Saudi Arabia
Highlights Several economic and financial market indicators point to a budding downtrend in Chinese capital spending and its industrial sector. The recent underperformance of global mining, chemicals and machinery/industrials corroborate that capital spending in China is starting to slump. Shipments-to-inventory ratios for Korea and Taiwan also point to a relapse in Asian manufacturing. This is occurring as our global growth sentiment proxy sits on par with previous peaks, and investor positioning in EM and commodities is overextended. Stay put on EM. Markets with currency pegs to the U.S. dollar, such as the Gulf states and Hong Kong, will face tightening local liquidity. Share prices in these markets have probably topped out. Feature On the surface, EM equities, currencies and local bond and credit markets are still trading well. However, there are several economic indicators and financial variables that herald negative surprises for global and Chinese growth. In particular: China's NBS manufacturing PMI new orders and backlogs of orders have relapsed in the past several months. Chart I-1 illustrates the annual change in new orders and backlogs of orders to adjust for seasonality. The measure leads industrial profits, and presently foreshadows a slowdown going forward. Furthermore, the average of NBS manufacturing PMI, new orders, and backlog orders also points to a potential relapse in industrial metals prices in general as well as mainland steel and iron ore prices (Chart I-2). The message from Charts I-1 and I-2 is that the recent weakness in iron ore and steel prices could mark the beginning of a downtrend in Chinese capital spending. While supply cuts could limit downside in steel prices, it would be surprising if demand weakness does not affect steel prices at all.1 Chart I-1China: Slowdown Has Further To Run Chart I-2Industrial Metals Prices Have Topped Out Although China's money and credit have been flagging potential economic weakness for a while, the recent manufacturing PMI data from the National Bureau of Statistics finally confirmed an impending deceleration in industrial activity and ensuing corporate profit disappointment. Our credit and fiscal spending impulses continue to point to negative growth surprises in capital spending. The latter is corroborated by the weakening Komatsu's Komtrax index, which measures the average hours of machine work per unit in China (Chart I-3). In both Korea and Taiwan, the overall manufacturing shipments-to-inventory ratios have dropped, heralding material weakness in both countries' export volumes (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Signs Of Weakness In Chinese Construction Chart I-4Asia Exports Are Slowing Notably, global cyclical equity sectors that are leveraged to China's capital spending such as materials, industrials and energy have all recently underperformed the global benchmark (Chart I-5). Some of their sub-sectors such as machinery, mining and chemicals have also begun to underperform (Chart I-6). Chart I-5Global Cyclicals Have ##br##Begun Underperforming... Chart I-6...Including Machinery ##br##And Chemical Stocks Among both global and U.S. traditional cyclicals, only the technology sector is outperforming the benchmark. However, we do not think tech should be treated as a cyclical sector, at least for now. In brief, the underperformance of global cyclical equity sectors and sub-sectors following last month's equity market correction corroborate that China's capital spending is beginning to slump. Notably, this is occurring as our global growth sentiment proxy rests on par with its previous apexes (Chart I-7). Previous tops in this proxy for global growth sentiment have historically coincided with tops in EM EPS net revisions, as shown in this chart. Chart I-7Global Growth Sentiment: As Good As It Gets All told, we may be finally entering a meaningful slowdown in China that will dampen commodities prices and EM corporate earnings. The latter are still very strong but EPS net revisions have rolled over and turned negative again (Chart I-8). Chart I-8EM EPS Net Revisions Have Plummeted EM share prices typically lead EPS by about nine months. In 2016, EM stocks bottomed in January-February, yet EPS did not begin to post gains until December 2016. Even if EM corporate profits are to contract in the fourth quarter of this year, EM share prices, being forward looking, will likely begin to wobble soon. Poor EM Equity Breadth There is also evidence of poor breadth in the EM equity universe, especially compared to the U.S. equity market. First, the rally in the EM equally-weighted index - where all individual stocks have equal weights - has substantially lagged the market cap-weighted index since mid 2017. This suggests that only a few large-cap companies have contributed a non-trivial share of capital gains. Second, the EM equal-weighted stock index's and EM small-caps' relative share prices versus their respective U.S. counterparts have fallen rather decisively in the past six weeks (Chart I-9, top and middle panels). While the relative performance of market cap-weighted indexes has not declined that much, it has still rolled over (Chart I-9, bottom panel). We compare EM equity performance with that of the U.S. because DM ex-U.S. share prices themselves have been rather sluggish. In fact, DM ex-U.S. share prices have barely rebounded since the February correction. Third, EM technology stocks have begun underperforming their global peers (Chart I-10). This is a departure from the dynamics that prevailed last year, when a substantial share of EM outperformance versus DM equities was attributed to EM tech outperformance versus their DM counterparts and tech's large weight in the EM benchmark. Chart I-9EM Versus U.S. Equities: Relative ##br##Performance Is Reversing Chart I-10EM Tech Has Started ##br##Underperforming DM Tech Finally, the relative advance-decline line between EM versus U.S. bourses has been deteriorating (Chart I-11). This reveals that EM equity breadth - the advance-decline line - is substantially worse relative to the U.S. Chart I-11EM Versus U.S.: Relative Equity Breadth Is Very Poor Bottom Line: Breadth of EM equity performance versus DM/U.S. has worsened considerably. This bodes ill for the sustainability of EM outperformance versus DM/U.S. We continue to recommend an underweight EM versus DM position within global equity portfolios. Three Pillars Of EM Stocks EM equity performance is by and large driven by three sectors: technology, banks (financials) and commodities. Table I-1 illustrates that technology, financials and commodities (energy and materials) account for 66% of the EM MSCI market cap and 75% of MSCI EM total (non-diluted) corporate earnings. Therefore, getting the outlook of these sectors right is crucial to the EM equity call. Table I-1EM Equity Sectors: Earnings & Market Cap Weights Technology Four companies - Alibaba, Tencent, Samsung and TSMC - account for 17% of EM and 58% of EM technology market cap, respectively. This sector can be segregated into hardware tech (Samsung and TSMC) and "new concept" stocks (Alibaba and Tencent). We do not doubt that new technologies will transform many industries, and there will be successful companies that profit enormously from this process. Nevertheless, from a top-down perspective, we can offer little insight on whether EM's "new concept" stocks such as Alibaba and Tencent are cheap or expensive, nor whether their business models are proficient. Further, these and other global internet/social media companies' revenues are not driven by business cycle dynamics, making top-down analysis less imperative in forecasting their performance. We can offer some insight for technology hardware companies such as Samsung and TSMC. Chart I-12 demonstrates that semiconductor shipment-to-inventory ratios have rolled over decisively in both Korea and Taiwan. In addition, semiconductor prices have softened of late (Chart I-13) Together, this raises a red flag for technology hardware stocks in Asia. Chart I-12Asia's Semiconductor Industry Chart I-13Semiconductor Prices: A Soft Spot? Finally, Chart I-14 compares the current run-up in U.S. FANG stocks (Facebook, Amazon, Netflix and Google) with the Nasdaq mania in the 1990s. An equal-weighted average stock price index of FANG has risen by 10-fold in the past four and a half years. Chart I-14U.S. FANG Stocks Now ##br##And 1990s Nasdaq Mania A similar 10-fold increase was also registered by the Nasdaq top 100 stocks in the 1990s over eight years (Chart I-14). While this is certainly not a scientific approach, the comparison helps put the rally in "hot" technology stocks into proper historical perspective. The main take away here is that even by bubble standards, the recent acceleration in "new concept" stocks has been too fast. That said, it is impossible to forecast how long any mania will persist. This has been and remains a major risk to our investment strategy of being negative on EM stocks. In sum, there is little visibility in EM "new concept" tech stocks. Yet Asia's manufacturing cycle is rolling over, entailing downside risks to tech hardware businesses. Putting all this together, we conclude that it is unlikely that EM tech stocks will be able to drive the EM rally and outperformance in 2018 as they did in 2017. Banks We discussed the outlook for EM bank stocks in our February 14 report,2 and will not delve into additional details here. In brief, several countries' banks have boosted their 2017 profits by reducing their NPL provisions. This has artificially boosted profits and spurred investors to bid up bank equity prices. We believe banks in a number of EM countries are meaningfully under-provisioned and will have to augment their NPL provisions. The latter will hurt their profits and constitutes a major risk for EM bank share prices. Energy And Materials The outlook for absolute performance of these sectors is contingent on commodities prices. Industrial metals prices are at risk of slower capex in China. The mainland accounts for 50% of global demand for all industrial metals. Oil prices are at risk from traders' record-high net long positions in oil futures, according to CFTC data (Chart I-15, top panel). Traders' net long positions in copper are also elevated, according to the data from the same source (Chart I-15, bottom panel). Hence, it may require only some U.S. dollar strength and negative news out of China for these commodities prices to relapse. Chart I-15Traders' Net Long Positions In ##br##Oil And Copper Are Very Elevated How do we incorporate the improved balance sheets of materials and energy companies into our analysis? If and as commodities prices slide, share prices of commodities producers will deflate in absolute terms. However, this does not necessarily mean they will underperform the overall equity benchmark. Relative performance dynamics also depend on the performance of other sectors. Commodities companies could outperform the overall equity benchmark amid deflating commodities prices if other equity sectors drop more. In brief, the improved balance sheets of commodities producers may be reflected in terms of their relative resilience amid falling commodities prices but will still not preclude their share prices from declining in absolute terms. Bottom Line: If EM bank stocks and commodities prices relapse as we expect, the overall EM equity index will likely experience a meaningful selloff and underperform the DM/U.S. benchmarks. Exchange Rate Pegs Versus U.S. Dollar With the U.S. dollar depreciating in the past 12 months, pressure on exchange rate regimes that peg their currencies to the dollar has subsided. These include but are not limited to Hong Kong, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). As a result, these countries' interest rate differentials versus the U.S. have plunged (Chart I-16). In short, domestic interest rates in these markets have risen much less than U.S. short rates. This has kept domestic liquidity conditions easier than they otherwise would have been. However, maneuvering room for these central banks is narrowing. In Hong Kong, the exchange rate is approaching the lower bound of its narrow band (Chart I-17). As it touches 7.85, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) will have no choice but to tighten liquidity and push up interest rates. Chart I-16Markets With U.S. Dollar Peg: ##br##Policymakers' Maneuvering Window Is Closing Chart I-17Hong Kong: Interest ##br##Rates Are Heading Higher In Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the monetary authorities have used the calm in their foreign exchange markets over the past year to not match the rise in U.S. short rates (Chart I-18A and Chart I-18B). However, with their interest rate differentials over U.S. now at zero, these central banks will have no choice but to follow U.S. rates to preserve their currency pegs.3 Chart I-18ASaudi Arabian Interest Rates Will Rise Chart I-18BThe UAE Interest Rates Will Rise If U.S. interest rates were to move above local rates in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, those countries' currencies will come under considerable depreciation pressure because capital will move from local currencies into U.S. dollars. Hence, if U.S. short rates move higher, which is very likely, local rates in these and other Gulf countries will have to rise if their exchange rate pegs are to be preserved. Neither the Hong Kong dollar nor Gulf currencies are at risk of devaluation. The monetary authorities there have enough foreign currency reserves to defend their respective pegs. Nevertheless, the outcome will be domestic liquidity tightening in the Gulf's and Hong Kong's banking system. In addition, potentially lower oil prices will weigh on Gulf bourses and China's slowdown will hurt growth and equity sentiment in Hong Kong. All in all, equity markets in Gulf countries and Hong Kong have probably seen their best in terms of absolute performance. Potential negative external shocks and higher interest rates due to Fed tightening have darkened the outlook for these bourses. Bottom Line: Local liquidity in Gulf markets and Hong Kong is set to tighten. Share prices in these markets have probably topped out. However, given these equity markets have massively underperformed the EM equity benchmark, they are unlikely to underperform when the overall EM index falls. Hence, we do not recommend underweighting these bourses within an EM equity portfolio. For asset allocators, a neutral or overweight allocation to these bourses is warranted. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report "China's "De-Capacity" Reforms: Where Steel & Coal Prices Are Headed," dated November 22, 2017; the link is available on page 16. 2 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report "EM Bank Stocks Hold The Key," dated February 14, 2018; the link is available on page 16. 3 Please see BCA's Frontier Markets Strategy Special Report "United Arab Emirates: Domestic Tailwinds, External Headwinds," dated March 12, 2018. The link is available on fms.bcaresearch.com. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Highlights This past week, oil ministers from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia - OPEC 2.0's putative leaders - separately indicated increased comfort with higher prices over the next year or so.1 This suggests they are converging on a common production-management strategy, which accommodates KSA's need for higher prices over the short term to support the IPO of Saudi Aramco, and Russia's longer term desire to avoid reaching price levels where U.S. shale-oil production is massively incentivized to expand. We believe OPEC 2.0's production cuts will be extended to year-end, given signaling by Khalid Al-Falih, KSA's energy minister. As a result, we expect Brent and WTI crude oil prices to average $74 and $70/bbl this year, respectively (Chart Of The Week). These expectations are up from our previous estimates of $67 and $63/bbl, which were premised on curtailed production slowly being returned to market beginning in July. For next year, the extended cuts could lift Brent and WTI to $67 and $64/bbl, up from our previous expectations of $55 and $53/bbl, respectively. Extending OPEC 2.0's production cuts will accelerate OECD inventory draws, which have been faster than expected. Higher prices caused by maintaining the cuts will lift U.S. shale production more than our earlier estimates. Backwardations in both Brent and WTI forward curves will remain steep in this regime, muting the impact of Fed policy on oil prices. Energy: Overweight. We are getting long Dec/18 $65/bbl Brent calls vs. short Dec/18 $70/bbl calls on the back of our updated price forecast. We also are taking profits on our long 4Q19 $55/bbl Brent puts vs. short 4Q19 $50/bbl Brent puts, which were up 27.4% as of Tuesday's close. Base Metals: Neutral. The U.S. Commerce Department proposed "Section 232" tariffs and quotas on U.S. aluminum and steel imports, following national security reviews. President Trump has until mid-April to respond, and we expect him to go through with one of the three proposed options. Precious Metals: Gold remains range-bound around $1,350/oz, as markets wrestle with the likely evolution of the Fed's rate-hiking regimen. Ags/Softs: Underweight. USDA economists project grain and soybean prices to slowly rise over the next 10 years, according to agriculture.com. Feature Chart Of The WeekBCA Lifts Oil Price Forecasts Over the past week, comments from Saudi and Russian oil ministers indicate they are more comfortable with maintaining OPEC 2.0's production cuts to end-2018, which, along with strong global demand growth, raises the odds Brent crude oil prices will exceed $70/bbl this year, and possibly next. Whether this is the result of the Saudi's need for higher prices to support the Aramco IPO, or it reflects an assessment by OPEC 2.0's leaders that the world economy can absorb higher prices without damaging demand over the short term is not clear. Markets have yet to receive what we could consider definitive forward guidance from OPEC 2.0 leadership, indicating that recent signaling could be foreshadowing the coalition's new policy. We are raising the odds that it is, and are moving our Brent and WTI forecasts higher for this year and next. Lifting 2018 Brent, WTI Forecasts To $74 And $70/bbl Maintaining OPEC 2.0's production cuts to end-2018 will lift average Brent and WTI crude oil prices to $74 and $70/bbl, respectively, this year, based on our updated supply-demand balances modeling (Chart Of The Week). This is not definitive OPEC 2.0 policy guidance: KSA's and Russia's oil ministers indicated they expect such an outcome in separate statements, and not, as has been the case with previous announcements, at a joint press conference.2 We are assuming the odds strongly favor such an outcome, and give an 80% weight to it. The remaining 20% reflects our previous expectation that OPEC 2.0's production cuts would cease at end-June, and curtailed volumes would slowly be restored over 2H18. Resolving this in favor of the former expectation would lift our price expectations to $76 and $73/bbl for Brent and WTI this year, and $70 and $68/bbl next year. These expectations are up from our previous estimates of $67 and $63/bbl for Brent and WTI prices this year, which were premised on curtailed OPEC 2.0 production slowly returning to market beginning in July, and a subsequent OECD inventory rebuilding. By maintaining production cuts to year-end, supply-demand balances remain tighter, which keeps inventories drawing for a longer period of time (Chart 2). Higher inventories would have increased the sensitivity of oil prices to the USD, which we showed in research on February 8th 2018. With OPEC 2.0's production cuts maintained throughout the year, OECD inventories will be more depleted by year-end (Chart 3). Extending OPEC 2.0's production cuts to end-2018 would result in an additional 130mm bbls reduction to OECD inventories versus our prior modeling. This means Brent and WTI forward curves will be more backwardated than they would have been had the barrels taken off the market at the beginning of 2017 been slowly restored starting in July of this year, as we earlier expected. Chart 2Fundamental Balances Remain In Deficit Longer Chart 3Maintaining Production Cuts Depletes Inventories Even More A steeper backwardation in oil forward curves - i.e., the front of the curve trades premium to the deferred contracts - reduces the USD effects on oil, all else equal. In other words, supply-demand fundamentals dominate the evolution of oil prices when forward curves are more backwardated, and the influence of financial variables -the USD in particular - is muted.3 For next year, we assume the volumes cut by OPEC 2.0 are slowly restored to the market over 1H19, lifting Brent and WTI to $67 and $64/bbl on average, up from our previous expectations of $55 and $53/bbl, respectively.4 Higher Shale Output, Strong Global Demand We expect U.S. shale production increases by 1.15mm b/d from December 2017 to December 2018, and another 1.3-1.4mm b/d during calendar 2019. This dominates non-OPEC production growth this year and next (Chart 4, top panel). Due to the supply response of the shales to higher prices in 2018, global production levels would see a net increase from March 2019 and beyond. Our assumption OPEC 2.0 production cuts will be maintained through 2018 puts our OPEC production assessment 0.14mm b/d below U.S. EIA's estimates (Chart 4, bottom panel). On the demand side, we continue to expect non-OECD (EM) growth to push global oil consumption up by 1.7mm b/d this year and 1.6mm b/d next year, respectively (Chart 5). Non-OECD demand is expected to account for 1.24mm b/d and 1.21mm b/d of this growth in 2018 and 2019, respectively (Table 1). Chart 4U.S. Shales Dominate Non-OPEC Supply Growth Chart 5Non-OECD Demand Growth Continues Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (mm b/d) Aramco IPO Driving OPEC 2.0's Short-Term Agenda In previous research, we noted what appeared to be a relatively minor divergence between the goals of KSA and Russia when it comes to the level prices each would prefer over the short term. Recent press reports - unattributed, of course - suggest Saudi Aramco officials prefer a Brent price closer to $70/bbl further along the forward curve (two years out) to support their upcoming IPO.5 This obviously would bolster Aramco's oil-export revenues - some 7mm b/d of its 10mm b/d of production are exported - and income, which shareholders would welcome. However, until this past week, Russia's energy minister, Alexander Novak, was signaling a range of $50 to $60/bbl works better for his constituents, i.e., shareholder-owned Russian oil companies. Novak recently amended his range to $50 to $70/bbl for Brent.6 These positions are not irreconcilable. One is shorter term (2 years forward) and the other is longer term, attempting to balance competitive threats over a longer horizon - e.g., from U.S. shale-oil producers, electric vehicles, etc. This most recent indication the leadership of OPEC 2.0 is comfortable with higher prices over the short term is an indication - at least to us - that these issues are being dealt with in a way that allows markets to incorporate forward guidance into pricing of crude oil over the next two years. Beyond that, however, markets will need to hear an articulated strategy containing a post-Aramco IPO view of the world, so that capital can be efficiently allocated. KSA and Russia are in a global competition for foreign direct investment (FDI), and having a fully articulated strategy re how they will manage their production in fast-changing markets - where, for example, shale-oil approaches becoming a "just-in-time" supply option - will be critical. Signing a formal alliance by year-end would support this, but that, too, will require a level of cooperation that runs deeper than what OPEC 2.0 has so far demonstrated, impressive though it may be. Bottom Line: OPEC 2.0 leadership is signalling production cuts will be maintained for the entire year, not, as we expected, left to expire at end-June with curtailed barrels slowly returned to the market over 2H18. While this does not appear to be official policy of the producer coalition yet, we are revising our price expectations in line with tighter markets this year, lower OECD inventories and continued backwardation in Brent and WTI forward curves. OPEC 2.0's shorter-term agenda, driven by KSA's IPO of Saudi Aramco, and its longer-term agenda - maintaining oil's competitive edge and accommodating U.S. shale-oil production (but not too much) - appear to be getting reconciled. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Matt Conlan, Senior Vice President Energy Sector Strategy mattconlan@bcaresearchny.com Hugo Bélanger, Research Analyst HugoB@bcaresearch.com 1 OPEC 2.0 is the name we coined for OPEC/non-OPEC coalition led by KSA and Russia, has removed some 1.4 to 1.5mm b/d of oil production from the market beginning in 2017. 2 Please see, "Brent crude settles flat, U.S. oil up on short covering," published by reuters.com on February 15th 2018, in which KSA's oil minister Khalid Al-Falih indicated OPEC would maintain production cuts throughout 2018. See also, "On the air of the TV channel 'Russia 24' Alexander Novak summed up the participation in the work of the Russian investment forum 'Sochi-2018,'" published by Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation on February 15th 2018. Lastly, please see "Saudi Arabia Is Taking a Harder Line on Oil Prices," published by bloomberg.com on February 19th 2018. 3 We discuss this in "OPEC 2.0 vs. The Fed," which was published on February 8th 2018 by BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 These expectations are highly conditional. Toward the end of this year, KSA and Russia are indicating the OPEC 2.0 coalition will become a more formal organization, with members signing a long-term alliance. Among other things, OPEC 2.0 members would be expected to build buffer stocks to address any sudden supply outages, in order to maintain orderly markets. Please see "Oil producers to draft long-term alliance deal by end-2018: UAE minister," published by reuters.com on February 15th 2018. 5 Please see "For timing of Aramco IPO, watch forward oil price curve," published by reuters.com on February 19th 2018. 6 Please see reference in footnote 3 and "Russia's Novak says current oil price is acceptable," published by reuters.com on February 15th 2018. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2018 Summary Of Trades Closed In 2017
Highlights This week's global equities sell-off spilled into oil markets, taking Brent and WTI down 2.7% and 3.7% as of Tuesday's close, in line with the S&P 500 decline, which began Friday. In line with our House view, we do not believe this will, in and of itself, deter the Fed from raising overnight rates four times this year. Nor do we believe oil-price weakness earlier this week reflects a breakdown in fundamentals. Any demand-dampening effects coming from a stronger USD in the wake of Fed rate hikes will have a muted effect on oil prices, provided OPEC 2.0 can maintain production discipline, and, critically, keep the Brent and WTI forward curves backwardated.1 Likewise, any demand stimulation coming from a weaker USD in the wake of a more measured Fed policy - e.g., two or three hikes - also will be muted by backwardation. Energy: Overweight. Fundamentally, we cannot see anything that warrants a change in our average-price forecast of $67 and $63/bbl for Brent and WTI this year. Our long Jul/18 WTI vs. short Dec/18 WTI calendar spread, put on in expectation of continued backwardation in oil forward curves, is up 81.5% since Nov 2/17, when we recommended it. Base Metals: Neutral. Base metals also were caught up in the equities sell-off, with spot copper trading ~ $3.15 - $3.20/lb on the COMEX. As with oil, we do not see the equities sell-off as a harbinger of a bearish shift in base metals fundamentals. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold returns were relatively flat amid the equities sell-off with only a 0.6% loss. Our long gold portfolio hedge is up 7.9% since it was recommended on May 4/17. Ags/Softs: Underweight. China opened an anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigation into U.S. sorghum imports, which the country's foreign ministry insisted was not related to recent U.S. tariffs on solar panels and washing machines. China accounts for ~ 80% of U.S. sorghum exports. Feature The global equity sell-off spilled into oil markets, with Brent and WTI prompt futures down 2.7% and 3.7% over the past week when the equity slide began (Chart of The Week). The proximate cause of the equities down leg appears to be the stronger-than-expected U.S. wage growth reported last week, suggesting inflationary pressures continue to build in the U.S. This prompted speculation the Fed would be inclined to increase the number of rate hikes it executes this year - going from a consensus view of three hikes to four - and that financial conditions would tighten. The equities sell-off this prompted then led to speculation the Fed would dial back the number of rate hikes it executes this year. We believe the Fed will look through the recent equity-market volatility, and will lift rates four times this year, in line with BCA's once-out-of-consensus House view. Chart of the WeekOil Prices Caught Up In Equities Sell-Off Chart 2Fundamentals Support Backwardation As far as oil markets are concerned, as long as the Brent and WTI forward curves remain backwardated (Chart 2), any impact from U.S. monetary policy on oil prices - chiefly through currency effects - will be muted. Demand-dampening effects coming from a stronger USD in the wake of Fed rate hikes will be dissipated in backwardated markets. Likewise, any demand stimulation coming from a weaker USD in the wake of fewer rate hikes policy at the Fed - e.g., two or three hikes - will be muted by backwardation. Fundamentals Dominate Oil-Price Evolution Chart 3Strong Fundamentals##BR##Force Inventories Lower Fundamentals point to continued tightening of crude oil markets in 1H18, the period we have the greatest visibility on: OPEC 2.0's production cuts are pretty much locked in to end-June, when the producer coalition again will meet to assess market conditions, and global demand growth will remain robust. Even with U.S. shale-oil output increasing, OECD inventories will continue to draw during this period (Chart 3). OPEC 2.0's goal of reducing OECD inventories to five-year average levels likely will be met late in 1H18 or early in 2H18, based on our global balances model. While it is possible OPEC 2.0 will extend its production cuts to year-end 2018, we don't believe it is likely. Voluntary production cuts by Russia and Gulf OPEC nations, combined with decline-curve losses in non-Gulf OPEC producers have removed ~ 1.4mm b/d from the market since January 2017. The bulk of these cuts have been made by KSA and Russia, which account for close to 1.0mm b/d of OPEC 2.0 production cuts. Based on our fundamentally driven econometric model, extending OPEC 2.0's cuts to year-end would lift average prices in 2018 from our current expectation of $67/bbl for Brent and $63/bbl for WTI to $71 and $67/bbl, respectively. Counterintuitively, we believe maintaining prices at this level for the entire year is not the desired outcome of OPEC 2.0's production-cutting strategy. Higher price levels will incentivize larger-than-expected shale-oil production gains than we currently are forecasting - ~ 1.0mm b/d in 2018 and 1.2mm b/d in 2019. In addition, they would breathe life into marginal production around the world, particularly in provinces where break-evens and services costs have fallen - e.g., the North Sea, Barents Sea and offshore Brazil. OPEC 2.0's Long Game KSA's and Russia's oil ministers, the leaders of OPEC 2.0, have stated they would prefer to see their coalition endure beyond end-2018, when their production-cutting deal expires. Be that as it may, they have yet to publicly articulate an agreed strategy for OPEC 2.0, either in terms of a preferred price level or price band, or a strategy that builds on the gains they've made in backwardating oil forward curves. Chart 4Stakes Are High For OPEC 2.0##BR##If No Post-2018 Strategy Emerges Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak recently suggested a preferred range for prices of $50 to $60/bbl for Brent, the international crude-oil benchmark. In the short term, KSA likely prefers a higher price - between $60 and $70/bbl for Brent - to support the IPO of Saudi Aramco, which probably will occur later this year. As we near the end of 1H18, OPEC 2.0's leaders will have to provide some indication they are converging on a common production-management strategy. They will, we believe, have to begin behaving more like a central bank - i.e., providing the market forward guidance - and less like a loose alliance of like-minded producers lurching between stop-gap measures to support prices. Importantly, when they do provide such guidance, they will have to follow through on publicly stated goals, or risk losing credibility with markets. The stakes are fairly high. If, as we've modeled in our unconstrained case, OPEC 2.0 returns ~ 1.1 - 1.2 mm b/d of actual production cuts (ex-decline-curve losses) to the market beginning in 2H18, and U.S. shale and other producers respond to 2018's higher prices with aggressive production growth that carries through 2019, Brent and WTI prices could be pushing toward $40/bbl by the end of 2019 (Chart 4). Also note that if prices start to moderate in H2 2018, 2019 shale production growth may ultimately be less than the 1.2 MMb/d we have forecast, softening the decline in prices during 2019. Longer term, we believe KSA and Russia are aligned with Russia's preference, if for no reason other than to keep U.S. shale-oil production from realizing the run-away growth sustained higher prices almost surely would provoke. Such growth would accelerate the development of U.S. crude oil export capacity - already hovering around ~ 2mm b/d - and the competition for market share in markets OPEC 2.0 members are keen to defend. Higher prices also would improve the competitive position of non-hydrocarbon-based transportation - e.g., electric vehicles and hybrids - which works against OPEC 2.0's long-term goals. Backwardation Matters For OPEC 2.0 Price levels always will be an important policy variable for OPEC 2.0. Equally important, we believe, will be having a strategy that maintains a backwardated forward curve in the Brent and WTI markets. This is because OPEC 2.0 member states sell oil at spot-price levels - the highest point of a backwardated forward curve - while shale-oil producers hedge their revenues over a 1- to 2-year interval. Other than allowing prices to collapse once again, this is the most viable way of constraining U.S. shale production growth longer term. The steeper the backwardation in the WTI forward curve, in particular, the lower the average price level of the hedges producers are able to lock in when they hedge forward revenues. This translates directly into lower output, since producers cannot afford to field as many rigs at lower prices over the life of the hedge as they would be able to field at higher prices. The extent to which OPEC 2.0 can keep forward curves backwardated will determine the extent to which the USD influences oil prices, as well. Our recently concluded research reveals backwardation can mitigate FX effects on oil prices induced by U.S. monetary policy. There is a long-term equilibrium between the level of the USD's broad trade-weighted index (TWIB) and crude oil prices (Chart 5). Indeed, the USD TWIB is one of the key variables we use in our demand, supply and price models. A weak dollar spurs consumption - USD/bbl prices ex-U.S. are cheaper in local-currency terms, especially for fast-growing emerging markets - while production costs ex-U.S. are higher, which limits output growth at the margin. A stronger dollar restrains consumption and encourages production ex-U.S., at the margin. However, this long-term equilibrium is asymmetric. The strength of the correlation between the level of the USD and crude oil prices is such that as oil inventories fall - and backwardation becomes more pronounced - the USD becomes less important to the evolution of oil prices.2 This can be seen in the month-on-month (m-o-m) rolling correlation between prompt WTI futures and the USD TWIB plotted against the spread between 1st nearby WTI futures and 12th nearby WTI futures (Chart 6). Chart 5Long-Term Inverse Correlation##BR##Between USD TWIB And Crude Prices Chart 6Backwardated Forward Curves##BR##Limit USD's Effect On Oil Prices With the exception of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the higher the backwardation in crude oil forward curves, the smaller the USD-WTI correlation becomes.3 This suggests that, if OPEC 2.0 can maintain the backwardation in WTI and Brent in 2018, the correlation between crude oil prices and the USD TWIB likely will not go back to the large negative correlation typical of previous cycles. In other words, sustained backwardation will weaken the inverse relationship between WTI prices and the USD TWIB vs. the long-term average in place since 2000, which is roughly when oil prices became random-walking variables. We also looked at year-on-year change in U.S. commercial inventories vs. the USD-WTI prices correlation (Chart 7). Our analysis indicates that when inventories are building, the correlation between USD and WTI prices becomes negative, and when they are falling the correlation goes to zero or positive. This supports our earlier observation that when crude inventories fall, the USD becomes less important to the evolution of WTI prices, particularly spot prices. One more point that we should note: the inverse relationship between the USD and oil prices is a two-way street. In addition to a weaker USD helping to support higher oil prices, higher oil prices have also tended to weaken the USD by inflating the U.S. trade deficit through more expensive petroleum imports. However, over the past decade, the U.S. has reduced its volumes of petroleum imports by roughly 75%, from 12-13 MMB/d in 2007 to only 3-4 MM b/d today (Chart 8). Therefore, this feedback loop of higher oil prices weakening the USD, and lower oil prices strengthening the USD, is greatly reduced. Chart 7Tighter Inventories Limit##BR##USD's Effect On Oil Prices Chart 8Lower Imports Of Petroleum Help##BR##Insulate USD From Oil Price Moves The USD's influence on the evolution of oil prices essentially is an exogenous variable out of OPEC 2.0's control. To the extent it can minimize these effects by backwardating oil forward curves, the coalition reduces the impact of an essentially exogenous USD risk from its production-management strategy. Bottom Line: The Fed likely will view the equity sell-off as a transitory event, and proceed with four overnight-rate hikes this year, in line with our House view. Any read-through from Fed policy decisions to the USD TWIB will be muted by continued backwardation in crude oil forward curves. To the extent OPEC 2.0 can maintain backwardated forward oil curves, it reduces the impact of an essentially exogenous USD risk from its production-management strategy. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Research Analyst HugoB@bcaresearch.com 1 Jargon recap: OPEC 2.0 is the moniker we coined for the producer coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia. Its historic production-cutting Agreement to remove 1.8mm b/d of production from the market - via a combination of outright cuts and decline-curve run-off - has largely held, despite wide-spread skepticism. "Backwardation" is a term of art in commodities describing a forward curve in which prompt-delivered crude oil trades at a higher price than crude delivered in the future - e.g., a year hence. This is a reflection of a tight market - i.e., refiners are willing to pay more for oil delivered tomorrow or next month than they are willing to pay for oil delivered next year. The opposite of a backwardated market is a "contango" market, another term of art. 2 Generally, falling commodity inventories put a premium on prompt-delivered supply. As inventories fall, there is less readily available supply in place to meet unexpected supply outages. Under such conditions, refiners will attempt to conserve inventory and bid for flowing supply more aggressively, either to replace consumption out of inventory or to keep inventories at safe levels so as to minimize stockout risks. Either way, prompt-delivered supply becomes more valuable than deferred supply. Backwardation reflects this dynamic by keeping prompt-delivered prices above prices for deferred delivery. Backwardation is the market's way of incentivizing storage holders to release inventory to the market. It also is the source of returns for long-only commodity index products. 3 The GFC of 2008 - 09 was a global liquidity event, in which correlations between most tradeable assets went to 1.0 as prices collapsed. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017
Highlights Slower global demand growth, coupled with surging production from the U.S. shales and higher OPEC 2.0 production, risks reversing the progress made in draining global commercial oil storage and tanking prices in 2019.1 Our updated balances modelling is in agreement with the backwardation in forward Brent and WTI curves, but, if anything, indicates the backwardation should be more pronounced: We are forecasting Brent and WTI prices next year will average $55 and $53/bbl, respectively, vs. $62.80/bbl and $57.40/bbl average prices for 2019's forward curves. For 2018, we are maintaining our $67 and $63/bbl expectation for Brent and WTI, although our modelling indicates higher prices are a distinct possibility, given our fundamental assumptions of falling supply and rising demand this year (Chart of the Week). Energy: Overweight. We liquidated our May and July Brent and WTI $55 vs. $60/bbl call spreads last week with gains of 110.1% and 129.0%. We will be liquidating our Dec/18 Brent and WTI $55 vs. $60/bbl call spreads at tonight's close; they were up 62.3% and 82.1% as of Tuesday. We remain long Jul/18 vs. Dec/18 WTI (up 47.4%), and long the S&P GSCI (up 8.5%), expecting backwardation. We will get long $55 Brent Puts vs. short $50 Brent Puts in 4Q19 at tonight's close. Base Metals: Neutral. We continue to expect base metals to remain well supported in 1H18 by environmental reforms in China, and supply uncertainty around contract renegotiations at the copper mines. The global expansion underpinning demand will compensate for slower Chinese growth in 2H18. Precious Metals: Neutral. Our long gold portfolio hedge is up 8.5% since inception in May/17. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Soybean markets rallied following last week's USDA WASDE report, but grains fell amid data indicating these markets will remain oversupplied. Feature If there is one truth in commodity markets it is this: The best cure for high prices is high prices, and vice versa. This is being dramatically demonstrated by OPEC 2.0 in its collective action to remove 1.8mm b/d of production from the market following disastrously low prices in 2015 - 16. Higher prices in 4Q17 and 1H18 oil futures are incentivizing a surge in U.S. shale output, and will give OPEC 2.0 comfort in slowly feeding output taken offline at the beginning of 2017 back into the market in 2H18 and 2019 (Chart 2). Higher prices and tightening monetary conditions globally will slow the rate of growth in demand next year (Chart 3). Chart of the WeekFundamentals##BR##Support Oil In 2018 Chart 2Non-OPEC Production##BR##Will Surge Chart 3Strong Consumption Growth In 2018,##BR##Tempered By Higher Prices In 2019 Given these fundamental inputs, we expect to see Brent averaging $55/bbl next year, and WTI averaging $53/bbl next year. Our forecast is highly uncertain, given the actual evolution of prices will, once again, depend on actions taken by OPEC 2.0 and the forward guidance provided by its leadership, KSA and Russia. Our forecast for 2018 - $67/bbl for Brent and $63/bbl for WTI - remains unchanged. If anything, our unconstrained models (Chart of the Week) have more upside risk than our forecast suggests, largely from falling production and surging demand - not to mention unplanned production outages. Looking to the end of 2019 from today, the backwardation we expect is greater than what is being priced into the Brent and WTI forward curves presently. Growth In U.S. Shales Dominates Non-OPEC Gains We are expecting U.S. crude oil production growth will dominate the increase in non-OPEC output in 2018 and 2019 (Chart 2, top panel). U.S. shale-oil output rises by 970k b/d and another 1.18mm b/d, respectively, this year and in 2019. By our reckoning, this will lift total U.S. crude oil production to 10.22mm b/d this year, a record level of output, and to 11.44mm b/d on average next year. Total U.S. crude and liquids output therefore rises from just under 17mm b/d in 2018 to 18.5mm b/d by the end of 2019. If our estimates are correct, the U.S. will join Russia in producing more than 11mm b/d of crude oil next year, and may even exceed it. Russia is expected to raise production slightly. As one of the putative leaders of OPEC 2.0, we expect Russia to maintain its 300k b/d production cut in 1H18, which will keep its overall liquids production steady at ~ 11.17mm b/d through June. In 2H18, Russia will gradually restore production to an average of 11.24mm b/d, reaching 11.4mm b/d by December. For 2019, we expect total Russian liquids production to average 11.35mm b/d, up ~ 140k b/d yoy. OPEC's return will be led by the Cartel's Gulf producers, which are expected to raise crude production 450k b/d this year and 350k b/d next year (Chart 2, bottom panel). Total production in Gulf OPEC states will reach 25.25mm b/d on average in 2019. This will, of course, be dominated by KSA, which we expect will lift crude production to ~ 10.36mm b/d in 2H18 after holding crude output steady at ~ 10mm b/d in 1H18 over-delivering vs. its quota under the OPEC 2.0 Agreement. For 2019, we expect KSA to maintain production above 10.1mm b/d.2 Non-Gulf OPEC producers, on the other hand, will see their production fall 140k b/d this year, and another 240k b/d next year, leaving it at 7.49mm b/d on average in 2019, in our estimation. The contribution of these states to the OPEC 2.0 production cuts has been "managing" their respective decline curves. It is highly unlikely they will see production surge following the expiration of the OPEC 2.0 agreement at the end of this year. Overall, we expect global crude and liquids production to reach 100mm b/d this year, and 102.2mm b/d next year (Table 1). Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (mm b/d) Oil Demand Surges This Year, But Slows In 2019 The global economic expansion will lift oil demand above 100mm b/d this year to 100.3mm b/d. This will be led, as always, by non-OECD growth, which we expect to increase 1.24mm b/d this year to 52.8mm b/d (Chart 3, top panel). DM demand - i.e., OECD consumption - will increase 440k b/d this year, to 47.5mm b/d, based on our estimates. Overall global demand rises 1.68mm b/d this year, by our reckoning (Chart 3). We expect tighter financial conditions this year and next will, with the lags typical of monetary policy, slow the rate of growth in oil demand next year. This will be delivered by tightening monetary policy, led by the U.S. Fed, and a mild recession next year, most likely in 2H19. We expect global demand to grow 1.57mm b/d next year, rising to just under 102mm b/d. EM demand will grow 1.21mm b/d, while DM demand will be up 360k b/d next year. Tightening Balances Will Reverse In 2H18 The yeoman effort put forth by OPEC 2.0 in reducing output and draining commercial inventories globally will reach its apotheosis by the end of 1H18 (Charts 4). Thereafter, as production grows and demand begins to slow, our balances indicate inventories will start to grow again (Chart 5). Chart 4Supply-Demand Balances##BR##No Longer Tightening In 2019 ... Chart 5... Leading To##BR##Inventory Accumulation Markets likely will start focusing on the implications of OPEC 2.0 returning production to the market and the surge in shale in 2H18 and during 2019. Non-forecastable events notwithstanding - e.g., a breakdown in Venezuela's production and exports - markets will be looking to OPEC 2.0 leadership for guidance on how the coalition will manage member-state production from 2H18 forward. If the OPEC 2.0 coalition is allowed to dissolve - something we do not expect - and a production free-for-all resumes similar to that of 2015 - 16, another round of supply destruction, brought about by lower prices, likely will ensue. This would greatly restrict E&P and services companies' access to capital, should it occur, and would, once again, imperil the economies of OPEC 2.0. In addition, because such volatility would discourage investment once again, it would set up a powerful price rally in the early 2020s following the attendant collapse in capex and E&P spending, as occurred in the previous down-cycle. We doubt this is the desired outcome of the OPEC 2.0 leadership, particularly KSA, as the Kingdom will be looking to IPO Saudi Aramco later this year to fund its Vision 2030 diversification efforts. We also doubt this is the desired outcome of Russia, given the economic pain it endured in the 2015 - 16 episode. More Frequent OPEC 2.0 Guidance Expected Given these considerations, we expect KSA and Russia to increase the frequency of forward guidance, directing market participants toward a preferred price band. Right now, this looks like a $50 to $60/bbl range - the 2018 forecast given by Russia's Energy Minister Alexander Novak earlier this week.3 It would be incumbent on OPEC 2.0 leadership to guide markets to expect production and inventory responses consistent with such guidance. We think the combination of OPEC 2.0 production restraint and the powerful synchronized global growth already in place puts Energy Minister Novak's guidance out of range for this year, and we are sticking with our forecasts for Brent and WTI. However, beginning in 2H18, a 2019 Brent forecast in Novak's range appears reasonable, based on the fundamentals discussed above. And, our WTI forecast of $53/bbl also is reasonable, given the average marginal cost of producing in the most prolific fields in the U.S. are at or below $50/bbl, according to the Dallas Fed's periodic Energy Survey.4 We believe the massive drawdown in global oil inventories to be the first step in a longer-term strategy by OPEC 2.0 countries. Lower OECD commercial inventory levels will diminish their shock-absorbing capacity, leading to a higher responsiveness of oil prices to supply-demand shocks. This will allow the coalition to exert greater control over oil prices via rapid, flexible storage adjustments and spare capacity management. Therefore, this year's out-of-range prices will be tolerated by Russia and KSA to achieve their optimal level of global inventories. A $50-to-$60/bbl Brent range for OPEC 2.0 would be consistent with a longer-term strategy to maximize the period of time hydrocarbons are the primary transportation fuel in the world. This is the only way to achieve the development goals set out by leaders of various oil-exporting states seeking to diversify the economic underpinnings of these economies. To do so, they have to keep oil-based transportation competitive for decades. Too much volatility - i.e., frequent excursions between very high and very low prices - will severely limit the access to capital these societies need to pull off this diversification. Managing production in a way that limits this volatility and keeps oil competitive in transport markets therefore is critical. Bottom Line: High prices will cause crude oil production to surge this year and next, particularly in the U.S. shales, and demand growth to slow. We expect Brent prices to average $67/bbl this year and $55/bbl next year. WTI prices will average $63/bbl this year and $53/bbl next year. We expect OPEC 2.0 to increase the frequency of its forward guidance - and to follow through on production and inventory adjustment in a manner that supports a desired price range for Brent prices in 2019 and into the 2020s. Right now, that range looks like $50 to $60/bbl. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Research Analyst HugoB@bcaresearch.com 1 OPEC 2.0 is a name we coined to describe the oil-producer coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia, which was formed at the end of 2016 to rein in out-of-control global oil production by cutting production some 1.4 to 1.5mm b/d last year (vs. a target of 1.8mm b/d). The coalition has been remarkably successful in maintaining production discipline in 2017 and extending their deal to the end of 2018 with an option to review quotas in June. We expect OPEC 2.0 to gradually return production taken off the market over the course of 2H18, which will, by next year, most likely reverse the draws seen in global inventories. 2 KSA's production should lift next year as pipeline repairs at its giant Manifa field are completed. Corrosion problems took some 300k of 900k b/d total production offline. In addition, there is another 500k b/d of capacity offline in the Neutral Zone shared with Kuwait. KSA's capacity likely will remain ~ 11.7mm b/d, versus its historical 12.5mm level, but as Energy Intelligence notes, it will have to balance actual production with spare capacity for the next year or so. Please see "A Headache for Aramco," published July 2017 by Energy Intelligence on its website. 3 Please see "CORRECTED-UPDATE 5-Brent oil falls by $1 but demand underpins near $70/barrel," published by uk.reuters.com on January 16, 2018. 4 In its December 2017 Dallas Fed Energy Survey, the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas reported the WTI price shale operators needed to profitably drill a new well in Texas and Oklahoma averaged $49/bbl (simple, unweighted survey average). The lowest cost was in the Permian Midland formation ($46/bbl) and the highest costs was in so-called Other U.S. (shale) at $55/bbl. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017
Dear Client, This is our last report of 2017. We will be back on January 4, 2018, with our customary recap of recommendations made this year. We wish you and your loved ones the very best this lovely season has to offer. Sincerely, Robert P. Ryan, Chief Commodity Strategist Commodity & Energy Strategy Highlights With GDP growth accelerating in ~ 75% of countries monitored by the IMF, we expect commodity demand - particularly for crude oil and refined products - to remain strong in 2018. On the supply side, OPEC 2.0 - the producer coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia - will maintain its production discipline, which will force commercial oil inventories lower in 2018. As a result, we expect oil markets to continue to tighten in 2018, keeping upside risk to prices from unplanned production outages acute. This was clearly demonstrated in separate incidents in the U.S. and North Sea in the past two months, which removed more than 400k b/d from markets since November. Geopolitical risk will remain elevated, particularly in Venezuela, where operations at the state oil company were paralyzed after senior military officers assumed leadership positions there. Beyond 2018, we believe OPEC 2.0 will endure as a coalition. It will manage production and provide forward guidance consistent with a strategy to keep WTI and Brent forward curves backwardated. This will provide a supportive backdrop for the Saudi Aramco IPO, expected toward the end of next year, and will limit the volume of hedging U.S. shale-oil producers are able to effect. In turn, this will limit the number of rigs U.S. E&Ps can profitably deploy. Energy: Overweight. Our Brent and WTI call spreads in 2018 - long $55/bbl calls vs. short $60/bbl calls - are up an average 53.8%. We will retain these exposures into 2018. Base Metals: Neutral. We expect base metals to be supported through 1Q18, after which reform measures in China could crimp supply and demand, as we discuss below. Precious Metals: Neutral. We remain long gold as a strategic portfolio hedge against inflation and geopolitical risk, even though inflation remains quiescent (see below). Ags/Softs: Underweight. Fed policy will be critical to ag markets in 2018. We expect as many as four rate hikes next year, as the Fed continues with rates normalization (see below). Feature Our updated balances model indicates global oil markets will continue to tighten in 2018, as demand growth accelerates and OPEC 2.0 - the producer coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia - maintains production discipline (Chart of the Week). Earlier this week, IMF noted improving employment conditions globally, which will continue to support aggregate demand and the synchronized global expansion in manufacturing and trade (Chart 2 and Chart 3).1 This acceleration of GDP growth rates globally will continue to support income growth and commodity demand generally. Oil-exporters have not participated in the global economic expansion to the extent of other economies, according to the Fund, which can be seen in the trade data (Chart 3). However, imports by Middle East and African countries are moving higher, and look set to post year-on-year (yoy) growth in the near future. Chart of the WeekOil Balances Will Continue to Tighten In 2018 Chart 2Global Upturn Boosts Manufacturing, ##br##Commodity Demand... The combination of continued production discipline from OPEC 2.0 and expanding incomes boosting demand will force crude and product inventories lower, particularly those in the OECD, which are the primary target of the producer coalition (Chart 4). Chart 3...And Global Trade Chart 4OECD Inventories Will Fall Below 5-year ##br##Average In BCA's Supply-Demand Assessment Unplanned Outages Mounting; Risk Remains Acute Unlike many forecasters, we continue to expect inventories to draw in 1Q18. This expectation is the direct result of our supply-demand modelling, and also is supported by our expectation that the risk of unplanned outages is increasing. This already has been demonstrated in the U.S. and U.K. North Sea, where more than 400k b/d of pipeline flows in November and December were lost. Of far greater moment, however, is the potential for unplanned outages in Venezuela. We believe the state-owned oil company there is one systemic malfunction away from shutting down exports entirely - e.g., a breakdown in pumping stations - as happened in 2002. Reuters reports the government of Nicolas Maduro appears to be consolidating power via an "anti-corruption" campaign, and is installing senior military officials with little or no industry experience in leadership roles inside PDVSA.2 Reuters notes, "The ongoing purge, in which prosecutors have arrested at least 67 executives including two recently ousted oil ministers, now threatens to further harm operations for the OPEC country, which is already producing at 30-year-lows and struggling to run PDVSA units including Citgo Petroleum, its U.S. refiner." The news service goes on to report, "Executives that remain, meanwhile, are so rattled by the arrests that they are loathe to act, scared they will later be accused of wrongdoing." We have Venezuela output at just under 1.90mm b/d, and expect it to decline to a little more than 1.70mm b/d by the end of 2018. Brent Expected To Average $67/bbl In 2018 We continue to forecast average Brent prices of $67/bbl and WTI at $63/bbl next year, given our assessment of global supply-demand balances, which drive our fundamental price forecasts: We expect global crude and liquids supply to average 100.23mm b/d in 2018, vs 100.01mm b/d expected by the U.S. EIA, while we have global demand coming in at 100.29mm b/d on average next year, vs the 99.97mm b/d expected by EIA (Chart 5 and Chart 6). Chart 5BCA's Expected Crude Oil Supply Vs. EIA's Chart 6BCA's Expected Demand Exceeds EIA's In 2018 Our expectations translate into a 2.55mm b/d increase in supply next year, vs a 1.67mm b/d increase in demand yoy (Table 1). Running the EIA's supply-demand assessments through our fundamental pricing models produces average Brent and WTI prices of $49/bbl and $47/bbl, respectively. EIA is expecting a 2.04mm b/d increase in supply next year, vs a 1.63mm b/d increase in demand. Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (mm b/d) In line with our House view, we are expecting some USD strengthening on the back of as many as four interest-rate hikes by the Federal Reserve in the U.S. (Chart 7). As we've noted in the past, we expect these effects to be felt more in 2H18. Along with higher U.S. shale-oil production driven by higher prices - we expect shale output to go up 0.97mm b/d next year to 6.64mm b/d - a stronger USD will keep Brent and WTI prices below $70/bbl next year. Oil Beyond 2018: OPEC 2.0 Endures OPEC 2.0 will remain an enduring feature of the oil market going forward, in our view. Allowing the coalition to fade away, and returning the global oil market to a production free-for-all once again serves neither KSA's nor Russia's interests. Following the IPO of Saudi Aramco toward the end of 2018, KSA will, we believe, want to maintain stability in the market, by demonstrating to capital markets that OPEC 2.0 can manage crude-oil supplies in a way that is not disruptive to its new-found investors. It is important to remember the Aramco IPO is only the beginning of the process of transforming KSA from a crude resource exporter into a vertically integrated global refining and marketing colossus. To eclipse Exxon as the world's largest refiner, Aramco would benefit from continued access to capital markets throughout the following decades, as well reliable cash flows to lower its cost of capital, service debt, and maintain whatever dividends it envisions. This cannot occur if oil markets are continually at risk of collapsing because production cannot be managed in a business-like manner. While Russia has not embarked on the same sort of transformation of its resource industry as KSA, it still has a very strong interest in maintaining stability in the crude oil markets, given its dependence on hydrocarbon exports. The Russian rouble moves in near-lock-step with Brent prices - since 2010, Brent prices explain ~80% of the movement in the rouble (Chart 8). It is obvious a collapse in global crude oil prices would, once again, have devastating effects on Russia's economy, as it did in 2009 and 2014. Such a collapse would trigger inflation domestically, as the cost of imports skyrockets, and threaten civil unrest as incomes and GDP are hobbled and foreign reserves evaporate. Chart 7Stronger USD Limits Oil-Price Appreciation In 2018 Chart 8Russia Cannot Afford An Oil Price Collapse Both KSA and Russia have a deep interest in maintaining oil's pre-eminent position as a transportation fuel for as long as possible. For this reason, neither wants to encourage prices that are too high - $100/bbl+ prices greatly encouraged the development of shale technology in the U.S. - nor too low, given the dire consequences such an outcome would have for both their economies. The common goals of KSA and Russia cannot be achieved by allowing OPEC 2.0 to dissolve, leaving member states to produce at will in the sort of production free-for-all that characterized the OPEC market-share war of 2014 - 15. To the extent possible, OPEC 2.0 must continue to manage member states' production in a manner that does not permit inventories to once again fill to the point where the only way to moderate over-production is to push prices through cash costs, so that enough output is shut in to clear the market. The most obvious way for these goals to be accomplished is by keeping markets relatively tight. This can be done by keeping commercial oil inventories worldwide low enough to keep Brent and WTI forward curves backwardated - particularly in highly visible OECD and U.S. storage facilities. A backwardated forward curve means the average price over a typical 2- or 3-year hedge horizon is lower than the spot price received by OPEC 2.0 producers. The deeper the backwardation, the lower the average price a U.S. shale producer can lock in by hedging. This limits the number of rigs that can be deployed by shale producers. This will require continual communication with markets to assure them sufficient spare capacity and easily developed production can be brought to market to alleviate any temporary shortage. In the meantime, OPEC 2.0 members with flexible storage will need to communicate these barrels will be readily available to the market. This management and forward-guidance should be easier for OPEC 2.0 to execute on, following its recent success in keeping some 1.0mm b/d of production off the market - largely in KSA and Russia - and member states' existing spare capacity and storage. We continue to expect the daily working dialogue of the OPEC 2.0 member states - most especially KSA and Russia - to deepen as time goes by, and for tactics and strategy to evolve as each gains comfort operating with the other. Whether OPEC 2.0 can pull this off remains to be seen. However, given the success of the coalition over the past two years, we are inclined to believe they will continue to develop a durable modus operandi supporting this outcome. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Research Analyst HugoB@bcaresearch.com Opposing Forces: Stay Neutral Metals In 2018 Chart 9Strong Global Demand Will Neutralize ##br##Impact of China Slowdown While we expect more upside to metal prices in the first half of 2018, slowing growth in China and a stronger USD will prevent a repeat of this year's stellar performance. While a deceleration in China is - ceteris paribus - most definitely a headwind to metal prices, we believe the impact may pan out differently this time around. The silver lining comes from the Communist Party's commitment to environmental reforms, which, in many cases, will manifest themselves in the form of less supply of the refined product, or demand for the ores. Either way, this alone is a positive for metals. China's Environmental Reforms Will Dominate in 1Q18 China's commitment to cleaning its air is currently shaping up in the form of winter cuts in major steel- and aluminum-producing provinces. While policies are hard to predict, we will keep monitoring the development and implementation of reforms from within China to assess how they will impact the markets. Outcomes from the Annual National People's Congress in March will give us a clearer indication of what to expect in terms of policy. For now, we see these reforms putting a floor under metal prices, at least in the beginning of 2018. Robust Global Demand Offsets Stronger USD & Slower Chinese Growth Xi's reforms will turn into a headwind for metal prices as they begin to impact the real economy in 2H18. Signs of weakness have already emerged in measures of industrial activity such as the Li Keqiang and Chinese PMI (Chart 9). In addition, the real estate sector has been showing some weakness since the beginning of the year. Annual growth rates in real estate investment and floor-space started are decelerating - a worrisome sign. Nonetheless, domestic demand remains robust, and policymakers in Beijing are approaching economic reforms gradually and with caution. Consequently we do not expect a major policy mistake to derail the Chinese economy. While Chinese growth will likely slow from above trend levels, a hard landing is most probably not in the cards. Another bearish risk comes from a stronger USD. We see the Fed as more committed to interest-rate normalization than markets expect, and consequently would not be surprised to see up to four rate hikes next year. Inverting the yield curve is a policy mistake incoming Chair Jerome Powell will try to avoid; however, we expect inflation to bottom in the first half of next year, giving the Fed room to accelerate its path of rate hikes. This will result in a stronger USD, which is bearish for commodities priced in U.S. dollars. In any case, these bearish factors will likely be offset by strong global growth, supported by a robust U.S. economy. Bottom Line: Xi's reforms will dominate metal markets in 2018 as bullish supply side environmental reforms duel against bearish demand-side economic reforms. Robust global growth will neutralize the impact of downside pressures. Stay neutral, but beware of modest USD strength. Low Inflation Retards Gold's Advance Once again, reality confounded theory: Inflation failed to emerge this year, even as systematically important central banks remained massively accommodative, and some 70% of the economies tracked by the OECD reported jobless rates below the commonly used estimate of the natural rate of unemployment (Chart 10). Chart 10Massive Monetary Accommodation Failed ##br##To Spur Inflation In The U.S. These fundamentals should be inflationary and supportive of gold. To date, they haven't been. We Expect Inflation To Revive The global economy has endured decades of low inflation going back at least to the 1990s. This has been driven by numerous factors. First, the expansion of the global value chain (GVC) over the past three decades has synchronized inflation rates worldwide, as our research and that of the BIS has found. As a result, U.S. wages and goods' inflation are now more dependent on global spare capacity. With the global output gap now almost closed, this disinflationary force will dissipate.3 Second, most measures of labor-market slack are now pointing toward tighter conditions, which, we expect, will strengthen the Phillips curve trade-off between inflation and unemployment next year. Inflation is a lagging indicator: Wage inflation lags the unemployment rate, and CPI inflation lags wage inflation. Investors should expect inflation to show up in 2018.4 Lastly, one-off technical factors, which depressed inflation last year - e.g. drop in cellphone data charges and prescription drug prices - also will fade. Once these big one-offs are no longer in annual percent-change calculations, inflation rates will rise. The Fed's Choppy Waters Against this backdrop, the Fed is embarking on a rates-normalization policy, which we believe will result in U.S. central bank's policy rate being increased up to four times next year. The risk of a policy error is high. Should the Fed proceed with its rate hikes while inflation remains quiescent, real interest rates will increase. This would depress gold prices, and, at the limit, threaten the current economic expansion by tightening monetary conditions well beyond current levels, potentially lifting unemployment levels. If, on the other hand, the Fed deliberately keeps rate hikes below the rate of growth in prices - i.e., it stays "behind the curve" - it risks being forced to implement steeper rate hikes later in 2018 or in 2019 to get stronger inflation under control. This could tighten monetary conditions suddenly, and threaten the expansion, pushing the U.S. economy into recession. There's a lot riding on how the Fed navigates these difficult conditions. Geopolitical Risks Will Support Gold On the geopolitical side, the risks we've identified in our October 12, 2017 publication - i.e. (1) U.S.-North Korea tensions, (2) trade protectionism of the Trump administration, and (3) ongoing conflicts in the Middle East-- will add a geopolitical risk premium to gold prices, supporting the metal's role as a safe haven.5 Bottom Line: We remain neutral precious metals, but still recommend investors allocate to gold as a strategic portfolio hedge against inflation and geopolitical risk. U.S. Policies Will Weigh On Ags In 2018 U.S. monetary and trade policy will dominate ags next year. Our modelling reveals that U.S. financial factors - real rates and the USD - are significant in explaining ag price behavior (Chart 11).6 Given that we expect the Fed to hike interest rates more aggressively than what the market is currently pricing in, we see grains as vulnerable to the downside. In addition, the risk that NAFTA is abrogated by the U.S. would weigh on ag markets, as Canada and Mexico are among the U.S.'s top three ag export destinations. Chart 11Bearish U.S. Monetary And Trade Policies ##br##Amid Healthy Inventories Will Weigh On Ags We expect ag markets will remain well supplied next year, and inventories will moderate the impact of supply-side shocks - most notably in the form of a La Nina event. The probability of a La Nina currently stands above 80%, and is expected to last until mid-to-late spring. U.S. Monetary Policy Is Relevant With U.S. inflation rates still subdued, there has been much talk about how soon the Fed will be able embark on its tightening cycle. A weaker-than-expected USD has been favorable for ag markets this year, and thus kept U.S. ag exports competitive. However, if and when the economy reaches the kink in the Philipps Curve, and inflation begins its ascent, the Fed will be able to proceed with its rate-hiking cycle. With the New York Fed's Underlying Inflation Gauge at a cycle high, we expect this scenario to unfold in the first half of 2018. This would give incoming Fed Chairman Jerome Powell ample room to hike rates which would - ceteris paribus - bear down on ag prices. FX Developments In Other Major Exporters Will Also Be Bearish The effects of higher U.S. interest rates are translated to ag markets via the exchange-rate channel. Commodities are priced in USD, thus a stronger USD vis-à-vis the currency of a major ag exporter will, all else equal, increase the profitability of farmers competing against U.S. exporters in international markets. Among the ag-relevant currencies, we highlight the Brazilian Real, EUR, Russian Rouble, and Australian Dollar as most likely to depreciate vis-à-vis the USD in 2018. Termination Of NAFTA Is A Risk For American Farmers U.S. farmers are keeping a close eye on NAFTA renegotiations, and rightly so. Canada and Mexico are the U.S.'s second and third largest agricultural export markets - accounting for 15% and 13% of U.S. agricultural exports in 2016, respectively. In fact, corn, rice, and wheat exports to Mexico accounted for 26%, 15%, and 11% share of U.S. exports of those commodities, respectively. However, as BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy service points out, the long-run impact depends on the underlying reason for the termination of the trade agreement. If Trump is merely a "pluto-populist" - as they expect - NAFTA will simply be replaced by bilateral trade agreements, with no lasting economic disturbance. The risk is that Trump is a genuine populist. If this turns out to be the case, tariffs and a rejection of the WTO would make U.S. exports less competitive, and would become a bearish force in ag markets.7 The risk of a collapse in the NAFTA trade deal would be devastating for U.S. farmers. In fact, in a bid to reduce reliance on the U.S., Mexican Economic Minister Ildefonso Guajardo recently announced that they are working on a Mexico-European Union trade deal.8 In addition, Mexico signed the world's largest free trade agreement with Japan, and is currently exploring the opportunity to join Mercosur. Bottom Line: Weather-induced volatility is possible in the near term, as a La Nina event threatens to reduce yields. Nevertheless, U.S. financial conditions and trade policy will dominate ag markets in 2018. With markets underestimating the Fed's resolve regarding interest rate hikes, we see some upside to the USD. This will keep a lid on ag prices next year. 1 Please see "The year in Review: Global Economy in 5 Charts," published on the IMF Blog December 18, 2017. https://blogs.imf.org/2017/12/17/the-year-in-review-global-economy-in-5-charts/ 2 Please see "Paralysis at PDVSA: Venezuela's oil purge cripples company," published by reuters.com December 15, 2017. 3 The IMF estimates the median output gap for 20 advanced economies reached -0.1% in 2017 and will rise to +0.3% in 2018. Please see BIS https://www.bis.org/publ/work602.htm. The Bank for International Settlements in Basel describes the GVC as "cross-border trade in intermediate goods and services." 4 The U.S. unemployment has been under its estimated NAIRU for 9 consecutive months now. 5 Please see Commodity and Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled "Balance Of Risks Favors Holding Gold," dated October 12, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 6 Our modelling indicates that U.S. financial factors are important determinants of agriculture commodity price developments. More specifically, a 1% move in the USD TWI and a 1pp change in 5 year real rates are associated with a 1.4%, and an 18% change in the CCI Grains & Oilseed Index, in the opposite direction. 7 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report titled "NAFTA - Populism Vs. Pluto-Populism," dated November 10, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see "Mexico sees possible EU trade deal as NAFTA talks drag on," dated December 13, 2017, available at reuters.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trade Recommendation Performance In 3Q17 Trades Closed in Summary of Trades Closed in
Highlights U.S. product inventories - particularly gasoline and distillates - will show sharp declines over the balance of September, as refining capacity continues to trail demand in the wake of Hurricane Harvey. U.S. crude inventories will accumulate as refineries slowly come back on line. This will keep the Brent vs. WTI spreads and crack spreads elevated, as refiners outside the U.S. Gulf scramble for crude (Chart of the Week).1 Global product storage facilities will be drained to more normal levels responding to this imbalance. It is understandable that the significance of the increased frequency of messaging from OPEC 2.0's leadership re its willingness to extend production cuts beyond March 2018 would be secondary to hurricane recovery. Nonetheless, we advise investors to stay focused on OPEC 2.0's evolution, particularly next year, as it develops a modus operandi for providing forward guidance to markets and investors. Energy: Overweight. Brent futures are backwardated to January 2018, reflecting a tight market as refiners, particularly in Europe, scramble for barrels to meet U.S. and Latin American product demand. We remain long Brent and WTI $50/bbl vs. $55/bbl call spreads in Dec/17, which are up 183.8% and 30.2%, respectively, since inception. Base Metals: Neutral. Our tactical COMEX copper short initiated last week is up 3.4%. Precious Metals: Neutral. The Dec/17 COMEX Gold contract gapped lower earlier in the week, as a strengthening USD, and a 15 - 0 vote Monday by the UN Security Council to adopt sanctions proposed by the U.S. against N. Korea took some of the luster off the metal. Our long strategic portfolio hedge is up 8.0% since it was initiated May 4, 2017. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Grains appear to be finding support around current levels. We are bearish, but do not advise shorting the complex, especially with erratic weather as a backdrop. Feature Chart of the WeekBrent - WTI Spread,##BR##Cracks Reflect Refining Scramble The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia, the putative leaders of what we've dubbed OPEC 2.0, are taking every opportunity to signal their willingness to consider an extension of their production-cutting agreement beyond March 2018, when it is scheduled to expire.2 We believe this to be part and parcel of an evolving forward guidance strategy, which KSA and Russia will deploy to signal their production intentions over the near term. This is consistent with our view such a strategy is necessary to keep the producer coalition durable, and to work out an even larger plan to begin messaging firms and institutions allocating capital to oil and natural gas markets globally. This is critical for KSA, which will be looking to IPO Saudi ARAMCO next year, and Russia, which is preparing for elections in March and still relies heavily on hydrocarbon exports to fund its government.3 The last thing either needs is out-of-control oil production tanking the market, as it almost did at the beginning of 2016. Other members of the OPEC 2.0 coalition seeking foreign direct investment (FDI) - e.g., Gulf Arab producers and non-OPEC states like Mexico and Kazakhstan - benefit from an oil-production-management framework as well. The significance of OPEC 2.0's emerging forward guidance strategy could be lost amid the devastation of hurricanes Harvey and Irma, which is understandable. But it will be critical to understanding the coalition's strategy regarding how it intends to manage its own production, now that U.S. shale is the marginal barrel in the world, even after Hurricane Harvey disrupted production and refining in Texas, and U.S. crude and product exports from the Gulf. Thus far, OPEC 2.0 continues to deliver on its production cuts, and global demand - which we expect will dip by less than 1mm b/d over the next few weeks due to the hurricanes - remains strong. In a month or two, we expect hurricane recovery efforts will restore lost refining capacity and product demand. As rebuilding goes into high gear, we expect product demand to get a significant boost. OPEC 2.0 Maintains Discipline We will be updating our oil supply/demand balances next week, but so far it appears KSA and Russia are honoring their commitments to restrain production. This allows them to maintain credibility with their respective OPEC and non-OPEC allies within OPEC 2.0, and with the market in general (Chart 2). KSA, in particular, has led the way among OPEC members of the coalition, according to a tally done by S&P Global's Platts, which put KSA's average crude oil production over the January - August 2017 period at 9.97mm b/d vs. its quota of 10.06mm b/d. This is up slightly over the 9.93mm b/d average production for January - June 2017 reported by JODI. KSA's August production reported in the September OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report was 9.95mm b/d. For the January - August 2017 period, Russia's total crude and liquids production averaged 11.22mm b/d, according to U.S. EIA estimates. For the May - August period, it averaged 11.16mm b/d, putting total output 300k b/d below its October 2016 level, against which OPEC 2.0 benchmarks. Russia committed to reducing output by 300k b/d under the OPEC 2.0 Agreement as part of an overall effort to remove 1.8mm b/d of production from the market to end-March 2018. Russia's crude oil production averaged 10.38mm b/d over the January - June 2017 period, according to JODI data, vs. an October level of 10.51mm b/d. For 2Q17, Russia's average production reported to JODI was 10.31mm b/d, or 200k b/d below its Oct/16 output. Overall OPEC compliance of members with quotas was 112% of agreed volumes last month, meaning OPEC members with quotas under the OPEC 2.0 Agreement are producing 630k b/d below agreed volumes, according to Platts.4 Seven of the OPEC states still covered by the Agreement are producing below quota. Iraq leads in over-production at 4.46mm b/d on average in the January - August period, or 82k b/d over quota. Overall, however, production discipline is holding (Chart 3, panel 2). Chart 2KSA, Russia Leading##BR##OPEC 2.0 By Example Chart 3Production Discipline, Strong Demand##BR##Will Continue To Support Prices Bottom Line: OPEC 2.0's forward guidance to markets, firms and institutions allocating capital in the energy sector has featured frequent re-statements of the coalition's leaders' willingness to extend their production cuts if inventories have not drawn sufficiently by March 2018, when their Agreement is due to expire. We believe this reflects the desire of OPEC 2.0's leadership to maintain the coalition as a long-term production-coordinating body. This will allow the major oil producing nations to communicate production plans and allay investor fears of out-of-control production in the future. Global Demand Will Remain Strong We have noted repeatedly global economic growth has been firing on all cylinders, which will keep global oil demand robust for at least the balance of 2017, and likely into 2018 (Chart 3, panel 3). This is particularly evident in global trade data, which we also will be updating next week.5 Global economic data continue to support this thesis: All 46 countries monitored by the OECD are on track to grow this year, the first time this has happened since 2007, according to BCA's Global Investment Strategy (GIS).6 In addition, BCA's Global Investment Strategy notes U.S. growth projections have been broadly stable, but these likely will be revised higher. The easing in U.S. financial conditions since the start of the year should boost real GDP growth over the next few quarters, which, along with the expected boost to product demand coming on the back of hurricane-recovery efforts, will continue to be bullish for refined product demand. Global Product Inventory Draws Will Accelerate OPEC 2.0's efforts to draw global inventories - particularly in the OECD - received an unexpected assist from hurricanes Harvey and Irma. We expect the trend of drawdowns seen over the past few months to accelerate (Chart 4). This will return global product inventories to more normal levels, and, with crude oil inventories accumulating, favor refiners as they scramble to meet demand. Our colleagues at BCA's Energy Sector Strategy upgraded U.S. refiners last week to overweight in line with their view Harvey has the "potential to finally normalize bloated refined product inventories. Over two weeks since the hurricane made landfall, the industry still has 1.0 MMb/d of refining capacity shut down (5 refineries), 2.15 MMb/d of capacity not operating but working on restarting operations (6 refineries), and 1.4 MMb/d of capacity operating below full capacity (5 refineries). Over the past 16 days, at least 55 million barrels of refined product have not been generated, which will result in increased crude inventories and shrinking refined product inventories, benefitting refiners" (Chart 5).7 Chart 4OECD Oil Inventory Declines Will Accelerate Chart 5Refinery Outages From Harvey Persist Over the short term, Brent crude - and related streams pricing off Brent - and products will remain bid, keeping refiner crack spreads elevated, as operations return to normal, and Florida emerges from the economic damage and dislocations caused by Irma. Typically, product demand falls immediately after severe storms, and recovers as rebuilding begins and progresses. We will be updating our balances model next week to reflect the effects of hurricanes and the continued indications of strong global growth. Bottom Line: Demand for refined products will dip slightly - likely less than 1% of global demand - as hurricane-ravaged markets recover. As rebuilding progresses, product demand likely will be boosted. This will drain OECD product inventories in the short term, providing an unexpected assist to OPEC 2.0's efforts to bring global stocks down to five-year average levels. This evolution will favor refiners, as well. OPEC 2.0's forward guidance to markets continues to evolve. In recent weeks, it has featured frequent re-statements of the coalition's leaders' willingness to extend their production cuts if inventories have not drawn sufficiently by March 2018. We believe this messaging is designed to allay fears of another production-free-for-all of the sort that threatened to take global benchmark crude oil prices below $20/bbl last year. It is too early to expect OPEC 2.0 will replace the original OPEC Cartel. But, we believe KSA and Russia are signaling their common desire to make OPEC 2.0 a durable feature of budgeting and investment considerations over the medium term. Actions speak louder than words, in this regard. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 A "crack spread" refers to the difference in refined-product prices and crude oil prices. It takes its name from the "cracking" long-chain hydrocarbon bonds in crude oil required to produce refined products like gasoline and diesel fuel. The Brent - WTI spread is the price difference in USD/barrel ($/bbl) between the global benchmark crudes. 2 Please see, for example, "Saudi Arabia Says It's Open to Another OPEC Cuts Extension," updated on bloomberg.com September 11, 2017; "Saudi, UAE agree extension of oil cuts may be considered - statement," published on the same day on reuters.com's U.K. service; and "Russia's Novak says to consider extension of oil cut deal if glut persists" published on reuters.com September 6, 20107. We have repeated noted markets are looking for OPEC 2.0 to provide forward guidance, if the principals to the deal intend to maintain a durable coalition. Please see, e.g., "KSA's Tactics Advance OPEC 2.0's Agenda," published by BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report August 10, 2017, and available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 The U.S. CIA estimates Russia exported 5.1mm b/d of crude oil in 2016, roughly half of crude production. This squares with exports reported by the Joint Organizations Data Initiative (JODI), a transnational agency headquartered in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Last year, Russia also exported 223 billion cubic meters of natural gas. KSA exported 7.65mm b/d of crude oil last year, according to JODI, or close to 75% of KSA's production. 4 Please see S&P Global Platts OPEC Guide published September 7, 2017, online. 5 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Trade And Commodity Data Point To Higher Inflation," published on July 27, 2017. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Research's Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Central Bank Showdown," published on September 8, 2017. It is available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Research's Energy Sector Strategy Weekly Report "Rebalancing Recommendations," published on September 13, 2017. It is available at nrg.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016
Highlights The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is taking a well-timed tactical decision to make room for increased Libyan and Nigerian output, by reducing allocations to refiners by more than 500k b/d in September. The bulk of these reductions will be directed at U.S. refiners, which are running their units at close to record output, while reducing their crude imports and boosting product exports. This will keep the year-on-year (yoy) reductions in OECD commercial oil stocks now showing up in the data on track, driven by continued sharp draws in U.S. inventories. Most importantly, these reductions will occur in the highly visible, high-frequency data produced by the U.S. every week. Energy: Overweight. Reports of foreign workers being pulled from Venezuelan oil fields will keep markets on edge. We remain long Dec/17 $50/bbl calls and short $55/bbl calls in Brent and WTI, which are up 127% and 74% since inception on June 22 and June 15, respectively. Base Metals: Neutral. Aluminum rallied on the back of news reports China's Shandong province ordered more than 3.2mm MT/yr of capacity shuttered by end-July. While surprising, such actions are not inconsistent with the stricter enforcement of environmental regulations in China we expect going forward. Precious Metals: Neutral. We remain long gold as a strategic portfolio hedge. Recent geopolitical tensions between the U.S. and North Korea are supporting this position, which is up 2.1% since inception on May 4, 2017. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Grains were treading water ahead of today's WASDE. We remain bearish, but continue to avoid shorting the complex. Feature Chart of the WeekU.S. Refiners Running At Close To Record Rates KSA's decision to reduce crude oil allocations to refiners in September, particularly in the U.S., is a well-timed tactical move.1 U.S. refinery net crude inputs hit record levels in early June at 17.3mm b/d, and remain close to that level (Chart of the Week). U.S. product exports continue at near-record levels, while imports have been trending lower (Chart 2). Crude oil exports from the U.S. are running close to record levels, and imports are trending lower (Chart 3). U.S. exports of crude and products hit a record in January at 5.9mm b/d - 5.24mm b/d of products, and just under 650k b/d for crude exports. At the end of July, total exports of crude and products stood at 5.44mm b/d, or 7.4% below the record set in January. U.S. product exports fell to 4.6mm b/d, while crude exports stood at 845k b/d. It is worthwhile pointing out that, in terms of total oil and products exports, the U.S. ranks among the top exporters in the world: KSA exports ~ 7mm b/d of crude, while Russia exports ~ 5mm b/d of crude. Chart 2U.S. Product Export Remain Strong,##BR##While Imports Continue Trending Lower ... Chart 3... While U.S. Crude Exports Remain High,##BR##And Imports Are Moderating With net U.S. crude and product imports declining (Chart 4), we expect U.S. commercial oil inventories - crude and products - to continue to draw sharply, which, since they account for close to 45% of OECD inventories, will draw down total DM stock levels as well (Chart 5). Indeed, U.S. commercial inventories drew close to 4% yoy in July, based on EIA historical data, the second month in a row the yoy comparisons came in negative in America. For the OECD as a whole, July marked the first month this year that the yoy percent change in stock levels was negative (-1.8%). Thus, as the summer driving season - and peak refiner crude demand - reaches its denouement next month, KSA's well-timed move to reduce shipments to U.S. refiners will push inventories lower and advance OPEC 2.0's agenda to clear out surplus OECD commercial oil inventories over the short term (Chart 6). Chart 4U.S. Net Crude And##BR##Product Imports Are Falling ... Chart 5... Which Will Support Continued Draws In##BR##Commercial Oil Stocks (Crude And Products) Chart 6KSA Will Continue Reducing##BR##Shipments To U.S. Refiners The OPEC 2.0 Agreement Is Holding ... On Average ... KSA is following through on Energy Minister Khalid al-Falih's "whatever it takes" assertion and making room for Libya and Nigeria, which together have added some 750k b/d of production to the market vs. April's level - 470k b/d for Libya and 280k b/d for Nigeria. April happens to be the month during which OPEC's producers recorded their largest production cuts vs. October's levels (1.12mm b/d), based on the EIA's historical tallies. OPEC 2.0 benchmarks to October 2016 production levels. Among OPEC members, neither Libya nor Nigeria were bound by the historic OPEC 2.0 Production Agreement. However, for those states that did obligate themselves to the agreement, compliance has been fairly high on average. OPEC member states that are party to the 2.0 deal have overproduced relative to their agreed production volumes by some 20k b/d over the January - July period on average.2 So, relative to the deal the OPEC members agreed, they've managed to cut 800k b/d of crude production on average versus their October 2016 production levels.3 During this period, Iraq stands out for its overproduction, having pumped 100k b/d on average over its agreed OPEC 2.0 volume of 4.35mm b/d (Chart 7). Among the non-OPEC members of the OPEC 2.0 coalition, Russia's compliance appears to be holding up, at close to 300k b/d below its October levels of crude and liquids production in 2Q17 and July (Chart 8). Oman produced ~ 980k b/d, over the first seven months of the deal vs. 1.02mm b/d in October, while Kazakhstan has faltered, with production averaging 1.88mm b/d in Jan - July, versus 1.79mm b/d in October. Chart 7Iraq Stands Out For Overproduction;##BR##Libya, Nigeria Not Covered In OPEC 2.0 Deal Chart 8Russia And KSA##BR##Continue To Lead OPEC 2.0 ... But Markets Await Articulated Strategy We continue to expect compliance with the OPEC 2.0 deal to remain relatively high to March 2018, which will draw OECD storage down to five-year average levels. We also are maintaining our expectation Brent prices will trade to $60/bbl by year end, with WTI trading ~ $58/bbl. Nonetheless, when we update our balances this month, we will continue to model for "compliance fatigue" among the OPEC 2.0 coalition. The fact that KSA and Russia are able to keep their rapport strong and compliance levels among OPEC and non-OPEC states relatively high, is a necessary condition for keeping OPEC 2.0 a viable coalition. However, the sufficient condition remains articulating a position on managing production via OPEC 2.0 that all these states can buy into, and support with concrete action. If, once the deal expires, the parties to the OPEC 2.0 coalition are left to go their own way and resume a production free-for-all, prices almost surely will fall, as the battle for market share is resumed. The ironic outcome of all this likely would be further destruction of capex budgets, which will set up another violent price surge that kills demand. We have no doubt the principal negotiators in OPEC 2.0 continue to discuss this, and that they are working on guidance. Bottom Line: KSA's tactical move to reduce exports to the U.S. likely will accelerate the commercial oil storage drawdown now apparent in OECD inventories, if current U.S. trends hold up - i.e., refinery runs remain high, exports of crude and products remain strong, and imports continue to fall yoy. Strategically, OPEC 2.0 still needs to convince markets there is a longer-term game plan for managing its output, short of a production free-for-all. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 This tactical move was reported by Reuters earlier this week. Please see "Saudi Arabia cuts crude oil allocations in September by more than its OPEC pledge," which was published by reuters.com August 8, 2017. 2 We are using the production levels specified by the Cartel in its "OPEC Bulletin 11 - 12/16" on p. 35. 3 This likely overstates the actual production available for export by KSA, since the Kingdom typically consumes some 500 - 600k b/d of crude domestically over the June - September period as direct-burn fuel to power generation producing electricity for air conditioners. So the reported data likely are noisy at this time of year. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016