Iran

Highlights We’ve searched in vain for imminent domestic weakness in the U.S. economy, … : Much of our work this spring has focused on trying to poke holes in our view that the equilibrium fed funds rate remains above the target fed funds rate, but we haven’t found any evidence of overheating in the real economy, or worrisome excesses in financial markets. … but an exogenous shock could well precipitate a recession if it were serious enough: The U.S. is a comparatively closed economy, but there’s no such thing as full-on decoupling. The U.S. may react more slowly than other major economies to what’s going on in the rest of the world, but it’s not immune to it. A trade war would threaten global growth, … : U.S.-China trade negotiations have taken center stage over the last couple weeks, and escalating tension between the world’s two largest standalone economies will surely cast a pall over the global outlook. … but there are other potential threats that bear monitoring: Tensions with Iran could be the catalyst for an oil price shock, while a significant rollback of globalization could crimp corporate profit margins. Either would hasten the end of the equity bull market and the expansion. Feature Tight monetary policy is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for a recession. We deem policy to be tight if the fed funds rate exceeds our estimate of the equilibrium fed funds rate, and easy if it is below our estimate of equilibrium. Over the six decades for which we compute an estimate of the equilibrium fed funds rate, the U.S. has only ever experienced recessions when the fed funds rate has exceeded our estimate of equilibrium (Chart 1). Tight policy isn’t always tantamount to a recession – nothing came of tight settings in 1984 or 1995 – but recessions don’t occur without it. Chart 1Recessions Only Occur When Monetary Conditions Are Tight We currently estimate that the equilibrium fed funds rate, a.k.a. the neutral rate, is about 3⅛%, and we continue to project that it will be around 3⅜% by the end of the year. Those estimates leave the Fed with plenty of headroom before it materially slows the economy. If our estimate is on the money, it will take four more rate hikes to induce an inflection in the business cycle. We have not seen anything in the ongoing flow of macro data, or evidence of excesses in the financial markets, that would suggest a recession is already under way or is lurking around the corner. Internal dynamics should continue to support the expansion, but threats from outside the U.S. are growing. We therefore conclude that the next recession may well not arrive for another two years, in the absence of a significantly adverse exogenous event. This week, we extend our focus beyond the U.S. to try to uncover the external threats that could stop the U.S. economy, and the bull markets in risk assets, in their tracks. Beyond the tariff fireworks, we also contemplate the possibility that conflict with Iran could lead to an oil price shock, and the impact of a significant rollback of globalization. It is not our base case that any of the various external threats will tip the U.S. into a recession, but investors should keep tabs on the biggest ones. Tariffs The U.S.-China trade saga has unfolded in three pairs of moves and counter-moves (Diagram 1). While the aggregate $50bn worth of Chinese goods tariffed in the first two salvos mostly targeted industrial equipment and machinery, the third installment, covering $200bn worth of imports, extended the tariffs’ reach to consumer products. Major categories included not only commodities such as base metals, chemical products and mineral fuels and oils, but also a broad swath of foods, textiles, electronics, vehicles and spare parts. After a three-month cease-fire, the developments of the last two weeks arguably marked the most significant escalation of tensions on both sides. The U.S. is now threatening to levy tariffs on the remaining $325bn of Chinese goods that have so far been spared. Diagram 1Anything You Can Do Our colleagues at BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy service suggest that recent foreign policy initiatives indicate that the White House does not feel any particular pressure to minimize economic risk this far ahead of the election. The risk of market-disruptive measures has therefore increased, and they see a 50-50 chance that the U.S. and China will fail to reach an accord (Table 1). Although the administration has delayed any action on autos and auto parts for now, Europe could be the next trade partner in its cross hairs. The odds that Section 232 (national-security-threat) tariffs will be levied on European auto imports is rising (Chart 2). Table 1U.S.-China Trade War: Probabilities Of A Deal By End Of June 2019 These heightened trade tensions may delay the global growth recovery that we were expecting to bloom in the summer, and they may also allow the dollar to keep advancing. The greenback is a countercyclical currency, moving inversely with global activity (Chart 3), and a bump in the road for global growth would likely extend its upward run. Chart 3The Countercyclical Dollar Although a strong dollar would be a headwind for exporters, the U.S. economy is comparatively closed. Tariffs are likely to exert the greatest pressure on the economy via softer consumption and investment. So far, the available evidence suggests that U.S. consumers and corporations have borne the brunt of higher tariffs in the form of higher retail prices and lower profit margins.1 Iran Our geopolitical strategists contend that investors have underrated conflict with Iran as a market risk for a while. Now that the contentiousness of U.S.-Iran relations has ratcheted higher upon the administration’s decision not to extend the import waivers on Iranian oil, the issue is back in the spotlight. Our strategists caution that managing the dispute may require more delicacy than the more hawkish elements of the administration realize. In their view, the potential for a misstep increases the odds of a recession and poses a significant risk to the equity bull market. In a joint Special Report by our Commodity and Energy Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy services at the beginning of the month, our in-house experts stressed that there are multiple moving parts driving the supply-demand balance in the global oil market.2 Investors should realize that the world faces the prospect of the loss of Venezuelan production (approximately 600,000 barrels per day (b/d)) and significant outages in Libya (~600,000 to 800,000 b/d), in addition to our strategists’ base-case estimate of 700,000 b/d from Iran’s current 1.3 million b/d output. BCA does not expect that all of that output will be lost, but the key point is that Iran is not the only potential source of a supply shortfall. Our energy strategists believe that OPEC 2.0 – the producer coalition led by Saudi Arabia and Russia, and supported by Saudi Arabia’s OPEC allies – has the capacity to make up for even their larger shortfall scenarios (Chart 4). The problem is that OPEC 2.0 may not have the will to do so in a timely fashion. Saudi Arabia and the rest of the OPEC 2.0 coalition were caught completely off guard by the administration’s issuance of import waivers in November, after they had ramped up production at its request to limit the market disruptions that would have ensued when Iran’s output was taken off the market. The last-minute waiver decision caused oil prices to crater in the wake of a supply glut that OPEC 2.0 has been working to sop up ever since (Chart 5). Chart 5... But The Oil Market Is Pretty Tight   OPEC 2.0’s members may feel that they were badly used last fall, and may not be inclined to move proactively now. Russia is managing its own low-grade conflict with the U.S., and all of the coalition should bear in mind that the U.S. could release over a million b/d from its Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) for a solid six to nine months, according to our energy team’s estimates. If rising oil prices are often viewed as a tax on American consumers, a late summer/early fall release of holdings could be viewed as an election rebate, courtesy of the skilled economic managers in the White House. Our team expects that OPEC 2.0 will likely guard against an oversupply-driven swoon in oil prices by managing its production on something akin to a just-in-time inventory strategy. Our energy and geopolitical strategists caution that there are two other ways the administration may overplay its hand. First, it might overestimate U.S. shale drillers’ ability to export their production. While new pipeline construction will relieve the transportation bottleneck limiting the Permian Basin output that reaches the Gulf of Mexico, oil exports from the Gulf are limited by a shortage of deep-water harbor facilities. If global trade tensions do worsen, both the dollar and U.S. equities may attract safe-haven flows. There is also the possibility that Iran might strike at Iraq, putting some of its 3.5 million b/d output at risk. It could also make good on its repeated threat to close the Straits of Hormuz, through which nearly a fifth of global oil supplies travel daily. Either of these options would dramatically escalate the conflict, but a desperate Iran might pursue them if it felt cornered. The bottom line is that the probability of an oil price shock is not negligible. Brinkmanship with Iran could upset a delicate supply-demand balance in global oil markets, and a delicate geopolitical balance in the Middle East. If the Volcker double-dip is treated as a single event, a surge in oil prices has preceded every recession in the last 45 years, except for the 2001 recession precipitated by the bursting of the dot-com bubble (Chart 6). Chart 6Oil Price Spikes Often Precede Recessions Significant Rollback Of Globalization Our Geopolitical Strategy and Global Asset Allocation services have cited peak globalization as an important long-term investment theme for the last several years. The tariff tensions between the U.S. and its trading partners would seem to have borne out their predictions, especially if one views them as having been inspired by unskilled workers’ losses from globalization. Taking on foreign exporters is likely to play well in the electorally decisive Rust Belt states, where manufacturing job losses have hit especially hard. We fully subscribe to the theory of comparative advantage as formulated by David Ricardo in the early 19th century. By allowing individual countries to specialize in what they do best, free trade increases the size of the global economic pie. Empirical evidence suggests that globalization also re-slices the pie, however. In the developed world, outsourcing manufacturing has operated to the benefit of investors and the detriment of less-skilled workers. For U.S.-based multinationals, tariffs are a minor irritant compared to the prospect of having to reroute supply chains around China. The modest headwinds to globalization observed before the U.S. began engaging in serial bilateral trade conflicts did not undermine corporate profit margins in any material way. A bigger anti-globalization push that forced global supply chains to be rerouted or partially unwound would have much more negative effects. The U.S. is a comparatively closed economy, but the multinationals that dominate equity market capitalization rely heavily on interactions with the rest of the world. Unwinding the global supply chains that have been carefully constructed over the last 30 years would be disruptive and costly. The worst-case scenario envisioned by our geopolitical strategists, in which U.S.-China relations dramatically worsen and the tariff back-and-forth escalates in a major way, would hit equities hard, especially if supply chains had to be rebuilt. As a proxy for what globalization has meant for investors’ and blue-collar workers’ share of the pie, we consider the path of real wages relative to productivity over the last 50 years. From 1970 through 2001, U.S. wages generally kept pace with productivity gains, observing a fairly narrow, well-defined range (Chart 7). Once China entered the WTO (as denoted by the vertical line on the chart), productivity-adjusted wages fell precipitously, and even their periodic bounces have fallen well short of the level that marked the lower end of the previous range. Chart 7The Pie Has Grown, But Unskilled Labor's Slice Has Shrunk Bottom Line: Temporary barriers to free trade, implemented as a negotiating tactic, are not a big deal for equities. A significant rollback of globalization would be, however, and a need to divert global supply chains away from China could stop the bull market in its tracks. Investment Implications Along with our Global Investment Strategy colleagues, we are somewhat more sanguine than our Geopolitical Strategy service that a worst-case outcome between the U.S. and China can be averted. We therefore continue to believe that the U.S. expansion, and the bull markets in risk assets, will persist until the Fed tightens monetary conditions enough to spark the next recession. We reiterate our recommendations that investors should maintain at least an equal weight position in equities and spread product. Enough is at stake in the conflicts with China and Iran, however, that a worsening of either could cause us to change our view, and we will be watching developments on each front closely. Doug Peta, CFA Chief U.S. Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Jennifer Lacombe Senior Analyst, Global ETF Strategy jenniferl@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      Mary Amiti, Stephen J. Redding, and David E. Weinstein, “The Impact of the 2018 Trade War on U.S. Prices and Welfare,” NBER Working Paper No. 25672, (March 2019). 2      Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy/Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, “U.S.-Iran: This Means War?,”dated May 3, 2019, available at ces.bcaresearch.com.

Special Report

Highlights So What? The Trump administration’s decision to apply maximum pressure to Iran fundamentally changes the investment landscape in 2019-20. Why? The impact of the Iran sanctions on a stand-alone basis can easily be handled given OPEC 2.0’s current spare capacity. However, not only Iranian and Venezuelan oil but also Iraqi oil could be pulled off the market in a full-fledged conflict. Policy-induced volatility and the oil risk premium will rise. Geopolitical tail risks have gotten fatter and the odds of a recession have also increased. Feature What are the Trump administration’s foreign policy objectives? First, to confront the U.S.’s greatest long-term competitor, China, by demanding economic reforms and greater market access. Second, to force a decision-point upon rogue regimes with significant ballistic missile programs and nuclear-weapon aspirations: North Korea and Iran. Third, to maintain credible deterrence in Russia’s periphery. Fourth, to reassert the Monroe Doctrine through regime change in Venezuela. The common thread, even with Russia, is confrontation. It is not necessary for President Trump to pursue all of these objectives at once. So his decision last November to issue waivers for eight importers of Iranian oil suggested to us that he was prioritizing – and becoming more risk averse ahead of the 2020 election. Full enforcement of the oil sanctions at that time threatened to push oil prices up at the same time as the Fed was raising rates, a pernicious combination late in the cycle (Chart 1). Thus, after walking away from the 2015 nuclear accord with Iran, it made sense for Trump to delay any confrontation with Iran until his hoped-for second term in office. He could focus on building the border wall, resolving trade tensions with China, and making peace with North Korea instead. Chart 1Full Sanctions Enforcement Was Too Risky Last November Chart 2Sanctions Will Raise Risk   This view has now been proved wrong. The oil waivers apparently represented only a temporary delay in the administration’s hawkish Iran policy. Now that financial conditions have eased and growth has stabilized, Trump has declared the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps a foreign terrorist organization and announced that he will discontinue the waivers, demanding full compliance on energy sanctions from all states by the end of May. Volatility will move higher (Chart 2). Trump is emboldened by America’s newfound energy independence (Chart 3). While the shale boom can be used to reduce U.S. strategic commitments in the Middle East, it can also encourage Washington to believe it is invulnerable to traditional Middle Eastern risks. Trump’s advisers, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and National Security Adviser John Bolton, apparently have won the Iran policy debate on this basis. Since Trump’s reelection is far from guaranteed, it would appear his advisers view re-imposing sanctions against Iran as a rare opportunity to achieve long-term strategic objectives. They may not have the chance in 2021. Chart 3The U.S. Is Energy Independent Chart 4Trump's Reelection At Risk If Oil Spikes All the same, the problem for Trump is that, while the U.S. will survive any chaos ensuing from an Iran confrontation, his presidency may not. Full enforcement of the sanctions could spiral out of control and, through the oil price channel, come back to hurt Trump’s economy – and hence his re-election odds (Chart 4). The implication is that Trump has either been misled about the risks of his Iran policy, or he does not care as much about his re-election odds as we believed. Either way, the result is aggressive policy, which increases the geopolitical risk premium in oil prices. We can see this in our simulations (below), which are based entirely on spare capacity and compliance by consumers to the sanctions. We did not include an Iran-retaliation scenario in this modeling. Therefore, any threat to Iraqi supplies, or talks of disrupting the Strait of Hormuz will add to our prices forecasts. U.S. Administration Sailing Close To The Wind From their public comments, it would appear the U.S. administration has convinced itself the global oil market can absorb a disruption from the loss of production in Iran and Venezuela. For the Trump administration, this view is supported by growing U.S. shale-oil supplies, and the administration’s belief the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and its Gulf allies stand ready to increase production to cover any losses arising from the re-imposition of Iranian oil-export sanctions by the U.S. This belief supports the administration’s end-game, which appears to be regime change in Iran, a position long favored by Trump’s national security advisor John Bolton. Frank Fannon, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Energy Resources, succinctly captured the administration’s view when he declared, “We are doing this ... in a favorable market condition with full commitment from producing countries.” He further stated, “We think this is the right time.”1 We believe the Trump administration is sailing close to the wind here. The U.S. administration has convinced itself the global oil market can absorb a disruption from the loss of oil production in Iran and Venezuela. While increasing U.S. shale output does provide something of a cushion to global oil markets, it is not a substitute for the heavy-sour crude produced by Iran and Venezuela (and others), which is favored by refiners with complex units. The loss of Iranian exports hits these refiners harder than those able to process lighter, sweeter crude of the sort exported by the U.S. (Chart 5).2 As Iranian and Venezuelan barrels are lost to the market, these heavier crudes are getting more scarce relative to the crude produced in U.S. shales – typically classified as West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil. This can be seen in tighter light-versus-heavy crude oil spreads, and the wider Brent-WTI spreads, which indicate WTI is relatively more plentiful (Charts 6A & 6B). Chart 6AWTI Relatively More Plentiful… Chart 6B…As Heavier Crudes Become More Scarce It is true U.S. production continues to grow, which is causing crude oil inventories to increase as sanctions on Iran are being re-imposed. We expect U.S. shale-oil output to grow 1.2mm b/d this year – taking it to a record 8.4mm b/d on average – and 800k b/d next year. Caution is required regarding inventories, however: U.S. refiners are in the thick of their plant maintenance – known as turn-around season – and have loaded a lot of the maintenance they would normally have done in the Fall into Spring. As a result, U.S. refiners are running at reduced rates preparing for the Northern Hemisphere’s summer driving season and the January 1, 2020, implementation of the U.N. IMO 2020 regulations, which will require shippers to use lower-sulfur fuel to power their vessels worldwide.3 OPEC 2.0 Gains Control Of Brent Forward Curve Growing U.S. production and inventories might give the Trump administration comfort the market can absorb the loss of Iran’s exports – some 1.3mm b/d at present. However, our base case holds that Iran’s exports will stabilize at ~ 600k b/d after sanctions fully kick in. In most of the scenarios we run (Table 1), the impact of Iran sanctions on a stand-alone basis can easily be handled given OPEC 2.0’s current spare capacity (Chart 7).4 Indeed, many of the low-probability scenarios we run – including the “maximum pressure” scenario, in which the Trump administration succeeds in removing all of Iran’s exports – can be accommodated by current supply and spare capacity without sending Brent prices through $100/bbl (Chart 8). OPEC 2.0 holds ~ 1.5mm b/d of what we would describe as readily available spare capacity – mostly in KSA – that can be brought to market fairly quickly, as the ramp-up last year ahead of the first round of sanctions in November amply demonstrated. Another 1.5mm b/d or so is held by the Kingdom and its GCC allies, but it would take longer to bring on line. Table 1BCA Oil Market Scenarios Chart 7OPEC 2.0 Can Handle Iranian Losses Chart 8Brent Unlikely To Surpass $100 In reality, once refiners are up and running at max capacity in the U.S. in a few weeks, U.S. inventories will begin to draw hard. This will support what we believe to be OPEC 2.0’s goal of backwardating the Brent curve – perhaps sharply. This will allow it some breathing space to gradually add barrels to the market in 2H19 as needed, as our balances and forecasts assume. It is important to remember OPEC 2.0 was formed to drain the massive storage overhang that resulted from the 2014-16 market-share war launched by KSA. The Kingdom’s energy minister, Khalid al-Falih, is in no hurry to reverse OPEC 2.0’s strategy now. Throughout the ramp to renewed sanctions, he has steadfastly maintained the Kingdom will provide oil as Aramco’s customers need it, following the blind-side hit KSA took from the Trump administration in November when it granted Iran’s largest customers waivers on its export sanctions. U.S. Pressure On OPEC To Raise Output Will Grow We expect the Trump administration to continue to pressure OPEC – the old cartel, not OPEC 2.0 – to boost production post-sanctions. However, it is not entirely clear that this time OPEC’s – particularly KSA’s – interests are 100% aligned with President Trump’s. KSA and other producers were shocked by the administration’s decision to grant waivers after lifting supply sharply in response to Trump’s demands. This time around, we believe OPEC – KSA in particular – will be more cautious lifting output, even as the U.S. Navy very publicly displays its ability to project and sustain force in the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf regions (Map 1). With good reason: The U.S. holds ~ 650mm barrels of oil in its Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), which can be released at a rate of 1mm to 1.3mm b/d for a year or so. Realistically, it is probably more like six to nine months, since, by the time much of the oil has been released to the market the reserves that are left likely will have higher concentrations of contaminants (e.g., metals and solids that migrated to the bottom of the storage while it was sitting idle), making buyers way more leery of using it. After the shock of the waivers, KSA likely will minimize its exposure to another surprise from the U.S. as sanctions take hold. The risk to OPEC – KSA in particular – is that Trump again will pull a fast one as the U.S. general election approaches. Given Trump’s demonstrated sensitivity to U.S. gasoline prices approaching elections, it is not unlikely that he would hold on to the SPR barrels until mid to late summer 2020, then release them in time to reduce prices further. If, in the run-up to U.S. elections, OPEC has steadily increased production to build precautionary inventories then it runs a non-trivial risk the crude oil price would once again crash as SPR barrels are released. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s energy minister, Khalid al-Falih, is in no hurry to reverse OPEC 2.0’s strategy now. In this iteration of Iranian export sanctions, we expect KSA to adopt a just-in-time inventory management strategy, so that it is not caught out once again over-supplying the market ahead of a U.S. surprise. U.S. Shales Will Figure Into OPEC 2.0’s Calculus Chart 9U.S. Export Capacity Is Constrained The other big fundamental OPEC 2.0 will be considering is the rate at which U.S. shale oil can be exported. Export capacity still is constrained by the shortage of deep-water harbor facilities in the U.S. Gulf. This is being addressed, but it has been slowed by additional requests for environmental impact statements from the federal and state governments. If prices start moving higher because KSA and OPEC 2.0 are responding to tightening markets with caution (and slowly), we’d likely see WTI production increase – it’ll have 2mm b/d of new pipe in the Permian to fill by end-2019 – but that crude could start backing up as storage in the U.S. Gulf fills. This would again widen the Brent vs. WTI - Houston spread, which will benefit refiners in the U.S. Gulf, but will lower prices received by U.S. shale producers (again) (Chart 9). Bottom Line: Trump’s decision not to extend the Iranian oil waivers suggests that he has plenty of risk appetite ahead of the 2020 election. His Iran policy is now the biggest geopolitical risk to the late-cycle bull market. It also risks tightening the oil market considerably as the election approaches. Can Iran’s Regime Withstand The Sanctions? Iran’s economic weakness was an added inducement for the Trump administration to take an aggressive turn. The sanctions against Iran’s crude oil exports have not yet been implemented in full force, but the economy is already showing signs of distress. For one, inflation is back near 40% – levels only reached during the previous round of sanctions (Chart 10). Given that food, beverages, and transportation are among the sectors experiencing the fastest growing prices, lower income groups – which the World Bank estimates spend almost half their income on food alone – will suffer disproportionately. Economic dissatisfaction has catalyzed protests in Iran in the past, and the squeeze from the U.S. sanctions could propel further unrest. Chart 10Iran's Economy Already Showing Signs Of Distress Moreover, soaring prices are coinciding with a slowdown in activity and consumption. On the surface Iran appears relatively well protected given that its economy is not as directly correlated with oil exports as some of its peers (Chart 11). However, Iran’s oil and non-oil sectors are actually closely intertwined. This is evident from weakness in the non-oil sector during the previous round of sanctions (Chart 12). The IMF expects the economy to contract by 6% this year – faster than its 3.9% estimate for last year – leaving Iranians to face a period of deepening stagflation. The jump in consumer prices is a reflection of the ongoing collapse of the currency. Despite the government’s best efforts to stabilize the foreign exchange market, heightened demand for foreign currencies caused a nearly 30% depreciation in the unofficial exchange rate vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar since the beginning of the year (Chart 13). Chart 13Unofficial Exchange Rate Continues To Weaken Chart 14Debt Burden Is Manageable To soften the impact of the weaker currency and the potential shortage of essential goods, authorities have introduced a three-tier exchange rate system, and banned the export of several products including grains and seeds, powdered milk, butter, and tea. Since the level of external debt remains manageable (Chart 14) the weak currency will pressure the economy through its impact on prices (highlighted above), with imported inflation eroding purchasing power. Furthermore, Iran will not benefit from any additional export competitiveness due to currency depreciation. The current account surplus is expected to deteriorate and eventually flip to a deficit amidst weak exports, and despite declining imports (Chart 15). The fact that Iran runs a non-energy trade deficit does not help. Chart 15Trade Surplus At Risk Chart 16Rising Budget Deficit Is A Constraint In terms of the fiscal purse, under normal circumstances, a weaker rial would raise government revenue from oil exports. However, given the restrictions on oil exports, the fiscal budget will not benefit from this relationship. Instead, the dominant impact will be greater government spending. Historically, expenditures tend to be countercyclical, aiming to mitigate the impact of the deteriorating economic environment on Iranian households (Chart 16). In the past, the Iranian government’s healthy fiscal balance allowed policymakers to implement social protection schemes to combat poverty and revitalize the economy. Now, however, the fiscal coffers are no longer so well-cushioned and the deficit will constrain this option. Stimulative fiscal policy in this environment would only raise inflation further. Furthermore, given that the lion’s share of Iran’s imports are capital and intermediate goods, the currency depreciation will spill over into the domestic industry and weaken demand, even for domestically produced goods. Investments have been lacking in many of the most essential services. The electricity sector is a prime example: while demand is rising, spare capacity is dwindling and causing recurring outages. Similarly, foreign direct investment will likely fall in this uncertain political environment. With the economy on the brink, Iran is not in a position to confront the United States directly. It must take total sanctions enforcement as a very grave risk and seek delaying actions and negotiations. However, this vulnerability will turn into desperation if the Trump administration proceeds with a full embargo without any “off ramp” for negotiations. Bottom Line: Full enforcement of sanctions threatens to destabilize Iran’s already vulnerable economy. Inflation is soaring, the currency is plunging, and the economy will likely be plagued by a twin deficit going forward. The implication is that Iran will eschew direct confrontation unless forced. Will Iran Retaliate In Iraq? Iran is also at risk of losing one of its great sources of leverage: Iraqi stability. Given its gloomy economic outlook, Iran is looking to expand ties with its neighbors in an attempt to soften the blow from the sanctions. Earlier this year president Hassan Rouhani and Iraqi prime minister Adel Abdul Mahdi signed several preliminary trade deals, with the ultimate aim to boost bilateral trade to $20 billion from its current ~$12 billion. However, natural gas exports to Iraq – a major traded good – are covered by the sanctions, so this target is probably unattainable. Although Iran is currently the only foreign supplier of natural gas and electricity to Iraq, the temporary halt in electricity supplies last summer coincided with violent protests in Southern Iraq.5 Growing anger over Iran’s inability to satisfy its commitments to Iraq highlights the tensions in the Iraq-Iran relationship. What’s more, the U.S. is pressuring Iraq to turn to other neighbors such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Kuwait for its electricity needs.6 In March, it renewed a three-month waiver allowing Iraq to import Iranian gas. Then Saudi Arabia promised to connect Iraq to the Saudi electricity grid during a visit by its economic delegation to Baghdad on April 4.7 At that meeting, the Saudi delegation also agreed to provide Iraq with $1 billion in loans, $500 million to boost exports, and a sporting complex as a gift. Additionally, the Saudi consulate in Baghdad – which had been closed for almost 3 decades – reopened last month. Saudi Arabia and Iraq are starting to cooperate. Iraq’s new government is clearly taking a pragmatic approach to its regional relationships. This is also largely in line with growing domestic opposition to Iranian interference within Iraq. Influential Shia leaders such as Muqtada al-Sadr and Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani have been voicing concerns about Iran’s influence in Iraqi politics. As such, the new Iraqi government is attempting to walk a tight rope between placating Iran and taking advantage of new opportunities with its Arab neighbors to rebuild its economy. This trend raises the risk that Iran will strike rapidly in Iraq if it believes Trump’s maximum pressure strategy is succeeding in bringing oil exports to zero. Iraq is the logical target as Iran has great political and sectarian influence there, it is the geographic buffer with Saudi Arabia, and it is the necessary launchpad for Iran’s strategic opponents to undermine or attack the Iranian regime (Map 2). Thus, not only Iranian and Venezuelan oil but also Iraqi oil could be pulled off the market in a fullfledged conflict. Thus, not only Iranian and Venezuelan oil but also Iraqi oil could be pulled off the market in a full-fledged conflict. About 85% of Iraq’s crude exports flow through the southern port city of Basra (Chart 17). It is already home to recurrent protests and any disruptions there threaten around 3.5mm bbl shipping to international markets daily. Bottom Line: Iraq is caught in the strategic tug-of-war between Iran and Saudi Arabia, with the latter gaining influence at present. Sanctions could compel Iran to retaliate in Iraq, jeopardizing up to 3.5mm b/d of supply. What Comes Next? The latest data suggest that Japan is in full compliance with the U.S. sanctions against Iran as of April and that China has been front-running the sanctions and is now reducing imports, as it was at the time the waivers were first introduced. China may not go to zero, but it is apparently complying. This is important given that the Trump administration has essentially introduced a bold new demand – cut off all energy imports from Iran – at the eleventh hour of the U.S.-China trade negotiations. Our projections of spare capacity suggest that the Trump administration will believe it has room to enforce the sanctions fully (Chart 18). This is a risky approach, as a fairly standard unplanned outage anywhere else in the world could bring spare capacity much lower, but the data suggest that Trump’s team will not see it as a hard constraint. If necessary, the administration can later choose to soft-pedal enforcement on black market activity so as to calibrate the global impact. The Iranians, for their part, are unlikely to leap to the most aggressive forms of retaliation immediately – such as fomenting unrest in Iraq – because of their economic vulnerability. Small acts of sabotage or subversion are a way to send the U.S. a warning signal, but generally Iran will want to signal defiance while shifting the emphasis to negotiations. Hence it will primarily retaliate through diplomatic actions and calculated displays of force. A limited response enables Iran to appear innocent, divide the U.S. and EU, and thus isolate the U.S. over its belligerent policies. Previously, Trump has sought to negotiate with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani. The Iranians have so far rebuffed him, but Foreign Minister Mohammad Zarif’s initial response to the waiver announcement was to blame Trump’s advisers, instead of Trump himself, and offer an exchange of prisoners (And release of detained Americans happen to be one of the Trump administration’s key demands – see Table 2.) Negotiations could begin through back channels and an uneasy period of tensions could thus ensue without a full-blown war. Table 2Trump Administration’s 12 Demands On Iran The problem is that negotiations cannot work if Trump fully and immediately enforces the sanctions without offering Iran an “off ramp.” If the administration backs Iran into a corner it will have no option but to strike out forcefully. Negotiations also cannot work if Iran joins the U.S. in withdrawing from the 2015 deal and reactivating its nuclear program, specifically the suspected military dimensions of that program. This would force Trump to respond (Diagram 1). Diagram 1Iran-U.S. Tensions Decision Tree In short, a period of “fire and fury” is about to ensue between Trump and Rouhani. It will be even more uncertain and disruptive than the summer 2017 showdown between Trump and Kim Jong Un of North Korea (Chart 19), which drove a 35 bps decline in the 10-year Treasury yield. Chart 19Upcoming "Fire And Fury" Will Be More Disruptive Than 2017 Trump-Kim Showdown There is a pathway for Trump’s pressure tactics to succeed: Iran is vulnerable and the United States and its allies are in a position of relative strength in terms of global oil supply. Therefore, it is possible that Trump could fully enforce the sanctions and yet avoid any uncontrollable crisis or oil shock. However, this pathway, at a subjective 26% probability, is less likely than the combined 48% probability of the alternatives: either escalation short of war, or ultimatums leading to Middle Eastern instability and much higher odds of war. Bottom Line: The geopolitical risk of U.S.-Iran confrontation is not contained. But we do not expect Iran to overreact unless Trump plows forward with full and immediate sanctions enforcement and offers no realistic “off ramp” for negotiations. At that point Iranian retaliation will be concrete and escalation could spiral out of control. Investors should keep in mind that Iran is not North Korea. Unlike the hermit kingdom, Iran has the ability to retaliate with a number of different levers. Indeed, it has threatened to shut the Strait of Hormuz in the past, and could, at the limit, be backed into that corner. While the risk of this is extremely low, should it occur the consequences would be huge – close to 20% of the world’s daily oil supply passes through the Strait daily. Indeed, just this week Iran’s Oil Minister Bijan Zanganeh again threatened to take action against any OPEC member working against its interests. Following a meeting with the Cartel’s president, he is reported to have said, “Iran is a member of OPEC because of its interests, and if other members of OPEC seek to threaten Iran or endanger its interests, Iran will not remain silent.”8 Investment Conclusions The Trump administration’s decision to apply maximum pressure to Iran is a significant and unexpected injection of geopolitical risk that we believe fundamentally changes the investment landscape in 2019-20. While our base case is that the U.S. will enforce the oil sanctions gradually and in such a way as to avoid causing an oil shock, policy-induced volatility and the oil risk premium will rise. Geopolitical tail risks have gotten fatter and the odds of a recession have also increased. Robert P. Ryan, Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Roukaya Ibrahim, Editor/Strategist roukayai@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Please see Humeyra Pamuk and Timothy Gardner, “How Trump’s hawkish advisors won debate on Iran oil sanctions,” Reuters, May 1, 2019, available at reuters.com. 2 Heavy-sour crudes are those with low API gravity (a measure of how easily a crude flows) and higher sulfur content. Light-sweet crudes have higher API gravity and lower sulfur content. 3 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, “IMO 2020: The Greening Of The Ship-Fuel Market,” February 28, 2019, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 OPEC 2.0 is the name we coined for the producer coalition led by KSA and Russia, which was formed in 2016 to manage global crude oil output. Its goal is to drain the massive storage overhang caused by the market-share war launched by KSA in 2014. 5 Iran cited dissatisfaction with Iraq over the accumulation of unpaid bills as the cause of the halt in electricity exports to Iraq. This prompted Iraqi authorities – under pressure from domestic unrest – to send a delegation to Saudi Arabia in attempt to negotiate an electricity agreement. 6 Please see Edward Wong, “Trump Pushes Iraq to Stop Buying Energy From Iran,” The New York Times, February 11, 2019, available at nytimes.com. 7 Please see Geneive Abdo and Firas Maksad, “Iraq’s Place in the Saudi Arabian-Iranian Rivalry,” The National Interest, April 15, 2019, available at nationalinterest.org. 8 Please see Babk Dehghanpisheh, “Iran will respond if OPEC members threaten its interests: oil minister,” Reuters, May 2, 2019, available at reuters.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q1 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades

Highlights So what? Quantifying geopolitical risk just got easier. Why?   In this report we introduce 10 proprietary, market-based indicators of country-level political and geopolitical risk. Featured countries include France, U.K., Germany, Italy, Spain, Russia, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, and Brazil. Other countries, and refinements to these beta-version indicators, will come in due time. We remain committed to qualitative, constraint-based analysis. Our GeoRisk Indicators will help us determine how the market is pricing key risks, so we can decide whether they are understated or overstated. Feature For the past three months we have been tracking a “Witches’ Brew” of political risks that threaten the late-cycle bull market. Some of these risks have abated for the time being: the Fed is on pause, China’s stimulus has surprised to the upside, and Brexit has been delayed. Other risks we have flagged, however, are heating up: Iran And Oil Market Volatility: Surprisingly the Trump administration has chosen not to extend oil sanction waivers on Iran from May 2, putting 1.3 million barrels per day of oil on schedule to be removed from international markets by an unspecified time.  It remains to be seen how rapidly and resolutely the administration will enforce the sanctions on specific allies and partners (Japan, India, Turkey) as well as rivals (China, others). Because the decision coincides with rising production risks from renewed fighting in Libya and regime failure in Venezuela, we expect President Trump to phase in the new enforcement over a period of months, particularly on China and India. But official rhetoric is draconian. Hence the potential for full and immediate enforcement is greater than we thought. In the short term, individual political leaders, and very powerful nations like the United States, can ignore material economic and political constraints. Since the Trump administration’s decision exemplifies this point, geopolitical tail risks will get fatter this year and next. Global oil price volatility and equity market volatility will increase with sanction enforcement actions and retaliation. We would think that Trump’s odds of reelection will marginally suffer, though for now still above 50%, as any full-fledged confrontation with Iran will raise the chances of an oil price-induced recession. U.S.-EU Trade War: Neither the Trump administration nor the U.S. has a compelling interest in imposing Section 232 tariffs on imports of autos and auto parts. Nevertheless the risk of some tariffs remains high – we put it at 35% – because President Trump is legally unconstrained. The decision is technically due by May 18 but Economic Council Director Larry Kudlow has said Trump may adjust the deadline and decide later. Later would make sense given the economic and financial risks of the administration’s decision to ramp up the pressure on Iran.1 But the risk that tariffs will pile onto a weak German and European economy will hang over investors’ heads. U.S.-China Talks Not A Game Changer: The ostensible demand that China cease Iranian oil imports immediately and the stalling of U.S. diplomacy with North Korea are not conducive to concluding a trade deal in May. We have highlighted many times that strategic tensions will persist even if Beijing and Washington quarantine these issues to agree to a short-term trade truce. The June 28-29 G20 meeting in Japan remains the likeliest date for a summit between Presidents Trump and Xi Jinping, but even this timeframe could be too optimistic. Continued uncertainty or a weak deal will fail to satisfy financial markets expecting a very positive outcome.   With a 70% chance that U.S. tariffs on China will not increase this year and, contingent on a U.S.-China deal, only a 35% chance that the U.S. slaps tariffs on German cars, we sound optimistic to some clients. But the Trump administration’s decision on Iran is highly market-relevant and portends greater volatility. We expect to see a geopolitical risk premium creep higher into oil markets as well as a greater risk of “Black Swan” events in strategically critical or oil-producing parts of the Middle East. There is limited research devoted to quantifying geopolitical risk. We are late in the business cycle and President Trump has emphatically decided to increase rather than decrease geopolitical risk. Quantifying Geopolitical Risk Geopolitical analysis has taken a bigger role in investors’ decision-making over the last decade. Surveys show that geopolitical risks rank among global investors’ top concerns overall. In the oft-cited Bank of America Merrill Lynch survey, geopolitical and related issues have dominated the “top tail risk” responses for the past half-decade (Chart 1). In other surveys, the most worrisome short-term risks are mostly political or geopolitical in nature, ranking above socio-economic and environmental risks (Chart 2). Despite this high level of concern, there is limited research devoted to quantifying geopolitical risk. Isolating and measuring the range of risks under this umbrella term remains a challenge. As such, for many investors, geopolitics remains an ad hoc, exogenous factor that is often mentioned but rarely incorporated into portfolio construction. For the past four decades the predominant ways of measuring political or geopolitical risk have been qualitative or semi-qualitative. The Delphi technique, developed on the basis of low-quality data sets in social sciences, relies on pooled expert opinions.2 Independently selected experts are asked to provide risk assessments and their responses are then interpreted by analysts to create a measure of risk. Another semi-qualitative method of measuring geopolitical risk ranks countries according to a set of political and socio-economic variables. These variables – such as governance, political and social stability, corruption, law and order, or formal and informal policies – are extremely important but inherently difficult to quantify.3 These results are useful but suffer from dependency on expert opinion, data quality, and institutional biases. More importantly, these methods are slow to react to breaking events in a rapidly changing world. The same goes for bottom-up assessments using political intelligence. The weakness of these methods is that it is highly unlikely that they will produce statistically significant estimates of risk. The odds of getting a “silver bullet” insight from a “key insider” are decent for simple political systems, but not in the complex jurisdictions that host the vast majority of global, liquid investments. Quantitative approaches to measuring geopolitical risk have since become more widespread. The most prominent method is based on quantifying the occurrence of words related to political and geopolitical tensions that appear in international newspapers. These word-counts typically include terms like “terrorism,” “crisis,” “war,” “military action,” etc. As a result, the indices reflect incidents of physical violence or other “Black Swan” events that may not have direct relevance to financial markets. Moreover, while news-based indices accurately capture dramatic one-time peaks at the time of a crisis, they are largely flat aside from these, as they rely on popular topics rather than underlying structural trends (Chart 3). They fail to capture geopolitical developments associated with electoral cycles, protest movements, paradigm shifts in economic policy, or other policy changes.4 Notice, for instance, that the fall of the Soviet Union in late 1991 and the resulting chaos in Russia and many other parts of the emerging world hardly register in Chart 3. Chart 3News-Based Indices Only Capture Crisis Peaks, Not Geopolitical Developments Introducing BCA’s GeoRisk Indicators The past 70 years have taught BCA Research to listen and respect the market. Why would we suddenly follow the media instead? Most quantitative geopolitical indicators begin with the premise that journalists and the news-reading public have accurately emphasized the most relevant risks and uncertainties. They proceed to quantify the terms of these assessments with increasingly sophisticated methods. This approach solves only part of the puzzle. News-based indices ... fail to capture geopolitical developments associated with underlying policy changes. At BCA Geopolitical Strategy, we aim to generate geopolitical alpha.5 This means identifying where financial media and markets overstate or understate geopolitical risks. We do not primarily aim to predict events or crises. As such, traditional news-based indicators that capture only major events, even those ex post facto, are of little relevance to our analysis. What is needed is a better way to quantify how the market is calculating risks. We start with a simple premise: the market is the greatest machine ever created for gauging the wisdom of the crowd. Furthermore, it puts its money where its predictions are, unlike other methods of geopolitical risk quantification which have no “value at risk.” Chart 4USD/RUB Captures Geopolitical Risk In Russia... To this end, we have introduced market-based indicators over the years that rely on currency movements, which are often the simplest and most immediate means of capturing the process of pricing risk. In 2015, for instance, we introduced an indicator that measures Russia’s geopolitical risk premium (Chart 4). It is constructed using the de-trended residual from a regression of USD/RUB against USD/NOK and Russian CPI relative to U.S. CPI. We can show empirically that it captures geopolitical risk priced into the ruble, as the indicator increases following critical incidents. These include the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 over eastern Ukraine in 2014; the warnings that Russia aimed to stage a “spring offensive” in Ukraine in 2015; Russian military intervention in the Syrian Civil War later that year; and the poisoning of former intelligence agent Sergei Skripal in the U.K. in 2018 and subsequent tensions. Using similar methods, we created a proxy to capture geopolitical risk in Taiwan, based on USD/JPY and USD/KRW exchange rates and relative Taiwanese/American inflation (Chart 5). The indicator tracks well with previous cross-strait crises. It jumped upon Taiwan’s election of President Tsai Ing-wen and her pro-independence government in January 2016 – and this was well before any tensions actually flared. It even registered a small increase upon her controversial phone call congratulating Donald Trump upon winning the U.S. election. Chart 5...And USD/TWD Captures Geopolitical Risk In Taiwan This year we have expanded on this work, constructing a set of ten standardized GeoRisk Indicators for five developed economies and five emerging economies: U.K., France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Russia, Turkey, Brazil, Korea, and Taiwan. Indicators for the U.S., China, and others will be rolled out in a future report. These indicators attempt to capture risk premiums priced into the various currencies – except for Euro Area countries, where the risk is embedded in equity prices. In each case, we look at whether the relevant assets are decreasing in value at a faster rate than implied by key explanatory variables. The explanatory variables consist of (1) an asset that moves together with the dependent variable while not responding to domestic geopolitical risks, and (2) a variable to capture the state of the economy. This set of indicators differs from our earlier indicators in the following ways: We aim to create a simple methodology that we can apply consistently to all countries, both in the DM and EM universes. We therefore omitted using regression models that can prove to be quite whimsical. Instead, we simply looked at the deviation of the dependent variable from the explanatory variables, all in expanding standardized terms, to create the GeoRisk proxy. We wanted an indicator that would immediately respond to priced-in risks, so we opted for a daily frequency rather than the weekly frequency we used in our initial work. To get as accurate of a signal as possible, we use point-in-time data. Since economic data tends to be released with a one-to-two-month lag, we lagged the economic independent variable to correspond to its release date. All ten indicators are shown in the Appendix. Across all countries, they track well with both short-term events and long-term trends in geopolitical risk. In the case of France, for example, the indicator steadily climbs during the period of domestic tensions and protests in the early 2000s; as the European debt crisis flares up; again during the rise of the anti-establishment Front National and the Russian military intervention in Ukraine; and finally during the U.S. trade tariffs and Yellow Vest protests (Chart 6). Our GeoRisk indicators isolate risks that either originate internally or otherwise affect the country more so than others. Similarly, in Germany, there is a general increase in perceived risk as Chancellor Gerhard Schröder implements structural reforms in the early 2000s; another increase leading up to the leadership change as Angela Merkel is elected Chancellor; another during the global and European financial crises; another during the Ukraine invasion and refugee influx; and finally another with the U.S.-China trade war (Chart 7). Chart 6Our French Indicator Picks Up Domestic And European Unrest Chart 7Greater German Risk Amid The Trade War   We have annotated each country’s GeoRisk indicator heavily in the appendix so that readers can see for themselves the correspondence with political events. The indicators are affected by international developments – like the Great Recession – but we have done our best to isolate risks that either originate internally or otherwise affect the country more than other countries. (As a consequence, the Great Recession is muted in some cases.) What are the indicators telling us now? Most obviously, they highlight the extreme risk we have witnessed in the U.K. over the now-delayed March 29 Brexit deadline. We would bet against this risk as the political reality has demonstrated that a “hard Brexit” is very low probability: the U.K. has the ability to back off unilaterally while the EU is willing to extend for the sake of regional stability. In this sense the pound is a tactical buy, which our foreign exchange strategist Chester Ntonifor has highlighted.6 Our U.K. risk indicator has been fairly well correlated with the GBP/USD since the global financial crisis and it suggests that the pound has more room to rally (Chart 8). Chart 8Betting Against A Hard Brexit, the GBP Is A Tactical Buy Meanwhile, Spanish risks are overstated while Italy’s are understated. As for the emerging world, Turkish risks should be expected to spike yet again, as divisions emerge within the ruling coalition in the wake of critical losses in local elections and a failure to reassure investors over monetary policy and the currency. Brazilian risks will probably not match the crisis points of the impeachment and the 2018 election, at least not until controversial pension reforms reach a period of peak uncertainty over legislative passage. Both our new Russian indicator and its prototype are collapsing (see Chart 4 above). This captures the fact that we stand at a critical juncture in Russian affairs, where President Putin is attempting to shift focus to domestic stability even as the U.S. and the West maintain pressure on the economy to deter Russia from its aggressive foreign policy. Given that both Putin’s and the government’s approval ratings are low amid rising oil prices, the stage is set for Russia to take a provocative foreign policy action meant to distract the populace from its poor living conditions. Venezuela is the obvious candidate, but there are others. Moscow will want to test Ukraine’s newly elected, inexperienced president; it may also make a show of support for Iran. With Russia equities having rallied on a relative basis over the past year and a half, and with the Iranian waiver decision already boosting oil prices as we go to press, the window of opportunity to buy Russian stocks is starting to close. (We remain overweight relative to EM on a tactical horizon; our Emerging Markets Strategy is also overweight.) Going forward, we will update these risk indicators regularly as needed and publish the full appendix at the end of every month along with our long-running Geopolitical Calendar. We will also fine-tune the indicators as new information comes to light. In other words, here we present only the beta version. We hope that these indicators will help inform investors as to the direction, and even magnitude, of political risks as the market prices them. Our GeoRisk indicators are not predictive, as establishing a trend is not a prediction. The main purpose of this exercise is to answer the critical question, “What is already priced in?” How is the market currently calculating geopolitical risk for a country? After that, it is the geopolitical strategist’s job to unpack this question through qualitative, constraint-based analysis. It is when our qualitative assessments disagree with what is priced in that we can generate geopolitical alpha.    Ekaterina Shtrevensky, Research Analyst ekaterinas@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic Consulting Editor marko@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      See Sean Higgins, “Auto tariffs decision could be delayed, Kudlow says,” Washington Examiner, April 3, 2019, www.washingtonexaminer.com. 2      Norman C. Dalkey and Olaf Helmer-Hirschberg, “An Experimental Application of the Delphi Method to the Use of Experts,” Management Science, Vol. 9, Issue: 3 (April 1963) pp. 458- 467. 3      Darryl S. L. Jarvis, “Conceptualizing, Analyzing and Measuring Political Risk: The Evolution of Theory and Method,” Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Research Paper No. LKYSPP08-004 (July 2008).  William D. Coplin and Michael K. O'Leary, "Political Forecast For International Business," Planning Review, Vol. 11 Issue: 3 (1983) pp.14-23. The PRS Group, “Political Risk Services”™ (PRS) or the “Coplin-O’Leary Country Risk Rating System”™ Methodology. Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, “The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5430 (September 2010). 4      Scott R. Baker, Nicholas Bloom, and Steven J. Davis, “Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 131, Issue 4, November 2016 (July 2016) pp.1593–1636. Dario Caldara and Matteo Iacoviello, “Measuring Geopolitical Risk,” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board, Working Paper (January 2018). 5      Please see BCA Research Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, “Five Myths On Geopolitical Forecasting,” dated July 9, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6      Please see BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, “Not Out Of The Woods Yet,” April 5, 2019, available at www.bcaresearch.com.   Appendix Appendix France Appendix U.K. Appendix Germany Appendix Italy Appendix Spain Appendix Russia Appendix Korea Appendix Taiwan Appendix Turkey Appendix Brazil What’s On The Geopolitical Radar?      Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights OPEC 2.0 will meet in June to decide whether to continue its production cuts into 2H19. Once again, the leaders are sending conflicting signals – KSA is subtly indicating OPEC 2.0’s 1.2mm b/d of production cuts will need to be extended to year-end. Russia, not so much. Much will depend on whether the U.S. extends waivers on Iran oil-export sanctions when they expire May 2. Not surprisingly, Trump administration officials also are not providing much in the way of forward guidance to markets, other than to insist they want Iran’s exports at zero. Our modeling indicates OPEC 2.0 – the producer coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia – will need to raise production in 2H19, as markets tighten on the back of Venezuela’s collapse, continued unplanned outages (most recently in Libya) and still-strong demand. This aligns our view somewhat with that of Russia. That said, OPEC 2.0’s leaders – and member states – all benefit from higher prices, as we show below. Some, like Russia, more so than others – e.g., KSA, hard as that is to reconcile with their respective stances on production cuts. But none benefits if EM demand is crushed by high prices. It’s a delicate balancing act, given the aggregate GDP of EM commodity-importing countries exceeds that of commodity-exporting countries (Chart of the Week).1 Chart of the WeekEM Commodity Importers Dominate Aggregate EM Oil Demand We continue to expect Brent to trade at $75/bbl this year and $80/bbl next year, given our expectation for global supply and demand. KSA and Russia remain the fulcrum of the oil market, as we argued recently, and anticipating their decision-making process remains the critical task for understanding the new political economy of oil.2 Highlights Energy: Overweight. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo demanded opposing forces in Libya cease fighting this week. The country recently lifted oil production over 1mm b/d, but renewed fighting threatens this output. Base Metals: Neutral. China’s National Development & Reform Commission (NDRC) earlier this week tee’d up markets to expect higher infrastructure and transportation spending, which lifted steel and iron ore markets. Markets continue to tighten on the back of the Vale high-grade iron-ore supply losses, which could lift prices above $100/MT in the short term. Precious Metals: Neutral. Central banks continued buying gold in February, the World Gold Council reported this week. Central-bank holdings rose a net 51 tonnes in February bringing total additions to 90 tonnes in the first two months of the year. Agriculture: Underweight. The USDA lifted its estimate of global ending stocks for corn by 5.5mm tons for the 2018/19 crop year. With total use estimates unchanged at 1.13 billion tons, this raises ending stocks-to-use estimates, which will continue to exert downward pressure on prices. Feature KSA and Russia share a common feature in that both are petro states, and thus heavily dependent on crude and product exports to fund their governments and economies. Both suffered a near-death experience during the 2014-16 oil-market-share war launched by OPEC, and both have seen their GDPs slowly recover, following the successful production-cutting agreements they jointly engineered to drain excess inventories and restore balance to the market beginning in 2017 and renewed this year (Chart 2). Russia’s GDP gets more than twice the lift from higher Brent prices than KSA’s does. At first blush, it would be logical to assume KSA’s and Russia’s GDPs are driven by the same economic forces of oil supply and demand. In broad terms, they are. Both benefit from higher oil prices, given they are predominantly petro-economies, although Russia tends to benefit more as prices rise (Chart 3). In the post-GFC era, we find that a 1% increase in Brent prices lifts Russia’s GDP ~ 0.07%, while KSA’s goes up ~ 0.03%. Another way of saying this is Russia’s GDP gets more than twice the lift from higher Brent prices than KSA’s does. Chart 2KSA, Russia GDPs Recover, Following OPEC 2.0 Production Cuts Chart 3Russia Benefits More From Higher Brent Prices Looking a bit deeper into KSA’s and Russia’s GDPs’ sensitivities to Brent prices, we modeled income growth for both using our Brent forecast (Table 1), the futures markets’ forward curve and compare both to the World Bank’s expectation (Chart 4, bottom panel). KSA tends to benefit more from higher EM oil demand, with its GDP rising almost 1% for every 1% increase in EM oil demand. Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) Given our expectation for EM GDP growth (Chart of the Week), we expect KSA’s GDP to show relatively strong growth with GDP up ~ 5.4% this year and ~ 3.5% next year, propelled partly by higher oil prices (Chart 4, top panel). KSA tends to benefit more from higher EM oil demand, with its GDP rising almost 1% for every 1% increase in EM oil demand. Russia’s GDP goes up ~ 0.25% for every 1% increase in EM oil demand. We expect Russia’s GDP to dip then recover in 4Q19, then rise 3.5% by the end of 3Q20 before tapering off toward the end of 2020. This is not surprising given the trajectory for Brent prices in our forecasts and in the futures curves, and the sensitivity of Russia’s GDP to oil prices.We found a similar impact of EM oil demand on Russia and KSA GDPs when controlling for EM FX rates instead of Brent prices (Chart 5).3 Chart 4Higher Oil Prices Will Lift KSA's And Russia's GDPs Chart 5While KSA Benefits More From Higher EM Demand U.S. Waivers Dictate OPEC 2.0’s Decision On Production KSA has indicated it sees a need to extend OPEC 2.0’s production-cutting deal into 2H19, when the coalition’s ministers meet in June. Of late, Khalid al-Falih, KSA’s oil minister, is indicating no further cuts in the Kingdom’s output are needed, however. Russia’s a bit of a cipher. President Vladimir Putin this week stated Russia will continue to cooperate with KSA vis-à-vis managing production, although his energy minister, Alexander Novak, has indicated he sees no reason for extending OPEC 2.0’s production deal. Both sides are waiting on fundamental data, and the decision of the U.S. on its waivers on Iranian oil-export sanctions. There’s also the ever-likely collapse of Venezuela to consider, and renewed violence in Libya, both of which argue against letting the waivers expire. The Trump administration has no incentive to risk inducing an oil shock on the global economy. The countries granted waivers on U.S. sanctions against Iranian crude oil imports appear to be exercising their option to lift additional barrels, based on data showing loadings out of Iran increased for the fourth consecutive month (Chart 6 and Table 2).4 Loadings out of Iran rose to 1.30mm b/d in March, from 1.24mm b/d in February. Table 2Iran Exports By Country 2018-2019 (‘000 b/d) Bottom Line: We continue to expect U.S. waivers on Iranian oil sanctions will be extended to year end in some form. The collapse of Venezuela and renewed violence in Libya show how tenuously balanced oil markets are at present. Going into a general election in the U.S. next year, the Trump administration has no incentive to risk inducing an oil shock on the global economy. When they meet in June, ministers from OPEC 2.0 member states will be ideally set up to respond to the Trump administration’s decision on waivers for Iranian oil imports, which expire May 2. We are closing our June 2019 $70 vs. $75/bbl call spread, as the position is close to expiry.   Robert P. Ryan, Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      In the post-GFC world, we find total EM oil demand rises ~ 0.4% for each 1% rise in EM commodity-importers’ GDP, while it only rises ~ 0.3% for each 1% rise in EM commodity exporters’ GDP, based on our modeling. According to World Banks’ constant 2010 USD series, EM commodity importers’ GDP represented 66% of total EM GDP in 2018, up from 56% in 2010. The EM income elasticity of oil demand has remained at roughly ~ 0.60 from 2000 to now, meaning a 1% increase in EM GDP – hence EM income – lifts oil demand by ~ 0.6%. This has been remarkably stable pre-GFC, post-GFC and from 2000 to now. 2      The new political economy of oil is a continuing theme in our research. For an extended discussion of this theme, please see “The New Political Economy of Oil,” and “OPEC 2.0: Oil’ Price Fulcrum,” published by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy on February 21 and March 21, 2019. Both are available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3      When using EM FX rates instead of Brent prices as an explanatory variable, we find KSA’s GDP still increases a little more than 1% for every 1% increase in EM oil demand, but Russia’s rises closer to 0.6%. NB: All GDP measures use historical World Bank data, and BCA Research estimates using the Bank’s projections in constant 2010 USD.  We proxy EM oil demand using non-OECD oil consumption.  KSA’s production is crude oil only, while Russia’s production is crude and liquids. 4      For a discussion of the waivers’ optionality, please see our BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report “OPEC 2.0: Oil’ Price Fulcrum,” published on March 21, 2019, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 2019 Q1 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table   Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades

Political economy – i.e., the interplay between critical nation states’ policies and markets – often trumps straightforward supply-demand analysis in oil. This is because policy decisions affect production and consumption, along with global trade. These decisions, in turn, determine constraints states – central and tangential – confront in pursuit of their interests. Presently, U.S. policies toward Venezuela and Iran dominate oil supply considerations, while Sino – U.S. trade tensions and their effect on EM consumption dominate the demand side. In this month’s balances assessment, we revised some of our supply-side assumptions to include the high probability U.S. waivers on Iranian export sanctions will have to be extended until Venezuela stabilizes. OPEC 2.0 appears to be flexible -- positioning for either an extension of waivers, or sanctions. This keeps our baseline oil-supply assumptions fairly steady this year as the coalition adjusts to changes in Venezuela’s output. Adjustments could be volatile, however. On the demand side, we continue to expect growth of 1.49mm b/d this year and 1.57mm b/d in 2020. Steadier production and unchanged demand assumptions lower our price forecasts slightly to $75/bbl and $80/bbl this year and next for Brent, with WTI trading $7.0/bbl and $3.25/bbl below those levels, respectively (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekExpect OPEC 2.0 To Smooth Venezuelan Production Losses In 2019 Highlights Energy: Overweight. Nigeria’s elections, scheduled for this past weekend, were unexpectedly postponed until Saturday. Political leaders urged Nigerians to “refrain from civil disorder and remain peaceful, patriotic and united to ensure that no force or conspiracy derail our democratic development.”1 Nigeria produces ~ 1.7mm b/d of oil. Base Metals/Bulks: Neutral. Estimated LMEX, CME, SHFE and bonded Chinese warehouse copper inventories are down 29.8% y/y, which will continue to be supportive of prices. Precious Metals: Neutral. Palladium is trading ~ $111/oz over gold, as concerns over supply deficits persist. The last time this occurred was on November, 2002. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Chinese buyers are believed to have cancelled as much as 1.25mm bushels of soybean purchases last week, according to feedandgrain.com. Feature The analytical framework informing global political economy provides a useful augmentation to our standard supply-demand analysis, particularly now, when U.S. policy continues to play a pivotal role in the evolution of oil fundamentals. In particular, we believe the near-term evolution of oil prices hinges on how events in Venezuela play out, following the imposition of U.S. trade and financial sanctions directed against the state-owned PDVSA oil company and the Maduro regime. The evolution of the U.S.’s PDVSA sanctions will directly determine whether waivers on Iranian export sanctions granted by the Trump administration in November are extended when they expire in May.2 These tightly linked evolutions, in turn, will drive OPEC 2.0 production policy, and whether its production-cutting agreement is extended beyond its June 2019 termination. As we discussed recently, we see OPEC 2.0 building its flexibility to adjust quickly to either an extension of the waivers on Iranian sanctions, or to accommodate the termination of these sanctions at the end of May. Given the state of the market, which we discuss below, we believe waivers on Iranian export sanctions almost surely will be extended when they expire in May. Global Oil Markets Are Tightening Our supply assumptions are driven by our assessment that global spare capacity of just over 2.5mm b/d could accommodate the loss of Venezuelan oil exports with little difficulty (in a matter of months), aside from a further tightening at the margin in the heavy-sour crude oil market (Chart of the Week and Table 1). In fact, the loss of up to 1mm b/d or more of Iranian exports – versus the ~ 800k b/d we now expect if waivers are extended until December – could also be accommodated by OPEC 2.0’s spare capacity, given the rebuilding of this potential output on the back of OPEC production cuts, which have the effect of increasing spare capacity (Chart 2).3 Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply – Demand Balances (MMb/d) (Base Case Balances) However, should this combination of events be realized, an unplanned outage similar to the one that removed ~ 1mm b/d of Canadian production due to wildfires in the summer of 2016, with Venezuela production falling toward 650k b/d and Iranian exports even partially constrained, could move the oil market perilously close to the limits of global spare capacity, which now stands just over 2.5mm b/d, based on the EIA’s reckoning. This would increase the risk of dramatically higher prices, simply because the flex in the system would approach zero. Iranian Waivers Hinge On Venezuela The manner in which U.S. sanctions against PDVSA and the Maduro regime evolve – in particular, whether regime change is affected – will determine whether waivers on the oil-export sanctions the U.S. re-imposed on Iran last November are extended beyond their end-May terminal point. In turn, this will affect OPEC 2.0’s production policies, particularly after its production-cutting agreement expires in June. In our current model of OPEC 2.0 production, we now expect its 2019 production to continue to decline in 1H19, to drain the overhang resulting from the ramp-up member states undertook in preparation for U.S. sanctions against Iran. This policy was substantially reversed with the last-minute granting of waivers to eight importing countries by the Trump administration prior to sanctions kicking in in November. This led to a sharp sell-off in crude oil prices in 4Q18, as market participants re-calibrated the supply side of global balances. In 2H19, our base case assumes OPEC 2.0’s production rises by ~ 900mm b/d (December vs. July 2019 level), to smooth out the loss of Venezuelan output as it falls to 650k b/d by the end of this year from just under 1.1mm b/d now. The goal of this policy is to quickly drain global inventories to levels comfortably below the five-year average (in 1H19), and then to keep Brent prices in the $75/bbl to $80/bbl range over 2H19 – end-2020 (Chart 3). We expect core OPEC 2.0 countries, led by KSA, core GCC states and Russia production to rise by more than 500k b/d in 2H19 (vs. 1H19 levels), to maintain inventories at desired levels and prices in the $75/bbl to $80/bbl range. Chart 3Core OPEC And Non-OPEC Output Will Rise To Offset Venezuelan Losses To this end, we assume core OPEC 2.0’s production rises in 2020 to 33.52mm b/d from 32.98mm b/d in 2019, led by a ~ 200k b/d increase from KSA – which takes its output to ~ 10.4mm b/d from ~ 10.2mm b/d in 2019. We expect Russian production to rise to 11.7mm b/d from ~ 11.5mm b/d in 2019. Additional output hikes come from core OPEC and other non-OPEC producers (Chart 4, Table 1). Chart 4OPEC 2.0's Goal: Quickly Reduce Inventories In 1H19 We do not try to forecast how the sanctions against PDVSA and the Maduro government play out – i.e., whether the incumbent government survives, or whether a peaceful or violent regime change occurs. If Venezuela were to descend into civil war, or were to experience a violent revolution, the outcome would be unpredictable and the rebuilding of that economy – regardless of who emerges to take control of the state – would require years. Likewise, if President Maduro and the military leaders supporting him were to quietly decamp, it still would require years to rebuild that country’s oil industry and economy.4 We view the odds of a confrontation between the U.S. and Venezuela’s benefactors/creditors as extremely low. We believe the U.S. would revive the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, and that Russia and China most likely would concede Venezuela is within the U.S.’s sphere of influence, as neither intend to project the force and maintain the supply lines such a confrontation would require.5 Because the resolution of the political uncertainty in Venezuela is unsure and the outcome unknowable – particularly when unplanned outages represent such a non-trivial risk to global supply at the margin – we strongly believe waivers granted on U.S. sanctions against Iranian oil exports will be extended at least by 90 to 180 days when they expire at the end of May. As we discuss above, global spare capacity is insufficient to cover the loss of Venezuelan and Iranian output, and still have the flexibility required to meet a large unplanned outage over the course of this year or next. For this reason, Iranian sanctions will not be immediately re-imposed following the termination of U.S. waivers on exports from that state; importers most likely will be increasing their liftings of Iranian crude, in line with the extension of the waivers we expect over the course of 2H19 (Chart 5). Oil Demand Continues To Hold Up We continue to expect global oil demand to grow by 1.49mm b/d this year and 1.57mm b/d in 2020, led as always by strong EM demand growth, with China and India at the forefront (Table 1). DM demand growth is expected to slow this year, but put in a respectable performance, as well. EM commodity demand growth generally has been trending down at a slow and constant pace since the beginning of 2018, as we discussed last week when we presented our new Global Industrial Activity (GIA) index. The index indicates demand is not as stellar as it was during the synchronized global upturn of 2017, but that it also is not as bad as sentiment and expectations would indicate.6 Pulling It All Together On balance, we expect the combination of stronger OPEC 2.0 output, plus an 800k b/d increase in U.S. shale-oil production, which lifts total U.S. crude-oil output from 12.42mm b/d to 13.49mm b/d next year, is enough to keep Brent prices close to $80/bbl next year, vs. the $75/bbl we expect this year (Chart 6). We revised our expectation for WTI slightly, and now expect it to trade ~ $7.0/bbl under Brent this year and at a $3.75/bbl discount next year. Chart 6Balanced Oil Market Expected This Year and Next ... The OPEC 2.0 production discipline and lower U.S. shale-oil output, coupled with strong – not stellar – demand growth combine to allow OECD commercial oil inventories (crude and products) to resume drawing and to fall comfortably below OPEC 2.0’s 2010 – 2014 five-year average target (Chart 7). This will be supportive of the Brent backwardation trade we recommended on January 3, 2019 which now is up 265.5%, as of Tuesday’s close. Chart 7... And Oil Inventories Resume Falling Bottom Line: We revised our supply estimates, and now expect OPEC 2.0 to cover lost Venezuelan output arising from the imposition of U.S. sanctions on PDVSA and the continued deterioration of that state’s oil industry. Because global spare capacity cannot handle the loss of Venezuelan and Iranian oil exports at the same time and still cover a large unplanned outage, we expect the waivers on U.S. sanctions of Iranian oil exports to be extended for up to 180 days following their termination at the end of May. We expect Brent crude oil prices to average $75/bbl this year and $80/bbl next year as oil markets balance. We expect WTI to trade ~ $7.0/bbl below Brent this year, and $3.25/bbl under in 2020.   Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see “Nigeria Election 2019: Appeal For Calm After Shock Delay,” published February 16, 2019, by bbc.com. 2 OPEC 2.0 is the name we coined for the producer coalition of OPEC states, led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and non-OPEC states led by Russia, which recently agreed to cut production by ~ 1.2mm b/d to drain commercial oil inventories and re-balance markets globally. OPEC 2.0’s market monitoring committee meets in April to assess the production-cutting deal it reached in November, which is set to expire in June. The full coalition meets in May to set policy going forward. This is just ahead of the expiration of U.S. waivers on Iranian oil exports. For a discussion of OPEC 2.0’s production optionality, please see “OPEC Starts Cutting Oil Output; Demand Fears Are Overdone,” published by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy January 24, 2019.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 We are watching the evolution of the partial closure of the offshore Safaniya field in KSA about two weeks ago closely. With 1mm b/d capacity, this is the world’s largest offshore producing field; no updates have been provided by KSA this week. 4 Please see “What Next For Venezuela,” by Anne Kreuger published by project-syndicate.org on February 15, 2019 for a discussion. 5 We note here that Gazprombank, the Russian bank, froze PDVSA’s accounts over the weekend to avoid running afoul of U.S. sanctions against the company. Please see “Russia’s Gazprombank decided to freeze PDVSA accounts – source,” published by reuters.com February 17, 2019. See also “What Comes Next For Venezuela’s Oil Industry,” published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies February 12, 2019, which details how U.S. sanctions amount to the equivalent of a full-on embargo by forcing payment for Venezuelan oil to be deposited in accounts that cannot be accessed by the government or PDVSA. 6 We discuss our global demand outlook in last week’s Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, in an article entitled “Oil, Copper Demand Worries Are Overdone.” It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 4Q18 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Trades Closed in