thai stocks’ performance is geared to the ebbs and flows of the business order book (Chart 13). Thailand Needs A Weaker Currency The state of the Thai economy not only warrants exchange rate depreciation, but also needs a much weaker currency to help an economic recovery. The country’s balance of payment is in deficit — for the first time since 2014. A crucial reason is that the baht is still expensive, which continues to weigh on exports. Of all the export-oriented Asian economies, Thai exports recovery has been the weakest (Chart 14). Chart 13Keep An Eye On The Order Book For A Sign In Stock Recovery Chart 14An Expensive Baht Held Back Thai Exports Recovery   The fact that a quarter of Thai exports go to other ASEAN countries — where demand has been and remains weak due to the lingering pandemic — doesn’t help either. As a result, the Thai trade surplus has narrowed significantly, and the current account has slipped into deficit (Chart 15, top and middle panels). The other main external revenue source of Thailand, tourism, continues to be near absent at 0.6% of GDP — a far cry from a high of 12% before the pandemic (Chart 15, bottom panel). What’s more, there is little hope of any recovery in the near future. The government now expects the number of foreign tourists this year to be as low as 0.3 million versus 40 million in 2019. On the capital account front, Thailand continues to hemorrhage both FDI and portfolio capital — just as it did the past several years. Despite that, the baht had remained strong until early this year, as a result of a substantial repatriation of bank deposits by Thai residents and, to a lesser extent, foreign borrowings. Those inflows prevented the Thai baht from depreciating. But such panic-stricken, one-off savings/deposit repatriations by Thai residents will certainly slow materially going forward (Chart 16). Chart 15The Thai Current Account Balance Will Struggle To Stay In Surplus... Chart 16...While The Capital Account Balance Will Slip Deeper Into Deficit...   There’s also little hope that FDI and portfolio inflows will pick up the slack. The reason is that the Thai economy is very weak and the return on capital is low. The latter discourages capital inflows. The fact that the baht continues to be an expensive currency in real terms, and therefore not as competitive as some of its neighbors’, doesn’t help either. The multi-nationals who are planning to re-locate out of China might find some other countries — where the currency is more competitive (such as in India, Malaysia, or the Philippines) — more attractive. Overall, the Thai capital account balance will likely slide deeper into deficit, at a time when the current account will also struggle to stay in surplus. The result will be a further deterioration in the country’s balance of payment, hurting the baht (Chart 17). Considered from another angle, if the return on capital on Thai assets is any guide, the baht could drop much more from its current levels (Chart 18). Chart 17...Putting Downward Pressure On The Baht Chart 18Thai Firms' Low Rates Of Return Point To More Baht Depreciation     The reality is that, given Thailand’s current macro backdrop, a cheaper currency is what the nation needs. That will help boost growth significantly by aiding exports and promoting import substitution. Since foreign trade makes up an impressive 90% of GDP, a boost therein could kickstart the entire economy. Another result of a weaker currency will be higher inflation, something the economy seriously needs. Higher inflation will contribute to lower real interest rates which, in turn, will encourage borrowing and spending. Higher spending and inflation will help achieve higher nominal sales, boost firms’ profits, employment, and eventually, household incomes. All in all, it could allow a productive cycle to unfold. Given all these possible benefits and given that policymakers have few other tools at their disposal at this juncture, chances are the central bank will let the baht depreciate more, albeit in an orderly fashion, in the months to come. What About Bonds? Chart 19Mantain A Neutral Allocation To Thai Domestic Bonds In An EM Basket Thai local currency bonds’ absolute return in US dollar terms, as expected, is highly dependent on the exchange rate (Chart 19, top panel). Given the weak currency outlook, foreign investors should refrain from holding Thai domestic bonds outright. For foreign asset allocators, however, the matter is more nuanced. Thai domestic bonds’ relative return versus that of overall EM did not depend on the baht movement alone. This is because Thailand has been a defensive market owing to the following: a traditionally strong current account, a manageable public debt (now 47% of GDP), and a relatively low holding of bonds by foreign investors (now 12% of total). A robust current account surplus for years meant that during periods of negative growth shocks, the baht often fell less than many other EM currencies — that is, in periods of distress, the baht helped boost the relative performance of Thai bonds vis-à-vis overall EM bonds in US dollar terms. Those periods of distress also saw Thai bond yields fall as the central bank was able to cut rates due to low inflation. In addition, during those periods, local investors moved from equities to government bonds. Since the holdings of local bond investors far outweighed those of foreign investors, Thai bond yields managed to go down, even when some foreign investors dumped EM and Thai domestic bonds. As a result of these factors, Thai bonds outperformed their EM counterparts during the commodity/EM slowdown in 2014-15, and again at the height of the COVID-19-scare in early 2020 — even though the baht fell versus the US dollar during those periods (Chart 19, middle panel). All that said, the reality in the ground has changed somewhat since early last year. The Thai current account is no longer in surplus, and, given the dismal tourism outlook and slowing trade surplus, it will probably stay that way for the foreseeable future. That will keep the baht relatively weak weighing on Thai bonds’ relative performance versus their EM peers. On the other hand, the grim outlook of the Thai economy and looming deflation risk means that Thai bond yields could fall going forward relative to their EM counterparts. That will be a tailwind for Thai domestic bonds’ relative outperformance versus their EM counterparts. There is, therefore, a good chance that the headwind from a relatively weaker baht could be somewhat compensated for by a drop in Thai local yields versus their EM peers. Indeed, the periods of the baht’s weakness usually coincided with Thai bonds’ relative yield compression (Chart 19, bottom panel). This calls for a neutral outlook for relative bond performance going forward. Investment Conclusions Currency: The baht outlook remains precarious. Investors would do well to remain short the baht versus the US dollar. Domestic Bonds: Thai bond yields will go down. The Bank of Thailand will have no choice but to cut rates further. Local investors should stay long bonds. For international dedicated EM fixed-income portfolios, we downgraded Thai bonds in February of this year, from overweight to neutral in an EM bond portfolio, in view of the impending baht weakness. That turned out to be a good decision. Going forward, investors should continue to have a neutral allocation on Thai bonds, as the headwind from the baht will be mitigated by the tailwind from relative bond yield compression. Foreign absolute-return investors, however, should avoid Thai bonds in view of expected currency depreciation. Chart 20A Vulnerable Baht Will Keep Foreign Equity Investors Away Stocks: A struggling economy offers little hope for corporate margins or profits recovery soon. A vulnerable currency makes Thai stocks even less appealing to foreign investors. Without their participation, it will be hard for this market to rise sustainably in absolute terms or outperform their EM counterparts (Chart 20). Thai equities are not cheap either: the P/Book ratio is at par with EM. That said, given the Thai market’s already very steep underperformance versus the EM equity benchmark, from a portfolio strategy point of view, we recommend investors stay neutral this market within an EM equity portfolio. Rajeeb Pramanik Senior EM Strategist rajeeb.pramanik@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please refer to the EMS report “Thailand: Beset By A Vulnerable Baht,” dated February 24, 2021. 2 The budget bill has to pass the second and third readings expected in August before it goes for senate and royal approval.

Special Report

Dear Client, This week we are sending you a joint Special Report written by my colleagues Xiaoli Tang, Associate Vice President at BCA Research’s Global Asset Allocation, and Qingyun Xu, Associate Editor at China Investment Strategy. In the Special Report Xiaoli and Qing investigate the impact on global portfolios when adding onshore Chinese assets. Their findings confirm our view that Chinese onshore equities have not been a good long-term, buy-and-hold asset for global equity investors due to extremely high volatility. However, they conclude that to improve both the absolute and risk-adjusted returns of the onshore equity market, investors can apply an equal-weighted, five-factor smart-beta strategy or active sector/industry allocation strategies. More importantly, they find that both hedged and unhedged Chinese onshore bonds are excellent risk diversifiers for DM bond investors, and Chinese onshore bonds are also a good risk-diversifier and complementary to Chinese equity-centric portfolios. I trust you will find it insightful. Next week the China Investment Strategy team will take our second of the two-week summer break. We will resume our publication on Wednesday, September 1st. Best regards, Jing Sima, China Strategist Highlights Global investors have become increasingly interested in Chinese onshore equities and bonds as part of their multi-asset portfolios as Chinese onshore equities and bonds have been included in major global stock and bond indexes. In this report, we investigate the impact on global portfolios when adding onshore Chinese assets. Three assets (stocks, bonds and stock-bond combinations) and six home currencies (the USD, JPY, EUR, GBP, CAD and AUD) are included in our portfolio analysis. Chinese onshore equities have not been a good long-term, buy-and-hold asset for global equity investors due to extremely high volatility. To improve both the absolute and risk-adjusted returns of the onshore equity market, however, investors can apply an equal-weighted, five-factor smart-beta strategy or active sector/industry allocation strategies. Hedged Chinese onshore bonds are excellent risk diversifiers for DM bond investors, but higher absolute and risk-adjusted returns may be derived from unhedged bonds, thanks to the positive carry and negative correlation between the onshore Chinese bond index and CNY crosses. Chinese onshore bonds are also a good risk-diversifier and complementary to Chinese equity-centric portfolios, given the negative correlation between the performance of Chinese bonds and equities. Adding a stand-alone Chinese portfolio with equally weighted onshore bonds and equities to a typical 70-30 domestic equity-bond portfolio would significantly improve a non-USD investor’s risk-adjusted return. Global investors may access China’s onshore equity and bond markets through Stock Connect(s), Bond Connect and CIBM Direct. Risk management tools are also available via both onshore and offshore instruments. Feature In the past three decades, China’s financial markets have become the second largest in the world both in terms of equity capitalization and bonds outstanding. Pro-market financial reforms have made the onshore markets increasingly accessible to foreign investors (Appendix 1). As China’s domestic equities and bonds are gradually added to major global equity and bond indexes, the onshore markets have become too sizeable to be ignored by global investors. Chart 1China A Onshore Shares: Highly Volatile Driven By Policy Swings Gyrations in China’s equity market in July in response to regulatory changes imposed on various industries (internet, property, education, healthcare and capital markets), however, should be a reminder that volatility in this market is an ever-present aspect. The instability is driven by China’s profound cyclicality in credit, money and macroeconomic policies (Chart 1). Moreover, the unpredictability is exacerbated by periods of geopolitical tensions and domestic political events. We focus on the portfolio impact of adding onshore equities and bonds to global investors’ domestic portfolios with six different home currencies: the USD, euro (EUR), Japanese yen (JPY), British pound (GBP), Australian dollar (AUD) and Canadian dollar (CAD). We also address how to access the onshore markets and what risk management tools are available. Many global investors already have a significant home bias in their portfolios, therefore this report will look at replacing part of a domestic portfolio with Chinese onshore assets. Part 1. Are Chinese Onshore Equities A Good Alternative For Global Equity Investors? 1.1: Chinese Equities Have A Poor Long-Term Return-Risk Profile Chart I-1How Does China A Compare With Global Equities The extremely volatile nature of the MSCI China A onshore equity index (referred to as ‘China A’ in this report) is not a recent phenomenon. Although the volatility in China A has moderated since 2015, the stocks in the index remain highly cyclical and closely correlated with China’s credit growth. China A has gone through two full boom-bust cycles since December 2000 and the third up-cycle started in 2019 is being challenged, as shown in Chart I-1 panel 1. On a rolling three-year basis, China A’s volatility has steadily declined since its peak in early 2015 and is currently comparable to other markets. Meanwhile, its correlation with the rest of the world has steadily risen, standing at around 60% with major equity markets (Chart I-1, bottom 3 panels). The change in correlation with global equity markets could be linked to the launch of the Shanghai Stock Connect and Shenzhen Stock Connect as well as a more market-based RMB exchange rate in the past six years.  Compared with domestic equities for investors in the US, euro area, Japan, UK, Canada and Australia, however, China’s A-shares’ unhedged return-risk profile did not become more attractive after the launch of the Shanghai Stock Connect. As illustrated in Table 1, China A’s underperformance has spanned the entire upcycle in global equities starting in March 2009. It was only in the early years following China’s entrance into the WTO in 2001 that China A-shares performed better than their peers in Japan and the euro area. Table 1Return-Risk Profiles: China A Onshore Index vs Global Equity Indexes and CNY Crosses USD/CNY exchange rate volatility has increased since the 2015 de-pegging from the US dollar, but remains at very low level compared with other CNY crosses. The People’s Bank of China (PBoC) primarily manages the RMB against the dollar by targeting a daily USD/CNY fixing rate, while allowing market forces to drive the RMB value against a basket of currencies in the China Foreign Exchange Trade System (CFETS) index. Chart I-2Correlations Between China A And DM Currencies Interestingly, even though CNY crosses with the euro, GBP, JPY, AUD and CAD have much higher volatility, the volatility in unhedged China A-shares in each of those currencies is similar to or lower than that in USD. For example, from December 2014 to July 2021, AUD/CNY had an annualized volatility of 8.8%, much higher than the 4.5% of the USD/CNY, yet the unhedged China A-share's volatility in AUD was 21%, lower than the 24% in USD. The reason lies in correlation, as shown Chart I-2. While China A-shares in CNY have a positive correlation with USD/CNY and JPY/CNY (i.e. China A-share prices tend to rise when China’s currency appreciates against the US dollar and Japanese yen), they have falling and negative correlations with the other four currencies. For equity investors in the US and Japan, exposure to the CNY would increase potential volatility to their home-currency portfolios, but the opposite would be true for investors in the euro area, the UK, Australia and Canada. In addition, Chinese onshore equity correlations with DM equities and EM-ex China equities were low, but have increased since 2015, making onshore shares less attractive for global equity investors looking to diversify. Bottom Line: Chinese onshore shares are a poor long-term asset for global equity investors. 1.2: Factor Strategies Work Well In The Onshore Market Despite Chinese equities’ poor long-term performance, applying a factor strategy to Chinese onshore stocks can create impressive results. In a GAA Special Report on smart-beta strategies for MSCI DM and EM markets, we concluded that a simple, equally weighted five-factor strategy would smooth out the cyclicality of individual factors and outperform the broad market. These five factors are value, equal weight (i.e. size), quality, momentum and minimum volatility, as defined and calculated by MSCI (see Box 1). When we apply the same methodology to the MSCI China A onshore market, the result is even more impressive as shown in Chart I-3. Box 1MSCI Factor Indices Chart I-3Factor Performance: China A Vs Global Since December 2004, the value and small cap factors  have outperformed the broad  benchmark by about 11%  and 47%, respectively, in the China A universe, despite sharp corrections since December 2016  for small cap  and Oct 2018 for value. In contrast, in the global universe, value and small cap have underperformed the global benchmark by 24% and 7%, respectively, in the same time frame (Chart I-3, panels 2 and 6.) This confirms anecdotal evidence that the onshore equity market was less efficient than its global peer, although efficiency has improved. Momentum is a consistent factor for global markets. A GAA Special Report on momentum strategy shows that momentum works better in markets with higher individuality where self-attribution and self-confidence are more pervasive, according to Hofstede’s Cultural Dimension theory. This behavioral aspect is confirmed by the performance of momentum in China’s onshore market: in the early years, momentum did not work well, but strengthened after both Shanghai and Shenzhen shares were accessible to foreign investors via the two Stock Connects and mainland institutional investors became more prevalent (Chart I-3, panel 4) Quality is the most consistent factor for global markets because investors reward companies with solid fundamentals. As shown in (Chart I-3, panel 3), this factor has worked even better in the China A market than in the global universe. The fact that good fundamentals have generated superior equity return repels the “myth” that the China A market is a “casino” driven by individual investors, who totally ignore company fundamentals. The minimum volatility factor works in a similar fashion in the onshore Chinese market as in the global markets. Chart I-4Onshore Equity Market Can Be Improved By Smart-Beta Strategies Factor timing can hardly generate consistent outperformance. BCA’s GAA team advocates equally weighting the five time-tested factors for the MSCI global universe. This approach also applies to China’s onshore market (Chart I-3, panel 1). Since all the factor indexes became available in August 2013, the equally weighted, five-factor portfolio has outperformed the benchmark by about 20% in total with similar volatility. On a rolling one- and three-year basis, this strategy also performs better than the benchmark (Chart I-4). Some investors may prefer a more active and quantitative approach; they should refer to CIS’s Special Report on factor investing in the A-share market. The CIS report recommends that global investors should opt for industry groups with above-median return on equity (ROE) and below-median ex-post beta when investing in the onshore market. ROE is a quality factor in MSCI (see Box 1 above) and below-median beta is a variation of low volatility. Bottom Line: Factor strategies can improve the return and risk profiles of China’s onshore equity market. Part 2. Chinese Onshore Bonds Chinese onshore bonds have attracted global investors because they offer much higher yields than DM government bonds (Chart II-1). At the same time, as shown in Chart II-2, Chinese onshore bond yields have low to negative correlations with major government bond yields. Thus, the onshore bonds offer potential risk diversification for global bond portfolios. Chart II-1Chinese Bonds Offer Higher Yields Chart II-2Chinese Yields Have Low Correlation With DM Bond Yields For foreign DM government bonds, the conventional wisdom is to hedge foreign currency exposure because currency fluctuations outweigh bond volatility. A GAA Special Report shows that hedged foreign bonds have favorable return-risk profiles compared with domestic bonds in major DM countries. For EM local currency debt (based on the JP Morgan GBI-EM Global Diversified Local Currency Debt Index), USD investors should hedge their EM FX exposure while non-USD DM investors should not hedge. However, non-USD investors should avoid EM local currency debt if their objective is to maximize risk-adjusted return on the long-term horizon. Do Chinese bonds share the same traits as the EM aggregate? Our analysis suggests that Chinese bonds have historically provided better risk-adjusted returns to USD-based bond investors, hedged and unhedged. Thus, allocating a portion of the US Treasury portfolio to Chinese onshore bonds would improve a US bond portfolio’s return-risk profile. The Bloomberg Barclays (BB) China Treasury and Policy Bank Bond Index is used for the analysis. The index has a history starting in January 2004, even though it was included in BB's three flagship bond indexes only in April 2019.  On a hedged basis, Chinese onshore bonds deliver similar returns to global bonds as shown in Chart II-3. This is not surprising because interest-rate parity implies that the expected return on domestic assets equals the exchange-rate adjusted return on foreign currency assets, given foreign exchange market equilibrium. Unhedged returns, however, have outperformed both local and foreign government bonds for bond investors in the US, Japan, UK and the euro area since 2004 (Chart II-4). Carry was negative for USD-, GBP- and euro-based investors before the Global Financial Crisis, but has become positive since that time. The CNY has appreciated in general, albeit with greater movement against the non-USD crosses.  Chart II-3Chinese Bond Performance In A Global Context Chart II-4Carry And Spot CNY Exchange Rate Unhedged Chinese bonds have much higher absolute returns and also much higher volatility when compared with hedged bonds. How do Chinese onshore bonds fare on a risk-adjusted return basis? Table 2 compares the risk-return profiles of hedged and unhedged Chinese bonds with local and hedged foreign DM bonds in two periods: one from January 2004 and the other from July 2017 when the Bond Connect was launched. Table 2Return-Risk Profiles: Chinese Onshore Bond Index Vs DM Local Bond Indexes Several observations from Table 2: In local currency terms, Chinese bonds have the best risk-adjusted return and the second lowest volatility – only higher than Japanese government bonds (JGBs) – both from January 2004 and from July 2017. Since the start of Bond Connect, the risk-adjusted return of Chinese bonds in CNY has strengthened significantly with higher return and lower volatility. In contrast, there has been a deterioration in DM local bonds and their corresponding hedged foreign government bonds’ return/risk profiles.   In the past four years, Chinese bonds have outperformed all DM local bonds when unhedged, both in terms of absolute return and risk-adjusted return. When compared with a hedged foreign government bond, however, the absolute return advantage has been offset by much higher FX volatility. Still, euro- and JPY-based bond investors enjoy higher risk-adjusted returns from unhedged Chinese bonds than their respective hedged foreign DM government bonds. However, GBP-based investors would be better off with hedged non-UK government bonds. For USD-based bond investors, unhedged Chinese bonds would only be slightly inferior to hedged non-US government bonds. On a hedged basis, Chinese bonds have lower returns and less volatility than local bonds (with the exception of Japan), but they have higher risk-adjusted returns than local bonds in all but the euro area. When compared with hedged foreign bonds, euro- and USD-based investors would do slightly better with the Chinese bonds while JPY- and GBP-based investors would earn slightly more with other DM government bonds. How much should a bond investor replace local bonds with Chinese ones? For illustration, Chart II-5 plots the efficient frontiers for bond investors in the US, euro area, Japan and the UK when hedged Chinese bonds are added to their respective domestic bond portfolios. This addition would reduce portfolio volatility for all domestic bond portfolios, regardless of time frame. This is especially impressive for JGB investors because JGBs already have the lowest volatility among DM bonds. Moreover, returns would be improved for USD- and JPY-based investors when Chinese bonds are gradually included in domestic bond portfolios up to the risk-minimizing point.  Chart II-5Adding Hedged Chinese Bonds Reduces Volatility For All DM Domestic Bond Portfolios* For GBP- and euro-based investors, however, adding hedged Chinese bonds would reduce absolute returns, but significantly improve risk-adjusted returns for GBP-based bond investors. Interestingly, even though euro zone local bonds have had superior risk-adjusted returns to hedged Chinese bonds since 2017, their risk-adjusted returns would still increase by about 18% when 50% of their local-bond portfolio is allocated to Chinese bonds. What is more striking is how unhedged Chinese bonds impact the return/risk profiles of global investors’ domestic bond portfolios. Unlike DM foreign bonds, which have inferior risk-adjusted returns when foreign currency exposure is not hedged, unhedged Chinese onshore bonds actually enhance a domestic bond investor’s absolute and risk-adjusted returns, as shown in Chart II-6. This is because of Chinese bonds’ superior risk-adjusted return measured in CNY (Table 2), negative correlations with CNY crosses (Chart II-7) and low to negative correlations with DM government bonds (Chart II-2). Chart II-6Adding Unhedged Chinese Bonds Enhances Absolute and Risk-Adjusted Returns For All DM Domestic Bond Portfolios* For US bond investors who seek to maximize risk-adjusted return, the domestic Treasury portfolio would be improved significantly if about 40-50% of their holding were allocated to unhedged Chinese bonds. In comparison, the ratios would be lower for bond investors in the euro area, Japan and the UK. The key message is that global investors do not need to hedge the RMB exposure when investing in the Chinese onshore bond market. Chart II-7Chinese Bond Correlation With DM Currencies Chart II-8Chinese Yuan Still Has Upside Potential We still have a favorable cyclical outlook for the CNY against the US dollar, supporting the case not to hedge the currency. The CNY is at about one standard deviation below fair value even though the gap has been narrowing since mid-2020 (Chart II-8). We expect the CNY to keep appreciating in the coming years barring major disruptive geopolitical/political events. China’s relatively strong productivity growth should continue to support the currency’s rising fair value. On a cyclical basis, given that the US Fed is firmly staying behind the curve (capping the upside in real bond yields in the US), the differential in real interest rates between China and other major economies should remain favorable for the RMB.  Bottom line: In a search-for-yield environment, the return-risk profiles of dedicated DM government bond portfolios may be enhanced by adding some exposure to Chinese onshore bonds on an unhedged basis. Part 3. Chinese Onshore Assets For Global Multi-Asset Portfolios Chinese onshore stocks on their own are not suitable for long-term, buy-and-hold strategic investments due to extremely high volatility, and the positive and rising correlation with global stocks and with CNY crosses. Chinese bonds, on the other hand, have an attractive risk-return profile with very low volatility, low correlation with global bonds, and negative correlation with CNY crosses. The negative correlation between Chinese stocks and bonds means that a mixed portfolio of the two assets would provide good diversification (Chart III-1). Chart III-1Chinese Onshore Assets Chart III-2Chinese Multi-Asset Portfolio Correlation With Global Multi-Asset Portfolios Investors may have different stock-bond allocations based on their return-risk objectives and constraints. For illustration, we constructed a stand-alone Chinese multi-asset portfolio by equally weighting onshore stocks and bonds. The correlations of this portfolio with six DM domestic 70-30 stock-bond portfolios have varied over time and by different countries, as shown in Chart III-2. Our Chinese-asset portfolio has a relatively high correlation with US and Japanese assets, but a low correlation with European assets, and almost no correlation with Australian and Canadian assets. Accordingly, the diversification effects are much stronger for GBP-, euro-, AUD- and CAD-based investors than for USD- and JPY-based investors, as shown in Chart III-3. Chart III-3Chinese Multi-Asset Portfolio Should Be Treated As A Standalone Asset By Non-US Asset Allocators Chart III-3 shows how the risk-return profile of a standard 70-30 stock-bond portfolio in the US, UK, Japan, euro area, Australia and Canada may be improved by adding some exposure to a 50-50 Chinese stock-bond portfolio. Even though this equally weighted Chinese onshore asset portfolio has unimpressive returns, when added to a domestic stock-bond portfolio there is an improvement in the return-risk profile of all non-USD-based portfolios. The optimal allocation to the stand-alone Chinese onshore portfolio varies with different home currencies, objectives and time periods, as shown in Table 3. Table 3Chinese Assets Improve Global Multi-Asset Portolios' Return-Risk Profiles Bottom Line: Unhedged Chinese onshore stocks and bonds may be treated as a stand-alone asset for global asset allocators, especially non-US ones. Adding a simple 50-50 Chinese stock-bond portfolio may boost the return/risk profile of global multi-asset portfolios. Part 4. Operational Q&A Many foreign investors believe that China’s onshore markets are hard to access. However, regulatory changes in the past 10 years, partially since Stock Connect was launched in 2014, have made it simpler from an operational point-of-view to buy and sell Chinese onshore equities and bonds. Below we answer some questions that international investors may have about market access. Q: Are there any access or quota restrictions for offshore investors to invest in China A-shares via Stock Connect? Historically, access to China’s mainland equity market by offshore investors was restricted through investment quotas and local currency controls. Since 2014, with the launch of Stock Connect, offshore investors no longer have access or repatriation restrictions. Stock Connect allows offshore investors to trade selected A-share stocks listed on the Shanghai (SSE) and Shenzhen (SZSE) Stock Exchanges through offshore brokers. Although not all A-shares listed on the SSE or SZSE can be invested in through Stock Connect, eligible stocks include almost all large- and medium-cap A-shares.1 Note that the Shanghai-Hong Kong (SH-HK) Stock Connect and the Shenzhen-Hong Kong (SZ-HK) Stock Connect complement each other, but they have a dual-channel, independent operation mechanism with two distinct Connect operations. Therefore, their shares cannot be cross-traded. Q: How to purchase China’s A-Shares via Stock Connect? Offshore investors need a Hong Kong or international broker (see MMA <GO> on Bloomberg for a list of Offshore brokers for Stock Connect northbound trading), through whom they buy A-shares. Brokers instruct Hong Kong Exchange’s (HKEX) participants to conduct northbound trades on the SSE or SZSE. Hong Kong Exchange’s subsidiary (a SSE or SZSE participant) also takes instructions to conduct trades on the SSE or SZSE stock exchanges. Clearing and settlement services of A-shares executed through Stock Connect are provided by the Hong Kong Securities Clearing Company (HKSCC), a solely-owned subsidiary of the HKEX, through clearing links established with the China Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation Limited (ChinaClear). The shares of offshore investors are held in an onshore omnibus securities account registered under the HKSCC. Q: Is margin trading or short selling allowed for Stock Connect northbound trading stocks? Yes, most eligible Stock Connect northbound trading A-shares are permitted for margin trading or short selling. Nowadays, more than 80% of the total eligible Stock Connect northbound trading stocks in the SSE and more than 70% of that in the SZSE are permitted for margin trading and short selling. HKEX provides a list of eligible equities for margin trading and short selling in a timely manner.2 Q: Are there other ways to tactically manage exposure to China’s A-shares? There are offshore ETFs that investors can use to hedge their exposure to Chinese equities (Table 4). For example, Direxion Daily CSI 300 China A Share Bear 1X ETF listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYEX) provides 100% of the inverse exposure of the performance for the CSI 300 index. This ETF may be used to hedge offshore investors’ exposure to domestic China A- shares. Table 4ETFs That Can Be Used To Hedge Investors’ Exposure To Chinese Equities Q: Describe the main differences between Bond Connect and CIBM Direct. How do overseas investors hedge their currency exposure when investing in China’s onshore bond market? Bond Connect and China Interbank Bond Market (CIBM) Direct are the official channels for offshore investors to invest in China's onshore bond market except for Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) and RMB Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (RQFII). Around 680 foreign institutional investors have entered China’s interbank bond market since Bond Connect’s launch in July 2017.3 Here are some differences between CIBM Direct and Bond Connect: Bond Connect is based offshore, which gives overseas investors easy and quota-free access to China’s onshore interbank bond market through offshore trade platforms. Bond Connect permits investors to open accounts, trade, and settle transactions in the offshore market whereas CIBM Direct stipulates the process must be completed in the onshore market. CIBM Direct offers greater access to opportunities in the onshore market because it has access to a wider range of products and hedge tools, such as repos, interest rate swaps, bond lending and bond forwards. In comparison, the only Bond Connect products are bonds traded in China’s inter-bank bond market, and hedge tools are limited. In terms of currency hedging, both CIBM Direct and Bond Connect allow FX hedge tools such as forwards, swaps and options to help investors hedge their exposure to CNY (Chinese yuan traded in the onshore market). CIBM Direct trades in CNY rather than CNH (CNH is Chinese yuan traded in the offshore market) and allows investors to hold onshore balances in CNY. Bond Connect, however, does not allow investors to hold CNY balances. Under Bond Connect, investors are required to exchange CNY into CNH for any excess cash from trading or coupon payments, which can be a currency risk when funds are repatriated. However, offshore investors can hedge their FX exposure with FX Settlement Banks by engaging in various FX trades and FX hedge tools that match their bond position. FX Settlement Banks are banks in Hong Kong approved by the China Foreign Exchange Trade System (CFETS) to access the FX market of CIBM as RMB participation banks. Offshore FX Settlement Banks may square positions in either offshore or onshore FX markets. Investors should contact their Hong Kong custodians, which will appoint an FX Settlement Bank for FX conversion and hedging. Q: Is there another currency hedge mechanism for investors’ CNY exposure?  CNY exposure can be hedged using the usual instruments, such as CNH-forwards or CNY-non deliverable forwards (NDF). However, the CNH-forward has CNH basis risk, which arises from the differences between CNY and CNH spot rates. Investors may consider short CNY currency ETFs listed on the offshore market, such as the WisdomTree Chinese Yuan Strategy Fund (CYB) on the NYEX. CYB offers exposure to the overnight Chinese yuan and uses both short- and long-forward currency contracts for both CNH and CNY to manage its expectations for the currency. It seeks to achieve total returns reflective of money market rates in China available to foreign investors and of changes in the value of the yuan versus the dollar. Xiaoli Tang Associate Vice President, Global Asset Allocation xiaoliT@bcaresearch.com Qingyun Xu, CFA Associate Editor, China Investment Strategy qingyunx@bcaresearch.com   Appendix 1: The Evolution of The Chinese Onshore Markets China’s onshore equity and bond markets have grown dramatically in the past two decades. The equity market is the second largest in the world with more than 4,400 listed companies; the combined market capitalization of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges has reached USD12.2 trillion (Chart A1). China’s bond market also is ranked second globally, after the US, with amounts outstanding at USD18.6 trillion (Chart A2). Chart A1China’s Stock Market Has Grown Sharply In The Past Two Decades Chart A2China’s Onshore Bond Market Is Second Largest In World Thanks to China’s financial market liberalization since the early 2000s, foreign investors can now access China's onshore stock and bond markets to include China A-shares and onshore bonds in portfolios. Various tools are available, including QFII, RQFII, Stock Connect, CIBM Direct and Bond Connect (Diagram 1). Since the launch of Stock Connect in late 2014, the cumulative net northbound flows to the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges have been more than RMB1.2 trillion (Chart A3, top panel). The cumulative net capital inflows through CIBM Direct and Bond Connect have reached more than RMB3.5 trillion since these mechanisms were introduced in 2016 and 2017, respectively (Chart A4, bottom panel).  Diagram 1China’s Financial Market Liberalization Roadmap Chart A3Net Inflows To China’s Onshore Markets Through Stock And Bond Connect Chart A4Growing Foreign Holdings Of China’s Onshore Equities And Bonds Although foreign investors’ holding of RMB-denominated assets increased significantly in recent years, their share of the total onshore market is still small, highlighting the potential for more capital inflows to China’s onshore market (Chart A4). Following the inclusion of China A-shares in global equity indexes, bond indexes have followed suit and Chinese government bonds are now offered in the world’s three major bond indices. Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate Index (BBGA) was the first to include Chinese government bonds in April 2019, followed by the JP Morgan Government Bond-Emerging Market Index (GBI-EM) in February 2020 and finally FTSE Russell’s World Government Bond Index (WGBI) in October 2021.   Footnotes 1The list of eligible A-shares for Shanghai and Shenzhen Connect can be accessed via the HK Exchange 2List of eligible equities for margin trading and short selling 3List of approved investors under Bond Connect Market/Sector Recommendations Cyclical Investment Stance