Steel
Highlights Seasonal capacity restrictions in China during the winter heating months - when pollution from steel mills is particularly high - and continued efforts to limit particulate emissions in major cities will drive steel prices higher. The steel rebar market in China is backwardated, indicating physical markets are tight; inventories have been falling since mid-March. We expect prices to remain elevated going into the winter months, when capacity restrictions kick in. Ongoing capacity reductions in steelmaking will favor higher-grade iron ores, which will widen price differentials versus lower-grade ores. We are recommending a long China rebar futures on the SHFE in 1Q19 vs short 62% Fe iron ore futures on the Dalian DCE in 1Q19 at tonight's close, based on our research. Energy: Overweight. Loadings of Iranian crude are expected to be curtailed beginning this month, as the November 4 deadline for the imposition of U.S. secondary sanctions kick in. Our base case calls for the loss of 500k b/d of exports from Iran; our ensemble forecast includes an estimate of 1mm b/d. Base Metals: Neutral. BHP asked the Chilean government to intervene in the strike called by unions at its Escondida mine. Union officials delayed strike action while talks are being held. Negotiators have until August 14 to reach an agreement. Reuters reported Chile's copper production was up 12.3% y/y in 1H18 to 2.83mm MT.1 Precious Metals: Neutral. U.S. sanctions on trading gold and precious metals with Iran went into effect earlier this week. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Chinese imports of U.S. soybeans could fall 10mm MT over the next year, if pig and chicken farmers switch to lower-protein feed and substitutes like sunflower seeds, and boost local production of the legume, state-run news service Xinhua reported.2 The USDA expects U.S. exports of 55.52mm MT of soybeans in the 2018 - 19 crop year, down 1.22mm MT from last year. Feature Steel prices have performed exceptionally since the beginning of 2Q18, seemingly oblivious to Sino - U.S. trade tensions, a stronger USD, and risks to China's economy roiling other metal markets (Chart of the Week). The MySteel Composite Index we use to track steel prices is up 7% since the beginning of April. With demand growth leveling off, steel's price dynamics highlight the continued relevance of the market's supply-side developments. Most notably, Beijing's battle for blue skies: Winter capacity curbs, and, to a lesser extent, ongoing efforts to retire older, highly polluting capacity will keep prices elevated over the next 9 months. Winter Curbs: China's New Normal As we highlighted in our April 12 weekly, despite the much-ballyhooed reductions in China's steel capacity over the 2017 - 18 winter months, markets in China and globally remained relatively well supplied over the winter.3 However, several key changes this year suggest the impact of these measures will intensify this time around, keeping producers constrained in their ability to ramp up production of the metal. For one, the data suggest strong production levels amid the anti-pollution curbs last winter were a result of an increase in output from regions unaffected by the capacity restrictions (Chart 2). This went a long way in muting the impact of the restrictions in the heavily industrialized Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region of northern China. Chart of the WeekSteel Oblivious To Pessimism Chart 22017/18 Winter Cuts: A Net Non-Event This year's curbs will broaden the regions targeted by anti-pollution restrictions. The campaign will encompass 83 cities, up from last year's 28, thereby reducing the potential production ramp up from regions not covered by these measures (Chart 3). This coming winter's closures will cover regions where producers traditionally account for 68% of China's steel output (Chart 4). Chart 3Second Annual Winter Capacity ##br##Restrictions Will Broaden Coverage... Chart 4...And##br## Impact The anti-pollution campaign is one of the three battles prioritized in Xi Jinping's plan for the coming years. These curbs will be implemented during the October 1, 2018 to March 31, 2019 heating season, extending the duration from last year's mid-November to Mid-March period. Because the minimal effect observed per last year's closures was due to specifying too narrow a range of plants and regions, not to non-compliance, we expect the measures announced for this coming winter to be fully implemented. These measures come amid already-tight market conditions. The steel rebar market in China is in backwardation - meaning a physical shortage is pushing up prompt prices relative to those further out the curve. Inventories have been falling since mid-March, reflecting supply-demand dynamics in other steel product markets. Thus, we expect prices to remain elevated going into the winter months. Capacity Impacts Are Difficult To Gauge Opaqueness and discretionary authority in the new rules clouds the outlook on how anti-pollution reforms will impact the steel market. This makes it difficult to estimate their impact with precision. This time around, China's State Council announced that curbs will be implemented in a more scientific and targeted approach, ensuring maximum efficiency to attain the targets. This means the constraints this year will depend on emissions in each region, which will be set at the discretion of local authorities.4 For example, steel mills in six key cities including Tianjin, Shijiazhuang, Tangshan, Handan, Xingtai and Anyang will be asked to keep capacity below 50% this winter, while producers in the rest of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region will keep production running at less than 70% of capacity. Furthermore, a draft plan by the city of Changzhou - which planned to implement the curbs beginning August 3 - suggests production curbs may vary by company, depending on operational situations and emission levels.5 These restrictions are applied to capacity, rather than production. Without up-to-date and accurate information on crude steel-making capacity across the different regions, it is extremely difficult to accurately quantify the impact. Specifics of the plans are up to the discretion of local authorities. Thus, these restrictions can be applied to different stages in the steel-making process (Diagram 1), impacting furnaces, pig iron or sintering plants. In some cases, the output curbs are not only restricted to the winter heating months. Several regions have been implementing curbs throughout the year on an as-needed basis. The cities of Tangshan and Changzhou are two such examples, implementing restrictions during the summer months as well. Furthermore, all industrial plants in the city of Xuzhou remain shut. High profit margins at steel mills may incentivize the shuttered illegal furnaces to restart. The industry ministry acknowledges this threat, and claims it will carry out checks on these producers to ensure they do not come back online. Diagram 1Steelmaking Production Process: Restrictions Can Be Applied To Different Stages Without full knowledge of these details, quantifying the impact of these restrictions is a challenge. Morgan Stanley estimates the impact of these curbs on steel output to be 78mm MT during the winter period by assuming capacity utilization is restricted to 50% in the key cities, while the rest of the areas cut capacity by 30%. The estimated production loss from these restrictions accounts for 9% of China's 2017 crude steel output.6 China's Ongoing Capacity-Reduction Reforms Most of the planned permanent capacity shutdowns have already taken place. Of the targeted 150mm MT of cuts between 2016 and 2020, 115mm MT have already taken place over the past two years. Furthermore, 1H17 witnessed the closure of all illegal induction furnaces producing sub-par quality steel, estimated to account for 140mm MT of crude steel capacity (Table 1).7 Table 1De-Capacity Reforms Still Ongoing We expect the magnitude of cutbacks to slow considerably. Even though the industry ministry issued a statement in February that it plans to meet steel capacity reduction targets this year - two years ahead of schedule. Furthermore, mills face restrictions on new steel capacity. China's State Council announced it intends to prevent new steel capacity additions in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, Guangdong province, and Yangtze River Delta regions, and a cap set at 200mm MT in Hebei by 2020. The capacity replacement plan, which allows a maximum of 0.8 MT of new capacity for each MT of eliminated capacity, will ensure capacity does not grow going forward. In fact, not all mills are eligible to take advantage of the replacement policy. Among others, now-shuttered induction furnace capacity, as well as producers that previously benefited from cash and policy support will not meet the requirements for this program. Steel And Iron Ore Prices Will Not Reconverge As a result of China's reform policies in the steel industry, iron ore prices have diverged from steel. Reduced steel production lowers demand for raw materials, including iron ore. This is reflected in falling Chinese iron ore imports amid contracting production (Chart 5). Chart 5Weak Demand For Iron Ore Chart 6EAF Penetration In China: Still Some Catching Up To Do China's reform and anti-pollution campaigns have had serious consequences on iron ore markets. For starters, China is encouraging the adoption of electric arc furnaces (EAF), rather than additional new blast furnaces.8 While the latter primarily uses iron ore, the former uses scrap steel. EAF penetration in China's steel industry significantly lags the rest of the world (Chart 6). This means that even if the capacity-replacement program allows eliminated furnaces to be replaced with newer, more up-to-date capacity, this will not spur demand for iron ore. Instead, we expect to see higher scrap steel prices (Chart 7). Furthermore, as we first highlighted in our January report, China's anti-pollution campaign coupled with high steel profit margins has incentivized the use of higher grade iron ore and iron ore pellets, widening the price spread between high- and low- grade ores (Chart 8).9 Chart 7EAFs Support Scrap Steel Demand Chart 8IO Grade Premiums Will Remain Elevated While high-grade ores are more expensive, they emit less pollution in the steelmaking process. Similarly, unlike fines, pellets which are direct charge feedstock, are not required to undergo the highly polluting sintering stage and can be fed directly into the furnace. China's Steel Dynamics Overshadow Global Markets The ongoing supply-side reforms in China are overshadowing events in other markets. Globally, steel is expected to remain in physical deficit this year (Chart 9). This is largely on the back of an increase in world ex-China demand, and the decline in Chinese supply, despite expectations of weaker Chinese demand, and increased supply from the rest of the world (Table 2). Chart 9Physical Steel Deficit Will Persist... Table 2...Despite Weaker Chinese Demand And Stronger RoW Supply These figures do not consider the impact of the ongoing Sino - U.S. trade dispute, which could evolve into a full-blown trade war, weighing on EM incomes and demand. In such a scenario, global demand for steel would take a hit, potentially shifting global markets into surplus. In theory, trade barriers on U.S. steel imports could lead to weaker domestic supply for American users and at the same time, leave more of the metal for use by the rest of the world. The net effect of that would be a higher price for American steel relative to the rest of the world. However, since May, 20,000 requests for steel tariff exemptions have been filed in the U.S., of which the Commerce Department has denied 639. To the extent that American steel users are able to obtain tariff exemptions, the impact of the barriers on global steel markets will be muted. Bottom Line: We expect China's steel market to tighten as we go into the winter season, during which capacity cuts will be broadened to 82 cities, from last year's 28. This will keep steel prices elevated. At the same time, we expect prices of 62% Fe material and lower iron ore grades to weaken, as appetite for the steelmaking raw material contracts during these months. Mills still running in the mid-November to mid-March period will have a preference for higher-grade ores and pellets, keeping premiums on these grades elevated. Barring a significant demand-side shock, expect more upside to steel prices and downside to iron ore prices over the coming 9 months. Based on our research, we are recommending a long China rebar futures on the SHFE in 1Q19 vs. short 62% Fe iron ore futures on the Dalian DCE in 1Q19 at tonight's close. Roukaya Ibrahim, Editor/Strategist Commodity & Energy Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "BHP asks for government mediation in talks at Chile's Escondida," published August 6, 2018, by uk.reuters.com. 2 Please see "Economic Watch: China can cut soybean imports in 2018 by over 10 mln tonnes," published August 5, 2018, by xinhuanet.com. 3 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled "Chinese Steel, Aluminum Markets Well Supplied Despite Winter Capacity Cuts," dated April 12, 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see "Chinese steel output cuts to vary from mill to mill next winter," dated July 21, 2018, available at reuters.com. 5 The restrictions will not only apply to the city's steel mills, but also to copper smelters, chemical makers as well as cement producers. Please see "China's Changzhou plans to enforce output curbs in steel, chemical plants," dated July 30, 2018, available at reuters.com. 6 Please see "Shanghai steel resumes rise, coke rallies as China eyes winter curbs," dated August 2, 2018, available at reuters.com. 7 Low-quality steel produced by induction furnaces, also referred to as ditiaogang, is made by melting scrap steel using induction heat, preventing sufficient control over the quality of the steel. Platts estimates ditiaogang production in 2016 to be 30-50mm MT. As we explain in our September 7, 2017 Weekly Report titled "Slow-Down In China's Reflation Will Temper Steel, Iron Ore In 2018," given that ditiaogang is illegal, these closures are not reflected in official steel production figures. Thus the closures of these mills have no impact on actual steel production, but instead raise the capacity utilization rates for Chinese steel producers. 8 China launched a carbon trading system in January 2018, which penalizes blast furnace operators with higher environmental taxes relative to EAF processes. 9 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled "China's Environmental Reforms Drive Steel & Iron Ore," dated January 11, 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017
Highlights Capacity cuts in China's steel and aluminum industries over the winter produced little in the way of output reductions, confounding our expectations. The resulting unintended inventory accumulation in Asian markets, reflecting high production relative to demand, and slowing Chinese steel exports are a downside risk to our neutral view. U.S. sanctions against Russian oligarchs close to President Putin could tighten the aluminum market, countering the unintended inventory accumulations. For now, we remain neutral base metals. Energy: Overweight. We are closing our long put spread position in Dec/18 Brent options at tonight's close. The fast-approaching May 12 deadline for President Trump to renew sanctions waivers against Iran shifts the balance of price risks to the upside. Base Metals: Neutral. COMEX copper rallied above $3.10/lb on the back of Chinese President Xi's remarks at the Boao Forum earlier this week, which re-hashed plans to open China's economy to imports. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold likely becomes better bid as the May 12 deadline to waive Iran sanctions nears. Our long gold portfolio hedge is up 8.9%. Ags/Softs: Underweight. European buyers are scooping up U.S. soybeans, as Chinese purchases of Brazilian beans makes U.S.-sourced crops relatively cheaper, according to Reuters.1 China also announced plans to start selling corn stocks from state reserves this week, offering an alternative protein for animals to partially offset the price impact of tariffs on their imports of U.S. soybeans. Feature Chart of the WeekAluminum Rebounds On U.S. Sanctions Despite much-ballyhooed capacity reductions in China's steel and aluminum capacity, these markets - both in China and globally - remained relatively well supplied over the winter. Higher global supplies, and falling Chinese steel exports, will result in unintended inventory accumulation, which already is showing up in Shanghai Futures Exchange (SHFE) inventories. While we remain neutral base metals, continued unintended inventory accumulation could cause us to downgrade the sector. The MySteel Composite Index we use to track steel prices is down more than 10% since the beginning of the year (Chart of the Week). Similarly, the first-nearby primary aluminum contract on the LME was down ~ 12% year-to-date (ytd) early last week, before regaining most of these losses on news of U.S. sanctions against Russian oligarchs, which hit shares of Rusal very hard. Given that these sanctions will restrict access to up to 6% of global aluminum supply, ex-China supply dynamics will dominate the aluminum market this year making the outlook relatively favorable, putting a floor beneath the London Metal Exchange Index (LMEX).2 Ex-Post Winter Production Production cuts over the winter - when Chinese mills in 28 smog-prone northern cities were ordered to reduce capacity by up to 50% - did not live up to our expectations.3 China's steel and aluminum sectors have undergone major supply-side reforms, particularly re the removal of outdated capacity, most of which has been completed. In addition to the winter capacity cuts, past reforms that have already been implemented, and have shaped current market conditions, are as follows: In an effort to eliminate outdated and unlicensed facilities, China removed an estimated 3-4 mm MT of annual capacity in 2017 - amounting to approximately 10% of total aluminum smelting capacity. In the case of steel, Beijing announced plans to shut down 150 mm MT of annual steel capacity between 2016 and 2020. To date, 115 mm MT of capacity have already been eliminated. Another estimated 80-120 mm MT of induction furnace capacity was shuttered in 1H17. Going forward, China's steel and aluminum markets will be driven by: An estimated 3-4 mm MT of updated aluminum capacity is expected to come on line this year, offsetting constraints from last year's supply cuts. 30 mm MT of steel capacity shutdowns are planned this year, putting Beijing on track to meet its five-year target two years ahead of schedule. The Chinese National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) has communicated its resolve to keep shuttered capacity offline. Major steelmaking cities in Hebei province - accounting for 22% of 2017 Chinese crude steel output - have announced plans to extend the capacity cuts to November 2018. The mid-November to mid-March capacity cuts implemented this past season are expected to be a recurring event. Winter Shutdowns Minimally Impact China's Steel Output ... According to steel production data released by the World Steel Association (WSA), winter capacity closures in China did not significantly affect overall output levels. Crude steel output from China was up 3.9% year-on-year (y/y) in the November to February period (Chart 2). At the same time, production from the rest of the world increased by 3.6% y/y in the November to February. Thus global crude steel supply remained in excess over the winter season, as global steel output increased 3.8% y/y. A caveat to these data: China does not account for the historical output of induction furnaces, which produced an estimated ~30-50 mm MT of steel in 2016. As mentioned in our previous research, the output of these furnaces was illegal and thus not carried in statistics we use to track supply.4 These data problems mean it is possible that actual output in the November 2016 to February 2017 period was higher than suggested by the data, and as a result, actual output during this year's winter season may actually be lower than last year. As induction-furnace data lie in the statistical shadows, we cannot ascertain this with certainty. Nevertheless, a buildup in China inventories - which we discuss below - indicates an oversupplied market. It is also likely producers - incentivized by high steel prices earlier this year - kept capacity utilization at maximum levels throughout the winter. ... And Aluminum Output According to International Aluminum Institute data, primary aluminum output in China fell 2.3% y/y in the November to February period, suggesting the winter cuts likely had an impact on aluminum supply (Chart 3). Data from the World Bureau of Metal Statistics (WBMS) show an even sharper decline in winter aluminum output: primary production in China fell 8.7% y/y in the November to January period. Chart 2Steel Output Grew##BR##Amid Winter Cuts Chart 3China Aluminum Market In Surplus##BR##Despite Production Decline Both sources reveal an especially pronounced contraction in November, at the onset of the winter cuts. Despite reduced supply, WBMS data indicate a positive Chinese aluminum market balance throughout the winter. A large contraction in demand offset the supply shortfall, and kept primary aluminum in a physical surplus throughout the winter, ultimately leading to a buildup in domestic inventories. A Look At The Trade Data Despite our disappointment regarding the impact of the winter cuts on steel and aluminum markets, trade data increasingly suggests China's steel exports have peaked. Aluminum exports from China, on the other hand, are likely to continue rising. Chinese Steel Exports Continue To Fall ... Chinese steel product net exports have been falling since mid-2016, and have continued falling in y/y terms throughout the winter. According to Chinese customs data, steel product net exports fell 35.1% y/y in the November to February period, driven by both falling exports as well as rising imports (Chart 4). Steel product exports plunged 30% y/y in the November to February period, more or less in line with the 2017 average. The decline mirrors the 2017 contraction in domestic supply, bringing exports to their lowest level since 2012. This indicates fears of a China slowdown leading to a flood of metal onto global markets have not materialized, at least not yet. In fact, Customs data show a 1.7% y/y increase in Chinese steel imports during the November to February period - a reversal from falling imports prior to the winter season. The conclusion we draw from this is that, while in the past, China was a source of supply for the world, ongoing capacity cuts and production controls could mean China will lack the ability to ramp up output in case of a global physical supply deficit. If this becomes the new normal, price volatility will likely increase. This trend is important, especially given our expectation of strong world ex-China demand this year. As such, global steel prices may find support amid this new normal. ... But Aluminum Exports Move Higher In the case of aluminum, Chinese net exports were up 28.7% y/y during the winter, continuing their upward trend. Customs data show a 14.8% y/y increase in aluminum exports in November to February, bringing exports in this period to their highest level since 2014/15 (Chart 5). At the same time, imports of aluminum have come down during this period - by 37.2% y/y. According to China customs data, 2017 imports over these winter months registered their lowest level since 1994. Chart 4Steel Exports Continue Falling ... Chart 5...While Aluminum Exports Are On the Uptrend The combination of growing exports amid falling imports puts China's net exports in expansionary territory. This will be especially true given the planned increase in capacity this year amid weak Chinese demand. All in all, ceteris paribus global supply of aluminum looks set to increase. However, we do not live in a ceteris paribus world and, as we explore below, sanctions against the top aluminum producer outside of China will have massive implications on the global aluminum supply chain. Are Inventories Due For A Turnaround? Chart 6Larger Than Expected##BR##Seasonal Inventory Buildup China Iron and Steel Association data indicate that since the beginning of the year, steel product inventories have been re-stocked to levels last seen in 1Q14. Inventories of the five main steel products we track have more than doubled since the beginning of the year (Chart 6). Although the Q1 build is seasonal, the re-stocking since the beginning of the year has been especially pronounced. This buildup occurred in an environment of stable supply - with minimal impact from the winter capacity cuts - amid weak exports, indicating domestic demand for the metal was subdued. However, steel inventories have turned around, and we expect further destocking as demand accelerates post the Chinese New Year. The question remains whether this destocking will bring inventories back down to their 5-year average. Aluminum inventories on the SHFE show similar dynamics. However in this case, it is part of the larger trend of rising stocks since the beginning of last year. Aluminum inventories at SHFE warehouses are up more than nine-fold - or 0.87 mm MT - since the end of 2016. In fact, the pace of buildup seems to have accelerated: the average weekly build of 16.6k MT of aluminum coming into warehouse inventories since the beginning of the year stands above the 2017 average weekly build of 12.6k MT. This brought SHFE aluminum inventories to almost 1 mm MT, more than double their previous record in 2010. Although the Chinese physical aluminum surplus weighed down on prices in 1Q18, we expect global aluminum prices to remain supported from here due to the impact of U.S. sanctions on world ex-China aluminum supply. U.S. Russian Sanctions Could Be A Game-Changer Chart 7Sanctions Will Restrict##BR##Marketable Aluminum Supply Last Friday, the U.S. announced sanctions on Russian oligarchs close to President Vladimir Putin. Among those sanctioned is Oleg Deripaska who controls EN+ Group, which owns a controlling interest in top aluminum producer United Company Rusal. Given that UC Rusal accounts for ~6% of global aluminum production, we view this move as significant to global aluminum markets. As the top producer of the metal outside China, Rusal aluminum likely makes up the majority of Russian supply, which account for 14% of U.S. imports (Chart 7). In fact, almost 15% of Rusal's revenues comes from its business with the U.S. While it is clear that these sanctions will, in effect, terminate aluminum trade between Russia and the U.S., more significant are the implications on the global supply chain. A clause in the U.S. Treasury Department's order extending the restrictions to non-U.S. citizens dealing with U.S. entities means the impact could be far-reaching, requiring a major re-shuffle in global aluminum trade. Earlier this week, the LME announced that it will no longer accept Rusal aluminum produced after April 6, effectively preventing the company's products from being delivered on the LME. These sanctions will likely turn global aluminum buyers off from Rusal products, as they can no longer deliver it to the LME. The net effect will be a contraction in global usable aluminum supply. Furthermore, these sanctions will likely disrupt supply chains as aluminum users scramble to avoid purchasing metal from the Russian producer. While the details of these restrictions are still unclear, the sanctions are a game changer in the global aluminum market - effectively restricting access to a major source of the metal. As such, primary aluminum on the LME is up more than 10% since the announcement last Friday. Bottom Line: While China's crude steel output increased y/y during government-mandated output cuts over the winter, seasonally weak demand meant that the metal piled up in inventories. Falling exports indicates that at least for now, the domestic surplus is not flooding global markets. The main risk to our neutral view here is that demand in China remains weak, and that this will lead to the offloading of Chinese metal to global markets, i.e. a pickup in exports. This has not yet materialized, so we are holding on to our neutral view for now. China's primary aluminum production declined y/y during the winter cuts. However the decline in domestic demand was greater - likely due to the decline in auto production and sales following the loss of tax credit incentives. Consequently, China's aluminum market remained in surplus throughout the winter. Some of the excess supply was exported, but SHFE inventories continued building. Our outlook on the aluminum market had been bearish, due to additional capacity coming online this year amid an uncertain China demand environment. However, the sanctions on Rusal could be a game changer, putting a floor beneath aluminum prices. This improves our near term outlook for the aluminum market. This makes our outlook on aluminum prices much more favorable. Roukaya Ibrahim, Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "As U.S. and China trade tariff barbs, others scoop up U.S. soybeans," published by reuters.com on April 8, 2018. 2 The six non-ferrous metals represented in the LMEX and their respective weights are as follows: aluminum: 42.8%, copper: 31.2%, zinc: 14.8%, lead: 8.2%, nickel: 2.0%, and tin: 1.0%. 3 China's winter smog "battle plan" targeted polluting industries in the northern China region by mandating cuts on steel, cement and aluminum production during the smog-prone mid-November to mid-March months. Steel and aluminum production cuts targeted a range between 30-50% during this period. This event is expected to be an annually recurring event until 2020. 4 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled "China's Environmental Reforms Drive Steel & Iron Ore," dated January 11, 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017
Highlights Several economic and financial market indicators point to a budding downtrend in Chinese capital spending and its industrial sector. The recent underperformance of global mining, chemicals and machinery/industrials corroborate that capital spending in China is starting to slump. Shipments-to-inventory ratios for Korea and Taiwan also point to a relapse in Asian manufacturing. This is occurring as our global growth sentiment proxy sits on par with previous peaks, and investor positioning in EM and commodities is overextended. Stay put on EM. Markets with currency pegs to the U.S. dollar, such as the Gulf states and Hong Kong, will face tightening local liquidity. Share prices in these markets have probably topped out. Feature On the surface, EM equities, currencies and local bond and credit markets are still trading well. However, there are several economic indicators and financial variables that herald negative surprises for global and Chinese growth. In particular: China's NBS manufacturing PMI new orders and backlogs of orders have relapsed in the past several months. Chart I-1 illustrates the annual change in new orders and backlogs of orders to adjust for seasonality. The measure leads industrial profits, and presently foreshadows a slowdown going forward. Furthermore, the average of NBS manufacturing PMI, new orders, and backlog orders also points to a potential relapse in industrial metals prices in general as well as mainland steel and iron ore prices (Chart I-2). The message from Charts I-1 and I-2 is that the recent weakness in iron ore and steel prices could mark the beginning of a downtrend in Chinese capital spending. While supply cuts could limit downside in steel prices, it would be surprising if demand weakness does not affect steel prices at all.1 Chart I-1China: Slowdown Has Further To Run Chart I-2Industrial Metals Prices Have Topped Out Although China's money and credit have been flagging potential economic weakness for a while, the recent manufacturing PMI data from the National Bureau of Statistics finally confirmed an impending deceleration in industrial activity and ensuing corporate profit disappointment. Our credit and fiscal spending impulses continue to point to negative growth surprises in capital spending. The latter is corroborated by the weakening Komatsu's Komtrax index, which measures the average hours of machine work per unit in China (Chart I-3). In both Korea and Taiwan, the overall manufacturing shipments-to-inventory ratios have dropped, heralding material weakness in both countries' export volumes (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Signs Of Weakness In Chinese Construction Chart I-4Asia Exports Are Slowing Notably, global cyclical equity sectors that are leveraged to China's capital spending such as materials, industrials and energy have all recently underperformed the global benchmark (Chart I-5). Some of their sub-sectors such as machinery, mining and chemicals have also begun to underperform (Chart I-6). Chart I-5Global Cyclicals Have ##br##Begun Underperforming... Chart I-6...Including Machinery ##br##And Chemical Stocks Among both global and U.S. traditional cyclicals, only the technology sector is outperforming the benchmark. However, we do not think tech should be treated as a cyclical sector, at least for now. In brief, the underperformance of global cyclical equity sectors and sub-sectors following last month's equity market correction corroborate that China's capital spending is beginning to slump. Notably, this is occurring as our global growth sentiment proxy rests on par with its previous apexes (Chart I-7). Previous tops in this proxy for global growth sentiment have historically coincided with tops in EM EPS net revisions, as shown in this chart. Chart I-7Global Growth Sentiment: As Good As It Gets All told, we may be finally entering a meaningful slowdown in China that will dampen commodities prices and EM corporate earnings. The latter are still very strong but EPS net revisions have rolled over and turned negative again (Chart I-8). Chart I-8EM EPS Net Revisions Have Plummeted EM share prices typically lead EPS by about nine months. In 2016, EM stocks bottomed in January-February, yet EPS did not begin to post gains until December 2016. Even if EM corporate profits are to contract in the fourth quarter of this year, EM share prices, being forward looking, will likely begin to wobble soon. Poor EM Equity Breadth There is also evidence of poor breadth in the EM equity universe, especially compared to the U.S. equity market. First, the rally in the EM equally-weighted index - where all individual stocks have equal weights - has substantially lagged the market cap-weighted index since mid 2017. This suggests that only a few large-cap companies have contributed a non-trivial share of capital gains. Second, the EM equal-weighted stock index's and EM small-caps' relative share prices versus their respective U.S. counterparts have fallen rather decisively in the past six weeks (Chart I-9, top and middle panels). While the relative performance of market cap-weighted indexes has not declined that much, it has still rolled over (Chart I-9, bottom panel). We compare EM equity performance with that of the U.S. because DM ex-U.S. share prices themselves have been rather sluggish. In fact, DM ex-U.S. share prices have barely rebounded since the February correction. Third, EM technology stocks have begun underperforming their global peers (Chart I-10). This is a departure from the dynamics that prevailed last year, when a substantial share of EM outperformance versus DM equities was attributed to EM tech outperformance versus their DM counterparts and tech's large weight in the EM benchmark. Chart I-9EM Versus U.S. Equities: Relative ##br##Performance Is Reversing Chart I-10EM Tech Has Started ##br##Underperforming DM Tech Finally, the relative advance-decline line between EM versus U.S. bourses has been deteriorating (Chart I-11). This reveals that EM equity breadth - the advance-decline line - is substantially worse relative to the U.S. Chart I-11EM Versus U.S.: Relative Equity Breadth Is Very Poor Bottom Line: Breadth of EM equity performance versus DM/U.S. has worsened considerably. This bodes ill for the sustainability of EM outperformance versus DM/U.S. We continue to recommend an underweight EM versus DM position within global equity portfolios. Three Pillars Of EM Stocks EM equity performance is by and large driven by three sectors: technology, banks (financials) and commodities. Table I-1 illustrates that technology, financials and commodities (energy and materials) account for 66% of the EM MSCI market cap and 75% of MSCI EM total (non-diluted) corporate earnings. Therefore, getting the outlook of these sectors right is crucial to the EM equity call. Table I-1EM Equity Sectors: Earnings & Market Cap Weights Technology Four companies - Alibaba, Tencent, Samsung and TSMC - account for 17% of EM and 58% of EM technology market cap, respectively. This sector can be segregated into hardware tech (Samsung and TSMC) and "new concept" stocks (Alibaba and Tencent). We do not doubt that new technologies will transform many industries, and there will be successful companies that profit enormously from this process. Nevertheless, from a top-down perspective, we can offer little insight on whether EM's "new concept" stocks such as Alibaba and Tencent are cheap or expensive, nor whether their business models are proficient. Further, these and other global internet/social media companies' revenues are not driven by business cycle dynamics, making top-down analysis less imperative in forecasting their performance. We can offer some insight for technology hardware companies such as Samsung and TSMC. Chart I-12 demonstrates that semiconductor shipment-to-inventory ratios have rolled over decisively in both Korea and Taiwan. In addition, semiconductor prices have softened of late (Chart I-13) Together, this raises a red flag for technology hardware stocks in Asia. Chart I-12Asia's Semiconductor Industry Chart I-13Semiconductor Prices: A Soft Spot? Finally, Chart I-14 compares the current run-up in U.S. FANG stocks (Facebook, Amazon, Netflix and Google) with the Nasdaq mania in the 1990s. An equal-weighted average stock price index of FANG has risen by 10-fold in the past four and a half years. Chart I-14U.S. FANG Stocks Now ##br##And 1990s Nasdaq Mania A similar 10-fold increase was also registered by the Nasdaq top 100 stocks in the 1990s over eight years (Chart I-14). While this is certainly not a scientific approach, the comparison helps put the rally in "hot" technology stocks into proper historical perspective. The main take away here is that even by bubble standards, the recent acceleration in "new concept" stocks has been too fast. That said, it is impossible to forecast how long any mania will persist. This has been and remains a major risk to our investment strategy of being negative on EM stocks. In sum, there is little visibility in EM "new concept" tech stocks. Yet Asia's manufacturing cycle is rolling over, entailing downside risks to tech hardware businesses. Putting all this together, we conclude that it is unlikely that EM tech stocks will be able to drive the EM rally and outperformance in 2018 as they did in 2017. Banks We discussed the outlook for EM bank stocks in our February 14 report,2 and will not delve into additional details here. In brief, several countries' banks have boosted their 2017 profits by reducing their NPL provisions. This has artificially boosted profits and spurred investors to bid up bank equity prices. We believe banks in a number of EM countries are meaningfully under-provisioned and will have to augment their NPL provisions. The latter will hurt their profits and constitutes a major risk for EM bank share prices. Energy And Materials The outlook for absolute performance of these sectors is contingent on commodities prices. Industrial metals prices are at risk of slower capex in China. The mainland accounts for 50% of global demand for all industrial metals. Oil prices are at risk from traders' record-high net long positions in oil futures, according to CFTC data (Chart I-15, top panel). Traders' net long positions in copper are also elevated, according to the data from the same source (Chart I-15, bottom panel). Hence, it may require only some U.S. dollar strength and negative news out of China for these commodities prices to relapse. Chart I-15Traders' Net Long Positions In ##br##Oil And Copper Are Very Elevated How do we incorporate the improved balance sheets of materials and energy companies into our analysis? If and as commodities prices slide, share prices of commodities producers will deflate in absolute terms. However, this does not necessarily mean they will underperform the overall equity benchmark. Relative performance dynamics also depend on the performance of other sectors. Commodities companies could outperform the overall equity benchmark amid deflating commodities prices if other equity sectors drop more. In brief, the improved balance sheets of commodities producers may be reflected in terms of their relative resilience amid falling commodities prices but will still not preclude their share prices from declining in absolute terms. Bottom Line: If EM bank stocks and commodities prices relapse as we expect, the overall EM equity index will likely experience a meaningful selloff and underperform the DM/U.S. benchmarks. Exchange Rate Pegs Versus U.S. Dollar With the U.S. dollar depreciating in the past 12 months, pressure on exchange rate regimes that peg their currencies to the dollar has subsided. These include but are not limited to Hong Kong, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). As a result, these countries' interest rate differentials versus the U.S. have plunged (Chart I-16). In short, domestic interest rates in these markets have risen much less than U.S. short rates. This has kept domestic liquidity conditions easier than they otherwise would have been. However, maneuvering room for these central banks is narrowing. In Hong Kong, the exchange rate is approaching the lower bound of its narrow band (Chart I-17). As it touches 7.85, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) will have no choice but to tighten liquidity and push up interest rates. Chart I-16Markets With U.S. Dollar Peg: ##br##Policymakers' Maneuvering Window Is Closing Chart I-17Hong Kong: Interest ##br##Rates Are Heading Higher In Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the monetary authorities have used the calm in their foreign exchange markets over the past year to not match the rise in U.S. short rates (Chart I-18A and Chart I-18B). However, with their interest rate differentials over U.S. now at zero, these central banks will have no choice but to follow U.S. rates to preserve their currency pegs.3 Chart I-18ASaudi Arabian Interest Rates Will Rise Chart I-18BThe UAE Interest Rates Will Rise If U.S. interest rates were to move above local rates in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, those countries' currencies will come under considerable depreciation pressure because capital will move from local currencies into U.S. dollars. Hence, if U.S. short rates move higher, which is very likely, local rates in these and other Gulf countries will have to rise if their exchange rate pegs are to be preserved. Neither the Hong Kong dollar nor Gulf currencies are at risk of devaluation. The monetary authorities there have enough foreign currency reserves to defend their respective pegs. Nevertheless, the outcome will be domestic liquidity tightening in the Gulf's and Hong Kong's banking system. In addition, potentially lower oil prices will weigh on Gulf bourses and China's slowdown will hurt growth and equity sentiment in Hong Kong. All in all, equity markets in Gulf countries and Hong Kong have probably seen their best in terms of absolute performance. Potential negative external shocks and higher interest rates due to Fed tightening have darkened the outlook for these bourses. Bottom Line: Local liquidity in Gulf markets and Hong Kong is set to tighten. Share prices in these markets have probably topped out. However, given these equity markets have massively underperformed the EM equity benchmark, they are unlikely to underperform when the overall EM index falls. Hence, we do not recommend underweighting these bourses within an EM equity portfolio. For asset allocators, a neutral or overweight allocation to these bourses is warranted. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report "China's "De-Capacity" Reforms: Where Steel & Coal Prices Are Headed," dated November 22, 2017; the link is available on page 16. 2 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report "EM Bank Stocks Hold The Key," dated February 14, 2018; the link is available on page 16. 3 Please see BCA's Frontier Markets Strategy Special Report "United Arab Emirates: Domestic Tailwinds, External Headwinds," dated March 12, 2018. The link is available on fms.bcaresearch.com. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Dear Client, Following up on last week's report, my colleagues Caroline Miller, Mathieu Savary, and I held a webcast on Wednesday to discuss the outlook for the dollar along with recent events. If you haven't already, I hope you find the time to listen in. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights Protectionism is popular with the American public in general, and Trump's base specifically. The sabre-rattling will persist, but an all-out trade war is unlikely. Trump is focused on the stock market, and equities would suffer mightily if a trade war broke out. The Pentagon has also warned of the dangers of across-the-board tariffs that penalize America's military allies. The rationale for protectionism made a lot more sense when there were masses of unemployed workers. That's not the case today. The equity bull market will eventually end, but chances are that this will happen due to an overheated U.S. economy and rising financial imbalances, not because of escalating trade protectionism. Investors should remain overweight global equities for now, but look to pare back exposure later this year. Feature Q: What prompted Trump's announcement? A: Last week began with President Trump proclaiming that he would seek re-election in 2020. Then came a slew of negative news, including the resignation of Hope Hicks, Trump's White House communications director, and the downgrading of Jared Kushner's security clearance. All this happened against the backdrop of the ever-widening Mueller probe. Trump needed to change the subject. Fast. However, it would be a mistake to think that the tariff announcement was simply a distractionary tactic. Turmoil in the White House might have been the immediate trigger, but events had been building towards this outcome for some time. The Trump administration had imposed tariffs on washing machines and solar panels in January. Hiking tariffs on steel and aluminum - two industries that had suffered heavy job losses over the past two decades - was a logical next step. In fact, the 25% tariff on steel and 10% tariff on aluminum were similar to the 24% and 7.7% tariff rates, respectively, that the Commerce Department proposed as one of three options on February 16th.1 Protectionism is popular with the American public. This is especially true for Trump's base (Chart 1). Indeed, it is safe to say that Trump's unorthodox views on trade are what handed him the Republican nomination and what allowed him to win key swing (and manufacturing) states such as Ohio, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. Trump made a promise to his voters. He is trying to keep it. Q: Wouldn't raising trade barriers hurt the U.S. economy, thereby harming the same workers Trump is trying to help? A: That's the line coming from the financial press and most of the political establishment, but it's not as clear cut as it may seem. An all-out trade war would undoubtedly hurt the U.S., but a minor skirmish probably would not. The U.S. does run a large trade deficit. Economists Katharine Abraham and Melissa Kearney recently estimated that increased competition from Chinese imports cost the U.S. economy 2.65 million jobs between 1999 and 2016, almost double the 1.4 million jobs lost to automation.2 This accords with other studies, such as the one by David Autor and his colleagues, which found that increased trade with China has led to large job losses in the U.S. manufacturing sector (Chart 2).3 Chart 1Trump Is Catering ##br##To His Protectionist Base Chart 2China's Ascent Has Reduced##br## U.S. Manufacturing Employment Granted, China does not even make it into the top ten list of countries that export steel to the United States. But that is somewhat beside the point. As with most commodities, there is a fairly well-integrated global market for steel. Due to its proximity to Asian markets, China exports most of its steel to the rest of the region (Chart 3). That does not stop Chinese overcapacity from dragging down prices around the world. Chart 3Most Of China's Steel Exports Don't Travel That Far Q: Wouldn't steel and aluminum tariffs simply raise prices for American consumers, thereby reducing real wages? A: That depends. If Trump's gambit reduces the U.S. trade deficit, this will increase domestic spending, putting more upward pressure on wages. As far as prices are concerned, the U.S. imported $39 billion of iron and steel in 2017, and an additional $18 billion of aluminum. That's only 2% of total imports and less than 0.3% of GDP. If import prices went up by the full amount of the tariff, this would add less than five basis points to inflation. And even that would be a one-off hit to the price level, rather than a permanent increase in the inflation rate. In practice, it is doubtful that prices would rise by the full amount of the tariff (if they did, what would be the purpose of retaliatory measures?). Most econometric studies suggest that producers will absorb about half of the tariff in the form of lower profit margins. To the extent that this reduces the pre-tariff price of imported goods, it would shift the terms of trade in America's favor. Chart 4Does Trade Retaliation Make Sense ##br## When Most Trade Is In Intermediate Goods? There is an old economic theory, first elucidated by Robert Torrens in the 19th century, which says that the optimal tariff is always positive for countries such as the U.S. that are price-makers rather than price-takers in international markets. Put more formally, Torrens showed that an increase in tariffs from very low levels was likely to raise government revenue and producer surplus by more than the loss in consumer surplus. So, in theory, the U.S. could actually benefit at the expense of the rest of the world by imposing higher tariffs.4 Q: This assumes that there is no trade retaliation. How realistic is that? A: That's the key. As noted above, a breakdown of the global trading system would hurt the U.S., but a trade spat could help it. Trump was trying to scare the opposition by tweeting "trade wars are good, and easy to win." In a game of chicken, it helps to convince your opponent that you are reckless and nuts. Trump's detractors would say he is both, so that works in his favor. Trump has another thing working for him. Most trade these days is in intermediate goods (Chart 4). It does not pay for Mexico to slap tariffs on imported U.S. intermediate goods when those very same goods are assembled into final goods in Mexico - creating jobs for Mexican workers in the process - and re-exported to the U.S. or the rest of the world. The same is true for China and many other countries. This does not preclude the imposition of targeted retaliatory tariffs. The EU has threatened to raise tariffs on Levi's jeans and Harley Davidson motorcycles (whose headquarters, not coincidently, is located in Paul Ryan's Wisconsin district). We would not be surprised if high-end foreign-owned golf courses were also subject to additional scrutiny! But if this is all that happens, markets won't care. The fact that the United States imports much more than it exports also gives Trump a lot of leverage. Take the case of China. Chinese imports of goods and services are 2.65% of U.S. GDP, but exports to China are only 0.96% of GDP. And nearly half of U.S. goods exports to China are agricultural products and raw materials (Chart 5). Taxing them would be difficult without raising Chinese consumer prices. Simply put, the U.S. stands to lose less from a trade war than most other countries. Chart 5China Stands To Lose More From A Trade War With The U.S. Q: Couldn't China and other countries punish the U.S. by dumping Treasurys? A: They could, but why would they? Such an action would only drive down the value of the dollar, giving U.S. exporters an even greater advantage. The smart, strategic response would be to intervene in currency markets with the aim of bidding up the dollar. Chart 6Slowing Global Growth Is Bullish##br## For The Dollar Q: So the dollar could strengthen as a result of rising protectionism? A: Yes, it could. This is a point that even Mario Draghi made at yesterday's ECB press conference. If higher tariffs lead to a smaller trade deficit, this will increase U.S. aggregate demand. The boost to demand would be amplified if more companies decide to relocate production back to the U.S. for fear of being shut out of the lucrative U.S. market. The U.S. economy is now operating close to full employment. Anything that adds to demand is likely to prompt the Fed to raise rates more aggressively than it otherwise would. That could lead to a stronger greenback. Considering that the U.S. is a fairly closed economy which runs a trade deficit, it would suffer less than other economies in the event of a trade war. A scenario where global growth slows because of rising trade tensions, while the composition of that growth shifts towards the U.S., would be bullish for the dollar (Chart 6). Q: What are the implications for stocks and bonds? A: Wall Street will dictate what happens to stocks, but Main Street will dictate what happens to bonds. The stock market hates protectionism, so it is no surprise that equities sold off last week. It is this fact that ultimately got Trump to soften his position. Trump is used to taking credit for a rising stock market. If stocks flounder, this could make him think twice about pushing for higher trade barriers. As far as bonds are concerned, they will react to whatever happens to growth and inflation. As noted above, a trade skirmish could actually boost growth and inflation. Given that the economy is near full capacity, the latter is likely to rise more than the former. This, too, could cause Trump to cool his heels. After all, if higher inflation pushes up bond yields, this will hurt highly-levered sectors such as, you guessed it, real estate. Q: In conclusion, where do you see things going from here? A: Trade frictions will continue. As my colleague Marko Papic highlighted in a report published earlier this week, NAFTA negotiations are likely to remain on the ropes for some time.5 The Trump administration is also investigating allegations of Chinese IP theft. The U.S. is a major exporter of intellectual property, but these exports would be much larger if U.S. companies were properly compensated for their ingenuity. Chinese imports of U.S. intellectual property were less than 0.1% of Chinese GDP in 2017, an implausibly small number (Chart 7). If China is found to have acted unfairly, this could lead the U.S. to impose across-the-board tariffs on Chinese goods and restrictions on inbound foreign direct investment. Nevertheless, as noted above, worries about a plunging stock market will constrain Trump from acting too aggressively. The rationale for protectionism made a lot more sense when there were masses of unemployed workers. Today, firms are struggling to find qualified staff (Chart 8). This suggest that Trump will stick to doing what he does best, which is taking credit for everything good that happens under the sun. Chart 7China Is Importing More IP From The U.S., ##br##But The "True" Number Is Probably Higher Chart 8Protectionism Makes Less Sense ##br##When The Labor Market Is Strong Ironically, the latest trade skirmish is occurring at a time when the Chinese government is taking concerted steps to reduce excess capacity in the steel sector, and the profits of U.S. steel producers are rebounding smartly (Chart 9). In fact, the latest Fed Beige Book released earlier this week highlighted that "steel producers reported raising selling prices because of a decline in market share for foreign steel ..."6 Chart 9Chinese Steel Exports Falling, U.S. Steel Profits Rising Meanwile, German automakers already produce nearly 900,000 vehicles in the U.S., 62% of which are exported. In fact, European automakers have a smaller share of the U.S. market than U.S. automakers have of the European one.7 A lot of what Trump wants he already has. The Pentagon has also warned that trade barriers imposed against Canada and other U.S. military allies could undermine America's standing abroad. This is an important point, considering that Trump invoked the rarely used Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which gives the President broad control over trade policy in matters of national security, to justify raising tariffs. Trump tends to listen to his generals, if not his other advisors. He probably was not expecting their reaction. All this suggests that a major trade war is unlikely to occur. As we go to press, it appears that the White House will temporarily exclude Canada and Mexico from the list of countries subject to tariffs. We suspect that the EU, Australia, South Korea, and a number of other economies will get some relief as well. White House National Trade Council Director Peter Navarro has also said that some "exemptions" may be granted for specific categories of steel and aluminum products that are deemed necessary to U.S. businesses. That is a potentially very broad basket. The bottom line is that the equity bull market will end, but chances are that this will happen due to an overheated U.S. economy and rising financial imbalances met with restrictive monetary policy, not because of escalating trade protectionism. Investors should remain overweight global equities for now, but look to pare back exposure later this year. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "Secretary Ross Releases Steel and Aluminum 232 Reports in Coordination with White House," U.S. Department of Commerce, February 16, 2018. 2 Katharine G. Abraham, and Kearney, Melissa S., "Explaining the Decline in the U.S. Employment-to-Population Ratio: A Review of the Evidence," NBER Working Paper No. 24333, (February 2018). 3 David H. Autor, Dorn, David and Hanson, Gordon H., "The China Shock: Learning from Labor-Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade," Annual Reviews of Economics, dated August 8, 2016, available at annualreviews.org. 4 A graphical illustration of this point is provided here. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "Market Reprices Odds Of A Global Trade War," dated March 6, 2018. 6 Please see "The Beige Book: Summary of Commentary on Current Economic Conditions By Federal Reserve District,"Federal Reserve, dated March 7, 2018. 7 Please see Erik F. Nielsen, "Chief Economist's Comment: Sunday Wrap," UniCredit Research, dated March 4, 2018. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Highlights Environmental reforms in China continue to reduce steelmaking capacity. The shuttering of illegal induction facilities in China also is tightening markets. Although official Chinese steel output is higher, this likely reflects the fact that output from illegal induction mills went unreported - and thus uncounted - while production from legal mills is increasing to fill the gap left by closures. Steelmakers' profits are surging, which means demand for iron ore in China will remain stout at least through 1H18. Copper has been well bid since June 2017, following supply disruptions and strong demand growth driven by the global economic upturn. We expect it will get an additional lift in 1H18, as wiring and plumbing in construction projects now absorbing steel in China get underway. Later, global growth will make up for any slowdown in China. Our analysis indicates the global steel market will be tightening in 1H18, as it already is doing in China. Consistent with this, we are opening a tactical long position in Mar/18 steel rebar futures on the Shanghai Futures Exchange, which are quoted in RMB/ton. We are including a 10% stop loss on this recommendation. Energy: Overweight. Our once-out-of-consensus oil view is now the consensus, so we are taking profits on Brent and WTI $55 vs. $60/bbl call spreads on May- and July-delivery oil at tonight's close. These positions were up 109.2% and 123.5% at Tuesday's close. Any sell-offs will present an opportunity to re-establish length along these forward curves. Base Metals: Neutral. Copper will remain well bid this year as the global economic recovery rolls on. A large number of contract renegotiations at mines is an additional upside risk to copper prices this year. Precious Metals: Neutral. Given our expectation of four rate hikes by the Fed, it is difficult to get too bullish gold. However, any indication the central bank is tilting dovish - particularly if we fail to see higher inflation this year - will rally the metal. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Markets will tread water until Friday's USDA WASDE. We remain underweight, except for corn. Feature Chart of the WeekIron Ore And Steel Prices Diverged In 2017 China's environmental policy actions have reduced world steel-making capacity by 100 mm MT between 1H16 and 1H18. This is most visible in Chinese steel prices, which gained more than 30% in 2017, following an almost 80% increase in 2016. The total gain in steel prices since the start of Beijing's focus on steel-market reforms is a resounding 135%. Iron ore prices posted similar gains to steel in 2016 but diverged sharply in 2017, slumping more than 40% between mid-March and mid-June - ending almost 8% lower year-on-year (yoy) (Chart of the week). Soaring steel prices pushed profit margins at Chinese mills higher, which, of course, fed through to demand for iron ore, the critical steel-making ingredient in China, toward year-end: Iron ore prices were up 20% in the last two months of 2017. How Did We Get Here? A Recap Of China's Steel Sector Reforms As part of its reforms aimed at reducing air pollution by eliminating outdated, excess industrial capacity, Beijing pledged to eliminate 100-150 mm MT of steel capacity over the 2016-2020 period. To date it has shuttered an estimated 100 mm MT of capacity. In addition to these reforms Beijing pledged to shut down smaller induction furnaces in China, which melt scrap steel, and produce steel of shoddy quality. These induction furnaces are estimated to account for 80-120 mm MT worth of annual capacity, although their actual output is far less: They produced an estimated 30-50 mm MT in 2016, according to S&P Global Platts.1 This is less than 7% of China's total crude-steel output. Production cuts from induction mills are not evident in official data - China's crude steel production figures have continued to rise amid these cuts, as we discussed in previous research (Chart 2).2 Data from the International Iron and Steel Institute shows global steel output was at a record high for the first 11 months of 2017, increasing by more than 5% yoy. Likewise, crude steel output from China - which accounts for 50% of global output - peaked in August: Output over the same period was the highest on record, increasing by 5.28% compared to the same period in 2016. This production paradox can be put down to the fact that many Chinese induction furnaces are illegal, and, as a result their output is not accounted for in official production data. As legal steelmakers ramped up their output to offset declines from the closed down induction furnaces, official crude production figures climbed. In fact, further examination of Chinese steel data makes it clear that China's steel market is in fact tighter than what can be inferred from the crude production figures (Chart 3). The following observations point to a strained market: While China's crude steel production has been paving new record highs, China Stat Info data reveals a contradictory picture about steel products. Output of steel products in the March to November period of 2017 came in 3.46% lower yoy, marking the first yoy decline for that period since 1995! While crude steel produced by induction furnaces would not be included in official crude steel figures, the metal would eventually be used to manufacture steel products - wires, rods, rails and bars, and are represented in this data. Thus the decline in steel products indicates that lower crude supply has weighed down on the output of steel products. China's steel exports have been on a downtrend. In theory, this can be due to either an increase in domestic demand or a decrease in foreign demand. Given the healthy state of the global economy, and what we know about steel production in China, we are believers in the former theory. China's exports of steel products are down 30% yoy in the first 11 months of 2017. Aside from the 3.04% yoy decline in 2016, these mark the first annual declines in exports since 2009. In face of lower domestic supply, China has likely reduced its exports in order to satisfy demand from local steel users. China's scrap steel imports fell in 2H17. Unlike blast furnaces which use iron ore as the main input in steelmaking, the shuttered illegal steelmakers use scrap steel which they melt in an induction furnace. Coincident with the elimination of these furnaces, China's imports of scrap steel fell 14.35% yoy in 2H17. This is further evidence of reduced demand for the scrap steel from these furnaces. China steel inventories are falling. In fact steel product inventories in major industrial cities are at record lows (Chart 4). This is a symptom of a tight market with demand outpacing supply, contradicting China's crude steel production figures. Chart 2Record Chinese Production Of Crude Steel##BR##Amid Falling Steel Products Output Chart 3China Trade Data Evidence##BR##Of Tight Market Chart 4Steel Inventories##BR##In China Are Falling Furthermore, according to World Steel Association (WSA), capacity utilization in the 66 countries for which they collect data increased by 3.12 percentage points yoy for the July to November 2017 period to average 72.64%, up from the 69.52% average in the same period of 2016. These observations are evidence that despite the increase in official crude steel production figures, the actual output has in fact fallen and supply is tighter. Whether steel prices will remain buoyed by tight supply hinges on whether China is successful in permanently shuttering excess capacity and shoddy steel producers, or if induction furnace operators are able to circumvent these policies and bring illegal steel back to the market. China's Reforms To Dominate Steel Market, At Least This Winter Following the conclusion of the mid-December Central Economic Work Conference, Chinese authorities announced the "three tough battles" for the next three years, which they see as crucial for future economic prosperity. These battles are summarized as (1) preventing major risks, (2) targeted poverty alleviation, and (3) pollution control. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that air pollution has led to ~1 million premature deaths while household air pollution caused an additional 1.2 million premature deaths in China annually.3 Because of this, improving China's air quality is a chief social and health target for China. Chart 5Lower Chinese Steel Production##BR##Will Impact Global Output This will mean that measures to reduce pollution and clear China's skies will be critically important to the steel sector. According to the Ministry of Environmental Protection, China has pledged a 15% yoy reduction in the concentration of airborne particles smaller than 2.5 microns in diameter - known as PM2.5 - in 28 smog-prone northern cities. The steel industry, which is mostly concentrated in the northern China region of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, is one of the top sources of air polluting emissions in that region. In fact, industrial emissions - most notably from the steel and cement sectors - are reportedly responsible for 40-50% of these small airborne particles. China's winter smog "battle plan" will target these polluting industries by mandating cuts on steel, cement, and aluminum production during the smog-prone mid-November to mid-March months, as well as restricting household coal use, diesel trucks and construction projects. Steel production cuts target a range between 30-50%, which, according to Platts estimates, will take 33 mm MT of steel production - equivalent to ~3.9% of China's projected 2017 crude steel output - offline during the winter. In fact, according to China's environment minister, Li Ganjie, "these special campaigns are not a one-off, instead it is an exploration of long-term mechanisms."4 Thus, these cuts may become a recurring event in China's steel sector. China's official crude steel figures are beginning to show the impact of these cuts with November crude production falling 8.6% month-on-month (mom) and growing by just 2.2% yoy - significantly slower than the 7.6% yoy average experienced since July. As a consequence, although crude production in the rest of the world grew in line with previous months, global steel output fell almost 6% month-on-month in November, while yoy production grew 3.7% – a significant deceleration from the average 6.6% yoy rate witnessed since the beginning of 2H17 (Chart 5). Risks to this outlook come from weak compliance with these cuts. There are recent reports of evasions by aluminum and steel producers in Shandong. Nonetheless, given China's focus on these reforms, we do not foresee widespread violations. Another risk comes from the demand side. As part of its environmental agenda, Beijing announced plans put off the construction of major public projects in the city - road and water projects - until springtime. The suspension is not intended to impact "major livelihood projects" such as railways, airports, and affordable housing. Construction is the largest end user for steel - according to WSA more than half of global steel is used for buildings and infrastructure - a slowdown in the construction sector would weigh on steel demand.5 If other major construction zones adopt a similar policy, the impact of lower steel supply will be offset by weak demand, muting the overall effect on the steel market. Bottom Line: We expect to see lower steel production and exports from China in the coming months. Given Xi Jinping's resolve to improve air quality, we expect compliance to environmental reforms among steelmakers to be strong this winter. This, along with lower output from induction furnaces in China, indicates the market could be tighter than is commonly supposed at least in 1H18. The likelihood the global economic recovery and expansion persists through 2018 suggests steel markets could remain well bid in 2H18, particularly if, as we expect, growth ex-China picks up the slack resulting from any slowdown in China. However, we will need to see what the actual reforms for the industry look like following the National People's Congress in March 2018.6 Steel Profit Margins Spur Iron Ore Demand Given steel's exceptional price gains over the past two years, and iron ore's lackluster performance in 2017, profit margins at China's steel producers reached multi-year highs (Chart 6). Ordinarily, this would normally encourage steel production, which would flood the market with supply and push prices down. However, China's environmental reforms will cap output from the country's most productive steelmaking region in coming months. Consequently, unless there are mass policy violations by steel producers this winter, we do not anticipate a swift price adjustment lower. Instead, steel producers are preparing to run on all cylinders when production restrictions are lifted in the spring. As such, they are filling iron ore inventories and taking advantage of weaker iron ore prices, before the iron ore market catches up with steel. China's iron ore imports reached an all-time record in September, while the latest data shows a 19% month-on-month (mom) jump in imports, corresponding with a 2.8% yoy increase (Chart 7). Chart 6Healthy Steel##BR##Profit Margins Chart 7Steel Producers Stocking Up On Iron Ore##BR##In Preparation For Spring This runs counter to what we expect during a period of muted steel production. Especially in an environment of healthy iron ore inventories, as China is in currently. Although Chinese inventories came down from mid-year peaks, they resumed their upward trend in 4Q17. This coincides with the steel winter capacity cuts, and is likely due to reduced demand for the ore from steel mills. There are two theories to explain this phenomenon: 1. Chinese steelmakers are taking advantage of lower iron ore prices and locking in higher profit margins, in anticipation of higher iron ore prices once steel production picks up again in the spring. 2. Amid the winter cuts, China's steelmakers are demanding high-grade iron ore, imported from Brazil and Australia. This will help them ensure that they are able to maximize their output without violating environmental policies. Environmental Consciousness Widens Iron Ore Spreads A consequence of the steel winter capacity cuts is stronger demand for higher grade raw materials to cut down on the most polluting phases of steel production. Higher-grade iron ore, which is defined by its purity or iron content, is more efficient for blast furnaces to use, allowing them to produce more steel from each tonne of iron ore they consume, maximizing output and profit. This is especially true in a tight steel market, with healthy profit margins: Steelmakers are able to afford the higher grades and are favoring productive efficiency. The discount for lower grade iron ore fines - 58% iron content - as well as the premium for higher grade 65% iron content have widened (Chart 8). This is because mills have found a way to legally circumvent the winter environmental restrictions, and still remain compliant. Furthermore, purer ores are less polluting, which helps serve China's environmental agenda. In addition, the premiums for iron ore pellets and iron ore lumps have also widened. Unlike lumps and pellets which can be fed directly into blast furnaces, fines require a sintering process which is highly polluting. Thus, China's environmental reforms have increased demand for higher grade, less polluting ores. An additional factor that could be driving up spreads is higher metallurgical coke prices (Chart 6). Higher grade iron ore contains less silica and thus requires less met coke to purify the ores. According to anecdotal evidence from China, Carajas fines from Brazil - which have the highest iron ore content and lowest silica content- are reportedly in high demand.7 Furthermore, China's imports show a decline in iron ore from India - which is of the lower grades. In the July to October period, imports fell 11.26% yoy with October imports falling almost 25% yoy and 30% mom. This is consistent with the theory that steel makers are shunning lower grade ores. On the other hand, imports from Brazil and Australia are expected to remain strong (Chart 9). The latest Australian Resources and Energy Quarterly forecasts Australian and Brazilian iron ore exports to grow 5.4% and 4.2% respectively in 2018, while Indian exports are projected to fall 57.5% yoy. Chart 8Wide Iron Ore##BR##Price Spreads Chart 9Environmental Concerns Will Support##BR##Demand For High Grade Iron Ore Bottom Line: In an effort to keep production high and profit from strong steel prices in face of the winter production cuts, steel producers are turning to higher-grade iron ore, pushing up the spread between high vs. low grade ores. The extent to which steel producers are able to successfully keep production going on the back of higher-grade ores will dampen the impact of the winter production cuts on the steel sector. Given that China's environmental focus is a long term plan, we expect these spreads to remain wide, rather than reverting back to their historic average. Steel Prices And Copper Markets Chart 10Steel Consumption Helps##BR##Predict Copper Prices The copper market had a roller coaster fourth quarter. Prices for the red metal were on a general uptrend since May, and first peaked in early September at $3.13/lb before bottoming at $2.91/lb by the second half of that month. Shortly thereafter, copper prices peaked at a new high of $3.22/lb by mid October - their highest in more than three years. Fears of a slowdown in China following messaging from the 19th Communist Party Congress caused the metal to lose almost 10% of its value, when it bottomed for the second time in early December. In fact, this coincided with a 4.65% decline in the price on December 5. While there is no clear justification for this fall, it can be put down to a mix of factors including a ~10 th MT increase in LME inventories, worries about a China slowdown, as well as a liquidation of positions ahead of the new year. Nonetheless, copper has since regained these losses to end the year at $3.28/lb. In our modelling of copper, we find that steel consumption is significant in forecasting future copper price behavior. More specifically, China's steel consumption has a significant positive relationship with copper prices 6 months into the future (Chart 10). This can be explained by the importance of the construction sector as an end user of both materials. However, each metal goes into the construction site at different time frames. While steel products are used in the construction of the structures, and thus are needed at the beginning of the project, copper is used in the electrical wiring and plumbing, and is thus needed later (6 months or so) in the project. This is in line with our findings that steel is most significant with a six-month lag - reflecting the average time period between which the structure is built and the plumbing and wiring are needed. Steel consumption in China is a useful leading indicator of copper markets when demand side fundamentals are dominating steel and copper markets. Government stimulus and a solid construction sector boosted China's steel demand in 2017. However, according to the WSA Short Range Outlook, demand for steel will moderate this year on the back of reflation in China, partially offset by strong global growth. WSA notes that the closure of induction furnaces skewed up steel demand growth figures to 12.4% yoy, and instead cite a more reasonable estimate along the lines of 3% yoy steel demand growth from China in 2017, bringing the global steel demand growth rate to 2.8%. While steel demand outside of China grew by an estimated 2.6% in 2017, they foresee it reaching 3% in 2018. In contrast, they expect flat demand from China in 2018, bringing world steel demand growth to 1.6% in 2018 (Table 1). Table 1Steel Demand (yoy Growth Rates) Moderating demand from China and the stability (or lack thereof) of the supply-side will dominate the copper market this year. On the demand side, China's steel market offers insight about the future direction of the red metal. Bottom Line: Given China's appetite for steel has remained healthy to date and is projected to maintain its 2017 level this year, we do not expect a demand-induced plunge in copper prices in the 6 month horizon. Roukaya Ibrahim, Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "Will China's induction furnace steel whac-a-mole finally come to an end?" published by S&P Global Platts March 6, 2017. 2 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Slow-Down In China's Reflation Will Temper Steel, Iron Ore In 2018," published September 7, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see IEA World Energy Outlook 2016 Special Report titled "Energy and Air Pollution," available at iea.org. 4 Please see "Provincial China officials used fake data to evade aluminium, steel capacity curbs - China Youth Daily," published on December 26, 2017, available at reuters.com. 5 Please see "Steel Markets" at worldsteel.org. 6 For additional discussion, please see "Shifting Gears in China: The Impact On Base Metals," in the November 9, 2017, issue of BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see "High-medium grade iron ore fines spread widens to all-time high of $23.55/dmt," published August 22, 2017, available at platts.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2017
Highlights The stellar performance in metals over the past year resulted from a combination of favorable demand- and supply-side developments, propelled along, as always, by China's outsized effect on fundamentals. On the demand side, robust global growth is keeping metals consumption strong. On the supply side, environmental reforms in China and the shuttering of mills - as well as supply-side shocks in individual markets - continues to bolster prices. A weak U.S. dollar - which lost 6% of its value in broad trade-weighted terms - further supports these bullish conditions for metal markets. We expect China's winter supply cuts to dominate 1Q18 market fundamentals. As we move toward mid-year, we expect a soft and controlled slowdown in China, brought about by the Communist Party's goals of reducing industrial pollution and pivoting toward consumer-led growth. Although this will moderate demand from the world's top metal consumer, strong growth from the rest of the world will neutralize the impact of this slowdown. Energy: Overweight. Pipeline cracks in the critical Forties system in the North Sea highlight the unplanned-outage risk to oil prices we flagged in recent reports. We remain long Brent and WTI $55/bbl vs. $60/bbl call spreads in 2018, which are up an average of 47%, respectively, since they were recommended in September and October 2017. Base Metals: Neutral. Following a strong 1Q18, a moderate slowdown in China will be offset by growth in the rest of the world (see below). Precious Metals: Neutral. We continue to recommend gold as a strategic portfolio hedge, even though we expect as many as three additional Fed rate hikes next year. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The U.S. undersecretary for trade and foreign agricultural affairs warned farmers this week they "need to have a backup plan in the event the U.S. exits the North American Free Trade Agreement," in an interview with agriculture.com's Successful Farming. No specifics were offered. Canada and Mexico - the U.S.'s NAFTA partners - are expected to account for $21 billon and $19 billion of exports, respectively, based on USDA estimates for FY 2018. These exports largely offset imports of $22 billion and $23 billion, respectively, from both countries. The U.S. runs an ag trade surplus of ~ $23.5 billion annually. Feature Metals had another extraordinary year in 2017. The LME base metal index rallied more than 20% year-to-date (ytd) bringing the index up more than 50% since it bottomed in mid-January 2016 (Chart Of The Week). Chart of the WeekA Great Year For Metals Steel, zinc, copper, and aluminum led the gains. In fact, of the metals we track, iron ore is the only one in negative territory - having lost almost 8% ytd. Nonetheless, it has been on the uptrend recently - gaining ~ 24% since it bottomed at the end of October. Capacity reductions in China, where policymakers mandated inefficient and highly polluting mills and smelters in steel- and aluminum-producing provinces be taken offline, continue to affect the supply side in those metals most. As China churns out less of these commodities, competition for the more limited supply will pull prices for them higher. Nevertheless, a stronger USD - brought about by a more hawkish Fed - likely will cap significant upside gains, and prevent a repeat of this year's exceptional performance. Strong Global Demand Will Neutralize China Slowdown The Chinese economy is beginning to show signs of a slowdown. The Li Keqiang Index - a proxy for China's economic activity - has rolled over. Furthermore, the manufacturing PMI has plateaued following last year's rapid ascent (Chart 2). This deceleration is also evident in China's infrastructure data. Annual growth in infrastructure spending in the first three quarters of the year are below the four-year average. And, although spending grew 15.9% year-on-year (yoy) in the first 10 months of this year, the rate of growth is slower than the four-year average of 19.6% (Chart 3). Chart 2A China Slowdown Is In The Cards... Chart 3...Threatening A Pull Back In Metals Demand That said, it is important to point out that this is due to a significant decline in utilities spending growth, which accounts for ~ 20% of infrastructure investments. Investment in utilities grew a mere 2.3% in the first ten months of the year, in contrast with the average 15.7% yoy increase of the previous four years. In any case, the slowdown in China's reflation reflects President Xi Jinping's resolve to shift gears and emphasize quality over quantity in future growth strategies. Now that Xi has consolidated his power, we expect policymakers to build on the momentum from the National Communist Party Congress, and be more effective in implementing reforms going forward. As such, Beijing should be more willing to tolerate slower growth than it has in the past. Nonetheless, we do not anticipate a significant slowdown. More likely than not, policymakers will resort to fiscal stimulus if the economy is faced with notable risks. Consequently, a hard landing in China is not our base case scenario. In any case, strong global demand will neutralize a slowdown in China's metal consumption in 2018. Despite a deceleration in China, the IMF expects global growth to pick up in 2018 (Table 1). The Global PMI is at its highest level since early 2011, supported by strong readings in the Euro Area and the U.S. (Chart 4). In all likelihood, conditions for global metal demand will remain favorable in 2018. Table 1IMF Economic Forecasts Chart 4Strong Global Demand Will Neutralize##BR##Impact Of China Slowdown China Real Estate Will Slow; Major Downturn Not Expected Chart 5Slowing Real Estate Investment Is A Mild Risk We do not foresee significant risks to China's real estate market, which is the big driver of base-metals demand in that economy. Total real estate investment is up 7.8% in the first 10 months of the year - the strongest growth for the period since 2014 (Chart 5). Even so, it is important to note the slowdown in that sector. After growing 9% yoy in 1Q17, growth rates fell to 8% and 7% in 2Q and 3Q17, respectively. In fact, growth in October, the latest month for which data are available, came in at 5.6% yoy - significantly slower than the average monthly yoy rate of 8% in the first nine months of the year. The slowdown in floor-space-started is more pronounced. The area of floor space started grew 5% in the first 10 months of the year, down from an 8% expansion in the same period in 2016. October data showed a yoy as well as month-on-month contraction - 4.2% for the former, and 12.1% for the latter. This is the second yoy contraction in 2017, with July experiencing a 4.9% reduction in floor area started. Similarly, quarterly data shows a significant slowdown from almost 12% yoy growth rates registered in 4Q16 and 1Q17 to the mere 0.4% yoy growth in 3Q17. In addition, the growth rate in commodity building floor-space-under-construction has slowed down to 3.1% yoy in the first 10 months of 2017, down from almost 5% for the same period in the previous two years. Although the data are a reflection of Xi's resolve to tighten control of the real estate market, we do not expect a major downturn that will weigh on metal demand. As BCA Research's China Investment Strategy desk notes, strong demand in the real estate sector, coupled with declining inventories, will prevent a major slowdown in construction activity, even in face of tighter policies.1 A Stronger Dollar Moderates Upside Price Pressures In our modeling of the LME Base Metal Index, we find that currency movements are important determinants of the evolution of metals prices. More specifically, the U.S. dollar is inversely related to the LME base metal index. While U.S. inflation has remained stubbornly low, we expect inflation to start its ascent sometime before mid-2018, allowing the Fed to proceed with its rate-hiking cycle. Given our view that too few hikes are currently priced in for 2018, there remains some upside to the USD. Thus, while dollar weakness has been supportive for metal prices in 2017, a stronger dollar will be a headwind in 2018. A Look At The Fundamentals In terms of supply/demand dynamics in individual metal markets, idiosyncrasies in their current states, and variations in how China's environmental reforms manifest themselves will mean the different metals will follow different trajectories next year. Muted Consumption Mitigated Impact Of Supply Disruptions In Copper Copper production had a bumpy 2017, rocked by sporadic supply disruptions in some of the world's top mines.2 This led to a contraction in world refined production ex-China, which was offset by an increase in Chinese output (Chart 6). Although Chinese refined copper output grew a healthy 6% yoy in the first three quarters, this was nonetheless a slowdown from the 8% yoy expansion for the same period in 2016. Even so, increased Chinese copper production more than offset declines from other top producers. Refined copper production in the rest of the world contracted by 1.5% in the first three quarters, bringing world production growth to 1.3% - significantly slower than the average 2.6% yoy increase witnessed in the same period in the previous two years. The supply-side impact on the overall market was mitigated by a slowdown in consumption. Chinese consumption, which accounts for 50% of global refined copper demand, remained largely unchanged in the first three quarters of the year compared to last year. This follows a yoy increase of ~ 8% in Chinese demand vs. the same period in 2016. Demand from the rest of the world contracted by 0.6% yoy, down from a 2.5% yoy expansion in the same period last year. So, despite supply disruptions, the copper market remained balanced - registering a 20k MT surplus in the first three quarters of this year, following a 230k MT deficit in the same period in 2016. Recently, there is news of capacity cuts in Anhui province - where China's second-largest copper smelter will be eliminating 20 to 30% of its capacity during the winter.3 If the copper market is the next victim of China's environmental reforms, global balances may be pushed to a deficit. Although copper remains well stocked at the major warehouses, an adoption of these winter cuts by other copper producing provinces would weaken refined copper supply and support prices (Chart 7). Chart 6Copper Rallied On Back Of Supply-Side Fears Chart 7Copper Warehouses Are Well Stocked Steel Prices Will Remain Elevated Throughout Q1 China's steel sector has undergone significant reforms this year. In addition to the 100-150 mm MT of capacity cuts to be implemented between 2016 and 2020, Beijing has also eliminated steel produced by intermediate frequency furnaces (IFF).4 Even so, Chinese steel production - paradoxically - is at record highs. This comes down to the nature of IFFs, which are illegal and thus not reflected in official crude steel production data. However, growth in steel products - which reflect output from both official as well as illegal steel mills - has been flat (Chart 8). In addition, China's steel exports have come down significantly since last year, reflecting a domestic shortage in the steel industry. November data shows a 34% yoy contraction, and exports for the first 11 months of the year are down more than 30% from the same period last year. We expect Chinese steel production to remain anemic until the end of 1Q18, as mandated winter capacity cuts cap production in major steel-producing provinces. The near-term cutback in production will keep steel prices elevated. The spread between steel and iron ore prices during this period will remain wide as lower steel production translates into muted demand for the ore. This is also consistent with China's inventory data which shows that after falling since August, iron ore stocks have been building up since mid-October - in conjunction with the start of winter steel-capacity cuts. Indonesian Nickel Exports Bearish In Long Run, Not So Much In Near Term Ever since Indonesia's ban on nickel ore exports in 2014, worldwide production has been on the downtrend. In the previous two years, shrinking supply from China - which makes up about a quarter of global output - was the culprit of reduced world output, offsetting increases from the rest of the globe, and causing global production to contract by 0.2% and 0.5%, respectively (Chart 9). Chart 8Falling Exports And Flat Steel Products##BR##Output Reflect Closures In Steel Chart 9Deficit And Inventory##BR##Drawdowns Dominate Nickel... However, at 2.5%, the contraction in global output is significantly larger for the first three quarters of this year. What is noteworthy is that it is caused by shrinking production both from China - down ~ 7.5% - as well as from the rest of the world, where output is down ~ 1%. Nevertheless, a decline in demand from China - which accounts for almost half of global consumption - has softened the impact of withering production. Chinese demand for semi refined nickel shrunk 22% in the first three quarters of the year, more than offsetting the 9% growth in demand from the rest of the world. However, there has been a recovery in global demand since June. A 15% yoy growth in the third quarter from consumers ex-China drove a 5% yoy gain in global growth. Despite weak demand in 1H17, the nickel market recorded a deficit in the first three quarters of the year. In fact, nickel has been in deficit for the past two years. Going forward, Indonesia's gradual lifting of the export ban will prop up production. In fact, global yoy production growth has been in the green since June. However, while Indonesian ores are slowly returning to the global market, they remain a fraction of their pre-ban levels. Thus, prices will likely remain under upside pressure in the near term. Record Deficit And Significant Inventory Drawdowns Dominate Aluminum... Aluminum has been in deficit for the past three years. In fact, at 100k MT, the deficit in the first three quarters of 2017 is the largest on record for that period. This is reflected in LME inventory data which has been experiencing drawdowns since April 2014 - Falling from more than 5mm MT to ~ 1mm MT (Chart 10). Strong growth from Chinese producers - which account for more than half the world's primary production - kept global output growth strong, despite a decline from other top producers. However, falling Chinese production in August and September compounded the fall in output from the rest of the world, leading to a 3.5% yoy decline for those two months. In fact, September's Chinese output data marks the lowest production figure since February 2016. On the demand side, global consumption is up 6.2% yoy in the first seven months of 2017, reflecting a general uptrend in both Chinese consumption and, to a lesser extent, a greater appetite for the metal from the rest of the world. However, there has been some weakness from China recently. Chinese demand contracted by 2.9% and 9.6% yoy in August and September. While an 8.2% yoy increase in consumption from the rest of the world offset the August weakness from China, global demand shrunk by 5.8% in September. As with steel, supply-side reforms will dominate and keep aluminum prices elevated in the near term. ... Along With Zinc Demand Global zinc production has been more or less flat this year. The 2.7% decline from Chinese producers, which supply 46% of global zinc slab, was offset by a 2.4% increase in production from the rest of the world. On the demand side, although Chinese consumption - which accounts for almost half of global zinc slab demand - has been flat, strength from the rest of the world supported global demand, which is up 2.3% yoy for the first three quarters of the year (Chart 11). Chart 10...As Well As Aluminum... Chart 11...And Zinc Static supply coupled with increased demand has led the zinc market to a deficit of 500k MT - a record for the first three quarters of 2017. The deficit has continued to eat up zinc stocks, which have been in free-fall, since early 2013.   Roukaya Ibrahim, Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's China Investment Strategy Weekly Report titled "Chinese Real Estate: Which Way Will The Wind Blow?," dated September 28, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled "Copper's Getting Out Ahead Of Fundamentals, Correction Likely," dated August 24, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see "Chinese Copper Smelter Halts Capacity to Ease Winter Pollution," published on December 7, 2017, available at Bloomberg.com. 4 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled "Slow-Down in China's Reflation Will Temper Steel, Iron Ore in 2018,' dated September 7, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016
Highlights China stands out as the most likely candidate to send negative shock waves through EM and commodities in 2018. Granted the ongoing policy tightening in China will likely dampen money growth further, the only way mainland nominal GDP growth can hold up is if the velocity of money rises meaningfully, offsetting the drop in money growth. Assigning equal probabilities to various scenarios of velocity of money, the outcome is as follows: one-third probability of robust nominal growth (continuation of the rally in China-related plays) and two-third odds of a non-trivial slowdown in nominal growth with negative ramifications for China-related plays. Hence, we reiterate our negative stance on EM risk assets Feature The key question for emerging markets (EM) in 2018 is whether a slowdown in Chinese money growth will translate into a meaningful growth deceleration in this economy, and in turn produce a reversal in EM risk assets. This week we address the above question in detail elaborating on what could make China's business cycle defy the slowdown in its monetary aggregates and how investors should approach such uncertainty. Before this, we review the status of financial markets going into 2018. Priced To Perfection Or A New Paradigm? Several financial markets are at extremes. Our chart on the history of financial market manias reveals that some parts of technology/new concept stocks may be entering uncharted territory (Chart I-1). Tencent's share price, for instance, has surged 11-fold since January 2010. Chart I-1History Of Financial Markets Manias: They Lasted A Decade This is roughly on par with the prior manias' average 10-year gains. As this chart indicates, the manias of previous decades run wild until the turn of the decade. It is impossible to know whether technology/new concept stocks will peak in 2018 or run for another two years. Regardless whether or not the mania in tech/new concept stocks endures up until 2020, some sort of mean reversion in their share prices is likely next year. This has relevance to EM because the magnitude of the EM equity rally in 2017 has been enormously boosted by four large tech/concept stocks in Asia. Our measure of the cyclically-adjusted P/E (CAPE) ratio for the U.S. market suggests that equity valuations are reaching their 2000 overvaluation levels (Chart I-2, top panel). The difference between our measure and Shiller's measure of CAPE is that Shiller's CAPE is derived by dividing share prices by the 10-year moving average of EPS in real terms (deflated by consumer price inflation). Our measure is calculated by dividing equity prices by the time trend in real EPS (Chart I-2, bottom panel). Our CAPE measure assumes that in the long run, U.S. EPS in real terms will revert to its time trend. Meanwhile, the Shiller CAPE is based on the assumption that real EPS will revert to its 10-year mean. Hence, the assumptions behind our CAPE model are quite reasonable if not preferable to those of Shiller's P/E. Remarkably, the U.S. (Wilshire 5000) market cap-to-GDP ratio is close to its 2000 peak (Chart I-3). With respect to EM equity valuations, the non-financial P/E ratio is at its highest level in the past 15 years (Chart I-4). EM banks have low multiples and seem "cheap" because many of them have not provisioned for NPLs. Hence, their profits and book values are artificially inflated. In short, excluding financials, EM stocks are not cheap at all, neither in absolute terms nor relative to DM bourses. Chart I-2A Perspective On U.S. Equity Valuation Chart I-3The U.S. Market Cap-To-GDP ##br##Ratio Is Close To 2000 Peak Chart I-4EM Non-Financial Equities Are Not Cheap Such elevated DM & EM stock market valuations might be justified by currently low global long-term bond yields. Yet, if and when long-term bond yields rise, multiples will likely shrink. The latter will overpower the profit growth impact on share prices, as multiples are disproportionately and negatively linked to interest rates - especially when interest rates are low - but are proportionately and positively linked to EPS.1 As a result, a small rise in long-term bond yields will lead to a meaningful P/E de-rating. Despite very high equity valuations, U.S. advisors and traders are extremely bullish on American stocks. Their sentiment measures are at all time and 11-year highs, respectively. So are copper traders on red metal prices (Chart I-5). The mirror image of the strong and steady rally in global stocks is record-low implied volatility. The aggregate financial markets' implied volatility index is at a multi-year low (Chart I-6). Finally, yields on junk (high-yield) EM corporate and sovereign bonds are at all-time lows (Chart I-7). They are priced for perfection. Chart I-5Bullish Sentiment On Copper Is Very Elevated Chart I-6Aggregate Global Financial Markets ##br##Implied VOL Is At Record Low Chart I-7EM Junk Bond Yields Are At Record Low Are we in a new paradigm, or are we witnessing financial market extremes that are unsustainable? In regard to the timing, can these dynamics last throughout 2018 or at least the first half of next year, or will they reverse in the coming months? We have less conviction on the durability of the U.S. equity rally, but our bet is that EM risk assets will roll over in absolute terms and begin underperforming their DM peers very soon. What could cause such a reversal in EM risk assets? China stands out as the most likely candidate to send negative shock waves through emerging markets and commodities. China: "Financial Stability" Priority Entails Tighter Policy The Chinese authorities are facing unprecedented challenges: The outstanding value of broad money in China (measured in U.S. dollars) is now larger than the combined U.S. and euro area broad money supply (Chart I-8, top panel). Chart I-8Beware Of Money Excesses In China As a share of its own GDP, broad money in China is much higher compared to any other nation in history (Chart I-8, bottom panel). In brief, there is too much money in China and most of it - $21 trillion out of $29 trillion - has been created by the banking system since early 2009. We maintain that the enormous overhang of money and credit in China represents major excess/imbalances and has nothing to do with the nation's high savings rate.2 Rather, it is an outcome of animal spirits running wild among bankers and borrowers over the past nine years. Easy money often flows into real estate and China has not been an exception. Needless to say, property prices are hyped and expensive relative to household income. Policy tightening amid lingering excesses and imbalances makes us negative on China's growth outlook. In a nutshell, we place more weight on tightening when there are excesses in the system, and downplay the importance of tightening in a healthy system without excesses. Importantly, excessive money creation seems to finally be pushing inflation higher. Consumer price services and core consumer price inflation rates are on a rising trajectory (Chart I-9, top and middle panels). As a result, banks' deposit rates in real terms (deflated by core CPI) have plunged into negative territory for the first time in the past 12 years (Chart I-9, bottom panel). Remarkably, the People's Bank of China's existing $3 trillion of international reserves is sufficient to "back up" only 13% and 11% of official M2 and our measure of M3, respectively (Chart I-10). If Chinese households and companies decide to convert 10-15% of their deposits into foreign currency and the PBoC takes the other side of the trade, its reserves will be exhausted. Chart I-9China: Inflation Is Rising And ##br##Real Deposit Rate Is Negative Chart I-10China: Low Coverage Of ##br##Money Supply By FX Reserves Therefore, reining money and credit expansion is of paramount importance to China's long-term financial and economic stability. "Financial stability" has become the key policy priority. "Financial stability" is policymakers' code word for containing and curbing financial imbalances and bubbles. Having experienced the equity bubble bust in 2015, policymakers are determined to preclude another bubble formation and its subsequent bust. Consequently, the ongoing tightening campaign will not be reversed in the near term unless damage to the economy becomes substantial and visible. By the time the authorities and investors are able to identify such damage in the real economy, China-related plays in financial markets will be down substantially. Chart I-11China: Corporate Bond Yields And Yield Curve Faced with significant excesses in money, leverage and property markets, the Chinese authorities have been tightening - and have reinforced their policy stance following the Party's Congress in October. There is triple tightening currently ongoing in China: 1. Liquidity tightening: Money market rates have climbed, and onshore corporate bond yields are rising (Chart I-11, top panel). Remarkably, the yield curve is flat, pointing to weaker growth ahead (Chart I-11, bottom panel). 2. Regulatory tightening: The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) is forcing banks to bring off-balance-sheet assets onto their balance sheets, and is reining banks' involvement in shadow banking activities. In addition, financial regulators are trying to remove the government's implicit "put" from the financial system, and thereby curb speculative and irresponsible investment behavior. Finally, many local governments are tightening investors' participation in the real estate market. 3. Anti-corruption campaign is embracing the financial institutions: The powerful anti-corruption commission is planning to dispatch groups of inspectors to examine financial institutions' activities. This could dampen animal spirits among bankers and shadow banking organizations. The Outlook: The "Knowns"... In China, broad money growth has already slumped to an all-time low (Chart I-12). The money as well as the credit plus fiscal spending impulses both point to a considerable slowdown in the mainland's industrial cycle and overall economic activity (Chart I-13). Chart I-12China: Broad Money ##br##Growth Is At All-Time Low Chart I-13China: Money And Credit & ##br##Fiscal Impulses Are Negative The slowdown is not limited to money growth; there are a few real business cycle indicators that are already weakening. For example, the growth rate of property floor space sold and started has slumped to zero (Chart I-14). Electricity output and aggregate freight volume growth have both decisively rolled over (Chart I-15). Chart I-14China: Property Starts Are Set To Contract Again Chart I-15China: A Few Signs Of Slowdown That said, based on the past correlation between money and credit impulses on the one hand and the business cycle on the other, China's economy should have slowed much more, and its negative impact on the rest of the world should have already been felt (Chart I-13, on page 9). This has been the key pillar of our view on EM, but it has not yet transpired. Is it possible that the relationship between money/credit impulses and the business cycle has broken down? If so, why? And how should investors handle such uncertainty? Bottom Line: China's ongoing policy tightening will ensure that money and credit impulses remain negative for some time. Can the country's industrial sectors de-couple from its past tight correlation with money and credit? ...And The "Unknowns" By definition, the only way to sustain nominal economic growth in the face of a decelerating money supply is if the velocity of money increases. This is true for any economy. Nominal GDP = Money Supply x Velocity of Money Provided China's policy tightening will likely further dampen money growth, the only way nominal GDP growth can hold up is if the velocity of money rises meaningfully, offsetting the drop in money growth. This is the main risk to our view and strategy. Chart I-16 portrays all three variables. Chart I-16China: Money, Nominal GDP ##br##And Velocity Of Money Even though the velocity of money has fallen structurally over the past nine years (Chart I-16, bottom panel), it has risen marginally in 2017, allowing the mainland's nominal economic growth to hold up despite a considerable relapse in money supply growth. Notably, this has been the reason why our view has not worked this year. What is the velocity of money, and how can we forecast its fluctuations and, importantly, the magnitude of its variations? The velocity of money is one of the least understood concepts in economic theory. The velocity of money is anything but stable. In our opinion, the velocity of money reflects animal spirits of households and businesses as well as government spending decisions. Forecasting animal spirits and the magnitude of their variations is not very a reliable exercise. In a nutshell, the banking system (commercial banks and the central bank) creates money via expanding its balance sheet - making loans to or acquiring assets from non-banks. However, commercial banks have little direct influence on the velocity of money. The latter is shaped by non-banks' decisions to spend or not (i.e., save). Significantly, non-banks' spending and saving decisions do not alter the amount of money in the system. Yet they directly impact the velocity of money. The banking system creates money, and non-banks churn money (make it circulate). At any level of money supply, a rising number of transactions will boost nominal output, and vice versa. Further, there is a great deal of complexity in the interaction between money supply and its velocity. Both are sometimes independent, i.e. they do not influence one another, but in some other cases one affects the other. For example, with the ongoing triple tightening in China and less money being originated by the banking system, will households and businesses increase or decrease their spending? Our bias is that they will not increase spending. This is especially true for the corporate sector, which has record-high leverage and where access to funding has been tightening. It is also possible that rising velocity will lead to more money creation as more spending leads to higher loan demand and banks accommodate it - i.e., originating more loans/money. These examples corroborate that money supply and the velocity of money are not always independent of each other. On the whole, it is almost impossible to reliably forecast the magnitude of changes in velocity of money. In the same vein, it is difficult to forecast animal spirit dynamics in any economy. Chart I-17U.S.: The Rise In Velocity Of Money ##br##Overwhelmed Slowdown In Money One recent example where nominal GDP has decoupled from broad money growth is the U.S. Chart I-17 demonstrates that in the past 12 months, U.S. nominal GDP growth has firmed up even though broad money (M2) growth has slumped. This decoupling can only be explained by a spike in the velocity of M2. In other words, soaring confidence and animal spirits among U.S. households and businesses have boosted their willingness to spend, even as the banking system has created less money and credit growth has slowed considerably over the past 12 months. Going back to China, how should investors consider such uncertainty in changes in the velocity of money? Investing is about the future, which is inherently uncertain. Hence, an investment process is about assigning probabilities to various scenarios. Provided the velocity of money is impossible to forecast, we assign equal probabilities to each of the following scenarios for China in 2018 (Figure I-1): One-third odds that the velocity of money rises more than the decline in broad money growth, producing robust nominal GDP growth; One-third probability that the velocity of money stays broadly flat - the outcome being meaningful deceleration in nominal GDP growth; A one-third chance that the velocity of money declines - the result being a severe growth slump. Figure I-1How Investors Can Consider Uncertainty Related To Velocity Of Money In short, a positive outcome on China-related plays has a one-third probability of playing out, while a negative outcome carries a two-thirds chance. This is why we continue to maintain our negative view on EM and commodities. Commodities Our view on commodities and commodity plays is by and large shaped by our view on China's capital spending. Given the credit plus fiscal spending impulse is already very weak, the path of least resistance for capital expenditures is down. Besides, the government is clamping down on local governments' off-balance-sheet borrowing and spending (via Local Government Financing Vehicles). A deceleration in capital expenditures in general and construction (both infrastructure and property development) in particular is bearish for industrial metals (Chart I-18). Money and credit impulses herald a major downturn in Chinese imports values and volumes (Chart I-19). Chart I-18Industrial Metals / Copper Are At Risk Chart I-19China Will Be A Drag On Its Suppliers As to China's commodities output reductions, last week we published a Special Report3 on China's "de-capacity" reforms in steel and coal. The report concludes the following: The path of least resistance for steel, coal and iron ore prices is down over the next 12-24 months. China's "de-capacity" reforms in steel and coal will continue into 2018 and 2019, but the scale and pace of "de-capacity" will diminish. Importantly, the mainland's steel and coal output will likely rise going forward as new capacity using more efficient and ecologically friendly technologies come on stream. The capacity swap policy introduced by the authorities has been allowing steel and coal producers to add new capacity in order to replace almost entirely obsolete capacity. The combination of demand slowdown and modest production recovery will weigh on non-oil raw materials. As for oil, the picture is much more complicated. Oil prices have been climbing in reaction to declining OECD inventories as well as on expectations of an extension to oil output cuts into 2018. One essential piece of missing information in the bullish oil narrative is China's oil inventories. In recent years, China has been importing more crude oil than its consumption trend justifies. Specifically, the sum of its net imports and domestic output of crude oil has exceeded the amount of refined processed oil. This difference between the sum of net imports and production of crude oil and processed crude oil constitutes our proxy for the net change of crude oil inventories. Chart I-20 shows that our proxy for mainland crude oil inventories has risen sharply in recent years. This includes both the nation's strategic oil reserves as well as commercial inventories. There is no reliable data on the former. Therefore, it is impossible to estimate the country's commercial crude oil inventories. Chart I-20China: Beware Of High Chinese Oil Inventories Nevertheless, whether crude oil inventories have risen due to a build-up of strategic petroleum reserves or commercial reserves, the fact remains that crude oil inventories in China have surged and appear to be reaching the size of OECD total crude and liquid inventories (Chart I-20). In short, China has been a stabilizing force for the oil market over the past three years by buying more than it consumes. Without such excess purchases from China, oil prices would likely have been much weaker. Going forward, the pace of Chinese purchases of crude oil will likely slow due to several factors: (a) China prefers buying commodities on dips, especially when it is for strategic inventory building. With crude oil prices having rallied to around $60, the authorities might reduce their purchases temporarily, creating an air pocket for prices, and then accelerate their purchases at lower prices; (b) Commercial purchases of oil will likely decelerate due to tighter money/credit, possibly high inventories and a general slowdown in industrial demand for fuel. Bottom Line: Raw materials and oil prices4 are at risk from China and overly bullish investor sentiment. Beyond Commodities The slowdown in China will impact not only commodities but also non-commodity shipments to the mainland (Chart I-21). In fact, 47% of the nation's imports are commodities and raw materials and 45% are industrial/capital goods - i.e., China's imports are heavily exposed to investment expenditures, not consumer spending. This is why money/credit impulses correlate so well with this country's imports. Consistently, China's broad money (M3) impulse leads EM corporate profit growth by 12 months - and currently heralds a major EPS downtrend (Chart I-22). In addition, aggregate EM narrow money (M1) growth also points to a material slump in EM EPS (Chart I-23). Chart I-21China Is A Risk To ##br##Non-Commodity Economies Too Chart I-22Downside Risk To EM EPS The only EM countries that are not materially exposed to China and commodities are Turkey and India. The former is a basket case on its own. Indian stocks are expensive and will have a difficult time rallying in absolute terms when the EM equity benchmark relapses. As for Korea and Taiwan, their largest export destination is not advanced economies but China. China accounts for 25% of Korea's exports and 28% of Taiwan's. This compares to a combined 22% of total Korean exports and 20% of total Taiwanese exports going to the U.S. and EU combined Can robust growth in the U.S. and EU derail the growth slowdown in China when capital spending slows? This is very unlikely, in our view. Chart I-24 portends that China's shipments to the U.S. and EU account for only 6.6% of Chinese GDP, while capital spending and credit origination constitute 45% and 25% of GDP, respectively. Chart I-23EM M1 And EM EPS Chart I-24What Drives Chinese Growth? A final word on tech stocks. EM's four large-cap tech stocks (Tencent, Ali-Baba, Samsung and TSMC) have gone exponential and are extremely overbought. At this juncture, any strong opinion on tech stocks is not warranted because they can sell off or continue advancing for no fundamental reason. We have been recommending an overweight position in tech stocks, and continue recommending overweighting them, especially Korean and Taiwanese semiconductor companies. As for Tencent and Alibaba, these are concept stocks, and as a top-down house we have little expertise to judge whether or not they are expensive. These are bottom-up calls. Investment Strategy EM Stocks: Asset allocators should continue to underweight EM versus DM, and absolute-return investors should stay put. Our overweights are Taiwan, China, Korean tech stocks, Thailand, Russia and central Europe. Our underweights are Turkey, South Africa, Brazil, Peru and Malaysia. Chart I-25EM Currencies: A Canary In ##br##Coal Mine For EM Credit? Stay short a basket of the following EM currencies: ZAR, TRY, BRL, IDR and MYR. We are also shorting the COP and CLP. Unlike in 2014-2015, EM currencies will depreciate not only versus the U.S. dollar but also the euro. For traders who prefer a market neutral currency portfolio, our recommended longs (or our currency overweights) are TWD, THB, SGD, ARS, RUB, PLN and CZK. INR and CNH will also outperform other EM currencies. Continue underweighting EM sovereign and corporate credit relative to U.S. investment grade bonds. The mix of weaker EM/China growth, lower commodities prices and EM currency depreciation bode ill for already very tight EM credit spreads (Chart I-25). Within the sovereign credit space, our underweights are Brazil, Venezuela, South Africa and Malaysia and our overweights are Russia, Argentina and low beta defensive credits. The main risk to EM local currency bonds is EM currency depreciation. With foreign ownership of EM domestic bonds at all-time highs, exchange rate depreciation could trigger non-trivial selling pressure. Among local currency bond markets, the most vulnerable are Turkey, South Africa, Indonesia and Malaysia. The least vulnerable are Korea, Russia, China, India, Argentina and Central Europe. Other high-conviction market-neutral recommendations: Long U.S. banks / short EM banks. Long U.S. homebuilders / short Chinese property developers. Long the Russian ruble / short oil. Long the Chilean peso / short copper. Long Big Five state-owned Chinese banks / short small- and medium-sized banks. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 For example, given that interest rates are in the denominator of the Gordon Growth model, a one percentage point change in interest rates from a low level can have a significant impact on the fair value P/E ratio. 2 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Reports from October 26, 2016, November 23, 2016 and January 18, 2017; available on ems.bcaresearch.com 3 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report titled "China's 'De-Capacity' Reforms: Where Steel & Coal Prices Are Headed," dated November 22, 2017, link available on page 22. 4 This is the Emerging Markets Strategy team's view and is different from BCA's house view on commodities. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations