Special Report
Highlights Investors have piled into private equity (PE) in recent years, pushing assets under management (AUM) up to an all-time high of $3 trillion. However, there are increasing concerns about the outlook for the asset class over the next few years. In this report, we look at the fundraising and deal environment for PE, analyze historical risk-adjusted returns in comparison to traditional assets, and suggest how investors can optimize their PE allocation. Private equity and its two major sub-categories, buyouts and growth capital, have generated annualized returns of 13.4%, 13.7%, and 15.0% respectively over the past 32 years, significantly beating the returns from global equities and small-cap stocks of 8.4% and 9.1%. But the current environment is tougher. Dry powder (funds raised but not yet invested) exceeds $1 trillion. PE managers face increased competition from other investors and from companies with large cash balances looking to make acquisitions. Funds raised at the peak of bull markets have a higher probability of underperforming. The next two vintage years (2018 and 2019) face headwinds to making good returns, because of high entry valuations and a rising cost of borrowing. Manager selection is critical for a successful private-equity program. Top-quartile PE funds have outperformed second-quartile funds by as much as 8% a year over the past two decades. Feature Introduction The private equity (PE) market has grown more than five-fold since 2000, lifting assets under management from $577 billion to $2.97 trillion. However, its share of the private investment market has declined from 82% to 58% (Chart 1). Private equity and venture capital investing is said to date back to 1901 when J.P. Morgan purchased Carnegie Steel Co from Andrew Carnegie and Henry Philips for $480 million. The industry has evolved significantly over the years, and now encompasses a wide range of sub-strategies, offering investors a spectrum of exposures with very different risk/return profiles. Chart 1Private Equity Is A $3 Trillion Market Compared to public equity, private equity investing is harder because of: 1) long-term illiquidity, whereas public equities can be bought and sold quickly, 2) limited information on target companies, 3) the lack of a clear price discovery function, meaning that pricing in private markets depends heavily on negotiations, 4) less separation between ownership and control - finance providers in PE tend to be managers too. The PE space has matured over the years, and this is clearly seen in the compression of returns. However, many investors remain bullish on this asset class because of its historically attractive risk-adjusted return, and ability to diversify traditional portfolios. As of mid-2017, the median net return of the PE holdings of public pensions globally over the previous 10 years was 8.5% compared to 4.2% for public equities, 4.5% for real estate, and 5.2% for fixed income.1 In this report, we analyze in detail the PE market, with an overview of the fundraising cycle, deal environment, and exit channels. We include in-depth analysis of historical returns from the private equity market in aggregate, and from its two largest sub-categories, buyouts and growth capital. We end by listing the key risks for limited partners (LPs - the investors in PE funds), and include a brief note on private-equity secondary investing. Our key conclusions are: Private equity, including buyouts and growth capital, has had exceptionally good returns over the past three decades, but has been on a structural downtrend as competition has increased. Buyout funds generate a negative skew and moderate kurtosis, whereas growth capital tends to have a larger kurtosis and positive skew. Funds raised at the peak of bull markets have a greater probability of underperforming given their higher entry valuations. This is likely to be the case for funds raised over the next 18 months. The current economic cycle has produced fewer home-run deals - in 2002-2005, 35% of deals produced returns of 3x invested capital, but this fell to 20% in the 2010-2013 period. Megacap buyout funds produce the best returns, but this comes with significantly higher volatility pushing down the risk-adjusted return. These larger funds experience larger negative skew and kurtosis driven by greater use of leverage. Entry valuations of investments made by PE funds have been steadily rising, and so has leverage: the median debt/EBITDA has reached 5.5x. As multiples keep rising, general partners (GPs - the fund managers) have to make up the difference with equity infusion. Top-quartile managers have significantly outperformed. Third-quartile managers struggled even to outperform global equities, and fourth quartile managers failed to preserve their initial capital. The secondary PE market is growing. It provides access to mature portfolio assets deeper into their distributions phase, which reduces the duration of the LP's investment. Fundraising, Deals, And Exits Private equity investing consists of many different sub-categories (Chart 2) that differ in value creation techniques and the maturity of target companies. Buyouts and growth capital are over 90% of the total. Buyouts2 invest in established companies, usually with the intention of improving operations and financials. There is usually substantial use of leverage. Growth capital3 takes significant minority positions in profitable yet still maturing companies mostly without the use of leverage. Secondary funds acquire stakes in PE funds from other LPs. Co-investment funds make minority investments alongside a buyout, recapitalization, or any other non-controlling investment. Turnaround funds aim to revitalize companies that face operational difficulties. Chart 2Buyouts & Growth Capital Are 90% Of PE Private-equity firms raised $701 billion in 2017, making the past five years the strongest period for fundraising in history, with a total of $3.2 trillion (Chart 3). Additionally, more than two-thirds of the funds which closed in 2017 met or exceeded their target amounts, and 39% took less than a year to close. The last time fundraising peaked was in 2008, right in the middle of the last recession. However, since 2009, fundraising for buyouts has dropped from 85% to 70% of the aggregate for private equity, with growth capital picking up the slack, rising from 8% to 21%. As fundraising has gotten stronger, PE firms have been raising larger funds.4 These megafunds (with AUM greater than $5 billion) raised $174 billion in 2017, or 58% of that year's total buyout volume, a steep increase from $90 billion in 2016. For investment institutions with large amounts of capital to deploy, megafunds are an attractive and efficient outlet. Another reason for the very strong fundraising environment has been quick follow-up funds, where GPs race to launch new funds before predecessor funds have matured. Historically GPs have waited an average of 62 months between closing one fund and starting the next, but this has come down to 40 months in the past five years. With fundraising so strong, GPs are under pressure to deploy this capital wisely. Global PE deal volume increased by 14% in 2017, surpassing $1.2 trillion (Chart 4). But global deal count has been on the decline since 2015. Along with larger funds being raised, the average deal size in the private market has been rising steadily since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Despite increasing deal activity, the sheer volume of fundraising in recent years has led to massive accumulation of dry powder,5 which currently stands at $1.03 trillion. After 2008, dry powder as a percentage of AUM (Chart 5) was on a downward trend because of increased acquisition activity due to attractive valuations following the GFC. But this bottomed in 2012 at 29% and had risen to 35% at the end of 2017. If this level of dry powder accumulation continues, GPs will be forced to reduce hurdle rates and deploy capital into less attractive deals. Chart 3$3.2 Trillion Raised in 5 Years Chart 4Rising Deal Size Chart 5Harder To Find Attractive Deals Another reason for dry powder accumulation is increasing competition for deals both within the private equity market, and from external sources. The number of private equity funds is at an all-time high of 7,775.6 The external competition comes largely from corporate buyers with large cash balances looking for inorganic growth. Corporations have two advantages over PE firms: 1) potential built-in synergies when it comes to integrating the target, giving them the ability to pay a higher price, and 2) a lower cost of capital. An increasing number of corporations have been setting up corporate venture-capital units (Chart 6) to focus on acquisition-led growth. In 2017, there were 38,479 companies bought and sold globally for a total value of $3.3 trillion. But, private equity's share of this market was just 13% by deal value and 8% by deal count (Chart 7). Looking forward, PE funds are likely to act more aggressively and take a larger share of the market, as they did in 2006-2007. In order to increase their share of global deal activity, private-equity funds need to look at more strategic ways to pick up assets: Chart 6Corporations Setting Up VCs Chart 7Buyouts Only A Tiny Player In Global M&A Zombie Assets: Assets (portfolio companies) belonging to funds that last raised initial capital between 2003 and 2008 but have not executed a deal since 2015. Currently there are over 100 such companies that are possible targets for takeover in 2018-2019. Carve-Outs: Over the past few years, one in five deals in the U.S. has come from corporations disposing of non-core assets.7 This provides a steady deal flow for buyout and turnaround funds. Public To Private: As multiples in private markets converge with those in public markets, more and more publicly listed companies are being taken private, and this market has doubled since 2016 (Chart 8). Additionally, lenders have become more comfortable about financing these high-value transactions. Buy & Build/Add-Ons: Purchasing cheaper small assets and adding them to existing large established platform companies. This in turn transforms a group of smaller companies at lesser multiples into a larger corporation with a premium valuation. Add-ons made up one-third of deals a decade ago, but that has now reached 50%. But, since such deals are smaller in terms of dollar value, they make up less than 25% of the total deal volume. Finally, PE firms have also been increasing the holding period of the assets in their portfolio. The median holding period before the GFC was four years, and this has now increased to over five years (Chart 9). Additionally, private equity firms exited 40% of all deals in fewer than three years, but now these quick-flips have fallen to only 20%. This is partly a response to increased competition: GPs are skeptical about finding new attractive deals, and this forces them to hold onto assets for as long as possible. Additionally, the new U.S. tax code has increased from one to three years the threshold period for carry to be treated as capital gain with a lower tax rate, rather than taxed as ordinary income. With fundraising on fire but deal activity struggling to keep pace, the final pillar for a successful private equity program is the exit environment. Global PE-backed exits have been flat for the past two years at around $500 billion, with the deal count between 2,500 and 3,000 (Chart 10). The rise in exit activity in 2015 was fuelled by PE firms looking to exit portfolio companies acquired before the financial crisis. By 2017, the dynamic had changed since more than 80% of exits that year were companies acquired in 2009 or later. Finally, dividend recapitalizations8 reached $42 billion in 2017, but these are heavily dependent on an accommodative debt market and positive environment for high-yield bonds. With rising rates, dividend recapitalization, and other forms of special dividends or distributions that require borrowing, become harder to execute. Chart 8Public-To-Private Activity Chart 9Longer Holding Periods Chart 10Global PE Exits Are Healthy Historical Returns Before we look at the past risk-return profile of investing in this asset class, a note on the data used in this report. All return data are based on the Cambridge Associates Private Investment Benchmarks.9 We are satisfied with the methodology used and the format in which the returns are presented. The provider has taken sufficient steps to minimize survivorship bias. For more details on the data methodology, please see the Appendix. What can investors expect in terms of risk-return exposure from this asset class? Looking at Table 1, private equity and its sub-strategies have comfortably outperformed global equities, with lower volatility, over the past 32 years. Even after statistically adjusting returns for stale pricing,10 volatility for aggregate private equity and buyouts remains lower than for global equities and small-cap stocks. On the other hand, growth capital has had realized volatility greater than that of global equities, but with a significantly higher return; it is still the more attractive investment on a risk-adjusted basis. However, the significantly lower realized volatility of PE in aggregate, and buyout funds in particular, compared to growth capital makes them more attractive investments. Additionally, venture capital experienced volatility of close to 42%, more than double that of small-cap stocks, making it very unattractive from a risk-adjusted perspective. Table 1Risk-Return Spectrum However, comparing the performance of PE with that of publicly traded assets could be misleading given the uncertain timing of cash inflows and outflows from private equity programs. Therefore, we also show the Public Market Equivalent11 (PME) to adjust public-market indices for uncertain cash flow streams. Looking at Tables 2-4, we can see that private equity still outperforms equity indices on a PME basis over different time frames. Table 2Private Equity PME Analysis Table 3Buyout PME Analysis Table 4Growth Capital PME Analysis Another unique characteristic of private-market returns is the J-curve effect where investments in private markets take time to bear fruit, and fees are initially based on committed capital rather than invested capital. In addition, the biggest cash flows will be received towards the end, so the returns for the first few years can be misleading. IRR will remain negative until the point when distributions at least match contributions (the payback point). Given the non-linear return distribution of alternative assets such as PE and venture capital, risk analysis is not complete without skewness and kurtosis. Investing in buyout funds generates a negative skew and a moderate level of kurtosis, which means that investors can expect more stable, predictable returns, closer to a normal distribution. However, growth capital tends to have larger kurtosis and positive skew, thereby a higher probability of large upside gains. Since buyout capital structures tend to be more heavily geared, there is a higher skew towards negative returns driven by the leverage effect. Venture capital exhibits a return distribution similar to growth capital, where a few portfolio companies produce large positive returns given the start-up nature of its targets. PE returns remain attractive but, as with other alternative asset classes, performance has been on a downward trend (Chart 11) driven by increased competition. In the 1980s and 1990s, buyout firms exploited the poor performance of large U.S. conglomerates by acquiring underperforming divisions and using leverage. In the early 2000s, funds took advantage of the stock market rise, fuelled by low rates and levered returns. Within the structural downtrend in returns, PE has had a cyclical profile just like public equities. During bull markets there are more exits at higher valuations, and larger distributions to LPs. However, funds raised in bull markets have a higher probability of underperforming given their higher entry valuations. Looking forward, funds from recent vintages that are halfway through their life are likely to be able to take advantage of current tailwinds to build value and exit at the top. However, funds raised in the next two years will have to deal with high entry valuations and a possible increase in the cost of borrowing. There have been fewer write-offs and deals with capital impairments in the post-2009 period than in the years after the 2001 recession. However, the current economic cycle has produced fewer of the home-run deals that really drive PE performance. For example, in 2002-2005, 35% of deals produced returns of 3x invested capital or better, and more than 50% generated multiples of 2x or better. For the period 2010-2013, the equivalent percentages were 20% and 42% respectively. Looking at Chart 12, we can see that PE, buyout, and growth capital funds outperformed global equities and small-cap equities during recessions and equity bear markets. Chart 11Private Vs. Public Equity Chart 12Recession & Bear Markets Return persistence is the ability of top-performing manager to repeat the strong performance in their follow-up funds. In the PE industry, some large firms have proved able to repeat top-ranked performance time after time across multiple funds. We believe this is likely a function of their network of contacts that gives them access to proprietary deal flows. However, there are three factors that may be creating a spurious correlation here: 1) GPs tend to raise new funds 2-5 years into the life of an existing fund, thus creating overlapping structures of successive funds that are exposed to similar market environments, 2) investments in some portfolio companies are split between successive funds which induces a spurious patterns of performance persistence, 3) much of the top-quartile performance persistence came during periods of low competition. There is also a relationship between holding period and performance, whereby funds that hold onto portfolio companies for longer have lower performance, while quick-flips perform better. Funds have an incentive to exit successful investments earlier to show a good track record, and to extend the holding period of unsuccessful ones hoping for a better outcome. There is an intrinsic cyclicality in this relationship: in bear markets when valuations are low, funds will hold off from selling their assets in the hope of a better time to sell. Table 5 show the average returns LPs can expect from investing in companies with a specific sector focus. But, this comes with a large amount of idiosyncratic firm- and sector-specific risk; this tends to have a larger impact on buyouts than on venture capital which is already very industry focused. Geographic diversification gives investors access to different economic cycles and levels of market maturity across the globe. In the last recession, PE performance was very poor in some regions, while not that bad in others. There has been a clear cyclical pattern for U.S. versus ex-U.S. performance over the past 30 years, closely linked to the relative growth rates in the underlying economies (Chart 13). Table 5Returns By Sector Exposure Chart 14 shows that from Q3 1998 to Q4 2000 relative performance between buyout and growth capital funds tended to move along with the interest-rate trajectory - the former benefits from falling rates which lower the cost of borrowing. Additionally, looking at median net IRR for funds by vintage year, we see that buyouts outperformed growth capital in 17 out of the 21 years (Chart 15). This was driven by stronger distributions to buyout fund LPs. Additionally; it was achieved with a fairly similar standard deviation of fund performance across vintage years. Within the buyout space, the median U.S.-focused buyout fund outperformed its ex-U.S. counterpart only in 2004-2012. Chart 13U.S. Vs. Rest Of The World Chart 14Impact Of Rising Rates Chart 15Buyouts Vs Growth Capital Finally, when allocating to private-equity and especially buyout funds, investors have a choice between different deal sizes (small to megacap). Looking at Table 6, it is clear that megacap buyout funds have been able to produce the best returns, but this came with significantly higher volatility, pushing down risk-adjusted returns. Additionally, these megacap deals have a larger negative skew and kurtosis - investors should expect a higher probability of large negative returns. Looking at performance in recessions, one can find a relationship between the nature of the downturn and the performance of different buyout deal sizes. For example, during the 2001 recession, the smallest deal sizes produced the worst performance because smaller-cap tech stocks suffered in the aftermath of the dotcom bust. During the 2007-2009 recession, the worst hit were larger buyout deals because of the damage done to the credit market. An analysis of PE would not be complete without a discussion of valuations. The average deal size has risen by 25% since 2009: two-thirds of this increase is due to rising multiples, and the remaining one-third is organic (Chart 16). Median EV/EBITDA has risen from 5.6x in 2009 to 10.7x in 2017. Leverage levels have been rising alongside multiples, and so lenders will be more hesitant to offer debt financing for deals. GPs will have to to make up the funding shortage with equity infusion, and this leads to a decrease in IRR. Additionally, covenant-lite loans have been increasing since 2012 and are now 75% of overall loan volume in the U.S. The percentage of listed companies globally valued at more than 11x EV/EBITDA rose from 20% in 2012 to 54% in 2016. Table 6Size Matters Chart 16Private Equity Is Expensive Lastly, return dispersion is much larger for private-market investments compared to public markets, because of the more active nature of the investment process. If an LP had consistently picked only top-quartile managers from 2000, they would have outperformed second-quartile managers by an impressive 7.7% (Chart 17) a year. Top-quartile managers generated these higher returns with only a trivial increase in volatility, thereby producing far superior risk-adjusted returns. Additionally, skewness and kurtosis measures show no significant deterioration (Table 7). Third-quartile managers struggled even to outperform global equities, and fourth-quartile managers failed even to preserve initial capital. Therefore, manager selection is critical to building a successful private-equity program. Over the past decade, there has been clear compression in fees charged by private equity firms (Chart 18). Management fees tend to differ significantly between the smallest and largest funds; but they are fairly consistent at about 1.975% for funds with AUM between $100 million and $1.9 billion. Chart 17Manager Selection Is Critical Table 7Large Dispersion Chart 18Fee Compression? Risks In Private Equity Chart 19Strong Distributions The long-term investment horizon, illiquid nature, and unique structure of PE bring logistical challenges and unique risks. Given the erratic nature of capital draw-downs by GPs, some LPs might be unable to service capital calls which leads to their defaulting on their obligations. In this case, investors are exposed to funding risk and could lose their entire investment in the fund and all the capital already paid in. LPs tend to use distributions from a mature fund to finance capital calls of younger funds. But this may not be feasible in a slowdown when exits dry up and distributions slow, forcing LPs to raise additional capital from external sources12 for commitments. Many investors run an over-commitment strategy to avoid being under-exposed to their strategic allocation. The strong equity bull market has increased overall portfolio values, meaning that LPs have received large distributions, which have been double contributions since 2013 (Chart 19). Therefore, the net asset value (NAV) of PE holdings has not grown, and allocations even contracted in 2017, forcing LPs to keep plowing gains back into their programs to maintain the target allocation. Investors also face significant liquidity risk. GPs could be forced to sell portfolio companies in the secondary market at a discount to NAV, given the illiquid nature of the market. The secondary market tends to be very cyclical and is likely to experience a deal drought, as seen during the last financial crisis. Market risk is the impact of volatile markets on the quarterly changes in NAV of the portfolio. Capital risk relates to the realization value of the private-equity investments. There is a risk of a private-equity investment going bust and losing all its value. Holding a portfolio of funds exposed to many different companies can reduce this risk and generate a statistical distribution skewed towards positive returns. Additionally, diversification over multiple vintage years should create a right-skewed distribution that minimizes long-term capital risk. A Note On Private Equity Secondaries Chart 20Secondaries: Faster Return But Smaller Upside The secondary market for LPs' private-equity investments is growing. Direct secondaries are the sale of an interest in a direct PE investment or portfolio of direct PE investments to a new third-party investor. A secondaries fund is a PE fund raised by a fund-of-funds manager to acquire limited partnership interests in private equity from the original LPs. Secondary investing is no longer looked at as a source of liquidity for distressed investors, but as a differentiated investment strategy and a regular portfolio management tool to rebalance fund exposures and lock in realized gains. The secondary penetration rate (the percentage of total NAV across all PE strategies that trades in the secondary market) is still less than 2%13 but, as the secondary market continues to expand, investors may see a broader spectrum of assets on sale. Many investors look at the secondary market solely for opportunistic investments, making commitments only during or immediately following periods of market distress. Intuitively this makes sense, as secondary buyers should be able to negotiate steeper discounts during periods of elevated uncertainty and tight liquidity. However, there are many reasons to have a dedicated allocation: It Mitigates The J-Curve: Mature secondary investments cut off several years from the typical term of a PE fund because a good portion of the investment period is already completed. This generates immediate returns from the mature private-equity program. Many fund-of-funds managers will combine secondary interests with their primary portfolios to mitigate the J-curve. Less Blind Pool Risk: In private equity, LPs commit capital to a portfolio that is yet to be built. Secondary investing significantly reduces this risk because portfolios acquired are generally more than 50% invested and have less unfunded commitments. This provides investors with an actual portfolio of companies to evaluate. It Diversifies A Private-Equity Program: An allocation to secondaries can provide instant exposure to a highly diversified portfolio of mature private-equity interests. Lower Probability Of Poor Performance: The potential upside for secondary funds is not as high as that of primary funds, but the former produce poor returns much less frequently (Chart 20). Aditya Kurian, Senior Analyst Global Asset Allocation adityak@bcaresearch.com 1 Source: Bain Global Private Equity Report 2018. 2 Buyouts refers to deals in which a PE fund borrows a significant amount to acquire a target company or companies, which tend to be larger-cap private or publicly listed corporations. 3 Investments in mature companies with proven business models that are looking for capital to expand or restructure operations, enter new markets, or finance a major acquisition. 4 Apollo Investment Fund IX with an AUM of $24.7 billion raised in 2016-2017 is the largest buyout fund raised in history. 5 The amount of capital that has been committed to a private equity fund, but not yet deployed. 6 Source: Pitchbook. 7 The largest global buyout was the $17.9 billion carve-out of Toshiba Memory Corp in 2018. 8 Whereby a company owned by a private-equity fund issues debt in order to pay a dividend to the fund. 9https://www.cambridgeassociates.com/private-investment-benchmarks/ 10 To de-smooth returns, we used a first-order autoregressive model as shown by Rt = A0 + At Rt-1 + e, where At is the auto-regressive coefficient, and A0 is the intercept term. However, statistical methods do not always satisfactorily solve the problem of underestimated volatility for appraised asset values. 11 PME replicates the timing and size of private equity cash flows (purchases and sales) as if they had been invested in public equities. It is the dollar-weighted return that could have been achieved if funds had been invested in the index whenever a capital contribution was made and divested when the GP paid out a distribution. 12 In the Global Financial Crisis, Harvard Management Co issued a bond of more than $1 billion and considered selling a private equity stake of $1.5 billion at a 40%-50% discount to fund its capital calls. 13 Source: Preqin Ltd. Appendix: A Note On Data Sources And Definitions The performance indices all use quarterly unaudited, and annual audited fund financial statements produced by the GPs for their LPs. Partnership financial statements and narratives are the primary source of information concerning cash flows and ending residual/net asset values for both partnerships and portfolio company investments. The data providers' goal is to have a complete record of the quarterly cash flows and NAVs for all funds in the benchmark. All performance is calculated net of fees, expenses, and carried interest. Cambridge Associates (CA) uses two types of return calculation in its indices: Since Inception IRR: This calculates a discount rate which makes the NPV of an investment equal to zero. It is based on cash-on-cash returns over equal periods modified for the residual value of the partnership's equity or portfolio company's NAV. The residual value attributed to each respective group being measured is incorporated as its ending value. Transactions are accounted for on a quarterly basis, and annualized values are used for reporting purposes. End-To-End/Horizon IRR: A money-weighted return similar to the Since Inception IRR, except that it measures performance between two points in time. The calculation incorporates the beginning NAV, interim cash flows, and the ending NAV. All interim cash flows are recorded on the mid-period date of the quarter. With regards to avoiding survivorship bias, CA requires the complete set of financial statements from the fund's inception to the most current reporting date. When an active fund stops providing financial statements, CA reaches out to the manager to encourage them to continue to submit data. CA may, during this communication period, roll forward the fund's last reported quarter's NAV for several quarters. When CA is convinced that the manager will not resume reporting, the fund's entire performance history is removed from the database. Survivorship bias can affect all investment manager databases, including those of public asset managers. But the illiquid nature of private investments can actually help limit this impact, since the private investment partnerships owning illiquid assets will continue to exist and be legally required to report to the LPs even after the original manager ceases to exit. Over the past nine years the number of fund managers that stopped reporting to the database before liquidation averaged per year 0.7% of the total number of funds, and 0.6% of total NAV in the database. During that period the overall number of funds in the database increased by an average of 8% per year. Public Market Equivalent (PME): A private-to-public comparison that seeks to replicate private-investment performance under public-market conditions. The public index is recalculated as if shares were purchased and sold according to the private fund's cash flow schedule, with distributions calculated in the same proportion as the private fund. The PME NAV is a function of PME cash flows and public index returns. The PME attempts to evaluate the return that would have been earned had the dollars been deployed in the public markets instead of in private investments.
