Geopolitics

Special Report

Highlights The odds of universal health care legislation being enacted in the U.S. by 2022 are about 10%-15%. Former Vice President Joe Biden is the most likely Democratic candidate in 2020, but the alternative is most likely a progressive candidate seeking universal health care. Trump is slightly favored to win in 2020, but a Trump loss is likely to translate into full Democratic control of the U.S. government, making ambitious legislation more likely to pass Congress. An overweight portfolio allocation in the S&P health care index is a sensible and defensive move. Fear selling in health care stocks could easily return but would create an exploitable trading opportunity at this late stage of the cycle. We are executing the upgrade of the S&P health care index via an upgrade of the S&P health care equipment index, which has seen a material valuation de-rating at the same time as profits are expanding, to overweight. Feature Will The Democrats Win? Can They Pass Universal Health Care? “Medicare for All,” or government-led universal health care in the United States, is less likely to become the law of the land by 2022 than the market expects. We put the probability at around 10%-15%. Here’s why. The industry faces only two certainties: Americans are getting older and the federal government is increasing its involvement. The former is a secular driver for health care demand. The latter is an inference drawn from the fact that the Republican Party failed to repeal the Affordable Care Act, or Obamacare, even when it had full control of government. It is very unlikely that the Republicans will get another chance at repeal. It is also very unlikely that the public will tolerate the current status quo forever. The result is that the U.S. will eventually end up with a restored Obamacare or an altogether new system with a greater government role. The Republican failure to repeal was not idiosyncratic – it was not based on the fact that the late Senator John McCain, who cast the decisive vote on July 27, 2017, had been diagnosed with brain cancer earlier that year. Rather, it was structural – the repeal failed because (1) it is always extremely difficult to remove an entitlement once it has been given to voters and (2) a slim majority of Americans approved of Obamacare – and still do (Chart 1). Republicans went on to dismantle aspects of Obamacare, including the problematic “individual mandate.” But they did so without replacing it. The result was a severe electoral defeat in the 2018 midterm elections, despite a huge drop in the unemployment rate (Chart 2) – which matters directly in a country where 49% get their health insurance through their employer. Health care was the single most important issue driving people to vote against the ruling party in November 2018, judging by both pre-election polls and exit polls (Charts 3 & 4). Chart 2Low Unemployment Has Not Solved Health Care Woes The need for reform is manifest. It is widely known that the U.S. spends more than other countries on health care (Chart 5) and yet achieves worse results: preventable mortality is higher than in other countries that spend less (Chart 6). Democrats have tried to overhaul the system since 1993. Even President Trump is seeking to cap prescription drug prices and maintain the Obamacare requirement that health care insurers accept customers with “pre-existing conditions.” Uncertainty has risen since the Republicans’ midterm defeat, which increases, or is seen as increasing, the odds of a Democratic victory in 2020. Such a victory would mark the third time in 12 years that American policy would witness a 180-degree reversal – and it would have a major impact on the health sector (Chart 7). Chart 7The Sector's Response To Major Political Events In truth Trump is still favored to win in 2020, on the back of the incumbent advantage – as long as the economy holds up. But with a chronically weak approval rating, and narrow 2016 margins of victory and the aforementioned midterm losses in key swing states, his odds of reelection are probably not much better than 55%. Meanwhile the Democrats are swinging to the left and may not settle simply for restoring Obamacare. Left-wing or “progressive” candidates for the Democratic nomination are polling in line with traditional center-left candidates (Chart 8), which is highly unusual (even compared with the 2007-08 race). Candidates are crowding onto the democratic socialist bandwagon in the wake of Bernie Sanders’s formidable challenge to Hillary Clinton and her subsequent loss to Trump. Could a progressive candidate win the nomination? Certainly. Former Vice President Joe Biden leads the pack at this early stage in the nomination process. He would seek to restore and build upon Obamacare. The second-ranked candidate is Sanders, whose initial proposal to create Medicare for All has transformed the national debate. Following Sanders are Senators Kamala Harris, who co-sponsored the latest version of the bill with Sanders, and Elizabeth Warren, an outspoken progressive who is also in favor of universal health care (Chart 9). Sanders does have a path to winning the nomination, as the leading progressive candidate at a time when the party is becoming more progressive. He performs better than Biden in head-to-head polls against Trump in the key battleground states (Chart 10). Strategic voters will have trouble convincing fellow Democrats that they should not vote for him because he is unelectable: he has a clear electoral path to the White House via Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, where he performed well in 2016 and polls well today. If Sanders has a chance, then Medicare for All has a chance. Because it is extremely difficult to unseat an incumbent president, a victory over Trump in 2020 is only likely to occur if there is a surge in voter turnout and Democratic Party support among (1) blue-collar workers who abandoned the Democrats for Trump in 2016, or (2) young voters, women, or minorities. Any such surge would also enable the Democrats to defend their senate seats while picking up Arizona, Colorado, and Maine, which are statewide elections that will be affected by the headline presidential race. And if the Democrats win 50 seats, they would get a majority in the senate, as the vice president would break any tie. With a majority, Senate Democrats could use the “nuclear option” to bypass the filibuster and drive through their priority legislation.1 This would set a new precedent with far-reaching consequences. But recent majority leaders have already begun eroding the filibuster and there is no hard constraint preventing a ruling party from removing it entirely. It is perfectly possible, and all the more likely if the nation sweeps a progressive candidate to power in a wave of enthusiasm for dramatic changes like universal health care. In other words, any victory against Trump is likely to entail full Democratic control of government. In this scenario, Democrats would have a very good chance of passing a major piece of legislation. Hence, if a progressive wins the nomination, and makes Medicare for All the policy priority, there is at least a 50/50 chance it will pass, probably more like 60%. The catch is that a progressive may not win the nomination. There is not decisive evidence that Americans really want Medicare for All. First, Americans tend to view their own health costs as “reasonable” (Chart 11). They are not, as a whole, clamoring for a single-payer system. Second, while Americans say they support Medicare for All, that support evaporates when they learn about the various policies that it would necessitate, such as eliminating private health insurance and raising taxes (Chart 12). Third, most Democrats are closer to Biden’s position than Sanders’s – they want to fix Obamacare rather than revolutionize the system (Chart 13). Fourth, Colorado tried to pass its own version of Medicare for All on the state level in 2016. The bill’s advocates were handed a 79% defeat by voters. Colorado is a swing state so it is not an irrelevant experiment. Fifth, independents are not shifting to the left in a way that would validate the sharp leftward shift within the Democratic Party (Chart 14). Nominating Sanders or another progressive is more likely to lead to a loss in the general election than it is to ensure that universal health care gets passed.   Chart 14Independents Not Swinging Dramatically To The Left A simple back-of-the-envelope exercise suggests that odds of universal health care by 2022 are about 10%-15%. Nevertheless, we attempt a conservative, back-of-the-envelope method for estimating the probability of passage. It runs like this: There is a 50% chance a progressive wins the Democratic nomination. We assume that if Biden wins it is because Democratic voters prefer a restitution of Obamacare. There is a 45% chance that Trump loses the presidential election. We assume that for the Democrats to unseat an incumbent is difficult enough that they will also win the Senate. Under these circumstances, there is a 50%-60% chance that universal health care legislation passes – even though it will be very difficult to get it over the line. (Note that the ACA passed very narrowly at a time when the Democrats had a huge tailwind due to voters’ disenchantment after the global financial crisis). With these assumptions, the conditional probability of passage is around 13.5% (0.5 x 0.45 x 0.6 = 0.135) These odds can be moderated by boosting Trump to a 69% chance of reelection (the historical average for sitting presidents), which brings down the odds of ultimate passage to 9%. Note, however, that the bond market is pricing a 27% probability of a recession 12 months from now (Chart 15). If there is a recession, then President Trump is virtually assured to lose reelection and the Democratic victor will have a strong tailwind of public support. This will increase the chance that universal health care passes to 80%. (We still assume in this case that Biden would stick with Obamacare as he would not be committed to Medicare for All and it is not an economic stimulus package). The conditional probability would become 0.5 x 0.27 x 0.8 = 11%. Chart 15Probability Of Recession Is Rising NY Fed's Yield Curve Model Suggests That The Probability Of A Recession Is Still Quite Low In other words, whether we upgrade Trump’s chances of winning or we upgrade the chances of a recession that kicks him out of office, the odds are roughly the same at 9%-11%. And they could be a bit higher at 14%. Medicare for All has a chance of becoming law, although it is not all that great. Bottom Line: With fairly conservative assumptions the odds range from 10%-15%. that the U.S. could legislate a sweeping overhaul of the health care system and new social entitlement by 2022. This is a serious risk to the industry. Health care equities have recovered the losses suffered since Sanders’s latest push for Medicare for All, which means that it is not pricing in a high probability of passage at present. Additional policy-related selloffs are likely between now and the spring of 2020, if and when the odds increase of Sanders (or another progressive) winning the Democratic nomination. Buy Into Health Care Weakness Regardless of the likelihood of passage, the faintest hint of the winds of change has brought about significant price changes in the relevant equities. In the lead up to the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Hillary Clinton, a health care reformer (though importantly NOT a Medicare for All advocate) was polling well ahead of Donald Trump. Health care stocks underperformed the broad market in anticipation of potential reforms resulting from a Clinton win (Chart 16). Two years after Donald Trump’s election, both S&P health care equipment and S&P managed health care have significantly outperformed with the effect most dramatic in the former. Chart 17 shows the reverse picture: a “blue wave” in the 2018 midterm elections was swiftly followed by the zenith for health care stocks as the market digested the implications of a Democratic House and the resulting higher probability of a similar sweep in 2020 in the Senate and executive branch. Chart 16Election Fear Creates Buying Opportunities... Chart 17...And History Appears To Be Repeating Itself Furthermore, our prior research shows that S&P health care has been the top performer in the last equity market surge to take place between the peak of the ISM manufacturing composite index and the beginning of the subsequent recession.2 This research was confirmed in a report last month analyzing sector returns after a Fed loosening cycle begins. The S&P health care index has historically outperformed from six months before a rate cut all the way to two years after easing policy.3#fn_3 As a reminder, the market has now priced in two rate cuts over the next year. We recommend an overweight position for the broad S&P 500 health care index as well as for health care equipment. BCA’s U.S. Equity Strategy has already moved to an overweight recommendation on the S&P managed health care index, a move that has netted our portfolio 12.4% of alpha. Today U.S. Equity Strategy is raising our recommendations on both the S&P health care equipment and, more importantly, the broad S&P health care index from neutral to overweight. Further, considering U.S. Equity Strategy’s recent portfolio changes, namely moving the S&P materials index to neutral, this upgrade of S&P health care to overweight moves our cyclicals vs. defensives style preference from overweight cyclicals to neutral. This move to the sidelines on the cyclical/defensive portfolio bent has netted modest gains of 2% since its October 2, 2017 inception. Equipping The World’s Hospitals Our upgrade of S&P health care equipment to overweight is not contingent upon earnings outperformance. Rather, it is a combination of overwrought investors having created a buying opportunity, combined with health care’s historic outperformance at the end of the business cycle. Nevertheless, an examination of the sector’s macro environment is revealing. The health care equipment index has recently completed an inventory clear-out cycle, as evidenced both by a slingshot rebound in the shipments-to-inventories ratio (second panel, Chart 18) and a recovery in industry pricing power (bottom panel, Chart 18). This is remarkable in the context of the deceleration in equipment fixed-investment growth that the industry has faced since reaching decade-highs in 2017 (third panel, Chart 18). The upshot is that steady pricing and resilient volume growth should deliver positive top-line growth. The margin picture has also dramatically improved: industrial production has been surging for the past year while hours worked have remained tepid (second and third panels, Chart 19). The combination has driven our productivity proxy to a multi-year high where it has recently diverged from the relative stock price (bottom panel, Chart 19). Chart 18Inventories Have Cleared Chart 19Productivity Is Soaring This underpins our thesis that health care stocks in general and health care equipment stocks in particular have recently suffered based on fear, not fundamentals, amidst a stable domestic demand environment and rosy profit picture. The export channel is at least as important to the S&P health care equipment index as the domestic demand environment. In fact, roughly 60% of sector revenues are generated outside the United States. The news on this front is encouraging. Europe, the other key market for domestically-manufactured health care equipment, has lately seen a pickup in new orders and coupled with the loss of momentum in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar signal that future export growth will remain upbeat (trade-weighted U.S. dollar shown inverted and advanced, bottom panel, Chart 20). The global PMI has historically led exports. While this series has turned down, it has been diverging from export growth for the past year. We believe this is a function of the early stages of a secular trend in health care equipment: the expansion of the EM safety net with health care at its core. The same demographic trend that has been driving the explosion of health care spending in the DM for the last 20 years is rapidly impacting the EM, namely an aging population. The UN projects that the share of the population aged 65 and older in the EMs will rise from roughly 7% this year to 16% in 2060, while population growth slows to below the replacement rate, a tectonic shift in the demographic landscape (Chart 21). Meanwhile, according to IMF data, EM health care spending is approximately 5% of GDP. By contrast, the DMs stand in excess of 14%. Chart 20The Export Valve Is Wide Open A catch-up phase looms, driven by both demographics and an overall global harmonization of standard of care, resulting in a secular outperformance of internationally geared health care equipment manufacturers’ earnings. This bodes well for U.S. health care equipment providers who are the technology leaders and often the only source for equipping hospitals/clinics around the globe. Notwithstanding the bright outlook, fear selling in the S&P health care equipment index has driven a reversal in the two-year valuation rerating that the index has undergone (bottom panel, Chart 22). With the valuation retreating back to its historical range, our main concern that the index is too expensive has eroded. Further, the valuation decline is coming at a time when forward earnings growth has come out of hiding and is now slated to materially outgrow the broad market (middle panel, Chart 22). Chart 22Valuations Have Returned To Earth Bottom Line: Something has to give in this equation and macro tailwinds suggest that a valuation re-rating phase looms. Accordingly, we are moving to an overweight recommendation on the S&P health care equipment index. This move pushes our S&P health care index to an above benchmark allocation and also moves our cyclical vs. defensive preference back to neutral. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the S&P health care equipment index are: BLBG: S5HCEP – ABT, MDT, DHR, BDX, SYK, ISRG, BSX, BAX, EW, ZBH, IDXX, RMD, TFX, HOLX, ABMD, VAR. BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy echoes the tenor of these recommendations and is going long the S&P 500 health care index and the health care equipment index versus the broad market. A Word On Pharma Between 1980 and 2000, pharma earnings expanded at a record clip, taking sector share prices into the stratosphere (top panel, Chart 23). Since the zenith in the early 2000’s, margins have been continually under pressure as R&D costs have outpaced volume gains (second panel, Chart 23). However, earnings growth has continued mostly uninterrupted as the industry has raised drug prices. Since 2015, however, price increases have flat lined and now they move at the same pace as overall inflation, though the current convoluted system keeps pricing mostly opaque (bottom panel, Chart 23). We think this is the new normal. The thesis of this report revolves upon a blue vs. red probability outcome. However, as noted, both parties seem united in the fight against high drug costs and Republicans under President Trump are not averse to government intervention to drive down prices. As such, we expect the pharma pricing headwinds to remain a secular trend, driven by outrage from both sides of the aisle and even universal coverage is not enough to bear the pressure. Accordingly, we reiterate our underweight recommendation. Chart 23Pharma Remains Underweight Conclusion Universal health care will be negative for the U.S. budget deficit but positive for economic growth. As for the macroeconomic impact of universal health care, it is complex to assess because much would depend on the extent of any reduction in private health-related sectors. Almost certainly, the U.S. would adopt a parallel system where private health care remains available, but there inevitably would be some job losses in the insurance sector. And drug companies would face downward pressure on pricing. On the other hand, the marked increase in government spending would be stimulative. And we do not see future American administrations exercising a heretofore unknown fiscal discipline once such a new entitlement is established. Many families would enjoy a reduction in health care costs. Overall, it should be positive for economic growth.   Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Chris Bowes, Associate Editor U.S. Equity Strategy ChrisB@bcaresearch.com Anastasios Avgeriou, U.S. Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      The filibuster is a means of prolonging debate and obstructing a vote. It can be defeated if 60/100 senators vote to move to end debate (“cloture”). It effectively ensures that the three-fifths majority is the standard majority needed to pass legislation in the senate. However, it is possible for the senate majority leader, backed with a simple majority, to alter the senate rules and remove the filibuster, so legislation can be passed with a simple majority. But it would be an aggressive move and a historic precedent. 2      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Portfolio Positioning For A Late Cycle Surge” dated May 22, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Sector Performance And Fed Loosening Cycles: A Historical Roadmap” dated May 6, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.   Current Recommendations

Highlights So What? U.S.-China relations are still in free fall as we go to press. Why? The trade war will elicit Chinese stimulus but downside risks to markets are front-loaded. The oil risk premium will remain elevated as Iran tensions will not abate any time soon. The odds of a no-deal Brexit are rising. Our GeoRisk Indicators show that Turkish and Brazilian risks have subsided, albeit only temporarily. Maintain safe-haven trades. Short the CNY-USD and go long non-Chinese rare earth providers. Feature The single-greatest reason for the increase in geopolitical risk remains the United States. The Democratic Primary race will heat up in June and President Trump, while favored in 2020 barring a recession, is currently lagging both Joe Biden and Bernie Sanders in the head-to-head polling. Trump’s legislative initiatives are bogged down in gridlock and scandal. The remaining avenue for him to achieve policy victories is foreign policy – hence his increasing aggressiveness on both China and Iran. The result is negative for global risk assets on a tactical horizon and possibly also on a cyclical horizon. A positive catalyst is badly needed in the form of greater Chinese stimulus, which we expect, and progress toward a trade agreement. Brexit, Italy, and European risks pale by comparison to what we have called “Cold War 2.0” since 2012. Nevertheless, the odds of Brexit actually happening are increasing. The uncertainty will weigh on sentiment in Europe through October even if it does not ultimately conclude in a no-deal shock that prevents the European economy from bouncing back. Yet the risk of a no-deal shock is higher than it was just weeks ago. We discuss these three headline geopolitical risks below: China, Iran, and the U.K. No End In Sight For U.S.-China Trade Tensions U.S.-China negotiations are in free fall, with no date set for another round of talks. On March 6 we argued that a deal had a 50% chance of getting settled by the June 28-29 G20 summit in Japan, with a 30% chance talks would totally collapse. Since then, we have reduced the odds of a deal to 40%, with a collapse at 50%, and a further downgrade on the horizon if a positive intervention is not forthcoming producing trade talks in early or mid-June (Table 1). Table 1U.S.-China Trade War: Probabilities Of A Deal By End Of June 2019 We illustrate the difficulties of agreeing to a deal through the concept of a “two-level game.” In a theoretical two-level game, each country strives to find overlap between its international interests and its rival’s interests and must also seek overlap in such a way that the agreement can be sold to a domestic audience at home. The reason why the “win-win scenario” is so remote in the U.S.-China trade conflict is because although China has a relatively large win set – it can easily sell a deal at home due to its authoritarian control – the U.S. win set is small (Diagram 1). Diagram 1Tiny Win-Win Scenario In U.S.-China Trade Conflict The Democrats will attack any deal that Trump negotiates, making him look weak on his own pet issue of trade with China. This is especially the case if a stock market selloff forces Trump to accept small concessions. His international interest might overlap with China’s interest in minimizing concessions on foreign trade and investment access while maximizing technological acquisition from foreign companies. He would not be able to sell such a deal – focused on large-scale commodity purchases as a sop to farm states – on the campaign trail. Democrats will attack any deal that Trump negotiates. While it is still possible for both sides to reach an agreement, this Diagram highlights the limitations faced by both players. Meanwhile China is threatening to restrict exports of rare earths – minerals which are critical to the economy and national defense. China dominates global production and export markets (Chart 1), so this would be a serious disruption in the near term. Global sentiment would worsen, weighing on all risk assets, and tech companies and manufacturers that rely on rare earth inputs from China would face a hit to their bottom lines. Chart 1China Dominates Rare Earths Supply Over the long haul, this form of retaliation is self-defeating. First, China would presumably have to embargo all exports of rare earths to the world to prevent countries and companies from re-exporting to the United States. Second, rare earths are not actually rare in terms of quantity: they simply occur in low concentrations. As the world learned when China cut off rare earths to Japan for two months in 2010 over their conflict in the East China Sea, a rare earths ban will push up prices and incentivize production and processing in other regions. It will also create rapid substitution effects, recycling, and the use of stockpiles. Ultimately demand for Chinese rare earths exports would fall. Over the nine years since the Japan conflict, China’s share of global production has fallen by 19%, mostly at the expense of rising output from Australia. A survey of American companies suggests that they have diversified their sources more than import statistics suggest (Chart 2). Chart 2Import Stats May Be Overstating China’s Dominance The risk of a rare earths embargo is high – it fits with our 30% scenario of a major escalation in the conflict. It would clearly be a negative catalyst for companies and share prices. But as with China’s implicit threat of selling U.S. Treasuries, it is not a threat that will cause Trump to halt the trade war. The costs of conflict are not prohibitive and there are some political gains. Bottome Line: The S&P 500 is down 3.4% since our Global Investment Strategists initiated their tactical short on May 10. This is nearly equal to the weighted average impact on the S&P 500 that they have estimated using our probabilities. Obviously the selloff can overshoot this target. As it does, the chances of the two sides attempting to contain the tensions will rise. If we do not witness a positive intervention in the coming weeks, it will be too late to salvage the G20 and the risk of a major escalation will go way up. We recommend going short CNY-USD as a strategic play despite China’s recent assurances that the currency can be adequately defended. Our negative structural view of China’s economy now coincides with our tactical view that escalation is more likely than de-escalation. We also recommend going long a basket of companies in the MVIS global rare earth and strategic metals index – specifically those companies not based in China that have seen share prices appreciate this year but have a P/E ratio under 35. U.S.-Iran: An Unintentional War With Unintentional Consequences? “I really believe that Iran would like to make a deal, and I think that’s very smart of them, and I think that’s a possibility to happen.” -President Donald Trump, May 27, 2019 … We currently see no prospect of negotiations with America ... Iran pays no attention to words; what matters to us is a change of approach and behavior.” -Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Abbas Mousavi, May 28, 2019 The U.S. decision not to extend sanction waivers on Iran multiplied geopolitical risks at a time of already heightened uncertainty. Elevated tensions surrounding major producers in the Middle East could impact oil production and flows. In energy markets, this is reflected in the elevated risk premium – represented by the residuals in the price decompositions that include both supply and demand factors (Chart 3). Chart 3The Risk Premium Is Rising In Brent Crude Oil Prices Tensions surrounding major oil producers ... are reflected in the elevated risk premium – represented by the residuals in the Brent price decomposition. Already Iranian exports are down 500k b/d in April relative to March – the U.S. is acting on its threat to bring Iran’s exports to zero and corporations are complying (Chart 4). Chart 4Iran Oil Exports Collapsing What is more, the U.S. is taking a more hawkish military stance towards Iran – recently deploying a carrier strike group and bombers, partially evacuating American personnel from Iraq, and announcing plans to send 1,500 troops to the Middle East. The result of all these actions is not only to reduce Iranian oil exports, but also to imperil supplies of neighboring oil producers such as Iraq and Saudi Arabia which may become the victims of retaliation by an incandescent Iran. Our expectation of Iranian retaliation is already taking shape. The missile strike on Saudi facilities and the drone attack on four tankers near the UAE are just a preview of what is to come. Although Iran has not claimed responsibility for the acts, its location and extensive network of militant proxies affords it the ability to threaten oil supplies coming out of the region. Iran has also revived its doomsday threat of closing down the Strait of Hormuz through which 20% of global oil supplies transit – which becomes a much fatter tail-risk if Iran comes to believe that the U.S. is genuinely pursuing immediate regime change, since the first-mover advantage in the strait is critical. This will keep markets jittery. Current OPEC spare capacity would allow the coalition to raise production to offset losses from Venezuela and Iran. Yet any additional losses – potentially from already unstable regions such as Libya, Algeria, or Nigeria – will raise the probability that global supplies are unable to cover demand. Going into the OPEC meeting in Vienna in late June, our Commodity & Energy Strategy expects OPEC 2.0 to relax supply cuts implemented since the beginning of the year. They expect production to be raised by 0.9mm b/d in 2H2019 vs. 1H2019.1 Nevertheless, oil producers will likely adopt a cautious approach when bringing supplies back online, wary of letting prices fall too far. This was expressed at the May Joint Ministerial Monitoring Committee meeting in Jeddah, which also highlighted the growing divergence of interests within the group. Russia is in support of raising production at a faster pace than Saudi Arabia, which favors a gradual increase (conditional on U.S. sanctions enforcement). Both the Iranians and Americans claim that they do not want the current standoff to escalate to war. On the American side, Trump is encouraging Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to try his hand as a mediator in a possible visit to Tehran in June. We would not dismiss this possibility since it could produce a badly needed “off ramp” for tensions to de-escalate when all other trends point toward a summer and fall of “fire and fury” between the U.S. and Iran. If forced to make a call, we think President Trump’s foreign policy priority will center on China, not Iran. But this does not mean that downside risks to oil prices will prevail. China will stimulate more aggressively in June and subsequent months. And regardless of Washington’s and Tehran’s intentions, a wrong move in an already heated part of the world can turn ugly very quickly. Bottom Line: President Trump’s foreign policy priority is China, not Iran. Nevertheless, a wrong move can trigger a nasty escalation in the current standoff, jeopardizing oil supplies coming out of the Gulf region. In response to this risk, OPEC 2.0 will likely move to cautiously raise production at the next meeting in late June. Meanwhile China’s stimulus overshoot in the midst of trade war will most likely shore up demand over the course of the year. Can A New Prime Minister Break The Deadlock In Westminster? “There is a limited appetite for change in the EU, and negotiating it won’t be easy.” - Outgoing U.K. Prime Minister Theresa May Prime Minister Theresa May’s resignation has hurled the Conservative Party into a scramble to select her successor. While the timeline for this process is straightforward,2 the impact on the Brexit process is not. The odds of a “no-deal Brexit” have increased but so has the prospect of parliament passing a soft Brexit prior to any new election or second referendum. The odds of a “no-deal Brexit” have increased. Eleven candidates have declared their entry to the race and the vast majority are “hard Brexiters” willing to sacrifice market access on the continent (Table 2). Prominent contenders such as Boris Johnson and Dominic Raab have stated that they are willing to exit the EU without a deal. Table 2“Hard Brexiters” Dominate The Tory Race Given that the average Tory MP is more Euroskeptic than the average non-conservative voter or Brit, the final two contenders left standing at the end of June are likely to shift to a more aggressive Brexit stance. They will say they are willing to deliver Brexit at all costs and will avoid repeating Theresa May’s mistakes. This means at the very least the rhetoric will be negative for the pound in the coming months. A clear constraint on the U.K. in trying to negotiate a new withdrawal agreement is that the EU has the upper hand. It is the larger economy and less exposed to the ramifications of a no-deal exit (though still exposed). This puts it in a position of relative strength – exemplified by the European Commission’s insistence on keeping the current Withdrawal Agreement. Whoever the new prime minister is, it is unlikely that he or she will be able to negotiate a more palatable deal with the EU. Rather, the new leader will lead a fractured Conservative Party that still lacks a strong majority in parliament. The no-deal option is the default scenario if an agreement is not finalized by the Halloween deadline and no further extension is granted. However, Speaker of the House of Commons John Bercow recently stated that the prime minister will be unable to deliver a no-deal Brexit without parliamentary support. This will likely manifest in the form of a bill to block a no-deal Brexit. Alternatively, an attempt to force a no-deal exit could prompt a vote of no confidence in the government, most likely resulting in a general election.3 Chart 5British Euroskeptics Made Gains In EP Election While the Brexit Party amassed the largest number of seats in the European Parliament elections at the expense of the Labour, Conservative, and UKIP parties (Chart 5), the results do not suggest that British voters have generally shifted back toward Brexit. In fact, if we group parties according to their stance, the Bremain camp has a slight lead over the Brexit camp (Chart 6). Thus, it is not remotely apparent that a hard Brexiter can succeed in parliament; that a new election can be forestalled if a no-deal exit is attempted; or that a second referendum will repeat the earlier referendum’s outcome. Chart 6Bremain Camp Still Dominates Bottom Line: While the new Tory leader is likely to be more on the hard Brexit end of the spectrum than Theresa May, this does not change the position of either the European Commission or the British MPs and voters on Brexit. The median voter both within parliament and the British electorate remains tilted towards a softer exit or remaining in the EU. This imposes constraints on the likes of Boris Johnson and Dominic Raab if they take the helm of the Tory Party. These leaders may ultimately be forced to try to push through something a lot like Theresa May’s plan, or risk a total collapse of their party and control of government. Still, the odds of a no-deal exit – the default option if no agreement is reached by the October 31 deadline – have gone up. In the meantime, the GBP will stay weak, gilts will remain well-bid, and risk-off tendencies will be reinforced. GeoRisk Indicators Update – May 31, 2019 Last month BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy introduced ten indicators to measure geopolitical risk implied by the market. These indicators attempt to capture risk premiums priced into various currencies – except for Euro Area countries, where the risk is embedded in equity prices. A currency or bourse that falls faster than it should fall, as implied by key explanatory variables, indicates increasing geopolitical risk. All ten indicators can be found in the Appendix, with full annotation. We will continue to highlight key developments on a monthly basis. This month, our GeoRisk indicators are picking up the following developments: Trade war: Our Korean and Taiwanese risk indicators are currently the best proxies to measure geopolitical risk implications of the U.S.-China trade war, as they are both based on trade data. Both measures, as expected, have increased more than our other indicators over the past month on the back of a sharp spike in tensions between the U.S. and China. Currently, the moves are largely due to depreciation in currencies, as trade is only beginning to feel the impact. We believe that we will see trade decline in the upcoming months. Brexit: While it is still too early to see the full effect of Prime Minister May’s resignation captured in our U.K. indicator, it has increased in recent days. We expect risk to continue to increase as a leadership race is beginning among the Conservatives that will raise the odds of a “no-deal exit” relative to “no exit.” EU elections: The EU elections did not register as a risk on our indicators. In fact, risk decreased slightly in France and Germany during the past few weeks, while it has steadily fallen in Spain and Italy. Moreover, the results of the election were largely in line with expectations – there was not a surprising wave of Euroskepticism. The real risks will emerge as the election results feed back into political risks in certain European countries, namely the U.K., where the hardline Conservatives will be emboldened, and Italy, where the anti-establishment League will also be emboldened. In both countries a new election could drastically increase uncertainty, but even without new elections the respective clashes with Brussels over Brexit and Italian fiscal policy will increase geopolitical risk. Emerging Markets: The largest positive moves in geopolitical risk were in Brazil and Turkey, where our indicators plunged to their lowest levels since late 2017 and early 2018. Brazilian risk has been steadily declining since pension reform – the most important element of Bolsonaro’s reform agenda – cleared an initial hurdle in Congress. While we would expect Bolsonaro to face many more ups and downs in the process of getting his reform bill passed, we have a high conviction view that the decrease in our Turkish risk indicator is unwarranted. This decrease can be attributed to the fact that the lira’s depreciation in recent weeks is slowing, which our model picks up as a decrease in risk. Nonetheless, uncertainty will prevail as a result of deepening political divisions (e.g. the ruling party’s attempt to overturn the Istanbul election), poor governance, ongoing clashes with the West, and an inability to defend the lira while also pursuing populist monetary policy. Roukaya Ibrahim, Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy roukayai@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Ekaterina Shtrevensky, Research Analyst ekaterinas@bcaresearch.com   France: GeoRisk Indicator U.K.: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator What's On The Geopolitical Radar? Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled “Policy Risk Sustains Oil’s Unstable Equilibrium,” dated May 23, 2019, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2 The long list of candidates will be whittled down to two by the end of June through a series of votes by Tory MPs. Conservative Party members will then cast their votes via a postal ballot with the final result announced by the end of July, before the Parliament’s summer recess. 3 A vote of no confidence would trigger a 14-day period for someone else to form a government, otherwise it will result in a general election. Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights In the political economy of oil, an awareness of the speed at which policy in systematically important states can change can restrain risk taking and investment. This can keep markets in an agitated state of anticipation, awaiting the next policy shift – or the fallout from earlier decisions – and can separate prices from fundamentals. Crude oil markets are in such an agitated state. Fundamentally, oil markets are tight and likely will get tighter, as backwardations in benchmark forward curves indicate (Chart 1). Oil demand continues to grow, with EM growth offsetting DM declines (Chart 2). Production is being restrained by OPEC 2.0, and could remain so in 2H19. U.S. shale-oil producers appear to be taking capital discipline seriously, and prioritizing shareholder interests, which likely will keep production growth within the limits dictated by free cash flow. Chart of the WeekBackwardations In Brent & WTI: Evidence Of Tight Oil Markets Chart 2EM Continues To Lead Global Oil Demand Growth   The combination of these fundamentals will keep supply growth below demand growth this year, which means balances will remain tight (Table 1 below). This will drain inventories and keep forward curves backwardated (Chart 3). Globally, monetary policy will remain largely accommodative. However, policy risks – chiefly Sino – U.S. trade tensions and rising U.S. – Iran tensions – are taking their toll, increasing uncertainty re demand growth, and raising concerns over the security of oil supply from the Persian Gulf, which accounts for ~ 20% of global output. The combination of these policy-risk factors is putting a bid under the USD, which creates a demand headwind by raising the cost of oil ex-U.S.1 This is, in our view, keeping Brent prices below $70/bbl, vs. the $75/bbl we expect this year. Chart 3Commercial Oil Inventories Will Resume Drawing Highlights Energy: Overweight. U.S. National Security Adviser John Bolton declared Iran was responsible for naval mines attached to oil tankers off the coast of the UAE earlier this month, which damaged four ships, two of them belonging to Saudi Arabia. Bolton also said the Iranian naval operation was connected to a drone attack on the Saudi East – West pipeline two days later, and an unsuccessful attack on the Saudi Red Sea port of Yanbu.2 Base Metals: Neutral. Global copper markets continue to tighten: Fastmarkets MB’s Asian treatment and refining charges (TC/RC) weekly index dropped to its lowest level since it was launched June 2013 at the end of last week – to $58.30/MT, $0.0583/lb. Lower TC/RC charges reflect lower raw ore supplies available for refining. Global inventories remain low – down 22% y/y at the LME, COMEX, SHFE and Chinese bonded warehouses – and a threatened strike at on of Codelco's Chilean mines could tighten supplies further. We are re-establishing our tactical long July $3.00/lb Comex copper vs. short $3.30/lb Comex copper call spread at tonight’s close, expecting continued tightening in markets. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold prices appear supported on either side of $1,280/oz, as trade, foreign and monetary policy risks remain elevated. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Heavier-than-expected rains are hampering plantings in the U.S. Midwest, which is driving grain prices higher. Corn, wheat, oats and beans surged Tuesday as markets re-opened from a long holiday weekend in the U.S. Feature Within the context of the political-economy framework we use to frame our analysis of oil markets, foreign policy and trade policy – particularly in the U.S. and China – are dominating fundamentals. Indeed, absent the threat of war in the Persian Gulf between Iran and the U.S., and their respective allies, and an uncertainty surrounding an expanded Sino – U.S. trade war, Brent crude oil would be trading above $75/bbl in 2H19, based on our modeling. As things stand now, we believe markets are under-pricing the risk of war in the Persian Gulf, and are over-estimating the short-term effects of the Sino – U.S. trade war. The longer-term consequences of a deeper and more protracted Sino – U.S. trade war, however, continue to be under-estimated. Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) U.S. – Iran War Risk Is Under-priced We have noted in the past the risk of an escalation in the military confrontation in the Persian Gulf remains acute for global oil markets, most recently in our latest balances report.3 In particular, we believe the risk of this scenario is not fully priced, given market participants’ mark-down of the probability of the price of Brent for December 2019 delivery exceeding $75/bbl and $80/bbl from 39% to 26% and 25% to 16% over the past month in options markets. The probability of Brent for March 2020 delivery exceeding $75/bbl and $80/bbl has similarly been marked down from 38% to 28% and 26% to 19% (Chart 4). An escalation of attacks on soft targets – specifically Saudi and UAE oil shipping and pipeline networks, as occurred earlier this month – likely would provoke a U.S. response against Iran or its proxies, given U.S. National Security Adviser John Bolton’s declaration this week re Iran, which we noted above. A direct attack on the U.S. military presence in the Gulf would be met with extreme force, according to U.S. President Donald Trump.4 A shooting war in the Gulf would, once again, raise the odds of a closing of the Strait of Hormuz, which has been threatened in the past by Iran. Some 20% of the world’s oil supply transits the Strait daily.5 A credible attack against shipping in the Strait would send oil prices sharply higher. If Iran were to succeed in blocking transit through the Gulf, an even sharper move in prices – above $150/bbl – could be expected. Markets Too Sanguine Re Sino – U.S. Trade War Commodity markets are not fully pricing the recent escalation of Sino – U.S. trade war, which were dialled up recently when Chinese President Xi Jinping declared China is embarking on a “New Long March” at a domestic political visit.6 The size of the tariffs thus far imposed by the U.S. against China and the EU are trivial in the context of global trade flows of ~ $19.5 trillion this year (Chart 5).7 According to the WTO, the USD value of merchandise trade rose 10% last year to $19.5 trillion, partly on the back of higher energy prices, while the value of services increased to $5.8 trillion, an 8% gain. Against this, U.S. tariffs of 25% on $250 billion worth of goods imported from China remain trivial. U.S. tariffs so far on EU imports by the U.S. are de minimis. Trade concerns do matter, however, in the longer run. Our geopolitical strategists make the odds of a no-deal outcome 50%, vs. a 40% chance of a deal being reached, and a 10% chance trade talks extend beyond the G20 talks scheduled for June. If markets become convinced the current Sino – U.S. trade war will evolve into a larger standoff between the U.S. and China – military or economic – capex and global supply chains will undergo profound changes. Globally, states likely will find themselves in the orbit of one of these powers, which will fundamentally alter investment flows and, ultimately, the profitability of global businesses. A full-blown trade war could become a Cold War, in other words, which would re-order global supply chains.8 Should this occur, an increase in demand for oil, bulks like iron ore, and base metals could ensue, as China ramps its fiscal and monetary stimulus, and the U.S. and others in its sphere of influence bid up commodity prices as they are forced to pay for other higher-cost alternatives for once-cheaper goods and services.9 USD Will Remain A Short-Term Headwind Globally, central banks remain accommodative, which will support aggregate demand domestically. However, the combination of rising U.S. – Iran tensions and the prospect of a widening Sino – U.S. trade war have put a bid under the USD in the short term. Our FX strategists expect the USD will appreciate another 2 – 3% before cresting and heading lower later in the year. In the short term, USD strengthening is a headwind for oil prices. A stronger dollar translates into higher prices in local currencies ex U.S., which reduces demand, all else equal. On the supply side, a stronger dollar lowers local production costs, which stimulates supply ex U.S. at the margin. Together, these militate against higher oil prices. Assuming the USD does weaken later in the year, as our FX strategists expect, oil prices could pick up a slight tailwind. However, policy risk and supply-demand fundamentals will continue to drive oil prices for the balance of the year. Bottom Line: Oil prices are being restrained by policy risk – particularly U.S. and Chinese trade policy and U.S. foreign policy in the Persian Gulf. We believe markets are under-estimating the odds of Brent prices being above $75/bbl for barrels delivering in December 2019, and in March 2020. A resolution of Sino – U.S. trade tensions is less likely than a no-deal outcome (40% vs. 50%), with the odds of trade talks continuing beyond next month’s G20 meeting being very slim (10%). A deepening of the Sino – U.S. trade war will have longer-term consequences for commodity demand – possibly positive in the wake of Chinese fiscal and monetary stimulus.   Robert P. Ryan, Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      Please see BCA’s Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled“President Trump And The Dollar”, dated May 9, 2019, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 2      Please see “Iranian naval mines likely used in UAE tankers attacks: Bolton,” published by reuters.com on May 29, 2019.  See also BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled “Risk Premium In Oil Prices Rising; KSA Lifts West Coast Export Capacity”, dated October 25, 2018, and BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy and Commodity & Energy Strategy Special Report “U.S.-Iran: This Means War?”, dated May 3, 2019, both available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3      Please see BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled“Policy Risk Sustains Oil’s Unstable Equilibrium” , dated May 23, 2019, available at cesbcaresearch.com. 4      Please see Trump issues harsh warning to Iran, tweeting it would meet its "official end" if it fights U.S. posted by cbsnews.com on May 20, 2019. 5      Please see BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy and Commodity & Energy Strategy Special Report titled “U.S., OPEC Talk Oil Prices Down; Gulf Tensions Could Become Kinetic”, dated July 19, 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 6      For an excellent discussion of these developments, please see BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report titled “Is Trump Ready For The New Long March?”, dated May 24, 2019, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. The “New Long March” is a reference to the 8,000-mile retreat of Chinese Communist Party fighters so they could regroup and ultimately prevail in their civil war in 1934-35. In recalling the Long March, “President Xi … told President Trump to ‘bring it on,’ as he apparently believes that a conflict with the U.S. will strengthen his rule,” according to Matt Gertken, BCA Research’s Chief Geopolitical Strategist. 7      Please see “Global trade growth loses momentum as trade tensions persist,” published by the WTO April 2, 2019. The World Trade Organization expects the growth in merchandise trade volume to drop from 3% last year to 2.6% in 2019, with a slight improvement next year back to 3% growth. Importantly, the WTO notes this is “dependent on an easing of trade tensions.” 8      The odds of a “hot war” between the U.S. and China also are rising, particularly in the South China Sea, according to Adm. James Stavridis (USN, Retired). Please see Collision course in the South China Sea published by the Nikkei Asian Review May 22, 2019. 9      Please see BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled“Expanded Sino – U.S. Trade War Could Be Bullish For Base Metals” dated May 9, 2019, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q1 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades