Policy
Highlights On the European side, the key risk to our bullish DXY stance is that European growth is strong, the labor market seems to be tightening, and core CPI has perked up. These risks are real but mitigated by budding signs that European growth is at its best, by the abundance of hidden labor market slack, and by the high chance that the CPI spike was transitory. On the U.S. side of the ledger, the key risks are that wages do not pick up, that credit growth continues to act as a break on activity, and that political risks hamper fiscal dynamics. All would mean a more dovish Fed than we anticipate. These risks are mitigated by the fact that hidden U.S. labor market slack is only now low enough for wages to improve, credit looks set to turn around as financial conditions are supportive, and fiscal policy should surprise to the upside. USD/NOK has upside as Norway experiences declining inflation. Go long CAD/NOK. Feature Last week, we augmented our cyclically dollar bullish view by removing our tactical bearish bias on the USD. In our eyes, the market is underestimating the capacity of the Fed to increase rates and is also overestimating the economic impact of the fiasco surrounding Trump's alleged relationship with Russia. Despite our high conviction view that the dollar can rally 10% or more from current levels, we cannot be blind to the key risks surrounding it. This week, we explore where our stance on Europe and the Fed can go wrong. ECB Tapering = Upcoming Tightening Campaign? The key risk to our negative euro stance is the ECB. The market has moved to discount the first rate hike in Europe to happen in barely two years, an event we judge highly unlikely. However, if the market is right that a tapering of asset purchases in 2018 and a potential increase in the rates on deposit facilities to 0% are the opening salvos of an imminent campaign to push up the repo rate, the EUR/USD rally is only in its early days. Here are the key factors that would support this bullish euro view: The European economy is in a major economic upswing. Not only have PMIs surged, the IFO has hit an all-time high (Chart I-1). If this pace of growth can be maintained for an extended period of time, the European output gap will close faster than we anticipate, providing a stronger basis for the ECB to nudge all rates higher. The euro area labor market is tightening. Euro area unemployment rate is at 9.5%, only 0.7% above the OECD's estimate for NAIRU (Chart I-2). Thus, it would paint a picture where there is little slack in the economy at large and in the labor market in particular. In this environment, a continuation of the elevated growth currently experienced by the euro area could boost wages. Core inflation has picked up to 1.2% (Chart I-3). The ECB has historically displayed a tight reaction function to inflation. In the past, headline CPI mattered, but since Mario Draghi took the helm of this institution, the focus has switched to underlying pricing pressures. Thus, if euro area core inflation continues to move up, especially as U.S. core PCE inflation has weakened to 1.6%, the market will be vindicated and the euro could rebound on a more hawkish ECB. Chart I-1Europe Is Booming Chart I-2Low Labor Market Slack In Europe Chart I-3That Should Help The ECB To Hike Why Are These Factors Risks And Not Base Cases? To begin with, these factors have been discounted by the markets, a fact highlighted by the 42-month fall in the month-to-hike for the ECB since July 2016 to 24 months today. Also, as the European surprise index has outperformed the U.S. one, EUR/USD has rallied by 6%. In the process, investors have switched from being massively short the euro to being the most aggressively long in three years (Chart I-4). Risk-reversals in EUR/USD options are also at elevated levels, highlighting the potentially too-bullish disposition of investors toward the euro. On the growth front, some factors suggest that European growth may soon peak. The large improvement in the amount of industrial activity and capacity utilization in Europe relative to the U.S. was reflective of the big easing in monetary conditions that followed the collapse of the euro after 2014. But, as Chart I-5 illustrates, European industrial production needed a falling euro to beat that of the U.S., soon after the euro stabilized, the growth outperformance began to recede and is now near inexistent based on this metric. Thus, the euro rebound removes one of the key factors that supported the European economy in the first place. Chart I-4Investors Have Discounted##br## The Good News In Europe Chart I-5Europe's Growth Outperformance ##br##Was Because Of Policy Additionally, some economic data are showing disturbing signs. While Germany's IFO stands at a record high, Belgian business confidence has rolled over. In fact, export orders have been particularly weak (Chart I-6). This is of importance as Belgium has long been a logistical center for the euro area, and is a small open economy deeply integrated in the European economic infrastructure. This, therefore, portends to emerging risks to the whole euro area. Monetary dynamics too raise questions. European business confidence, a key piece of soft data that has underpinned investors increased bullishness on the euro is led by dynamics in M1 money supply. The roll over in M1 implies that business conditions in Europe are slowly passing their best period (Chart I-7). If euro area growth peaks, this also raises concerns about the state of the labor market. This is especially worrisome as we think the unemployment gap based on the OECD's estimate of NAIRU misses key elements of the European labor market slack. As we wrote last week, the key problem in Europe is labor underutilization; hidden labor market slack remains a serious concern.1 With workers in irregular contracts being a key source of job creation since the end of the 2013 recession, there are plenty of workers willing to change jobs without the incentive of a higher pay, limiting the upside in wages. Without wage growth, it will be difficult for European core inflation to continue its uptrend, especially as there are many signs that the rebound that has excited investors' imagination may have been a transitory event. Worryingly for euro bulls, our Core CPI A/D line for Europe, which tends to lead core CPI itself, rolled over last year and points to lower core CPI.2 Industrial good prices excluding energy have also been weakening for 15 months now, suggesting this inflation rebound may be an aberration (Chart I-8). Chart I-6Where Belgium Goes, ##br##So Does Europe Chart I-7Money Trends Point To A Deceleration##br## In European Soft Data Chart I-8Europe Core CPI ##br##Will Roll Over Bottom Line: Investors have become very bullish of the euro based on the fact that the economy has been very strong, the European headline unemployment rate is moving closer to NAIRU, and core inflation has perked up; raising the specter of high rates sooner than we anticipate. These economic developments need to be monitored closely, but the growth impulse in Europe is likely to soon deteriorate, broader measures of labor market slack in the euro area are far from being at full employment, and the tick up in core inflation is likely to prove to have been only a temporary blip. These forces should weigh on the euro for the rest of 2017. Maybe The Fed Will Not Tighten That Much? Meanwhile, in the U.S., investors only expect three rate hikes over the next 24 months. Markets have begun doubting the fed's capacity or resolve to hike interest rates as aggressively as we envision. A slew of disappointing data and political developments have cemented this opinion among investors. Among the most crucial factors are the following: Chart I-9Disappointing U.S. Wages Wage growth in the U.S. remains poor, especially as per average hourly earnings which are still only growing at a disappointing 2.3% rate (Chart I-9). This raises the specter that consumption will remain tepid and that inflationary dynamics will never take hold in the U.S. This risk is perceived as especially salient as core inflation and core PCE have slowed below the 2% objective of the FOMC. Slowing credit growth has also garnered a lot of attention among the public. Credit is the life blood of the economy, and this slowdown has prompted many investors to begin questioning whether or not the U.S. economy would ever be able to take off. This compounded worries around the perennially weak Q1 GDP growth. Finally, the myriad of scandals surrounding Trump and his dealings with Russia have raised much questions about his ability to ever implement fiscal stimulus. Moreover, the punitive terms associated with the repeal of Obamacare and the implementation of the American Health Care Act (AHCA) - which according to the CBO could leave as many as 23 million individuals without health insurance by 2023 and cause sharp increases in insurance premia - may dull any growth boosting impact of potential tax cuts. Thus, the political backdrop may prompt the Fed to be easier than was anticipated as recently as December 2016. Why Are These Factors Risks And Not Base Cases? To begin with, BCA still hold the view that wages in the U.S. are set to accelerate in the coming quarters. The Phillips Curve continues to be a reality, as the Atlanta Fed Wage Tracker still display a tight relationship with the unemployment gap (Chart I-10). Moreover, it is often argued that the problem with today's labor market is that much of the job creation is happening in low-skilled positions. This is true, but historically, low-skilled jobs have tended to experience the most upward pressures when the job market tightens significantly. Instead, the key anchor on average hourly earnings has been the hidden labor market slack. However, today, the U-6 unemployment rate is finally ticking at 8.6%, levels where in previous cycles wage growth accelerated (Chart I-11). A rebound in GDP growth, as highlighted by the Atlanta Fed growth forecast of 4.1% in Q2, would accentuate pressures on the labor market and help realized the underlying wage pressures resulting from the current readings of the U6 unemployment rate. Chart I-10The Phillips Curve: It's Alive Chart I-11U.S. Wages Will Pick Up What could support growth? Let's begin with the credit dynamics. As we have argued, credit growth is a lagging indicator of economic activity. The improvement in the ISM through 2016 and early 2017 continues to point to a rebound in C&I loans in the U.S. (Chart I-12). Moreover, aggregate bank credit in the U.S. is already re-accelerating, suggesting that credit will once again add to economic activity, and will stop subtracting from it (Chart I-13). Chart I-12Credit Lags, And It Will Pick Up Chart I-13Momentum In U.S. Loans Is Turning Up Another positive for the U.S. economy has been the substantial easing in financial conditions resulting from the fall in the dollar and bond yields since the beginning of 2017. This easing should help economic activity over the course of the next quarters (Chart I-14). In its most recent minutes, the Fed has alluded to these forces. The fall in the dollar is already showing signs of helping. The ISM export orders index is currently ticking near 60, suggesting that the fall in the USD has had a stimulative impact on the U.S economy (Chart I-15). This is especially salient when contrasted with the euro area industrial production dynamics described above. Chart I-14U.S. Financial Conditions Will Help Growth Chart I-15The Dollar's Easing Is Evident Finally, when it comes to fiscal policy, our Geopolitical Strategy team remains adamant that tax cuts will materialize in the coming quarters. It is becoming imperative for congressional Republicans to achieve this as Trump's popularity remains dismal at the national level, which could prompt a serious electoral rout in the 2018 mid-term elections (Chart I-16). This means that fiscal easing is likely to come through, which should have an impact on asset prices and the dollar: The DXY is back to pre-election levels and the relative performance of stocks most sensitive to changes in tax policy is back to January 2016 levels. These price trends indicate that investors have massively curtailed their expectations for governmental support to growth. Chart I-16If Tax Cuts Don't Pass, Republicans Are Heading For A Huge Defeat In 2018 Moreover, the current format of the AHCA is unlikely to make it through the more moderate U.S. Senate. The loss of coverage and the insurance premia increases implied by the current plan are likely to be electoral poison in 2018, something well understood by key GOP policymakers. An AHCA still up in the air does not preclude tax cuts either. The budget deficit hole created by unfunded tax cuts will likely be patched through aggressive growth assumptions, the magic of dynamic scoring. The recently revealed Trump budget proposal itself is also unlikely to see the light of day in its current form and will evolve toward something more supportive of growth as time and negotiations pass. Bottom Line: Investors have massively curtailed their expectations of Fed tightening over the next two years. This view has been based on the lack of wage acceleration in the U.S., the poor credit growth numbers, and the uncertainty surrounding fiscal policy. These are still important risks to our bullish stance. However, we remain optimist because wage growth is only set to increase now, credit is a lagging indicator that looks about to pick up anew, financial conditions should help future U.S. economic activity, and the potential for tax cuts is far from dead. Stay long DXY. Norway's Passing Inflation Problem It was not long ago when the Norges Bank was facing the daunting task of kick starting a Norwegian economy ravaged by the collapse in oil prices while trying to contain the high inflation brought upon by the sell-off in the krone. However, following the stabilization of the NOK, this dilemma has dissipated as multiple measures of inflation have plunged. The Norges Bank is now free to maintain its dovish bias as the economy remains tired and will require easy monetary to recover going forward. Based on the effect of currency moves, inflation might reach a bottom at the beginning of next year, but it will likely stay below the central bank's target of 2.5 % for the foreseeable future (Chart I-17). Indeed, in spite of the rebound in oil prices, employment is contracting, the output gap is large, and wage growth remains deeply negative (Chart I-18). The Norges Bank is sympathetic to this view, acknowledging in its most recent monetary policy statement that inflation will hover in a 1-2% range in the coming years. Chart I-17A Stable NOK Will Keep Inflation Subdued Chart I-18No Domestic Inflationary Pressures In Norway Lastly, Norway's bubbly real estate market, the last obstacle to the Norges Bank dovish bias, is finally slowing down. Thanks to changes in regulation on residential mortgage lending at the start of the year, banks are tightening lending standards to households, a precursor to a cooling housing market (Chart I-19). With a Fed looking to increase rates, the real rate differential between the U.S. and Norway should move in favor of USD/NOK. Yet, could rising oil prices deepen the USD/NOK weakness? This seems doubtful as USD/NOK continues to be more correlated with real rate differentials than with the price of oil (Chart I-20). Nevertheless, the outlook of the krone against the AUD and the NZD is much more promising: Chart I-19No Need To Raise Rates To Curb Housing Prices Chart I-20Real Rates Matter More Than Oil Yesterday, OPEC Russia agreed to maintain their production cuts in place for the next nine months. This deal should keep the oil market in a deficit, pushing oil prices up and providing a tailwind to the NOK against non-oil commodity currencies. Chart I-21CAD/NOK: A Call On The U.S. Dollar On the other hand, the outlook for industrial metals and other commodities, which are more sensitive to the Chinese economy, continues to be worrying. Monetary conditions are still tightening in China and multiple economic activity indicators have disappointed to the downside. While base metals have already fallen considerably, we believe that additional weakness in the Chinese economy will trigger a selloff in EM assets, bringing the NZD and the AUD down with them. Finally, it may be time to sell the NOK against the CAD. The Bank of Canada struck a hawkish tone on Wednesday, stating that the Canadian economy's adjustment to lower oil prices is largely complete and that consumer spending should be supported by an improving labor market. This change in rhetoric should set the stage for a rally in CAD/NOK. Moreover, our Intermediate-Term Timing Model shows that this cross is 7% cheap, and our bullish USD view implies an outperformance of the loonie versus the krone given the tight correlation between CAD/NOK and the DXY (Chart I-21). Bottom Line: Outperformance of oil in the commodity space will help the krone outpace non-oil commodity currencies. However, the Norges Bank is likely to keep a dovish bias, which should make it difficult for the NOK to rally durably against a cheap U.S. dollar. Go long CAD/NOK. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Juan Manuel Correa Research Analyst juanc@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled "Bloody Potomac", dated May 19, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled "The Achilles Heel Of Commodity Currencies", dated May 5, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 The greenback suffered some losses following the release of Fed minutes. Puzzlingly, the rhetoric was not dovish, as markets and news outlets confirmed the prospect for a June rate hike. The result was a dollar selloff and a drop in yields. This easing in financial conditions created an additional fillip for the S&P as it traded at a record high, the opposite of what is expected with a looming rate hike. As new home sales contracted on a monthly basis and the manufacturing PMI disappointed, the U.S. soft patch continues. Nevertheless, our base case remains on par with the Fed's: the weakness in data is temporary and the Fed will hike more than the markets expect. We are already seeing this as continuing and initial jobless claims beat expectations at 1.923 million, and 234,000 respectively, and the greenback has found a footing at the 97.1 level. As this scenario further unfolds, gold will retreat as real returns increase, and the greenback will gain upward momentum. Report Links: Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 The euro area continues to surprise with better than expected data: German IFO: Overall Business Climate came in at 114.6 - levels last seen in 1970; Expectations came in better than expected at 106.5; and the Current Assessment also beat expectations of 121.2, coming in at 123.2. Euro area Manufacturing PMI is at 57 for May, beating expectations of 56.5, and the Composite measure also recorded an outperformance, coming in at 56.8. On the consumer side, German Gfk Consumer Confidence Survey came in at 10.4, beating expectations of 10.2. While the euro to be overvalued on short-term metrics, and the euro area is structurally weaker than the U.S., weaker data needs to be seen for the markets to see a correction. Report Links: Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data has been negative in Japan: Manufacturing PMI decreased to 52 in May from 52.7 in April. Exports growth decreased to 7.5%, from 12% the month before and underperforming expectations. Japan's all industry activity Index also underperformed expectations, contracting by 0.6% MoM. We continue to believe that Japanese economic activity will ultimately be determined by the exchange rate. The yen has appreciated since this the start of the year, therefore it is understandable that inflation and economic activity have been subdued. Taking this into account, the BoJ will continue to target a yield of 0% in JGB's, and thus the yen should suffer on a cyclical basis given that real rates differentials with the U.S. will continue to widen. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent British data has been mixed: GDP growth underperformed, coming in at 2%, decreasing from last quarter and underperforming expectations, mostly reflecting poor trade numbers. Meanwhile total business investment grew by 0.8%, outperforming expectations. We are not positive on the pound against the dollar, given that near 1.3 the pound is no longer a bargain tactically. On the other hand we expect more upside against the euro. Powerful inflationary pressures are building in the U.K., and governor Carney, previously concerned about the effects of Brexit in the economy, might be more inclined now to deal with inflation as the U.K. has proved resilient. This will put upward pressure in British rates vis-à-vis European rates. Additionally EUR/GBP has reached overbought levels, indicating it might be a good time to short this cross. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 As the greenback's descent slowed down, so did the Aussie's ascent. The underlying motives for strength in the antipodean currency are misplaced. As data remains unpromising, this week followed through with further disappointments as overall construction work done contracted by 7.2% on an annual basis, with the engineering component contracting by 13%. Research by the RBA illustrates that construction work has a very close relationship with the national accounts of Australia. This could result in a slowdown in the economy - something which the RBA cannot afford amidst flailing inflationary pressures. On a more optimistic note, the commodity selloff is taking a breather. Most crucially for the AUD, iron ore futures have remained flat for almost a month after a 30% depreciation, and natural gas has been flat for almost a month. These developments have limited the AUD's downside for now. However, looming EM risks and the potential resumption of the dollar bull market represent very real risks for the AUD going forward. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 AUD And CAD: Risky Business - March 10, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 The kiwi has appreciated by about 1.5% against the dollar this week. Additionally, recent data has been positive: Visitor Arrivals yearly growth skyrocketed to 21.5% on April. The trade balance outperformed expectations coming in at -3.48 Billion The kiwi economy continues to surge, with 7% growth in nominal GDP and retail sales growth at decade-highs. Additionally, dairy prices continue to surge, and are now growing at a 60% YoY pace. For this reason we are bearish on AUD/NZD, as the Australian economy is not only in a more precarious state, but is also more sensitive to the Chinese industrial cycle. Meanwhile, we continue to be bearish on NZD/USD, as a negative view on EM assets necessarily entails a bearish view on the kiwi. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Following on from the dollar's weakness, the CAD displayed further strength after the BoC's decision statement. While keeping rates unchanged, the bank highlighted that "recent economic data have been encouraging" and that "consumer spending and the housing sector continue to be robust on the back of an improving labor market". Furthermore, the Bank more or less expects these supports to growth to "strengthen and broaden over the projection horizon". While wholesale sales increased by less than expected at 0.9%, the BoC also expects that the "very strong growth in the first quarter will be followed by some moderation in the second quarter". This is likely to keep market expectations anchored and the CAD's value intact. Additionally, oil should pare recent weaknesses as OPEC follows through on its cuts. The CAD is therefore likely to see some strength against other commodity currencies. Report Links: Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 EUR/CHF has continued to depreciate after coming close to reaching 1.1. We continue to be negative on this cross, as the Euro is likely to have limited upside from current levels. The ECB is unlikely to hike rates any time soon, as wage pressures outside of Germany continue to be muted. Furthermore, this is not likely to change any time soon, as the labor market of the periphery continues to be very rigid. Meanwhile, the SNB is likely to take off the floor from this cross next year, as core inflation and retail sales growth have both returned to positive territory. We will continue to monitor the rhetoric by the SNB to have a more clear understanding of when the removal of the floor might occur. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 The krone has rallied this week, thanks to the rise in oil prices. However real rate differentials should continue to move in favor of USD/NOK. While the fed is likely to hike more than what is currently anticipated in the OIS curve, the Norges Bank will stay dovish, given that the Norwegian economy is still too weak to sustain a rise in interest rates. Furthermore, macro prudential measures seem to be helping the Norges bank to slow down the housing market. The NOK is also likely to have downside against the CAD. The dollar bull market should help this cross rally, given the tight correlation between CAD/NOK and the DXY. Furthermore the BoC has struck a more hawkish tone as of late, which should further increase the difference between interest rate expectations in these two countries. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits -December 16, 2016 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Positive data emerged from Sweden this week as consumer confidence picked up to 105.9 from 103.7, beating expectation of a decline to 103.6. The seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate remains on a structural downtrend, coming in at 6.6% according to Statistics Sweden. In terms of crosses, USD/SEK continues to weaken due to the greenback's instability. EUR/SEK has topped out and is also showing some weakness. Against commodity currencies, the movement is mixed. The SEK has shown the most strength against the AUD, while CAD/SEK and NZD/SEK have been flat, and NOK/SEK has seen considerable strength on the back of robust oil prices. We can see the SEK being weak against oil-based currencies as we expect OPEC to remain focused on cutting global oil inventories, while AUD/SEK could see further downside due to poor fundamentals in Australia. Report Links: Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Highlights Fiscal policy is likely to be eased modestly in most advanced economies over the next two years. The U.S. Congress will ultimately cut taxes, although the size of the cuts will be far smaller than what President Trump has proposed. Ironically, fiscal stimulus is coming to America just when the economy has reached full employment. The market is pricing in too little Fed tightening over the remainder of the year. The dollar's swoon is ending. Go short EUR/USD with a target of parity by the end of the year. Feature Fiscal Thrust Around The World In its latest Fiscal Monitor, the IMF estimated that advanced economies eased fiscal policy by 0.2% of GDP in 2016, reversing a five-year streak of fiscal tightening (Chart 1). The Fund expects a further 0.1% of GDP of easing in 2017, followed by a neutral stance in 2018. In the EM universe, the IMF foresees a fiscal thrust1 of -0.2% of GDP in 2017 and -0.4% of GDP in 2018. Chart 1IMF Expects Modest Fiscal Easing In Advanced Economies, Further Tightening In EM Averages can disguise a lot of variation across countries (Charts 2). Comparing 2018 with 2016, the IMF expects Canada and the U.S. to experience a positive fiscal thrust of 0.7% of GDP and 0.4% of GDP, respectively. The fiscal thrust is projected to be -0.2% of GDP in the euro area, -1% of GDP in the U.K., and -0.5% of GDP in Japan. Among the larger advanced economies, Australia is expected to experience the largest degree of fiscal tightening, with a fiscal thrust of -1.2% of GDP. Across the EM universe, most of the fiscal tightening is projected to occur among oil producers. The IMF expects oil-exporting economies to collectively reduce their fiscal deficits by US$150 billion between 2016 and 2018. Political considerations require that the IMF give considerable weight to the stated objectives of governments when formulating fiscal projections. In reality, governments often struggle to meet their budget targets. Consequently, the Fund has typically overestimated the degree of fiscal consolidation that ends up happening (Chart 3). As such, our own projections foresee somewhat less fiscal tightening - and in some countries, a fair bit of fiscal easing - than the IMF projects. In particular: Chart 2Countries Will Follow Different Fiscal Paths Chart 3IMF Forecasts Tend To Overestimate Extent Of Fiscal Consolidation We do not expect much more incremental fiscal tightening out of the euro area. Thanks to a slew of austerity measures, the euro area's structural primary budget balance went from a deficit of 2.6% of GDP in 2010 to a surplus of 1.0% of GDP in 2014. It has remained close to those levels ever since. Now that a primary surplus has already been achieved and interest rates and bond spreads have fallen to exceptionally low levels, the need for further belt tightening has abated. That's the good news. The bad news is that high government debt levels in many European economies rule out any major new stimulus programs (Chart 4). The U.K. will slow the pace of fiscal consolidation. The U.K.'s structural primary budget deficit fell from a peak of 7.1% of GDP in 2009 to 1.3% of GDP in 2016. The IMF expects the primary balance to move into a surplus of 0.6% of GDP in 2019. We think that's unlikely. The Conservatives are under intense pressure to keep the economy afloat during Brexit negotiations. Prime Minister Theresa May has indicated she will delay eradicating the budget deficit until the middle of the next decade, having previously promised a 2020 target date. Japan has limited scope to further tighten fiscal policy. Japan's structural primary budget deficit reached 6.9% of GDP in 2010. The IMF expects it to reach 3.7% this year and fall further to 2% in 2020, provided the government goes forward with raising the VAT from 8% to 10%. We are skeptical that Japan's economy will be strong enough to allow the government to raise taxes. However, even if it is, this will only be because the Bank of Japan gooses growth by keeping long-term yields pinned to zero, thereby allowing the yen to depreciate further. China is making a structural transition to large budget deficits. The IMF estimates that China's structural primary budget balance deteriorated from a surplus of 0.1% of GDP in 2014 to a deficit of 2.8% of GDP in 2016. The increase in the fiscal deficit cannot be explained by the reclassification of off-budget spending as on-budget, since the IMF's "augmented" fiscal balance - which attempts to control for such statistical issues - deteriorated by roughly the same amount (Chart 5). Part of the erosion in China's fiscal balance stemmed from the global manufacturing slowdown in 2015-2016, which hit tax receipts and necessitated a healthy dose of fiscal stimulus. However, there is more to the story than that. As we controversially argued in "China Needs More Debt," now that China is no longer in a position to run gargantuan current account surpluses, large fiscal deficits will be necessary to absorb excess private-sector savings.2 The government's desire to rein in credit growth will only add to the impetus to find new sources of aggregate demand. The era of red ink has begun. Chart 4Government Debt Levels Outside Of Germany Are Still High Chart 5China's Fiscal Deficit Has Been Increasing The U.S. Congress will ultimately cut taxes, although the size of the cuts will be far smaller than what President Trump has ambitiously proposed. After a wave of euphoria following the presidential election, the market has largely priced out meaningful fiscal stimulus. This can be seen in the flagging relative performance of infrastructure stocks and highly-taxed companies, as well as in the sharp decline in inflation expectations (Chart 6). We think this pessimism is overdone. Donald Trump desperately needs a "win," and cutting taxes is one key area where the President and Congress both see eye to eye. Trump's falling poll numbers have heightened the risk that the Republicans will lose control of the House of Representatives next November (Chart 7). This makes passing a tax bill before the midterm elections all the more urgent. The main questions surround the scale and scope of any tax cuts, and just as critically, how they are paid for. We discuss these issues next. Chart 6Markets Have Priced Out Meaningful Fiscal Stimulus Chart 7Challenging Outlook For Republicans In 2018 Trump's Budget Proposal: Fake Math Chart 8Trump In Wonderland? If the definition of a good leader is one who underpromises and overdelivers, then President Trump's budget proposal left much to be desired. Trump's plan assumes that U.S. growth will reach 3% over the next ten years. Even in the unlikely event that the economy manages to avert a recession over this period, such a growth rate would be a remarkable feat. After all, growth has averaged only 2.1% since 2009. And keep in mind that the unemployment rate has fallen from 10% to 4.4% over this interval, consistent with potential GDP growth of only 1.4%. The slow pace of capital accumulation following the Great Recession undoubtedly hurt the supply side of the economy, but it would take a phenomenal - and rather implausible - acceleration in potential GDP growth to justify Trump's 3% target. Many of the other assumptions in Trump's blueprint are no less dubious (Chart 8). Despite projecting much slower growth, the Federal Reserve expects short-term rates to rise to 3% in 2019. In contrast, the Trump administration sees rates increasing to only 2.4%, an assumption that perhaps not coincidentally helps reduce projected debt-servicing costs. Most flagrantly, the plan assumes no decline in the revenue-to-GDP ratio, even though the basis for faster growth largely rests on the assumption of steep tax cuts. When pressed on the issue, officials from the Office of Management and Budget sheepishly noted that there would be offsetting limits on tax deductions, which would have the effect of broadening the tax base. However, no specific information was given on what these would entail. Many theories have been offered as to why Trump offered such an outlandish budget plan. Was he trying to appease conservatives in Congress? Perhaps this was just a sly attempt to gain leverage in future budget negotiations? Our theory is simpler: Trump promised an economic boom during the election campaign, while assuring voters that his tax cuts would more than pay for themselves. Hell would need to freeze over before he released a plan that did not share these assumptions. Congress Will Decide So where do we go from here? The specifics of Trump's plan are irrelevant. Congress will rewrite the budget from scratch. Major spending cuts will be scrapped. So will the onerous cuts to insurance subsidies and Medicaid in the House version of the health care bill. The Senate will ditch those. In contrast, Trump's tax cuts will be preserved, albeit on a smaller scale than envisioned in his budget proposal. Granted, congressional leaders have said they want tax reform to be revenue neutral, meaning that any tax cuts would need to be offset by other revenue-raising measures. That is easier said than done, however. The three main ways that House Republicans have offered to pay for corporate and personal tax cuts - introducing a border adjustment tax, eliminating the deductibility of business interest payments, and jettisoning the deduction for state and local income taxes for individuals - all face severe resistance from vested interests. In Washington, where there is a will there is usually a dishonest way. Budget forecasts are typically made over a 10-year window. Thus, it is possible to lower taxes upfront and promise spending cuts and ill-defined revenue raising measures in the tail end of the budget window. Such a strategy would generate a positive fiscal thrust early on, while leaving the door open for Congress to dump any future spending reduction or revenue measures before they are actually implemented. Add to that the tax revenue that is projected to pour in from supply-side reforms, and the stage is set for a dollop of fiscal easing starting in early 2018. How likely is it that Republicans will pursue such a strategy? Very likely. As evidence, look no further than the fact that White House budget director Mick Mulvaney floated the idea on Wednesday of extending the 10-year budget scoring window to 20 years. Investment Conclusions Chart 9Phillips Curve Is Alive And Well An obsessive focus on fiscal austerity hamstrung the recovery in many countries following the Great Recession. The irony is that fiscal stimulus is coming to America just when the economy has reached full employment. This means that much of the increase in aggregate demand arising from a more expansionary fiscal stance will be reflected in higher inflation rather than faster growth. This does not represent a major threat to risk assets now, but could later next year. Despite all the obituaries that have been written for the death of the Phillips curve, the data show that it is alive and well (Chart 9). Higher inflation will allow the Fed to raise rates once per quarter. The market is not prepared for this. Investors currently expect only 45 basis points in rate hikes over the coming 12 months. That is far too low. On the other side of the Atlantic, the ECB's months-to-hike measure has plummeted from 65 months in July 2016 to only 24 months today (Chart 10). Real rates are projected to be a mere 14 basis points higher in the U.S. than in the euro area in five years' time (Chart 11). Chart 10The Big Shift In Market Sentiment Towards ECB Policy Chart 11The Vanishing Transatlantic Bond Spread Poor demographics and high private-sector debt levels imply that the neutral rate of interest is lower in the euro area than in the U.S. And while the euro area may not be tightening fiscal policy any longer, the fact that its structural primary budget balance is 2.6% of GDP larger than America's means that the euro area's overall fiscal stance will contribute less to aggregate demand than in the U.S. This will force the ECB to keep rates lower for longer, causing the euro to weaken. Chart 12Widening Real Rate Differentials ##br##Support The Dollar Chart 13Speculators Are Long The Euro For ##br##The First Time In Three Years Incredibly, two-year real interest rate differentials between the euro area and the U.S. have widened by 41 basis points in favor of the latter since the end of March, even though EUR/USD has actually rallied over this period (Chart 12). We think this divergence has occurred because investors have been busy covering the euro hedges that they put on in the lead up to the French elections. However, now that net long speculative positions in the euro have risen to a three-year high - having been deeply short just a few weeks ago - the speculative demand for euros will subside (Chart 13). With all this in mind, we are going short EUR/USD today with a year-end target of parity and a stop-loss of 1.14. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 The fiscal thrust is defined as the change in the structural primary budget balance from one year to the next. As a convention, we define a positive thrust as loosening in fiscal policy (i.e., a lower fiscal balance). 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Does China Have A Debt Problem Or A Savings Problem?" dated February 24, 2017, and "China Needs More Debt," dated May 20, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Highlights The equity risk premium (ERP) is distorted: too low. The Eurostoxx600 uptrend is reaching a technical limit according to its 130-day (6-month) fractal dimension. The U.S.-Euro area bond yield spread is distorted: too high. The Spain-France bond yield spread is distorted: too high. The Italy-Germany bond yield spread is not distorted. Feature Central banks' massive interventions in markets have left many investors wondering: has the market's price discovery mechanism become dysfunctional - and if so, where most severely? It is a good question because clearly, the prices that are most distorted are also the ones most likely to dislocate, and generate lucrative opportunities. This week's report assesses the distortion in three important relative pricings: the Italy-Germany sovereign yield spread; the U.S.-euro area sovereign yield spread; and the prospective excess return from equities over bonds, otherwise known as the equity risk premium. The Italy-Germany Bond Yield Spread Is Not Distorted We often hear the claim that the ECB's bond purchase program has compressed periphery bond yields relative to core yields. But we find no evidence for such a distortion. For example, relative to the ECB's capital key1 and other guidelines for bond purchase volumes, there is a larger ongoing supply of Italian BTPs than German bunds.2 So from a technical perspective, the ECB's interventions should have depressed German bund yields more than Italian BTP yields, thereby expanding the spread. Chart Of The WeekLow Volatility: We've Been Here Before... And It Didn't Last In fact, the technical distortion seems quite small because the Italy-Germany yield spread can be fully justified by its two underlying fundamentals: relative competitiveness (Chart I-2) and euro breakup probability (Chart I-3). Chart I-2Euro Area Yield Spreads Depend On Relative Competitiveness ... Chart I-3... And The Probability Of Euro Break-Up The premium on Italian BTP yields exists as a compensation for the expected redenomination loss in the tail-event of euro breakup. Assuming this currency depreciation would neutralize Italy's current 25% under-competitiveness versus Germany, we can infer that the 125 bps yield premium on 5-year BTPs is pricing a 5% annual probability of euro breakup (because 125 bps = 25% loss times 5% probability). The probability should account for an Italian election that is due within the next year, and Italian public support for the euro hovering at an unconvincing majority of around 55%. In this context, the probability should be somewhat elevated, though not alarming. So a 5% annual probability of euro breakup through the next five years seems reasonable within its post-crisis 2%-20% range. On this basis, the Italian-Germany yield spread is not distorted (Chart I-4). Instead, the real anomaly is the Spain-France (5-year) yield spread which stands at 50 bps (Chart I-5). There is now no difference in competitiveness between Spain and France, so there should be no redenomination premium on Spanish Bonos over French OATs, irrespective of the probability of euro break up. Stay structurally overweight Spanish Bonos versus French OATs. Chart I-4The Italy-Germany Yield Spread At 150 Bps Is Fair Chart I-5The Spain-France Yield Spread At 50 Bps Is Too High The U.S.-Euro Area Bond Yield Spread Is Distorted: Too High If bond price discovery were based solely on economic fundamentals, the U.S.-euro area yield spread would not be at a multi-decade extreme today. Such an extreme spread exists because the difference between Fed and ECB policy is much more polarized than is justified by the economic fundamentals. In this sense, the relative pricing is distorted. Consider the hard data. The percentages of the working age population in employment are at the same respective pre-crisis highs in both economies; the difference in wage inflation is closing; and the gap between core inflation in the U.S. and euro area has narrowed very sharply to just 0.6%. Indeed, excluding the cost of shelter - which is not represented in the euro area CPI - core inflation in the U.S. is now lower than in the euro area. Agreed, Fed policy should be tighter than ECB policy. But the expected difference should not be at a multi-decade extreme. Given the self-proclaimed 'data-dependency' of both the Fed and the ECB, the polarization of monetary policy expectations (Chart I-6) has to converge to the rapidly narrowing gap in the hard economic data, one way or another (Chart I-7). Chart I-6The U.S.-Euro Area Yield ##br##Spread Is Too High ... Chart I-7... And Will Gravitate To The Narrowing ##br##Gap In The Economic Data I conclude that: the U.S.-euro area (and U.S.-Germany) yield spread can close much further; euro/dollar can rise structurally; and the market neutral equity pair-trade long euro area Financials/short U.S. Financials can continue to outperform. The caveat is that these positions are just one big correlated trade (Chart I-8 and Chart I-9). Chart I-8Expected Monetary Policy Difference ##br##Is Driving The U.S.-Germany Yield Spread ... Chart I-9... And Therefore The Relative ##br##Performance Of Financials The Equity Risk Premium Is Distorted: Too Low Equity market behaviour is starkly asymmetric; market ascents tend to be gentle and drawn out, while descents tend to be violent and abrupt. By contrast, bond market behaviour is more symmetric; both upward and downward moves can be gentle or violent. The upshot is that when the equity market is ascending, its observed volatility declines. And the longer and more established the ascent becomes, the lower the observed volatility goes, both in absolute terms and relative to bonds. Crucially, this is just an observation of the inherent behaviour of equities: a low observed volatility simply tells us that equity ascents are gentle and drawn out (Chart I-10); it does not tell us that equity risk has diminished. Chart I-10Low Volatility Just Tells Us That Equity Ascents Are Gentle And Drawn Out. ##br##It Does Not Tell Us That Equity Risk Has Diminished! Unfortunately, the decline in the observed volatility may create the illusion that equity risk has diminished. In response, investors might demand a smaller (or no) equity risk premium (ERP) - the excess prospective long-term return over bonds - because they have falsely concluded that the risk of a large intermediate loss is vanishing. In turn, the shrinking ERP and lower required return justifies an even higher price today, allowing the market to continue its gentle ascent. So observed volatility falls even further, and the process feeds on itself in a self-reinforcing spiral. Readers might recognise this as the setup of the Minsky hypothesis in which the illusion of systemic stability breeds systemic instability and an eventual tipping point - a so-called 'Minsky Moment'. The Minsky hypothesis is an explanation for the boom bust cycle in the economy. It proposes that a credit boom initially generates strong and steady growth with low observed volatility. But the associated hubris - "no more boom and bust" - eventually encourages reckless lending and thereby sows the seeds of its destruction. When the misallocated loans cannot be repaid, the inevitable nemesis arrives. Likewise, in the case of the equity market, today's low observed volatility is absolutely not a reason for hubris. Yet as demonstrated in Markets Suspended In Disbelief,3 the low observed volatility has seduced investors into accepting a wafer-thin ERP. Today's low observed volatility is at the lower end of a range that has existed for at least 50 years (Chart of the Week). We have been here many times before. In each case, the low observed volatility did not last. And when it rose, so too did the ERP. As supporting evidence, observe that the 130-day (6-month) fractal dimension of the Eurostoxx600 is suggesting that the current uptrend is reaching its technical limit (Chart I-11). As a reminder, when an investment's fractal dimension approaches its natural lower bound, it signals that excessive trend following and groupthink have reached a natural point of instability. At which point the established trend is likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. Chart I-11The Current Uptrend In The Eurostoxx600 ##br##Is Reaching Its Technical Limit Before making a large absolute commitment to the equity asset class on a 6-12 month or longer horizon, I would first like to see both of these trustworthy signals stop flashing red. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 The capital key refers to the proportion of the ECB's capital owned by each of the euro area member states, and it is broadly pro-rata to the member state's GDP. 2 German GDP is 2 times the size of Italian GDP, but the stock of German sovereign debt is only 1.1 times the size of Italian sovereign debt. 3 Published on April 13 2017 and available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* The 65-day fractal dimension of nickel versus tin is approaching a level which has previously signaled an imminent trend-reversal. Go long nickel/short tin as this week's trade. Chart I-12 For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Feature Chart 1 Senior officials at the Federal Reserve have begun preparing the market for the eventual run down of the central bank's balance sheet. After several rounds of quantitative easing (QE), total assets held by the Fed currently stand at US$4.5 trillion - a dramatic increase from US$900 billion before the global financial crisis. Indeed, efforts to shrink the Fed's balance sheet are essentially reverse QE. As the 2013 'Taper Tantrum" suggests, such a profound change in U.S. monetary policy can have a significant impact on interest rates and broader financial assets, and Fed officials are working hard to properly anchor market expectations. In comparison, how the People's Bank of China manages its balance sheet is much less transparent and less understood by market participants, even though the PBoC has the biggest balance sheet among the world's major central banks (Chart 1). Currently, the PBoC's total assets amount to US$4.9 trillion, compared with about US$4.5 trillion for both the Fed and the European Central Bank (ECB). Moreover, its balance sheet has stopped growing since 2015 in local currency terms and has been shrinking in dollar terms, but the impact on the economy and financial markets has so far not been material. Generally speaking, a central bank uses its balance sheet to aid monetary policy. It controls the size and composition of its assets to affect interest rates, and in turn the economy. Through "operation twist" and QE, the Fed significantly increased its holdings of longer-dated Treasury securities and mortgage backed securities (MBS), which currently account for 95% of its assets (Table 1). Therefore, shrinkage of the Fed balance sheet means that the Fed's holdings of long-term securities will gradually be reduced - likely by allowing them to run off at maturity rather than selling them in the open market. This should nonetheless put some upward pressure on long-term risk-free rates going forward. Table 1The Fed's Balance Sheet In a Special Report we published six years ago, we pointed out the explosion in the PBoC's balance sheet and its unique features compared with other central banks.1 In a nutshell, the PBoC's biggest holdings on its asset side were U.S. Treasurys rather than domestic risk-free assets. The Chinese central bank was essentially engaging in a massive "currency swap" in which it accumulated U.S. Treasurys while dramatically increasing the country's monetary base. Meanwhile, it was also working hard to "sterilize" by forcing commercial banks to maintain an increasingly massive sum of required reserves with the central bank. These policy tools, however, were inherently crude and clumsy, with huge volatility in monetary market rates and overall financial volatility being a key after-effect. This week we are revisiting the PBoC's balance sheet to highlight some major shifts in recent years. Some developments are worth highlighting. Dynamics have completely reversed since 2015, when Chinese official reserves began to fall, leading to a shrinking in the PBoC's balance sheet by about US$500 billion since the all-time peak. The "sterilization" process has also been reversed, as the PBoC has been releasing liquidity back into the domestic financial system. The overall liquidity situation has been largely stable. Normally a decline in the PBoC's foreign asset holdings would lead to a decline in the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) to offset the liquidity outflows, leading to a simultaneous decline in both sides of the central bank's balance sheet. The PBoC, however, has been resisting shrinking its balance sheet. As its foreign asset holdings (U.S. Treasurys) have been declining, the PBoC has significantly ramped up domestic asset holdings by increasing direct claims on commercial banks through repos and other lending facilities. The central bank appears to be concerned that a lowered RRR will stoke more domestic capital outflows, which risks creating a vicious circle. How the PBoC manages domestic liquidity has seen major shifts in recent history, and will likely continue to evolve going forward. The RRR, as a monetary policy tool, will likely be gradually phased out.2 Over the long run, this will lead to important changes in the PBoC's balance sheet and the way it conducts monetary policy. In the short term, commercial banks' excess reserves are at close to record low levels. The odds are rising that the RRR will be lowered in the coming months, especially if the RMB stabilizes against the dollar, as we expect.3 Finally, it is worth noting that the most aggressive phase of the Fed's QE efforts coincided with the most rapid phase of the PBoC's balance sheet expansion. This means that both central banks were aggressive buyers of U.S. Treasurys and risk-free assets in previous years. Looking forward, if a shrinking Fed balance sheet leads to a sharp increase in U.S. interest rates and a dollar rally, it could force the PBoC to also liquidate its holdings of U.S. Treasurys to stabilize the RMB exchange rate. This means both the Fed and the PBoC could become marginal sellers of Treasurys, which would have a much more profound impact on U.S. interest rates and the growth outlook. Monitoring the PBoC's balance sheet will become increasingly important for Fed watchers. Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "Delving Into the PBoC'S Balance Sheet," dated July 27, 2011, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "More On The Chinese Debt Debate," dated April 20, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Can The RMB Appreciate Against The Dollar, Again?" dated May 11, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Table 2 offers a simplified balance sheet of the People's Bank of China. Foreign assets still account for 65.6% of its total assets, down from a peak of 83% in 2014. In comparison, most other major central banks' assets are predominantly domestic government bonds. The explosive growth of the PBoC's holding of foreign assets had been the only source of its balance sheet expansion before 2015. In the past two years the PBoC's domestic assets have increased sharply. Overall the PBoC's balance sheet has stayed flat in the RMB terms. PBoC's holding of foreign and domestic assets has been matched by expansion of reserve money (monetary base) on the liability side of the PBoC's balance sheet, including currency issuances (M0 and cash in the vaults of depository institutions) and deposits of commercial banks in the central bank. Commercial banks' reserve deposits at the PBoC have continued to grow even though the PBoC balance sheet expansion has stalled. (Chart 2) Table 2The PBoC's Balance Sheet Chart 2 PBoC holdings of foreign assets include foreign exchange reserves and gold. Foreign reserves currently account for 63% of PBoC total assets, compared with a peak of 84% in 2014. Official record shows that gold is still a negligible share of its total assets. Other major items on the asset side of the PBoC's balance sheet include claims on the government, commercial banks and other financial corporations. The PBoC's claims on the government (entirely on the central government) account for 4.5% of its total assets. In 2007 the government set up a sovereign wealth management fund to manage part of the country's reserves. The government issued bonds to the PBoC in exchange for foreign exchange reserves, which was used as capital of the investment firm. Legally the PBoC is forbidden to directly hold government bonds. The PBoC's claims on other depository corporations (commercial banks) include loans and rediscounts to commercial banks and the net amount of repurchase agreements, which has increased sharply since 2016. The PBoC claims on other commercial banks were a major policy tool to control liquidity in the early 2000s. The central bank's claims on other financial corporations mainly include loans to the asset management firms that the government set up in the late 1990s to deal with bad loans spun off from commercial banks. There has been no change in this item in recent years. (Chart 3 and Chart 4) Chart 3 Chart 4 On the liability side of the PBoC's balance sheet, the dominant item is reserve money, which includes currency issuances and deposits of depository corporations. Taken together these items account for almost 90% of banks' total liabilities. However, currency issuances (M0 and cash in vault) have been hovering around 20% of the PBoC balance sheet in recent years. Deposits of depository corporations account for about 66%. Deposits of commercial banks in the central bank include required and free reserves. Currency issuance and free reserves make up China's "high power money" that can result in a much larger increase in money supply through the money multiplier. Therefore, adjusting the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) on banks has been a key policy tool for the PBoC to control "loanable" funds and liquidity. The central bank, however, been reluctant to adjust RRR since 2016 despite continued liquidity outflow. Commercial banks used to hold large amounts of free reserves with the central bank, which however have declined sharply in recent years. The massive reserves of commercial banks in the PBoC offer a critical liquidity buffer for banks at times of crisis. As banks' free reserves have been running thin, there is a building case for an RRR reduction in coming months. (Chart 5 and Chart 6) Chart 5 Chart 6 Other major items on the liability side of the PBoC's balance sheet include bond issues, government deposits and foreign liabilities. The central bank started to issue bonds (notes) in 2002 as a way to sterilize foreign capital inflows, a tool that has essentially been phased out. Currently, total outstanding bonds amount to RMB 50 billion, a mere 0.1% of the PBoC total liability, compared with almost 30% in 2007. The PBoC's foreign liabilities are deposits of international financial institutions, which account for a negligible share of its total assets. Government deposits account for 8.4% of the central bank's total liabilities, or RMB 2.88 trillion at the end of April 2017. The PBoC regularly auctions off fiscal deposits to commercial banks as a way to adjust interbank liquidity. (Chart 7 and Chart 8) Chart 7 Chart 8 There are four main items on the PBoC's balance sheet that the central bank uses at its discretion to manage domestic liquidity: claims on depository corporations (banks), deposits of depository corporations, liabilities to the government (fiscal deposits) and bond issues. Claims on depository corporations are on the asset side, and include loans and rediscounts to commercial banks and the net amount of repurchase agreements. The PBoC has significantly expanded some new liquidity tools, such as various lending facilities and open market operations. These assets are mostly short term, allowing the central bank flexibility to adjust the quantity quickly. Reserve deposits of commercial banks, central bank bond issues and fiscal deposits are on the liability side of the PBoC's balance sheet, but reserve deposits play by far the largest role in the central bank's sterilization efforts. Commercial banks reserve deposits are still hovering around record high levels. (Chart 9 and Chart 10) Chart 9 Chart10 Taken together, the ebbs and flows of the PBoC's sterilization operations coincide with the pace of country's foreign reserve accumulation. The PBoC was able to "sterilize" about 80% of foreign capital inflow before 2015, and it has been quickly adjusting its balance sheet to offset domestic capital outflows in the past two years. All these items on the PBoC's balance sheet should be cross-checked to assess its liquidity operations, rather than focusing on one item. Looking forward, the PBoC's liquidity operations will remain contingent on the situation of cross-border capital flows in the near term, and its monetary independence will remain compromised. Over the long run, a free-floating RMB exchange rate will diminish the purpose of PBoC's precautionary holdings of foreign reserves, which will in turn impact how the central bank manages its balance sheet for domestic considerations. (Chart 11 and Chart 12) Chart 11 Chart 12 Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Feature EM risk assets refuse to sell off - regardless of new information and developments that historically would have caused these markets to tumble. Indeed, political turmoil and changes in Brazil and South Africa - two high-beta EM markets - have so far had limited impact on flows and market dynamics. Moreover, while our Reflation Confirming Indicator has rolled over, EM share prices have not reacted at all (Chart I-1). EM stocks have also decoupled with the equal-weighted average of global mining and energy equity indexes (Chart I-2). Chart 1Reflation Confirming Indicator And ##br##EM Stocks Chart 2Commodities Share Prices And ##br##EM Equities: Unsustainable Divergence We do not subscribe to the thesis that EM assets have permanently decoupled from both commodities and their domestic credit cycles, and that tried and tested indicators no longer work. Technology and social media share prices have been instrumental to this latest decoupling, as we wrote in last week's report.1 This group of stocks is in a full-blown mania phase, and it is hard to know when this will end. Yet, exponential price moves always occur at the end of a bull market, and are typically followed by bear markets. As we elaborated in last week's report, the investment call on social media and internet stocks is a bottom-up - not macro - call. Top-down analysis can add some value on the semiconductor cycle, and we suggested last week that it is likely topping out. This week new data releases support the thesis that Asian/global trade in general and the semiconductor cycle in particular are already decelerating. Korean exports data for the first 20 days of May, Japanese preliminary manufacturing PMI for May, and Taiwanese manufacturing output volume growth for April have all decelerated (Chart I-3). Finally, one technical piece of evidence that this rally is late is relative weakness in the equal-weighted MSCI equity indexes. In the EM space, the equally-weighted individual stock index has fared poorly against the EM market cap-weighted index since May 2016 (Chart I-4, top panel). In the U.S., the same measure of market breadth has deteriorated since December 2016 (Chart I-4, bottom panel). Chart 3Asia's Manufacturing Growth ##br##Is Already Decelerating Chart 4The EM And U.S. Equity Rally ##br##Has Been Driven By Large-Cap Stocks Bottom Line: EM financial markets are in the midst of irrational exuberance. The rally is late, but it is impossible to time the top. The forthcoming selloff will be large and protracted. Beware Of China's Budding Growth Slump Interest rates have risen in China sufficiently enough to cause a major growth slowdown in the mainland economy (Chart I-5). Liquidity tightening amid a lingering credit bubble could not be a more dangerous combination. In this context, financial markets are extremely complacent on EM/China plays. China's liquidity tightening continues, and is bound to create a decisive growth relapse in the months ahead, as well as dampen exports in countries that sell to China (Chart I-6). Chart 5China Growth To Slump Chart 6Exports To China To Slump Not only is the People's Bank of China (PBoC) guiding interest rates higher, but there is an ongoing regulatory crackdown on the financial system. Regulators are forcing banks to bring Wealth Management Products (WMPs) and other off-balance-sheet items onto their balance sheets. As a result, banks' capital adequacy and risk matrixes will deteriorate, and they will be forced to slow down credit creation. Chart 7EM Share Prices Ex. Tech Have Not Broken Out Remarkably, policymakers are determined to get things under control. According to The Wall Street Journal,2 key policymakers have issued strongly worded statements. "Strong medicine must be prescribed," said Guo Shuqing, chairman of the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CRBC), according to people familiar with the matter. "If the banking industry gets into a mess," he added, "I will resign." He was appointed as the head of the CRBC last October, and likely has a mandate from the President to tackle speculative excesses in the financial system. In its first quarter Monetary Policy Implementation Report,3 the PBoC repeatedly used the phrase "preventing bubbles." Besides, in his statements, the chairman of the PBoC has frequently emphasized the need to normalize credit growth and curb speculative activities. The former head of the insurance regulator, who has been "accommodating" and "tolerant" of risky activities by insurance companies, was jailed last fall for corruption. These are strong indications confirming that policymakers are determined to curb speculative financial activities. Provided how entrenched and large various speculative financial schemes and the credit bubble have become in China, it will be impossible to tackle speculative excesses without a slowdown in overall credit growth and associated harm to the real economy. This is not to say that policymakers are tightening with intentions to cause a growth collapse. Policymakers in all countries always tighten to cap inflation or credit excesses or normalize interest rates - i.e., they never tighten to cause a major shock to the real economy. This applies to Chinese policymakers at the moment, especially ahead of the party Congress later this year. That said, when the existing imbalances in the economy or financial system are sufficiently large, even minor tightening can cause a financial accident or growth relapse. It is not within policymakers' powers to predict or prevent it. They may alter their policy after the fact, but markets will sell off considerably beforehand. We do not know exactly how financial dynamics in China will evolve in the months ahead, but we are certain that the market consensus is too complacent and that EM asset prices are at major risk. Bottom Line: It is impossible to predict financial accidents (stress among specific institutions) but we are certain that China's credit growth and, consequently, capital spending are bound to slow considerably in the coming months. This bodes ill for producers of commodities and industrial goods both within and outside China. Accordingly, EM risk assets will suffer the most. As a final note, EM ex-technology share prices have not yet broken out and we do expect them to relapse from the current levels (Chart I-7). Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report titled, "Can Tech Drive EM Stocks Higher?," dated May 17, 2017, link available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 2 Lingling Wei and Chao Deng, "China's War on Debt Causes Stocks to Drop, Bond Yields to Shoot Up and Defaults to Rise," May 5, 2017, The Wall Street Journal. 3 Please refer to http://www.pbc.gov.cn/zhengcehuobisi/125207/125227/125957/3307990/3307409/index.html (In Chinese only). Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Highlights U.S. fiscal stimulus will be priced back into markets; Northeast Asia is consumed with domestic politics for now; China's financial crackdown raises risks, but so far looks contained; South Korea's relief rally will lead to buyer's remorse; Japan's constitutional reforms portend more reflation. Feature The market has lost faith in U.S. fiscal stimulus. The bond market has given back all of the expectations of faster growth and higher inflation (Chart 1). Hopes of populist, budget-busting tax cuts appear to have been dashed by the Putin-gate scandal and alleged White House obstruction of justice. As a result, the DXY has fallen to pre-election levels, while the Goldman Sachs high tax-rate basket of equities has fallen to its lowest level relative to the S&P 500 since February 2016 (Chart 2). We continue to believe that tax reform, or just tax cuts, will happen this year or early next year and that the market will have to re-price fiscal stimulus and budget profligacy at some point this year.1 As such, we are not ready to close our tactical recommendations of going long the high-tax rate basket relative to S&P 500 (down 1.62% since April 5) or playing the 2-year / 30-year Treasury curve steepener (down 11.4 bps since November 1). Republicans in Congress will push through tax reforms or cuts for the sake of remaining competitive in the upcoming midterm elections. And we doubt their commitment to budget discipline. That said, it is not clear that the equity market needs tax reforms to continue its upward trajectory. The Atlanta Fed's GDPNow model is predicting growth of 4.1% in the second quarter while the NY Fed's Nowcast is forecasting 2.3%. BCA U.S. Equity Strategy's earnings model continues to predict continued healthy profit growth for the remainder of the year both in the U.S. and abroad (Chart 3).2 In fact, if expectations of stimulus in the U.S. fully dissipate, the USD will take a breather - giving global stocks a boost - and the Fed will be able to take it easy on tightening U.S. rates, easing global monetary conditions. Chart 1Market No Longer##br## Believes In Trump Stimulus... Chart 2...Or Trump ##br##Tax Cuts Chart 3Corporate Profit ##br##Outlook Still Strong Perhaps far more important for global and U.S. risk assets is global growth. And the fulcrum of global growth has been China's economic performance. As the only country willing to run pro-cyclical monetary and fiscal policy, China has had a disproportionate impact on global growth since 2008. As such, we turn this week to the geopolitics and politics of Northeast Asia. China: How Far Will Deleveraging Go? Chinese financial policy tightening caught the market by surprise this year. The running assumption was that policy would be fully accommodative in order to ensure stability ahead of the all-important nineteenth National Party Congress in October or November.3 However, it is possible that the assumption is flawed. First, as we have pointed out in the past, China does not have a record of proactive economic stimulus ahead of party congresses (Chart 4). Second, President Xi Jinping may be far more secure in his position than is understood. Chart 4Not Much Evidence Of Aggressive Stimulus Ahead Of Mid-Term Party Congresses In China The crackdown on the financial sector in recent months suggests that Xi's administration has a greater appetite for risk ahead of the party congress than is generally believed: The administration is continuing to tamp down on the property sector. The PBoC has drained liquidity and allowed interbank rates to rise (Chart 5). The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) has launched inspections and new regulations on wealth management products and the shadow lending sector. The China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) has imposed new restrictions, including preventing insurers from selling new policies. One can make a good case that these measures will be limited so as not to cause excessive disruption in the financial system. All of the key Communist Party statements, from Premier Li Keqiang's recent comments to those made by the economic leadership in December, at the beginning of this tightening cycle, have emphasized that stability remains the priority.4 The PBoC's measures have been marginal; other measures have mostly to do with supervision. Notable personnel changes affecting the top economic and financial government positions fall under preparations for the party congress and do not necessarily suggest a new ambitious policy initiative is under way.5 Moreover, the government has already stepped back a bit in the face of the liquidity squeeze. One of the signs of the PBoC's tighter stance was its discontinuation of its Medium-Term Lending Facility in January, but this has since been reinstated.6 And throughout May the PBoC has injected increasing amounts of liquidity into the interbank system, marking an apparent tactical shift (Chart 6). Furthermore, government spending is already growing again after a brief contraction. Chart 5People's Bank Tightens Marginally... Chart 6...But Keeps Interbank Rates On A Leash In light of these decisions, it seems policy tightening is intended not to be stringent but merely to keep the financial sector - especially the shadow banking sector - in check during a year in which the assumption is that regulators' hands are tied. After all, an unchecked expansion of leverage throughout the year could interfere with the stability imperative. There are two major risks to this view. First, there is the danger of unintended consequences: China is overleveraged: The fundamental problem for China is that there is too much leverage in the system and there has not been a bout of deleveraging for several years (Chart 7). Much of the leverage is off-balance sheet as a result of the rapid growth in shadow lending. There are complex and opaque webs of counterparty risk. When authorities crack down, they cannot be certain that their actions will not spiral out of control. Recently, heightened scrutiny of "mutual guarantees," a type of shadow lending between corporations, led to the default of a company in Shandong that prompted a local government bailout, and more such credit events have occured.7 Policymakers are human: It is a fallacy to assume that Chinese policymakers are omnipotent. The mishaps of 2015-16 put a point on this. A state-backed newspaper has recently reiterated that its "deleveraging" campaign is not finished - the government could accidentally push too far.8 The rise in bond yields has already inverted the yield curve, causing the five-year bond yield to rise higher than the ten-year (Chart 8). This is a red flag and warrants caution.9 Quick fixes have negative side-effects: China escaped the last round of financial jitters, in 2015-16, by using its time-tried technique of credit and fiscal spending to boost the property market and build infrastructure, while imposing draconian capital controls. The growth rebound came at the expense of more debt, less economic rebalancing, and less financial openness. Chart 7China Is Massively Overleveraged Chart 8China's Yield Curve Has Inverted Second, there is the risk that Xi Jinping's calculus ahead of the party congress is not knowable. It may well be the case that Xi's position in the party is strengthened by a disruptive financial crackdown. The party congress is already under way: The party congress runs all year; it is not merely a one-off event this fall. Senior party officials will come up with a list of candidates for promotion in June or July. Then the PSC and former PSC members will likely meet behind the scenes to hash out their final list, which the Central Committee will ratify in the fall. If financial jitters were supposed to be strictly avoided for the party congress, then the current crackdown would never have begun. The outcomes are uncertain: The negotiations for the Politburo and PSC are not a foregone conclusion no matter how well positioned Xi appears to be as the "core" of the Communist Party. A simple assessment of the current Politburo suggests that the factions are evenly balanced when it comes to the current Politburo members capable of filling the five positions on the new PSC. Two of these positions should go to President Xi's and Premier Li Keqiang's successors, likely to be of opposing factions, while there will probably be three remaining slots that will have to be divvied up among an equal number of candidates from the two main factions (Table 1). Xi may still need to win some battles for influence behind the scenes in order to stack the Central Committee, Politburo, and PSC with his people for 2017 and beyond.10 His anti-corruption campaign has slowed down but is not over (Chart 9). This is all the more imperative for him since his retirement could be rattled by future enemies, given that he has removed the longstanding impunity of former PSC members. Table 1Lineup Of New Politburo Standing Committee Yet To Take Shape - Factions Evenly Balanced Despite these risks, we still tend to think that for China, as for the world, political risks are overstated in 2017 and understated in 2018.11 If Xi deliberately courts instability this year, as opposed to merely staying vigilant over the financial sector, then it will mark a major break from the norms of Chinese politics. The true risk to China's stability - aside from the unintended consequences discussed above - arises after the party congress, when Xi's political capital is replenished and he can attempt to reboot his policy agenda. Previous presidents Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin both launched reform pushes after their midterm congresses in 2007 and 1997, respectively. Hu's reform drive was cut short by the global financial crisis, while Jiang's was large-scale and disruptive and paved the way for a decade of higher potential GDP. Having consolidated power in the party, bureaucracy, and military, and tightened controls over the media, Xi Jinping will be in a position in 2018 to launch sweeping reforms should he choose to do so. Presumably these reforms would follow along the lines of those he outlined in the Third Plenum of the Eighteenth Central Committee back in 2013 - they would be pro-market reforms focused on raising productivity by transferring more wealth to households and SMEs at the expense of state-owned enterprises and local governments.12 To illustrate the process of structural reform, we have often used the notion of the "J-Curve" in Diagram 1. This shows that painful reforms deplete political capital, creating a "danger zone" for political leaders in which they lose popularity as economic pain hurts the public. Xi's work over the past five years to fight corruption and rebuild the party's public image have given him the ability to start the J-Curve process from a higher point than otherwise would have been the case. He will start at point D in the diagram, instead of point A, which means that the low point E may not embroil him as deeply in the danger zone of serious political instability as point B. Chart 9Embers Still Burning In ##br##Anti-Corruption Campaign Diagram 1The J-curve Of##br## Structural Reform But there is still no guarantee that he intends to expend his political capital in this way. The current round of financial tightening could be preliminaries for bigger moves next year - or it could be just another mini-cycle in the ongoing process of "managing" China's massive leverage. If China decides to execute a major deleveraging campaign, either now or next year, it will have a negative effect on global commodity demand (particularly base metals), on commodity exporters, on emerging markets in general, and ultimately on global growth. It would be beneficial for Chinese growth in the long run but negative in the short run, and in terms of Chinese domestic risk assets would open up opportunities for investors to favor "new (innovative) China" versus "old (industrial) China." Bottom Line: We remain long Chinese equities versus Taiwanese and Hong Kong equities for now, but are wary of any sign of doubling down on policy tightening in the face of more frequent and intense credit events. That would indicate that the Chinese leadership has a higher risk appetite than anyone expects and may be willing to induce serious financial disruption before the party congress. Korea: Drunk On Moonshine The Korean election is over and with it much of the heightened uncertainty that accompanied the impeachment and removal from office of President Park Geun-hye over the past year. The new president, Moon Jae-in of the Democratic Party, performed right around the polled expectations at 41% of the vote (Table 2). His competitor on the right wing, Hong Jun-pyo, outperformed expectations, though he still trailed well behind at 24%, giving Moon a large margin of victory by Korean standards that will help provide him with political capital (Chart 10). Table 2South Korean Presidential Election Results Chart 10Moon Will Have A Honeymoon Moon's election will bring relief to markets on both the domestic and geopolitical front. On the domestic front, he is proposing a series of policies that will cumulatively boost fiscal thrust and growth. On the geopolitical front, he will revive the "Sunshine Policy" (now "Moonshine Policy") of engagement with North Korea, reducing the appearance that the peninsula is slipping into war.13 The power vacuum in South Korea was a key driver of North Korea's belligerence in 2016, as the lead-up to South Korean elections has been in the past (Chart 11). South Korean presidents typically enjoy a substantial honeymoon period in which they are able to drive policy. The fact that the election occurred seven months early, as a result of the impeachment, gives Moon a notable boost to this period - he has seven months longer than he would have had before he faces any potential check from voters in the 2020 legislative elections. That is not to say that Moon has free rein. Ahn Cheol-soo's People's Party holds 40 seats in the National Assembly and is therefore in a "kingmaker" position - able to provide either the ruling Democratic Party or the fractured right-wing opposition with a majority of seats (Diagram 2). The People's Party is already criticizing Moon's call for increasing government spending by around 0.7% of GDP to fulfill his campaign pledges. True, the People's Party leans to the left and rose to power as a result of the median voter's shift to the left in the 2016's legislative elections. This may limit its ability to obstruct Moon's agenda at first. Nevertheless, it poses a substantial constraint on Moon's agenda through 2020. Chart 11Bull Market For##br## North Korean Threats Diagram 2Center-Left People's Party##br## Is The Korean Kingmaker Markets are relieved but not ebullient. The impeachment rally is over and eventually markets will realize that while Moon's agenda is pro-growth, it is not necessarily pro-corporate profits (Chart 12). He is promising to introduce a higher minimum wage, to convert temporary labor contracts into permanent ones, to increase social spending, and to toughen up labor and environmental regulation (Table 3). He has also appointed the so-called "chaebol sniper" as his point man in leading the reform of the country's chaebol industrial giants. On one hand, South Korea definitely needs corporate governance reform; on the other, the process will add uncertainty and Moon's approach may not be market-positive.14 Chart 12Relief Rally Likely To Disappoint Table 3South Korean President's Campaign Proposals To get an indication of what kind of impact Moon's economic agenda may have, it is helpful to compare that of his mentor, Roh Moo-hyun, president from 2002-7. Roh gave a boost to consumption, both government and private, and saw a relative drop off in fixed capital accumulation, which fits with the broad agenda of supporting workers and households and removing privileges for Korea's traditional export-oriented industrial complex (Chart 13). Roh proved very beneficial for the financial sector, wholesale and retail trade, and health and social work. Education and public administration received some support but were flat overall (Chart 14 A & B). If Moon follows in Roh's footsteps, he will be beneficial for the domestic-oriented economy. Chart 13South Korea's Left Wing##br## Boosts Domestic Consumption Chart 14ASouth Korea's Left Wing Boosts Finance,##br## Domestic Trade, And Health Care (I) Chart 14BSouth Korea's Left Wing Boosts Finance,##br## Domestic Trade, And Health Care (II) Abroad, the Moonshine Policy is likely to have some success, at least in the medium term. The Trump administration is pursuing a strategy comparable to the U.S.'s nuclear negotiations with Iran from 2011-15, in which it tries to rally a coalition to impose tougher sanctions on the rogue state with the purpose of entering into a new round of negotiations that will actually generate concrete results. The "arc of diplomacy" will take time to get going and could last several years - it is essentially a last-ditch effort to convince North Korea to pause its nuclear and missile advances. The tail risk of conflict on the Korean peninsula will be moved out to the end of this effort, perhaps around the end of Trump's term.15 Meanwhile, Moon is already patching up trade relations with China, according to reports, after the latter imposed sanctions on Korea for deploying the U.S. THAAD missile defense system (Chart 15). He will also seek joint infrastructure projects with China and Russia to connect the peninsula. China has a vested interest in Moon's success because it is attempting to demonstrate to the Trump administration that it is cooperating on North Korean security. Chart 15China Likely To Ease##br## Sanctions On South Korea Chart 16South Korean Inflation##br## And Credit Impulse Weak The geopolitical risk to markets is, first, that North Korea miscalculates the threshold of other nations' patience, continues with provocations, and eventually causes an incident that derails the new negotiations. This is possible given the North's record of belligerent acts and the fact that both the Trump administration and the Abe administration could cut diplomacy short in the face of a truly disruptive provocation for domestic political reasons. Second, there is a risk that Trump decides to escalate North Korean tensions again, whether to distract from domestic scandals or to reinforce the military deterrent in the event that China and South Korea appear to be giving North Korea a free pass in another round of useless talks. If Moon pursues a unilateral détente with North Korea, without adequate coordination with the U.S., and pushes for the removal of THAAD missiles, then the U.S. and South Korea are headed for a period of higher-than-normal alliance tensions that could become market-relevant.16 Bottom Line: We remain short KRW/THB. Core inflation and domestic demand remain weak in Korea, which reinforces the central bank's recent decision to stick to an accommodative monetary policy. Credit growth is cyclically weak, which reinforces the fact that rate cuts are still on the table (including the possibility of a surprise rate cut like in mid-2016) (Chart 16). Finally, the KRW has been relatively strong compared to the currencies of Korea's competitors (Chart 17). Chart 17South Korean Won Has Outpaced The Yuan And Yen In terms of equities, the top six chaebol have come under scrutiny, but Samsung has rallied despite lying at the center of the corruption scandal. The others have not performed well amid the economic slowdown. We see no opportunity at present to short the chaebol in relation to the broader market. Broadly, however, Moon's policies will add burdens to large internationally competitive industrials while boosting small and medium-sized enterprises. We also remain short the Korean ten-year government bond versus the two-year (see Chart 12, panel three, above). Moon's policy bent will subtract from a 1% budget surplus (2016) and worsen the long-term trajectory of the country's relatively low public debt (39% of GDP). Insofar as his foreign policy succeeds, it entails a larger future debt burden as a result of efforts to integrate with North Korea, which is relevant to long-term bonds well before reunification appears anywhere on the horizon. At bottom, we are structurally bearish South Korea because of rising headwinds both to U.S.-China relations and to the broader globalization process that has benefited South Korea so much in the recent past. Japan: Is Militarism The Final Act Of Abenomics? Japan has reached peak political capital under Shinzo Abe. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party, with its New Komeito coalition partner, continues to play in a totally different league from its competitors - there is no political alternative at the moment (Chart 18). The ruling party has a de facto two-thirds supermajority in both houses of the Diet. Abe himself is more popular than any recent prime minister, and has retained that popularity over a longer period of time (Chart 19). He has secured permission from his party to stay on as its president until 2021, though he faces general elections in December 2018 to stay on as prime minister. Chart 18Japan: Liberal Democrats Still Supreme Chart 19Shinzo Abe Remains The Man Of The Hour Political capital is a fleeting thing, so Abe must use it or lose it. This is why we have insisted that he would press forward rapidly with attempts to revise Japan's constitution, his ultimate policy goal, which he has now confirmed he will do. His proposed deadline is July 2020 for the new provisions coming into force.17 Constitutional revision is not only about enshrining the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) so as to normalize the country's defense policy. It is also about Japan becoming an independent nation again, capable of forging its own destiny outside of the one foreseen by the American framers of the post-WWII constitution. Though Abe has specific constitutional aims, any change to the constitution will demonstrate that change is possible and break a taboo, advancing Abe's broader goal of nudging the Japanese public toward active rather than passive policies.18 Hence Japanese politics are about to heat up in a big way. Abe has already done a trial run in his passage of a new national security law in September 2015. This law allowed the government to reinterpret the constitution so as to achieve many of his chief military-strategic aims (e.g. allowing the JSDF to come to the aid of allies in "collective self-defense"). Over the course of that year, Abe's popularity flagged, as public opinion punished him for shifting attention away from the economic reflation agenda that got him elected so as to focus on his more controversial, hawkish security agenda (Chart 20). Nevertheless, Abe stuck to the security agenda, in the face of some of the largest protests in Japan's post-Occupation history, and managed to shift back to the economy in time to notch another big victory in the upper house elections of 2016. We expect a similar process to unfold this time, though with bigger stakes and far less of a chance that Abe can "pivot" again. Under no circumstances do we see him reversing the constitutional drive now that he has the rare gift of supermajorities in the Diet; rather, he is going to spend his political capital. After all, there is no telling what could happen in the 2018 election. What are the market implications of this agenda? There may be some hiccups in consumer and business sentiment as a result of the rise in activism, political opposition, and controversy that is already beginning and will intensify as the process gets under way. Abe will be accused of putting the economy on the backburner. Abenomics is already of questionable success (Chart 21) and it will come under greater criticism as Abe shifts attention elsewhere, especially if global headwinds gain strength. Chart 20Abe Loses Support When He Talks##br## Security Instead Of Economy Chart 21Abenomics: ##br##Progress Is Gradual However, we recommend investors fade this narrative and buy Japan. Abe's constitutional changes must receive a simple majority in a nationwide popular referendum in order to pass - and Abe does not clearly have what he needs at the moment (Chart 22). This means that he cannot, in reality, afford to put Abenomics on the back burner, but instead must err on the side of monetary dovishness, fiscal stimulus, and reflation in order to win support for the non-economic agenda. There has been virtually no talk of fiscal stimulus this year, yet the policy setting is conducive to increasing spending as necessary. The Bank of Japan has explicitly embraced a monetary regime designed to allow for greater "coordination" with fiscal policy (Chart 23).19 There is no reason whatsoever to believe Abe is backing away from this stance. (Incidentally, the next consumption tax hike is not slated until October 2019, and could be delayed again.) Geopolitics are also fairly supportive of the Abe administration. First, the Korean situation is currently alarming enough to help justify the constitutional changes yet not alarming enough to provoke outright conflict. Abe is also making headway toward a historic improvement of relations with Russia, allowing Japan's military to pivot from the north to the south and west (i.e. China and North Korea). The chief risk for Abe is if North Korea surprises on the dovish side and new international diplomatic efforts appear so fruitful as to reduce domestic support for remilitarization. China, South Korea, and possibly North Korea will encourage the latter dynamic, while drumming up global criticism of Japan for warmongering. Meanwhile Japan will try to remind the domestic public and the U.S. that North Korea remains a clear and present danger and tends to take advantage of negotiations. Given the relatively positive geopolitical backdrop for Abe, the biggest risk to his agenda is an exogenous economic shock. Even then, if that shock stems from China and causes Beijing to rattle-sabers as a domestic distraction, then it will benefit Abe's remilitarization agenda. What would hurt Abe is if global growth sags but China and North Korea lay low. It is too soon to say that they will do this, but it is unlikely. Trump is also a wild card whose threats of "tough" policy toward China and North Korea may reemerge in 2018, in time to help Japan make constitutional changes that the U.S. generally supports. Bottom Line: Go long Japan. While there is no correlation between Japan's defense-exposed equity sector performance and the current government's remilitarization efforts, there is a clear case to be made that nominal GDP and defense spending will both be going up as a result of constitutional and economic policies (Chart 24). Abe will double down on reflation for at least as long as is necessary to maintain popular approval of his government ahead of a historic constitutional referendum. Chart 22Revise The Constitution? Yes.##br## End Pacifism? Maybe. Chart 23Japanese Reflation ##br##Will Continue Chart 24Expect Higher Nominal##br## Growth And Defense Spending Housekeeping: Play Pound Strength Through USD, Not EUR We are closing our short EUR/GBP position, open since January 25, for a loss of 1.77%. This trade has largely been flat. We put it on as a way to articulate our view that Brexit political risks are overstated and that the pound bottomed on January 16. The political call was right, but the pound has largely moved sideways versus the euro since then. We maintain our short USD/GBP, which is up 4.63% since March 29, as a way to articulate the same view that Brexit (and the upcoming U.K. elections) are not a risk. Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Jesse Anak Kuri, Research Analyst jesse.kuri@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Buy In May And Enjoy Your Day!" dated April 26, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Trump Thumps The Markets," dated May 19, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 3 The party congress, which occurs every five years and marks the "midterm" of President Xi Jinping's administration, will see a sweeping rotation of Communist Party officials, including on the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC). 4 Please see "China able to keep its financial markets stable, Premier Li says," Reuters, May 14, 2017, available at www.reuters.com. For the December meeting, see "China's monetary policy to be prudent, neutral in 2017," Xinhua, December 16, 2016, available at www.chinadaily.com. 5 Finance Minister Xiao Jie, Commerce Minister Zhong Shan, NDRC Chairman He Lifeng, and China Banking Regulatory Commission Chairman Guo Shuqing have all recently been appointed, but they replaced leaders due to retire as part of the party congress reshuffle. Only the new China Insurance Regulatory Commission Chairman Xiang Junbo and the new Director o f the National Bureau of Statistics Wang Baoan were replaced for reasons other than retirement, having been stung by the anti-corruption campaign. By March 2018 the world should have a better sense of Xi's economic and financial "team" for 2018-22. 6 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China: Financial Crackdown And Market Implications," dated May 18, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 7 Zouping government, in Shandong, intervened into the case of Qixing aluminum company's insolvency in order to transfer control to Xiwang, a corn oil and steel producer that had given a mutual guarantee to Qixing. The Zouping authorities arrested the son of Qixing's chairman to force the transfer. Please see "Bond Buyers Blacklist Some Chinese Provinces After Run Of Defaults," Bloomberg, April 26, 2017, available at www.bloomberg.com. 8 Please see "China Deleveraging To Continue As Goals Not Yet Achieved: State Paper," Reuters, May 17, 2017, available at www.reuters.com. 9 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "Signs Of An EM/China Growth Reversal," dated April 12, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com, and Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Signal From Commodities," dated May 19, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 10 Xi may yet go after another big "tiger," Zeng Qinghong, the right-hand man of former President Jiang Zemin. 11 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Political Risks Are Understated in 2018," dated April 12, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 12 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Reflections On China's Reforms," dated December 11, 2013, and "Taking Stock Of China's Reforms," dated May 13, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com, and China Investment Strategy Special Report, "Tracking The Reform Progress," dated October 22, 2014, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 13 "Moonshine Policy" is a phrase we regrettably did not coin, but we discussed its coming in BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "What About Emerging Markets?" dated May 3, 2017, and "How To Play The Proxy Battles In Asia," dated March 1, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 14 Moon has nominated Kim Sang-jo, a professor of economics at Hansung University in Seoul, to head his Fair Trade Commission. Kim is a long-time advocate for shareholders against the family-controlled chaebol and led a prominent law suit against Samsung. Past efforts at reforming the chaebol led by Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun focused on improving balance sheets, protecting minority shareholders' rights, limiting the total amount of investment, and improving corporate management and accountability. It remains to be seen how Moon (and Kim Sang-jo, assuming his nomination is confirmed) will proceed, but the effort will bring domestic challenges to the top industrial conglomerates' operating environment at least initially. 15 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "North Korea: Beyond Satire," dated April 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 16 South Korea's special envoy Hong Seok-hyun claims that Trump told him at the White House that he will work closely with Moon and is willing to try engagement with Pyongyang, conditions permitting, though he is not interested in talks for the sake of talks. This fits with our view that the U.S. saber-rattling this year was designed to make the military option more credible before pursuing a new round of diplomacy. 17 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, and Special Report, "Japan: The Emperor's Act Of Grace," dated June 8, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 18 So, for instance, if it should happen that, over the course of the coming debates, Abe is forced to drop his proposed revisions to the pacifist Article 9, he may still achieve changes to the amendment-making procedure in Article 96. The latter would be even more important for Japan's future, since it would make it easier for Japan to change the constitution for whatever reason in the coming decades. 19 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "King Dollar: The Agent Of Righteous Retribution," dated October 12, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights Duration: The bond market is not providing adequate compensation for the inflationary economic back-drop. Remain below-benchmark duration on a 6-12 month investment horizon. The Fed & Inflation: Even in the most deflationary of the four scenarios we consider, inflation is still projected to be very close to the Fed's median forecast by year end. The Fed is still on track for two more rate hikes this year. The Fed's Balance Sheet: The run-down of the Fed's balance sheet will lead to a substantial increase in gross Treasury issuance next year. Most, if not all, of this extra issuance will be met by greater demand from the banking sector. Feature Chart 1Inflationary Pressures Are Building No, the title of this report does not refer to the challenge of getting a tax reform bill through Congress when betting markets say there is a 44% chance that the President won't keep his job through 2018.1 Although bond markets are clearly sending the message that progress on tax reform is less likely with the White House embroiled in controversy. The 10-year Treasury yield fell to 2.22% last week after having briefly broken above 2.4% earlier in the month (Chart 1). For the record, our Geopolitical Strategy service thinks that even a growing scandal within the Trump administration won't be enough to prevent tax cuts,2 and from our point of view, we worry that bond markets might be distracted by the political soap opera and are missing the underlying economic picture. As the nominal 10-year yield fell last week, the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate also declined to 1.78%, its lowest level since prior to the election. Meanwhile, the base case scenario from our Phillips Curve model of core PCE inflation, which closely tracks the 10-year TIPS breakeven rate (Chart 1, bottom panel), is sending the message that inflationary pressures are building in the economy, tax reform or no tax reform. Chart 2The Fed's 2017 Forecasts The next section of this report provides more detail on the assumptions underlying our Phillips Curve model, but suffice it to say that the bond market is not providing adequate compensation for the inflationary economic back-drop. Remain below-benchmark duration on a 6-12 month investment horizon. The remainder of this report focuses on two key challenges that U.S. policymakers will face this year. The first is the Fed's challenge of whether to focus on Phillips Curve derived forecasts of inflation or the actual core inflation data. The second challenge relates to how the Treasury department will deal with the run-off of the Fed's balance sheet. The Fed's Phillips Curve Challenge As of the March FOMC meeting, the Fed's median projection called for two more 25 basis point rate hikes before the end of the year, and also for core PCE inflation to reach 1.9% (Chart 2). It would be logical to assume that if inflation were no longer expected to reach 1.9%, that the anticipated pace of rate hikes would also decline. On that note, a cursory glance at recent inflation data makes 1.9% look a tad aspirational. Core PCE inflation is running at only 1.56% year-over-year through March, and will probably stay low in April given that year-over-year core CPI fell from 2% in March to 1.89% in April (see Box). BOX A Note On The Divergence Between CPI And PCE While weak core CPI probably does indicate that core PCE will stay low, we would not expect the entirety of April's CPI drop to translate into the PCE data. A key driver of last month's disappointing core CPI was a 0.2% month-over-month decline in medical care prices, and the treatment of medical care costs is an important difference between CPI and PCE. The weight of medical care in core PCE is more than double the 10% weighting of medical care in core CPI, because the PCE deflator also factors in the medical care spending of government agencies on behalf of consumers while CPI only tracks the amount spent by consumers directly. For this reason, we see that the medical care components of CPI and PCE are not closely correlated (Chart 3). In fact, CPI medical care inflation has been decelerating for some time while PCE medical care inflation has been grinding higher alongside the health care component of the Producer Price Index (PPI). The health care component of PPI was flat in April, but the underlying uptrend remains unbroken. We would expect the spread between core CPI and core PCE to tighten in the months ahead as relative medical care costs continue to converge (Chart 3, bottom panel). Chart 3Expect CPI and PCE To Converge Meanwhile, a forecast based on trends in the labor market would suggest that inflation is set to accelerate. This, in a nutshell, is the Fed's conundrum. It can rely on Phillips Curve-type inflation forecasts and risk tightening too quickly if inflation does not respond as expected. Or, it can rely on the actual inflation data and risk staying easy for too long. For now, we believe the Fed will cling firmly to the Phillips Curve option. In a speech from September 2015,3 Chair Yellen outlined her model for inflation forecasting. In Yellen's model, core inflation tends to fluctuate around a long-run trend that is determined by inflation expectations. Changes in resource utilization (aka the employment gap) and relative import prices can cause inflation to deviate from this trend but, as long as these shocks prove transitory, inflation should gradually move back toward the level determined by expectations. Inspired by this approach, we created a Phillips Curve model of core PCE - the output of which was shown in Chart 1 on page 1. Specifically, we model core PCE as a function of: 12-month lag of core PCE Long-run inflation expectations from the Survey of Professional Forecasters Resource utilization (proxied by the difference between the unemployment rate and the Congressional Budget Office's (CBO) estimate of the long-run natural unemployment rate) Non-oil import prices relative to overall core PCE The value of this approach is that we can assess how core inflation is likely to react to varying assumptions about inflation expectations, the unemployment rate, the natural unemployment rate (NAIRU), and the trade-weighted U.S. dollar. We use the trend in the dollar to forecast relative import prices. A stronger dollar leads to lower import prices, and vice-versa. Charts 4-7 show the results of running this model under four different scenarios. We conclude that it is very difficult to create a set of reasonable assumptions where core PCE inflation does not approach the Fed's 1.9% forecast by year end. Given that Fed policymakers are very likely using a similar framework, we would expect them to arrive at the same conclusion. Scenario 1: The Base Case. In the first scenario we assume that the unemployment rate stays at its current level (4.4%) and also that the trade-weighted dollar remains flat. We also use the CBO's NAIRU estimate and assume no change in inflation expectations. In this environment, our model projects that year-over-year core PCE inflation will reach 2.11% by the end of December (Chart 4). Scenario 2: Strong Dollar. In this scenario we make the same assumptions as in Scenario 1, except that we allow the dollar to appreciate at a pace of 10% per year. The result is that import price deflation is more pronounced, but year-over-year core PCE inflation is still projected to reach 1.95% by year end (Chart 5). Chart 4Phillips Curve Model: Base Case Scenario Chart 5Phillips Curve Model: Strong Dollar Scenario Scenario 3: Bad NAIRU. In this scenario we consider that the CBO's NAIRU assumption might be too high. Specifically, we allow NAIRU to decline linearly from 5.07% at the end of 2012 to 4% by the end of 2013, we then hold it constant at 4%. Currently, the CBO's NAIRU estimate is 4.74%. In this scenario we also hold the unemployment rate, inflation expectations and the dollar flat. The result is that year-over-year core PCE inflation is projected to reach 2.03% by the end of the year (Chart 6). Scenario 4: The Deflation Case. In this scenario we make the same NAIRU assumption as in Scenario 3, but also incorporate 10% per year dollar appreciation. In this most deflationary scenario, the model still projects 1.88% core PCE inflation at year end (Chart 7). Chart 6Phillips Curve Model: Bad NAIRU Scenario Chart 7Phillips Curve Model: The Deflation Case Bottom Line: Even in the most deflationary of our four scenarios we still project inflation that is very close to the Fed's median forecast. We expect the Fed will arrive at a similar conclusion and will stay on track for two more rate hikes this year. However, if the actual core inflation data do not respond by moving higher during the next 3-4 months, then the Fed's hawkish stance will increasingly come into question. The Fed's Balance Sheet Is The Treasury's Problem Janet Yellen is sure to face some questions about how the Fed plans to unwind its balance sheet at next month's FOMC press conference, but the truth is that we already have a lot of information about how the Fed intends to proceed. The more challenging questions should be asked to the Treasury department, since it is the Treasury that will decide in what form the Fed's balance sheet run-off ultimately finds its way back into private hands. We have written about this topic twice in recent months. First, we published a detailed Special Report on how we expect monetary policy to evolve from an operational perspective in February.4 Then, we updated our expectations based on information contained in the March FOMC minutes.5 This week, we provide some additional observations based on what we learned from the recent meeting of the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee (TBAC). Chart 8Fed's Balance Sheet Will Still Be Large First, a brief recap. The Fed has told us that it plans to: Start shrinking its balance sheet later this year (assuming its growth forecasts remain intact) Shrink its balance sheet by ceasing the reinvestment of both MBS and Treasury securities at the same time The Fed has still not decided whether it will simply cease reinvestment all at once, or whether reinvestment will be phased out gradually (i.e. "tapered"). It has also not provided any guidance on what level of reserve balances it intends to maintain going forward. In Chart 8 we show that even if the Fed decides to drain reserves all the way down to zero, this process is likely to be complete by mid-2021. In fact, it might not even take that long since we have assumed a relatively slow pace of $15 billion MBS run-off per month. What is notable is that the Fed's balance sheet will still be sizeable even after reserves have fallen to zero. The reason is that the Fed's balance sheet needs to increase over time to keep pace with the growth of currency in circulation. Our calculations show that by the time reserve balances reach zero in mid-2021, the Fed will still be holding $1.3 trillion of Treasury securities and $1.1 trillion of MBS. After 2021, the Fed would likely continue to allow MBS to run off, but would once again start reinvesting the proceeds into Treasuries. Where Does The Treasury Department Come In? At present, the Fed reinvests the proceeds from its maturing securities by purchasing Treasury notes and bonds at regularly scheduled auctions. This means that when the Fed ceases the reinvestment of the securities running off its balance sheet, the Treasury department will have to increase the amount of issuance that is made available to the public. The Treasury is therefore tasked with determining whether the extra issuance will take the form of T-bills, short-dated notes or long-dated bonds. At the most recent TBAC meeting, committee members seemed to favor a strategy where the extra issuance is spread evenly across all maturities in proportion to current auction sizes, and where the proportion of T-bills in the overall funding mix is held constant. In Chart 9 and Chart 10 we show what this will mean for gross Treasury issuance of 2-year, 5-year, 10-year and 30-year securities, both in dollar terms and as a percentage of GDP. Chart 9Gross Coupon Issuance: In Dollar Terms Chart 10Gross Coupon Issuance: % Of GDP Interestingly, the Treasury department decided against placing a larger portion of the extra issuance in T-bills, as we had thought they might, and we remain concerned about the lack of short-term low-risk debt instruments in the market. The demand for short-term, low-risk instruments - largely from non-financial corporations, asset managers and foreign exchange reserve funds - is in a secular uptrend. Prior to the financial crisis this demand was met by broker/dealers in the repo market. Then, when regulations killed the repo market, the Fed increased the supply of bank reserves to make up for the shortfall (Chart 11). If the Fed drains reserves from the system and T-bill issuance does not increase substantially to compensate, a supply shortage of short-maturity instruments could develop. We would not be surprised to see the Treasury increase the proportion of T-bills in its funding mix, from historically low levels (Chart 12), if stresses in short-term rates markets start to appear at some point down the road. Chart 11A Shortage Of Cash-Like Instruments Chart 12Bill Issuance Has Room To Rise Can The Treasury Market Absorb All The Extra Issuance? Obviously, the most important question is whether the Treasury market will be able to absorb the substantial extra issuance shown in Charts 9 & 10. There are two reasons why we don't think the extra issuance will have a material impact on yields. First, the path of inflation and the expected pace of rate hikes will continue to drive the movement in long-dated yields. While the inflation component of nominal yields is tied to realized inflation, the real component of yields is closely linked to the expected number of rate hikes during the next 12 months (Chart 13). From this perspective, it is difficult to see how shrinkage of the Fed's balance sheet can have a material impact on yields unless it influences inflation or the expected pace of hikes. Second, the draining of reserves from the banking system will increase banks' demand for Treasury securities, providing a powerful offset to the increased supply of Treasuries. The newly implemented Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) mandates that banks must hold High-Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA) that are at least sufficient to cover net cash outflows over a stressed 30-day period. HQLAs are divided into tiers, with Treasury securities and reserves at the Fed qualifying as Tier 1 assets. Agency MBS are considered Tier 2A assets, this means that a 15% haircut must be applied to MBS balances for the purposes of the HQLA calculation. An even larger haircut is applied to riskier assets such as corporate bonds. Chart 14 shows the aggregate balances of reserves, Treasury securities and Agency MBS for all private depository institutions, as well as a proxy for banking sector HQLAs that we calculated to include only: reserves, Treasury securities, and agency MBS with a 15% haircut. Chart 13Focus On Rate Expectations Chart 14Banks Need Safe Assets As the Fed's balance sheet shrinks and reserves are drained from the banking system, banks will be forced to buy Treasuries in numbers that are at least sufficient to maintain mandated HQLA balances. At the moment, it is difficult to calculate how much Treasury buying will be necessary. The regulation only forces banks to start reporting their LCRs on a quarterly basis starting on April 1 of this year. Citigroup did report an LCR of 121% in its 2016 annual report, and we suspect that the ratios for other banks are in the same neighborhood. The mandated LCR is 100%. If Citigroup's reported LCR is a reasonable guide, this means that banks are just barely above mandated LCR levels. In other words, banks will need to replace almost all of the decline in bank reserves with purchases of Treasury securities. This surge in demand will offset a good chunk, if not all, of the extra Treasury issuance that is on its way. Bottom Line: The run-down of the Fed's balance sheet will lead to a substantial increase in gross Treasury issuance next year. Most, if not all, of this extra issuance will be met by increased demand from the banking sector. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 https://www.predictit.org/Contract/5367/Will-Donald-Trump-be-president-at-year-end-2018#data 2 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Break Glass In Case Of Impeachment", dated May 17, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 3 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150924a.htm 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "The Way Forward For The Fed's Balance Sheet", dated February 28, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Payback Period In Corporate Bonds", dated April 11, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights Politics will inject further volatility into risk assets, but stocks will outperform bonds and cash on a 6-12 month horizon. The health of the economy and earnings matter more than Trump's political woes for investors and the Fed. The consumer - a key driver of the U.S. economy and corporate earnings - will provide a solid backdrop for the economy through 2017 and beyond. The combination of balance sheet shrinkage and Fed rate hikes will lead to higher bond yields than are currently discounted in the market. It is a different story for the mortgage market, where spreads will be biased to widen during Fed runoff. Feature The Economy Matters More Than Politics The health of the economy and earnings matter more than Trump's political woes for investors and the Fed. When the economy and earnings backdrop was favorable during presidential scandals in the 1920s and the 1990s, the equity markets performed well. In the early 70s, amid soaring inflation and the worst recession since the Great Depression, there was a bear market in equities (Chart 1). Today, the backdrop for the economy and earnings - while not as robust as in the 1920s or late 1990s - provides support for higher stock prices, two more Fed rate hikes and higher Treasury bond yields. Trump's political woes may slow, but not completely halt the GOP's legislative agenda1. Support for Trump among his GOP base remains high at 85%, making impeachment a long shot until after the November 2018 mid-term elections (Chart 2). If the Democrats take the House, they are likely to impeach Trump in 2019. For the Trump and the Republicans in Congress, this means the impetus is even greater to make progress now on tax cuts, tax reform and infrastructure. However, the embattled White House will slow the process as the president's staff often acts as a coordinator among the various factions in Congress. With Trump's team preoccupied with political woes, they will not be effective in this role. Chart 1Economy Will Trump Politics ##br## For Financial Markets Chart 2GOP Base Not Yet Willing To ##br## Impeach Trump The Fed will look through the politics and focus on the health of the economy and will continue to raise rates gradually this year, with the next hike coming in June. Financial conditions have eased since the Fed's 25 basis point rate hike in December, and that alone should be enough to keep the Fed on track to tighten next month. As we have noted in recent reports, even without fiscal stimulus, the U.S. economy will still grow near its long-term potential, tighten the labor market and push up wages and inflation. The Fed has been reticent to include any impact from fiscal stimulus into their policy deliberations thus far. The minutes of the March FOMC meeting noted that "members continued to judge that there was significant uncertainty about the effects of possible changes in fiscal and other government policies". Bottom Line: The lack of progress on legislation may result in a pullback in U.S. equity prices, but absent a material weakening of the U.S. economy or profit picture, the pullback will not turn into a bear market. Checking In On The Consumer The consumer - a key driver of the U.S. economy and corporate earnings - will provide a solid backdrop for the economy through 2017 and beyond. This backdrop will allow the Fed to pursue two rate hikes this year. The weakness in several indicators has worried some investors that the economy may be on the verge of a slowdown or even a collapse. However, a firming economy should sustain corporate earnings growth and, ultimately, higher stock prices. Consumer spending's share of GDP is 68% and increasing (Chart 3). GDP growth excluding consumer spending is more volatile than overall GDP growth. The household sector has contributed 75% to growth since the end of the recession, which is the best performance of any sector. The key drivers of spending point to further gains in the sector, and the imbalances that were present ahead of prior downturns are not evident today. Chart 3Household Share Of GDP Is At An All Time High And Rising Chart 4Consumer Spending Remains In An Uptrend Household spending growth has softened but remains in an uptrend. Broad measures of consumer spending tend to peak two to four years prior to the start of a recession. The lead time is even longer in a long-cycle expansion.2 Investors should not dismiss the weakness altogether, but position portfolios for the late-cycle environment. Personal consumption expenditure growth peaked at 4% year-over-year in Q1 2015. Auto sales, a timelier measure of spending although not as comprehensive, peaked in December 2016 (Chart 4). Applying the 2 to 4 year lead time noted above - and making the assumption that spending has indeed peaked - this points to a recession commencing in the middle of 2019 at the earliest. Household net worth is at an all-time high, and the overall wealth effect on consumer spending has been positive for some time. Our forecast for financial markets and the housing market, though modest, imply that the positive wealth effect will continue. Debt-financed spending remains a viable option for consumers, which was not the case in late 2007 before the onset of the recession. Banks have not changed their lending standards for most consumer loans and demand for these loans will stay solid despite the Fed rate increases that we expect. The Bank Credit Analyst's March 2017 report showed that even a 100-basis point rate rise from the current levels would not lift the interest payments to burdensome levels by historical standards. Incomes will continue to climb and importantly, consumer income expectations have also hit new highs. With the economy at the Fed's assessment of full employment, wage growth is accelerating, albeit more modestly than in previous recoveries. Our recent report3 found that wages tend to rise about two years after the output gap has formed a bottom. A narrowing output gap leads to a tighter labor market and higher incomes. As measured by the quit rate, job security is at a fresh cycle high (not shown). Many consumer indicators are in better shape today than they were in 2007 or at similar points in the other long cycles4 (Charts 5 and 6). We define the long cycle economic expansions as those lasting 8-10 years. The two expansions that meet the definition are 1981-1990 and 1992-2001.5 Consumer spending is running in line with incomes, unlike in the mid-2000s. Chart 5Key Consumer Metrics ##br## Remain Favorable Chart 6There Is Still Plenty Of Support ##br## For Solid Consumer Spending Mortgage equity withdrawal, a crucial source of debt-fueled consumer spending prior to 2007, has been non-existent in this cycle. Spending on essentials are close to all-time lows. In 2007 they were at record highs and had moved up dramatically in the prior half-decade amid escalating debt levels, rising energy prices and consumer interest rates. We are concerned by the historically high percentage of household incomes (17%) dedicated to medical care. An aging population, ever rising healthcare costs and uncertainty surrounding the future of Obamacare may drive medical spending even higher. Household debt levels as a percentage of disposable income peaked in 2008 at over 120%, but are back under 100%, i.e. at the level that existed prior to the 2007-2009 recession. The level of household debt compares favorably to similar points in the long cycles of the 1980s and 1990s. Financial obligations are at multi-decade lows (Chart 6, bottom panel). Bottom Line: The fundamentals supporting consumer spending remain solid. A healthy consumer means the economy can meet the Fed's modest GDP forecast for 2017, keeping the central bank on track to tighten twice more in 2017. This outlook supports our view for stocks over bonds in the next 6-12 months. The Fed's Balance Sheet: It's Diet Time Chart 7Fed Set To Begin Tapering In Early 2018 The minutes from the March FOMC meeting indicated that a change in the Fed's reinvestment policy will likely be appropriate "later this year". The minutes suggested that the FOMC is split on whether to simply terminate all reinvestment for both Treasurys and MBS, or to "taper" reinvestment over time. Our base case is that the Fed will follow up a June rate hike with another one in September, at which point policymakers will provide some details on their plans for balance sheet runoff to begin in January of 2018. Investors are rightly concerned about the potential impact of the runoff, especially given that memories of the 2013 "taper tantrum" are still fresh. There is disagreement among academics about whether quantitative easing (QE) directly depressed bond yields by restricting the supply of high-quality fixed income assets, or whether the impact on yields was solely via the "signaling effect" (i.e. that QE implied that short-rates will be held at a low level for a very long time). Either way, balance sheet runoff will likely have some impact on bond yields. A good starting point is to employ an empirical estimate of the impact of QE. The IMF has modeled long-term Treasury yields based on a number of economic and financial variables, including inflation expectations, demographics, growth, current accounts and budget balances. The model also includes the stock of assets held by the Fed as a share of GDP. If the Fed were to begin running off its holdings of both Treasurys and MBS at the beginning of 2018 by terminating all reinvestment, then the amount of bank reserves held at the Fed would likely evaporate by 2021. This represents a fall of roughly 10 percentage points of GDP (Chart 7). Given the IMF interest rate model's coefficient of -0.9, it implies that long-term Treasury yields and mortgage rates would rise by 90 basis points from the "portfolio balance" effect alone. However, it is more complicated than that. The impact on yields is likely to be tempered by three factors: The Fed may opt to avoid going "cold turkey" on reinvestment, choosing instead to scale back gradually. Fed President William Dudley recently commented that the Fed wants balance sheet reduction to "run in the background", such that it is not a major event for markets. Some academic experts are recommending that the Fed maintain a fairly large balance sheet by historical standards because of the need in financial markets for short-term, risk-free assets that would diminish if there are fewer excess bank reserves available. Banks, for example, are required by regulators to hold more high-quality assets than they did in the pre-Lehman years. The implication is that the balance sheet may never fully revert to historic norms relative to GDP. As the FOMC dials back monetary stimulus it will be concerned with overall monetary conditions, including short-term rates, long-term rates and the dollar. If long-term rates and/or the dollar rise too quickly, policymakers will moderate the pace of rate hikes and use forward guidance to talk down the long end of the curve so as to avoid allowing financial conditions get too tight, too quickly (i.e. the term premium would rise, but would be partly offset by a lower expected path for the fed funds rate). Thus, the path of short-term rates is dependent on the dollar and the reaction of the long end of the curve. It is difficult to estimate how it will shake out, but a recent report from the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City estimated that a $675 billion reduction in the size of the Fed's balance sheet is equivalent to a 25 basis point increase in the fed funds rate (although the authors admit that the confidence band around this estimate is extremely wide).6 We expect that the impact of runoff alone will be much less than the 90 basis point estimate discussed above. Still, the combination of balance sheet shrinkage and Fed rate hikes will lead to higher bond yields than is currently discounted in the market. We could also see some upward pressure on global term premia when the ECB announces the next tapering of its QE purchase program, possibly this autumn. However, it will be years before the ECB will be in a position to reduce the size of its balance sheet. As for the Bank of Japan, we doubt that the central bank will ever shed its JGB holdings. What about the shape of the Treasury curve? Our fixed-income strategists believe that the shape of the curve will be determined by the normal cyclical dynamics we have seen in the past. We are still in a window in which the Treasury curve will steepen as yields rise. A little later in the Fed cycle, the curve will bear-flatten as the long-end begins to rise at a slower pace than the front end. We do not see balance sheet adjustment as changing these dynamics much. Similarly, with respect to credit spreads, the state of nonfinancial corporate sector balance sheets and the overall stance of monetary policy will continue to be the main drivers of the credit cycle. If unwinding the balance sheet leads to a premature tightening of financial conditions, then the Fed will proceed more slowly on rate hikes. The crucial indicator to watch is core PCE inflation. Credit spreads will remain fairly well contained until core PCE inflation reaches the Fed's 2% target. At that point, the pace of monetary normalization will ramp up, putting spreads at risk of widening. It is a different story for the mortgage market, where spreads will be biased to widen during Fed runoff. While spreads have already widened a bit, in our view they still do not adequately compensate for the additional MBS supply that will hit the market when the Fed takes a step back. Historically, there is a reasonably tight correlation between MBS spreads and the spread between mortgage rates and Treasury yields (Chart 8). Thus, it is reasonable to expect mortgage rates to rise by more than Treasury yields. Chart 8MBS Spreads Set To Widen As Fed Tapers While the Fed's balance sheet reduction by itself may not have a big impact on the dollar, we still believe the currency has more upside because of the divergence in the overall monetary policy stance between the U.S. on one side and the ECB and Bank of Japan (BoJ) on the other. The BoJ will hold the 10-year JGB near to zero for quite some time. The ECB will also not be in a position to tighten for a long time, outside of removing negative short rates and tapering QE purchases a bit further in 2018. Meanwhile, we think the Fed will tighten by more than is currently discounted. Admittedly, the economic data have disappointed so far in 2017 and CPI inflation has softened which, at the margin, would cause some FOMC members to back away from rate hikes. Nonetheless, policymakers are focused more on the labor market than GDP to gauge the health of the expansion and the amount of economic slack. Despite the dismal Q1 GDP figures, following unimpressive growth in 2016, the unemployment rate has already fallen below what the FOMC expected the rate will be at the end of this year! A tightening labor market means that the economy is still growing above a trend pace. Unless there is a clear deceleration in wage growth as measured by the ECI or the Productivity and Cost report, the FOMC will likely hike rates by more than the 38 basis points currently discounted over the next 12 months. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com 1 See Geopolitical Strategy Report, "Break Glass In Case Of Impeachment," May 17, 2017. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com 2 See The Bank Credit Analyst, March 2017. Available at bca.bcaresearch.com 3 See U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Still Awaiting the Next Pullback", May 15, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com 4 See The Bank Credit Analyst, March 2017. Available at bca.bcaresearch.com 5 We did not include the 1960s in this analysis because the Fed waited too long to tighten and allowed inflation to get out of hand. 6 Forecasting the Stance of Monetary Policy Under Balance Sheet Adjustments. The Macro Bulletin, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. Troy Davig and A. Lee Smith. May 10, 2017.
Highlights The political theater in Washington has caused the last inning of the dollar correction to materialize. The U.S. economy remains at full employment, growth will stay above trend, and the Fed will be capable of hiking rates by more than the 66 basis points priced into the OIS curve over the next 24 months. It is time to buy the DXY. Investors are too optimistic on the euro and too negative on the CAD, short EUR/CAD as a tactical bet. The Swedish economy continues to improve. Yet, the SEK has limited upside as the Riksbank continues to find excuses to justify its dovishness. The downside for EUR/SEK is limited to 9.3. Feature Chart I-1Trump Rally Is Gone Four weeks ago, we wrote that the U.S. dollar correction was entering its last inning and recommended investors should wait a few more weeks before betting on renewed dollar strength.1 We think the time to bet on this rebound is now. To begin with, the dollar index has now erased all the gains accumulated since Trump's electoral victory, suggesting that all the hope of fiscal stimulus, deregulation, and tax cuts have now been priced out of the greenback (Chart I-1). In fact, at this point in time we think too many risks have been priced into the dollar. For one, the market is overemphasizing the likelihood of a Trump impeachment. While our Geopolitical Strategy group does think the likelihood of an impeachment procedure is near 100% if the democrats win the House in 2018, the likelihood remains much lower in 2017.2 Simply put, Trump remains a very popular president among republican voters (Chart I-2). Most problematic for many republicans that would like to see Trump out of office, is that his popularity is particularly strong among the "Tea Party" districts and voters (Chart I-3). Chart I-2Trump Still Popular With Republicans Chart I-3Trump Is Popular In Tea Party Territory Second, the chance that tax cuts are part of the upcoming budget negations is high. Tax cuts are espoused by the entire GOP caucus. Additionally, Republicans know that in order to avoid losing the Senate or the House of Representatives, or both, they have to do something popular with voters. Tax cuts definitely fit the bill. This simple political assessment points toward a likely passage of stimulus in the coming quarters despite Trump's personal woes. Finally, if Trump were to be stabbed in the back by the GOP establishment, what would the impact be on the dollar? Would the U.S. default? No. Would the economy enter a recession? No. Would the Fed become dovish? Neither. If anything, a potential removal of Trump from the oval office reduces the risk that he appoints a super-dove at the helm of the Fed, a risk that would have been very negative for our positive dollar cyclical stance. Regarding the economics behind the dollar rally, our positive cyclical stance on the USD predates the election of Trump, and in fact relied on the underlying shifts in the U.S. economy.3 These dynamics are still intact: While wage growth remains anemic, this partly reflects the fact that the long-term determinant of wage growth, productivity growth, is low. When this is taken into account, productivity-adjusted wage growth is in line with levels that in the past have prompted the Fed to tighten policy in order to combat potential inflationary dynamics (Chart I-4). Nonetheless, the risk is that wages begin accelerating going forward. The labor market is at full employment, with the U-3 unemployment rate standing 0.3 percentage points below the Fed's estimate of the neutral unemployment rate. Additionally, hidden labor market slack has also greatly dissipated (Chart I-5), with the U-6 unemployment rate, the number of workers in part-time jobs for economic reasons, and the amount of workers outside of the labor force but that would still like to have a job if economic conditions warranted it all back to levels where historically wage growth has gained momentum. Chart I-4Without Productivity Gains, Current Wage##br## Growth Is Enough For A Tighter Fed Chart I-5U.S. Labor Market##br## Is Tight Moreover, the outlook for consumption remains sturdy. Overall household income growth remains supported by elevated levels of job creation, and our indicator for real household disposable income growth continues to point up. Additionally, Federal income tax withholdings are accelerating, a sign of more robust consumption to come (Chart I-6). With consumer confidence at 17-year highs, positive income developments are likely to be translated into consumption. The outlook for capex is also bright. CEO confidence and capex intentions have all rebounded sharply, moves whose genesis predate Trump's election (Chart I-7). Moreover, elements are in place for these positive feelings to be catalyzed into actual investment. On the back of rebounding revenue growth, thanks to nominal GDP growth exiting levels historically associated with recessions, profit growth will receive a fillip, which should boost capex in the current context (Chart I-8). Chart I-6Income Tax Receipts Points ##br##To Healthy Consumption Chart I-7Capex Intentions Point ##br##To Higher Growth Chart I-8Revenue Growth Exiting ##br##Recessionary Levels Finally, when all major indicators are aggregated, real GDP growth looks set to accelerate. BCA's Beige Book diffusion index, based on the distribution of positive and negative mentions about the state of the economy in the Fed's Beige Book, is pointing to an acceleration in activity (Chart I-9). This suggests that the collapse in U.S. economic surprises may be toward its tail end. With this in mind, we continue to expect the Fed to increase rates more than the 66 basis points currently anticipated in the OIS curve over the next two years, as such, this supports our bullish stance on the dollar. In terms of tactical developments, the recent selloff has brought the DXY toward the levels congruent with the end of the correction.4 Additionally, based on our Intermediate-term timing model, the USD is now cheap enough to justify taking a long bet on the currency. The deeply oversold levels reached by our Intermediate-term momentum oscillator supports this message (Chart I-10). Finally, the Swedish Krona seems to be confirming these signposts. USD/SEK has historically displayed one of the strongest betas to the trade-weighted dollar's movements. The fact that this pair has not been able to break down below a long-term upward slopping trend line put in place since 2014, and that it also managed to stay above its 2015 peaks, gives us more confidence that the dollar correction is likely to have run its course (Chart I-11). Chart I-9BCA's Beige Book Monitor ##br##Improves Growth Will Strengthen Chart I-10Dollar Is ##br##Oversold Chart I-11USD/SEK Giving A Hopeful##br## Signal For DXY Bottom Line: The dollar has taken a beating in the wake of the scandals emerging out of the White House. In our view, these developments were only the catalyst that crystalized the last leg of the USD correction that begun in late 2016/early 2017. Ultimately, the bull case for the dollar predates Trump and rests on the dissipating slack in the U.S. economy. These developments are intact, even with Trump's fiascos in the foreground. Tactically, the dollar is now cheap enough and oversold enough to justify investors buy the DXY again. We are opening a long DXY trade this week. We remain long the dollar against most commodity currencies and EM currencies. The yen may continue to benefit if the budding weaknesses in the EM space gather further momentum. EUR/CAD Is A Short At this juncture, it would be natural for us to begin shorting the EUR against the USD. In fact, we believe the recent spike in the EUR has created a good shorting opportunity against the European currency. While we worry investors are becoming too pessimistic on the U.S., we believe investors are too optimistic regarding the capacity of the ECB to increase rates. Investors moved away from deep short positions on the euro and are now net long this currency. Also, while in July 2016 investors expected the first ECB rate hike to materialize in more than five years' time, they are now expecting the first repo rate hike to happen in just 24 months (Chart I-12). This looks premature. For comparison's sake, in the U.S. we are only seeing the early signs of labor market tightness, despite the last recession ending in the summer of 2009. Europe was victim to a double-dip recession, the last leg of which ended in 2013. This decreases the likelihood of Europe being at full employment today. More concretely, there remains plenty of hidden labor market slack in the euro area. In Europe, the main form of slack exists among workers hired under contracts, contracts that do not offer the same level of benefits and protections as regular employment. The euro area increasingly has a dual labor market, a condition that has weighed on wage growth for more than two decades in Japan. Today, as a result of such dynamics, the level of labor underutilization in Europe is still very elevated, which will continue to limit wage growth going forward (Chart I-13). Hence, core inflation dynamics in Europe are likely to prove disappointing and they will keep the ECB on a more dovish path than investors currently appreciate. Chart I-12Investors Too Optimistic On The ECB Chart I-13Labor Market Slack In The Euro Area Remains High For now we are electing to profit from this view by tactically shorting the euro against the CAD. We do believe there are problems in Canada, a topic we discussed a few weeks ago.5 But at this juncture, these worries seem well digested by markets. The Home Capital Group debacle has been front page news for weeks, but the aggregate banking sector remains strong, especially as loses on the mortgage holdings of Canadian banks will ultimately be passed on to the government through the insurance provided by the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation. Additionally, in the wake of the deepening trade dispute on softwood lumber, the fears of a disintegration of NAFTA have hit Canada especially violently, with the CAD falling 16% against the peso since January 2017. Chart I-14EUR/CAD Is Toppy Tactically, the pieces are falling into place to favor the CAD over the EUR. Our Commodity and Energy group remains positive on the outlook for oil prices. The continuation of the output controls by OPEC and Russia remains binding as oil producers want to further curtail elevated oil inventories. Therefore, oil prices have little downside and may even experience further upside, helping the CAD in the process. Additionally, investor positioning is very skewed. Investors are massively short the CAD, especially when compared to the euro, which historically has provided a signal to short EUR/CAD (Chart I-14). This is re-enforced by our Intermediate-term technical indicator which shows EUR/CAD as massively overbought. Shorter-term momentum measures such as the RSI or the MACD have also been forming negative divergences with actual prices in recent days. Bottom Line: The euro is likely to suffer if the USD correction is indeed finishing. Hidden labor market slack remains a much deeper problem in Europe than in the U.S. and will limit the capacity of the ECB to increase rates in the next two years, as investors are currently expecting. For now, we are electing to short the euro against the CAD instead of against the USD. The Canadian dollar is oversold and oil prices have limited downside from here as supply adjustments remain positive. Moreover, investors are at record shorts on the CAD, especially when compared to the euro. Sweden Is Strong, But The Riksbank Still Haunts The SEK The long-term outlook for both Sweden and the Swedish krona remain bright but the ultra-dovish stance of the Riksbank remains a potent short-term hurdle. To begin with, the SEK offers great value. Not only is it trading at 24% and 8% discounts to its PPP fair value against the USD and the EUR, respectively, but the trade-weight SEK is also trading at a near one-sigma discount against our long-term fair value models (Chart I-15). Chart I-15SEK Is Cheap... But Is It Enough? Additionally, Sweden's net international investment position has moved back in positive territory in 2014, and now stands 16.4% of GDP (Chart I-16). This is not only a reflection of the weakness in the SEK since 2014, but is first and foremost the end-result of more than two decades of accumulated current account surpluses. This development is crucial. Not only does the positive income balance generated by assets in excess of international liabilities put a floor under the current account; historically, currencies with positive and growing net international investment positions tend to exhibit an upward bias. In terms of economic developments, employment growth in Sweden remains steady. Unemployment has been in a protracted downtrend, falling 2.9 percentage points since 2008 (Chart I-17). Yet, despite being well into full employment territory, wage growth has been absent. To a large degree, this reflects entrenched deflationary pressures in the Swedish economy. However, deflationary forces are abating. Chart I-16A Long-Term Driver Pointing North Chart I-17Swedish Labor Market At Full Employment To begin with, Sweden's output gap has recently entered positive territory, which historically has been a reliable indicator of inflationary pressures in this country (Chart I-18). Also, monetary aggregates, M1 in particular, continue to point toward higher inflation in Sweden. This means that with the employment market being at full capacity, the conditions for higher inflation in Sweden are emerging. Our expectation of an upcoming upturn in the Swedish credit impulse - which until now has been contracting and exerting deflationary forces on the economy - reinforces confidence in our inflation view. Credit growth tends to lag industrial activity, but our industrial production model for Sweden is perking up. Improving industrial variables suggest that credit will move from depressing demand back to supporting demand, further rekindling inflationary forces (Chart I-19). Chart I-18Swedish Inflation Is Set To Pick Up Chart I-19Swedish Credit Impulse Will Rebound With this positive backdrop for prices, should investors buy the SEK right now? The Riksbank continues to represent a great hurdle for SEK bulls. The Swedish central bank has one of the strongest dovish biases amongst global monetary guardians. Against expectations, it recently increased the duration of its asset purchase program, giving markets a strong signal that it is unlikely to increase rates soon. This means that the Riksbank is unlikely to tighten policy until it sees the "whites of inflation's eyes". While we are moving in the right direction, we are not there yet. Officially, the Riksbank targets CPIF, which currently clocks in at 2%. Yet, the emphasis of the central bank on domestic price dynamics implies that adjustment away from dovishness will only occur when core inflation itself moves to 2% (Chart I-20). This means that gains in the SEK will be limited. To begin with, EUR/SEK does have downside, and our view that the euro is getting overextended highlights that EUR/SEK could fall toward 9.3. However, beyond this level, gains should prove limited as Sweden is a small open economy and EUR/SEK plays a big role in tightening monetary conditions for that country. As a result, any move in EUR/SEK below 9.3 is likely to be unwelcomed by the Riksbank until core inflation moves closer to 2%. Versus the USD, it will be even more difficult for the SEK to rally. Historically, the SEK has been one of the most sensitive currencies to the dollar's trend, implying that strength in DXY could be magnified in USD/SEK. In fact, the absence of breakdown in USD/SEK in the face of violent dollar selling pressures this week suggests that the SEK could be a serious casualty of a rebounding dollar. Additionally, real rate differentials continue to move in favor of the U.S. dollar, with U.S. 2-year real rates now 180 basis points above that of Sweden (Chart I-21). With the Intermediate-term technical indicator for USD/SEK now hitting oversold levels, the downside for USD/SEK is very limited, further supporting the idea that any rebound in DXY could lead to significant weaknesses in SEK. Chart I-20Core Inflation Needs To Rise Chart I-21Rates Differentials Support A Lower SEK Bottom Line: The Swedish economy has adjusted and several factors are pointing toward a pickup in core inflation in the coming quarters. However, the Riksbank has maintained a strong dovish bias. We need to see an actual pick up in core inflation itself before the central bank moves away from its dovish bias. While EUR/SEK could weaken toward 9.3, more gains for the krona against the euro will prove elusive until the Riksbank sees firmer inflation. USD/SEK is a buy at current levels. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Haaris Aziz, Research Assistant HaarisA@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled “The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction”, dated April 21, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report titled “Break Glass In Case Of Impeachment”, dated May 17, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled “Dollar: The Great Redistributor”, dated October 7, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled “The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction”, dated April 21, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled “AUD and CAD: Risky Business”, dated March 10, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 The past week has been quite eventful for the greenback, slipping almost 2.3%. Most of the downside is owed to markets revising down rate expectations, on the basis of weak growth numbers and political scandals. The 10-year yield dropped, gold rose, and equities fell. There was also a large sell-off in EM currencies and a sharp appreciation in the yen. Furthermore, the soft patch in U.S. data continued as housing starts and building permits came in especially weak in April: 1.172 million and 1.229 million respectively, both underperforming consensus. Nevertheless, markets calmed after the release of stronger employment numbers with initial and continuing jobless claims beating expectations. The upswing in the Philly Fed index also helped revive sentiment. The dollar picked up Thursday morning following these releases. Interestingly, the DXY is at pre-election levels, which suggests that the dollar is nearing its bottom. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 The euro has enjoyed significant upside as a result of Macron's victory and the dollar's drubbing. Weak data in the U.S. caused markets to revise growth expectations, pressuring the dollar downwards and the euro up. Further lifting the euro were comments by ECB President Mario Draghi, who highlighted that growth in the euro area is performing well. However, he also reiterated that "it is too early to declare success". These forces have lifted the euro to expensive levels on a tactical basis, suggesting the path of least resistance is most likely down as the ECB will find it hard to tighten policy and the dollar resumes its bull market. Data in the euro area has been mixed as of late without too much disappointment, and inflationary pressured remain unchanged. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 After coming slightly above 114, USD/JPY has plunged by more than 3%, as a result of the market pricing increasing odds that president Trump will get impeached. Although we believe that the correction of the dollar has run its course, the end of the Trump trade might have triggered the sell-off we have been expecting in emerging markets. Thus we like to play this risk off period by shorting NZD/JPY. On the data side, news have mostly been negative: Machinery orders contracted by 0.7% YoY, underperforming expectations. Consumer confidence came in lower than last month at 43.2. Bank lending grew by a measly 3% YoY underperforming expectations. However, real GDP for Q1 came in at 0.5% QoQ, beating expectations. This was dampened by the weak GDP deflator, which contracted by tk%. We continue to be yen bears on a cyclical basis, as the fed will raise rates more than the markets expects, while the BoJ will continue anchoring 10-year yields around zero. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K has been mixed: Industrial Production growth came in at 1.4%, underperforming expectations. However retail sales and retail sales ex-fuel growth came in at 4% and 4.5% respectively, both outpacing expectations. Crucially, both core and headline inflation came above expectations at 2.4% and 2.7% respectively. This surge in inflation is important as it raises the odds of a BoE hike this year, especially as the economy remains resilient. Moreover, as long term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored consumption is likely to continue to surprise as households are looking through the inflation caused by the depreciation in the pound. Overall, we continue to be positive on GBP against all other currencies but the U.S. dollar, given that the British economy will likely stay more resilient than investors are anticipating. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 The RBA shed some light on the Australian economy through its most recent Minutes, highlighting that monetary policy needs to remain accommodative to support economic trends. It noted the negative hit to terms of trade as a result of Cyclone Debbie curtailing coking coal exports. China's housing market was also identified as a risk to Australia's exports and terms of trade. Nevertheless, this week the AUD was buoyant, helped by a weaker greenback. However, the factors above paint a bleak picture for the AUD's future. The very important employment figures depicted a similar trend to that of last year, with full-time employment in fact contracting while part-time employment picked up. Unemployment also declined by 0.2% to 5.7%, however, wages remain subdued. This corroborates the weaker core CPI measure of 1.5%, while the strong headline figure of 2.1% is likely to be transitory when the recent commodity-prices weakness kicks in. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 AUD And CAD: Risky Business - March 10, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 The RBNZ continues to much more accommodative than warranted. The monetary policy report highlighted that the recent surge in inflation is mainly attributable to tradables, and that non-tradable inflation is bound to increase very gradually. We continue to believe that the RBNZ is understating the inflationary pressures in the economy, as core inflation is already higher than 2%. Additionally, retail sales are growing at 10-year high and nominal GDP growth has skyrocketed to 7.5%, by far the highest in the G10. Right now, the market expects the first rate hike to come in 9 months. We believe that a rate hike at this point would be the bare minimum for the RBNZ to avoid an overheating in the economy. Thus expectations have nowhere to go than up and the NZD now has considerable upside against the AUD. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 USD/CAD has been somewhat weaker this past week as oil prices rebounded and the dollar fell. Oil prices are likely to see further upside as OPEC and Russia are likely to agree to another supply cut to support oil prices. Domestically, the economy is improving as unemployment is declining and PMIs are perking up. The BoC also identified the output gap to close earlier than expected in its last meeting. The almost 4% depreciation in the CAD in the past month has made the oil-based currency considerably cheap. When looking at EUR/CAD, the depreciation has been around 7.5%. With the euro now sitting in expensive territory, the ECB is unlikely to change its stance any time soon as inflation has not yet rooted itself, while peripheral economies' inflation remain weak. The CAD, however, is likely to see further upside on the back of increasing oil prices and a strengthening economy. These factors warrant a short EUR/CAD trade. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 And CAD: Risky Business -AUD March 10, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Following the election of Emmanuel Macron as the new president of France EUR/CHF skyrocketed, coming close to hitting 1.1. At this point EUR/CHF is a very attractive short, given that good news for the euro are likely to tapper now that the French election is behind us. When it comes to inflation, the ECB will likely focus on the lowest denominator, because in spite of higher inflation in some countries like Germany or Austria, inflationary pressures remain muted in most other economies. This will prevent the ECB from tightening monetary policy as fast as the market expects. Meanwhile, the possibilities that the SNB takes the floor off EUR/CHF at the end of this year or the beginning of 2018 are rising given that inflation and economic activity are slowly coming back to Switzerland. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 USD/NOK has depreciated in the past weeks thanks to the fall in the dollar as well as rising oil prices. Additionally, the fall in inflation is slowing down, with core and headline inflation coming in at 1.7% and 2.2% respectively. Is it time to become bullish on the NOK against the U.S. dollar? We do not believe this is the case. While inflation might be close to bottoming it is unlikely to surpass the Norges Bank target in the coming years, given that inflationary pressures remain muted in Norway. Furthermore, given that USD/NOK is more sensitive to real rate differentials than oil prices, the effect of a dovish Norges Bank on USD/NOK will be much stronger than the impact of rising oil prices. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 We expect the SEK to experience limited upside in the next 3-6 months. The Greenback is bottoming and we expect USD/SEK to pick up on the back of the dollar bull market. Furthermore, EUR/SEK has limited downside as the RIksbank wants to keep monetary conditions easy. Indeed, the Swedish central bank is also planning to officially target CPIF instead of the CPI. While both of these measures are near 2%, the behavior of the Riksbank suggests that it is in fact targeting core inflation. Core inflation itself is still somewhat depressed, as consumer activity remains weak. However, we expect core inflation to pick up on the back of a higher credit impulse and money supply growth, which should help the Riksbank exit its dovish tilt later this year. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades