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Overweight Managed health care has been on a tear for the past five years, but 2017 has seen an acceleration, for good reason. Profit growth has been steady and the formula for a further pick up in earnings is in place, making a powerful tonic for the index. The rate of increases in drug prices, which had been a key pain point earlier this decade, has been falling since the end of 2015 (second panel) as generics continue to gain share. Further, consumer spending on health care has been declining as a share of the American household's budget (third panel), which should signal fewer claims ahead and put industry cost pressures into remission. At the same time as health care is losing share of the wallet, pricing power has remained remarkably healthy (third panel), emphasizing the profit resilience of the sector and its ability to deliver outsized earnings growth when costs are falling. Continued earnings growth is now a requirement to be able to maintain the index's upward trajectory as valuations have crept higher this year (bottom panel). We think they are up to the task; stay overweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5MANH - UNH, AET, ANTM, CI, HUM, CNC.
Special Report Highlights We estimate total Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) investment will rise from US$120 billion this year to about US$170 billion in 2020. The size of BRI investments is about 47 times smaller than China's annual gross fixed capital formation (GFCF). Therefore, a slump in domestic capital spending in China will fully offset the increase in demand for industrial goods and commodities as a result of BRI projects. Pakistan, Kazakhstan and Ghana will benefit the most among major frontier markets from BRI. Investors should consider buying these bourses in sell-off. On a positive note, BRI leads to improved global capital allocation, allows China to export its excess construction and heavy industry capacity, and boosts recipient countries' demand for Chinese exports. Feature China's 'Belt and Road' Initiative (BRI) is on an accelerating path (Chart I-1), with total investment expected to rise from US$120 billion to about US$170 billion over the next three years. Chart I-1Accelerating BRI Investment From China The BRI has been one of the central government's main priorities since late 2013. The primary objectives of the BRI are: To export China's excess capacity in heavy industries and construction to other countries - i.e., build infrastructure in other countries; To expand the country's international influence via a grand plan of funding investments into the 69 countries along the Belt and the Road (B&R) (Chart I-2); To build transportation and communication networks as well as energy supply to facilitate trade and provide China access to other regions, especially Europe and Africa; To facilitate the internationalization of the RMB; To speed up the development of China's poor (and sometimes restive) central and western regions, namely by turning them into economic hubs between coastal China and the BRI countries in the rest of Asia; To boost China's strategic position in central, south, and southeast Asia through security linkages arising from BRI cooperation, as well as from assets (like ports) that could provide military as well as commercial uses in the long run. From a cyclical investment perspective, the pertinent questions for investors are: How big is the current scale of BRI investment, and where is the funding coming from? Will rising BRI investment be able to offset the negative impact from a potential slowdown in Chinese capex spending? Which frontier markets will benefit most from Chinese BRI investment? Chart I-2The Belt And Road Program China's BRI: Scale And Funding Scale China has been implementing its strategic BRI since 2013. To date it has invested in 69 B&R countries through two major approaches: infrastructure project contracts and outward direct investment (ODI). The first approach - investment through projects - is the main mechanism of BRI implementation. BRI projects center on infrastructure development in recipient countries, encompassing construction of transportation (railways, highways, subways, and bridges), energy (power plants and pipelines) and telecommunication infrastructure. The cumulative size of the signed contracts with B&R countries over the past three years is US$383 billion, of which US$182 billion of projects are already completed. However, the value of newly signed contracts in a year does not equal the actual project investment occurred in that year, as generally these contracts will take several years to be implemented and completed. Table I-1 shows our projection of Chinese BRI project investment over the years of 2017-2020, which will reach US$168 billion in 2020. This projection is based on two assumptions: an average three-year investing and implementation period for BRI projects from the date of signing the contract to the commercial operation date (COD) of the project, and an average annual growth rate of 10% for the total value of the annual newly signed contracts over the next three years. Table I-1Projection Of Chinese BRI Project Investment Over The Years 2017-2020 The basis for the first assumption is that the majority of the completed BRI projects were by and large finished within three years, and most of the existing and future BRI projects are also expected to be completed within a three-year period.1 The second assumption of the 10% future growth rate is reasonable, given the 13.5% average annual growth rate for the past two years, but from a low base. These large-scale infrastructure projects were led mainly by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and often in the form of BOTs (Build-Operate Transfers), Design-Build-Operate (DBOs), BOOT (Build-Own-Operate-Transfers), BOO (Build-Own-Operate) and other types of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). After a Chinese SOE successfully wins a bid on an infrastructure project in a hosting country, the company will typically seek financing from a Chinese source to fund the project, and then execute construction of the project. After the completion of the project, depending on the terms pre-specified in the contract, the company will operate the project for a number of years, which will generate revenues as returns for the company. The second approach - investing into the recipient countries through ODI - is insignificant, with an amount of US$14.5 billion last year. This was only 12% of BRI project investment, and only 8.5% of China's total ODI. Chinese ODI has so far been mainly focused on tertiary industries, particularly in developed countries that can educate China in technology, management, innovation and branding. Besides, most of the Chinese ODI has been in the form of cross-border M&A purchases by Chinese firms, with only a small portion of the ODI targeted at green-field projects, which do not lead to an increase in demand for commodities and capital goods. Therefore, in this report we will only focus on the analysis of project investment as a proxy of Chinese BRI investment, as opposed to ODI. The focal point of this analysis is to gauge the demand outlook for commodities and capital goods originating from BRI. The Sources Of Chinese Funding The projected US$120 billion to US$170 billion BRI investment every year seems affordable for China. This is small in comparison to about US$3-3.5 trillion of new money origination, or about US$3 trillion of bank and shadow-bank credit (excluding borrowing by central and local governments) annually in the past two years. The financing sources for China's BRI investment include China's two policy banks (China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China), two newly established funding sources (Silk Road Fund and Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank), Chinese commercial banks, and other financial institutions/funds. Table I-2 shows our estimate of the breakdown of BRI funding in 2016. Table I-2BRI Funding Sources In 2016 China Development Bank (CDB): As the country's largest development bank, the CDB has total assets of US$2.1 trillion, translating into more than US$350 billion of potential BRI projects over the next 10 years, which could well result in US$35 billion in funding annually from the CDB. The Export-Import Bank of China (EXIM): The EXIM holds an outstanding balance of over 1,000 BRI projects, and has also set up a special lending scheme worth US$19.5 billion over the next three years. This will increase EXIM's BRI lending from last year's US$5 billion to at least US$6.5 billion per year. Silk Road Fund (SRF): The Chinese government launched the SRF in late 2014 with initial funding of US$40 billion to directly support the BRI mission. This year, Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged a funding boost to the SRF with an extra 100 billion yuan (US$15 billion). Therefore, SRF funding to BRI projects over the next three years will be higher than the US$6 billion recorded last year. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB): The AIIB was established in October 2014 and started lending in January 2016. It only invested US$1.7 billion in loans for nine BRI projects last year. The BRI funding from the AIIB is set to accelerate as the number of member countries has significantly expanded from an original 57 to 80 currently. Chinese commercial banks: Chinese domestic commercial banks, the largest source of BRI funding, have been driving BRI investment momentum. Chinese commercial banks currently fund about 62% of BRI investment and the main financiers are Bank of China (BoC) and Industrial & Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). After lending about US$60 billion over the past two years, the BOC plans to provide US$40 billion this year. The ICBC has 412 BRI projects in its pipeline, involving a total investment of US$337 billion over the next 10 years, which will likely result in an annual US$34 billion in BRI investment. The China Construction Bank (CCB) also has over 180 BRI projects in its pipeline, worth a total investment of US$90 billion over the next five to 10 years. Only three commercial banks will likely fund US$80 billion of BRI projects over the next three years. A few more words about the currency used in BRI funding. The U.S. dollar and Chinese RMB will be the two main currencies employed in BRI funding. Chinese companies can get loans denominated either in RMBs or in USDs from domestic commercial banks/policy banks/special funds/multilateral international banks to buy machinery and equipment (ME) from China. For some PPP projects that involve non-Chinese companies or governments (i.e. those of recipient countries), the local presence can use either USD loans or their central bank's Chinese RMB reserves from the currency swap deal made with China's central bank. China has long looked to recycle its large current account surpluses by pursuing investments in hard assets (land, commodities, infrastructure, etc.) across the world, to mitigate its structural habit of building up large foreign exchange reserves that are mostly invested in low-interest-bearing American government securities. Risky but profitable BRI infrastructure projects are a continuation of this trend. China had so far signed bilateral currency swap agreements worth an aggregate of more than 1 trillion yuan (US$150 billion) with 22 countries or regions along the B&R. The establishment of cross-border RMB payment, clearing and settlement has been gaining momentum, and the use of RMB has been expanding gradually in global trade and investment, notwithstanding inevitable setbacks. Bottom Line: We estimate total BRI investment with Chinese financing will rise from US$120 billion this year to about US$170 billion in 2020, and Chinese financial institutions will be capable of funding it. Can BRI Offset A Slowdown In China's Capex? From a global investors' perspective, a pertinent question around the BRI program is whether the BRI-funded capital spending can offset the potential slowdown in China's domestic investment expenditure. This is essential to gauge the demand outlook for industrial commodities and capital goods worldwide. Our short answer is not likely. Table I-3 reveals that in 2016, gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) in China was estimated by the National Bureau of Statistics to be at RMB 32 trillion, or $4.8 trillion. Table I-3China's GFCF* Vs. China's BRI Investment Expenditures Meantime, China-funded BRI investment expenditure amounted to US$102 billion in 2016. In a nutshell, last year GFCF in China was about 47 times larger than BRI investment expenditures. The question is how much of a drop in mainland GFCF would need to take place to offset the projected BRI investment. The latter will likely amount to US$139 billion in 2018, US$153 billion in 2019 and US$168 billion in 2020. Provided estimated sizes of Chinese GFCF in 2017 are RMB 33.5 trillion (US$4.9 trillion), it would take only 0.4% contraction in GFCF in 2018, 0.3% in 2019 and 2020 to completely offset the rise in BRI-related investment expenditure (Table 3). Chart I-3Record Low Credit Growth... We derive these results by comparing the expected absolute change in BRI capital spending expenditures with the size of China's GFCF. The expected increases in BRI in 2018, 2019 and 2020 are US$20 billion, US$14 billion and US$15 billion. Given the starting point of GFCF in 2017 was US$4.9 trillion, it will take only about 0.4% of decline in $4.9 trillion to offset the $20 billion rise in BRI. In the same way, we estimated that it would take only an annual 0.3% contraction in nominal GFCF in China to completely offset the rise in BRI capital spending in both 2019 and 2020. To be sure, we are not certain that the GFCF will contract in each of the next three years. Yet, odds of such shrinkage in one of these years are substantial. As always, investors face uncertainty, and they need to make assessments. Is an annual 0.4% decline in China's GFCF likely in 2018? In our opinion, it is quite likely, based on our money and credit growth, as illustrated in Chart I-3. Importantly, interest rates in China continue to drift higher. A higher cost of borrowing and regulatory tightening on banks and shadow banking will lead to a meaningful deterioration in China's credit origination. The latter will weigh on investment expenditures. The basis is that the overwhelming portion of GFCF is funded by credit to public and private debtors, and aggregate credit growth has already relapsed. Chart I-4 and Chart I-5 demonstrate that money and credit impulses lead several high-frequency economic variables that tend to correlate with capital expenditure cycles. Chart I-4Negative Money Credit Impulses Point To... Chart I-5...Slowing Capital Expenditure Therefore, we conclude that meaningful weakness in the GFCF is quite likely in 2018, and that it will spill out to 2019 if the government does not counteract it with major stimulus. By and large, odds are that a slump in domestic capital spending in China offset the rise in BRI-related capital expenditures. BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy service has written substantively on motives surrounding China's capital spending and how it is set to slow, and we will not cover these topics. Some reasons why investment spending is bound to slow include: considerable credit excesses/high indebtedness of companies; misallocation of capital and resultant weak cash flow position of companies; non-performing assets on banks' and other creditors' balance sheets and their weak liquidity position. To be sure, investors often ask whether or not material weakness in mainland growth will lead the authorities to stimulate. Odds are they will. Yet, before the slowdown becomes visible in economic numbers, financial markets will likely sell-off. In brief, policymakers are currently tightening and will be late to reverse their policies. Finally, should one compare the entire GFCF, or only part of it? There is a dearth of data to analyze various types of capital spending. In a nutshell, Chart I-6 reveals that installation accounts for roughly 70% of investment, while purchases of equipment account for the remaining 18%. Therefore, we guess the composition of BRI projects will be similar to structure of investment spending in China, and hence it makes sense to use overall GFCF as a comparative benchmark. In addition, the GFCF data is a better measure for Chinese capital spending over Chinese fixed asset investment (FAI) data, as the FAI number includes land values, which have risen significantly over the years and already account for about half of the FAI (Chart I-7). Chart I-6Chinese Fixed Investment Structure Chart I-7GFCF Is A Better Measure Than FAI Bottom Line: While it is hard to forecast and time exact dynamics over the next several years, odds are that the next 12-24 months will turn out to be a period of a slump in China's capital spending. This will more than offset the increase in demand for industrial goods and commodities as a result of BRI projects. Implication For Frontier Markets The BRI, which currently covers 69 countries, will keep expanding its coverage for the foreseeable future. Insofar as it is a way for China to create new markets for its exports, Beijing has no reason to exclude any country. In practice, however, certain countries will receive greater dedication, for the simple reason that their development fits into China's political, military and strategic interests as well as economic interests. As most of the investments are infrastructure-focused, aiming to improve transportation, energy and telecommunication connectivity as well as special economic zones, the recipient countries, especially underdeveloped frontier markets, will benefit considerably from China's BRI. Table I-4 shows that Pakistan, Kazakhstan and Ghana will benefit the most among major frontier markets, as the planned BRI investment in those countries amounts to a significant amount of their GDP. Chart I-8 also shows that, in terms of current account deficit coverage by the Chinese BRI funding, the three countries that stand to benefit most are also Pakistan, Kazakhstan and Ghana. Table I-1The B&R Countries That Benefit From ##br##China's BRI Investment (Ranged From High-To-Low) Chart I-8Chinese BRI Funding's Impact On ##br##External Account Of B&R Countries Of these, clearly Pakistan and Kazakhstan have the advantage of attracting China's strategic as well as economic interest: Kazakhstan offers China greater access into Central Asia and broader Eurasia; Pakistan is a large-population market that offers a means of accessing the Indian Ocean without the geopolitical complications of Southeast and East Asia. These states also neighbor China's restive Xinjiang, where Beijing hopes economic development can discourage separatist and terrorist activities. Pakistan Pakistan is a key prospect for China's exports in of itself, and in the long run offers a maritime waystation and an energy transit hub separate from China's other supply lines. For China, it is a critical alternative to Myanmar and the Malacca Strait. In April 2015, China announced a remarkable US$46.4 billion CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) investment plan in Pakistan, equal to 16.4% of Pakistani GDP. It is expected to be implemented over five years. In particular, the planned US$33.2 billion energy investment will increase Pakistan's existing power capacity by 70% from 2017 to 2023. On the whole, China's CPEC plan will be significantly positive to economic development in Pakistan in the long run, but in the near term it is still not enough to boost the nation's competitiveness (Chart I-9A, top panel). Chart I-9AOur Calls Have Been Correct Chart I-9BTop 3 Frontier Markets Benefiting Most ##br##From Chinese BRI Investment Also, as about 40% of the investment has already been invested over the previous two years, odds are that China's CPEC investment will go slower and smaller this year and over the next few years. BCA's Frontier Markets Strategy service's recent tactical bearish call on Pakistani stocks has been correct, with a 25% decline in the MSCI Pakistan Index in U.S. dollar terms since our recommendation in March (Chart I-9B, top panel).2 We remain tactically cautious for now. Kazakhstan Kazakhstan is a key transit corridor for Chinese goods to enter Europe and the Middle East. In June 2017, Chinese and Kazakh enterprises and financial institutions signed at least 24 deals worth more than US$8 billion. China's BRI investment in Kazakhstan facilitated the country's accelerated economic growth (Chart I-9A, middle panel). BCA's Frontier Markets Strategy service reiterates its positive view on Kazakhstan equities because of a recuperating economy, considerable fiscal stimulus and rising Chinese BRI investment (Chart I-9B, middle panel).3 Ghana Ghana is not strategic for China (it is a minor supplier of oil). Instead, it illustrates the fact that BRI is not always relevant to China's strategic or geopolitical interests. Sometimes it is simply about China's need to invest its surplus U.S. liquidity into hard assets around the world. Of course, Ghana itself will benefit considerably from the committed US$19 billion BRI investment, which was announced only a few months ago. This is a huge amount for the country, equaling 45% of Ghana's 2016 GDP. This massive fresh investment will boost Ghana's economic growth in both the near and long term (Chart I-9A, bottom panel). BCA's Frontier Markets Strategy service upgraded its stance on the Ghanaian equity market from negative to neutral in absolute terms at the end of July, and we also recommended overweighting the bourse relative to the broader MSCI EM universe (Chart I-9B, bottom panel).4 Our positive view on Ghana remains unchanged for now and we are looking to establish a long position in the absolute terms in this bourse amid a potential EM-wide sell-off. Other Macro Ramifications Industrial goods and commodities/materials are vulnerable. BRI will not change the fact that a potential relapse in capital spending in China will lead to diminishing growth in commodities demand. If there is a massive slowdown in property market like China experienced in 2015, which is very likely due to lingering excesses, Chinese commodity and industrial goods demand could even contract (Chart I-10). Notably, mainland's imports of base metals have been flat since 2010, and imports of capital goods shank in 2015 even though GDP and GFCF growth were positive (Chart I-11). The point is that there could be another cyclical contraction in Chinese imports of commodities and industrial goods, even if headline GDP and GFCF do not contract. Chart I-10Chinese Capital Goods Imports Could Contract Again Chart I-11Imports Of Metals Could Slow Further As China accounts for 50% of global demand of industrial metals and it imports about US$ 589 billion of industrial goods and materials annually, either decelerating growth or outright demand contraction will be negative news for global commodities markets and industrial goods producers. China's Exports Have A Brighter Outlook China's machinery and equipment (ME) exports account for 47% of total exports, and 9% of its GDP (Table I-5). The BRI investment will boost Chinese ME exports directly through large infrastructure projects. Table I-5Structure Of Chinese Exports (2016) Meantime, robust income growth in the recipient countries will boost their demand for household goods (Chart I-12). China has a very strong competitive advantage in white and consumer goods production, especially in low-price segments that are popular in developing economies. Therefore, not only is China exporting its excess construction and heavy industry capacity, but the BRI is also boosting recipient countries' demand for Chinese household and other goods exports. Adding up dozens of countries like Ghana can result in a meaningful augmentation in China's customer base. Notably, Chinese total exports have exhibited signs of improvement as Chinese ME exports and exports to the major B&R countries have contributed to a rising share of total Chinese exports since 2015 (Chart I-13). Chart I-12BRI Will Lift Chinese Exports Of ##br##Capital And Consumer Goods Chart I-13Signs Of Improvement In Chinese Exports ##br##Due To Rising BRI Investment BRI Leads To Improved Global Capital Allocation BRI is one of a very few global initiatives that improves the quality of global capital allocation. Therefore, it is bullish for global growth from a structural perspective. By shifting capital spending from a country that has already invested a lot in the past 20 years (China) to the ones that have been massively underinvested, BRI boosts the marginal productivity of capital. One billion dollars invested in the underinvested recipient countries will generate more benefits than the same amount invested in China. Risks To BRI Projects Notable deterioration in the health of Chinese banks may meaningfully curtail BRI funding, as Chinese non-policy banks will likely need to provide 60% of BRI projects' funding. Political stability/changes in destination countries: As most infrastructure projects have been authorized by the top government and need their cooperation, any changes in the recipient countries' governments or regimes may slow down or deter BRI projects. China already has a checkered past with developing countries where it has invested heavily. This is because of its employment of Chinese instead of local labor, its pursuit of flagship projects seen as benefiting elites rather than commoners, its allegedly corrupt ties with ruling parties, and perceived exploitation of natural resources to the neglect of the home nation. As China's involvement grows, local politics will be more difficult to manage, requiring China to suffer occasional losses due to political reversals or to defend its assets through aggressive economic sanctions, or even expeditionary force. For now, as there are no clear signs that any these risks are imminent, we remain positive on the further implementation of China's BRI program. Ellen JingYuan He, Editor/Strategist ellenj@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 China has long been known to use three-year periods - as distinct from its better known "five year plans" - for major domestic initiatives. In 2016, the National Development and Reform Commission re-emphasized three-year planning periods for "continuous, rolling" implementation. 2 Please see BCA's Frontier Markets Strategy Special Report "Pakistani Stocks: A Top Is At Hand", published March 13, 2017. Available at fms.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA's Frontier Markets Strategy Special Report "Kazakhstan: A Touch Less Dependent On Oil Prices", published March 28, 2017. Available at fms.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA's Frontier Markets Strategy Special Report "Ghana: Sailing On Chinese Winds", published July 31, 2017. Available at fms.bcaresearch.com.
Feature The Brazilian economy is finally improving following a devastating depression of about 3 years, where real GDP dropped by a whopping 7.4%. Does the current economic revival warrant a bullish stance on its financial markets? If the global risk-on trade persists among EM risk assets and commodities and there are no domestic political blunders in Brazil, the country's financial markets will continue to rally as economic growth improves. If the EM and commodities rallies wane and an EM risk-off cycle develops, Brazilian risk assets will sell off, regardless of domestic economic recovery. Provided economies around the world have become interconnected, it is often difficult to separate global economic and financial market impact from domestic economic dynamics. Yet, it is possible to do so in Brazil in the latest cycle. Chart I-1 demonstrates that the Brazilian real bottomed with iron ore prices on December 21, 2015 - not with the bottom in the Brazilian economy in early Q1 2017 (Chart I-1, bottom panel). In turn, the currency's rally amid the collapse in domestic demand has led to a material drop in inflation and allowed the central bank to cut interest rates aggressively. The exchange rate is the main variable driving financial markets in many developing countries, including Brazil. In these countries, it is the exchange rate that causes swings in interest rate expectations, not the other way around. Furthermore, other important variables that led to the bottom in iron ore prices and the BRL were the Chinese manufacturing PMI and money growth, both of which bottomed in the second half of 2015 (Chart I-2). Chart 1BRL Correlates With Commodities ##br##Not Domestic Demand Chart 2Chinese Data Led##br## The Bottom In BRL In short, economic recovery arrived much later in Brazil, and so far it has been exceptionally tame and tentative (Chart I-3). Brazil's domestic demand performance has in no way justified the rally in its financial markets since January 2016. If anything, it is the opposite: the domestic economic recovery emerged too late, and has been extremely subdued compared with the sizable gains in share prices. For example, banks' EPS bottomed only in May 2017, while their share prices troughed in January 2016 (Chart I-4). Similarly, Brazil's fiscal outlook and debt profile has continued to deteriorate, even though the country's sovereign spreads have tightened substantially (Chart I-5). Chart 3Brazil: Economic Recovery Is Exceptionally Tame Chart 4Brazil: Bank Share Prices And EPS Chart 5Brazil's Fiscal And Debt Profiles Have Deteriorated Hence, one can safely argue that economic growth and domestic fundamentals were not the basis behind why Brazilian financial markets found a bottom and rallied starting January 2016. Rather, the critical driving force has been commodities prices, China, the U.S. dollar and global risk appetite. This is consistent with the defining features of bull and bear markets: In a bull market, liquidity lifts all boats, and all flaws are overlooked or discharged while minor positives are magnified by the market. In a bear market, even marginal negatives are overblown, and the market punishes severely for minor missteps. In short, global risk assets have been in a genuine bull market since early 2016, and that has overridden Brazil's poor domestic fundamentals. Going forward, we recommend avoiding Brazilian risk assets - not because we do not expect an economic recovery in Brazil to progress, but because our view on China's impact on commodities and the potential U.S. dollar rebound will curb overall risk appetite toward EM. We discussed this EM/China/commodities outlook at length in last week's report.1 Timing a shift in financial market regimes is always a difficult task, but our sense is that a top in EM risk assets will likely occur between now and the end of October, as China's Communist party Congress reiterates its focus on containing financial risk and leverage, as well as the authorities' marginal tolerance for slightly slower growth. Furthermore, our broad money (M3) impulse for China suggests an imminent relapse in Goldman Sach's current economic activity indicator for the mainland economy (Chart I-6). Our assumption is that commodities prices will drop due to potential weakness in China, and that the U.S. dollar and U.S. bond yields are oversold and will recover, respectively. Altogether, these views warrant a cautious stance on EM currencies. The real has historically been correlated with commodities prices, and this positive correlation will likely continue. As and when the Brazilian currency resumes its depreciation, the risk-on trade in Brazilian equities and credit markets will end. As for Brazilian financial markets, a few relationships are worth highlighting: Since early this year, iron ore prices have been inversely correlated with Chinese money market rates (Chart I-7). A possible explanation is that iron ore and other commodities prices trading on Chinese exchanges have been driven by meaningful speculative buying that negatively correlates with borrowing costs on the mainland. Chart 6China's Growth Is Set To Slow Chart 7Iron Ore Prices Are Vulnerable Given the latest relapse in Brazil's nominal GDP growth, the pace of amelioration in private banks' NPL and NPL provisions could stall (Chart I-8). In turn, Brazilian banks' share prices seem to move inversely with the rate of change in private banks' NPL and NPL provisions (Chart I-9A & Chart I-9B). If these relationships hold, we might be close to a peak in Brazilian bank share prices. Chart 8Brazil: Is The Improvement In NPL Cycle Over? Chart 9ABrazil: NPL Cycles and Bank Stocks Chart 9BBrazil: Provisions Cycles And Bank Stocks Finally, the pace of economic recovery will likely disappoint because the Brazilian economy is facing numerous headwinds: High borrowing costs - the real prime lending rate is 12.5% and the policy rate in the real terms is 6.8%, while public banks' lending rates are set to rise due to the TJLP reform that will remove the government budget's subsidy for borrowers. With 50% of outstanding credit being earmarked credit (previously subsidized by the government and provided by public banks), the impact on economic activity will be non-trivial; Lower government spending, as 2018 government expenditure growth cannot exceed the 2017 June headline inflation rate of 3%. Besides, the fiscal balance is so disastrous that risks to taxes are to the upside, not downside. Furthermore, the recently augmented 2017 year-end fiscal primary deficit target of BRL 159 billion is smaller than the deficit of BRL 182 billion for the past 12 months. This entails government spending cuts are likely this year, which will weigh on growth. The Brazilian exchange rate is not cheap. The nation needs a cheaper currency to reflate its economy. Lingering political uncertainty amid the corruption scandals and upcoming presidential elections in fall 2018 will continue to weigh on capital spending and employment, which have not yet recovered. Bottom Line: Our overarching negative view on EM, China and commodities heralds staying cautious on Brazil's financial markets despite the early signs of domestic economic recovery. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic, Research Assistant andrijav@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Copper Versus Money/Credit In China - Which One Is Right?", dated September 6,. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Highlights Bonds As A Safe Haven: Global bond yields have been driven lower by safe haven buying, despite ample evidence of faster global growth and central bankers that are still biased to shift to a less easy policy stance. There is now considerable upside risk for global bond yields over the next 6-12 months from these current depressed levels. ECB: The ECB is giving strong indications that a decision on tapering its asset purchase program will be made next month. With the Euro Area economy growing at a solid pace, and with inflation creeping higher, a reduction in the pace of bond buying in 2018 is highly probable. Canada: The Bank of Canada will continue to deliver on rate hikes without decisive signs that the current booming Canadian economy is slowing down, which leading indicators do not suggest is imminent. Stay underweight Canadian government debt, with a curve flattening bias. Feature Fade The Doomsday Trade Investors have had a lot of depressing news to process over the past several weeks. From threats of nuclear war with North Korea, to fears of a U.S. government shutdown over the debt ceiling, to the potential of Biblical flooding from hurricanes in Texas and Florida, the environment has not been conducive to risk-taking. This has triggered a flight into safe-haven assets like gold and U.S. Treasuries as investors have looked to protect portfolios from "existential" risks (Chart of the Week). Yet despite this rapid run-up in the value of save-havens, risky assets like equities and corporate credit have performed relatively well since the most recent peak in bond yields in early July (Table 1). Chart of the WeekFalling Yields Reflect Save Haven Demand,##BR##Not Slower Growth Table 1Changes In Risk Assets Since##BR##U.S. Treasury Yields Peaked On July 7th This move toward safety and risk aversion has widened the disconnect between global bond yields and economic fundamentals - specifically, growth momentum and central bank guidance - to extreme levels. Investors are now underestimating the potential for additional rate hikes in the U.S. in 2018, and are not fully appreciating the likelihood that the European Central Bank (ECB) will slow the pace of its asset purchases next year. Investors plowing money into government bonds now can only be rewarded if global monetary policy was set to ease, which would only be the case if global growth was slowing. That is not happening right now, even in the U.S. where the most apocalyptic headlines have been occurring. While the impact of Hurricanes Harvey and Irma will likely weigh on U.S. growth in the next few months, the underlying trend remains one of steady above-potential growth that is boosting both corporate profits and household incomes. More globally, depressed investor sentiment, indicated by measures such as the global ZEW survey, has helped drive bond yields lower despite the steady upturn in leading economic indicators (Chart 2). When looking at indicators of actual economic activity, like manufacturing PMIs, the growth story looks far stronger. As a sign of how much this "sentiment versus reality" divergence has distorted bond yields, look no further than our own valuation model for the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield. This model, which only uses the global manufacturing PMI and sentiment towards the U.S. dollar as inputs, indicates that the current "fair value" of the 10-year Treasury yield is 2.67%, nearly 60bps higher than market levels seen as this publication went to press (Chart 3). This is a level of overvaluation that even exceeds the extreme levels seen after the U.K. Brexit vote in July of 2016. Chart 2Bond Investors Are##BR##Ignoring Strong Growth Chart 3U.S. Treasuries Are##BR##Now Extremely Overvalued In Table 2, we present a decomposition of the 10-year yield changes in the major Developed Markets since that recent peak in U.S. Treasury yields on July 7th. As can be seen in the first two columns of the table, yields declined everywhere but Canada where the central bank has been hiking interest rates (as we discuss later in this report). Yet the vast majority of the yield decline has come from falling real yields and not lower inflation expectations. This has also occurred via a bull-flattening move in government bond yield curves (again, ex-Canada where the curve has bear-flattened), which suggests it is risk-aversion that has driven yields lower. Table 2Developed Market Bond Yield Changes Since U.S. Treasury Yields Peaked On July 7th The relative lack of movement in inflation expectations is a bit surprising given how strongly global oil prices have risen, denominated in any currency (see the final column of Table 2). When plotting the Brent oil price (in local currency terms) vs. the 10-year market-based inflation expectations (from inflation-linked bonds or CPI swaps), some notable divergences stand out. Inflation expectations in the U.S., U.K., Australia and even Japan look around 10-20bps too low relative to where they were the last time oil prices were at current levels (Charts 4 & 5). Meanwhile, inflation expectations are largely in lines with levels implied by oil and currency levels in the Euro Area and Canada. Most importantly, expectations are depressed in all countries, largely because actual inflation has stayed stubbornly low. Chart 4Inflation Expectations Vs. Oil Prices (1) Chart 5Inflation Expectations Vs. Oil Prices (2) The lack of realized inflation in places with allegedly "full employment" economies like the U.S. has led to questions over the usefulness of frameworks like the NAIRU (non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment) in predicting inflation. A reduced link between the NAIRU and inflation does appear in many countries, but not necessarily in all countries when viewed in aggregate. Chart 6The NAIRU Concept Is Not Dead Yet In Chart 6, we present an indicator that shows the percentage of OECD economies (34 in total) that have an unemployment rate below the NAIRU rate. Currently, there are 67% of the countries in this list with unemployment rates under the OECD estimate of NAIRU, which is back to levels seen before the 2009 Great Recession. During that pre-crisis period, global inflation rates were accelerating for both goods and services inflation (bottom two panels). While the correlation between this global NAIRU indicator and realized inflation rates declined in the years after the recession, the linkages have improved over the past couple of years. This may be a sign that there is a "global NAIRU level" (or global output gap) that is more important in determining global inflation rates than individual country NAIRU measures. Or put more simply, investors are downplaying the NAIRU concept just at the time when it could be expected to strengthen. If that were the case, inflation expectations around the world would be too low, although it will take some evidence of faster realized inflation (especially in the U.S. and Europe) before the markets begin to discount that in bond yields. In the meantime, markets have become even too pessimistic on growth prospects and the implications for bond yields. Investors have driven down rate hike expectations in the U.S. and U.K. (and, to a lesser extent, the Euro Area) during this latest bond market rally, dragging longer-term bond yields down with them (Chart 7). Yet growth in the developing world is showing little signs of slowing down outside of the U.K., with leading economic indicators still pointing to a continued steady expansion (Chart 8). Even if central bankers are starting to question how fast their economies can grow before inflation pressures pick up in a meaningful way, they are unlikely to stand by and see faster growth prints without responding with less stimulative monetary policies. Chart 7Not Much Tightening Priced##BR##(Except For Canada)... Chart 8...Despite Improving Growth##BR##In Most Countries Net-net, bond markets are now discounting too pessimistic of an outcome for both global growth and inflation. We continue to see more upside risks for global yields on a 6-12 month horizon, although it will take some signs of faster global inflation (not just growth) before bond yields respond. Bottom Line: Global bond yields have been driven lower by safe haven buying, despite ample evidence of faster global growth and central bankers that are still biased to shift to a less easy policy stance. There is now considerable upside risk for global bond yields over the next 6-12 months from these current depressed levels. September ECB Meeting: All Systems Go For A 2018 Taper Last week's ECB meeting provided no changes on interest rates or the size of asset purchases, but plenty of clues on the central bank's next move. A reduction in the size of the ECB's asset purchase program in 2018, to be announced next month, is now highly probable - even with a strengthening euro. The ECB's GDP forecast for 2017 was revised higher from the June forecasts (2.2% vs. 1.9%), while the projections for 2018 (1.8%) and 2019 (1.7%) were unchanged. Meanwhile, the inflation forecast for 2017 was left unchanged at 1.5% and the forecasts for the next two years were only revised slightly lower (2018: 1.2% vs. 1.3%, 2019: 1.5% vs. 1.6%). The fact that the 14% rise in euro versus the U.S. dollar seen so far in 2017 was not enough to move the needle much on the ECB's projections speaks volumes about the central bank's confidence in the current European economic expansion, as well as its comfort level with the rising currency. That makes sense when looking at the euro rally more broadly, as the currency has only gone up 6% in trade-weighted terms year-to-date. Simply put, the ECB does not yet seem overly worried that the strengthening euro represent a serious threat to the economy that could cause a more prolonged medium-term undershoot in Euro Area inflation. ECB President Mario Draghi did make references to currency volatility as being something that should be closely monitored with regards to the growth and inflation outlook. Right now, the realized volatility of the euro has been quite subdued, even as the currency has steadily appreciated (Chart 9). At the same time, our Months-to-Hike indicator has also fallen as the market has pulled forward the date of the next ECB rate hike. That hike is still not expected until late 2019 - pricing that we agree with. However, the fact that the euro can appreciate with such low volatility alongside a slightly-more-hawkish repricing of ECB rate expectations suggests that the market thinks that a move towards reduced monetary stimulus in the Euro Area is credible. That will remain true until the rising euro starts to become a meaningful drag on the economy or inflation, which is not evident in the broad Euro Area data at the moment (Chart 10). Chart 9A "Credibly Hawkish" ECB? Chart 10No Impact (Yet) From A Stronger Euro Draghi did note that the "bulk of decisions" regarding the ECB's asset purchase program would likely take place in October. That means a reduction in the size of the monthly purchases starting in January of next year, but without any changes in short-term interest rates (the ECB reiterated that rates will stay at current levels until after the end of the asset purchase program). Nonetheless, the ECB is incrementally moving towards a less accommodative policy stance that will continue to put upward pressure on the euro and, eventually, trigger a move toward higher longer-term Euro Area bond yields. Bottom Line: The ECB is giving strong indications that a decision on tapering its asset purchase program will be made next month. With the Euro Area economy growing at a solid pace, and with inflation creeping higher, a reduction in the pace of bond buying in 2018 is highly probable. Maintain an underweight medium-term stance on Euro Area government debt. Bank Of Canada: Shock Hawks The Bank of Canada (BoC) continues to confound investors with a surprisingly hawkish policy bias. Another 25bp rate hike was delivered at last week's monetary policy meeting, a move that was not fully discounted by the market, bringing the BoC Overnight Rate up to 1%. The Bank cited the impressive strength of the Canadian economy, as well as the more synchronous global expansion that was supporting higher industrial commodity prices, as reasons for the rate hike. With Canadian real GDP growth surging to a 3.7% year-over-year pace in the 2nd quarter, in a broad-based fashion across all components, perhaps policymakers can be forgiven for feeling that interest rate settings are still too stimulative for an economy with a potential growth rate of only 1.4% (the most recent BoC estimate). In the statement announcing the rate hike, it was noted that the level of Canadian GDP was now higher than the BoC had been expecting after the last Monetary Policy Statement (MPS) published in July. The BoC was already projecting that the output gap in Canada would be closed by the end of 2017. Thus, a higher realized level of GDP suggests an output gap that will be closed even sooner than the BoC was forecasting. This alone would be enough to move sooner on rate hikes for a central bank that focuses so much on its own measures of the output gap when making inflation projections. However, at the moment, there is not much inflation for the central bank to worry about. Chart 11The Great White North Headline CPI inflation sits at 1.2%, well below the midpoint of the BoC's 1-3% target band, while the various measures of core inflation that the BoC monitors are between 1.3% and 1.7%. Annual wage growth accelerated to the faster growth rate of the year in August, but still only sits at 1.7% even with the unemployment rate now down to a nine-year low of 6.2%. Meanwhile, the Canadian dollar has appreciated 13% vs. the U.S. dollar, and 10% on a trade-weighted basis, since bottoming out in early May. This move has been supported by growth and interest rate differentials that favor Canada. This is especially true versus the U.S. where the 2-year gap between Overnight Index Swap (OIS) rates is now positive at +21bps - the highest level since January 2015 (Chart 11). The BoC acknowledged this in last week's policy statement, suggesting acceptance of a strong loonie as a reflection of a robust Canadian economy that requires higher interest rates. The strength in the Canadian dollar will likely weigh on import price inflation in the coming months, and act as a drag on overall inflation. This will not trigger any move by the BoC to back off from its hawkishness unless there is also some weakness in the Canadian economic data. For a central bank that focuses so much on the output gap in its assessment of its own policy stance, the inflationary impact from a booming economy will far outweigh the disinflationary effects of a stronger currency. It remains to be seen if the BoC will be proven right on delivering actual rate hikes with inflation well below target. This is a problem that many central banks are facing at the moment, but the robust Canadian economy is forcing the BoC's hand. An appreciating currency may limit the number of rate hikes that the BoC eventually undertakes, but given its own assessment that that terminal interest rate is around 3%, there are plenty of additional hikes that the BoC can deliver before getting anywhere close to "neutral". The key risk will come from the spillover effects on the overheated Canadian housing market from the interest rate increases. Already, house prices are coming off the boil in the most overheated markets like Toronto, where median home values are down 20% since April due to regulatory changes aimed at reducing leveraged speculation in Canadian housing. It remains to be seen how much the BoC hikes will exacerbate the latest downturn in house price inflation and, potentially, have spillover effects on consumer confidence given high levels of household indebtedness. For now, we do not recommend fighting the BoC, with Canadian leading economic indicators still accelerating and the BoC's own business surveys showing that the economy is likely to remain strong. While there are already 50bps of rate hikes priced next twelve months, this would only take the Overnight Rate to 1.5% - still a stimulative level in the eyes of the central bank. This could also create additional strength in the loonie, although that impact should be lessened if the Fed comes back into play and delivers additional rate hikes in 2018, as we expect. We continue to recommend a below-benchmark duration stance on Canadian government bonds, with yields likely to surpass the relatively modest increases currently priced into the forwards (Chart 12, top panel). We also continue to advise an underweight allocation to Canadian government bonds in hedged global fixed income portfolios (middle panel). We also are staying with our winning Canadian trades in our Tactical Overlay portfolio, where are positioned for wider Canada-U.S. bond spreads and a flatter Canadian yield curve (Chart 13). Chart 12Stay Underweight##BR##Canadian Government Bonds Chart 13Sticking With Our Tactical##BR##Canadian Bond Trades Bottom Line: The Bank of Canada will continue to deliver on rate hikes without decisive signs that the current booming Canadian economy is slowing down, which leading indicators do not suggest is imminent. Maintain an underweight stance on Canadian government debt, with a curve flattening bias. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
Highlights Beige Book highlights disconnect between inflation words and inflation data. Peak in auto sales is not a harbinger of recession. Capital spending still trending higher. Inflation and inflation surprise will need to move higher before Fed hikes again. Big disconnect between 10-year yield and our fair value model. Feature Disconnect On Inflation Chart 1Beige Book Monitors Support##BR##Fed's Outlook On Economy And Inflation The Beige Book released on September 6 supports the Fed's base case outlook for the economy and inflation. It also keeps the Fed on track to begin trimming its balance sheet in September and boost rates by another 25 basis points in December if the CPI and PCE inflation readings turn higher. Our quantitative approach to the qualitative data in the Beige Book points to an acceleration in GDP and inflation, less business unease from a rising U.S. dollar, and ongoing improvement in real estate, both commercial and residential (Chart 1). At 64%, the BCA Beige Book Monitor was still near its cycle highs in September, providing further confirmation that economic growth was sturdy in the first two months of Q3. The Fed noted that "the information included in the report was primarily collected before Hurricane Harvey made landfall on the Gulf Coast." However, there was a mention of the storm's clout based on preliminary assessments of business and banking contacts across several districts. The U.S. dollar should not be much of an issue in the Q3 earnings season, according to the Beige Book. The greenback seems to have faded as a concern for small businesses and bankers, in sharp contrast with 2015 and early 2016 when Beige Book references to a strong dollar surged. The Q3 earnings reporting season will provide corporate managements with another forum to discuss the currency's impact on their operations. The 2% decline in the dollar over the past 12 months suggests that the dollar may even provide a small lift to Q3 results (Chart 1, panel 4). Remarkably, business uncertainty over government policy (fiscal, regulatory and health) has moved lower in 2017. The implication is that the business community is largely ignoring the lack of progress by Washington policymakers on Trump's agenda (Chart 1, panel 5). Echoing the market's disagreement with the Fed on inflation, the big disconnect in the Beige Book showed up in the number of inflation words (Chart 1, panel 3). Expressions of inflation dipped between the July and September reports. That said, a wide disconnect remains between the elevated inflation mentions and the soft readings on CPI and PCE. In the past, increased references to inflation have led measured inflation by a few months, suggesting that the CPI and core PCE may soon turn up. Bottom Line: The Beige Book backs the Fed's assertion that the economy will expand around 2% this year and inflation will mount in the coming months, supporting a gradual removal of policy accommodation. Policy uncertainty in Washington and worries over the dollar seem to be fading. The divide between the quantity of inflation words in the Beige Book and measured inflation remains unresolved. Neither the soft data in the Beige Book nor the hard data on the economy suggest that an economic downturn is nigh. Recession Not Imminent Some investors have concluded that the peak in auto sales, a key component of consumer spending on durable goods, suggests that a recession is imminent (Chart 2). We take a different view. Zeniths in consumer durable goods, followed closely by consumer services, were primary harbingers of economic downturns in the post-WWII period. However, expenditures on autos, light trucks and other durables tend to peak seven quarters before the onset of recession. Consumer spending on nondurable goods and services provide less of a warning, topping out just five and four quarters out, respectively. The implication for investors is that the peak in auto sales suggests that a recession is still several years away (Chart 3, panels 1-4). Chart 2Vehicle Sales May##BR##Have Peaked Chart 3Consumer Spending And##BR##Housing Prior To Recessions Housing investment provides an even earlier indication that a recession is on the horizon (Chart 3, panel-panel 5). Housing peaked 17 quarters before the start of the 2007 recession and 20 quarters, on average, before the onset of the 2001 and 1991 recession. Since the early 1960s, a crest in housing provided seven quarters of warning before a downturn commenced. While housing's contribution to overall economic growth plunged in Q2, we expect housing to provide fuel for the next few years as pent up demand from the depressed household formation rate since the GFC is worked off. The implication from our upbeat view on housing is that the next recession is still several years away. Bottom Line: We expect the next recession to be triggered by an over aggressive Fed, not by imbalances in one of more segments of the economy. It is premature to say that the economy is headed into recession based on a peak in auto sales. Stay long stocks versus bonds, but we recommend that clients be prudent, paring back any overweight positions and holding some safe-haven assets within diversified portfolios. Business Capital Spending Still Up Elevated readings on capex in the first half of the year should persist into the second half. Corporate managements may be postponing investment decisions until they have more clarity on federal tax policy and the Trump administration's plans for infrastructure investment. In short, corporations continue to struggle with how much and when to spend, rather than whether to invest at all. The key supports for sustained corporate spending stayed in place despite the soft July factory orders report and lackluster C&I loan growth. BCA's model for capex (based on non-residential fixed investment, small business optimism and the speculative-grade default rate) suggests lending is poised to climb on a 12-month basis (Chart 4) despite the softening of C&I loan growth since November 2016. Moreover, the 3.3% month-over-month (m/m) drop in factory orders in July masked an upward revision to orders in June and a substantial 1.0% m/m gain in core orders. Core shipments, which feed directly into GDP, rose 1.2% m/m in July. Almost all of the weakness in orders and shipments in July was linked to a 71% plunge in the volatile aircraft orders segment. BCA's research shows that sustainable capital spending cycles get underway only when businesses see evidence that consumer final demand is on the upswing. Consumer expenditures averaged an above-trend 2.7% in 1H. We anticipate that household spending will continue to improve in the second half of 2017.1 Moreover, recent readings on core durable goods orders and shipments show that the uptrend that began in mid-2016 persists, despite recent monthly wiggles in the data (Chart 5). Chart 4BCA Capex Model Points##BR##To Further Improvement Chart 5Capital Spending##BR##Remains In An Uptrend CEO confidence, still a primary support for capex, recently soared to a 13-year high in Q1, but retreated modestly in Q2. The last reading on this survey was in mid-July, and the dip in sentiment reflects the lack of legislative progress in Washington (Chart 5, top panel). The next CEO survey is set for mid-October. The dip in CEO sentiment in Q2 stands in sharp contrast with the easing of concerns around policy in the Beige Book. Chart 6Surprising Drop In Policy##BR##Uncertainty This Year Surprisingly, the chaos in Washington during the first eight months of the Trump administration has not led to an increase in economic policy uncertainty (Chart 6). Instead, after rising sharply in the wake of the Brexit vote in mid-2016 and the U.S. presidential election in November, policy uncertainty has ebbed. While uncertainty over economic policy remains elevated relative to the past few years, the concern under Trump is surprisingly subdued. This metric is in line with the Beige Book's assessment of Trump's impact on sentiment. A series of business-friendly legislative wins for the GOP and President Trump would further reduce any qualms. Even so, a failure by Congress to boost the debt ceiling and fund the U.S. government later this month would increase business worries/fears. Late last week, Trump cut a deal with Congressional Democrats to extend the debt ceiling for three months and is in talks to do away with it altogether. Bottom Line: The fundamentals still support solid business spending. However, BCA's positive capex outlook in the U.S. could be blemished if the Republicans fail to deliver on their promises to cut taxes and boost infrastructure spending in the next several months. Inflation Surprise And The Fed Chart 7The Fed Cycle And Inflation Surprise We expect inflation surprise to move higher, which could spur the Fed to resume its rate hike campaign. A disconnect has opened between economic surprise and inflation surprise.2 In the past 13 years, there have been 15 periods when economic surprise has climbed after a trough. The inflation surprise index temporarily increased in 13 of those episodes. For example, in the aftermath of the oil price peak in the U.S. in mid-2014, both economic surprise and inflation surprise diminished through early 2015 and then began climbing. However, today's inflation surprise index has rolled over while economic surprise has gained. The inflation surprise index escalated during previous tightening regimes when the economy was at full employment and the Fed funds rate was in accommodative territory (Chart 7). The last time those conditions were in place, which was in 2005, the Fed was wrapping up a rate increase campaign that began in mid-2004. Mounting inflation surprise also accompanied most of the Fed's rate increases from mid-1999 through mid-2000 under similar conditions. In late 2015, as the current set of rate hikes commenced, the inflation surprise index was on the upswing, the economy was close to full employment and the Fed funds rate was accommodative. What Does This Mean For The Fed? The above analysis underscores that economic growth is in good shape and it is likely to remain so for the next year at a minimum, barring any nasty shocks. Normally, the positive U.S. (and global) growth backdrop would place upward pressure on bond yields. It has not been the case this time. Investors appear skeptical of the ability of strong economic growth to generate higher inflation. The attitude seems to be "we will believe it when we see it". Some on the FOMC are taking a similar attitude. Lael Brainard, a FOMC governor, presented an interesting speech last week that makes this point. She speculated that inflation has been lower post-Lehman for structural reasons related partly to a drop in long-term inflation expectations. The Fed has been reluctant in the past to even hint that inflation expectations have become unmoored, because that could reinforce the trend, thus making it harder for the Fed to move inflation up to target. Brainard, a voting member of the committee with a dovish bias, argued that unemployment may have to undershoot the full employment level for longer than normal because low inflation expectations will be a persistent headwind. She also implied that the central bank should allow inflation to temporarily overshoot the 2% target. At a minimum, she wants to see evidence of rising inflation and inflation expectations before the Fed delivers the next rate hike. In the past, Brainard's speeches have sometimes heralded shifts in the FOMC's consensus. An example is her December 1, 2015 speech at Stanford.3 It is not clear if this is the case this time, but it does reinforce the view that a strong economy and a falling unemployment rate is not enough to justify another rate hike this year according to the consensus on the FOMC. Bottom Line: Our inflation indicators are pointing mildly up. Nonetheless, timing the upturn in inflation is difficult and the Fed will not hike in December without at least a modest rise in inflation (together with higher inflation expectations). We are short duration because Treasuries are overvalued and market expectations for Fed rate hikes over the next year are overly complacent (see next section). Nonetheless, a rise in yields may not be imminent. Disconnect On Duration The Global Manufacturing PMI reached a more than 6-year high in August, climbing from 52.7 in July to 53.1 last month (Chart 8, panel 3). Meanwhile, bullish sentiment toward the U.S. dollar continues to plunge (Chart 8, bottom panel). Together, these two factors suggest that global growth is accelerating and becoming broader based. BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy service4 views the improving global economic backdrop as an extremely bond-bearish development. A wide global recovery means that when U.S. data turns surprisingly positive, it is less likely that any increase in Treasury yields will be met with an influx of foreign demand and surge in the dollar. Our Treasury model (based on Global PMI and dollar sentiment) currently places fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.67% (Chart 8, top panel). Moreover, our 3-factor version of the model (which includes the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index), puts fair value slightly higher at 2.68% (not shown). Investors should continue to position for a steeper curve by favoring the 5-year bullet versus a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. After adjusting for changes in credit rating and duration over time, the average spread offered by the Bloomberg Barclays corporate bond index is fairly valued relative to similar stages of past business cycles. However, the Aaa-rated portion of the market looks expensive. Further, strong Q2 profit growth likely foreshadows a decline in net leverage. This lengthens the window for corporate bond outperformance. We recommend an overweight in the high-yield market. In the early stages of the previous two Fed tightening cycles (February 1994 to July 1994 and June 2004 to December 2005), the index option-adjusted spread averaged 342 bps and traded in a range between 259 bps and 394 bps. This puts the current junk spread (378 bps) almost in line with the average achieved during other similar monetary conditions (Chart 9). We continue to favor a "buy on the dips"5 approach in the high-yield market. Chart 8Treasury Fair Value Models Chart 9High-Yield Market Overview Regarding high-yield valuation, our estimated default-adjusted spread stands at 245 bps. Historically, this level is consistent with excess returns of just under 3% versus duration-matched Treasuries over the subsequent 12 months. Our estimated default-adjusted spread is based on an expected default rate of 2.6% and recovery rate of 49% (Chart 9, bottom panel). We remain underweight MBSs; While MBS are starting to look more attractive, especially relative to Aaa credit, we think it is still too soon to buy. The Fed will announce the run-off of its balance sheet when it meets later this month. The market has been pricing in this eventuality for most of the year, leading to a significant widening in MBS OAS. More recently, the option cost component of MBS spreads has joined in, widening alongside falling mortgage rates and expectations of rising prepayments. Bottom Line: Rates have tested their post-election lows, but BCA's fair value model suggests a bounce higher, which supports our stocks-over-bonds stance. In terms of U.S. bonds, we favor short duration over long and credit over high quality. MBSs will be hurt more than Treasuries as the Fed begins to shrink its balance sheet. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy ryans@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed's Third Mandate", July 24, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Surprise, Surprise", August 28, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 3 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20151201a.htm 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary, "The Cyclical Sweet Spot Rolls On," September 5, 2017. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Keep Buying Dips," March 28, 2017. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com.
Overweight This year has been a tough one so far for the S&P packaged foods index. A relative decline in stock prices seems counterintuitive in the context of a surge in manufacturers' shipments and pricing power pulling out of deflation (second panel), despite intense price competition between its grocer customers. Further, a sliding U.S. dollar seems supportive of an export relief valve should domestic demand prove less resilient than we expect. Profits too have been outperforming as restructurings from 2015 and 2016 have borne fruit. Margins averaged 200 bps higher in the latest trailing year than in 2015 (third panel). Notwithstanding significant margin gains, the packaged foods index is much cheaper than 2015, which has resulted in a contraction in relative valuation multiples to more than 20% below the three-year mean (bottom panel). We think a cyclical rotation out of defensive stocks is the most likely culprit for the poor relative share price performance. In fact consumer staples, of which packaged foods is a component, is our only remaining defensive overweight recommended index. Still, eventually valuation catches up to sentiment; packaged foods is poised to be a primary beneficiary. Stay overweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5PACK - MDLZ, KHC, GIS, TSN, K, HSY, CAG, SJM, MKC, CPB, HRL.
Highlights Chinese monetary conditions have tightened on the margin, but have remained fairly stimulative compared with previous years, likely the key reason why overall growth has remained reasonably robust. Listed Chinese firms reported strong and broad based H1 earnings growth. The profit recovery is of fundamental importance to the Chinese economy, and the positive feedback between profits and business activity has further to run. Collectively the markets are likely flashing further upside in China’s growth cycle. At a minimum, there is no sign of an imminent downturn. The macro backdrop of economic and market fundamentals are conducive for higher equity prices in general, and Chinese equities in particular. Feature Recent manufacturing PMIs from a number of major countries confirm that the global economy is on a synchronized upturn. As an increasingly important driving force of the world economy, how China's growth outlook pans out matters materially. On this front, the most recent news has been encouraging. Chinese manufacturing PMIs, both official and private, accelerated in August and remained above the expansion/contraction threshold. Meanwhile, earnings of Chinese-listed companies in the first half of the year increased strongly from a year earlier across all major sectors, with both stronger sales and higher margins, confirming that the Chinese profit cycle upturn is firmly in place. This should further support business activity, especially among private enterprises. In addition, some market signals from global assets that are traditionally sensitive to Chinese growth trends have been fairly strong of late, likely signaling further upside in the Chinese business cycle. All of this is conducive for higher prices for Chinese equities, and paints a bullish backdrop for global risk assets. A Closer Look At The PMI The stronger-than-expected August Chinese PMI numbers set a firmer tone for the economic data to be released in the coming weeks. They also herald that economic growth in the third quarter will likely remain comfortably above the government's target, setting an ideal political environment for the country's top leadership going into the 19th Communist Party Congress in October. The policy setting will likely be maintained at status quo, and downside risks remain low. It is important to note that the recent rise in PMI has occurred in tandem with a continued decline in Chinese broad money growth, suggesting the improvement in Chinese industrial activity has little to do with money and credit stimuli (Chart 1). Some analysts have been preoccupied with inventing some obscure measures of "credit impulse" to guestimate China's near-term growth outlook, which in our view is misguided.1 Instead, China's growth improvement since last year has to a larger extent been due to marked easing in monetary conditions - a combination of lower real rates and a cheaper trade-weighted RMB. In this vein, Chinese monetary conditions have begun to tighten on margin, but have remained fairly stimulative compared with previous years. This is likely the key reason why overall growth has remained reasonably robust, despite falling monetary aggregates. It is particularly noteworthy that the trends of new orders and finished products inventory have diverged of late. New orders have stayed at close to multi-year highs, while inventory PMI has remained well below 50 since 2012, and has relapsed anew in recent months, leading to a significant rise in the new orders-to-inventory ratio (Chart 2). In other words, manufacturers remain decisively in a destocking mood, despite the improvement in new orders. Looking forward, this should supercharge production should new orders remain strong, and create a buffer for manufacturing activity should orders roll over. Chart 1Chinese PMI: Monetary Conditions ##br##Matter More Than Money Supply Chart 2Manufacturers Remain Decisively ##br##In Destocking Mood Another important development is that there appears to be some regained pricing power among service providers, which historically has been a leading indicator for manufacturers' producer prices (PPI), as shown in Chart 3. It appears that PPI may continue to downshift toward year end and regain some strength early next year. PPI has been a key signpost for China's reflation trend, and matters materially for manufacturers' profit margins and the real cost of funding. Any sign of PPI improvement will likely be viewed as a positive development from a market perspective. The market relevance of the PMI survey is that it often leads net earnings revisions of listed Chinese companies by bottom-up analysts (Chart 4). If history is any guide, net earnings revisions will likely improve further, notwithstanding earnings of listed companies have already recovered strongly in the first half of the year. Chart 3Early Signs Of PPI Bottoming? Chart 4PMI Leads Net Earnings Revisions Earnings Reality Check Chart 5A Sharp Profit Upturn By now, all listed firms in Chinese domestic stock exchanges have released financial statements for the first half of the year. Our calculations show that total earnings increased by 18% year-over-year for all listed firms, or 36% if banks and petroleum firms are excluded - both sharply higher compared with a year earlier. This is largely in line with the profit upturn reported by the national statistics agency2 (Chart 5, top panel). A few observations can be made: First, the sharp increase in earnings is due to a combination of rising sales and improving margins, underscoring a marked ease in deflationary pressures and a significant pickup in business activity in nominal terms. (Chart 5, bottom two panels). It is noteworthy that revenue growth stagnated for several consecutive years before the strong recovery since mid-last year. Similarly, profit margins dropped to close to record low levels between 2012 and mid-2016, and have since largely recovered. Profit margins, however, do not yet look overly excessive from a historical perspective. Second, the improvement in earnings is broad-based, as shown in Table 1. Materials producers and energy concerns have experienced a massive profit boom, particularly steelmakers. With the only notable exception being utilities, largely thermal power plants, whose profit margins have been squeezed by rising coal costs, most other sectors have also booked healthy profit gains. This means the profit upturn has been driven by improvement in the broader economy rather than specific government policies that benefit select industries. Finally, the banking sector has also experienced a pickup in earnings growth, especially among large state-controlled banks. More importantly, asset quality of bank loans has also improved, albeit marginally. Our calculation shows that non-performing loans (NPL) and "special-mention-loans," which banks place closer scrutiny on as borrowers face higher risks of default, have both begun to decline (Chart 6). This should not be surprising, given the corporate sector's rising profits. Leaders in the current profit recovery are mining companies, materials producers and some industrial firms, all of which have been regarded as major trouble spots in banks' loan books.3 It may be premature to declare the peak of China's NPL problem, but the profit improvement has certainly helped banks mend their balance sheets. Table 1Earnings Scorecard Chart 6Marginal Improvement##br## In Banks' Asset Quality In short, we maintain the view that profit recovery is of fundamental importance to the Chinese economy, a key pillar in our positive stance on China's cyclical outlook.4 Rising profits restore entrepreneurial confidence, boost private-sector capital spending, ease balance sheet stress of asset-heavy enterprises and de-escalate banking sector risk. It is certainly unrealistic to expect profit growth to perpetually accelerate, but there are no signs of a sudden contraction in profits anytime soon. We expect the positive feedback loop between profits and business activity has further to run. Reading Market Tea Leaves Stronger Chinese growth is also reflected in asset prices well beyond its borders. Some asset classes that are traditionally highly sensitive to Chinese growth cycles have been showing remarkable strength of late. Metals prices have been firm across the board. The London Metal Exchange Index has historically been a reliable leading indicator of China's business cycle (Chart 7). Stock prices of metals producers in major producing countries have significantly outperformed their respective benchmarks, likely pointing to an imminent upturn in China's leading economic indicator (Chart 8) The Baltic Dry Index, the benchmark for bulk shipping rates that is largely driven by Chinese materials demand, has stayed elevated, probably a sign that China's bulk commodities intake has remained fairly robust (Chart 9) Turning to the Chinese equity market, real estate developers have been among the star performers in the Chinese equity universe so far this year - historically, the relative performance of Chinese developers has been an excellent leading indicator for home sales, which in turn drives real estate investment (Chart 10). Chart 7Metals Point To Further Upside##br## In Chinese Business Cycle... Chart 8...So Do Metal Producers Chart 9Baltic And Chinese Commodity Imports Chart 10Developers' Relative Performance ##br##Leads Home Sales Collectively the markets are likely flashing further upside in China's growth cycle. At a minimum, there is no sign of an imminent downturn. Currently, global equity markets, including those in the Greater China region, are clouded by the escalating geopolitical risk over the Korean Peninsula, where the near term outlook remains volatile and unpredictable.5 Barring an extreme scenario, the macro backdrop of economic and market fundamentals are conducive for higher equity prices in general, and Chinese equities in particular. Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "A Chinese Slowdown: How Much Downside?" dated June 8, 2017, and Special Report, "Focusing On Chinese Money Supply", dated July 27, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "A Closer Look At Chinese Equity Valuations", dated August 31, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "Stress-Testing Chinese Banks", dated July 27, 2016, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see China Investment Weekly Report, "China: The 2017 Outlook, And The Trump Wildcard", dated January 12, 2017, and "China Outlook: A Mid-Year Revisit", dated July 13, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China's Geopolitical Pressure Points: Knowns, Unknowns And A Hedge", dated August 17, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Highlights Beijing's continued focus on reducing excess industrial capacity in the lead-up to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party will keep iron ore and steel markets buoyant for the balance of the year. The trajectory of prices further out the curve will, however, depend greatly on how quickly China's reflationary policies wane next year. Energy: Overweight. U.S. gasoline inventories could fall by 7-10mm barrels in the first week following the storm (data to be reported today by the EIA), and another 5-10mm barrels (or more) over the next month, depending on how long it takes to restart all of the refineries knocked offline by Hurricane Harvey, according to estimates in BCA Research's Energy Sector Strategy. Current gasoline inventories sit about 20 million barrels above the 2011-2015 average, which, based on our calculations, could be completely evaporated within a month, materially changing the U.S. gasoline market and related crack spreads.1 Base Metals: Neutral. Following our analysis last month, we are recommending a tactical short Dec/17 COMEX copper position at tonight's close, expecting the market to correct in line with the fundamentals we highlighted.2 Precious Metals: Neutral. We remain long gold as a strategic portfolio hedge. The metal will be supported by low real interest rates and safe-haven demand. The position was recommended May 4, 2017, and is up 8.7%. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Another bumper crop is being priced into corn this year. Expectations for higher corn yields this year - ranging from 166.9 bushels/acre (bpa) to 169.2 bpa vs. 169.5 bpa expected by the USDA - will keep prices under pressure. We remain bearish.3 Feature In reaction to Chinese economic and environmental policies, iron ore and steel each rallied by ~78% in 2016. While steel continued its ascent in 2017 - gaining a further ~20% in the year-to-date (ytd), iron ore broke away from this trend and plummeted by more than 40% between mid-February and mid-June (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekSteel And Iron Ore Diverged Earlier This Year Although iron ore has since reversed its path and regained most of the loss, the divergence between steel and the ore from which it is produced comes down to a difference in fundamentals. Increased supplies of iron ore at a time of healthy inventories were bearish in H1. On the other hand, closures of both steel capacity as well as coal capacity kept the steel market tight. While China's supply-side policies have been the force behind the strength in both to date, Chinese demand - which accounts for ~50% of global iron ore and steel consumption, and steel production - will take center stage next year. The speed at which China's reflationary policies wane will determine the long-term trajectory of steel and iron ore markets. Granted while there are some early signs of a potential slowdown in China's economy, we do not expect this to hit metals generally in the near term. As Beijing continues its focus on reducing excess capacity in the steel sector, and as policymakers prepare for the 19th National Congress later this year, we expect steel and iron ore to remain buoyant in H2. China's Steel Production Paradox Eliminating Excess Steel Capacity At The Forefront Of Reform Agenda... The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) - China's top economic planning authority - has made clear that reducing overcapacity is at the forefront of its reform priorities. More concretely, Beijing aims to cut steel capacity by up to 100-150mm MT over the five-year period between 2016 and 2020. It has already made progress towards that end - shuttering a reported 65mm MT last year - and is on track to meet its targeted 50mm MT of steel capacity cuts by the end of 2017. Additionally, in January the central government announced its intention to eliminate all steel capacity from intermediate frequency furnaces (IFF) by the end of June 2017. So it is no surprise that steel has been performing so well. However, this narrative is inconsistent with Chinese data. ...Yet Chinese Production Is At All-Time Highs Steel production from China this year has been soaring, growing by more than 5% year-on-year (yoy) in the first seven months of 2017. In fact, latest production data from July came in at 74mm MT, marking a more than 10% yoy increase, and an all-time record high for monthly production (Chart 2). And since ~50% of global steel is produced in China, this has translated into strong global steel production figures in 2017. Production grew by 4.75% yoy in the first seven months of 2017, the most since 2011 and almost five times as much as the five-year average yoy increase for that period. In fact, the China Iron and Steel Association recently announced that the strength in steel prices does not reflect underlying fundamentals and is instead due to speculation and a misunderstanding of the market impact of China's policies. In an effort to deter speculation, China's commodity exchanges implemented several restrictions in August, including increasing margins on futures contracts and limiting positions (Chart 3).4 Chart 2Record Steel Production##BR##Amid Chinese Capacity Cuts Chart 3Pure Speculation Or Not?##BR##Beijing Cracking Down On Market Speculation It Comes Down To The Nature Of IFFs This paradox of record high production at a time of capacity closures comes down to the nature of IFF capacity that was shutdown. While for the most part, old, outdated and unproductive facilities were targeted for closure last year, the shift in focus towards IFFs had a different effect on the market in 2017. IFFs use scrap steel, rather than iron ore, as a raw material, which is melted through an induction furnace to produce low-quality steel. Because this steel fails to meet government specifications for high-quality steel, it is considered "illegal" and, although it is used to satisfy steel demand, it is not included in official production data. Thus, efforts to shut-down these producers are not evident in China's production figures. However, IFF steelmaking capacity is estimated to be 80-120mm MT a year, and accounts for ~10% of steel production capacity in China. In terms of output, this substandard steel accounts for almost 4% of Chinese production. Thus, traditional steelmaking facilities have been required to fill the supply void caused by IFF closures, raising the official production figures. Steel Exports Take A U-Turn As "Illegal" Capacity Is Shuttered Moreover, Chinese exports have reversed their trend and are on the decline. Steel exports registered a ~30% yoy fall in the first seven months of this year (Chart 4). This is further evidence that the capacity closures have had a real impact on actual steel production, and that domestic consumers have turned to steel that is typically exported, in order to fulfill their demand for the metal. Furthermore, as authorities crack down on IFFs, demand for scrap steel - the main raw material in IFFs - has declined. Amid waning demand, scrap steel prices fell by 9% in H1 before regaining almost 6% in July. This follows a ~70% rally last year (Chart 5). Chart 4Exports Are Down As##BR##Capacity Is Shutdown Chart 5Scrap Steel Rally Takes A Break##BR##As Demand From IFFs Eliminated Coking Coal Cost Push As part of its environmental protection plans, China's policymakers announced plans to replace 800mm MT of outdated coal mining capacity with 500mm MT of "advanced" capacity by 2020. Last year, coal-mining capacity closures exceeded the 250mm MT target, reversing the slump in coal prices and leading an almost 225% rally in coke futures. Coking coal, or metallurgical coal, is a key ingredient in the steelmaking process. Although coke dipped since its December high, it has rallied by 34% in the past two months. Thus, Chinese steel mills are now producing in an environment of higher input costs, which will translate to higher prices for the finished good. China's Capacity Closures Likely Peaked Given that China has set June 30, 2017 as the target for eliminating induction furnace-based steelmaking, we do not expect IFF shutdowns to continue impacting the steel market. Additionally, while excess steel capacity is conventionally estimated to be 325-350mm MT in China, the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) argues that this estimate does not account for the need for a certain amount of excess capacity. Instead, they cite 130mm MT as a more reasonable figure of Chinese excess steel capacity. According to PIIE estimates, this means that by the end of the year, China will have eliminated almost all of its excess capacity, and will be very close to the quantity of capacity closures it aims to achieve by 2020. Consequently, we do not expect shutdowns to continue driving up steel prices. However, plans to halve blast-furnace production at Northern China mills to reduce pollution during the winter will weigh on near term Chinese production and the steel market. Bottom Line: Chinese authorities are closing in on their targeted capacity shutdowns. We do not expect this reduction in capacity to continue impacting steel markets in the long term. Near-term supply dynamics will be driven by efforts to reduce winter pollution. IFF Closures Spur Demand For Iron Ore Chart 6Mid-Year China Inventories At Record High With the elimination of IFFs, which take in scrap steel as the main input, we expect greater demand for iron ore from traditional steel mills as they work toward filling the supply gap left by the loss of the so-called illegal steel. While steel prices have been on a consistent uptrend since 2016, iron ore - which usually moves in tandem with steel - diverged from its main demand market earlier this year, before resuming its rally in Q2. The deviation earlier this year was due to increased supplies from Australia and Brazil amid record levels of Chinese inventories (Chart 6). This has reversed, and iron ore has resumed its climb. Stronger demand for iron ore is consistent with import data, which shows that China has been hungry for Australian and Brazilian iron ore. However, since the average iron ore production cost in China - estimated at more than 60 USD/MT, or roughly three (3) times the cost of iron-ore production in Brazil and Australia - is greater than in other regions, many Chinese mines go offline during periods of low prices. By the same token, elevated prices tempt high-cost Chinese producers back online, increasing global supply. Bottom Line: Since the closure of induction furnaces has shored up demand for iron ore, pulling prices up with it, we do not anticipate further drops in prices. However, if prices remain elevated, increased production from China amid well stocked global markets will keep a tight lid on iron ore prices. Chinese Appetite Will Determine Long-Run Market Performance While steel and iron ore are currently well supported, their near term strength is in large part due to China's reflation policies which have revived demand. Given that it is a sensitive political year, we do not foresee downturns in the Chinese economy this year. Authorities will want to go into the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party in mid-October with solid economic data as a backdrop. However, waning Chinese growth would be a long-run negative for the markets (Chart 7). Specifically, official government data indicate: 1. There are early warning signs that the property market in China may be losing momentum. New floor space started, and new floor space completed contracted in July, while growth in floor space under construction and floor space sold have been easing. Furthermore, while total real estate investment has been growing at an average monthly rate of almost 9% yoy since the beginning of the year, July figures show a marked slowdown, at less than 5% yoy growth. We would not be surprised to see the property market winding down as China begins to tighten its real estate policies. 2. Chinese automobile production has slowed significantly from all-time highs recorded at the end of last year. The monthly average 4% yoy growth in the five months to July is a significant deceleration from the 10% yoy average witnessed during the same period last year. 3. However, infrastructure investment has been strong, recording its all-time high in June, and a 20% yoy increase in July. With the National Congress scheduled in October, we do not expect a slowdown in infrastructure spending this year. In addition, August manufacturing PMI data in China came in above expectations, and registered a slight increase from the previous month (Chart 8). The index has remained relatively stable since the beginning of the year, after gaining strength last year. Chart 7Despite Signs Of Fizzling,##BR##Slowdown Not Expected In 2017 Chart 8Accomodative Policies Will##BR##Keep Near Term Demand Solid Bottom Line: Although we expect China's appetite for steel will begin to wane as the economy unravels from its reflationary policies, steel demand will remain strong in 2017. Chinese authorities will want to ensure solid growth in the run-up to the National Congress scheduled for mid-October. Thus, the near-term focus will remain on supply, and the impact of its reforms on ferrous metals. Post-Harvey Rebuilding Will Spur Steel Demand Hurricane Harvey is expected to impact steel markets in three main ways: 30-35% of all U.S. steel imports come through Port Houston. However, the port resumed operations as of September 1 and there is no longer a threat posed on steel imports. The disruption in freight service resulting from Harvey is expected to temporarily push up trucking rates in the next few weeks. This will give U.S. steel firms, which have long been suffering from cheaper Chinese imports, an advantage and opportunity to fill the demand void which will be bullish for U.S. steel. Harvey will have a longer-run positive impact on steel markets through the demand that will be generated from the infrastructure rebuilding process. Still, increased demand for steel will be partially mitigated by a rise in scrap steel supply, in the aftermath of destruction. While it is still too early to measure the extent of damage and the impact of the rebuilding process on steel markets, estimates from the storm's damage run as high as USD 120 billion. Texas's governor estimated the damage to be much greater - between USD 150-180 billion. This compares to USD 110 billion from Hurricane Katrina, the most devastating storm to hit the U.S. prior to Harvey. Bottom Line: While it is still too early to determine the full extent of destruction, the infrastructure rebuilding phase will spur demand for steel. Roukaya Ibrahim, Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's Energy Sector Strategy Weekly Report "Upgrading Refining Sector As Harvey Clears Out Inventories," published September 6, 2017 It is available at nrg.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Copper's Getting Out Ahead Of Fundamentals, Correction Likely," published August 24, 2017. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see "GRAINS - Corn lower as U.S. yield forecasts rise; soy, wheat climb," published by reuters.com on September 1, 2017. 4 Please see "Shanghai exchange urges steel investors to act rationally, hikes fees" published by reuters.com on August 11, 2017. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016
Underweight For most of this decade, U.S. airline pricing power and the price of jet fuel have moved in lockstep (second panel) i.e.: airlines have been able to pass through their primary input cost. However, this relationship has broken down since the end of 2016 as the industry has been locked in a price war between low cost carriers and the largely-restructured legacy airlines. The result has been a coincident fall in operating margins (bottom panel). The disruption to U.S. refining capacity and distribution of refined products from Hurricane Harvey seems likely to keep the price of jet fuel elevated and exacerbate the decline in near-term operating margins. Until recently, investors have shrugged off tumbling margins with expanding valuation multiples (bottom panel), though that appears to have turned early this summer; the S&P500 airlines index has been in freefall since. With higher costs a certainty in Q3, no relief from aggressive pricing and the longevity of higher jet fuel prices an unknown, it still doesn't pay to be long airlines. Stay underweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5AIRL: LUV, ALK, AAL, UAL, DAL.
Highlights The ECB can talk down the euro, but not by much. The central bank has previously expressed comfort with EUR/USD at 1.15. The cyclical and structural direction of EUR/USD is higher... ...because the euro area versus U.S. long bond yield spread should ultimately compress to -40 bps from today's -130 bps. Remain neutral in Germany's DAX and underweight Sweden's OMX. Equity markets with a strong base currency and a large exposure to exporters will come under pressure. Overweight German consumer services equities versus German exporters and the DAX. Underweight U.K. consumer services equities versus the FTSE100. Feature When mariners know that a sea-change is coming, their concern is not whether it comes today, tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. The big issue is the sea-change itself - because it brings major implications for navigating the seas. In the same way, when currency markets know that a sea-change in monetary policy is coming, their concern is not whether the policy announcement comes on September 7, October 26 or December 141 - or indeed whether the sea-change will happen suddenly or gradually. At a sea-change, currency markets look much further ahead. Just as for mariners, the big issue is the sea-change itself. EUR/USD is now moving in lockstep with the expected differential between euro area and U.S. policy interest rates not next year, nor the year after next, but rather the differential five years out (Chart I-2). Chart I-1AA Strong Euro Is Good For ##br##German Consumer Services... Chart I-1B...A Weak Pound Is Bad For##br## U.K. Consumer Services Chart I-2EUR/USD Is Moving In Line With The Interest ##br##Rate Differential Expected In 2022 The ECB Can Talk Down The Euro, But Not By Much Chart I-3EUR/USD Might Find Support At 1.15 Therefore, if the ECB really wants to unwind the euro's sharp appreciation this year, the central bank must tell the market that the expectation for a sea-change is completely wrong. In other words, the ECB must indicate that it has no intention to dial back its emergency monetary accommodation. Such a volte-face is unlikely, for two reasons. First, the ECB likes to adjust market expectations incrementally rather than violently. The last policy meeting made the case "for proceeding gradually and prudently when approaching adjustments in the monetary policy stance and communication." Second, not to dial-back its emergency monetary accommodation flies in the face of a euro area economic expansion that is solid, broad, and among the strongest and best-established among major developed economies. "Postponing an adjustment for too long could give rise to a misalignment between the Governing Council's communication and its assessment of the state of the economy, which could (eventually) trigger more pronounced volatility in financial markets." Nevertheless, at the margin, dovish words from Draghi could pare back the euro. How much? Consider that at the last policy meeting EUR/USD stood at 1.15 and the ECB justified this level on the basis of the improved "relative fundamentals in the euro area vis-à-vis the rest of the world." (Chart I-3) Given that these relative fundamentals are still intact, 1.15 might provide a level of support in a technical retracement. Of course, EUR/USD also depends on the Federal Reserve and expectations for its policy rate five years out. EUR/USD would sink if the market became much more hawkish about where it sees the U.S. 'terminal' interest rate. However, for the terminal rate expectation to rise suddenly and sharply in the U.S. relative to the euro area would also fly in the face of the economic data on both sides of the Atlantic. Recently, there has been little difference in either economic growth or inflation rates. The 'Neutral' Real Interest Rates In The Euro Area And U.S. Are The Same More fundamentally, there is little difference in the so-called 'neutral' (or mid-cycle) real interest rates in the euro area and the U.S. Through the 19 years of the euro's life, the euro area versus U.S. long bond yield spread has averaged -40 bps2 (Chart I-4). Over this same period, the euro area versus U.S. annual inflation differential has also averaged -40 bps (Chart I-5). Ergo, the real interest rate differential has averaged zero. Meaning, the neutral real interest rates in the euro area and the U.S. have been exactly the same. Chart I-4Euro-U.S.: Average Interest ##br##Differential = -40bps Chart I-5Euro Area-U.S.: ##br##Inflation Differential = -40bps Bear in mind that the 19 year life of the euro captures multiple manias and crises, some centred in Europe, some in the U.S. Hence, 1999-2017 is a good representation of what the future holds, at least in relative terms if not in absolute terms. With little difference in the neutral real rates over the past two decades, is there any reason to expect a big difference in the future? Our starting assumption has to be no. Chart I-6If Composition Differences Were Removed, ##br##Euro Area And U.S. Inflation Would Be Near-Identical In fact, even the -40 bps annual inflation shortfall in the euro area is due to a compositional difference in the consumer price baskets. The euro area does not include owner occupied housing costs, whereas the U.S. does at a hefty weighting.3 If this compositional difference were removed, inflation would also be near-identical (Chart I-6). Still, each central bank must target inflation as it is defined in its respective jurisdiction, so let's assume the annual inflation differential continues to average -40 bps. In this case, the long bond yield spread should also ultimately compress to -40 bps from today's -130 bps. The biggest risk to this view is if the existential threat to the euro resurfaced. Looking at the political calendar, the German Federal Election on September 24 poses no such threat. Meanwhile, ahead of the Italian general election to be held no later than May 20 2018, even the non-establishment Five Star Movement and Northern League are toning down their anti-euro rhetoric. As my colleague Marko Papic, our Chief Geopolitical Strategist, puts it: "euro area politics are a red herring." On this basis, our central expectation is that the euro area versus U.S. yield spread has the scope to compress much further from its current -130 bps. This means that after a possible near-term retracement, we expect the cyclical and the structural rally in the euro to resume. German Consumers Are Winners, U.K. Consumers Are Losers When European currencies strengthen, the big winners are European consumers because they become richer in terms of the goods and services they can buy in international markets. This is significant because Europe imports its food and energy in large (and inelastic) volumes. Hence, their price decline in local currency terms significantly boosts the real spending power of consumers. And vice-versa (Chart I-7). As if to prove the point, German consumer services equities have rallied strongly this year (Chart I-8). And their outperformance has closely tracked euro strength (Chart of the Week, left panel). Across the English Channel, it is the mirror-image story. The pound has slumped. And the big losers are U.K. consumers, whose real spending power is evaporating as food and energy prices - in pound terms - rise. Again, to prove the point, U.K. consumer services equities have struggled to make any headway this year (Chart I-9). And their underperformance has closely tracked the trade-weighted pound's weakness (Chart of the Week, right panel). Chart I-7German Consumption Accelerating,##br## U.K. Consumption Decelerating Chart I-8German Consumer Services ##br##Have Rallied Chart I-9U.K. Consumer Services ##br##Have Struggled If the euro has more cyclical and structural upside - as we anticipate - then these equity performance trends have further to run. Chart I-10The Exporter Heavy DAX And##br## OMX Have Struggled Remain overweight German consumer services equities versus German exporters and the DAX. And remain underweight U.K. consumer services equities versus the FTSE100. At the same time, equity markets with a strong base currency and a large exposure to exporters will come under pressure. Mostly, this is because the translation of multi-currency international earnings into a strengthening base currency hurts index profits. For the time being, this influences our allocation to Germany's DAX - in which we have been neutral relative to the Eurostoxx600 - and Sweden's OMX - in which we have been underweight (Chart I-10). Next week, we will update our overall European country allocation. Given the large sector skews in European equity indexes, this country allocation is heavily dependent on the stance towards Healthcare and Banks. Hence, we await any incremental communication from the ECB. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 These are the dates of the ECB's three remaining monetary policy meetings in 2017. 2 Calculated from the over 10-year government bond yield: euro area average, weighted by sovereign issue size, less U.S. 3 The imputed cost of owner occupied housing (owners' equivalent rent of residences) comprises 25% of the U.S. consumer price basket but 0% of the euro area consumer price basket. Fractal Trading Model Basic materials equities are technically overbought. Initiate a short position relative to the broad market with a profit target / stop loss at 2.5%. In other trades, long Mediaset Espana / short IBEX35 hit its stop-loss. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-11 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations