Monetary
Highlights Duration: The Fed is unlikely to slow its 25 bps per quarter rate hike pace until there is sufficient evidence pointing to a slow-down in economic growth. Maintain below-benchmark duration in U.S. bond portfolios. Yield Curve: The yield curve will remain near its current level and await confirmation from rising wage growth. The 2-year maturity point is becoming more attractive, and it will soon be time to switch our yield curve positioning from favoring the 5-year/7-year part of the curve to the 2-year. Economy: The global growth data improved somewhat during the past month, but weak foreign growth remains the greatest risk to the U.S. recovery and the Fed's 25 bps per quarter rate hike cycle. Feature Treasury yields increased last week. The 10-year is once again flirting with 3% and the market now discounts four 25 basis point rate hikes by the end of 2019. This time last week it was only priced for three (Chart 1). Chart 110-Year Testing 3% Last week's bearish price action occurred despite core inflation and retail sales both printing well below expectations. But the market saw through the economic data and instead took its cue from a speech given by Fed Governor Lael Brainard.1 A speech that was rightly interpreted as hawkish. We view last week's speech as important because Governor Brainard effectively refuted two arguments that the Fed could use to justify a slower pace for rate hikes in the coming months. Brainard's message to markets is that if any investor still expects the Fed to rely on one of those excuses, they should think again. Getting Close To Neutral One potential reason for the Fed to slow its 25 bps per quarter rate hike pace is that current FOMC estimates place the longer-run neutral fed funds rate between 2.8% and 3.5%.2 This means that four more rate hikes would be sufficient for monetary policy to move from accommodative to neutral. If those neutral rate estimates turn out to be correct, then the Fed might be justified in halting its rate hike cycle this time next year. The problem, as we have pointed out in several prior reports, is that the error bars around such neutral rate estimates are very wide. So wide that we think the FOMC will pay them little attention and focus instead on trends in the actual economy and financial markets.3 Governor Brainard attacks the issue from a different angle, but arrives at the same conclusion. Brainard's framework draws a distinction between the short-run neutral rate - which is allowed to fluctuate in response to changes in the economy - and the long-run neutral rate - which is the neutral rate that prevails "after transitory forces reflecting headwinds or tailwinds have played out." In practice, this distinction means that if the economy proves resilient to a rising fed funds rate, we should conclude that the short-run neutral rate is moving higher. This would mean that higher interest rates are required before monetary policy turns restrictive. If economic tailwinds are strong enough, the short-run neutral rate could even move above the long-run rate. This framework leads to the same investment strategy we have suggested in many prior reports. Investors should ignore neutral rate estimates altogether, and focus instead on monitoring the economy and financial markets for signals that monetary policy is turning restrictive. Some potential signals we have suggested in the past include:4 When year-over-year nominal GDP growth is below the fed funds rate When cyclical spending slows as a percentage of overall GDP When the Treasury curve inverts When the gold price breaks dramatically lower Governor Brainard's speech pointed to one more indicator that we should add to our list: evidence of tightening from indicators of overall financial conditions. The strong relationship between financial conditions and future economic growth is well documented, meaning that Fed rate hikes will only exert a drag on growth if they translate into tighter overall financial conditions. Charts 2, 3 and 4 show how this played out during the past three Fed tightening cycles. Chart 2 shows that financial conditions tightened immediately after the Fed first raised rates in March 1997. They continued to tighten until the Fed stopped hiking in mid-2000. In contrast, Chart 3 shows that financial conditions did not tighten immediately when the Fed first lifted rates in June 2004, but that they eventually tightened as the Fed persisted with hikes. Chart 4 shows how financial conditions have evolved in the current cycle. Broadly speaking, overall financial conditions appear easier now than when the rate hike cycle began in December 2015. In other words, Fed rate hikes have so far not translated into tighter financial conditions. In Brainard's framework this can only mean that the short-run neutral rate has been rising alongside the fed funds rate. This suggests that more rate hikes are required to tighten overall financial conditions and slow growth. Chart 2Financial Conditions: 1990s Chart 3Financial Conditions: 2000s Chart 4Financial Conditions: Present Day Inflation Is Well Contained A second reason why many have suggested that the Fed could slow its pace of rate hikes is that inflation remains well contained near the Fed's target, and the risk of a meaningful overshoot appears low. At 2.19%, year-over-year core CPI inflation is consistent with the Fed's target. However, our Base Effects Indicator suggests it will decelerate during the next six months (Chart 5). Our core PCE Base Effects Indicator sends a similar message, as we showed in a recent report.5 But Brainard suggested that the Fed should broaden its scope beyond a simple inflation target. Specifically, she observed that: The past few times unemployment fell to levels as low as those projected over the next year, signs of overheating showed up in financial-sector imbalances rather than in accelerating inflation. The Federal Reserve's assessment suggests that financial vulnerabilities are building[.] As evidence that financial vulnerabilities are rising, Brainard pointed to low corporate bond spreads, rising corporate debt levels and easing underwriting standards (Chart 6). This would appear to make the case for further rate hikes even if inflation remains well contained near the Fed's target. Chart 5Inflation Will Stay Close To Target Chart 6Brainard Looks Beyond Inflation Bottom Line: The Fed is unlikely to slow its 25 bps per quarter rate hike pace until there is sufficient evidence pointing to a slow-down in economic growth. Maintain below-benchmark duration in U.S. bond portfolios. Treasury Curve: Considering The 2-Year As we pointed out last week, the Treasury curve has already discounted a significant acceleration in wage growth (Chart 7).6 This is fairly common cyclical behavior. In each of the past two cycles the Treasury curve has flattened sharply and then leveled-off at a low level as wages accelerated. We expect we have now reached this latter stage. The 2/10 slope will stay near its current level for a time, awaiting confirmation from wage growth. Chart 7Waiting For Wages In our view, the more interesting yield curve trend is that the spread between the 2-year yield and the fed funds rate has widened to above the 2/10 slope (Chart 7, panel 2). Periods where the fed funds/2-year slope exceeds the 2-year/10-year slope are rare, and tend to be quickly followed by fed funds/2-year flattening. The attractiveness of the 2-year note is confirmed by our butterfly spread models. We model different butterfly spread (bullet over duration-matched barbell) combinations relative to the slope between the two legs of the barbell.7 Our models show that the 2-year bullet is consistently cheap relative to different barbell combinations, and in fact cheaper than all other bullet maturities (Table 1). Table 1Butterfly Strategy Valuation At present, we recommend a yield curve position that is long the 7-year bullet and short the 1/20 barbell. We will continue to hold this position for the time being because, while the 2-year note appears cheaper than the 7-year, we think the 2-year has room to cheapen even further. As mentioned at the beginning of this report, the Treasury market is priced for just barely four rate hikes between now and the end of 2019. The 2-year yield has further upside as more rate hikes get priced in. The upside in the 7-year yield is more limited. Bottom Line: The yield curve will remain near its current level and await confirmation from rising wage growth. The 2-year maturity point is becoming more attractive, and it will soon be time to switch our yield curve positioning from favoring the 5-year/7-year part of the curve to the 2-year. Global Growth Update Governor Brainard's speech shot down two arguments for why the Fed might turn more dovish, but this certainly does not rule out the Fed slowing its pace of rate hikes if economic growth starts to weaken. In past reports we noted that the Global Leading Economic Indicator (LEI) excluding the U.S. is below zero (Chart 8). Since 1993, every time the Global ex. U.S. LEI has fallen below zero, the U.S. LEI has eventually followed. It is conceivable, and perhaps even likely, that the same dynamic will play out again. However, the most recent data on global growth have been somewhat more optimistic. While the Global Manufacturing PMI (excluding the U.S.) has been trending lower, it remains at healthy levels compared to recent history (Chart 8, panel 2). Further, our Global PMI Diffusion index perked up in August, and now shows that 86% of the 36 countries in our sample have PMIs above the 50 boom/bust line (Chart 8, panel 3). The Global LEI also ticked higher in July, and its diffusion index increased, though it remains below 50% (Chart 8, bottom panel). While the monthly LEI and PMI data have improved, indicators of investor sentiment derived from both surveys and financial market prices remain downtrodden. The Global ZEW survey of investor sentiment, the performance of cyclical equity sectors versus defensives and our Boom/Bust Indicator all suggest that U.S. bond yields are too high for the global growth environment (Chart 9). Chart 8Slight Improvement In Global Growth Chart 9High Frequency Global Growth Indicators It's difficult to say how this will all play out, but our sense is that there remains a strong chance that weak foreign growth will eventually drag the U.S. lower. This will cause the Fed to pause its rate hike cycle for a time. However, given the uncertainty surrounding this outcome and the fact that the market is already priced for only two rate hikes in the remainder of 2018 and two more in all of 2019, we view the balance of risks as still consistent with below-benchmark portfolio duration. Bottom Line: The global growth data improved somewhat during the past month, but weak foreign growth remains the greatest risk to the U.S. recovery and the Fed's 25 bps per quarter rate hike cycle. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20180912a.htm 2 Governor Brainard defines the neutral fed funds rate as: "the level of the federal funds rate that keeps output growing around its potential rate in an environment of full employment and stable inflation." 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Powell Doctrine Emerges", dated September 4, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Tracking The Two-Stage Treasury Bear", dated August 14, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Powell Doctrine Emerges", dated September 4, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary, "Playing Catch-Up", dated September 11, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies", dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights When projecting the future course of interest rates, the Fed is the best place to start: Although the Fed only expressly controls short rates, its influence is felt across all maturities. Until it inverts the yield curve, its rate-hike campaigns push all yields higher. Its decisions are influenced by inflation, ... : Our checklist of items that might lead us to change our below-benchmark duration view includes key consumer price series as well as inflation expectations and estimates of the economy's supply-demand balance. ... the state of the labor market, ... : We are monitoring compensation trends and ancillary employment measures in addition to the headline unemployment rate to get a fix on how much slack remains in the labor market. ... and signs of major imbalances: Heading off, or ameliorating, a crisis is the third element of the Fed's mandate. Major economic or financial imbalances, or an overseas crisis, could alter the Fed's policy course, and we are on the lookout for them. Feature Over the last seven weeks, we have laid out our big-picture views on markets and the economic backdrop influencing them. We see rates going higher (July 30th Weekly Report); credit performance deteriorating, albeit slowly (August 6th Weekly Report); and the equity bull market stretching into the second half of next year (August 13th Special Report). We do not foresee a recession before 2020 (August 13th Special Report), in large part because we do not expect the monetary policy cycle to turn until the second half of next year (September 3rd Special Report). With that cyclical framework in place, we can now turn to an analysis of the relevant real-time data and its impact on our market outlooks. Checklists are useful tools to help systematize that analysis. They also help track the evolution of our views in real time. Consistent tracking helps us evaluate and improve our process, while making it easier for clients to think along with us, and anticipate our next moves. This week, we introduce our rates checklist, which details the key series we're watching that could encourage us to change our below-benchmark duration recommendation. We will roll out a companion equity checklist next month. The Fed Versus Market Expectations Table 1Rates View Checklist Our aversion to Treasuries largely stems from our view that the Fed will hike more than markets currently expect. The divergence between our view and the markets' view can be resolved in one of two ways: the market can revise its rate-hike expectations higher to meet ours, or we can lower our expectations to meet theirs. Long-maturity bonds will sell off in the former scenario, validating our below-benchmark-duration call, but the call will underperform if we have to cut our expectations. The "Market Perceptions of the Fed" section of our checklist (Table 1) is designed to highlight changes in the Fed's actions or investors' interpretation of them. Opportunities to earn market-beating returns arise from divergences between outcomes and consensus expectations. If, as we expect, the fed funds rate peaks at 3.5% or above in this cycle, well ahead of the current 3% market expectation, below-benchmark-duration positions will outperform. As the consensus expectation approaches our expectation, however, the incremental return from estimating the terminal rate more accurately than the consensus shrinks. The first checklist item monitors the difference between our terminal rate projection and the market projection as implied by overnight index swaps. As the distance narrows between our estimate (marked by the "X"s in Chart 1), and the peak of the OIS series, so too will the prospective rewards from below-benchmark-duration positioning. The checklist also tracks the yield curve for its insight into whether or not rate hikes have gone too far (Chart 2).1 One explanation for inversion in the latter stages of tightening cycles holds that the curve inverts once the bond market senses that monetary conditions are sufficiently tight to induce a material slowdown. As much insight into future growth prospects as the orientation of the yield curve might offer, however, neither it nor any of the other checklist items acts as a standalone indicator. Even if the curve were to invert tomorrow, we would not change our view without corroboration from several other factors. Chart 1The Consensus Is Way Behind The Curve Chart 2Still Plenty Of Margin For Error Inflation And Its Drivers Price stability is one half of the Fed's statutory mandate, enshrining inflation as a critical policy driver. In our base-case scenario, adding significant fiscal stimulus to an economy already operating at its full potential will consume what remains of spare capacity, fueling upward inflation pressures. The policy upshot is that the Fed will be unable to stop hiking rates until it gains some control over inflation. Since tightening monetary conditions enough to throttle inflation is likely to induce a recession, we expect that rates will rise before they ultimately fall. To track the course of inflation, and the accuracy of our projections, we are looking at headline and core CPI, and headline and core PCE (Chart 3). We will also monitor estimates of the output gap to gauge the potential for inflation pressures to turn into accelerating inflation (Chart 4). We are keeping a close eye on inflation break-evens, the expected level of inflation implied by the difference in yields on nominal and inflation-protected Treasuries. Our bond strategists peg 2.3-2.5% as the break-even level consistent with the Fed's 2% inflation target, and expect that the Fed will turn more hawkish once break-evens threaten the top end of the range (Chart 5). Failure to make progress toward that level in a timely fashion would force us to take a hard look at our stance. Chart 3Inflation Is Slowly Creeping Higher Chart 4If The Output Gap Really Is Closed, ... Chart 5... Inflation Will Normalize The State Of The Labor Market The relative tightness of the labor market is an important determinant of the level of slack in the overall economy. Phillips Curve adherents (along with anyone else who believes in the law of supply and demand) also view labor market slack, or the lack thereof, as a key variable in wage growth and a meaningful influence on the overall level of inflation. We are watching the headline unemployment rate relative to estimates of NAIRU,2 the minimum level of unemployment the economy can sustain without overheating. If unemployment remains below NAIRU, the Fed will have little choice than to remain vigilant; if it rises, or estimates of NAIRU are revised lower, the Fed may be able to ease up a little (Chart 6). Chart 6Sub-NAIRU Unemployment, ... We are also looking at ancillary indicators of labor market health like the broader U-6 measure of unemployment3 (Chart 7, top panel); the participation rate of work-age citizens in the labor market (Chart 7, second panel); and the quit rate, which sheds light on how easily workers can switch jobs (Chart 7, bottom panel). The first two measures offer insight into the potential size of the pool of workers available to re-enter the labor market and relieve supply constraints, while the last focuses on employee bargaining power, which should impact wages. We also look at a range of compensation growth measures: the average hourly earnings series from the monthly employment situation report (Chart 8, top panel); the Atlanta Fed wage tracker, which follows the same employees from year to year, sidestepping the composition issues that broader surveys face (Chart 8, second panel); and the employment cost index (including benefits), our choice for the single best compensation measure (Chart 8, bottom panel). Chart 7... And Declining Chart 8... Argue For Higher Wages The Fed's Third Mandate In addition to maintaining price stability and full employment, the Fed also has to protect the economy from shocks or at least try to mitigate their impact. Previous Feds may not have had much taste for supervisory matters, but supervision is now an explicit point of emphasis. There do not appear to be lending excesses today, and Basel III and Dodd-Frank would seem to make them much less likely than they were before the crisis. Corporations have made the most of a parade of indulgent bond buyers, securing promiscuously easy covenants, but turmoil in the bond market does not necessarily pose a systemic threat. In our view, excesses in this cycle are more likely to emerge from typical economic overheating. We are monitoring the most cyclical economic segments' share of activity, though it remains well below previous peaks (Chart 9). But just last week, in a speech about the neutral policy rate, Governor Brainard suggested that an overheating economy may create financial problems instead of economic ones. Viewed in conjunction with recent speeches, the Fed seems to be building a case for tightening policy in response to frothy credit conditions. Chart 9Cyclical Engines Aren't Overheating Yet "The past few times unemployment fell to levels as low as those projected over the next year, signs of overheating showed up in financial-sector imbalances rather than in accelerating inflation. The Federal Reserve's assessment suggests that financial vulnerabilities are building, which might be expected after a long period of economic expansion and very low interest rates. Rising risks are notable in the corporate sector, where low spreads and loosening credit terms are mirrored by rising indebtedness among corporations that could be vulnerable to downgrades in the event of unexpected adverse developments. Leveraged lending is again on the rise; spreads on leveraged loans and the securitized products backed by those loans are low, and the Board's Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices suggests that underwriting standards for leveraged loans may be declining to levels not seen since 2005."4 Central bank orthodoxy has long held that raising interest rates specifically to prick a bubble is self-defeating because it will likely provoke undesirable collateral damage. But the Fed could presumably justify hiking more than it otherwise would on the grounds that post-crisis banks are far more insulated from loan losses than they have been for several decades. Sustained by their fortified capital positions, banks wouldn't stem the flow of credit as much as they normally would in response to a pickup in provisions and charge-offs, so it would take a higher fed funds rate to slow the economy enough to counter overheating. This is a somewhat esoteric argument, to be sure, but Fed thinking appears as if it may be evolving in that direction. Our final checklist item is major international duress. An overseas crisis, or near-crisis, could pose a dual threat to our rates view. On the one hand, it could spark a flight to quality that brings Treasury yields down. On the other, it could lead the Fed to back off of tightening in the fear that international turmoil could begin to impact the U.S. economy. In our view, the odds of the current EM rumblings deterring the Fed from its "gradual-pace" roadmap are long. The U.S. economy is not only an 800-pound gorilla, it's an especially insular 800-pound gorilla. Only the most significant EM event would cause ripples within the U.S. - even the Asian Crisis failed to register in the U.S. for a year and a half after the Thai baht's collapse, and only then via a hedge fund leveraged to the gills in a way that simply is not possible today. To the extent that there is an "EM put" that could stay the Fed's hand, it's a put with a strike price that is way out of the money. Investment Implications Maintain below-benchmark Treasury duration and underweight fixed income overall. Rates are going to rise more than the consensus expects. We remain neutral on spread product within fixed income portfolios as defaults have already bottomed for the cycle, and capital losses will chip away at stingy coupons. Even though they expect the default rate will rise slowly, our fixed-income strategists are unenthused about the prospects for risk-adjusted excess returns. Doug Peta, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy dougp@bcaresearch.com 1 We will track the 3-month/10-year segment of the yield curve, which is less susceptible to estimate error, and has historically been more sensitive, than the widely cited 2-year/10-year segment. 2 NAIRU is an acronym for the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment. 3 The Bureau of Labor Statistics' U-6 series includes people working part time because they're unable to find a full-time position, and discouraged workers who are not actively looking for work and are therefore not counted as unemployed, in addition to the unemployed in the headline U-3 series. 4 Brainard, Lael (2018). "What Do We Mean by Neutral And What Role Does It Play in Monetary Policy," speech delivered at the Detroit Economic Club, Detroit, Mich., September 12. Emphasis added.
Highlights Oil markets and U.S. monetary policy are tightening coincidentally. This confluence of events in the past typically presages an equity correction and recession in the U.S. in the following 6 to 18 months (Chart of the Week). EM economies also could weaken as Fed policy collides with the oil-price spike we expect in the wake of a supply shock. In spite of continuing pressure from the Fed's policy-rate normalization policy, we continue to favor gold as a portfolio hedge (see below). Energy: Overweight. Russia's energy minister Alexander Novak expressed his determination to cooperate with OPEC to evolve the current production cut and emphasized his willingness to maintain a stable market, as reported by Platts on Tuesday.1 Base Metals: Neutral. Alcoa workers at Western Australian alumina and bauxite facilities voted to extend a strike initiated on August 8. Precious Metals: Neutral. The odds of sharply higher oil prices colliding with rising U.S. interest rates are increasing as the year winds down. Gold will outperform equities in this environment. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Brazilian farmers are lobbying Chinese consumers and Argentine suppliers to establish a futures contract tailored for delivery of soybeans from Latin America to China.2 Feature Oil markets continue to tighten, as the now fully discounted loss of ~ 2mm b/d of Iranian and Venezuelan exports is compounded by additional supply-side concerns in Iraq and Libya, and razor-thin OPEC spare capacity. Global demand remains robust. Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising the energy ministers of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia are huddling with the U.S. Energy Secretary this week to discuss oil markets in separate meetings on opposite sides of the globe.3 The risk an oil-supply shock collides with tightening monetary conditions in the U.S. is rising, as the Fed continues its rates-normalization policy. This potent confluence of risks, which could push Brent prices above $120/bbl, raises the odds of a sharp correction in U.S. equities (Chart of the Week). It also could pull the recession we expect in 2020 into 2019. This is a risk assessment, not our baseline scenario. While the odds of an oil-price spike accompanied by higher interest rates are increasing, we are not changing our view of oil or gold markets: We expect Brent crude to average $70/bbl in 2H18 and $80/bbl in 2019. We also remain long gold as a portfolio hedge against higher inflation this year and next, and expect the Fed to stay the course on its rates-normalization policy.4 Chart of the WeekOil Price Spikes + Rising U.S. Interest Rates Typically Presage S&P 500 Sell-Off That said, gold will remain one of the best indicators of how markets assess the Fed's willingness to lean into its rates policy: If prices weaken further, it will signal markets are pricing in continued tightness in U.S. monetary policy. Any weakness resulting from this expectation will be an opportunity to get long (or longer) gold as a portfolio hedge, particularly if oil markets tighten as we expect. Energy Ministers Meet As Oil Markets Tighten KSA's minister, Khalid al-Falih, and U.S. Energy Secretary Rick Perry met in Washington this past Monday, and Perry is due to travel to Moscow for a scheduled visit today. The increasing likelihood of 2mm b/d of exports being lost to U.S. sanctions against Iran later this year, and the imminent collapse of Venezuela, provides the context for these meetings. Platts Analytics estimates as much as 1.4mm b/d of Iranian exports could be lost to the market by the time U.S. sanctions against that country kick in in November. In our base case, we expect a loss of 1mm b/d, which keeps the global market in a physical deficit next year (Chart 2). Total OPEC production in August is estimated by Platts at 32.9mm b/d, a 10-month high, with output in Iraq surging to 4.7mm b/d and to 940k b/d in Libya.5 That Iraqi and Libyan production surge is increasingly at risk, however. In addition to the fully discounted Iranian and Venezuelan risk, we expect American, Saudi and Russian ministers also will discuss the growing risk to Iraq's and Libya's production, and its implications for global supply.6 Civil unrest in these states raises the risk of additional unplanned outages over the near term just as output is recovering.7 Concerns over razor-thin OPEC spare capacity - equal to ~ 1.5% to 2.0% of global demand - and continued strong global consumption likely number among their concerns, as well. In our view, these factors strongly suggest the oil market is setting up for a supply shock that could lift prices above $120/bbl (Chart 3). Chart 2Physical Deficits Could Widen Chart 3High-Price Scenarios Becoming More Likely Fed Policy Could Collide With Oil Price Spike With the U.S. economy at or very near full capacity, unemployment below 4%, and inflation and inflation expectations ticking higher, we believe the Fed will remain focused on its rates-normalization policy. This increases the risk an oil-supply shock collides with tightening monetary conditions in the U.S. is rising. If the Fed looks through the oil-price spike we expect in the next 6 to 12 months - treating it as a transitory event - its rates-normalization policy will become problematic for the U.S. and global economies. Such a reading by the Fed would be a policy error, in our estimation. As shown in the Chart of the Week, an oil-supply shock accompanied by continued Fed tightening raises the risk of a sharp correction in U.S. equity markets, and perhaps could trigger a bear market. In addition, the recession we expect later in 2020 could be pulled into 2019. As shown in Table 1, 10 out of the 11 recessions in the U.S. since 1945 were preceded by spikes in oil prices. Not every rise in oil prices was accompanied by a recession. In other words, recessions in the U.S. are usually preceded by spikes in oil prices, but not all spikes in oil prices are followed by recessions. This is important, as it implies that forecasting a recession based solely on rises in oil prices can sometimes misfire. Table 1History Of Oil Supply Shocks On the other hand, an oil-price shock combined with a rate-tightening cycle presents a more reliable recession signal. In fact, since 1970, every time the Fed-funds rate rose by more than ~200bps and oil prices rose by more than 50%, the U.S. business cycle peaked in the following 6-18 months.8 EM Growth Threatened, As Well As the Fed proceeds with its policy-rate normalization, the broad trade-weighted USD (USD TWIB) will strengthen. A sharp increase in oil prices accompanied by continued strength in the USD TWIB will redound to the detriment of EM economies, reducing demand for commodities generally, as the local currency costs of all USD-denominated goods increases. The confluence of these factors - should they materialize - would reduce EM income growth - perhaps even cause a contraction - and would produce a medium-term deflationary impulse, along with a rush to U.S. treasuries and other safe-haven assets. This would lower U.S. interest rates, all else equal, forcing the Fed to put its rates-normalization policy on hold, and possibly reverse it.9 Favor Gold, If Oil Spikes And Rates Rise In sum, the U.S. economy is at or very near full capacity, which will keep the Fed focused on its rates-normalization process. This will likely cause the Fed to treat the oil-price spike we expect on the back of a supply-side shock over the next 6 - 12 months as transitory. The Fed won't view it as a true inflationary threat, and will continue with its rates policy, as its core inflation gauge - the U.S. PCEPI ex food and energy - continues to move higher. Over the short run, this would look like U.S. real rates are falling, boosting the appeal of gold. However, the oil-price spike plus a maintained bias by the Fed to continue raising policy rates will lift the USD TWIB, even as oil prices remain high. This will be a double-whammy to EM economies - the absolute price of oil in USD will rise significantly, even as a stronger USD raises the cost of all other dollar-denominated goods and services. This will reduce disposable income and lower aggregate demand in EM economies. Should the Fed misread the oil-price spike in a rising interest-rate environment, we believe holding gold in a diversified portfolio continues to make sense. Gold outperforms in rising inflation environments, and when demand for safe-havens increases. In addition, gold outperforms equities in periods of declining stock markets (Chart 4). This convexity on the upside and downside is one of gold's strongest attributes. Bottom Line: Given the continued pressure on gold from the Fed's rates-normalization policy, the yellow metal will remain an inexpensive portfolio hedge. Gold prices are currently below or close to their long-term average when expressed in terms of the S&P 500 or oil units (Chart 5). Hence, diverting limited amount from equity to gold is recommended on a risk-adjusted basis. Chart 4Gold V. S&P 500 Chart 5Gold Is Relatively Cheap Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "Russian energy minister Novak sees broader OPEC, Russia, allies cooperation charter 'expedient' from Jan 1, 2019" published by SP Platts Global on September 11, 2018. 2 Please see "Brazil Farmers Vie For Soy Contract During U.S. - China Trade War," published by reuters.com on September 10, 2018. 3 Please see "U.S. and Saudi energy ministers to meet in Washington: DOE," and "Russia's Novak to meet with U.S. counterpart Perry, discuss oil markets," both published by reuters.com on September 10, 2018. 4 Our view is aligned with BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy, which can be found in "The Powell Doctrine Emerges" published September 4, 2018. It is available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see "OPEC crude oil production rises to 32.89 mil b/d in Aug as cuts unwind: Platts survey" published by SP Platts Global September 6, 2018. Noteworthy in the Platts analysis is the KSA increase to 10.5mm b/d. NB: We will be updating our balances next week. See also "U.S. warns Iran it will respond to attacks by Tehran allies in Iraq" published by reuters.com on September 11, 2018. 6 Rising secular tensions in Iraq - particularly vis-à-vis Iran's role in that state - could threaten production and exports there, as we discussed in the Special Report we published last week, in concert with BCA's Geopolitical Strategy. Please see "Iraq: The Fulcrum Of Middle East Geopolitics And Global Oil Supply" published September 5, 2018, and "Iraq Is The Prize In U.S. - Iran Sanctions Conflict" published June 7, 2018. Both are available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 7 Civil order in Libya is collapsing. The Islamic State is increasing the tempo of its operations in and around Libya; forces loyal to the late dictator late Muammar Qaddafi staged a mass escape from a Tripoli prison earlier this month; and local militia are threatening to extend the Libyan unrest into neighboring states. Please see "Libya's Haftar threatens to 'spread war' to Algeria" reported by Arab News September 11, 2018; "Masked gunmen attack Libyan oil corporation HQ in Tripoli," published by The Guardian September 10, 2018; and "Hundreds escape in jailbreak near Libyan capital" published by The National in the UAE September 3, 2018. 8 These effects are not constant or fixed. Each period has its own specificities implying a range around the rate hike and oil-prices spike necessary to disrupt the economy. 9 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Trade, Dollars, Oil & Metals ... Assessing Downside Risk" published August 23, 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017
Highlights Fed policy and U.S. interest rates are not irrelevant to EM, but they are of secondary importance. The most vital factors that drive EM financial markets - the direction of global trade, domestic demand, corporate profits, and borrowing costs - do not currently indicate a sustainable bottom. Stay short/underweight EM risk assets. Feature How long and how deep will the selloff in emerging markets (EM) be? There are many factors that investors should be watching to gauge potential for further downside in the EM universe, and to exercise judgement about a bottom. These include the business cycle trajectory, policy actions and shifts, market technicals, liquidity, valuations and other fundamental variables. Not all of preconditions typically need to be satisfied before a major bottom emerges. What's more, not all bottoms are identical and contingent on the same factors. Hence, there is no magical formula for calling a bottom or top in any financial market. Today we revisit some of the variables that, in our opinion, are worth monitoring in terms of gauging a bottom. To begin, we address a currently popular narrative within the investment industry, which contends the following: EM woes are primarily being driven by Federal Reserve tightening. According to this view, when the Fed halts its tightening campaign, the skies will clear for EM risk assets. By and large, we disagree with this narrative. EM And The Fed: Let's Get Things Straight Fed policy and U.S. interest rates are not irrelevant to EM, but they are of secondary importance. The primary drivers of EM economies are domestic fundamentals and the overall global business cycle. Historically, the correlation between EM risk assets and the fed funds rate has been mixed (Chart 1). On this chart, we shaded the periods in which EM stocks rallied, despite a rising fed funds rate. Chart 1EM Equity Prices And Fed Funds Rate: Mixed Correlation There were only two episodes when EMs crashed amid rising U.S. interest rates: the 1982 Latin America debt crisis and the 1994 Mexican Tequila crisis. Yet, it is vital to emphasize that these crises occurred because of poor EM fundamentals: elevated foreign currency debt levels, negative terms-of-trade shocks, large current account deficits, pegged exchange rates, and so on. Importantly, EM stocks and currencies did well during other periods of a rising fed funds rate: in 1983-1984, 1988-1989, 1999-2000 and 2017, as illustrated by the shaded periods in Chart 1. Hence, statistically there is no case that EMs plunge when the Fed is tightening policy. Why did the behavior of EM risk assets during various Fed tightening episodes differ? The key was EM fundamentals at the time: When fundamentals were healthy, EM managed to rally, despite Fed tightening; when fundamentals were flawed, EM markets relapsed regardless of the Fed's policy stance. Dire EM fundamentals also prevailed before the Asian/EM crises of 1997-1998. However, these late-1990s EM crises occurred without much in the way of Fed tightening or rising U.S. bond yields. Notably, U.S. and EU growth were booming and U.S. bond yields were dropping in 1997-'98. Specifically, U.S. and EU import volumes were growing at double-digit rates but this did not preclude EM crises, including in export-dependent Asian economies such as Korea, Malaysia and Thailand (Chart 2). It is critical to emphasize that China was not an economic superpower in the late 1990s. EM economic dependence on the U.S. and European economies was much greater than it is today. Yet neither booming demand in the U.S. and EU nor falling U.S. government bond yields prevented the Asian/EM crises from rolling across the globe in 1997-'98 (Chart 3A). Moreover, the S&P 500 was in a bull market in the second half of 1990s, as it is today (Chart 3B), but it did not help EM either. Chart 2Asian/EM Crises In 1997-98 Occurred Amid Booming Growth In U.S. And EU Chart 3AAsian/EM Crises In 1997-98 Took Place Amid Falling U.S. Bond Yields And Rising S&P 500 Chart 3BAsian/EM Crises In 1997-98 Took Place Amid Falling U.S. Bond Yields And Rising S&P 500 Hence, we can safely conclude that the EM fallout in 1997-'98 was due to EM domestic fundamentals - not developed market dynamics in general and Fed tightening in particular. An essential question is: Why are EM risk assets currently plunging while U.S. stocks and credit markets are holding up just fine? The U.S. economy is much more exposed to rising U.S. borrowing costs than EM. Despite this, the American economy, U.S. share prices and corporate bonds have been performing very well. In our view, this also stipulates that the core root for the current EM bear market is EM fundamentals. As we have repeatedly noted in various reports,1 EM fundamentals have been very frail, and the end of easy Fed monetary policy has not helped. The Fed's tightening can be regarded as the trigger - not the cause - of the EM bear market. The cause is weak EM fundamentals, such as credit excesses, low return on capital, weakening productivity growth and, in some cases, inflation and dependence on external funding. Importantly, the dependence of EM countries on the Chinese economy is presently greater than their dependence on the U.S. as shown in Table 1. Further, mainland growth is decelerating. Adding it all up, it is not surprising to us that EM financial markets are in turmoil. Table 1Many Emerging Economies Sell More##br## To China Than to The U.S. Our bearish view on EM has not been based on a negative view on U.S./EU growth. On the contrary, we have been bearish on EM/China and positive on domestic demand in the U.S. and the EU. Early this year, we promoted the theme of tectonic macro shifts,2 arguing that China/EM growth would slump and the U.S. economy would accelerate - and that such dynamics would propel the U.S. dollar higher. In turn, a firm dollar would inflict substantial pain on EM. Bottom Line: Rising U.S. interest rates, in and of itself, is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for EM to sell off. Consequently, the Fed adopting an easier policy stance or lower U.S. Treasury yields may not, in and of themselves, create sufficient conditions for a reversal in EM financial markets, unless they coincide with a turnaround in other variables that matter for EM. What Matters For EM? As of now, we do not think sufficient conditions exist for a bottom in EM financial markets because of several pertinent factors: The most important factor for EM assets in the medium term is the direction of the business cycle in EM in general, and in China in particular. The EM business cycle is still decelerating, as evidenced by falling manufacturing PMI indexes in EM ex-China and China (Chart 4). Consistently, corporate earnings growth is decelerating for EM non-financial companies and Chinese non-financial A-share corporates (Chart 5). The rationale for our focus on non-financial corporate earnings is that non-performing loans are usually not recognized and provisioned for by banks in a timely way to reflect their true profitability. Typically, banks' earnings cycle lags the real economy. When the real economy is slowing, banks' profits typically deteriorate with a time lag. Chart 4Manufacturing Is Slowing In China And EM Ex-China Chart 5EM/China Corporate Profit Growth Is Decelerating Corporate profits in China and in EM have not yet contracted, but our view is that there will be a meaningful profit contraction in this downturn. As and when corporate earnings shrink, share prices will sell off. In brief, we are not out of the woods yet. In China, the industrial part of the economy continues to weaken, as evidenced by the slump in the total freight index and electricity consumption by manufacturing and resource sectors (Chart 6). So far, the cumulative impact of policy easing in China has not been sufficient to reverse its business cycle. As we discussed in our prior report,3 money/credit impulses lead China's industrial sector by nine months or so. Even if the government's recent stimulus initiatives cause money/credit impulses to improve materially today (which we still doubt), the impact on growth will be felt only next year. While financial markets are forward-looking, they are unlikely to bottom a full six months before the bottom in the real economy. Hence, we are currently in the window where China plays in financial markets remain at risk. Global trade is also weakening, as evidenced by falling semiconductor prices (Chart 7) and industrial metals. Similarly, the container freight index at Chinese ports is sluggish, and broader Asian export volumes are slowing (Chart 8). Chart 6Signs Of Industrial Slowdown In China Chart 7Semiconductor Prices Are Plunging Chart 8Asian Export To Slow Further Regarding liquidity, there are various definitions and ways to measure liquidity. One measure of EM liquidity is EM local interest rates. Chart 9A and 9B shows that interbank rates in various EM countries are rising due to the ongoing currency weakness. EM benchmark local currency bond yields are also under upward pressure (Chart 10, top panel). These are all signs of tightening liquidity. The ramifications of higher interest rates will be a slowdown in money and credit, and consequently a slump in domestic demand. Chart 9AEM: Interbank Rates##br## Are Rising Chart 9BEM: Interbank Rates##br## Are Rising Chart 10EM: Local Currency Bonds Yields##br## And Narrow Money Growth Chart 10 illustrates that local bond yields negatively correlate with narrow money growth in EM ex-China, Korea, Taiwan and India. These four markets are not included in the EM GBI local bond index; to maintain consistency, we have removed them from the money supply aggregate. EM sovereign and corporate bond yields continue to rise. As we have shown numerous times in previous reports, EM share prices do not bottom until EM corporate and sovereign bond yields roll over on a sustainable basis. Finally, we discussed EM equity and currency valuations in our August 23 report. We maintain that aggregate EM equity and currency valuations are not yet cheap enough to warrant bottom-fishing. Bottom Line: The most vital factors that drive EM financial markets - the direction of global trade, domestic demand, corporate profits, and borrowing costs - do not currently indicate a sustainable bottom. Stay short/underweight EM risk assets. 6 September 2018 The list of our trades and country allocation is always presented at the end of each report (please see page 10-11). Specifically, we continue shorting BRL, CLP, ZAR, IDR and MYR versus the U.S. dollar. Within the equity space, our overweights are Taiwan, Korea, Thailand, Chile, India, Mexico and central Europe; and underweights are Brazil, Peru, Malaysia, Indonesia, and South Africa. Among local currency bonds we are overweight Russia, Korea, Mexico, Thailand, and central Europe and underweight Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "Understanding The EM/China Cycles," July 19, 2018. 2 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "Two Tectonic Macro Shifts," January 31, 2018. 3 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "EM: Do Note Catch A Falling Knife," August 23, 2018. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Highlights The primary trend for both Chinese stock prices and CNY-USD remains captive to negative surprises related to the trade war between the U.S. and China. Considerable uncertainty remains on this front, but our outlook is that the situation is likely to get worse, not better. It remains too early to forecast a durable stabilization in the exchange rate. It is an open question whether the PBOC will be forced to change short-term interest rates in order to guide the currency in their preferred direction. There is some evidence to suggest that China can control both the interest and exchange rate should it choose to do so, but analyzing the issue is significantly complicated by the approach Chinese policymakers are using to manage the impossible trinity. There is room for Chinese short-term interest rates to rise modestly if the worst of the U.S./China trade war does not materialize. This would be consistent with the goal of avoiding significant releveraging of China's private sector. For now, investors should maintain no more than a benchmark allocation towards Chinese investable stocks within a global equity portfolio, and should continue to favor low-beta sectors within the investable universe. Feature We noted in our August 22 Weekly Report that the persistent weakness of the RMB appeared to be one important factor weighing on Chinese stocks, particularly the domestic market.1 We presented some tentative evidence that part of the decline in CNY-USD since mid-June has been policy-driven (despite the PBOC's statements that it had not been depreciating the currency), but also noted that the RMB had now likely fallen outside the comfort zone of policymakers. The PBOC's re-introduction of its "counter-cyclical factor" when fixing the yuan's daily mid-point supports this view, and suggests that monetary authorities are now aiming for a broadly stable exchange rate (or are aiming to limit further downside). Chart 1 highlights that there have been some, albeit modest, signs of success. Whether they succeed will, first and foremost, be largely determined by what appears to be an imminent decision by the Trump administration to levy tariffs on an additional $200 billion in imports from China. Our previous analysis of potential equilibrium levels for CNY-USD suggests that investors have already priced in the imposition of a second round of tariffs, but the key factor for markets will be whether the tariff rate applied is 10% or 25%. In the first case it is possible that the RMB has overshot to the downside; in the latter case, CNY-USD will very likely come under renewed pressure that would be difficult for the PBOC to fully counter. Chart 1Some Modest Signs Of Currency Stability Chart 2Interest Rate Differentials And CNY-USD: A Tight Link But an additional question is whether the PBOC will be forced to change short-term interest rates in order to guide the currency in their preferred direction. Both our Global Investment Strategy and Emerging Markets Strategy services have highlighted that USD-CNY has broadly tracked the one-year swap differential between the U.S. and China over the past few years (Chart 2). This suggests that, at a minimum, there is some link between the interbank market and the exchange rate, despite the fact that capital controls are still tight in the Chinese economy. It also seems to imply, ominously, that the PBOC may have to choose between potentially significant releveraging and a significant re-appreciation in the exchange rate. Revisiting The Impossible Trinity "With Chinese Characteristics" The exact nature of this interest/exchange rate link is difficult to analyze, because of how China has chosen to manage the "impossible trinity" following the August 2015 devaluation of the yuan. The upper portion of Chart 3 illustrates the standard view of the impossible trinity, which posits that policymakers must choose one side of the triangle, foregoing the opposite economic attribute. For example, most modern economies have chosen "B", allowing the free flow of capital and independent monetary policy by giving up a fixed exchange rate regime. Hong Kong has chosen "A", meaning that its monetary policy is driven by the Fed in exchange for a pegged exchange rate and an open capital account. Chart 3The Possible Trinity? China historically has chosen "C", an economy with a closed capital account, a fixed exchange rate, and independent monetary policy. There is no causal link between interest and exchange rates in the world of option C, but following the PBOC's move in 2015 towards a more market-oriented approach for the exchange rate, it was accused by many market participants of trying to pursue all three goals simultaneously. In short, market participants have not been able to clearly discern what option China has chosen following over the past few years. China, in effect, answered these criticisms by arguing that it was not bound by the standard view of the impossible trinity, but rather one "with Chinese characteristics". The lower portion of Chart 3 presents this theory, which posits that policymakers must distribute a 200% adoption rate among three competing choices. The chart depicts a possible scenario where policymakers are relatively tolerant of capital flow, partially adopting two measures in addition to fully independent monetary policy: quasi-floating exchange rates highly subject to the interest rate dynamics shown in Chart 2, and loosely enforced capital controls. The chart also shows what ostensibly occurred in response to significant capital flight in 2014 and 2015, i.e. a crackdown on capital control enforcement and a less market-driven exchange rate. To the extent that this framework still applies, Charts 4 - 7 suggest that this capital flow crackdown has not abated and that the PBOC may be able to prevent significant further weakness in the currency without dramatically raising interest rates: China tightened scrutiny on trade invoicing verifications in 2016 to crack down on "fake" international trades, such as imports from Hong Kong (local firms fabricated import businesses to move money offshore). Based on the recent trend, these restrictions remain in effect (Chart 4). In addition, quarterly net flows of currency and deposits, which turned sharply negative in Q3 2015, have risen back into positive territory (Chart 5). Chart 4Blocking Capital Leakage In Trade... Chart 5...And Cash Chart 6 presents Chinese foreign reserves measured in SDRs, and highlights that reserves have been stable for the better part of the past two years. This stability is in sharp contrast to the material decline that occurred in 2015, and is supportive of the view that China can control both the interest and exchange rate, should it choose to do so. Chart 7 highlights that there are a few precedents for a divergence between interbank rates and CNY-USD. One divergence in 2012-2013 is particularly noteworthy: CNY-USD trended higher, but interbank interest rates remained flat for some time. Crucially, this does not appear to have been driven by falling U.S. interest rates, as the 2-year Treasury yield had already fallen close to zero in 2011 and did not begin to rise until mid-2013. Chart 6China Has Stabilized Its ##br##Foreign Reserves Chart 7Short-Term Interest Rates And ##br## CNY-USD Have Diverged Before Interest Rates And Moderate Releveraging Despite the evidence presented in Charts 4 - 7, the bottom line is that it is not clear whether the PBOC would be forced to raise short-term interest rates (and by how much) if it chooses to stabilize the currency. Would doing so be a death-knell for the Chinese economy? In our view, the answer is no, unless the trade war does indeed metastasize further. We have argued that the magnitude of the decline in the 3-month repo rate has been excessive, and is not currently consistent with a moderately reflationary scenario. We have argued that the repo rate decline is a side-effect of the PBOC's heavy liquidity injections, which were more likely aimed at ensuring financial system stability against the backdrop of struggling small banks. Chart 8Lending Rates Will Decline Substantially ##br## If Repo Rates Don't Rise But the current level of liquidity support carries risks to the objective of controlling private-sector leveraging. Chart 8 suggests that unless the PBOC raises the benchmark lending rate (which would be interpreted very hawkishly by the market), the magnitude of the decline in the repo rate will push the weighted average lending back to its 2016 low (when the monetary authority had turned the policy dial to "maximum reflation"). Last week's Special Report explained in detail why this would carry significant risks to China's financial stability.2 We noted that most of the private sector leveraging that has occurred in China since 2010 has occurred on the balance sheet of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the household sector. While the household debt-to-GDP ratio is still low, it is rising rapidly and may accelerate even further if lending rates fall significantly. The picture for SOEs is even more dire: leverage is extremely elevated, and a comparison of adjusted return on assets to borrowing costs suggests that the marginal operating gain from debt has become negative. This suggests that further leveraging of SOEs could push them into a debt trap and/or shackle the monetary authority's ability to meaningfully raise interest rates. As such, it is actually our expectation that short-term interest rates will rise modestly following a 10% rate on the second round of tariffs (instead of 25%), or if it becomes clear that there will be no third round. If the trade war escalates, however, short-term interest rates would not be expected to rise at all, and the drive to control leverage could be downshifted yet again. Investment Conclusions Chart 9Stay Neutral Towards Chinese Stocks, ##br##And Favor Low-Beta Sectors What does this all mean for our view on the RMB, and what are the implications for Chinese stocks? For now, we can draw the following conclusions: The primary trend for both stock prices and the exchange rate remains captive to negative surprises related to the trade war between the U.S. and China. We would expect further financial market weakness in response to a 25% rate on the second round of tariffs, and especially if President Trump moves forward with plans to tariff the remaining $250 billion of imports from China (the "third round"). Conversely, a 10% second-round tariff rate, or convincing signs that there will be no third round, could soon put a floor under the RMB and stock prices. On this front, the lead-up to a possible meeting between Presidents Trump and Xi in November will be important to monitor. But for now, given our view that the trade war between the U.S. and China is likely to get worse, not better, it remains too early to forecast a durable stabilization in the exchange rate, and an overweight stance towards Chinese equities in absolute terms remains premature. A-shares are deeply oversold and we are watching closely for signs to time a reversal, relative to investable stocks (at least at first). Higher Chinese short-term interest rates are not necessarily negative for stock prices, as long as the rise is modest and not in the context of a further, material uptick in trade tensions between the U.S. and China. While a moderate releveraging scenario would clearly imply a weaker earnings growth outlook than if credit accelerated strongly, earnings growth is still positive and yet Chinese equities are 20-30% off of their 1-year high in local currency terms. Modestly higher interest rates, in the context of durable RMB stability and an end to the escalation of trade threats, is likely to be equity-positive. As we wait for more clarity on the trade outlook, we reiterate our core equity investment recommendations: Investors should maintain no more than a benchmark allocation towards Chinese investable stocks within a global equity portfolio, and should continue to favor low-beta sectors within the investable universe (Chart 9). As always, we will be monitoring developments related to the timing and magnitude of the upcoming export shock, as well as further policymaker responses continually over the coming weeks and months. Stay tuned! Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 Pease see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "In Limbo", dated August 22, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Pease see China Investment Strategy Special Report "Chinese Policymakers: Facing A Trade-Off Between Growth And Leveraging", dated August 29, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Most FOMC participants currently think that r-star is somewhere between 2.75% and 3%. If this is correct, it means that the Fed's current 25 basis point per quarter hike pace will cause the funds rate to reach neutral by the middle of next year. This is…
Highlights Monetary Policy: Investors should not place much importance on current estimates of NAIRU or the neutral fed funds rate. The Fed will continue to lift rates at a pace of 25 bps per quarter until the economic recovery is threatened, revising NAIRU and neutral rate estimates as necessary. Duration: The spillover from weak global growth into the U.S. will probably cause the Fed to pause its gradual rate hike cycle at some point next year. But with the market priced for only one rate hike in all of 2019, this risk is already in the price. Maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration on a 6-12 month investment horizon. Inflation: Recent rapid increases in year-over-year core inflation will moderate in the coming months, as base effects provide less of a tailwind. But the economic back-drop remains highly inflationary and we expect inflation's uptrend will continue. Investors should maintain an overweight allocation to TIPS versus nominal Treasuries, targeting a range of 2.3% to 2.5% for both the 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates. Feature Fed Chairman Jerome Powell used his highly anticipated Jackson Hole address to reinforce the theme that has quickly become the hallmark of his tenure.1 Much like at the June FOMC press conference, the Chairman stressed the importance of incorporating uncertainty into the decision-making process.2 Specifically, the uncertainty surrounding real-time estimates of important macroeconomic variables such as the natural rate of unemployment (NAIRU) and the neutral (or equilibrium) fed funds rate. Chart 1The Fed's "Gradual" Rate Hike Cycle Uncertainty Surrounding NAIRU Considering the uncertainty surrounding NAIRU, the Chairman pointed to two specific time periods. The first being the "Great Inflation" of the 1960s and 1970s. In the late 1960s, real-time NAIRU estimates suggested that the unemployment rate was only slightly below its natural level, meaning that inflationary pressures were thought to be relatively muted (Chart 2). That expectation led policymakers to maintain an accommodative monetary policy that fueled the inflation of the 1970s. In Powell's view, the policy error was placing too much faith in real-time estimates of NAIRU, which with hindsight have been heavily revised (Chart 2, bottom panel). Chart 2Real-Time NAIRU Estimates Are Often A Poor Guidepost For Policymakers The second period Powell discusses is the late 1990s. This period is the opposite of the 1960s in the sense that real-time NAIRU estimates were eventually revised lower (Chart 2). At the time, labor markets were thought to be very tight. But former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan downplayed real-time NAIRU estimates and kept monetary policy easier for longer than many would have liked. Powell argues that subsequent downward NAIRU revisions vindicated that decision. At present, the unemployment rate of 3.9% is considerably below the Fed's most recent median NAIRU estimate of 4.5% (Chart 3). Complete faith in that NAIRU estimate would suggest that the Fed should be aggressively tightening policy. But as in the 1990s, it is possible that current NAIRU estimates will eventually need to be revised down. Despite seemingly tight labor markets, year-over-year core PCE inflation has still not returned to the Fed's 2% target. This makes future downward NAIRU revisions currently appear more likely than future upward revisions. Chart 3Current Estimates Point To A Very Tight Labor Market Powell argues that the Fed's "gradual" tightening path - raising the fed funds rate 25 bps per quarter - is a way of splitting the difference. The process of lifting rates acknowledges the current NAIRU estimate, while the relatively slow pace hedges the risk that it turns out to be too high. Uncertainty Surrounding The Neutral Rate Chart 4Growth At Odds With The Yield Curve Other than NAIRU, policymakers must also deal with the concept of the neutral (or equilibrium) fed funds rate. This is the interest rate that will keep the economy growing at its potential, leading to neither inflationary nor deflationary pressures. At the moment, most FOMC participants think the longer-run neutral rate is somewhere between 2.75% and 3% (in nominal terms). If this is correct, it means that the Fed's current 25 bps per quarter rate hike pace will cause the funds rate to reach neutral by the middle of next year. This is illustrated by the shaded grey boxes in Chart 1. If we assume complete confidence in the current estimate of the neutral rate, it is obvious that unless inflation significantly overshoots the 2% target, the Fed should halt its tightening cycle next year when the funds rate hits neutral. In fact, some FOMC members are advocating for at least a pause. Dallas Fed President Robert Kaplan recently said that when the fed funds rate reaches the current estimate of neutral: I would be inclined to step back and assess the outlook for the economy and look at a range of other factors - including the levels and shape of the Treasury yield curve - before deciding what further actions, if any, might be appropriate.3 However, the importance Powell places on uncertainty makes us think that any such pause would be very brief, if it occurs at all. In a recent report we showed that while the slope of the yield curve is consistent with a monetary policy that is already close to neutral, economic indicators do not corroborate this message (Chart 4).4 Bottom Line: Investors should not place much importance on current estimates of NAIRU or the neutral fed funds rate. The Fed will continue to lift rates at a pace of 25 bps per quarter until the economic recovery is threatened, revising NAIRU and neutral rate estimates as necessary. Heading For A Slowdown? The catalyst that could actually derail the Fed's rate hike cycle would be a meaningful slowdown in U.S. economic growth. In this regard, we observed in a recent report that current weakness outside of the U.S. is likely to spill over.5 Since 1993, every time the Global (ex. U.S.) Leading Economic Indicator (LEI) has fallen below zero, the U.S. LEI has eventually followed (Chart 5). Is there any reason to believe that this time might be different? One reason for optimism is that the Eurozone has been the main driver of the year-to-date slowdown in the Global Manufacturing PMI (Chart 6). This is encouraging because while Eurozone growth has certainly slowed, the PMI remains at a high level, well above the 50 boom/bust line. Further, recent data have shown some stabilization. The PMI is falling less rapidly than earlier in the year and broad money growth has picked up (Chart 7, top panel). However, weakness in China and emerging markets could easily swamp any positive impulse out of Europe. Though indicators of current economic activity in China appear in good shape, leading indicators and the imposition of tariffs point to weakness ahead (Chart 7, panel 2). Chinese policymakers have taken some steps to ease monetary conditions (Chart 7, bottom panel), but it remains unclear whether that will be sufficient to maintain current growth rates. Chart 5Global Growth Could Bring Down The U.S. Chart 6Weakness Due To Eurozone Chart 7The Biggest Risk Is From China Our assessment is that it is highly likely that weak global growth will eventually filter into the States. This will cause the Fed to pause its 25 bps per quarter tightening cycle at some point next year. However, applying Chairman Powell's uncertainty doctrine to our investment strategy, we must weigh this risk against what the market is already discounting. Chart 1 shows that the fed funds futures market is priced for a funds rate of 2.33% by the end of this year and 2.68% by the end of 2019. This means that the market is priced for only a single 25 bps rate hike in 2019, rather than the four we would expect in an environment of no economic hiccups. According to our golden rule of bond investing, we should be reluctant to adopt an above-benchmark portfolio duration stance unless we are confident that Fed rate hikes will come in below expectations over our investment horizon.6 Given that a significant growth slowdown would be required for the Fed to deliver only one hike in 2019, we think below-benchmark portfolio duration is still justified on a 6-12 month horizon. Bottom Line: The spillover from weak global growth into the U.S. will probably cause the Fed to pause its gradual rate hike cycle at some point next year. But with the market priced for only one rate hike in all of 2019, this risk is already in the price. Maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration on a 6-12 month investment horizon. Inflation Update An additional reason why any pause in the Fed's rate hike cycle could prove fleeting is that core inflation is very close to returning to the Fed's 2% target. Trailing 12-month core PCE inflation clocked in at 1.98% in July, while trailing 12-month trimmed mean PCE inflation was 1.99%. Rising inflation is likely the reason that long-dated TIPS breakeven inflation rates have remained stable in recent weeks, even as high-frequency global growth indicators have turned down (Chart 8). Looking ahead, the economic backdrop suggests that monthly inflation prints will continue to be strong. Our Pipeline Inflation Indicator remains elevated, despite the recent decline in commodity prices, and our PCE diffusion index shows that recent price increases have been broadly based (Chart 9). Chart 8Closing In On Target Chart 9Macro Environment Is Inflationary However, unless month-over-month inflation prints strengthen considerably, we should expect smaller increases in the year-over-year inflation rate going forward, as base effects provide less of a tailwind. To assess how much base effects influence year-over-year inflation rates we created our Core PCE Base Effects Indicator. We constructed the indicator using core PCE growth rates over horizons ranging from 1 to 11 months. We compare each growth rate to the growth rate over the next longest interval and increase the indicator's value by 1 each time a shorter-interval growth rate exceeds a longer-interval growth rate. In other words, we compare the 1-month growth rate in core PCE to the 2-month growth rate. If the 1-month growth rate is above the 2-month growth rate, we add 1 to our indicator. We then compare the 2-month growth rate to the 3-month growth rate, and so on. This gives us an indicator that ranges between 0 and 11. Chart 10 shows that when our Base Effects Indicator is elevated it usually means that year-over-year core PCE inflation will rise during the next six months, and vice-versa. We also observe that the cut-off point between positive and negative base effects is between 5 and 6. That is, when our indicator is at 6 or above, base effects bias the year-over-year core PCE inflation rate higher. Base effects tend to drag year-over-year inflation lower when our Indicator gives a reading of 5 or below. Chart 11 demonstrates the impact of base effects in more detail. The chart presents the median, first quartile and third quartile of 6-month changes in year-over-year core PCE inflation for each possible reading from our indicator. The median inflation change is positive for readings of 6 and above, and negative for readings of 5 and below. Chart 10Base Effects Now Less Of A Tailwind Chart 11The BCA Base Effects Indicator Tested (1960 - Present) In recent months, the reading from our Base Effects Indicator had been at 8, suggesting a very strong tailwind pushing the year-over-year growth rate in core PCE higher. But following last week's July PCE release our indicator fell to 6, suggesting only a mild positive impact from base effects going forward. Bottom Line: Recent rapid increases in year-over-year core inflation will moderate in the coming months, as base effects provide less of a tailwind. But the economic back-drop remains highly inflationary and we expect inflation's uptrend will continue. Investors should maintain an overweight allocation to TIPS versus nominal Treasuries, targeting a range of 2.3% to 2.5% for both the 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/powell20180824a.htm 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Rigidly Defined Areas Of Doubt And Uncertainty", dated June 19, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-21/fed-s-kaplan-inclined-to-reassess-rates-amid-yield-curve-angst 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Tracking The Two-Stage Treasury Bear", dated August 14, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "An Oasis Of Prosperity?", dated August 21, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing", dated July 24, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights We remain bullish on the dollar, but no longer think that being long the greenback is the "slam-dunk" trade that it was earlier this year. A reacceleration in growth outside the U.S. and an overly dovish Fed represent the biggest risks to our constructive dollar view. China is likely to stimulate its economy, but concerns about high debt levels and malinvestment will limit the scale of any fiscal/credit stimulus. Letting the RMB slide may prove to be the preferable option. Worries about debt sustainability in Italy and EM contagion to European banks will constrain credit growth in the euro area, thus keeping the ECB in a highly dovish mode. For the time being, we favor developed market stocks over their EM peers. At the sector level, we would overweight defensives relative to deep cyclicals. U.S. stocks will outperform European stocks in dollar terms, although the performance is likely to be much more balanced in local-currency terms. The longer-term path for Treasury yields is to the upside. Nevertheless, a stronger dollar, coupled with safe-haven flows into the Treasury market, could temporarily push the 10-year yield down to 2.5% over the next few months. Feature The Dollar At A Crossroads After surging by 10% between February 1st and August 15th, the broad trade-weighted dollar has fallen by 0.9% over the past two weeks. Despite the latest setback, the greenback is still 23.2% above its 2014 lows and only 2.8% below its December 28, 2016 high (Chart 1). BCA continues to maintain a bullish view on the dollar. However, given recent market action, it is useful to stress-test our thesis in order to explore what could go wrong with it. As we discuss below, a key risk to the dollar is that global growth reaccelerates, with the U.S. once again going from leader to laggard in the global growth horserace. Global Growth And The Dollar The dollar tends to strengthen when global growth is deteriorating. Since the U.S. is a "low-beta" economy dominated by services rather than manufacturing and primary industries, an environment in which the global economy is slowing is usually one where the U.S. is outperforming the rest of the world. Chart 2 shows that there is a strong correlation between the value of the trade-weighted dollar and the difference between The Conference Board's U.S. Leading Economic Indicator (LEI) and the non-U.S. LEI. The gap between the U.S. and the non-U.S. LEI is still quite large. However, it has started to shrink recently, reflecting both a dip in the U.S. LEI as well as a small improvement in the non-U.S. LEI. The implication is that the U.S. economy is outshining the rest of the world, but the magnitude of outperformance has begun to narrow. Looking forward, the fate of the dollar will hinge on whether growth in the rest of the world can catch up with the United States. By definition, this can happen either if U.S. growth falls or non-U.S. growth rises. We examine each possibility in turn. Chart 1Despite Recent Pullback, ##br##The Dollar Is Still Close To Its 2016 High Chart 2The U.S. Economy Is Still Outperforming The Rest Of The World, But The Gap Is Starting To Narrow U.S. Growth: As Good As It Gets? The second quarter was probably the high watermark for U.S. growth for the rest of this cycle. Real GDP expanded by 4.2%, more than double most estimates of trend growth. The deceleration in payroll growth in July, a string of weak housing data releases, and the drop in the national ISM surveys alongside declines in a number of regional surveys such as the Philly Fed PMI, all point to a somewhat softer third quarter GDP growth reading. How worried should dollar bulls be? We see three reasons to downplay the negative impact on the dollar from the recent string of softer economic data. While the U.S. economy has slowed, it is still quite strong. The Bloomberg consensus forecast suggests that real GDP will increase by 3% in Q3. The Atlanta Fed's GDPNow model predicts 4.1% growth, while the New York Fed's Nowcast anticipates a more modest growth rate of 2%. The underlying drivers of aggregate demand remain supportive. U.S. financial conditions have loosened recently, thanks mainly to narrower credit spreads and higher equity prices (Chart 3). The effects of fiscal stimulus have also yet to make their way fully through the economy, especially with respect to government spending. The consumer is in great shape. The unemployment rate is near a 20-year low and the savings rate stands at a comfortable 6.7%, well above the level that the current ratio of household net worth-to-disposable income would predict (Chart 4). The housing vacancy rate is close to all-time lows, which limits the downside risk both to home prices and construction activity (Chart 5). Chart 3U.S. Financial Conditions Have Eased Recently Chart 4The Savings Rate Has Room To Fall Some of the apparent slowdown in U.S. growth appears to be due to intensifying supply-side constraints rather than faltering demand (Chart 6). This is important because slower growth resulting from weaker demand should, in principle, cause the Fed to moderate the pace of rate hikes, whereas slower growth resulting from an overheated economy should prompt the Fed to accelerate the pace of rate hikes. The latter is much better for the dollar than the former. Chart 5Low Housing Inventories Will ##br##Support Home Prices And Construction Chart 6U.S. Economy Is Hitting Supply-Side ##br##Constraints The Fed's Fate Is In The Stars What is true in principle, however, does not always match what happens in practice. In his Jackson Hole address, Jay Powell invoked a Draghi-esque phrase when saying that the FOMC would "do whatever it takes" to keep inflation expectations from becoming unmoored.1 Nevertheless, he also said that "there does not seem to be an elevated risk of overheating" at the moment. This is a curious statement considering the abundant evidence that U.S. firms are struggling to find qualified workers. To his credit, Powell stressed the inherent difficulty of "navigating by the stars," that is, of setting monetary policy based on highly imprecise estimates of the natural rate of unemployment, u*, and the neutral real rate of interest, r*. What he did not say is that the Fed's current estimates of these "stars" stand at record lows, which introduces a dovish bias into monetary policy should these estimates prove to be too low. Our baseline view is that the Federal Reserve will raise rates more than the market is currently discounting. We also doubt the Fed will succumb to President Trump's pressure to keep rates low or to accommodate any effort by the Treasury to intervene in the foreign exchange market with the aim of driving down the value of the dollar. That said, the risk to this view is that the Fed reacts too slowly to rising inflation. This could cause real rates to drift lower, with adverse consequences for the dollar. The China Policy Wildcard The discussion above suggests that the dollar would suffer either if U.S. growth slows significantly or if the Fed falls too far behind the curve in normalizing monetary policy. An additional risk to the dollar is that growth outside the U.S. picks up. This would suck capital away from the U.S. and into the rest of the world, with adverse consequences for the greenback. At present, the biggest question mark around the global growth outlook concerns China. The Chinese economy has struggled of late, with trade tensions adding to the misery (Chart 7). The stock market is down in the dumps. On-shore corporate yields for low-quality borrowers continue to rise. Industrial production, retail sales, and fixed asset investment all disappointed in July, following a further drop in the PMIs. The economic surprise index remains in negative territory. Only the housing market is showing renewed vigour, with both starts and sales rebounding (Chart 8). Chart 7China: Some Signs Of A Struggling Economy... Chart 8...With Housing Being The Main Exception The central bank has responded by easing liquidity. Interbank rates fell from a peak of 5.9% in late 2017 to 2.9% today. The authorities have also instructed local governments to expedite their spending plans, while ordering state-owned banks to expand lending to the export sector and for infrastructure-related projects. Fiscal/credit stimulus of the sort the authorities engaged in both 2009 and 2015 carries significant risks, however. Debt levels have reached stratospheric levels and concerns about excess capacity and malinvestment abound. We suspect these facts will cause policymakers to be more guarded than they would otherwise be. What's Next For The RMB? Letting the RMB weaken offers an alternative way to stimulate the economy - and one, crucially, that does not require piling on evermore debt. In contrast to more roads and bridges, a cheaper Chinese currency would not be welcome news for the rest of the world. A weaker RMB makes it more difficult for other economies to compete against China. A weaker currency also increases the costs to Chinese firms of importing raw materials, thus putting downward pressure on commodity prices. Despite efforts by emerging markets to diversify their economies, EM earnings remain highly correlated with industrial metals prices (Chart 9). Despite the presence of capital controls, the USD/CNY exchange rate has broadly tracked the one-year swap differential between the U.S. and China over the past few years (Chart 10). The differential has dropped from close to 300 basis points at the beginning of this year to less than 100 basis points today. Given that prospect of further Fed rate hikes, the only way the Chinese authorities will be able to keep the interest rate differential from falling even more is by tightening monetary policy themselves. This could slow credit growth and thus weaken the economy. The failure to raise rates, however, would probably cause the RMB to fall further. Both outcomes would be problematic for the rest of the world. Chart 9EM Earnings Are Correlated ##br##With Industrial Metal Prices Chart 10USD/CNY Tracks China-U.S. ##br##Interest Rate Differentials Our bet is that the authorities will ultimately choose to keep domestic monetary conditions fairly easy - leading to a weaker RMB - but will use administrative controls to prevent credit growth from accelerating too rapidly. That said, we would not rule out the possibility that the authorities succeed in stimulating the economy in a way that precludes further currency weakness. If this stimulus coincides with a thawing in trade tensions, it could lead to a burst in optimism about China specifically, and global growth in general. Such an outcome would hurt the dollar. The Euro Area: Keeping The Recovery On Track After putting in a strong performance in 2017, the economy in the euro area has struggled to maintain momentum this year. Growth is still above trend, but the overall tone of the data has been lackluster at best, with the risks to growth increasingly tilted to the downside. Weaker growth in China and other emerging markets certainly has not helped. However, much of the problem lies closer to home. The election of a populist government in Italy renewed concerns about debt sustainability in the euro area's third largest economy. The 10-year yield reached a four-year high of 3.2% this week. It is now 150 basis points above its April 2018 lows (Chart 11). The resulting tightening in Italian financial conditions will continue to weigh on growth in the months ahead. Bank credit remains the lifeblood of the euro area economy. Chart 12 shows that the 12-month credit impulse - defined as the change in credit growth from one 12-month period to the next - tends to move closely with GDP growth. Euro area credit began to moderate this year even before the Italian imbroglio and worries about the exposure of European banks to vulnerable emerging markets came on the scene. It will be difficult for euro area GDP growth to accelerate unless credit growth revives. In the absence of faster credit growth, the ECB will have little choice but to remain firmly in dovish mode. Chart 11Italian Populism Meets The Bond Market Chart 12Euro Area Credit Growth Has Flatlined The best-case scenario for the common currency is that EM stresses subside, and the Italian government reaches a friendly agreement with the European Commission over next year's budget. The thawing in Brexit negotiations would also help. We are skeptical that any of these three things will happen, but if one or a number of them did occur, this would benefit the euro at the expense of the dollar. Investment Conclusions We are not as bullish on the dollar as we were earlier this year. Sentiment towards the greenback has clearly improved (Chart 13). The narrative about a "synchronized global growth recovery" that was all the rage last year has also given way to a more sober appreciation of the problems facing emerging markets. In short, markets have moved a long way towards our view of the world. Still, we are not ready to abandon our strong dollar view. Chinese stimulus or not, the structural challenges facing emerging markets - high debt levels, poor productivity growth - will not go away. The same goes for Europe and its litany of political and economic travails. Even if the dollar did manage to weaken again, this would constitute an unwelcome easing in U.S. financial conditions at a time when the Fed wants to tighten financial conditions in order to keep the economy from overheating. From this perspective, a weaker dollar just means that the Fed would need to hike rates even more than it otherwise would. Since more rate hikes will buttress the dollar, the extent to which the dollar can weaken is self-limiting. In short, interest rate differentials between the U.S. and its trading partners should continue to favor the greenback. Assuming the dollar does strengthen from here, emerging markets will be the main casualties. While EM assets have cheapened considerably, Chart 14 shows that neither EM equities, credit, nor currencies are at levels that have marked past bottoms. Global investors should continue to favor developed market stocks over their EM peers. At the equity sector level, investors should overweight defensives over deep cyclicals. Regionally, this posture implies that U.S. stocks will outperform European stocks in dollar terms, although the performance is likely to be much more balanced in local-currency terms. Chart 13Investors Have Turned More Bullish On The Dollar Chart 14EM Assets Are Not Very Cheap As we recently discussed in a two-part Special Report,2 the longer-term path for Treasury yields is to the upside. Nevertheless, a broad-based appreciation in the value of the dollar, coupled with safe-haven flows into the Treasury market, could temporarily push the 10-year yield down to 2.5% over the next few months. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Jerome H. Powell, "Monetary Policy in a Changing Economy," Speech at "Changing Market Structure and Implications for Monetary Policy," a symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, August 24, 2018. 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Reports, "1970s-Style Inflation: Could It Happen Again? (Part 1)," dated August 10, 2018; "1970s-Style Inflation: Could It Happen Again? (Part 2)," dated August 24, 2018. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades