Sectors

Underweight Declining share of the consumer's wallet has been the narrative for media stocks for several years (top panel). Millennials, currently the largest U.S. age cohort, have been "cord cutting" and preferring competitive "on demand" services, largely explaining the near collapse in media spending. As a result, industry pricing power is under attack with relative sales and profit expectations steadily sinking (second and third panels). These bleak spending patterns are not isolated in the S&P movies and entertainment index, they have also infiltrated the S&P cable & satellite media sub-index. Even extremely resilient cable TV pricing power is losing its luster on the back of shrinking industry demand, as cable price hikes can no longer keep up with overall inflation (bottom panel). Given the high capital intensity of these firms, tightening margins will eventually translate into cash flow compression. Bottom Line: Downgrade the S&P movies & entertainment and S&P cable and satellite indexes to underweight and see this week's Weekly Report for more details. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the S&P movies & entertainment and S&P cable and satellite indexes, are BLBG: S5MOVI - DIS, TWX, FOXA, FOX, VIAB and BLBG: S5CBST - CMCSA, CHTR, DISH, respectively.

Highlights Chinese domestic stocks have materially lagged their investable peers over the past three years, due to the legacy effects of an enormous, policy-driven bubble in 2014-2015. While A-shares have worked off some of this speculative bubble and multiples are no longer extreme, the outlook for earnings is uninspiring and the valuation discount offered by domestic stocks is modest, at best. Investors should maintain a neutral stance towards Chinese A-shares over the coming 6-12 months, but should remain alert to any improvements in China's housing market and especially any easing monetary policy, as they may signal a potential upgrade catalyst. Finally, we note that the negative perception of Chinese domestic stocks by many global investors does not appear to be justified by the data. A-shares have a place within a regional equity portfolio, and should not be ignored when the right cyclical conditions present themselves. Feature Since last October we have written extensively about the character and magnitude of the economic slowdown in China, and what it means for both Chinese import growth as well as earnings growth for the MSCI China Index (our investable benchmark). Chart 1Disappointing Relative Performance ##br##From A-Shares We have focused our investment strategy discussions on investable stocks because domestic A-shares have underperformed our investable benchmark by a significant margin over the past three years (Chart 1). In this week's report we take a closer look at the reasons for this underperformance, and review the outlook for A-shares over the coming 6-12 months. We conclude that the case for A-shares is currently uninspiring over the cyclical investment horizon, warranting a neutral stance for now. However, we also note that the negative perception of China's domestic stocks among some global investors, that it is a "casino" market untethered from fundamentals, is not supported by the data. This underscores that A-shares deserve a place within a regional equity portfolio, and should be favored when cyclical conditions warrant it. 2014-2015: A Policy-Driven Bubble In Domestic Stocks The drivers of A-share underperformance over the past few years can be traced back to events that occurred in 2014/2015, when A-shares rose 160% over the course of 12 months (Chart 2). Following several years of poor performance in the domestic stock market, Chinese policymakers began a push in 2014 to encourage retail investors to buy A-shares. This policy was part of a plan to help reduce what the government saw as a massive flow of savings towards investments that were excessively speculative in nature (such as wealth management products and China's property market), as well as to support a market that authorities hoped would become a more prominent target of international investors. This push involved lowering transaction and account opening fees, lowering margin debt restrictions, and using state media to wage a campaign to encourage equity ownership.1 Chart 3 highlights that the authorities' efforts initially worked at boosting stock prices, by showing the strong relationship between the MSCI China A Onshore index and margin debt linked to the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. But this experiment ultimately ended badly, and domestic stock prices and margin debt began to crash in the summer of 2015. In total, the MSCI China A Onshore index fell roughly 50% from June 2015 to January 2016, nearly rivaling the total decline experienced by the S&P 500 during the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. Chart 22014/2015 Was A Policy-Driven Bubble ##br##In Domestic Stocks Chart 3Easing Margin Debt Restrictions ##br##Had An Enormous Impact While domestic stocks have risen by an impressive 30% (12.5% annualized) since they troughed in early-2016, they have underperformed their investable peers (both overall and excluding technology) over the same period. This disappointing relative performance has caused many global investors to question whether they should bother investing in A-shares, and under what conditions, if any, should they favor domestic stocks over investable equities. A-Share Value No Longer Extreme... The narrative of a policy-driven bubble in 2014-2015 suggests that extreme overvaluation is the root cause of the recent underperformance of domestic Chinese equities. Chart 4 shows that this is indeed the case, by presenting the 12-month forward P/E ratio for MSCI China (our investable benchmark), MSCI China A Onshore, and All Country World. Chinese equities, both investable and domestic, were deeply discounted relative to global stocks in late-2014, reflecting the multi-year Chinese economic slowdown that began in mid-2010. But the government's campaign to encourage domestic stock ownership caused the A-share multiple to more than double in 12 months, and to exceed that of global stocks. Chart 4The Underperformance Of A-Shares, As Told By Multiples The multiple of investable equities also rose due to the campaign, but by a much smaller magnitude. It began to fall in mid-2015 alongside the domestic stock multiple but bottomed before the end of the year in response to signs that China's economy was about to enter the upswing of a mini economic cycle. The following 2 years saw investable equities re-rate significantly as China's economy recovered, whereas the still-elevated domestic market multiple simply trended sideways. But the bottom line for investors is that A-shares have worked off a good portion amount of the overvaluation that was caused by the policy-driven bubble of 2014-2015, meaning that their risk-reward profile has materially improved. ...But The Outlook For Domestic Stocks Is Uninspiring Given that domestic equities have largely closed their valuation gap relative to investable stocks, shouldn't investors be overweight the former? In our view, there are several factors currently arguing against an overweight stance towards A-shares: While we acknowledge the improvement in relative valuation, multiples at a level similar to the overall investable market are not cheap enough to make domestic stocks look highly attractive, given that the latter are no longer cheap themselves versus the global benchmark. We noted in our February 15 Weekly Report that investable technology stocks have been responsible for pushing our relative composite valuation indicator for China into overvalued territory over the past year,2 and we recommended in that report that investors continue to maintain their Chinese equity exposure on an ex-tech basis (which are considerably cheaper in relative terms). Given the fact that China's economy is slowing, and given that the corporate sector has substantially increased its leverage over the past decade, we believe that Chinese equities should be priced at some discount relative to global stocks. Chart 5 suggests that this discount is modest, at best. Chart 5 shows that domestic stocks are modestly cheap versus the global benchmark according to earnings and book value, but are expensive according to cash flow and dividends. While gaps of these kinds have existed in the past, the fact that cash-based measures have been lagging more accrual-based measures since 2013 raises the odds of a problem with earnings quality in the domestic market. This is a topic that we hope to revisit in the coming months, but for now it reinforces the view that the valuation discount applied to A-shares (versus global) is likely insufficient. Chart 6 presents a forecast for A-share earnings per share growth in U.S. dollars, based on its relationship with the Li Keqiang index. The chart shows that while a significant earnings contraction is not in the cards, the growth rate may fall to zero over the coming 6-12 months. This, in conjunction with only a minor valuation discount relative to global stocks, paints an uninspiring cyclical outlook for A-shares over the coming year. Chart 5The Current Valuation Discount Applied To A-Shares Is Modest, At Best Dispelling The Myth Of The "Casino" Market While we find the cyclical outlook for A-shares to be lackluster, the fact that valuation has improved significantly since mid-2015 is an important development from the perspective of regional equity allocation. From our perspective, A-shares should be on the radar screen of global investors as a potential market to favor if the opportunity presents itself, even if the cyclical conditions do not currently warrant an overweight stance. Besides the issue of regulated investability, one reason why global investors tend to overlook domestic Chinese stocks is the perception that A-shares are largely a "casino" market. Admittedly, the decision by policymakers in 2014 to effectively engineer a bubble in domestic stocks did not help to dispel this perspective. However, a closer examination of this question highlights that domestic Chinese equities are, while relatively volatile, hardly untethered from fundamentals at the broad index level. First, Chart 6 below highlighted that there is a close correlation between the Li Keqiang index and the growth rate of A-share trailing earnings. Earnings quality issues aside (the risk of which can be managed by assigning a valuation discount), this certainly does not suggest that A-share returns are more likely to be random than other stock markets. Second, as we noted in a September Special Report,3 the gap in the volatility of A-shares relative to other markets is slowly declining (Chart 7). More recently, the decline in A-share volatility appears to be due to the involvement of China's "national team", i.e. purchases by state-owned financial institutions that are designed to reduce the oscillation of daily price changes, and that began in the wake of the 2015 selloff with the goal of stabilizing the stock market. In the developed world, this type of government interference in financial markets is viewed with deep suspicion and is often referred to in the financial media as being necessary for the government to "prop up" its stock market to avoid an inevitable decline. Chart 6An Uninspiring Domestic Equity Earnings Outlook Chart 7A-Shares Are Relatively Volatile, But The Gap Is Narrowing But Chart 6 highlights how this is misleading: the recovery in A-share earnings that has occurred since 2015 is clearly legitimate given the mini-cycle upswing, meaning that China's "national team" has, at worst, prevented a sharp decline in an elevated multiple over the past two years. It is difficult to see this as anything but a genuine attempt at managing the workout process of a market that underwent a major shock, quite similar in concept to what the Federal Reserve did in the U.S. during the first few years of the subpar economic recovery. From our perspective, as long as this buying remains counter-cyclical and does not somehow interfere with the link between the economy and underlying earnings growth, this should argue in favor a global investor allocation to A-shares (via a lower equity risk premium), not against it. Third, a "casino" market that truly ignores fundamentals and is based heavily on herd-following behavior should rank as highly inefficient from the perspective of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH). We test whether the A-share market falls into this category by looking for two telltale signs of an inefficient market: whether past returns carry significant information about future returns, and whether simple technical trading rules can lead to outsized profits. Tables 1 and 2 present our findings: in Table 1, we show the F-statistic and R-squared of a second-order autoregression for several regional markets (higher numbers = less efficient), and in Table 2 we show the "win rate" of a trend following rule that buys stocks in the following month if the closing index price at the end of the prior month is above its 9-month moving average (higher win rate = less efficient). Table 1China's Domestic Market Is Less Inefficient Than It Used To Be Table 2Simple Technical Rules Don't Earn Outsized Profits In The A-Share Market The tables show that while there is some evidence to suggest that the A-share market has been relatively inefficient on average compared with other stock markets since the beginning of the last decade, this gap has been significantly reduced over the past few years. To us, this is a compelling sign that A-shares deserve a place within a global equity portfolio and should be favored when cyclical conditions warrant it. Investment Conclusions The ongoing economic slowdown in China means that the earnings outlook for domestic Chinese equities is uninspiring. When coupled with a modest (at best) valuation discount relative to global stocks, this suggests that global investors should have a neutral allocation to A-shares over the coming 6-12 months. However, the observable link between China's economy and domestic equity earnings growth means that investors should be looking to increase their allocation to A-shares on any signs of a pickup in Chinese economic activity. In particular, Chart 8 highlights that domestic stocks appear more likely to lead corporate bond spreads and housing market indicators than investable stocks are, suggesting that any significant easing in monetary policy or a continued improvement in the housing market could act as a potential catalyst to upgrade A-shares even within the context of a benign growth slowdown in China's industrial sector. Chart 8A-Shares Better Lead The Housing Market##br## And Domestic Corporate Bond Spreads As a final point, even if A-shares were to become a more attractive investment at some point in the future, investability remains somewhat of a challenge for some investors. Over the years, BCA's China Investment Strategy service has published and periodically updated our Research Note, "China Shop," as a practical guide for investors looking for exposure to Chinese assets. Our most recent edition, published last August, has a simple list of ETFs that investors can use to gain exposure to the domestic market when the right conditions present themselves.4 But for investors who wish to rank these ETFs based on a proprietary BCA methodology, or who want to easily compare key metrics such as liquidity, legal structure, constituents, sector exposure, performance, etc, BCA's Global ETF Strategy service has a new tool that will greatly assist the process. Effective mid-February, our Global ETF Strategy team launched a new completely redesigned interactive website, along with a Special Report that reviewed how investors can make the most of the matching engine at the heart of the platform (as well as how to best profit from the entire Global ETF Strategy service).5 Given the issues surrounding investability in China's domestic equity market, we highly recommend that any clients who are potentially interested in allocating to A-shares read the report, and take note of this unique, time-saving service. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 "China's State Media Join Brokerages Saying Buy Equities", Bloomberg News, September 4, 2014. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "After The Selloff: A View From China", dated February 15, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "A Stock Market With Chinese Characteristics", dated September 21, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see China Investment Strategy Research Note, "China Shop: Calling Foreign Investors", dated August 10, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see Global ETF Special Report, "A User's Guide To Global ETF Strategy", dated February 14, 2018, available at etf.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Underweight In mid-January we put the S&P consumer discretionary sector on downgrade alert as our EPS model had rolled over. Combined with BCA's high interest rate theme for 2018, it is time to execute the alert and cut the S&P consumer discretionary sector to a below benchmark allocation. Fed tightening, from both higher rates and a balance sheet unwind, is negative for these extremely interest rate-sensitive equities. Both the household financial obligation ratio and household debt service payments have bottomed and are actually increasing. A higher interest rate backdrop will sustain the upward pressure on both and likely weigh on consumer discretionary relative share prices (both series shown inverted, second and third panels). Our Consumer Drag Indicator (bottom panel) captures this, as well as other factors, and sends a clear message that relative share price momentum will dwindle in the coming months. As such, we recommend a below benchmark allocation in the S&P consumer discretionary index; please see yesterday's Weekly Report for more details.

Highlights Portfolio Strategy Quantitative tightening, a rising fed funds rate and higher prices at the pump are all bearish consumer discretionary stocks. Downgrade exposure to underweight. We are executing this interest rate-sensitive sector downgrade by reducing the S&P movies & entertainment and S&P cable & satellite sub-indexes to underweight. A downbeat industry spending backdrop and fading pricing power paint a gloomy EPS picture. Recent Changes S&P Consumer Discretionary - Downgrade to underweight today. S&P Movies & Entertainment - Trim to underweight today. S&P Cable & Satellite - Downgrade to underweight today. Table 1 Feature Equities are still in the recovery ward and the consolidation/absorption phase in place since the February 5th crack has yet to fully run its course. According to our "buy the dip" cycle-on-cycle analysis, a retest of the recent lows typically occurs in the first month following the initial shock, suggesting that the market is already out of the woods (Chart 1A). However, the return of vol may keep a lid on the SPX for a while longer (Chart 1B). Our strategy in place since February 8th is to buy this dip as we do not foresee an end to the business cycle in 2018.1 Chart 1ABuy This Dip Worked Out Nicely... Chart 1BBut The Return Of Vol May Spoil The Party Recent tariff news has dominated the media, however, our sense is that a full blown retaliatory trade war is a low probability outcome. Keep in mind, that the average U.S. tariff rates have drifted lower during the past three decades and, according to the World Bank, are now 1.6%, one of the lowest in the world2 (third panel, Chart 2). And as for concerns that the rhetoric surrounding trade will lead to a surge in the U.S. dollar, we note that the last two times there was a trade spat of sorts the U.S. dollar actually depreciated, both in the early-2000s and in the early-to-mid 1990s (Chart 2). Tack on the recent euphoria surrounding manufacturing exports - which just hit a 30-year high - and it is likely that deep cyclical EPS would overshoot were a trade war to ensue (bottom panel, Chart 2). Such a weak U.S. dollar policy is also a boon for overall SPX profits, if history at least rhymes (Chart 3). Chart 2Tariffs Don't Matter Chart 3SPX EPS Would Get a Boost From A Tariff War Importantly, synchronized global growth and the selloff in the bond markets remain the dominant macro themes. Last week we showed that since the GFC, empirical evidence suggests that the U.S. economy can withstand a tightening of roughly 125bps in a short time span (please see Chart 3B from the March 5th Special Report). This week we add two components to our interest rate analysis and increase the dataset range back to the 1960s. We compare cyclical momentum in the SPX with the annual change in the 10-year Treasury yield, and also document the shifting correlation between these two asset classes. We then filter for a minimum year-over-year (yoy) 100bps tightening in the 10-year Treasury yield and a clear indication of a negative correlation between the two variables, i.e. a deceleration or straight up contraction in the SPX annual percent change. In other words, we are searching for tightness in monetary conditions that cause equity market consternation, excluding recessions. Table 2 summarizes our results. While cyclical stock momentum and changes in the 10-year Treasury yield have been a near carbon copy since the late-1990s (Chart 4), according to our analysis there have been five iterations when rising bond yields proved restrictive for equities: once in each of the 1960s, 1970s and 1990s and twice in the 1980s. Table 2SPX Returns In Times Of ##br##Restrictive 10-Year UST Selloffs Chart 4The Great ##br##Moderation Years In the mid-1960s, the U.S. deployed troops in Vietnam and the Fed also tightened monetary policy by enough to invert the yield curve (Chart 5). During the mid-1970s episode, fresh off the first oil shock-induced recession, the Fed started tightening monetary policy in 1977 in order to contain inflation and never looked back. Eventually, the Fed inverted the yield curve in late-1978 before the second oil shock hit that morphed into the early-1980s recession (Chart 6). Chart 5100bps Tightening... Chart 6...Can Hurt Equities... In the 1980s, following the double dip recession, Fed Chairman Paul Volcker started lifting interest rates as the economy was recovering, and similarly in 1987 the Fed was aggressively tightening monetary policy up until the "Black Monday" crash (Chart 7). Finally, in 1994 the Fed doubled interest rates in a span of nine months and in December of that year Mexico had to devalue the peso and the "Tequila effect" gripped Asia and Latin America. Such abrupt tightening caused a mild indigestion in the stock market (Chart 8). Chart 7...When The Stock-To-Bond Yield Correlation... Chart 8...Turns Negative On average, the SPX drawdown from peak-to-trough during these five iterations was 19% and lasted 6.5 months. Currently, in order for interest rates to turn from reflective of growth to restrictive and cause a sizable pullback in the SPX, we calculate that the 10-year Treasury yield would have to rise above 3.05% by September 2018. Simultaneously, the correlation between stocks and bond yields would have to sink into negative territory. Nevertheless, given the steepness of the recent selloff in bonds, in order for the yoy 100bps rule of thumb to remain in place, post September the 10-year Treasury yield should continue to gallop higher and end the year near 3.5%, and further rise to 3.94% in early 2019. While this is possible, we assign low odds to such an outcome. As a reminder, BCA's higher interest rate view calls for a selloff in the 10-year Treasury bond near 3.25% by year-end 2018, a level that both the economy and the SPX will likely be able to shake off (Chart 4). This week we act on our mid-January alert and downgrade an interest rate-sensitive sector to underweight. Trim Consumer Discretionary To Underweight In mid-January we put the S&P consumer discretionary sector on downgrade alert heeding the anemic signal from our EPS growth model and also owing to BCA's high interest rate theme for 2018. We are now acting on the alert and cutting exposure and moving the S&P consumer discretionary sector to a below benchmark allocation. At this stage of the cycle, when the Fed is on track to continue to steadily lift interest rates in the coming two years as the economy heats up, investors should lighten up on consumer discretionary stocks (Chart 9). In addition, this cycle the Fed is orchestrating dual tightening as it is simultaneously unwinding the size of its balance sheet. Quantitative tightening is also bearish discretionary stocks (Chart 10). Chart 9Mind The Fed Funds Rate Chart 10Quantitative Tightening Also Bites This rising short-term interest rate backdrop is not conducive to owning extremely interest rate-sensitive equities. Both the household financial obligation ratio and household debt service payments have bottomed and are actually increasing. A higher interest rate backdrop will sustain the upward pressure on both and likely weigh on consumer discretionary relative share prices (both series shown inverted, Chart 11). The U.S. consumer has been firing on all cylinders with PCE growing 4% in real terms last quarter and contributing positively to overall real output growth (Chart 12). Chart 11Household Financing ##br##Costs Have Troughed Chart 124% Real PCE Growth Is##br## Unsustainable Absent Wage Inflation However, such a breakneck pace is unsustainable without wage inflation follow through. Worrisomely, the personal savings rate has been depleted to the point where the consumer appears tapped out. Historically, consumer confidence and the savings rate have been perfectly inversely correlated (Chart 13). Sky high sentiment and almost zero savings suggest that the consumer has to resort to credit card debt in order to finance outlays in the absence of wage inflation. Revolving credit is soaring, but worryingly credit card delinquency and chargeoff rates at small commercial banks are at recession type levels, warning that this credit outlet may be drying up (Chart 14). Chart 13Depleted Savings Are Problematic Chart 14Early Signs Of Trouble? All of this is taking place at a time when bankers are still not willing extenders of consumer installment credit, according to the Fed's latest Senior Loan Officer Survey. The implication is that even a modest tick down in consumer confidence and simultaneous rebuilding of savings will likely, at the margin, dent consumer spending. Another macro headwind the consumer has to contend with is higher prices at the pump. BCA's constructive crude oil view suggests that increasing gasoline prices will continue to eat into consumer discretionary spending power. Taken together, these macro headwinds will dampen consumer discretionary outlays. Our Consumer Drag Indicator captures these forces and is signaling that relative share price momentum will dwindle in the coming months (Chart 15). Under such a backdrop, while consumer discretionary EPS can expand modestly, they will trail the broad market that is slated to grow profits close to 20% in calendar 2018. Relative performance will likely converge lower to falling relative profitability (top panel, Chart 16). We currently side with the sell-side community and expect a contraction in relative profit growth. Therefore, not only are we unwilling to pay an 18% premium valuation to own this interest rate-sensitive sector, but we would also sell into strength given our view of a derating phase taking root in the coming months (bottom panel, Chart 16). Our Cyclical Macro Indicator confirms this downbeat relative EPS growth outlook, and underscores that the path of least resistance is lower for consumer discretionary stocks (Chart 15). Chart 15Models Say Sell Chart 16Unsustainable Divergence Finally, a few words on AMZN.3 Cracks have already formed in relative share prices ex-AMZN (top panel, Chart 11). The AMZN juggernaut has masked the true consumer discretionary picture given its hefty market cap weight in the index (20%) that will only increase in late-summer following the already announced S&P index composition changes. Accordingly at that time, we will also make changes to our portfolio. While we maintain a neutral exposure to the S&P internet retail index, that AMZN dominates4 and that we recently initiated coverage on, the way we are executing the S&P consumer discretionary downgrade to underweight is by trimming the media index to a below benchmark allocation. Media: Exit Stage Right Since the late 1970s the media complex's fortunes have been joined at the hip with the U.S. dollar. When the greenback is roaring, investors pile into media shares and vice versa. While media outlets do have international sales exposure, it is small and significantly trails the overall market's foreign revenue exposure. Thus, the mostly domestic nature of media stocks explains the positive correlation with the U.S. dollar (Chart 17). This multi-decade relationship remains in place, and given the sizable losses in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar since the December 2016 peak, the relative share price ratio will remain under intense pressure. On the operating front, shifting consumer spending trends are weighing on relative performance. The top panel of Chart 18 shows that relative media outlays have been in a free fall. Millennials, currently the largest U.S. age cohort, have been "cord cutting" and preferring competitive "on demand" services, largely explaining the near collapse in media spending. Chart 17Joined At The Hip Chart 18Bearish Operating Metrics As a result, industry pricing power is under attack with relative sales and profit expectations steadily sinking (middle & bottom panels, Chart 18). Nevertheless, media barons have awakened to the threats engulfing this industry and are scrambling to fight back. The knee-jerk reaction in the movies & entertainment subindustry has been to seek intra-industry buyout candidates (Chart 19). Inter-industry M&A is also ongoing with the AT&T/Time Warner and Justice Department trial still pending, the tie-up between Disney and Fox and the competitive bids for Sky plc from Fox and Comcast. However, media consolidation is not a sustainable way forward for profit growth. Organic EPS growth remains anemic and the visible breakdown in the correlation between consumer confidence and relative share prices since early 2016 represents a yellow flag (top panel, Chart 20). Chart 19M&A Nearly Exhausted Chart 20Unnerving Breakdown In Correlations Similar to consumer confidence, the ISM non-manufacturing composite is also probing cycle highs, however, industry spending is now outright contracting and steeply diverging from the upbeat ISM services survey. Tack on rising gasoline prices and the news is grim for S&P movies & entertainment profitability (Chart 20). These bleak spending patterns are not isolated in the S&P movies and entertainment index, they have also infiltrated the S&P cable & satellite media sub-index. Chart 21 shows that relative consumer outlays on cable services have taken a plunge, warning that relative share prices will likely suffer the same fate in the coming quarters. Even extremely resilient cable TV pricing power is losing its luster on the back of shrinking industry demand, as cable price hikes can no longer keep up with overall inflation (bottom panel, Chart 21). The implication is that sales are at risk of further steep deceleration. Given that cable providers have to continually upgrade their networks in order to keep up with ever increasing bandwidth demand, tightening margins will eventually translate into cash flow compression (Chart 22). Chart 21Demand And Prices Are Deflating Chart 22Margin Trouble Bottom Line: Downgrade the S&P movies & entertainment and S&P cable and satellite indexes to underweight. This also pushes our exposure to the broad S&P consumer discretionary sector to the underweight column. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the S&P movies & entertainment and S&P cable and satellite indexes, are BLBG: S5MOVI - DIS, TWX, FOXA, FOX, VIAB and BLBG: S5CBST - CMCSA, CHTR, DISH, respectively. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Insight, "Buy The Dip," dated February 8, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TM.TAX.MRCH.WM.AR.ZS?locations=US 3 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Special Report, "Internet Retail: Dialed Up," dated February 26, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4 Ibid. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth. Stay neutral small over large caps (downgrade alert).

Dear Client, Following up on last week's report, my colleagues Caroline Miller, Mathieu Savary, and I held a webcast on Wednesday to discuss the outlook for the dollar along with recent events. If you haven't already, I hope you find the time to listen in. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights Protectionism is popular with the American public in general, and Trump's base specifically. The sabre-rattling will persist, but an all-out trade war is unlikely. Trump is focused on the stock market, and equities would suffer mightily if a trade war broke out. The Pentagon has also warned of the dangers of across-the-board tariffs that penalize America's military allies. The rationale for protectionism made a lot more sense when there were masses of unemployed workers. That's not the case today. The equity bull market will eventually end, but chances are that this will happen due to an overheated U.S. economy and rising financial imbalances, not because of escalating trade protectionism. Investors should remain overweight global equities for now, but look to pare back exposure later this year. Feature Q: What prompted Trump's announcement? A: Last week began with President Trump proclaiming that he would seek re-election in 2020. Then came a slew of negative news, including the resignation of Hope Hicks, Trump's White House communications director, and the downgrading of Jared Kushner's security clearance. All this happened against the backdrop of the ever-widening Mueller probe. Trump needed to change the subject. Fast. However, it would be a mistake to think that the tariff announcement was simply a distractionary tactic. Turmoil in the White House might have been the immediate trigger, but events had been building towards this outcome for some time. The Trump administration had imposed tariffs on washing machines and solar panels in January. Hiking tariffs on steel and aluminum - two industries that had suffered heavy job losses over the past two decades - was a logical next step. In fact, the 25% tariff on steel and 10% tariff on aluminum were similar to the 24% and 7.7% tariff rates, respectively, that the Commerce Department proposed as one of three options on February 16th.1 Protectionism is popular with the American public. This is especially true for Trump's base (Chart 1). Indeed, it is safe to say that Trump's unorthodox views on trade are what handed him the Republican nomination and what allowed him to win key swing (and manufacturing) states such as Ohio, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. Trump made a promise to his voters. He is trying to keep it. Q: Wouldn't raising trade barriers hurt the U.S. economy, thereby harming the same workers Trump is trying to help? A: That's the line coming from the financial press and most of the political establishment, but it's not as clear cut as it may seem. An all-out trade war would undoubtedly hurt the U.S., but a minor skirmish probably would not. The U.S. does run a large trade deficit. Economists Katharine Abraham and Melissa Kearney recently estimated that increased competition from Chinese imports cost the U.S. economy 2.65 million jobs between 1999 and 2016, almost double the 1.4 million jobs lost to automation.2 This accords with other studies, such as the one by David Autor and his colleagues, which found that increased trade with China has led to large job losses in the U.S. manufacturing sector (Chart 2).3 Chart 1Trump Is Catering ##br##To His Protectionist Base Chart 2China's Ascent Has Reduced##br## U.S. Manufacturing Employment Granted, China does not even make it into the top ten list of countries that export steel to the United States. But that is somewhat beside the point. As with most commodities, there is a fairly well-integrated global market for steel. Due to its proximity to Asian markets, China exports most of its steel to the rest of the region (Chart 3). That does not stop Chinese overcapacity from dragging down prices around the world. Chart 3Most Of China's Steel Exports Don't Travel That Far Q: Wouldn't steel and aluminum tariffs simply raise prices for American consumers, thereby reducing real wages? A: That depends. If Trump's gambit reduces the U.S. trade deficit, this will increase domestic spending, putting more upward pressure on wages. As far as prices are concerned, the U.S. imported $39 billion of iron and steel in 2017, and an additional $18 billion of aluminum. That's only 2% of total imports and less than 0.3% of GDP. If import prices went up by the full amount of the tariff, this would add less than five basis points to inflation. And even that would be a one-off hit to the price level, rather than a permanent increase in the inflation rate. In practice, it is doubtful that prices would rise by the full amount of the tariff (if they did, what would be the purpose of retaliatory measures?). Most econometric studies suggest that producers will absorb about half of the tariff in the form of lower profit margins. To the extent that this reduces the pre-tariff price of imported goods, it would shift the terms of trade in America's favor. Chart 4Does Trade Retaliation Make Sense ##br## When Most Trade Is In Intermediate Goods? There is an old economic theory, first elucidated by Robert Torrens in the 19th century, which says that the optimal tariff is always positive for countries such as the U.S. that are price-makers rather than price-takers in international markets. Put more formally, Torrens showed that an increase in tariffs from very low levels was likely to raise government revenue and producer surplus by more than the loss in consumer surplus. So, in theory, the U.S. could actually benefit at the expense of the rest of the world by imposing higher tariffs.4 Q: This assumes that there is no trade retaliation. How realistic is that? A: That's the key. As noted above, a breakdown of the global trading system would hurt the U.S., but a trade spat could help it. Trump was trying to scare the opposition by tweeting "trade wars are good, and easy to win." In a game of chicken, it helps to convince your opponent that you are reckless and nuts. Trump's detractors would say he is both, so that works in his favor. Trump has another thing working for him. Most trade these days is in intermediate goods (Chart 4). It does not pay for Mexico to slap tariffs on imported U.S. intermediate goods when those very same goods are assembled into final goods in Mexico - creating jobs for Mexican workers in the process - and re-exported to the U.S. or the rest of the world. The same is true for China and many other countries. This does not preclude the imposition of targeted retaliatory tariffs. The EU has threatened to raise tariffs on Levi's jeans and Harley Davidson motorcycles (whose headquarters, not coincidently, is located in Paul Ryan's Wisconsin district). We would not be surprised if high-end foreign-owned golf courses were also subject to additional scrutiny! But if this is all that happens, markets won't care. The fact that the United States imports much more than it exports also gives Trump a lot of leverage. Take the case of China. Chinese imports of goods and services are 2.65% of U.S. GDP, but exports to China are only 0.96% of GDP. And nearly half of U.S. goods exports to China are agricultural products and raw materials (Chart 5). Taxing them would be difficult without raising Chinese consumer prices. Simply put, the U.S. stands to lose less from a trade war than most other countries. Chart 5China Stands To Lose More From A Trade War With The U.S. Q: Couldn't China and other countries punish the U.S. by dumping Treasurys? A: They could, but why would they? Such an action would only drive down the value of the dollar, giving U.S. exporters an even greater advantage. The smart, strategic response would be to intervene in currency markets with the aim of bidding up the dollar. Chart 6Slowing Global Growth Is Bullish##br## For The Dollar Q: So the dollar could strengthen as a result of rising protectionism? A: Yes, it could. This is a point that even Mario Draghi made at yesterday's ECB press conference. If higher tariffs lead to a smaller trade deficit, this will increase U.S. aggregate demand. The boost to demand would be amplified if more companies decide to relocate production back to the U.S. for fear of being shut out of the lucrative U.S. market. The U.S. economy is now operating close to full employment. Anything that adds to demand is likely to prompt the Fed to raise rates more aggressively than it otherwise would. That could lead to a stronger greenback. Considering that the U.S. is a fairly closed economy which runs a trade deficit, it would suffer less than other economies in the event of a trade war. A scenario where global growth slows because of rising trade tensions, while the composition of that growth shifts towards the U.S., would be bullish for the dollar (Chart 6). Q: What are the implications for stocks and bonds? A: Wall Street will dictate what happens to stocks, but Main Street will dictate what happens to bonds. The stock market hates protectionism, so it is no surprise that equities sold off last week. It is this fact that ultimately got Trump to soften his position. Trump is used to taking credit for a rising stock market. If stocks flounder, this could make him think twice about pushing for higher trade barriers. As far as bonds are concerned, they will react to whatever happens to growth and inflation. As noted above, a trade skirmish could actually boost growth and inflation. Given that the economy is near full capacity, the latter is likely to rise more than the former. This, too, could cause Trump to cool his heels. After all, if higher inflation pushes up bond yields, this will hurt highly-levered sectors such as, you guessed it, real estate. Q: In conclusion, where do you see things going from here? A: Trade frictions will continue. As my colleague Marko Papic highlighted in a report published earlier this week, NAFTA negotiations are likely to remain on the ropes for some time.5 The Trump administration is also investigating allegations of Chinese IP theft. The U.S. is a major exporter of intellectual property, but these exports would be much larger if U.S. companies were properly compensated for their ingenuity. Chinese imports of U.S. intellectual property were less than 0.1% of Chinese GDP in 2017, an implausibly small number (Chart 7). If China is found to have acted unfairly, this could lead the U.S. to impose across-the-board tariffs on Chinese goods and restrictions on inbound foreign direct investment. Nevertheless, as noted above, worries about a plunging stock market will constrain Trump from acting too aggressively. The rationale for protectionism made a lot more sense when there were masses of unemployed workers. Today, firms are struggling to find qualified staff (Chart 8). This suggest that Trump will stick to doing what he does best, which is taking credit for everything good that happens under the sun. Chart 7China Is Importing More IP From The U.S., ##br##But The "True" Number Is Probably Higher Chart 8Protectionism Makes Less Sense ##br##When The Labor Market Is Strong Ironically, the latest trade skirmish is occurring at a time when the Chinese government is taking concerted steps to reduce excess capacity in the steel sector, and the profits of U.S. steel producers are rebounding smartly (Chart 9). In fact, the latest Fed Beige Book released earlier this week highlighted that "steel producers reported raising selling prices because of a decline in market share for foreign steel ..."6 Chart 9Chinese Steel Exports Falling, U.S. Steel Profits Rising Meanwile, German automakers already produce nearly 900,000 vehicles in the U.S., 62% of which are exported. In fact, European automakers have a smaller share of the U.S. market than U.S. automakers have of the European one.7 A lot of what Trump wants he already has. The Pentagon has also warned that trade barriers imposed against Canada and other U.S. military allies could undermine America's standing abroad. This is an important point, considering that Trump invoked the rarely used Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which gives the President broad control over trade policy in matters of national security, to justify raising tariffs. Trump tends to listen to his generals, if not his other advisors. He probably was not expecting their reaction. All this suggests that a major trade war is unlikely to occur. As we go to press, it appears that the White House will temporarily exclude Canada and Mexico from the list of countries subject to tariffs. We suspect that the EU, Australia, South Korea, and a number of other economies will get some relief as well. White House National Trade Council Director Peter Navarro has also said that some "exemptions" may be granted for specific categories of steel and aluminum products that are deemed necessary to U.S. businesses. That is a potentially very broad basket. The bottom line is that the equity bull market will end, but chances are that this will happen due to an overheated U.S. economy and rising financial imbalances met with restrictive monetary policy, not because of escalating trade protectionism. Investors should remain overweight global equities for now, but look to pare back exposure later this year. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "Secretary Ross Releases Steel and Aluminum 232 Reports in Coordination with White House," U.S. Department of Commerce, February 16, 2018. 2 Katharine G. Abraham, and Kearney, Melissa S., "Explaining the Decline in the U.S. Employment-to-Population Ratio: A Review of the Evidence," NBER Working Paper No. 24333, (February 2018). 3 David H. Autor, Dorn, David and Hanson, Gordon H., "The China Shock: Learning from Labor-Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade," Annual Reviews of Economics, dated August 8, 2016, available at annualreviews.org. 4 A graphical illustration of this point is provided here. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "Market Reprices Odds Of A Global Trade War," dated March 6, 2018. 6 Please see "The Beige Book: Summary of Commentary on Current Economic Conditions By Federal Reserve District,"Federal Reserve, dated March 7, 2018. 7 Please see Erik F. Nielsen, "Chief Economist's Comment: Sunday Wrap," UniCredit Research, dated March 4, 2018. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Overweight The managed health sector was shaken up this week with the announcement of another mega-merger, this time with Cigna buying the last major independent prescription benefits manager (PBM), Express Scripts, for $67 billion. This transaction follows the pending blockbuster acquisition of Aetna by CVS in the trend of vertical integration among health insurance providers and PBMs in an effort to rein in prescription prices, which have already started to fall (second panel). Assuming drug prices maintain their trajectory, other falling input costs (third panel) imply margin resilience in managed health should prove sustainable. Tack on a tight labor market and small-business hiring plans hitting new highs (unemployment rate shown inverted, bottom panel), and the outlook for EPS growth looks rosier than ever; stay overweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5MANH - UNH, AET, ANTM, CI, HUM, CNC.

Underweight As with other metals-consuming industries, stocks in both the S&P auto components and S&P autos indexes have traded sharply lower following the announcement of the proposed steel and aluminum tariffs (top panel). With roughly a quarter share of domestic steel consumption, autos are second only to the construction industry in terms of exposure to higher steel prices. Fears of higher prices are amplified as new vehicle sales growth appears to be petering out. We think fears are well-founded but not because of higher steel prices but rather from a contraction in credit growth (second panel). Tighter lending standards (third panel) have followed a glut of subprime lending with rising defaults (bottom panel) that are only now working their way through lenders' balance sheets. A backdrop of potentially higher prices only fuels the flames on this negative story; stay underweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the S&P auto components index are: BLBG: S5AUTC - APTV, BWA, GT.

Underweight Stocks in the S&P soft drinks index have been reeling in the last few trading sessions as fears the Trump administration’s proposed aluminum tariff will raise costs in an already-beleaguered industry. Despite Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross’ comments that the cost increases would be “no big deal”, such costs will have to find a way through the P&L, either through price increases or lower margins. With respect to the former, the timing for price increases is inopportune; sales have been contracting for the past year and most of the past three (second panel). Meanwhile, the steep decline in shipments since early last year has proven persistent (bottom panel), suggesting that receding sales are far from turning. These were the reasons behind our mid-summer 2017 downgrade to underweight; that thesis is certainly reinforced with higher input costs. Overall, the proposed tariffs remain uncertain but even the specter of margin pressure should keep share prices bottled up; we reiterate our underweight recommendation. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5SOFD - PEP, KO, DPS, MNST.

The S&P banks index has been the best performer on our 2018 high-conviction call list and begs the question whether or not there is any "gas left in the tank". In this week's Special Report, we give our top 10 reasons why we still like banks, despite the recent run-up in relative share prices. The return of volatility helps bank profits, via rising trading revenues. Vol has also historically been an excellent leading indicator of rising relative bank valuations. The accelerating price of credit too bodes well for bank profits and is a harbinger of further stock outperformance. Pristine credit quality resulting from record low unemployment. Upbeat credit growth prospects from the capex upcycle, a general revival of animal spirits and residential real estate price inflation. Our U.S. banks profit growth model is humming, reflecting the aforementioned improving credit growth backdrop. Vastly improved stress test results have caused the Fed to allow banks to bump dividend payouts. Similar to rising dividend payouts, pent up buyback demand is getting unleashed. The U.S. banking system remains the best capitalized in the world and foreign flows will likely continue to chase U.S. banks in global equity portfolios. Dodd-Frank regulatory relief seems to be in the offing in the current administration. Both on a relative price-to-book and relative forward P/E basis, banks look appealing. Bottom Line: We reiterate the high-conviction overweight in the S&P banks index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5BANKX - WFC, JPM, BAC, C, USB, PNC, BBT, STI, MTB, FITB, CFG, RF, KEY, HBAN, CMA, ZION, PBCT. Please see yesterday's Special Report for more details.

Highlights Chart 1Inflation Perks Up The Fed has struck a decidedly more upbeat tone in 2018. We noted last week that the Fed staff made upward revisions to its growth forecasts, and then Chairman Jerome Powell testified to Congress that "some of the headwinds the U.S. economy faced in previous years have shifted to tailwinds." So far this more optimistic outlook is borne out in the data. Core PCE inflation rose sharply in January. The annualized 6-month rate of change is back above the Fed's target (Chart 1), and the 12-month rate of change should follow once base effects kick-in in March. For our investment strategy the message is to stay the course. The re-anchoring of inflation expectations will impart another 18 bps to 38 bps of upside to the 10-year Treasury yield. How much higher yields rise beyond that will depend on how well credit markets and equities digest the less accommodative monetary environment. Stay at below-benchmark duration and be prepared to scale back on credit risk once our target range of 2.3% to 2.5% is reached by both the 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates. Feature Investment Grade: Overweight Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 62 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +10 bps. Although last month's sell-off did return some value to the investment grade corporate space, the sector is still expensive compared to both its own history and other comparable sectors. The 12-month breakeven spread for a Baa-rated corporate bond has only been tighter 11% of the time since 1989 (Chart 2). Further, in last week's report we compared breakeven spreads across the investment grade bond universe, split by credit tier.1 Our results showed that municipal bonds offer greater breakeven spreads than investment grade corporates, after adjusting for the tax advantage. We also found that Foreign Agency debt is more attractive than investment grade corporate debt in both the Aa and Baa credit tiers. Local Authority debt is more attractive in the Baa credit tier. With a less than compelling valuation case for investment grade corporates, we will start to pare exposure once our TIPS breakeven inflation targets (mentioned on page 1) are met. This week we take a preliminary step toward de-risking by adjusting our recommended sector allocation (Table 3). The adjustments were made to both increase exposure to sectors that look cheap after adjusting for credit rating and duration, and also to lower the average duration-times-spread (DTS) of the portfolio. Specifically, we downgrade Cable/Satellite, Paper, Media/Entertainment, Brokerage/Asset Managers/Exchanges and Lodging. We upgrade Supermarkets, Tobacco, Life Insurance and P&C Insurance. Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 52 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +97 bps. The average index option-adjusted spread widened 17 bps on the month, and currently sits at 348 bps. The 12-month trailing speculative grade default rate edged down to 3.2% in January, and Moody's projects it will fall to 2% in one year's time. The projected decline is mostly driven by the continued waning of credit stress in the oil & gas sector. Using the Moody's projection as an input, we forecast High-Yield default losses of 1.3% for the next 12 months. This means that if junk spreads are unchanged from current levels we would expect High-Yield to return 251 bps in excess of duration-matched Treasuries (Chart 3). One hundred basis points of spread tightening would translate roughly to excess returns of 661 bps, and 100 bps of spread widening would translate to excess returns of -159 bps. Though High-Yield valuation is more attractive than for investment grade corporates - the 12-month breakeven spread for a B-rated security has been tighter than it is today 28% of the time since 1995, the same measure has been tighter only 13% of the time for a Baa-rated security - we still view the potential for spread tightening in high-yield as limited. First, 130 bps of spread tightening would lead to all-time expensive valuations in the High-Yield index - using the 12-month breakeven spread as our valuation measure. Second, the higher levels of implied equity volatility that are likely to prevail in an environment with a less-accommodative Fed will also limit how far spreads can fall (top panel). MBS: Neutral Chart 4MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 10 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -25 bps. February's underperformance was concentrated in GNMA and Conventional 15-year issues, and also in 3.5% and 4% coupons. Excess returns for Conventional 30-year MBS were roughly flat, and securities with coupons above 5% delivered strong positive performance. The conventional 30-year zero-volatility MBS spread narrowed 4 bps on the month, split between a 3 bps reduction in the compensation for prepayment risk (option cost) and a 1 bp tightening in the option-adjusted spread. In last week's report we showed that the value proposition in Agency MBS is comparable to a Aaa-rated corporate bond, but is much less attractive than other Aaa-rated securitizations (consumer ABS and CMBS).2 However, MBS are also likely to offer investors more protection in a risk-off environment. Refinancing risk will remain muted as interest rates rise (Chart 4), and in past reports we showed that extension risk will likely be immaterial.3 Valuation in MBS versus investment grade corporates is less attractive than it was a month ago, owing to the recent widening in corporate spreads, but the relative spread is still elevated compared to recent years (panel 3). MBS will start to look more attractive on a relative basis as corporate spreads recoup some of their February losses. After that, we stand ready to shift some exposure from corporate bonds to MBS once our end-of-cycle inflation targets are met. Government-Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 20 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +22 bps. Sovereign debt underperformed the Treasury benchmark by 108 bps on the month, Foreign Agencies underperformed by 20 bps and Supranationals underperformed by 2 bps. Local Authorities delivered excess returns of +11 bps, and Domestic Agencies performed in-line with the benchmark. The Sovereign index has returned only 9 bps in excess of Treasuries so far this year, compared to 40 bps from the Baa-rated corporate bond index (Chart 5).4 We expect this poor relative performance to continue in the months ahead as the composition of global growth shifts back to the U.S., putting upward pressure on the dollar. In last week's report we looked at 12-month breakeven spreads in each segment of the investment grade U.S. fixed income market.5 Our results showed that Sovereign debt looks expensive across every credit tier. In contrast, Foreign Agency debt and Local Authority debt offer elevated breakeven spreads. Foreign state-owned energy companies account for a large portion of the Foreign Agency index, and this sector's relative performance closely tracks the price of oil. With our commodity strategists now calling for average 2018 crude oil prices of $74/bbl and $70/bbl for Brent and WTI respectively, the Foreign Agency sector should stay well supported.6 Municipal Bonds: Underweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 32 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +86 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Aaa-rated Municipal/Treasury yield ratio declined a modest 1% on the month, concentrated at the long-end of the curve. January's abrupt increase in flows into municipal bond mutual funds reversed course last month (Chart 6). Interestingly, the sudden surge and subsequent reversal in flows was mirrored by the behavior of municipal bond issuance for new capital (panel 2). This suggests that both trends were driven by changes to the federal tax code. While we remain underweight municipal bonds for now, we stand ready to shift exposure out of corporate bonds and into municipal bonds once our end-of-cycle inflation targets are met. But in the meantime, we note that municipal bonds are already quite attractive compared to corporates. In last week's report we showed that tax-adjusted municipal bond breakeven spreads are much higher than for comparable-quality corporate bonds.7 We also note that the yield differential between a tax-adjusted Aaa-rated municipal bond and an equivalent-duration A3/Baa1 corporate bond is only -19 bps (bottom panel). Historically, this yield differential turns positive near the end of the credit cycle and investors get an even better opportunity to shift out of corporates and into Munis. We expect to get that opportunity this year. Treasury Curve: Favor 5-Year Bullet Over 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve rose sharply and steepened in February. The 2/10 Treasury slope steepened 4 basis points and the 5/30 slope steepened 5 bps. As a result, our recommendation to favor the 5-year bullet versus a duration-matched 2/10 barbell returned +5 bps on the month, though it is still underwater 35 bps since the trade was initiated in December 2016. As we explained in a Special Report last year, bullet over barbell trades are designed to profit from curve steepening.8 But they also depend on what is initially priced into the yield curve. Our model of the 2/5/10 butterfly spread relative to the 2/10 Treasury slope shows that the 5-year note is currently 5 bps cheap on the curve (Chart 7). Or alternatively, it shows that the 2/5/10 butterfly spread is priced for roughly 26 bps of 2/10 curve flattening during the next six months (panel 4). In other words, if the 2/10 slope steepens during the next six months, or flattens by less than 26 bps, we would expect the 5-year bullet to outperform the 2/10 barbell. The window for curve steepening is clearly closing, given that the Fed has adopted a more aggressive tightening bias. However, with inflation on the rise and long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates still below levels consistent with the Fed's target, we think 2/10 flattening in excess of 26 bps during the next six months is unlikely. TIPS: Overweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 9 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +84 bps. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate rose 1 bp on the month and currently sits at 2.12%. The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate fell 4 bps and currently sits at 2.21%. As we explained in a recent report, we view the first stage of the cyclical bond bear market as being driven by the re-anchoring of inflation expectations.9 We will consider inflation expectations well anchored when both the 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates are in a range between 2.3% and 2.5%, where they were the last time that inflation was well anchored around the Fed's target. If the recent trend in realized inflation continues, then this re-anchoring could occur relatively soon. January data show that the annualized 6-month rate of change in trimmed mean PCE jumped to 1.99% (Chart 8), and while the 12-month rate of change rose only slightly to 1.69%, it will start to move higher in March when the strong inflation prints from January and February 2017 are removed from the sample. Our Pipeline Inflation Indicator also suggests that inflation will move higher, as do leading indicators for both shelter and medical care inflation, as we showed in last week's report.10 ABS: Neutral Chart 9ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 20 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -16 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS widened 10 bps on the month and now sits at 45 bps, 12 bps above its pre-crisis low (Chart 9). The 12-month breakeven spread differential between Aaa-rated ABS and Aaa-rated corporate bonds currently sits at +13 bps, solidly above its post-2010 average (panel 3).11 Further, we noted in last week's report that consumer ABS exhibit relatively low excess return volatility.12 Although valuation is quite attractive, the evidence suggests that collateral credit quality is starting to weaken. Delinquency rates have bottomed for both auto loans and credit cards, and a rising household debt service ratio suggests they will continue to trend higher (panel 4). Banks have also noticed the deterioration in credit quality and have responded by tightening lending standards (bottom panel). Historically, tighter lending standards tend to coincide with periods of spread widening. Remain neutral ABS for now, based on still-attractive valuation relative to investment alternatives, but monitor credit trends for a signal on when to downgrade further. Non-Agency CMBS: Underweight Chart 10CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 14 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +47 bps. The index option-adjusted spread widened 4 bps on the month and currently sits at 62 bps, close to one standard deviation below its pre-crisis mean (Chart 10). In last week's report we observed that the 12-month breakeven spread of Aaa-rated non-Agency CMBS is elevated compared to other Aaa-rated sectors (consumer ABS being the exception), but that it also exhibits high excess return volatility.13 While there is no doubt that relative value is attractive, we are concerned about the gap that has emerged between CMBS spreads and the rate of appreciation in commercial real estate (CRE) prices (panel 4). It is possible that tight spreads are simply foreshadowing an imminent re-acceleration in prices, and in fact bank lending standards have become less of a headwind, tightening less aggressively than in recent years (bottom panel). But for now, we think non-Agency CMBS are still not worth the risk. Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 6 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +8 bps. The index option-adjusted spread widened 1 bp on the month and currently sits at 41 bps. In last week's report we noted that the 12-month breakeven spread for Agency CMBS is higher than for all other Aaa-rated sectors, except for non-Agency CMBS and consumer ABS. We also noted that the sector has historically exhibited low excess return volatility. Remain overweight. Treasury Valuation Chart 11Treasury Fair Value Models The current reading from our 2-factor Treasury model (based on Global PMI and dollar sentiment) pegs fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.96% (Chart 11). The fair value was revised down by 5 bps compared to last month due to a combination of more bullish dollar sentiment (bottom panel) and a tick lower in the Global PMI (panel 3). Of the four major economic blocs, PMIs declined in the U.S., Eurozone and Japan. Only the Chinese PMI managed a slight increase (panel 4). We see the risk of a significant relapse in the U.S. PMI as quite low, but recently highlighted that weakening leading indicators in China could soon bleed into lower Chinese PMI prints.14 This is a significant near-term risk to our below-benchmark duration recommendation. For further details on our Treasury models please refer to U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Message From Our Treasury Models", dated October 1, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com At the time of publication the 10-year Treasury yield was 2.86%.   Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Alex Wang, Research Analyst alexw@bcaresearch.com Jeremie Peloso, Research Assistant jeremiep@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Monetary Restraints", dated February 27, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Monetary Restraints", dated February 27, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "On The MOVE", dated February 13, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 The Baa-rated corporate index is the Sovereign sector's closest comparable in terms of average credit rating. 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Monetary Restraints", dated February 27, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "OPEC 2.0 Getting Comfortable With Higher Prices", dated February 22, 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Monetary Restraints", dated February 27, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies" dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 9 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Two-Stage Bear Market In Bonds", dated February 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 10 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Monetary Restraints", dated February 27, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 11 The breakeven spread measures the option-adjusted spread on offer per unit of duration. 12 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Monetary Restraints", dated February 27, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 13 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Monetary Restraints", dated February 27, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 14 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Two-Stage Bear Market In Bonds", dated February 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation Total Return Comparison: 7-Year Bullet Versus 2-20 Barbell (6-Month Investment Horizon)