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The yields continue being range bound, creating an environment more favorable for companies which derive majority of their earnings further in the future. In addition, earnings growth has peaked and is slowing down, making growth stocks more attractive at times when earnings growth is becoming a little harder to find. These two factors support our thesis that it’s time to revisit growth stocks. Looking at growth names in the context of the business cycle is also instructive. The chart below shows relative performance of different S&P 500 styles during various stages of the business cycle. Historically, growth shines best during periods of slowdown, as it is one of the safer styles. Bottom Line: Investors should add growth exposure to their portfolio.
Highlights In the near term, the RMB against the US dollar has ceased to be a one-way bet. Market sentiment will re-focus on economic fundamentals, which are less supportive of further RMB appreciation.  In the longer term, the RMB still has some upside potential, but the pace of its growth should be much slower than in the past 12 months. The sharp rise in the trade-weighted RMB index is starting to threaten China’s export sector and has exacerbated the tightening of domestic monetary conditions. Barring a monetary policy reset by Chinese authorities, even a small increase in the broad-RMB index would heighten the risk of a contraction in corporate profit growth in the coming 12 months. We remain risk adverse to Chinese stocks for the next 6 months. Feature Chart 1The RMB Back On A Fast Ascending Path After a brief pause in March, China’s currency versus the US dollar extended its steep upward trend began in mid-2020 (Chart 1). Chinese policymakers recently ramped up their strong-worded statements warning against speculating on the RMB. Regulators have also taken steps to stem the rise. Questions we have recently been getting from our clients about the RMB can be summarized as follows: After a 10% appreciation since its trough a year ago, does the RMB have more upside in 2021 and beyond? If the RMB continues to appreciate, what would be the impact on China’s economy and corporate sector? What can the PBoC do to slow the pace of the currency’s appreciation? One could argue that the US dollar will continue to weaken, but we see substantial headwinds to the RMB within the year. A weaker US dollar would support global stock prices outside of the US and foreign inflows have driven the recent rally in China’s onshore stocks. However, we think China’s domestic macro policy and economic conditions pose more downside risks on a cyclical basis. How Far Can The RMB Go? A continued upswing in the CNY relative to the USD can no longer be taken for granted. In the coming months, there is a strengthening case for the RMB to fall against the greenback as factors supporting a strong RMB in the past year start to abate. Economic fundamentals will no longer prop up the RMB’s rise going into 2H21. China’s growth momentum is softening due to significant tightening in the monetary environment in the second half of last year and a rapid deceleration in credit growth this year (Chart 2). Meanwhile, the massive rollouts of COVID-19 vaccines in North America and Europe have successfully reduced new infections and hospitalization rates, allowing these countries to reopen their economies. The economic growth gaps between China and the developed markets (DMs) will narrow more significantly in the coming months (Chart 3). Chart 2Chinese Economic Fundamentals Will Start To Weaken Chart 3China's Growth Gap Relative To DMs Will Narrow Chart 4Global Consumption Recovery In Services Will Likely Outpace Goods China’s large current account surplus will likely start narrowing. It has been driven by strong global demand for goods, which is unlikely to be sustained as the pent-up demand for services in DMs will outpace the consumption for goods (Chart 4). Emerging countries (EMs), many of which are China’s export competitors, lag far behind DMs and China on inoculation rates and some have resurging COVID cases (Chart 5). However, EMs will likely benefit from meaningful expansions in global vaccine production in the second half of the year.1 A catchup in vaccinations in these countries will reduce China’s export-sector advantage, reversing the RMB’s gains over other Asian currencies in the past month. Chart 5China's Asian Neighbors Have Been Hit By Resurging COVID Cases The future trend of the USD also matters to the USD/CNY exchange rate. The recent strength of the CNY vis-à-vis the dollar was the mirror image of USD weakness, which has been due to low real rates in the US and recovering economic momentum outside the US (Chart 6). However, the broad dollar index is sitting at a critical technical level that could either breakout or breakdown (Chart 7). When the Fed announces the slowing of asset purchases, which our BCA US Bond Strategy expects before the end of 2021, it could lead to higher US real yields and reverse the trend of hot money flows into China. Chart 6The Sharp Rise In The RMB In The Past Two Months Has Been Dollar-Driven Chart 7The Dollar Index: Breakout or Breakdown? Furthermore, the financial market does not seem to have priced in unstable US-China relations, which could undermine global risk appetite (Chart 8). Recent actions by US President Joe Biden – from expanding the investment ban on 59 blacklisted Chinese tech companies to calling for the US intelligence community to investigate the origins of COVID-19 – point to risks for escalating tensions between the two nations. Longer term, the RMB is at about one standard deviation below its fair value, which suggests that it still has more upside potential (Chart 9). Based on our BCA’s Foreign Exchange Strategist’s real effective exchange rate (REER) model, the RMB’s fair value mostly climbed in the past three decades, driven by higher productivity in China relative to its trading partners. However, part of the RMB’s appreciation since mid-2020 has been a catch up to its pre-trade war value and its valuation gap has rapidly narrowed. From the current valuation levels, the pace of RMB appreciation should be much slower going forward. Chart 8Geopolitical Surprises Could Spook The Market Chart 9Valuation Gap Has Rapidly Narrowed We also expect China’s real interest rates relative to the US to dwindle in the next three to five years. Demographic headwinds in China herald lower real rates while the Fed is primed to start rate liftoffs within the next two years. Bottom Line: The RMB still has some upside potential in the long run, but the pace of its appreciation should be much slower than in the past 12 months. In the near term, odds are high that economic fundamentals will not boost the RMB any further.  How Does A Stronger RMB Affect China’s Economy? Historically, a stronger RMB relative to the dollar has not had a significant impact on China’s economy. However, if the CNY appreciates considerably versus the greenback so that it pushes up the trade-weighted RMB index, then China’s corporate profits will be negatively affected (Chart 10). Chart 10Strengthening Broad-RMB Index Has Historically Led To Weaker Corporate Profit Growth... Chart 11...And Could Significantly Raise Prob Of A Earnings Contraction In 12 Months Our earnings growth recession probability model confirms our view. If all else is equal, a 3% rise in the trade-weighted RMB index from its current level would more than double the probability of a contraction in earnings growth in the coming 12 months (Chart 11, Scenario 1). On the other hand, all else will not be equal if the broad RMB index goes up by 3%. A quick increase in the RMB’s value against the currencies of its trading partners will impede China’s export growth and tighten domestic monetary conditions. Chart 12Moving Into Restrictive Territory For Chinese Exports Chart 12 shows the impact on export growth from the speed of the RMB’s appreciation; we calculate the rise in an export-weighted RMB index relative to its highs and lows in the past few years. The metric implies that the acceleration in the RMB’s value has reached levels that should be restrictive for exports. The nominal export-weighted RMB index has been significantly above the median value since 2015 and it is approaching the peak reached in that year. Clearly, the strong RMB is linked to a recent weakness in the PMI surveys on export orders. A 3% increase in the trade-weighted RMB from the current level, coupled with a drop in export growth and further deceleration in credit impulse would prop up the earnings contraction probability to more than 50% (Scenario 2 in Chart 11 above). Bottom Line: Our metrics suggest that the RMB’s recent sharp rise is starting to threaten the export sector. An additional 3% appreciation in the broad RMB index would cause a meaningful increase in the probability of a corporate earnings growth contraction in the coming 12 months. What Can The PBoC Do To Halt The RMB Rally? We break this question into two parts: the willingness and the capability of the PBoC to intervene in the currency market.  On the first aspect, the PBoC in recent years has largely refrained from draconian intervention measures in the currency market. Allowing a more market-based currency exchange rate regime is a crucial part of China’s RMB internationalization process. The PBoC seems to be mostly sticking to this long-term goal. Chart 13New FX Regime Began In 2015 Has Significantly Lowered USD Weight In The Broad-RMB Index... Importantly, the new exchange rate regime that the PBoC switched to at end-2015 has greatly weakened the link between the USD and the broad RMB trend (Chart 13). Since then China has continuously cut the weighting of the USD in the CFETS currency index basket, which has reduced the impact of dollar moves on the index. Therefore, the PBoC has mostly ignored short-term volatilities in the CNY/USD exchange rate. The central bank tends to intervene only when swings in the CNY/USD exchange rate are large enough and/or the market forms a unilateral view on the Chinese currency to drive sustained movements in the broader RMB index.  For example, the RMB value rose at a much faster rate against the USD compared with its other trading partners in the second half of 2020. However, this year, the pace of growth in the broad RMB index has caught up with that of the CNY/USD appreciation. Moreover, even when the RMB depreciated against the USD in March, the CFETS index basket kept rising and is now breaching its previous peak in April 2018 (Chart 14). As discussed in the previous section, a sharp jump in the trade-weighted RMB would be more detrimental to China’s corporate profits than an increase in the CNY/USD. Chart 14...But The Massive Appreciation In The CNY/USD Of Late Has Pushed The RMB Index To A Three-Year High Chart 15The PBoC Has Been Trying To Guide Market Expectations Lower On The RMB On the second aspect, the PBoC is unlikely to alter its monetary policy trajectory to tame the RMB’s appreciation. A looser monetary environment would encourage more asset price bubbles domestically and jeopardize policymakers’ ongoing progress in financial and property-market de-risking. If the CFETS strengthens further, Chinese authorities will probably use tools such as managing market expectations and various capital controls to mop up excess FX liquidity generated from capital inflows. In the near term, the PBoC may set a weaker fixing rate against the dollar to dampen market expectations for more RMB growth (Chart 15). An increase in the FX deposit reserve requirement ratio (RRR) rate, announced by the PBoC last week, is another example of the central bank trying to prevent a one-sided expectation by market participants. However, the previous three FX deposit RRR hikes –all taken place more than a decade ago—did little to alter the path of the CNY exchange rate; the pace of USD/CNY depreciation actually accelerated following the May 2007 RRR hike.  The two-percentage point bump in the FX deposit RRR rate will drain China’s domestic FX liquidity by about US$20 billion. Its effect on domestic FX liquidity and FX loan rates is rather limited – FX inflows to Chinese financial institutions since 2H20 were more than US$20 billion a month –more than offsetting the tightening from a RRR rate hike.  The PBoC can further loosen outward capital controls to release some pressure on the RMB’s increase. In a report from November last year we wrote that Chinese policymakers attempted to slow the pace of appreciation in the RMB through a build-up in strategic FX assets by commercial banks and other financial institutions . Since August last year, China has relaxed outbound investment regulations and increased quotas to help channel domestic money into offshore financial markets. China’s commercial banks significantly ramped up their FX assets last year (Chart 16). In Q1 this year, commercial banks enriched their FX asset holdings by US$518.5 billion, a record high in the past five years.  Bottom Line: The PBoC is willing to allow more volatility in the USD/CNY exchange rate, but a sharp jump in the RMB’s value against a basket of other currencies would warrant further policy actions. Chart 16Chinese Banks Ramped Up FX Asset Holdings Chart 17Chinese Onshore Stocks Propped Up By Foreign Investors Investment Conclusions A tightened monetary and credit environment has created headwinds for Chinese equities since early this year. However, the domestic market appears to have found support at a key technical level of late (Chart 17). The recent rebound in China’s onshore stocks on the back of a sharp CNY appreciation and accelerated foreign capital inflows, in our view, are unsustainable on a cyclical basis. Despite buoyant global economic growth, investors should consider deteriorating cyclical conditions in China when judging the appropriate allocation for Chinese equities. While policy tightening has brought multiples closer to earth than last year, the upside in Chinese stock prices will be capped by subsiding stimulus and slower profit growth ahead. As such, a decisive breakout to the upside in Chinese stock prices will require major reflationary catalysts, and it is the reason we are still risk adverse on Chinese equities (Chart 18). Meanwhile, we continue to favor onshore consumer discretionary stocks relative to the broad A-share market. A strong RMB can be a booster to domestic discretionary spending. We initiated this trade in May last year and it has largely outperformed China’s onshore broad market (Chart 19). We will close the trade when the CNY loses its strength and Chinese domestic demand starts to falter. Chart 18Cyclical Performance In Chinese Stocks Is Still Driven By Economic Fundamentals Chart 19Keep A Long CD Position, But On A Short Leash   Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1The UN estimates that as many as 15 billion vaccine doses could be produced by the second half of 2021, enough to inoculate most of the world’s population. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Our hedging techniques proved profitable this year with the previous long VIX futures trade  bringing in gains just shy of 20%, on top of our two synthetic SPY long options trades that added 676% ($5.41/contract) and 2850% ($8.86/contract) in returns to the portfolio. Our reinstated and currently active June 2021 VIX futures hedge is about to expire for a loss of 27% as the market has proven to be resilient. Alas, wrong and early look the same! Indeed, we had a chance to crystalize some gains on May 12, but we believed, and still do, that a more pronounced correction is imminent, especially given the divergence between high-yield corporate spreads and the SPX (see chart) along with many other reasons, such as expensive valuations and an expected gradual growth slowdown. The VIX curve has also shifted higher over the past several months making it more expensive to roll the hedge, but a 5-10% SPX correction will make this trade profitable. Bottom Line: Roll the June 2021 VIX hedge into the September 2021 contract.    
Dear Client, I am delighted to take charge of the US Equity Strategy publication upon Anastasios Avgeriou’s departure. By way of introduction, I have been an investor for nearly 20 years, with my career spanning both the buy and sell side, bottom-up stock selection and top-down asset allocation, and fundamental and quantitative approaches to investing. I have invested through two business cycles (starting on the third one now), watched the internet stock bubble burst, and seen grown men shedding tears on Bloomberg keyboards in the summer of 2008 – the market has a way of humbling us, mere mortals. As a result of these diverse professional experiences, I became an agnostic and don’t believe there is one correct way to invest as long as a thesis is well thought through and backed up by numbers and in-depth analysis. I believe that different approaches to investing, fundamental and quant, bottom up and top down, should complement each other leading to “best of all worlds” results.  I also rely on an investment framework which is disciplined enough to offer a structure to fall back on to minimize behavioral biases, and yet is flexible to rapidly accommodate both “black swan” and “grey rhino” themes into investment decision-making. The following are the guiding principles of this investment framework. I hope this week’s publication will provide insights into my approach to investing and the nature of the US Equity Strategy product under my stewardship. I look forward to your feedback and suggestions. Kind Regards, Irene Tunkel Chief Strategist, US Equity Strategy   Principle 1: The Business Cycle Matters The business cycle and macroeconomic conditions are the cornerstones of any investment decision as they underpin the fundamentals of most assets, and preordain the types of assets likely to outperform based on their level of risk and sensitivity to economic growth. Analyzing the stages of the business cycle is a succinct way to summarize a wide range of economic data, such as capacity utilization, growth, policy, credit conditions and valuation. Each business cycle is different, yet on average across all cycles, the stages have the following characteristics (Table 1). Table 1Business Cycle Is In Expansion Stage Recovery: Policy is easy, and liquidity is plentiful, profits rebound but growth is scarce, inflation is low, risk aversion elevated, and stocks are still cheap. In this environment cyclicals, small caps and value outperform. Expansion: Policy is neutral, inflation is moderate, growth is abundant, risk aversion is low. During this phase it is cyclicals and small caps that shine. Slowdown: Inflation is higher, and policy is tightened, growth is rolling over, valuations are extended, and risk aversion is rising. In this environment of slowing growth, growth stocks, large caps, defensives and real assets outperform (Chart 1). Contraction: Deflation (or fears thereof) ensues, output is falling, growth is scarce and risk aversion is high. In this environment defensives, quality and highly profitable stocks rule the day. Chart 1Performance Of Equities In Different Stages Of Business Cycle Although the pandemic is barely over, the markets have galloped through the recovery stage and have landed squarely in expansion territory. US equities exhibited exceptional earnings growth of 52.5% year-on-year in Q1-2021 on the back of economic reopening, fiscal and monetary stimulus, and pent-up demand. Monetary and fiscal policy remain easy. The only deviation from a textbook description of expansion is low capacity utilization and a high unemployment rate which persist as aftereffects of factors specific to the pandemic: School closures and elevated unemployment benefits. High unemployment whilst demand for labor is high triggered inflationary pressures. However, we believe that we are near the end of the expansion stage and are about to transition into a moderate slowdown. While growth is to remain robust, it is bound to slow modestly from its peak: The Manufacturing ISM PMI came down from 64.7 in April to 61.2 in June. According to Bloomberg consensus estimates GDP growth is to slow from 6.4% in 2021 to 4% in 2022. The Fed is starting to “talk about talking about tightening”, and with inflation elevated many expect somewhat hawkish rhetoric/intervention from the Fed sooner than the end of 2022. Valuations are rich. Now may be opportune time to reposition for a slowdown to be ahead of the game. To do well in a slowdown stage, which may last for months but by no means heralds the end of a bull market in equities, we recommend dusting off growth, large-cap and defensive stocks and taking profits in some of the recent cyclical outperformers. A barbell approach may do well at this point, with portfolio overweights in both cyclical sectors such as energy and industrials along with more defensive plays such as health care and technology Principle 2: Shocks And Transient Themes Trump Both Macro And Fundamentals Macro is important on the cyclical time horizon but, intra-cycle, it is transient themes and macro shocks that move markets. These themes, also known as “black swans” and “grey rhinos”, are exogenous shocks and developments that dominate investor psyche. Mostly, they are policy driven, like trade war or fiscal stimulus, but occasionally are force majeure events, like Covid-19. Transient themes may have a positive or negative effect on the market. These are news and developments that are not immediately priced by the market but are not to be ignored or dismissed: They dominate investment outcomes irrespective of the normal market order of things. Usually transient themes are short-lived and fade once macroeconomic and fundamental data have readjusted to the new reality: Economic and earnings growth estimates have been revised, and relevant stock and sector returns have absorbed the shock. Back in March 2020, neither fundamentals nor valuations mattered. Nor did macro. Stocks were first sledgehammered by a “corona” theme, and then soared on a “liquidity is abundant” theme. It took analysts three months to downgrade US GDP growth to contraction (Chart 2)! Over the past few months, the only theme that seemed to matter to market participants was inflation, and inflation alone. Implications? Fear of inflation and sooner-than-expected Fed tightening have triggered an energetic selloff in bonds and defensive/growth equities. However, there are early signs that this theme is beginning to fade with rates stabilizing and growth stocks rebounding (Chart 3). Chart 2Markets Take Time To Price In Shocks Chart 3Inflation Fears Triggered Equity Rotation Principle 3: Interplay Between Valuations And Fundamentals Once the macro backdrop and transient themes are well understood, we zoom in our analysis to the valuations and fundamentals of individual styles and sectors to select the most attractive opportunities. Ideally, we are looking for the reasonably priced sectors that have solid fundamentals and can deliver strong growth. Finding sectors like that is easier said than done: Rarely do good and cheap exist in the same incarnation. Hence, investors need to compromise: Buy cheap stocks with poor earnings growth and challenged fundamentals or pay a premium for solid growth. A classic value/growth dilemma. Our approach is as follows: Cheap Sectors: Relative valuations are very important: Most value investments are mean-reversion plays (Chart 4) We don’t attach much weight to fundamentals – we don’t expect a stellar balance sheet or earnings growth In order to screen out value traps, we are looking for a catalyst for mean reversion For cheap stocks valuations are more important than fundamentals. Expensive Sectors: Relative valuations are much less important than growth expectations and fundamentals. Are fundamentals continuing to improve or have they reached a peak? Is earnings growth about to accelerate or slow? If fundamentals, e.g. RoE or margins are improving, and a slowdown in growth is not expected, then the valuation premium is justified. Chart 4Value Is Mean Reverting The software industry group is a case in point. Back in 2019-2020 valuations were eyewatering (more than two standard deviations above 10 years of history) but earnings growth was resilient, and profitability was in a multi-year upward trend. The valuation premium was justified. But late in 2020 RoE started deteriorating, and the industry group experienced a pullback. More recently, RoE has stabilized and turned. Returns are following (Chart 5). Chart 5Changes In Profitability Drive Valuations Principle 4: Stock Markets Are Markets Of Stocks Understanding the behavior of individual stocks makes top-down sector and style selection much more informed and nuanced. After all, we are dealing not just with a stock market, but with a market of stocks. Those glued to Bloomberg screens in March 2020 may have noticed a rare green with companies like Zoom, Citrix and Amazon rallying amidst stock Armageddon. These were green shoots (no pun intended) of one the most vigorous stock market rallies in history. Paying attention to stock-level data also gave an early pointer that pandemic shutdowns, as awful as they were, would be a boon for selected technology and e-commerce sectors (Chart 6). At present, we notice that cyclicals have not outperformed defensives since March. We also notice over the past two-to-three weeks the comeback of hot technology stocks, many of which are former “Covid-19 winners”, beaten up by a “back-to-work rally”. These are fintech and e-commerce names such as PayPal, Pinterest and Peloton, some of which are more than 50% off from their February peak. Reversal in performance of growth stocks is a sign that rates have stabilized, inflation fears are overdone, and US economic growth is gradually slowing.   Chart 6Covid-19 Winners Led S&P 500 Rebound Principle 5: Markets Are Forward Looking As Warren Buffet succinctly put it “buy risky assets when there is blood in the streets”, and “be fearful [i.e., sell], when others are greedy.” In other words, it is important to anticipate turning points, and be one step ahead of the market. Last year’s rally is a case in point, with the S&P 500 delivering the best return in history despite not having much to show for it in terms of earnings growth, with nearly 70% of S&P 500 returns coming from multiple expansion. Investors looked past shutdowns, rightly believing that the profit recession is transitory, companies are in sound financial health, valuations are at abysmal, once-in-a-lifetime, levels, and the V-shaped recovery will ensue once the pandemic is over (Chart 7). Chart 7Stocks Returns Lead Earnings   Conversely, the Q1-2021 earnings season was stellar, but many stocks, even those which exceeded expectations, have ceded gains: Stocks are priced to perfection, and investors concluded that, for some of them, the best days are behind, and growth is slowing (Chart 8). At present, trailing valuations of nearly all sectors and styles in the S&P 500 are at extreme levels, trading at 36x trailing earnings. However, forward PEs are on average 9 points lower, around 21x forward earnings. Hope is that the stock market will rerate and grow into its big shoes within the next 12 months with expected EPS growth of 23%. We think it will! Chart 8During Q1-2021 Earning Season, Beats Were Not Rewarded  Principle 6: Asset Prices Respond To The “Second Derivative” This principle is a corollary to “markets are forward looking”. Usually the rate of growth is already priced in, as markets are efficient and new information arrives as a change in expected growth, i.e. the impulse. Change in the growth outlook is absorbed by the markets and is a leading indicator of turning points in equity returns. Most often the impulse relates to change in economic or earnings growth expectations. For example, sales for the hotels industry group are still falling, but at a lower rate than before (the second derivative is improving). These “less bad” numbers are enough to send hotels returns soaring (Chart 9). Chart 9Hotels Are Rallying On “Less Bad” Sales Principle 7: Thematic Investing: Channeling Cathie Woods Thematic investing is really “smart” momentum investing, but its appeal lies in being able to identify a theme/catalyst that unites stocks and makes them move in unison. Knowing a theme behind momentum helps one to understand its thematic drivers and anticipate turning points. Arguably, thematic investing is a nuisance for stock pickers, but a boon for top-down investors: Identifying a theme has a higher impact on portfolio returns than choosing the individual stocks to represent it. For example, identifying recovery in air travel and investing into the Jets ETF is a more important decision than choosing the right airline stock. Since February 2020, American Airlines is 94% and Delta is 98% correlated with Jets ETF (Chart 10). Knowing the drivers, we can brainstorm what can trigger a reversal of this theme, for example: An increase in the price of oil, a structural shift in business travel, falling consumer confidence, and a high household dissaving rate. Thematic investing is popular as it allows an investor to ride the momentum yet also be equipped to anticipate turning points. Chart 10Air Travel Stocks Are Highly Correlated Thematic investing may be over a variety of investment horizons (stocks benefitting from retirement of baby boomers being an example of a structural theme versus stocks benefitting from post-corona supply-chain disruption being (hopefully) a short-lived theme). Further, themes can be high tech, such as autonomous driving or green energy, and low tech, such as the pandemic “puppy boom”. The most prominent and widely discussed themes in the recent months are “Covid-19 winners” vs “back to work”. Arguably, thematic investing is the “passive investing” of the future – a trend illustrated by the popularity of the ARK funds managed by Cathie Woods. Going forward, the US Equity service will be covering investment themes in a series of Special Reports. Principle 8: “No Country Is An Island” Lastly, while the focus of this publication is squarely on the US equity market, it is important to keep an eye on developments in the rest of the world. Companies in the S&P 500 derive 43% of sales from abroad. As a result, corporate earnings are highly sensitive to the direction of the trade-weighted dollar both due to the price of goods and to translation effects. Recent depreciation of the dollar will boost corporate earnings growth, especially for the technology (58% of earnings outside the US), materials (56%) and energy (50%) sectors. It takes roughly three to six months to fully absorb dollar moves into sales growth (Chart 11). Further, the economic growth rates of the major US trading partners, i.e., Europe, Mexico, Canada, and China, also have a profound effect on the US economy with transmission through the US trade balance, dollar movements and Treasury yields (Chart 12). Chart 11US Dollar Drives S&P 500 Sales Chart 12Major US Trading Partners Affect US Economy Bottom Line Markets are complex: Macro works until it does not, expensive stocks can be a good investment, and an equity rally may take off in the midst of an earnings recession. Yet, we believe that the eight principles of investing that we have outlined above will guide us through the noise and help successfully navigate equity markets. Irene Tunkel Chief Strategist, US Equity Strategy irene.tunkel@bcaresearch.com  
The 10-year US Treasury yield has been range bound between 1.5% and 1.7% for the past three months despite fireworks in the US economic data, from CPI readings to unemployment beats. The fact that the bond market has refused to budge no matter how positive US data got, confirms our view that all the good news has already been priced in. Citigroup US economic surprise index (CESI) is hovering around zero, which corroborates the same message. Given a tight positive correlation (0.44) between CESI and UST10Y, and the fact that growth is peaking, it is unlikely that the bond market will enter another aggressive sell-off phase (see chart). The implication for equities is that long-duration growth equities, beaten down by rising yields, may stage a come back, especially once inflation data makes a clear ∩-turn on a year-over-year basis. Bottom Line: Bond market is likely to remain calm over the next three to six months, and it’s time to revisit beaten down growth names. Stay tuned for future research on the topic.
In today’s Sector Insight report, we take the opportunity to summarize our views on the US equity market return expectations across different investment horizons. And by doing so help clients reconcile our views with the other BCA publications. Currently, US Equity Strategy is cyclically (6 to 12 months investment horizon) bullish on the prospects of the broad equity market. The reasons for that are numerous: Pent up demand does not show signs of waning, supply chain bottlenecks are yet to be resolved, and stimulus checks and excess savings are yet to be spend. All of the above is to contribute to robust earnings growth which we expect to surprise on the upside, just like during Q1-2021 earnings season. Looking ahead we do not anticipate a recession but only a modest slowdown in a current fast pace of economic growth. This business cycle bull market rally has not run its course. Having said that, we believe that in the near term the market is ripe for a correction. It is fully valued, if not outright expensive: nearly 50% of all industries have PEs ranking in top 10 percentile of their ten-year history. There is simply not much valuation cushion left to absorb any negative shocks. More specifically, there are two major risks that can serve as a catalyst for a selloff: 1) Fed may surprise the market with hawkish rhetoric if jobs data exceeds expectations or inflation exhibits a staying power; 2) China growth deceleration surprises further on the downside. And these are just the known risks. Further, we are mindful of the SPX risk/reward profile over the next 3-6 months. The market expects EPS NTM of $196 and if we assume an optimistic 22x forward P/E multiple, this equates to SPX target of 4,312 over the next 3-6 months. This is a 3% upside from the current level of 4200. Deploying new capital at these levels of valuations and with a limited upside is like picking up pennies in front of a steamroller.  Our recommendation is to raise dry powder by taking profits from some of the recent winners like industrials and basic materials, and redeploying capital during the next market pullback which would provide a more favorable risk/return profile. Bottom Line: We remain cyclically bullish on the prospects of the broad equity market, but are keeping our guard up in the near-term. ​​​​​​​
Highlights Political and corporate climate activism will increase the cost of developing the resources required to produce and deliver energy going forward – e.g., oil and gas wells; pipelines; copper mines, and refineries. Over the short run, the fastest way for investor-owned companies (IOCs) to address accelerated reductions in CO2 emissions imposed by courts and boards is to walk away from the assets producing them, which could be disruptive over the medium term. Longer term, state-owned companies (SOCs) not facing the constraints of IOCs likely will be required to provide an increasing share of the resources needed to produce and distribute energy. The real difficulty will come in the medium term. Capex for critical metals like copper languishes, just as the call on these metals steadily increases over the next 30 years (Chart of the Week). The evolution to a low-carbon future has not been thought through at the global policy level. A real strategy must address underinvestment in base metals and incentivize the development of technology via a carbon tax – not emissions trading schemes – so firms can innovate to avoid it. We remain long energy and metals exposures.1 Feature And you may ask yourself, "Well … how did I get here?" David Byrne, Once In A Lifetime Energy markets – broadly defined – are radically transforming from week to week. The latest iteration of these markets' evolution is catalyzed by climate activists, who are finding increasing success in court and on corporate boards – sometimes backed by major institutional investors – and forcing oil and gas producers to accelerate CO2 emission-reduction programs.2 Climate activists' arguments are finding increasing purchase because they have merit: Years of stiff-arming investors seeking clarity on the oil and gas producers' decarbonization agendas, coupled with a pronounced failure to provide returns in excess of their cost of capital, have given activists all of the ammo needed to argue their points. Chart of the WeekCall On Metals For Energy Will Increase This activism is not limited to the courts or boardrooms. Voters in democratic societies with contested elections also are seeking redress for failures of their governments to effectively channel mineral wealth back into society on an equitable basis, and to protect their environments and the habitats of indigenous populations. This voter activism is especially apparent in Chile and Peru, where elections and constitutional conventions likely will result in higher taxes and royalties on metals IOCs operating in these states, which will increase production costs and ultimately be passed on to consumers.3 These states account for ~ 40% of world copper output. IOCs Walk Away Earlier this week, Exxon walked away from an early-stage offshore oil development project in Ghana.4 This followed the unfavorable court rulings and boardroom setbacks experienced by Royal Dutch Shell, Chevron and Exxon recently (referenced in fn. 2). While the company had no comment on its abrupt departure, its action shows how IOCs can exercise their option to put a project back to its host government, thus illustrating one of the most readily available alternatives for energy IOCs to meet court- or board-mandated CO2 emissions targets. If these investments qualify as write-offs, the burden will be borne by taxpayers. As climate activism increases, state-owned companies (SOCs) not facing the constraints of IOCs likely will be required to provide an increasing share of the resources – particularly oil and gas – needed to produce and distribute energy going forward. This is not an unalloyed benefit, as the SOCs still face stranded-asset risks, if they invest in longer-lived assets that are obviated by a successful renewables + grid buildout globally. That is a cost that will have to be compensated, when the SOCs work up their capex allocations. Still, if legal and investor activism significantly accelerates IOCs' capex reductions in oil and gas projects, the SOCs – particularly those in OPEC 2.0 – will be able to expand their position as the dominant supplier in the global oil market, and could perhaps increase their influence on price levels and forward-curve dynamics (Chart 2).5 Chart 2OPEC 2.0s Could Expand If Investor Activism Increases Higher Call On Metals At present, there is a lot of talk about the need to invest in renewable electricity generation and the grid structure supporting it, but very little in the way of planning for this transition. Other than repeated assertions of its necessity, little is being said regarding how exactly this strategy will be executed given the magnitude of the supply increase in metals required. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the refined copper market, which has been in a physical deficit – i.e., production minus consumption is negative – for the last 6 years (Chart 3). Physical copper markets in China, which consumes more than 50% of refined output, remain extremely tight, as can be seen in the ongoing weakness of treating charges and refining charges (TC/RC) for the past year (Chart 4). These charges are inversely correlated to prices – when TC/RCs are low, it means there is surplus refining capacity for copper – unrefined metal is scarce, which drives down demand for these services. Chart 3Coppers Physical Deficit Likely Persist Chart 4Chinas Refined Copper Supply Remains TightTheoretically, high prices will incentivize higher levels of production. However, after the last decade’s ill-timed investment in new mine discoveries and expansions, mining companies have become more wary with their investments, and are using earnings to pay dividends and reduce debt. This leads us to believe that mining companies will not invest in new mine discoveries but will use capital expenditure to expand brownfield projects to meet rising demand. In the last decade, as copper demand rose, capex for copper rose from 2010-2012, and fell from 2013-2016 (Chart 5). During this time, the copper ore grade was on a declining trend. This implies that the new copper brought online was being mined from lower-grade ore, due to the expansion of existing projects(Chart 6). Chart 5Copper Capex Growth Remains Weak Chart 6Copper Ore-Quality Declines Persist Through Capex Cycle Capex directed at keeping ore production above consumption will not be sufficient to avoid major depletions of ore supplies beginning in 2024, according to Wood Mackenzie. The consultancy foresees a cumulative deficit of ~ 16mm MT by 2040. Plugging this gap will require $325-$500 billion of investment in the copper mining sector.6 The Case For A Carbon Tax The low-carbon future remains something of a will-o'-the-wisp – seen off in the future but not really developed in the present. Most striking in discussions of the low-carbon transition is the assumption of resource availability – particularly bases metals –in, e.g., the IEA's Net Zero by 2050, A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector, published last month. In the IEA's document, further investment in hydrocarbons is not required beyond 2025. The copper, aluminum, steel, etc., required to build the generation and supporting grid infrastructure will be available and callable as needed to build all the renewable generation the world requires. The document is agnostic between carbon trading and carbon taxes as a way to price carbon and incentivize the technology that would allow firms and households to avoid a direct cost on carbon. A real strategy must address the fact that most of the world will continue to rely on fossil fuels for decades, as development goals are pursued. Underinvestment in base metals and its implications for the buildout of generation and grids has to be a priority if these assets are to be built. Given the 5-10-year lead times base metals mines require to come online, it is obvious that beyond the middle of this decade, the physical reality of demand exceeding supply will assert itself. A good start would be a global effort to impose and collect carbon taxes uniformly across states.7 This would need to be augmented with a carbon club, which restricts admission and trading privileges  to those states adopting such a scheme. Harmonizing the multiple emissions trading schemes worldwide will be a decades-long effort that is unlikely to succeed. Such schemes also can be gamed by larger players, producing pricing distortions. A hard and fast tax that is enforced in all of the members of such a carbon club would immediately focus attention on the technology required to avoid paying it – mobilizing capital, innovation and entrepreneurial drive to make it a reality. This would support carbon-capture, use and storage technologies as well, thus extending the life of existing energy resources as the next generation of metals-based resources is built out. In addition, a carbon tax raises revenue for governments, which can be used for a variety of public policies, including reducing other taxes to reduce the overall burden of taxation. Lastly, a tax eliminates the potential for short-term price volatility in the pricing of carbon – as long as households and firms know what confronts them they can plan around it.  Tax revenues also can be used to reduce the regressive nature of such levies. Investment Implications The lack of a coherent policy framework that addresses the very real constraints on the transition to a low-carbon economy makes the likelihood of a volatile, years-long evolution foreordained. We believe this will create numerous investment opportunities as underinvestment in hydrocarbons and base metals production predisposes oil, natural gas and base metals prices to move higher in the face of strong and rising demand. We remain long commodity index exposure – the S&P GSCI and GSCI Commodity Dynamic Roll Strategy ETF (COMT), which is optimized to take advantage of the most backwardated commodity forward curves in the index. These positions were up 5.3% and 7.2% since inception on December 7, 2017 and March 12, 2021, respectively, at Tuesday's close. We also remain long the MSCI Global Metals & Mining Producers ETF (PICK), which is up 33.9% since it was put on December 10, 2020. Expecting continued volatility in metals – copper in particular – we will look for opportunities to re-establish positions in COMEX/CME Copper after being stopped out with gains. A trailing stop was elected on our long Dec21 copper position established September 10, 2020, which was closed out with a 48.2% gain on May 21, 2021. Our long calendar 2022 vs short calendar 2023 COMEX copper backwardation trade established April 22, 2021, was closed out on May 20, 2021, leaving us with a return of 305%.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish OPEC 2.0 offered no surprises to markets this week, as it remained committed to returning just over 2mm b/d of production to the market over the May-July period, 70% of which comes from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), according to Platts. While Iran's return to the market is not a given in OPEC 2.0's geometry, we have given better than even odds it will return to the market beginning in 3Q21 and restore most of the 1.4mm b/d not being produced at present to the market over the course of the following year. OPEC itself expects demand to increase 6mm b/d this year, somewhat above our expectation of 5.3mm b/d. Stronger demand could raise Brent prices above our average $63/bbl forecast for this year (Chart 7). Brent was trading above $71/bbl as we went to press. Base Metals: Bullish BHP declared operations at its Escondida and Spence mines were running at normal rates despite a strike by some 200 operations specialists. BHP is employing so-called substitute workers to conduct operation, according to reuters.com, which also reported separate unions at both mines are considering strike actions in the near future. Precious Metals: Bullish The Fed’s reluctance to increase nominal interest rates despite indications of higher inflation will reduce real rates, which will support higher gold prices (Chart 8). We agree with our colleagues at BCA Research's US Bond Strategy that the Fed is waiting for the US labor market to reach levels consistent with its assessment of maximum employment before it makes its initial rate hike in this interest-rate cycle. Subsequent rate changes, however, will be based on realized inflation and inflation expectations. In our opinion, the Fed is following this ultra-accommodative monetary policy approach to break the US liquidity trap, brought about by a rise in precautionary savings due to the pandemic. In addition, we continue to expect USD weakness, which also will support gold and precious metals prices. We remain long gold, expecting prices to clear $2,000/oz this year. Ags/Softs: Neutral Corn prices fell more than 2% Wednesday, following the release of USDA estimates showing 95% of the corn crop was planted by 31 May 2021, well over the 87% five-year average. This was in line with expectations. However, the Department's assessment that 76% of the crop was in good-to-excellent condition exceeded market expectations. Chart 7 Chart 8 Footnotes 1     Please see Trade Tables below. 2     Please see OPEC, Russia seen gaining more power with Shell Dutch ruling and EXCLUSIVE BlackRock backs 3 dissidents to shake up Exxon board -sources published by reuters.com June 1, 2021 and May 25, 2021. 3    Please see Chile's govt in shock loss as voters pick independents to draft constitution published by reuters.com May 17, 2021, and Peru’s elite in panic at prospect of hard-left victory in presidential election published by ft.com June 1, 2021.  Peru has seen significant capital flight on the back of these fears.  See also Results from Chile’s May 2021 elections published by IHS Markit May 21, 2021 re a higher likelihood of tax increases for the mining sector.  The risk of nationalization is de minimis, according to IHS. 4    Please see Exxon walks away from stake in deepwater Ghana block published by worldoil.com June 1, 2021. 5    Please see OPEC 2.0's Production Strategy In Focus, which we published on May 20, 2021, for a recap our how we model OPEC 2.0's strategy.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 6    Please see Will a lack of supply growth come back to bite the copper industry?, published by Wood Mackenzie on March 23, 2021. 7     Please see The Challenges and Prospects for Carbon Pricing in Europe published by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies last month for a discussion of carbon taxes vs. emissions trading schemes.     Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2021 Summary of Closed Trades
Special Report Highlights Asset Management Regulation (AMR) represents a critical and successful structural reform that is defusing risks in the most hazardous parts of China’s credit system. This bodes well for long-term sustainability of the nation’s financial system and, hence, its long-term economic outlook. That said, the sheer size of risky products and shadow banking makes it impossible to reduce systemic risk without hampering overall credit origination. AMR will dampen bank and shadow banking credit growth further and the credit impulse will be negative by year-end. As a result, China's growth will decelerate. The risk-reward profile of Chinese stocks remains poor. Favor Chinese local currency government bonds as yields will drop further. Feature Chart 1China’s Growth Is Set To Decelerate China’s broad credit and money growth have relapsed substantially. Given that they have historically been reliable leading indicators of business cycles (Chart 1), the question is: how far will credit growth decelerate. When gauging the magnitude of a money/credit slowdown, one should not only look at borrowing costs but also at the willingness and capacity of creditors to extend credit. In this context, it is essential to examine the impact of Asset Management Regulation (AMR) in China on both bank and non-bank credit growth. Please refer to Box 1 below for a more detailed discussion on AMR.     BOX 1 What Is AMR? AMR (Asset Management Regulation) was introduced in 2018 to mitigate financial system risks, increase transparency of financial products, and, hence, enhance investor protection. Financial institutions (banks and non-banks) were originally obliged to meet AMR requirements by the end of 2020. However, after the pandemic broke out, this term was extended to the end of 2021. The main objectives of AMR are: To restrict financial institutions from dodging financial regulations and prevent them from engaging in regulatory arbitrage. To prohibit financial institutions from providing other financial organizations with “channels” for evading regulatory requirements. To preclude banks from investing in high-risk assets. To forbid financial institutions from providing explicit or implicit guarantees for the principal and return on asset management products. AMR non-compliant products need to be either terminated or revamped to become AMR compliant before December 31, 2021. Assessing the value of outstanding AMR non-compliant products will help to gauge the actual impact of AMR on credit growth over the course of this year. A portion of banks’ wealth management products (WMP) and single fund trust products are AMR non-compliant and will need to be terminated or revamped. Commercial banks’ WMPs represent fund investment and management plans developed, designed and sold by commercial banks to individuals or institutions. In China, individual investors are the main customers for banks’ WMPs. In 2020, individual investors accounted for more than 99% in number of investors and 87% in investment amounts.1 The outstanding amount of WMPs is presently RMB 25 trillion. Single fund trusts have one investor – usually a bank or another financial institution. Given the disclosure regulation for single fund trusts is much looser than other fund trusts, it was prevalently used by financial institutions, including banks, to channel funds into investments to achieve regulatory arbitrage. Chart 2China Has Not Yet Deleveraged AMR represents regulatory tightening and will negatively affect bank and non-bank credit growth over the course of this year. In this report we examine what its impact will be on broad credit growth as banks and shadow banking attempt to comply with AMR by end of December this year. Authorities in China have been conducting well-thought-out surgical reforms – AMR being the cornerstone of these – to curb and restructure the risky elements of the credit system. By doing so, they have already dramatically reduced systemic risk in the financial system. Regardless of how deft and precise these reforms have been, they will continue to weigh on bank and shadow banking credit growth. The basis is that the sheer size of risky products and shadow banking makes it impossible to reduce systemic risk without hampering overall credit origination. It should also be noted that China has not yet deleveraged (Chart 2). How Large Are AMR Non-Compliant Assets? We reckon that AMR’s effect on broad credit is mainly through its impact on commercial banks’ Wealth Management Products (WMP) and single fund trusts. S&P Global2 estimates that by the end of 2020, banks will still have RMB 8.5 trillion in off-balance sheet WMP to restructure.  Single fund trusts’ assets stood at RMB 7.7 trillion in March 2021. However, to avoid double counting, flows from banks to trust funds (“bank-trust cooperation”) should be deducted from this value. The basis is that channeling funds by banks via trust companies is already captured in banks’ WMP statistics. Overall, non-compliant AMR assets that need to be revamped by year-end are as follows: Banks’ non-compliant WPM          8.5 trillion Single fund trust assets excluding “bank-trust cooperation”                   1.2 trillion Total                                          RMB 9.7 trillion This RMB 9.7 trillion represents 3.6% of total social financing (TSF) excluding equity issuance and 4.2% of private credit. The latter is defined as TSF excluding equity and central and local government bond issuance as well as special bonds.  Chart 3China: Various Borrowing Costs SP Global2 estimates that around RMB 5 trillion WMP will be revamped and made AMR compliant during this year. To put this figure into perspective, banks revamped RMB 4.8 trillion in 2020 and RMB 5.7 trillion in 2019. This will leave RMB 3.5 trillion of non-compliant WMP that banks are likely to take on their balance sheet before year-end. Even in the case of revamped WMP and single fund trusts, there will be unintended consequences for borrowers. In particular, the cost of borrowing could rise and/or the maturity of loans could be shortened. Both will weigh down on economic activity in general, and investment in the real economy in particular.   With full transparency and no implicit guarantee from banks, investors will require higher interest rates to invest in these products (Chart 3). In addition, investors will opt for shorter maturities of these products. Impact On Bank Credit… Chart 4China: Bank Loan Approvals And Bank Credit Impulse As banks take these AMR non-compliant WMP onto their balance sheets, their assets will automatically expand even though they will not originate new loans/provide financing to the real economy. The estimated RMB 3.5 trillion of WMP is equivalent to 1.5% of commercial bank broad credit and 1.2% of their assets. Hence, AMR will reinforce the deceleration in new credit origination. Both bank assets and broad bank credit will slow and their impulses will contract further (Chart 4).   Importantly, bringing these assets onto their balance sheet will require banks to both (1) allocate more capital to support these new assets and (2) increase provisions for the portion of these assets that are non-performing. The non-performing share of these AMR-non-compliant assets could be significant given that funds from off-balance sheet WMP were often invested in high-risk, high-return projects. These often represent claims on risky businesses, including property developers and local government financing vehicles (LGFV). In brief, there were reasons why banks did not initially put these assets on their balance sheets and doing so now will not be inconsequential. Overall, this move will hinder commercial banks’ ability and willingness to originate new credit, i.e., to provide new funding to the real economy (Chart 4). …And Shadow Banking Chart 5 demonstrates that shadow banking credit – comprised of trust loans, entrust loans, and unrealized banker acceptance bills – has been contracting. Outstanding shadow banking credit at RMB 23.9 trillion makes up 9% of TSF excluding equity issuance. Single fund trust loans – please refer to Box 1 above for more information – are the most vulnerable part of shadow banking to AMR. Despite their having contracted since 2017, single fund trust assets excluding “bank-trust cooperation” still amount to RMB 1.2 trillion or 0.5% of TSF, excluding equity issuance (Chart 6). Chart 5China’s Shadow Banking Continues To Shrink Chart 6Single Fund Trusts Are The Most Vulnerable To AMR Regulation     This type of financing will continue to shrink, weighing on aggregate credit flow. Although investors in these products might reinvest their funds in AMR-compliant funds, they will demand higher interest rates to offset higher credit risk. The basis is that full transparency will inform them that the trust companies and banks can neither guarantee principal nor interest on their investments. Higher interest rates demanded by investors in trust funds or their reduced financing will affect borrowers that rely on funding from this source. Specifically, trust funds investment in property developers and LGFV has been and will continue to shrink (Chart 7).      Impact On Property Developers And LGFV Property developers and LGFV are among the most vulnerable segments to reduced financing because of AMR. Trust companies have meaningful exposure to both real estate developers and LGFV. RMB 2.3 trillion in trust funds are invested in real estate and RMB 1.2 trillion in government projects, mostly representing claims on LGFV. Trust companies’ claims to both segments have been and will continue contracting (Chart 7). Property developers and LGFV are not only vulnerable to curtailed funding due to AMR but also from authorities’ campaign to limit their debt. Three Red Lines policy for property developers imposes caps on their debt. In addition, bank regulators have imposed limits on banks’ claims on property developers as well as residential mortgages (Chart 8, top panel). Loans are capped at 40% for the largest state-owned lenders, while banks’ mortgage lending should be no more than 32.5% of large banks’ outstanding credit. The regulations are even more rigorous for smaller banks. For smaller banks, caps on loans to real estate and mortgage loans are 27.5% and 20%, respectively.3 Banks’ credit to property developers and household mortgages are growing at a historically low pace and will likely decelerate further (Chart 8, bottom panel). To sum up, banks and shadow banking will curtail their exposure to property developers and LGFV. Consequently, these credit-intensive sectors will have to shrink their capital spending and construction activity. The latter will have ramifications for raw materials and industrial sectors exposed to traditional infrastructure and construction. Chart 7Trust Funds’ Exposure To Property Developers And LGFVs Chart 8Banks’ Exposure To Property Developers And Residential Mortgages   Investment Conclusions On the positive side, AMR represents critical and successful structural reform that is defusing risks in the most hazardous parts of China’s credit system. This bodes well for long-term sustainability of the nation’s financial system and, hence, its long-term economic outlook. Nevertheless, this regulatory tightening along with clampdown on the property market and local government debt will weigh on the Chinese business cycle over the next six-to-nine months: Private credit growth will continue downshifting and its impulse will turn negative, weighing on credit-exposed sectors (Chart 9). Although the private credit impulse is unlikely to reach -10% of GDP like it did in 2018, it will likely turn negative by year-end. Our guess it might be negative 3-4 % of GDP later this year. Chart 9China: Private Credit Impulse Will Turn Negative By Year-End Chart 10China: Fiscal Spending Impulse Will Be Modestly Positive In 2021   Public sector credit – measured as borrowing by central and local government, including special-purpose bonds – will continue decelerating according to bond quotas for this year. Still, higher government revenue will offset the slump in government borrowing so that government spending will grow in 2021 from a year ago. In aggregate, the fiscal spending impulse for all of 2021 will be positive at 1.6% of GDP (Chart 10). Overall, the fiscal spending impulse of 1.6% of GDP in 2021 will not offset the private credit impulse that we reckon to be about negative 3-4% of GDP. The upshot will be a modestly negative aggregate credit and fiscal spending impulse. The latter will be slightly worse than the readings of this indicator during the 2011 and 2014-15 slowdowns but more positive than in 2018 (please refer to Chart 1 above). This heralds a non-trivial business cycle slowdown. The latter will be concentrated in areas that usually benefit from credit and fiscal stimulus. Construction activity and traditional infrastructure spending are the most vulnerable areas. This entails that Chinese demand for raw materials will disappoint and base metals prices are vulnerable. With regard to investment strategy, investors should continue favoring Chinese local currency government bonds over stocks. As the economy decelerates, bond yields will drift lower. Share prices remain vulnerable. Chart 11 illustrates that net EPS revisions for the MSCI China A-share index has rolled over but has not yet dropped to their previous lows. Our hunch that EPS slowdown is not yet fully priced into the Chinese onshore equity market. Concerning MSCI China Investable non-TMT stocks, they have rolled over at their previous high (Chart 12). Given the negative corporate profit outlook, the risk-reward is unattractive both in absolute terms and relative to global equities. Chart 11Chinese Stocks: EPS Growth Expectations Will Downshift Further Chart 12An Intermediate-Term Top In Chinese Non-TMT Stocks?   In the long run, however, the de-risking of the credit system is bullish for Chinese share prices. Declining systemic financial risks entail a lower equity risk premium. Consequently, equity valuations will ultimately be re-rated. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Qingyun Xu Associate Editor Qingyun@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 2020 Bank’s Wealth Management Product Report 2 Source: SP Global "China Banks May Still Have RMB3 Trillion In Shadow Assets By Year-End Deadline." 3 https://www.cbirc.gov.cn/cn/view/pages/ItemDetail.html?docId=955074&ite…   Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
On Friday 4th June, I will be debating my colleague Peter Berezin on the future of cryptocurrencies. I believe that the cryptocurrency asset-class has substantial further price upside, whereas Peter thinks that it is going to zero. So please join us for what will be a lively debate on Friday 4th June at 10am EDT, (3pm BST, 4pm CEST). Dhaval Joshi Feature Chart of the WeekThe Fractal Structure Of Cryptos Had Become Very Fragile Today’s report is a brief review and update of the 22 short-term trades that we have recommended through the past three months, and it demonstrates the power of Fractals: The Competitive Advantage In Investing. At the end of the report we also introduce a new trade. Our 22 recommendations have comprised 10 structured trades – which include profit-targets, symmetrical stop-losses, and expiry dates – plus a further 12 recommendations without structured exit points. In summary, three structured recommendations have hit their profit targets: short NOK/PLN +2.6 percent, long European Personal Products versus Autos +15 percent, and long Finland versus Sweden +4.7 percent. Two open trades are in profit, and one is flat. Against this, two structured recommendations hit their stop-losses: short GBP/JPY -2.2 percent, and long New Zealand versus MSCI ACWI -4 percent. Meanwhile, long China versus Netherlands reached its expiry date at a slight loss -1.8 percent. And one open trade is in loss. This results in a ‘win ratio’ at a commendable 55 percent – counting a ‘full win’ as hitting the profit target, a ‘full loss’ as hitting the symmetrical stop-loss, and pro-rata for partial wins and losses. The win ratio at 55 percent is commendable because, in recent months, all financial assets been strongly correlated to the ebb and flow of bond yields and the ‘reflation trade’ – as we highlighted in The Pareto Principle Of Investment. This has made the current environment a difficult one to find genuinely independent investment ideas. Even more commendably, the 12 unstructured recommendations, which included Bitcoin, Ethereum, and several commodities, have all anticipated exhaustions or sharp reversals. The sections below review the structured and unstructured recommendations in chronological order. The 10 Structured Recommendations 1.            18th March: Short NOK/PLN                 Achieved its +2.6 percent profit target. 2.            25th March: Short GBP/JPY                 Hit its -2.2 percent stop-loss. 3.            1st April: Long European Personal Products vs. European Autos                 Achieved its +15 percent profit target. 4.            15th April: Long China vs. Netherlands                 Expired at -1.8 percent (versus its +5 percent profit target). 5.            15th April: Long Finland vs. Sweden                 Achieved its +4.7 percent profit target. 6.            22nd April: Long New Zealand vs. MSCI ACWI                 Hit its -4 percent stop-loss. 7.            6th May: Short Building and Construction (PKB) vs. Healthcare (XLV)                 In profit, and we expect further upside (Chart I-2). Chart I-2Short Building And Construction Versus Healthcare 8.            6th May: Short France vs. Japan                 In loss, but we expect upside. 9.            13th May: Long USD/CAD                 Flat, but we expect upside. 10.          20th May: Long 10-year T-bond vs. 10-year TIPS                 In profit, and we expect further upside (Chart I-3). Chart I-3Short Inflation Expectations The 12 Unstructured Recommendations 1.            18th March: Stocks vs. Bonds (MSCI ACWI vs. 30-year T-bond) to consolidate                 As anticipated, global stocks have consolidated versus bonds since mid-March, and we expect the consolidation to continue. 2.            18th March: Long 30-year T-bond                 Likewise, exactly as anticipated, bond prices have rebounded since mid-March, and we expect the rebound to continue (Chart I-4). Chart I-4Bond Prices To Rebound 3.            25th March: Tactically short Bitcoin                 Bitcoin subsequently corrected by almost 40 percent, but the correction is mostly done (Chart I-1).   4.            25th March: Tactically short Ethereum                 Likewise, Ethereum subsequently corrected, but the correction is mostly done. 5.            15th April: Short Taiwan vs. China                 Taiwan subsequently corrected versus   China, but the correction is mostly done. 6.            22nd April: Short PKR/USD                 As anticipated, PKR/USD corrected in the subsequent month. 7.            6th May: Short Corn vs. Wheat 8.            6th May: Short Timber (Chart I-5) Chart I-5Short Timber 9.            13th May: Short Soybeans 10.          20th May: Short Copper 11.          20th May: Short Tin 12.          27th May: Short Iron Ore                 As anticipated, all the above commodities have corrected, and in some cases very sharply. But the correction is still underway. New Recommendation Finally, this week’s new recommendation comes from the MSCI world equity index universe. The massive outperformance of Austria versus Chile – in large part due to the different sector compositions of the two markets – is fragile on all fractal dimensions: 65-day, 130-day, and 260-day (Chart I-6). Chart I-6Short Austria Vs. Chile Accordingly, the recommendation is to short Austria versus Chile, setting the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 7 percent.   Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System Fractal Trades 6-Month Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Equity Market Performance   Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart I-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Euro Area Chart I-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Europe Ex Euro Area Chart I-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Asia Chart I-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Other Developed   Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart I-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart I-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart I-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart I-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  
In yesterday’s Special Report, we initiated a long S&P oil & gas exploration & production / short S&P metals & mining market neutral trade as a way to capitalize on the China/DM growth differential on a 6 to 12-month time horizon. This trade is also a way to express our view that crude oil will likely outperform copper going forward. While we outlined the demand side of the story in the Special Report, today we touch on relative supply dynamics. Ultimately, supply of crude oil and copper is dictated by how much companies invest in capex. It allows them to dig up more commodities in the future, thus increasing supply and lowering commodity prices. The chart below illustrates this relationship for copper and crude producers and highlights that on a relative basis, copper producers’ capex meaningfully outpaced the one of oil producers (relative capex shown inverted). In short, that means that not only relative demand dynamics are a major headwind for the copper/crude oil price ratio, but the supply side of the story will also be a drag. Bottom Line: We reiterate our newly established long S&P oil & gas exploration & production / short S&P metals & mining pair trade. For more details on the rationale behind the trade, please refer to yesterday’s Special Report.