Ukraine

Executive Summary Higher Prices Expected Global oil supply will move lower for a few months, until shipping can be re-routed and re-priced in response to sanctions against Russian oil producers and refiners.  In the wake of another outbreak of COVID-19 in China, oil demand will likely move marginally lower in the near term.  Chinese fiscal stimulus to support demand and Chinese equity markets will be bullish for oil, natgas and metals. Work-arounds by China and India to circumvent Western sanctions likely will keep the hit to Russian oil production contained to March and April.  However, longer term – 2024 and beyond – sanctions will put Russia's oil output on a downward trajectory. Saudi Arabia will launch an experiment this year to be paid in yuan for oil exports to China.  As a risk-management strategy, KSA needs USD alternatives for storing wealth and retaining access to its foreign reserves, given the success of sanctions in restricting Russia's access to its foreign reserves following its invasion of Ukraine. Our Brent forecast is higher, averaging $93/bbl for this year and in 2023. Bottom Line: We recommend buying the dip in any oil-and-gas equity sell-off.  We remain long the XOP ETF.  We also remain long the S&P GSCI and COMT ETF – long commodity-index based vehicles that benefit from higher commodity prices and increasing backwardation in these markets, particularly oil. Feature Shipping delays in the wake of sanctions – official and self-imposed – against Russian oil and gas exports will stretch out global hydrocarbon supply chains in 1H22. This will have the effect of reducing actual supply, as these vessels are re-routed, and work-arounds are found to get oil to ports accepting Russian material.1 Related Report  Commodity & Energy Strategy2022 Key Views: Past As Prelude For Commodities So far, China and India appear to be moving quickly to develop sanctions work-arounds. Both have long-term trading relationships with Russia, and, in the case of India, the capacity to revive a treaty covering rupee-invoicing of trade in commodities and arms. Estimates of the total hit to Russian oil production resulting from export sanctions imposed by the West following its invasion of Ukraine last month range as high as 5mm b/d in output losses, but we do not share that view.2 There is a strong desire for discounted oil in China and India, and to find alternatives to USD-denominated trade. This has been catalyzed by the sanctions on Russia's central bank and the shutdown of access to its foreign reserves. Payment-messaging systems competitive with the Brussels-based SWIFT network have been stood up already. These will be refined in the wake of the Ukraine war by states with a long-standing desire to diversify payment systems away from the world's reserve currency (i.e., the USD). Among these states, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is reported to be exploring alternatives for diversifying away from USD-based payment systems, and foreign-reserves custodial relationships dependent on Western central-bank oversight – particularly the US Fed.3 In addition, as ties between China and GCC states have strengthened, the Kingdom might also be looking to diversify its defense partnerships, particularly given the open hostility between the Biden administration in the US and KSA's leadership. Monitoring Chinese state media coverage of this will provide a good indication of the extent of such cooperation. Assessing Highly Uncertain Supply In our base case, Russian output likely falls by ~ 1mm b/d over the March-April period because of shipping delays that force production to be throttled back at the margin due to storage constraints. In its magnitude, this is a similar assumption to the reference case considered by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (OIES) but is extended for two months (Table 1).4 We expect shipping delays and payment work-arounds to be sorted out in a couple of months, which, given the incentives of all involved, does not seem unreasonable. Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) To Dec23 In our base case modeling, supply changes by core-OPEC 2.0 in 2022 are required to meet physical deficits brought about by less-than-expected volumes returned to the market by the entire coalition from August 2021 to now. This amounts to ~ 1.2mm b/d by our reckoning. For all of 2022, we assume core-OPEC 2.0 will lift supply by 1.3mm b/d, with most of this being provided to markets beginning in May 2022. In 2023, supplies from KSA, UAE and Kuwait are assumed to increase by roughly 0.2mm b/d, led by KSA (Chart 1). This is higher relative to our previous estimates, given our expectation, this core group will have to lift output to compensate not only for reduced Russian output and supply-chain delays this year and next, but falling output within the producer coalition's other non-core states. Outside OPEC 2.0, stronger WTI futures prices in spot markets and along the entire forward curve drive our estimate of US shale output (L48 ex-GoM) to 9.89mm b/d in 2022 (0.86mm b/d above 2021 levels) and 10.58mm b/d in 2023 (0.69mm above our 2022 levels). Supply-chain disruptions and cost inflation showing up in US shale producers' operations likely will dampen output increases.5 For the US, we expect 2022 average US production of 12.1mm b/d, or 900k b/d higher than 2021 output, and 12.8mm b/d in 2023, which is 700k b/d higher than 2022 levels (Chart 2). Chart 1Still Expecting Core-OPEC 2.0 Production Increases Chart 2US Oil Output Slightly Higher   Higher Brent prices will encourage short-term production increases from North Sea producers and others. However, it is not clear whether this will incentivize the years-long projects that will be needed to offset the lack of capex in the sector over the past decade or so. One of our high-conviction views resulting from the dearth of capex in oil and gas production is increasingly tighter markets by mid-decade – likely apparent by 2024 – which will require higher prices to reverse the lack of investment in new production. In line with our House view, we are not restoring the return of up to 1.3mm b/d of Iranian production to markets, given the guidance from this source proved unreliable earlier this month when it suspended talks with the US on its nuclear deal. We also are not assuming ceasefire talks between Ukraine and Russia will end to the Ukraine war, given the unreliability of the source (Russia) in these reports. Softer Demand Near Term Over the next few months, we expect the recent upsurge in COVID-19 cases in China to reduce Asian demand, but not tank it relative to our existing assumptions.6 Even though this was expected in our balances estimates, we are reducing our 2Q22 demand estimate by an additional 250k b/d, which is split evenly between DM and EM economies. This reflects the direct short-term hit to EM demand from China's lockdowns and a stronger USD, which raises the local-currency costs of oil, as well as the knock-on effects of additional supply-chain disruptions. Global consumption for 2022 is expected to be 4.4mm b/d higher on average vs 2021 levels, coming in at 101.54mm b/d, and 1.7mm b/d higher in 2023 vs. 2022 levels. We expect the Russian sanctions work-arounds being pursued by China and India – together accounting for a bit more than 20% of global oil demand – will be effective and will put overall EM demand back on trend in 2H22, assuming China's COVID-19 outbreak is brought under control (Chart 3).   Chart 3COVID-19 Hits China Demand, But Does Not Tank EM Overall While markets remain highly fluid – subject to sharp changes in perceptions of fundaments and their trajectories – these supply-demand estimates continue to point to relatively a balanced market this year and next (Chart 4). That said, the supply-demand fundamentals still leave inventories extremely tight, which means they will  provide limited buffering against sudden shifts in supply, demand or both (Chart 5). This will, in our estimation, keep forward curves backwardated, which will support our long-term positions in long commodity-index exposure (i.e., the S&P GSCI and the COMT ETF).  Chart 4Markets Remain Balanced... Chart 5...And Inventories Remain Tight Our base-case balances estimates translate into a 2022 Brent price forecast that averages $93/bbl, and a 2023 average estimate of $93/bbl, which are lower than our previous forecasts of $94/bbl and $98/bbl, respectively. For 1Q22, we now expect prices to average $98/bbl; 2Q22 to average $98.25/bbl; 3Q22 $88.45/bbl; and 4Q22 $87.30/bbl. Risks To Our View The supply side of our modeling remains exposed to exogenous political risks, chiefly: A failure on the part of core-OPEC 2.0 to increase production to offset lower-than-expected output outside the coalition's core; Lower-than-expected US oil output, given stronger-than-expected production discipline; and A return of up to 1.3mm b/d of Iranian barrels, which we no longer are assuming in our balances. We continue to believe core-OPEC 2.0 will increase production because it is in their interest not to allow inventory depletion to accelerate and for prices to move higher faster. The local-currency cost of oil in EM economies – the growth engine for oil demand – is high and going higher. In real terms – i.e., inflation-adjusted terms – it is even higher, as the real effective USD trade-weighted FX rate exceeds that of the nominal rate (Chart 6). This can be seen in the local-currency costs of oil in the world's largest consumers (Chart 7). We expect an announcement from core-OPEC 2.0 by the end of this month regarding a production increase. Chart 6High Real USD FX Rates Increase Local Oil Costs Chart 7Local-Currency Oil Costs In Large Consuming States   Of course, KSA's diversification to USD alternatives as a risk-management strategy makes it less certain it will lead an output increase in exchange for an increased US commitment to its defense. Regarding US shale output, producers remain disciplined in their capital allocation. Even though we expect higher prices across the WTI forward curve will incentivize additional production, we could be over-estimating the extent of this increase in our modeling. Lastly, as noted above, Iran and Russia are indicating their trade concerns have been addressed by the US, which presumably will presumably will be followed by the return up to 1.3mm b/d of production to export markets. However, forward guidance from these producers has not been particularly reliable, and we could be wrong here as well. This would be a bearish fundamental on the supply side, which would pressure prices lower. Investment Implications Given the breakdown in talks between the US and Iran – presumably under pressure from Russia for guarantees the US would not sanction its trade with Iran – our Brent price forecast remains above $90/bbl (Chart 8). We expect the near-term price increase will dissipate as the sanctions work-arounds – particularly by China and India – re-route oil flows. Core OPEC 2.0 producers – KSA, the UAE and Kuwait – have sufficient surplus capacity to increase production to allow refiners to re-build inventories. This big question for markets now is will they bring it to market in the near term? KSA's interest in exploring yuan-linked oil trade with China adds an element of uncertainty to whether production will be increased. Perhaps that is a goal of this exercise: The US is being shown there are alternatives available to large oil exporters re terms of trade and providers of defense services. Chart 8Higher Prices Expected There is sufficient spare capacity available at present to address the current physical deficits in global markets. Our analysis indicates markets are balanced but still tight, as can be seen in current and expected inventory levels. We remain long the XOP ETF and the S&P GSCI and COMT ETF. The latter ETFs provide long commodity-index based exposure that benefits from higher commodity prices and increasing backwardation in commodity markets generally, particularly oil.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com     Commodities Round-Up Precious Metals: Bullish Markets expected the Federal Reserve's rate hike of 25 basis points in the March and was not disappointed. Further rate hikes this year will occur against the backdrop of high geopolitical uncertainty and inflation, both of which are bullish for gold. The Russia-Ukraine crisis has added a new layer of complexity, and the Fed will need to proceed with caution to curb inflation but not over-tighten the economy.       Footnotes 1     Please see All at sea: Russian-linked oil tanker seeks a port, published by straitstimes.com on March 10, 2022 for examples of shipping delays. 2     Please see Could Russia Look to China to Export More Oil and Natural Gas? published by naturalgasintell.com on March 9, and India says it’s in talks with Russia about increasing oil imports., published on March 15, for additional reporting. See also Besides China, Putin Has Another Potential De-dollarization Partner in Asia published by cfr.org, which discusses India-Russia trade agreements between 1953-92 with the signing of the 1953 Indo-Soviet Trade Agreement. 3    Please see Saudi considering China’s yuan for oil purchases published by al-monitor.com on March 16. 4    Please see the OIES Oil Monthly published on March 14. 5    Oil producers in a ‘dire situation’ and unable to ramp up output, says Oxy CEO published on March 8 by cnbc.com. 6    A resurgence of COVID-19 in China was not unexpected. It was one of our key views going into 2022. Please see 2022 Key Views: Past As Prelude For Commodities, which we published on December 16, 2021. In that report, we noted, "… China still is operating under a zero-tolerance COVID-19 policy, and has relied on less efficacious vaccines that appear to offer no protection against the omicron variant of the coronavirus. This also is a risk for EM economies that rely on these vaccines. However, the roll-out of mRNA vaccines globally via joint ventures will be gathering steam in 2H22, which is bullish for commodity demand." We continue to expect Chinese authorities to deploy mRNA vaccines or antivirals to combat this outbreak.   Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Trades Closed in 2021

Special Report

Executive Summary Tight Inventories Spike Metals Russia's war against Ukraine is a watershed moment, which will realign production, distribution and consumption of commodities globally. The development of new sources of the critical metals desperately needed to build out renewable energy grids and the drive to secure access to oil, gas and coal will intensify along political lines. China, reinforced by Russia, will lead the East, while the US and its allies will lead the West, in a redux of the Cold War. Local politics will intrude on this process, as left-of-center governments in important commodity-producing states secure their electoral victories and claim greater shares of commodity revenues. The rebuilding of defense systems, particularly in Europe, will compete with the renewable-energy transition. This will stress already-tight metals markets, where low inventories will predispose markets to higher volatility a la this week's oil, natgas and nickel price spikes. This will retard economic growth. In the short term, CO2 emissions will surge. Longer term, the transition to net-zero carbon emissions by 2050 will be pushed back years, as states compete for access to commodities. East-West trade restrictions and hoarding of commodities secured via trade within these respective blocs, as is occurring presently, will increase. Bottom Line: Russia's war against Ukraine is a watershed moment.  The development of new sources of the critical metals desperately needed to build out renewable energy grids, and the drive to secure access to oil, gas and coal will intensify. China, reinforced by Russia, will lead the East, while the US and its allies will lead the West, in a redux of the Cold War. Feature Russia's war with Ukraine provoked a watershed moment for Europe: Leaders suddenly realized they had to reverse decades of energy dependence on Russia, rebuild their militaries, and sustain a massive buildout of the continent's renewable-energy generation and grid. This occurred as inventories of the basic commodities required to achieve all of these objectives were stretched so tight that the mere threat of the cutoff of pipeline natural gas was enough to send benchmark EU natgas prices to a record $113/MMBtu, up nearly 80% from the previous day's close before it settled back to still-elevated levels (Chart 1). Oil inventories also were stretched extremely thin even before Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine 24 February (Chart 2). The situation is not improving, since, in the wake of the Ukraine war, numerous refiners and trading companies now are observing self-imposed sanctions against taking any Russian oil or refined products. It is worthwhile remembering this began before the US and UK announced they would ban all imports of Russian material this week.1 This will stretch supply chains by unknow durations – the movement of crude from Russia to a refiner could take months instead of weeks, until new trade patterns are established. Chart 1Little Flex In EU Gas Inventories Chart 2Little Flex In EU Gas Inventories   Global economic and policy uncertainty is massively elevated, with percent changes in oil and gas prices swinging on a double-digit basis daily. This makes it extremely difficult to bid or offer oil cargoes in the physical market or make markets (i.e., bid or offer) in the futures markets, which has the effect of compounding uncertainty and volatility. Fundamentals – supply, demand and inventories – take a back seat to fear and uncertainty in such markets. This makes it virtually impossible to assign a probability to any price outcomes based on supply and demand – the true definition of uncertainty in the Frank Knight sense – and to make long-term capex decisions over the long term.2 We raised our 2022 and 2023 Brent forecasts on the back of the massive uncertainty in the markets to $90/bbl and $85/bbl, respectively, right after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. We assume 1Q22 Brent will average $100/bbl. We expect core OPEC 2.0 producers – Saudi Arabia, UAE and Kuwait – will increase production beginning in 2Q22; US shale-oil output will rise, and ~ 1.2mm b/d of Iranian production will return to market in 2H22. Among the risks to our forecasts are a failure by core OPEC 2.0 to lift output (we expect an announcement at the end of this month when the producer coalition meets); lower-than-expected US shale output, and a failure to resolve the Iran nuclear deal with the US. Our modeling indicated these outcomes could lift Brent to between $120/bbl and $140/bbl by 2023 (Chart 3). We will be updating our forecasts next week.3 Chart 3Brent Forwards Lift EU's Watershed Metals Moment EU leadership is setting out to reverse decades of energy dependence on Russia, rebuild their militaries, and sustain a massive buildout of the continent's renewable-energy grid, all a result of the Ukraine war. This will require massive investment in metals mining and refining, along with steel-making capacity. Already, Germany is pledging to increase LNG import capacity and measures to reduce its dependence on Russian natural gas by 75% this year.4 The EU is looking to restore its natgas inventories to 90% of capacity before next winter, and has pledged to double down on renewables, in order to remove member-state dependence on Russian energy exports.5 These ambitious goals are up against the hard reality of scarce base metals supply globally. This will be exacerbated going forward by actions taken by and against Russia. The Russia-Ukraine crisis will destabilize metal markets, given supply uncertainty from Russia and its contribution to global supply. The commodities heavyweight constitutes 6%, 5% and 4% of global primary aluminum, refined nickel and copper production. Against the backdrop of very low global inventories in these metals (Chart 4), the prices of all three hit record highs over the last few days due to uncertain supply (Chart 5). LME nickel prices more than quadrupled on Tuesday as traders rushed to cover short positions and margin calls. Chart 4Low Inventories... Chart 5...Lead To Price Volatility Uncertainty has engulfed metal markets, with a Western ban on Russian metal imports still a possibility. Putin’s announcement regarding raw material export restrictions will further fuel supply uncertainty.6 As in the case of oil, private entities’ self-sanctioning, sanctions on the Russian financial system, and war-related supply chain disruptions are causing current Russian metal export disruptions.7 So far, Western sanctions on commodities have not directly interfered with metal flows from Russia. But markets are taking it day to day. Supply disruptions and sanctions force the formation of new trade patterns, as private entities aim to maximize arbitrage opportunities. For example, high European aluminum price spreads incentivized shipments from China, the world’s largest producer and consumer of refined aluminum. Normally, Europe relies on Russia for aluminum supplies. Rising European physical premiums for delivered metal, caused by Russian export disruptions, will see trading companies take advantage of arbitrage opportunities in other commodities as well. Europe's Risk Profile Rising Since the Ukraine war began, rising European physical premiums in commodities ranging from metals to natgas indicate the continent – more so than others – is particularly vulnerable to Russian export disruptions. Europe’s reliance on Russian energy and its supply disruptions will raise operating costs for smelters and refiners on the continent, threatening smelter shutdowns similar to those we saw this past winter. Markets were expecting power price relief over the warmer months and higher smelting activity. Elevated fuel and power prices, however, will constrain metals refining in Europe, and could shut or close even more smelters, keeping refined metals supply scarce and prices high. Rebuilding Europe's Defenses EU leaders are scheduled to take up a new energy and defense funding proposal today, which media reports are describing as "massive" (no detail provided ahead of the meeting, of course). This program reportedly will be akin to the EU's $2 trillion COVID-relief fund.8 The EU's fast response to defense shortfalls comes against the backdrop discussed above regarding super-tight metals markets, which now face a further complication of unpredictable local politics in metals-producing states. Some of these states have voted left-of-center governments into office, which now appear to be intent on nationalizing mining operations.9 Chile, e.g., accounts for ~ 30% of global copper ore output, and is in the process of re-writing its constitution, which will change tax and royalty law, and could pave the way for nationalization of copper and lithium mines. This political risk compounds any long-term planning operations by consumers like the EU and producers. Investment Implications Energy markets – broadly defined to include oil, gas and coal along with the base metals required for renewables and their supporting grids and electric vehicles – are being rocked by Russia's war with Ukraine. Base metals, in particular, will have to find price levels that destroy demand among competing uses, if the EU's dual-track plan to build out its renewables generation and restore a military capability is approved. A "massive" funding effort in Europe, coupled with equally massive efforts in the US and China – both intent on building out their renewable generation and grids, as well as expanding their defensive capabilities – will be extremely difficult to pull off. Critical base metals inventories remain low, and prices are high because demand exceeds supply for the foreseeable future (Chart 6). Chart 6Tight Inventories Spike Metals The EU will join a world in which the other two great economic centers – the US and China – will engage in a geopolitical competition over access to and control of scarce base metals, oil, gas and coal resources. Russia will remain aggressive toward the West, at least until the Putin regime falls, and will play an ancillary role to China. Fossil fuels and base metals have been starved for capex for more than a decade. Governmental pronouncements will not reverse this. These markets will remain tight, and will get tighter in order to allocate increasingly scarce supply with rapidly growing demand. As such, we remain long commodity-index exposure (S&P GSCI and the COMT ETF), along with equity exposure to oil and gas producers via the XOP ETF, and the XME and PICK ETFs to retain exposure to base metals and bulks producers and traders.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     Please see Russian tankers at sea despite ‘big unknown’ over who will buy oil, published by ft.com on March 7, 2022. 2     Please see Explained: Knightian uncertainty, published by mit.edu for discussion. 3    Please see Oil Risk Premium Abates, But Still Remains, which we published on February 25, 2022. 4    Please see Germany Revives LNG Import Plans to Cut Reliance on Russian Natural Gas in Marked Policy Shift, published by naturalgasintel.com on March 1, 2022. 5    Please see Climate change: EU unveils plan to end reliance on Russian gas, published by bbc.co.uk on March 8, 2022, and The EU plan to drastically ramp renewables to replace Russian gas, published by pv-magazine.com on March 9, 2022. 6    Please see Russia to Omit Raw Material Exports but Omits Details, published by Bloomberg on March 9, 2022. 7     Please see here for Which companies have stopped doing business with Russia? 8    Please see Ukraine: ECB governing council to meet as crisis intensifies, published on March 8, 2022 by greencentralbanking.com. 9    Please see Chile a step closer to nationalizing copper and lithium, published by mining.com on March 7, 2022, and Add Local Politics To Copper Supply Risks, which we published on November 25, 2021.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations

Executive Summary Euro Natgas Soars; LME Nickel Squeezed Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak's threat to halt shipmentsof natgas on Nord Stream 1 to Europe lifted European gas prices 25% overnight, and will reverberate for years. We make the odds of a cut-off of Russian natgas exports to the EU low but not extremely low. Russia’s war is about the status of Ukraine. Russia needs the EU markets, and the EU needs Russia's gas. However, if Russia follows through on Novak's threat, it would be a major disruption for gas markets in the short term. Over the medium to long term, US shale gas producers, LNG terminal operators and exporters will benefit from new demand. On the import side, China likely benefits most from Russia's need to re-route gas. But this will require substantial infrastructure investment to monetize Russia's gas supplies and as such will take years to realize. Separately, the LME has shut down its nickel markets following an explosive 250% rally over two days that took prices above $100,000/MT. Nickel settled at ~ $80,000/MT before the LME closed the market today for margin calls on shorts squeezed by the surge in prices to make margin calls. Bottom Line: We remain long commodity-index exposure (S&P GSCI and the COMT ETF), along with equity exposure to oil and gas producers via the XOP ETF. We also remain long the XME and PICK ETFs to retain exposure to base metals and bulks.

Executive Summary US Can Do Without Russia's Oil, EU, NATO … Not So Much The US will ban Russian oil imports shortly.  This is not as big a deal markets had feared over the weekend, when news of a possible ban of Russian oil and refined products into the US and Europe was telegraphed by US officials, powering prices to $140/bbl.1 The US imported a combined 400k b/d of Russian crude oil and refined products in December 2021, the EIA reports, which accounted for less than 5% of the 8.6mm b/d of imports. Europe is another story.  Roughly 60% of Russia's 11.3mm b/d of crude oil and refined-products output goes to OECD Europe, according to the IEA. Russia considers Western sanctions to be on an equal footing with a declaration of war.2  President Putin has threatened a nuclear response if the West interferes with invasion of Ukraine, which could elicit a similar response from the West.3  US shale producers will be highly incentivized to increase output given high prices.  Our view continues to include a production increase from core OPEC 2.0 – Saudi Arabia, UAE and Kuwait.  We also anticipate a return of 1mm b/d from Iran, following a nuclear deal with the US. Bottom Line: We remain long commodity-index exposure (S&P GSCI and the COMT ETF), along with equity exposure to oil and gas producers via the XOP ETF. Footnotes 1     Please see Crude price jumps on talk of US oil ban as Russia steps up shelling of civilian areas, published by the Financial Times on March 6, 2022. 2     Please see Putin says Western sanctions are akin to declaration of war, published on March 5, 2022. 3    Please see How likely is the use of nuclear weapons by Russia?, published by Chatham House on March 1, 2022.  The report notes, " If Russia were to attack Ukraine with nuclear weapons, NATO countries would most likely respond on the grounds that the impact of nuclear weapons crosses borders and affects the countries surrounding Ukraine. NATO could respond either by using conventional forces on Russian strategic assets, or respond in kind using nuclear weapons as it has several options available."

Executive Summary Russian Stocks Are Breaking Below Their 2008 And 2015 Lows The Kremlin will not halt its military operations in Ukraine for now. The strategic objective of Putin is to bring Ukraine back into its geopolitical and economic orbit. His immediate goal is to unseat the current government in Kyiv and install a pro-Kremlin administration. Russia is embracing a long period of economic and financial isolation. Russian financial markets will remain uninvestable for an extended period. We are downgrading Central European equities and local currency bonds to underweight within their respective EM portfolios. As a new trade, we recommend shorting the Polish zloty versus the US dollar. Recommendation Inception Date Return Short PLN / Long USD Mar 02, 2022   Bottom Line: The security situation in Europe will continue to deteriorate, especially if the Russian army fails to secure a rapid military victory. This poses a risk to global and EM risk assets. Within a global equity portfolio, investors should overweight the US, and underweight EM and Europe. Feature Global macro has taken a back seat and geopolitics has become the dominant driver of financial markets. Still, we believe geopolitical risks are underappreciated by global financial markets. Will Western Sanctions Halt Russia’s Military Operation? While sanctions have started and will continue to hurt the Russian economy and its financial system, the Kremlin will not halt its military operations in Ukraine for now. The strategic objective of Putin is to bring Ukraine back into its geopolitical and economic orbit. His immediate goal is to unseat the current government in Kyiv and install a pro-Kremlin administration. In fact, having already incurred considerable economic and financial costs, Russia will not pull back its army anytime soon. If anything, Russia’s rhetoric and actions will get more aggressive in the coming weeks. For now, the Kremlin will not agree to anything short of the surrender of Ukraine’s government and its army. In turn, Ukraine authorities and its military intend to continue fighting with the support of arms supplies from the West. As a result, any peace talks will be futile. The situation will thus continue to escalate and the risk premium in global financial markets will rise further. The global political uncertainty index will be rising and, as a rule of thumb, it heralds a lower P/E ratio for global equities (Chart 1). Chart 1Rising Geopolitical Risks = Lower P/E Ratio The main question is, therefore, how bad could it get? We believe the conflict might take a turn for the worse. If the Russian military fails to achieve its goal to remove the current government in Kyiv, Putin will go all out. Losing this war is not an option for him. The failure of the Kremlin to secure a rapid military victory implies a massive escalation on two fronts: (1) the military actions of the Russian army in Ukraine will intensify and civilian infrastructure and potentially the population at large might be threatened; and (2) Russia will become more aggressive in its threats to the West. If and when Putin perceives that his military operation is failing or his power is threatened at home, he will resort to the extreme actions he has been warning about. Putin will bolster his military threats to Europe and to the US. In such a scenario, global risk assets will tank. Bottom Line: The security situation in Europe will continue to deteriorate, especially if the Russian army fails to secure a rapid military victory. Investors should position their portfolio to account for the fact that things will get worse before they improve. Russian Markets Are Uninvestable Chart 2No Buyers For Russian Bonds Russian markets have become uninvestable and will remain so for some time (Chart 2). The elevated odds of further military escalation in Ukraine entails more downside in Russian financial assets. Additional sanctions on the Russian economy cannot be ruled out at this point. These sanctions as well as the capital controls imposed by Russia on both residents and non-residents make Russian financial markets uninvestable. We downgraded Russian stocks to underweight within an EM equity portfolio on December 17, 2021, arguing that geopolitical tensions surrounding Ukraine would escalate. Chart 3 suggests that Russian share prices in USD terms are about to break below their 2008 and 2015 lows. Technically speaking, if this transpires, it will entail considerable downside. Similarly, the ruble versus an equally-weighted basket of the US dollar and euro on a total return basis has formed a technically bearish head-and-shoulders configuration (Chart 4, top panel). Notably, the ruble’s real effective exchange rate based on both CPI and PPI is not as cheap as it was in 1998 and 2015 (Chart 4, bottom panel). Chart 4More Downside In The Ruble Chart 3Russian Stocks Are Breaking Below Their 2008 And 2015 Lows The sanctions have effectively cut off the largest Russian commercial banks1 from the SWIFT electronic system and frozen the central bank of Russia’s (CBR) foreign exchange reserves deposited at foreign institutions. As of June 2021, roughly US$ 377 billion out of US$ 585 billion of Russian foreign exchange reserves were held in Western commercial banks or institutions, most of it in liquid financial securities. Meanwhile, the rest were held either in gold physical holdings (US$ 127 billion) or at Chinese institutions (US$ 80 billion). If all western countries freeze the CRB’s assets held at their banks, Russia’s effective foreign exchange reserves will be down to US$ 207 billion. This assumes the amount of international reserves at western banks has not changed since June 2021. As a result, the ratio of the central bank’s foreign reserves-to-broad money supply (all household and corporate local currency deposits) has dropped from 0.9 to 0.6 (Chart 5). This suggests that the central bank’s available amount of foreign exchange reserves coverage of broad money supply has been reduced dramatically in recent days due to economic and financial sanctions. This and a massive flight of capital out of the country has led the authorities to impose capital controls. Also, the government is compelling domestic exporting firms to sell 80% of their foreign generated revenues. Will the West lift sanctions right after the war in Ukraine ends? We doubt it. In our view, Russia is embracing a long period of economic and financial isolation. Besides, Russia lacks the manufacturing capabilities needed to mitigate the effects of these sanctions. Chart 6 shows that Russia has been investing little outside resource sectors and real estate. At 8-8.5% of GDP, investment in non-resource sectors excluding properties has been too low for too long. Chart 5Russia: FX Reserves' Coverage Of Money Supply Chart 6Russia Has Not Been Investing Much   This entails that Russia cannot become self-sufficient in many manufacturing sectors and technology. Trade with China will be the main channel that Russia can secure the manufacturing goods, machinery and technology it requires. Still, this will not allow the Russian economy to avoid a prolonged period of stagflation. Bottom Line: Odds are high that Russian financial markets will remain uninvestable for an extended period. The Russia economy is facing years of stagflation. Central European Financial Markets: Contagion Or An Existential Threat? Chart 7Central European Currencies Will Depreciate Although Central European countries are not at risk from Russia’s military attack, their financial markets will remain jittery for a while. We are downgrading Polish, Czech and Hungarian equities, currencies and domestic bonds to underweight (Chart 7). The likelihood of strikes on Poland, the Baltic states or any other neighboring NATO member country is very low. Attacking a NATO member would trigger Article V of NATO and force the organization to defend its member. Importantly, we do not think the Kremlin has the appetite for war against NATO. Even though Russia is unlikely to stage an attack on any NATO member, there could still be threats from Moscow and escalation involving central European countries. This will be especially so if Putin fails to secure the change of government in Kyiv in the coming weeks and starts threatening the West due to the latter’s support of Ukraine. As a result, Central European financial markets will continue selling off further in response to this potential escalation. Bottom Line: We are downgrading Central European equities and local currency bonds to underweight within a respective EM universe. We are maintaining the long CZK / short HUF trade. As a new trade, we recommend shorting the Polish zloty versus the US dollar. Investment Recommendations Global share prices will continue selling off. Our US equity capitulation indicator has fallen significantly but is not yet at 2010, 2011, 2015-16 and 2018 levels (Chart 8). It will at least reach this level before the S&P 500 bottoms. Chart 8The S&P 500 Selloff Is Not Over Our capitulation indicator for EM stocks is not low yet either (Chart 9). Hence, there is more downside. Investors should continue to take a defensive stance. Chart 9EM Stocks: Is There A Capitulation Phase Still Ahead? Chart 10US Stocks Are About To Resume Their Relative Outperformance Within a global equity portfolio, investors should overweight the US, and underweight EM and Europe. As US/global bond yields drop due to geopolitical jitters, the US stock market and growth stocks will resume their outperformance, at least for a period of time (Chart 10). Within an EM equity portfolio, we recommend overweighting Brazil, Mexico, Chinese A-shares, Singapore and Korea and underweighting Russia, Central Europe, South Africa, Indonesia, Turkey, Peru, Chinese Investable Stocks, Colombia and Chile. EM currencies and fixed-income markets remain vulnerable as the global risk off move causes the US dollar to spike. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic Associate Editor andrijav@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     Following the invasion of Ukraine on February 26, the US administration added the two largest Russian banks, Sberbank and VTB Bank, to the sanction lists. Both banks combined total assets represent close to 40% of total Russian banking system assets. ​​​​​​

Executive Summary Hopes of an imminent peace deal between Russia and Ukraine will be dashed. The conflict will worsen over the coming days. As was the case during the original Cold War, both sides will eventually forge an understanding that allows the pursuit of mutually beneficial arrangements. A stabilization in geopolitical relations, coupled with fading pandemic headwinds, should keep global growth above trend this year, helping to support corporate earnings. The era of hyperglobalization is over. While central banks will temper their plans to raise rates in the near term, increased spending on defense and energy independence will lead to higher interest rates down the road. How Stocks Fared During The Cuban Missile Crisis Bottom Line: The near-term outlook for risk assets has deteriorated. We are downgrading global equities from overweight to neutral on a tactical 3-month horizon. We continue to expect stocks to outperform bonds on a 12-month horizon as the global economic recovery gains momentum. On an even longer 2-to-5-year horizon, equities are likely to struggle as interest rates rise more than expected.   Dear Client, Given the rapidly evolving situation in Ukraine, we are sending you our thoughts earlier than normal this week. We will continue to update you as events warrant it. Best regards, Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist   False Dawn In the lead-up to the invasion, Vladimir Putin assumed that Ukrainian forces would fold just as quickly as US-backed Afghan forces did last summer. He also presumed that the rest of the world would reluctantly accept Russia’s takeover of Ukraine. Both assumptions appear to have been proven wrong. Even if Putin succeeds in installing a puppet government in Kyiv, a protracted insurgency is sure to follow. In the initial days of the invasion, Russian troops generally tried to avoid harming civilians, partly in the hope that Ukrainians would see the Russian military as liberators. Now that this hope has been dashed, a more brutal offensive could unfold. This would trigger even more sanctions, leading to a wider gulf between Russia and the West. It is highly doubtful that sanctions will dissuade Putin from trying to subdue Ukraine. Putin made a name for himself by staging a successful invasion of Chechnya in 1999, just three years after the Yeltsin government had suffered a major defeat there. To withdraw from Ukraine now, without having fomented a regime change in Kyiv, would be a humiliating outcome for him. In this light, BCA’s geopolitical team, led by Matt Gertken, has argued that ongoing peace talks taking place on the border of Ukraine and Belarus are unlikely to amount to much. The situation will get worse before it gets better. Market Implications It always feels a bit crass writing about finance during times like this, but as investment strategists, it is our job to do so. With that in mind, we would make the following observations: Global equities are likely to suffer another leg down in the near term as hopes of an imminent peace deal fizzle. Consequently, we are downgrading our view on global stocks from overweight to neutral on a 3-month horizon. Nimble investors with a low risk tolerance should consider going underweight equities. We are shifting our stance on US stocks from underweight to neutral on a 3-month horizon. Europe could face significant pressures from near-term disruptions to Russian gas supplies. It does not make much sense for Russia to export gas if it is effectively barred from accessing the proceeds of its sales. Central and Eastern Europe will be particularly hard hit (Chart 1). Chart 1Central and Eastern Europe Would Suffer The Most From A Russian Energy Blockade For now, we are maintaining an overweight to stocks on a 12-month horizon. While it will take a month or two, both sides will ultimately forge an understanding whereby Russia and the West continue to publicly bad-mouth each other while still pursuing mutually beneficial arrangements. Remember that during the Cold War, the Soviet Union continued to sell oil to the West. Even the Cuban Missile Crisis had only a fleeting impact on equities (Chart 2). Chart 2How Stocks Fared During The Cuban Missile Crisis Chart 3European Fiscal Policy Will Remain Structurally Looser Over The Coming Years Assuming that any reduction in Russian energy exports is temporary, oil prices will eventually recede. BCA’s commodities team, led by Bob Ryan, expects Brent to settle to $88/bbl by the end of 2022 (down from the current spot price of $101/bbl and close to the forward price of $87/bbl). Like oil, gold prices have upside in the near term but should edge lower once the dust settles.    Global growth should remain solidly above trend in 2022 as pandemic-related headwinds fade and fiscal policy turns more expansionary. Even before the Ukraine invasion, the structural primary budget deficit in Europe was set to swing from a small surplus to a deficit (Chart 3). The emerging new world order will lead to sizable additional military spending, as well as increased outlays towards achieving energy independence (new LNG terminals, more investment in renewables, and perhaps even some steps towards restarting nuclear power programs). China will also step up credit easing and fiscal stimulus. This will not only benefit the Chinese economy, but it will also provide some much-needed support to European exporters (Chart 4). While credit spreads are apt to widen further in the near term, corporate bonds should benefit from stronger growth later this year. US high-yield bonds are pricing in a jump in the default rate from 1.3% over the past 12 months to 4.2% over the coming year, which seems somewhat excessive (Chart 5).  Chart 4Chinese Policy Will Be A Tailwind For Growth Chart 5Credit Markets Are Pricing In An Excessive Default Rate Central banks will temper their plans to raise rates in the near term. Investors and speculators are net short duration at the moment, which could amplify any downward move in bond yields (Chart 6). However, over a multi-year horizon, recent events will lead to both higher inflation and interest rates. Larger budget deficits will sap global savings. The retreat from globalization will also put upward pressure on wages and prices. As defensive currencies, the US dollar and the Japanese yen will strengthen in the near term as the conflict in Ukraine escalates. Looking beyond the next few months, the dollar will weaken. On a purchasing power parity basis, the dollar is amongst the most expensive currencies (Chart 7). For example, relative to the euro, the dollar is 22% overvalued (Chart 8). The US trade deficit has doubled since the start of the pandemic, even as equity inflows have dipped (Chart 9). Speculators are long the greenback, which raises the risk of an eventual reversal in dollar sentiment. Chart 6Short Duration Is A Crowded Trade Chart 7The US Dollar Is Overvalued…   Chart 8...Especially Against The Euro The freezing of Russia’s foreign exchange reserves will encourage China to diversify away from US dollars towards hard assets such as land and infrastructure in economies where they are less likely to be seized. It will also encourage the Chinese authorities to bolster domestic demand and permit a further modest appreciation of the RMB since these two steps will reduce the current account surpluses that make foreign exchange accumulation necessary. EM currencies will benefit from this trend. Chart 9The Trade Deficit Is A Headwind For The Dollar In summary, the near-term outlook for risk assets has deteriorated. We are downgrading global equities from overweight to neutral on a tactical 3-month horizon. We continue to expect stocks to outperform bonds on a 12-month horizon as the global economic recovery gains momentum. On an even longer 2-to-5-year horizon, equities are likely to struggle as interest rates rise more than expected. Trade Update: We closed our long Brent oil trade for a gain of 24% last week. Earlier today, we were stopped out of the trade we initiated on September 16, 2021 going long the Russian ruble and the Brazilian real. The BRL leg was up 6.2% at the time of termination while the RUB leg was down 23.1% (based on the Bloomberg RUB/USD Carry Return Index as of 4pm EST today). Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com View Matrix Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores

Executive Summary Stronger Capex Than Last Decade The fog of war continues, but the worst potential outcome for the market—a freeze of Russian energy exports to Europe—has been avoided. Energy inflation is reaching its apex. Markets will remain volatile in the near term as uncertainty remains elevated in the coming days. Moreover, a transition from a recovery driven by consumer durable goods to services remains a hurdle against near-term European outperformance. Italian bonds and European banks are attractive, but it is not yet prudent to plunge headfirst into the euro. The longer-term consequences of the conflicts point toward greater capex and public deficits in Europe. This will boost the neutral rate of interest and European yields. Industrials and defense stocks are also key structural beneficiaries. Bottom Line: Keep hedges in place for the near term, as uncertainty remains rife. Buy Italian bonds and European banks, which will benefit from ECB support. Industrials still face near-term hurdles but should be a structural overweight position in European equity portfolios, along with financials and defense stocks. Feature The situation in Ukraine is reaching a climax. Following Russia’s recognition of the breakaway Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics (LPR and DPR) and its invasion of Ukraine, the S&P 500 entered correction territory. Importantly, the Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 is now down 10% since its January 5th high, which validates our repeated call over the past four weeks to hedge risk asset portfolios by selling EUR/CHF and EUR/JPY. An international conflict has begun and a human tragedy is unfolding; but, at the time of writing, it looks like the worst-case scenario for markets will be avoided. Germany is folding Nord Stream 2 indeterminably and Western allies have imposed painful economic sanctions on Russia. However, an expulsion of the SWIFT payment system is not in the cards. This is crucial because it greatly limits the risk that Russia will stop sending natural gas and oil to the EU. Ultimately, neither Russia nor the EU wants this outcome, since it imposes an enormous loss of revenues on the former (which needs hard currency to finance its war) and guarantees a recession for the latter (Chart 1). The war will still cost Europe. European natural gas prices surged again on Thursday, rising by more than 60% intraday. While a spike above EUR200/MWh is unlikely in the absence of an oil embargo, 20% of European natural gas imports pass through Ukraine. The conflict suggests that these flows will remain disrupted for now and that natural gas prices will remain between EUR80/MWh and EUR100/MWh for the next few months. This translates into elevated energy and electricity costs for the EU (Chart 2). Chart 1A European Recession Averted Chart 2Peaking But Elevated Chart 3Ebbing Energy Inflation Oil markets are set to peak soon. The run-up in Brent prices in recent weeks was largely driven by geopolitical concerns. With the odds of an oil embargo declining, the pressure on Brent will also recede. Bob Ryan, BCA’s commodity and energy strategist, believes that Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait will increase their own production in coming weeks to burnish their credentials as reliable oil producers, especially if oil experiences more turmoil.  Bob expects crude prices to drop to $85/bbl by the second half of 2022. These dynamics are important because they imply that European headline inflation will soon peak. Yes, the recent spike in natural gas prices will keep energy inflation higher for a few more months, but, ultimately, ebbing base effects will bring down energy CPI. As Chart 3 highlights, even if Brent and natural gas prices stay at today’s levels for the remainder of the year, their year-on-year inflation rates will collapse, which will drive HICP lower. Near-Term Market Dynamics In this context, what to do with European assets? It is probably still too early to abandon our hedges, but we will likely do so next week or soon after. While the market has probably bottomed, prudence remains of prime consideration as a war is taking place and the situation on the ground may deteriorate. Chart 4A Buying Opportunity The clearest near-term investment implication comes for European peripheral bonds. Italian spreads have widened significantly in the wake of the hawkish pivot by the ECB (Chart 4). However, we argued that, when interest rate expectations priced in 50bps of the hike for 2022, the move was excessive and that only one ECB hike in the fourth quarter was likely this year. Now that the Ukrainian crisis is reaching a climax, even some of the ECB’s most hawkish members, such as Robert Holzmann, Governor of the Austrian National Bank, indicate that the removal of liquidity will be slower than originally anticipated. This means that the ECB is likely to continue to backstop the European peripheral bond markets. Italian and Greek bonds, which offer spreads of 165bps and 249bps over German bunds, are appealing in light of this explicit backstop. European financials are another attractive buy. Investors should buy banks outright. As Chart 5 highlights, all the major Eurozone countries’ banking stocks have suffered widespread selloffs. However, the exposure to Russian debt is limited at $67 billion (Chart 6). Additionally, the European yield curve slope is unlikely to flatten significantly from here. The ECB will limit the upside in the German 2-year yields by not hiking until Q4 2022, while the terminal rate proxy in Europe has significant upside from here. A steeper yield curve will boost the appeal of banks, especially in a context in which peripheral spreads are likely to narrow. Chart 5Too Much Of A Dive Chart 6Limited Russian Exposure The outlook for the euro is more complex. Narrower peripheral spreads would boost the euro’s appeal, a cheap currency currently trading at a 17% discount to its PPP fair value. EUR/USD also trades at a 5% discount to the BCA Intermediate-Term Timing Model, which suggests that considerable bad news is already embedded in the exchange rate (Chart 7). The fact that the EUR/USD did not close below its January 27th low in the face of a major war on European soil adds to the notion that the euro already embeds a significant risk premium. However, there are still ample reasons to worry about additional volatility in the coming week or so. The ECB is sounding less hawkish, while the Fed is not changing its tone. Meanwhile, 1-month and 3-month risk reversals are not at levels consistent with a bearish capitulation, which suggests that the euro could suffer one last wave of liquidation (Chart 8). Thus, we are not buying the euro yet and are willing to forego the first few cents of gains for a clearer signal. Chart 7EUR/USD Is Cheap Chart 8Sentiment Could Get More Negative Circling back to the equity front, European equities had become very oversold after the 14-day RSI fell below 30. The diminishing risk of an energy crisis will also help. However, global equities face more risks than just Ukraine. As we wrote earlier this week, the transition away from consumer durable goods as the driver of global growth to services will involve some adjustments for stocks, especially in an environment in which the Fed is allowing global monetary conditions to deteriorate (Chart 9). Thus, the window of volatility in stocks is unlikely to close in the near term. The relative performance of European equities vis-a-vis the US is complex as well. European equities have undone most of the relative gains accrued so far in 2022 (Chart 10). On the one hand, the global growth transition will hurt European equities more than US ones, as a result of their greater exposure to manufacturing activity. Additionally, high energy costs are more of a problem for Europe right now than the US. On the other hand, the continued hawkishness of the Fed is likely to limit the ability of tech stocks to extend the rebound that began last Thursday. As a result, the most likely pattern is for some churning in the relative performance of Europe and the US in the coming week. Chart 10Vanishing Outperformance Chart 9Tightening US Liquidity Conditions For the remainder of the year, we expect the European equity outperformance to re-establish itself in view of the favorable relative profits picture for 2022, a topic that we will explore more deeply in the coming weeks. Bottom Line: The near-term outlook for European assets remains extremely murky. Not only is a war in Ukraine a major threat that can hurt sentiment further, but European assets still have to handle the short-term implications of a change in global growth leadership away from goods consumption. Nonetheless, the dovish message of the ECB in the wake of the Ukrainian invasion suggests that the collapse in Italian bonds and European banks in recent weeks is overdone. European stocks will likely continue to churn against US stocks in the near term but outperform for the remainder of the year. The sell-off in the euro is advanced, but prudence prevents us from buying EUR/USD today. Keep short EUR/CHF and short EUR/JPY hedges in place for now. Longer-Term Implications The crisis in Ukraine heightens Europe’s need to diversify its energy sourcing away from Russia. However, this is not a transition that can be executed on a dime. It will take years. For now, Europe remains dependent on Russian energy, which greatly limits the EU’s options. However, time offers many more possibilities. First, kicking Russia out of SWIFT will become feasible, because it will increase the robustness of the SPFS payment system, allowing Russia to receive funds for its energy, even if it is out of SWIFT. Second, and most importantly, time will allow Europe to find new energy sources. For example, Qatari LNG is often mentioned as a potential replacement for Russian natural gas. Qatar currently does not have the capacity to service Europe extensively, while fulfilling its previous contractual obligations, but the expansion of the production in its North Field East will increase capacity to 126MTPA by 2027. The LNG export capacity of the US may also increase over the coming years. Even if Qatar and the US could send enough LNG to satisfy the hole left by Russia tomorrow, Europe would not be able to accept delivery, as it does not have enough terminals to accommodate these shipments. Thus, investments in that sector will expand. Chart 11The Renewables Envelope Will Expand Chart 12Nuclear Skepticism Remains Most importantly, Europe will accelerate its transition toward renewable energy. Renewables are already a major focus of the NGEU program (Chart 11). However, we expect that, for the remainder of the decade, the NGEU program will be enlarged to allow greater investments in that space. Not only does it fit European green goals, but this policy would also increase the region energy security. More investment in nuclear electricity production is also possible but lacks popular support (Chart 12). The main message of these observations is that European infrastructure spending is likely to remain elevated in the coming years. As a result, industrial stocks may face some near-term headwinds as the global economy transitions away from the consumer goods-buying binge of COVID-19, but they will ultimately benefit greatly from an expansion of the capital stock around the world. Another long-term theme derived from the current crisis is that European defense stocks will fare well on a structural basis. The current crisis will force greater European unity. The presence of a common enemy will incentivize European nations to increase military spending, especially as the US continues to pivot toward Asia. Investors should overweight these stocks. In terms of bond market developments, more military spending and investment in energy infrastructures means that European budget deficits will be wider than if the Ukrainian crisis had not emerged. More accommodative fiscal policy will support aggregate demand, which will feed through greater capex (Chart 13). Thus, the experience of the last decade, whereby aggregate demand was curtailed by unnecessarily stringent European fiscal policy, will not be repeated. This confirms our expectation that the neutral rate of interest will rise in Europe and that Europe will escape an environment of zero rates (Chart 14). Therefore, German bunds yields have upside, the yield curve can steepen, and the outlook for European financials is positive on a long-term basis, not just on a near-term one. Chart 13Stronger Capex Than Last Decade... Chart 14...Means Higher Yields And A steeper Curve Chart 15Ebbing Fixed-Income Outflows? Finally, the picture for the euro is murky. On the one hand, its inexpensiveness is a major advantage while a higher neutral rate of interest will limit the European fixed-income outflows that have plagues the Euro for the past decade (Chart 15). However, if we are correct that European capex will increase and that budget deficits will remain wider than in the last decade, this also means that the European current account surplus will narrow as excess savings recede. This implies that one of the key underpinnings of the euro will dissipate. In the end, productivity will be the long-term arbiter of the exchange rate. Europe still lags behind the US on this front, which augurs poorly for the performance of the euro (Chart 16). Reforms and capex may save the day, but it is too early to make this call. Chart 16The Productivity Handicap​​​​​​​ Bottom Line: The events in Ukraine portend a structural shift in European capex. Europe will need to ween itself off its Russian energy dependency, which will require major investments in LNG facilities and renewable power. Moreover, European defense spending will rise. These will continue to support fiscal and infrastructure spending. As a result, industrials will benefit from a structural tailwind, as will European defense stocks. These same forces will put upward pressure on European risk-free yields, which will benefit beleaguered European financials and banks. The long-term outlook for the euro is murkier. More research must be conducted before making a definitive directional bet.   Mathieu Savary, Chief European Strategist Mathieu@bcaresearch.com Tactical Recommendations Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations

Executive Summary Risk Premium Abates, But Does Not Disappear The risk premium in crude oil and natural gas prices is abating, and we expect that to continue. In the immediate aftermath of Russia's invasion, Brent crude oil traded close to $105/bbl on Thursday. At the urging of China's Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin suggested he is prepared to enter negotiations with Ukraine in Minsk to discuss the latter's neutrality. Whether Ukraine is amenable to negotiations framed in this manner remains to be seen. Nothing has changed in supply-demand balances for oil or natgas. Markets are tight, and more supply is needed. In this highly fluid situation, we project Brent crude oil will average $100.00/bbl in 1Q22; $90.30/bbl in 2Q22; $85.00/bbl in 3Q22; and $85.00/bbl in 4Q22 (see Chart). Our estimate for 2023 Brent averages $85.00/bbl. Upside risk dominates in the near term. We expect the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Kuwait, the only members of OPEC 2.0 with the capacity to increase and sustain higher production, to lift output by 1.75mm b/d. The Iran nuclear deal likely gets a boost from the Russian invasion, which will hasten the return of ~ 1.0mm b/d of production in 2H22, perhaps sooner. We also expect the US, and possibly the OECD, to release strategic petroleum reserves, but, as typically is the case, this will have a fleeting impact on markets and pricing. These supply increases will return prices closer to our base case forecast, which we raise slightly to $85/bbl from 2H22 to end-2023. If we fail to see an increase in core-OPEC production, or the US shales, or if Iranian barrels are not returned to export markets, oil prices have a good chance of moving to $140/bbl, as can be seen in the accompanying Chart. Bottom Line: We remain long commodity-index exposure (S&P GSCI and the COMT ETF), along with equity exposure to oil and gas producers via the XOP ETF.  

Special Report

Executive Summary From Nixon-Mao To Putin-Xi The geopolitical “big picture” of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the deepening of the Russo-Chinese strategic partnership. While Russia’s economic and military constraints did not prohibit military action in Ukraine, they are still relevant. Most likely they will prevent a broader war with NATO or a total energy embargo of Europe. Still, volatility will persist in the near term as saber-rattling, aftershocks, and spillover incidents will occur this year.  Russo-Chinese relations are well grounded. Russia needs investment capital and resource sales, while China needs overland supply routes and supply security. Both seek to undermine the US in a new game of Great Power competition that will prevent global politics and globalization from normalizing. Tactically we remain defensive but buying opportunities are emerging. We maintain a cyclically constructive view. Favor equity markets of US allies and partners that are geopolitically secure. Trade Recommendation Inception Date Return Long Gold (Strategic) 2019-12-06 32.7% Bottom Line: Tactically investors should remain defensive but cyclically they should look favorably on cheap, geopolitically secure equity markets like those of Australia, Canada, and Mexico. Feature To understand the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the likely consequences, investors need to consider three factors: 1.  Why Russia’s constraints did not prohibit war and how constraints must always be measured against political will. 2.  Why Russia’s constraints will grow more relevant going forward, as the costs of occupation and sanctions take hold, the economy weakens, and sociopolitical pressures build. 3.  Why the struggle of the Great Powers will drive a Russo-Chinese alliance, whose competition with the US-led alliance will further destabilize global trade and investment. Russia’s Geopolitical Will Perhaps the gravest national security threat that Russia can face, according to Russian history, is a western military power based in the Ukraine. Time and again Russia has staged dramatic national efforts at great cost of blood and treasure to defeat western forces that try to encroach on this broad, flat road to Moscow. Putin has been in power for 22 years and his national strategy is well-defined: he aims to resurrect Russian primacy within the former Soviet Union, carve out a regional sphere of influence, and reduce American military threats in Russia’s periphery. He has long aimed to prevent Ukraine from becoming a western defense partner. Chart 1Russia Structured For Conflict While Moscow faced material limitations to military action in Ukraine, these were not prohibitive, as we have argued. Consider the following constraints and their mitigating factors: Costs of war: The first mistake lay in assuming that Russia was not willing to engage in war. Russia had already invaded Ukraine in 2014 and before that Georgia in 2008. The modern Russian economy is structured for conflict: it is heavily militarized (Chart 1). Military spending accounts for 4.3% of GDP, comparable to the United States, also known for waging gratuitous wars and preemptive invasions. Financial burdens: The second mistake was to think that Moscow would avoid conflict for fear of the collapse of the ruble or financial markets. Since Putin rose to power in 2000, the ruble has depreciated by 48% against the dollar and the benchmark stock index has fallen by 57% against EMs. Each new crackdown on domestic or foreign enemies has led to a new round of depreciation and yet Putin remains undeterred from his long-term strategy (Chart 2). Chart 2Putin Doesn't Eschew Conflict For Sake Of Ruble Or Stocks Economic health: Putin’s foreign policy is not constrained by the desire to make the Russian economy more open, complex, advanced, or productive. While China long practiced a foreign policy of lying low, so as to focus on generating wealth that could later be converted into strategic power (which it is doing now), Russia pursued a hawkish foreign policy for the past twenty years despite the blowback on the economy. Russia is still an undiversified petro-state and total factor productivity is approaching zero (Chart 3). Chart 3Putin Doesn't Eschew Conflict For Sake Of Productivity​​​​​​ Chart 4Putin Doesn’t Eschew Conflict For Fear Of Sanctions​​​​​​ Western sanctions: Western sanctions never provided a powerful argument against Russian intervention into Ukraine. Russia knew all along that if it invaded Ukraine, the West would impose a new round of sanctions, as it has done periodically since 2014. The 2014 oil crash had a much greater impact on Russia than the sanctions. Of course, Russia’s overall economic competitiveness is suffering, although it is capable of gaining market share in exporting raw materials, especially as it depreciates its currency (Chart 4). Chart 5Putin Doesn't Eschew Conflict For Sake Of Popular Opinion Public opinion: Surely the average Russian is not interested in Ukraine and hence Putin lacks popular support for a new war? True. But Putin has a strong record of using foreign military adventures as a means of propping up domestic support. Of course, opinion polls, which confirm this pattern, are manipulated and massaged (Chart 5). Nevertheless Russians like all people are highly likely to side with their own country in a military confrontation with foreign countries, at least in the short run. Over the long haul, the public will come to rue the war. Moscow believes that it can manage the domestic fallout when that time comes because it has done so since 2014. We doubt it but that is a question for a later time. Investors also need to consider Putin’s position if he did not stage ever-escalating confrontations with the West. Russia is an autocracy with a weak economy – it cannot win over the hearts and minds of its neighboring nations in a fair, voluntary competition with the West, the EU, and NATO. Russia’s neighbors are made up of formerly repressed Soviet ethnic minorities who now have a chance at national self-determination. But to secure their nationhood, they need economic and military support, and if they receive that support, then they inherently threaten Russia and help the US keep Russia strategically contained. Russia traditionally fights against this risk. Bottom Line: Investors and the media focused on the obstacles to Russian military intervention without analyzing whether there was sufficient political will to surmount the hurdles. Constraints Eroded None of the above suggests that Putin can do whatever he wants. Economic and military constraints are significant. However, constraints erode over time – and they may not be effective when needed. Europe did not promise to cancel all energy trade if Russia invaded: Exports make up 27% of Russian GDP, and 51% of exports go to advanced economies, especially European. Russia is less exposed to trade than the EU but more exposed than the US or even China (Chart 6). However, Russia trades in essential goods, natural resources, and the Europeans cannot afford to cut off their own energy supply. When Russia first invaded Ukraine in 2014, the Germans responded by building the Nord Stream pipeline, basically increasing energy cooperation. Russia concluded that Europeans, not bound to defend Ukraine by any treaty, would continue to import energy in the event of a conflict limited to Ukraine. Chart 6Putin Limits Conflict For Sake Of EU Energy Trade​​​​​​ Chart 7Putin Limits Conflict For Sake Of Chinese Trade​​​​​​ Russia substitutes China for Europe: As trade with the West declines, Russia is shifting toward the Far East, especially China (Chart 7). China is unlikely to reduce any trade and investment for the sake of Ukraine – it desperately needs the resources and the import-security that strong relations with Russia can provide. It cannot replace Europe – but Russia does not expect to lose the European energy trade entirely. (Over time, of course, the EU/China shift to renewables will undermine Russia’s economy and capabilities.) Ukraine is right next door: Aside from active military personnel, the US advantage over Iraq in 2002-03 was greater than the Russian advantage over Ukraine in 2022 (Chart 8). And yet the US got sucked into a quagmire and ultimately suffered political unrest at home. However, Ukraine is not Afghanistan or Iraq. Russia wagers that it can seize strategic territory, including Kiev, without paying the full price that the Soviets paid in Afghanistan and the US paid in Afghanistan and Iraq. This is a very risky gamble. But the point is that the bar to invading Ukraine was lower than that of other recent invasions – it is not on the opposite side of the world. ​​​​​​​Chart 8Putin Limits Conflict For Fear Of Military Overreach Chart 9Putin Limits Conflict For Fear Of Military Weakness NATO faces mutually assured destruction: NATO’s conventional military weight far surpasses Russia’s. For example, Russia, with its Eurasian Union, does not have enough air superiority to engage in offensive initiatives against Europe, even assuming that the United States is not involved. Even if we assume that China joins Russia in a full-fledged military alliance under the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), NATO’s military budget is more than twice as large (Chart 9). However, this military constraint is not operable in the case of Ukraine, which is not a NATO member. Indeed, Russia’s aggression toward Ukraine stems from its fear that Ukraine will become a real or de facto member of NATO. It is the fear of NATO that prompted Russia to attack rather than deterring it, precisely because Ukraine was not a member but wanted to join. Bottom Line: Russia’s constraints did not prohibit military action because several of them had eroded over time. NATO was so threatening as to provoke rather than deter military action. Going forward, Russia’s economic and military constraints will prevent it from expanding the war beyond Ukraine.  Isn’t Russia Overreaching? Yes, Russia is overreaching – the military balances highlighted in Charts 8 and 9 above should make that plain. The Ukrainian insurgency will be fierce and Russia will pay steep costs in occupation and economic sanctions. These will vitiate the economy and popular support for Putin’s regime over the long run. Chart 10The West Is Politically Divided And Vulnerable The West is also vulnerable, however, which has given rise to a fiscal and commodity cycle that helps to explain why Putin staged his risky invasion at this juncture in time: The US and West are politically divided. Western elites see themselves as surrounded by radical parties that threaten to throw them out and overturn the entire political establishment. Their tenuous grip on power is clear from the thin majorities they hold in their legislatures (Chart 10). Nowhere is this clearer than in the United States, where Democrats cannot spare a single seat in the Senate, five in the House of Representatives, in this fall’s midterm elections, yet are facing much bigger losses. Russia believes that its hawkish foreign policy can keep the democracies divided.​​​​​​​ Elites are turning to populist spending: Governments have adopted liberal fiscal policies in the wake of the global financial crisis and the pandemic. They are trying to grow their way out of populist unrest, debt, and various strategic challenges, from supply chains to cyber security to research and development (Chart 11). China is also part of this process, despite its mixed economic policies. The result is greater demand for commodities, which benefits Russia.    Elites are turning to climate change to justify public spending: Governments, particularly in Europe and China, are using fears of climate change to increase their political legitimacy and launch a new government “moonshot” that justifies more robust public investment and pump-priming. The long-term trend toward renewable energy is fundamentally threatening to Russia, although in the short term it makes Russian natural gas and metals all the more necessary. Germany especially envisions natural gas as the fossil-fuel bridge to a green future as it has turned against both nuclear power and coal (Chart 12). Russian aggression will provoke a rethink in some countries but Germany, as a manufacturing economy, is unlikely to abandon its goals for green industrial innovation. Chart 11Politically Vulnerable States Need Fiscal Stimulus​​​​​​ Chart 12The West Reluctant To Abandon Climate Goals​​​​​​ Proactive fiscal and climate policy motivate new capex and commodity cycle: The West’s attempt to revive big government and strategic spending will require vast resource inputs – resources that Russia can sell at higher prices. The new commodity cycle gives Russia maximum leverage over Europe, especially Germany, at this point in time (Chart 13). Later, as inflation and fiscal fatigue halt this cycle, Russia will lose leverage. Chart 13Commodity Cycle Gives Russia Advantage (For Now) Meanwhile Russia’s economic and hence strategic power will subside over time. Russia’s potential GDP growth has fallen since the Great Recession as productivity growth slows and the labor force shrinks (Chart 14). Chart 14Future Will Not Yield Strategic Opportunities For Russia​​​​​​ Chart 15Younger Russians Not Calling The Shots (But Will Someday) In short, the Kremlin has chosen the path of economic austerity and military aggression as a means of maintaining political legitimacy and achieving national security objectives. Western divisions, de-carbonization, the commodity cycle, and Russia’s bleak economic outlook indicated that 2022 was the opportunity to achieve a pressing national security objective, rather than some future date when Russia will be less capable relative to its opponents. In the worst-case scenario – not our base case – the invasion of Ukraine will trigger an escalation of European sanctions that will lead to Russia cutting off Europe’s energy and producing a global energy price shock. And yet that outcome would upset US and European politics in Russia’s favor, while Putin would maintain absolute control at home in a society that is already used to economic austerity and that benefits from high commodity prices. Note that Putin’s strategy will not last forever. Ukraine will mark another case of Russian strategic overreach that will generate a social and political backlash in coming years. While Putin has sufficient support among older, more Soviet-minded Russians for his Ukraine adventure, he lacks support among the younger and middle-aged cohorts who will have to live with the negative economic consequences (Chart 15). The entire former Soviet Union is vulnerable to social unrest and revolution in the coming decade and Russia is no exception. The Russo-Chinese Geopolitical Realignment Chart 16From Nixon-Mao To Putin-Xi From a broader, geopolitical point of view, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine drives another nail into the coffin of the post-Cold War system and hyper-globalization. Russia is further divorcing itself from the western economy, with even the linchpin European energy trade falling victim to renewables and diversification. The US and its allies are imposing export controls on critical technologies such as semiconductors against Russia to cripple any attempts at modernization. The US is already restricting China’s access to semiconductors and from now on is locked into a campaign to try to enforce these export controls via secondary sanctions, giving rise to proxy battles in countries that Russia and China use to circumvent the sanctions. Russia will be forced to link its austere, militarized, resource-driven economy to the Chinese economy. Hence a major new geopolitical realignment is taking place between the US, Russia, and China, on the order of previous realignments since World War II. When the Sino-Soviet communist bloc first arose it threatened to overwhelm the US in economic heft and dominate Eurasia. This communist threat drove the US to undertake vast expeditionary wars, such as in South Korea and Vietnam. These were too costly, so the US sought economic engagement with China in 1972, which isolated the Soviet Union and ultimately helped bring about its demise. Yet China’s economic boom predictably translated into a strategic rise that began to threaten US preeminence, especially since the Great Recession. Today Russia and China have no option other than to cooperate in the face of the US’s increasingly frantic attempts to preserve its global status – and China’s economic growth and technological potential makes this alliance formidable (Chart 16). In short, the last vestiges of the “Nixon-Mao” moment are fading and the “Putin-Xi” alignment is already well-established. Russia cannot accept vassalage to China but it can make many compromises for the sake of strategic security. Their economies are much more complimentary today than they were at the time of the Sino-Soviet split. And Russia’s austere economy will not collapse as long as it retains some energy trade with Europe throughout the pivot to China. In turn the US will attempt to exploit Russian and Chinese regional aggression as a basis for a revitalization of its alliances. But Europe will dampen US enthusiasm by preserving economic engagement with Russia and China. The EU is increasingly an independent geopolitical actor and a neutral one at that. This environment of multipolarity – or Great Power Struggle – will define the coming decades. It will ensure not only periodic shocks, like the Ukraine war, but also a steady undercurrent of growing government involvement in the global economy in pursuit of supply security, energy security, and national security. Competition for security is not stabilizing but destabilizing. Hyper-globalization has given way to hypo-globalization, as regional geopolitical blocs take the place of what once promised to be a highly efficient and thoroughly interconnected global economy. Investment Takeaways Tactically, Geopolitical Strategy believes it is too soon to go long emerging markets. Russia is at war, China is reverting to autocracy, and Brazil is still on the path to debt crisis. Multiples have compressed sharply but the bad news is not fully priced (Chart 17). The dollar is likely to be resilient as the Fed hikes rates and a major European war rages. Europe’s geopolitical and energy insecurity will weigh on investment appetite and corporate earnings. American equities are likely to outperform in the short run. Chart 17Investors Should Not Bet On Russian And European Equities In This Context​​​​​ Chart 18Investors Find Value, Minimize Risk In Geopolitically Secure Equity Markets​​​​​​ Cyclically, global equities outside the US, and pro-cyclical assets offer better value, as long as the war in Ukraine remains contained, a Europe-wide energy shock is averted, and China’s policy easing secures its economic recovery. While European equities will snap back, Europe still faces structural challenges and eastern European emerging markets face a permanent increase in geopolitical risk due to Russian geopolitical decline and aggression. Investors should seek markets that are both cheap and geopolitically secure – namely Australia, Canada, and Mexico (Chart 18). We are also bullish on India over the long run.    Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)

Special Report

Executive Summary EU-Russia Energy Trade To Persist Russia invaded Ukraine to prevent it from becoming a defense partner of the US and its allies. It is not likely to attack NATO members, which share a mutual defense treaty, so the war is limited in scope. Spillovers can occur but the US and Russia have 73 years of experience avoiding direct war. The US and EU will levy sweeping sanctions but they will not halt Russian energy exports, as that would cause a recession in Europe. European political leaders would likely fall from power in the coming years if there were a full-scale energy crisis. European nations will leverage Russian aggression to strengthen their popular support at home, while diversifying away from Russian energy over the long run. Europe will impose tough sanctions on Russia’s non-energy sectors, including finance and technology, to hobble the regime. China will consolidate power at home and strengthen ties with Russia but a war over Taiwan is a medium-to-long term risk.   Bottom Line: Investors should be cautious over the very near term but should prepare to buy the dip of a geopolitical incident that is generally limited to Ukraine and the Black Sea area. Supply responses from oil producers will remove the risk premium from oil prices and send the price of Brent crude to $85 per barrel by the end of the year. EU-Russia energy flows are the key risk to monitor. Feature Russia launched an invasion of Ukraine on February 24. The invasion was not limited to the far eastern corner of the country but involved attacks in the capital Kiev and in the far west and the coastline. Hence investors should proceed on the assumption that Russia will invade all of Ukraine even if it ends up limiting its invasion, as we expect (Map 1). Map 1Russian Invasion Of Ukraine 2022 It is critical for investors to understand the cause of the war in order to gauge its scope and adjust their risk appetite accordingly. Consider: Ukraine does not have mutual defense treaties that automatically trigger a broader war. Russia is attacking Ukraine to prevent it from becoming a defense partner of the US and its allies. Russia does not have the military capacity to attack the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members, which have a mutual defense pact. Russia is attacking Ukraine because it does not have a mutual defense pact but was seeking one. Russia aims to neutralize Ukraine. If Moscow sacks Kiev and sets up a puppet state, then Ukraine will not seek western defense cooperation for the foreseeable future. If Russia conquers key territories to strengthen its control over Ukraine, then future Ukrainian governments will limit relations with the West for fear of Russian absorption. Russia is likely to seize coastal territory to ensure the long-term ability to blockade Ukraine. Russia will not withdraw troops until it has changed the government and seized key territories. Russia and NATO have no interest in war with each other. In the immediate fog of war, global financial markets will experience uncertainty about whether fighting will expand into a broader war between Russia and NATO. Such an expansion is unlikely because of mutually assured destruction (MAD) due to nuclear weapons. The US and Europe have already pledged that they will not send troops to fight in Ukraine. They will send troops and arms to support neighboring NATO states in central Europe, such as the Baltic states, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and others. This will serve as a deterrent to Russia to keep its operations limited. Spillover incidents can and will occur, such as with Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 in 2014, but the US and Russia have 73 years of experience avoiding direct war, including when Russia invaded Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in 1979. The US and EU will levy sweeping sanctions but the EU will not halt Russian energy exports. When Russia first invaded Ukraine and seized territory in 2014, Germany responded by working with Russia to build the Nord Stream II pipeline so as to import energy directly from Russia and circumvent Ukraine. This historical fact over the past eight years reveals Germany’s true interests. Thus energy cooperation increased as a result of Russian aggression. Of course, Germany has suspended the certification of that pipeline in light of today’s invasion, but it was not yet operating, so energy flows are not impeded, and it still physically exists for future operation when Germany finds it politically expedient. Hungary, Italy, Finland, the Czech Republic and others will also need to keep up Russian energy flows. Chart 1EU-Russia Energy Trade To Persist Nevertheless, a cessation of energy flows is still the most important risk for investors to monitor, whether triggered by European boycott or Russian embargo. That would cause a recession in Europe. Recession would cause European political leaders to fall from power in the coming years, which explains why they will not pursue that objective in face of Russian aggression. Even the US is vulnerable to a global price shock (during a midterm election year) and hence will allow the EU to keep importing Russian energy, whatever its sanctions package may contain. True, Russia may cut off natural gas flows via Ukraine, which account for nearly 20% of Europe’s imports (Chart 1). Moreover, Europe may threaten or claim that they will sanction the energy sector. But most flows will likely continue. Europe will diversify away from Russian energy over the long run. Instead of cutting off their own vital energy supplies, European nations will leverage Russian aggression to strengthen their popular support at home, while initiating emergency state-led efforts to diversify away from Russian energy over the long run through renewables and imports from the US and its allies. This will be advantageous to European democracies that were already struggling to increase political legitimacy amid nascent populism – they will now have a crusade with which to rally their people and maintain fiscal support for their economy: energy security. Europe will sanction Russia’s non-energy sector. Europe will impose tough sanctions on Russia’s non-energy sectors, including finance and technology, to hobble the regime. Russia will eventually be cut off from the SWIFT banking communications network, since it already has a rudimentary alternative that it developed in recent years, but Germany will not agree to cut it off until the payment alternate to continue energy flows can be arranged, which is ultimately possible. China will take advantage of the moment but is probably not ready to invade Taiwan. China could seize the opportunity to consolidate power at home and it may increase pressure on Taiwan through rhetoric, sanctions, or cyber-attacks, but it is not likely to invade Taiwan. An amphibious invasion of the globally critical territory of Taiwan is far riskier for China than a land invasion of the non-critical territory of Ukraine is for Russia. Russia’s strategic calculations and timing are separate from China’s, despite their growing de facto alliance. But a war in the Taiwan Strait is at risk over the long run, as the situation is geopolitically unsustainable, for reasons similar to that of Ukraine. The situation in Ukraine is likely to get worse before it gets better, implying that investors should expect further volatility in risk assets in the near term. Structurally, the shift to a less geopolitically stable multipolar world will favor defense and cybersecurity stocks. “Great Power Struggle” is our top geopolitical investment theme over the long run and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine highlights its continuing relevance. Bottom Line: A buying opportunity for heavily discounted, pro-cyclical or high-beta assets is emerging rapidly, given our assessment, and we will monitor events over the coming weeks to identify when such a shift is prudent. A wholesale energy cutoff to Europe is the chief risk, as it would justify downgrading global equities relative to long-maturity bonds on a six-to-12 month horizon. Investment Takeaways Global Investment Strategy: With real rates coming down, owning gold remains an attractive hedge. As a fairly cheap and defensive currency, a long yen position is advisable. Assuming the conflict remains contained to Ukraine, equities and other risk assets should recover over the remainder of the year. The geopolitical premium in oil prices should also come down. Consistent with our Commodity & Energy Strategy views, our Global Investment Strategy service is closing its long Brent trade recommendation today for a gain of 24.0%. Commodities & Energy Strategy: While oil exports from Russia are not expected to diminish as a result of the invasion, it will prompt increased production from core OPEC producers – Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait – to take the elevated risk premium out of Brent crude oil prices and allow refiners to rebuild inventories. The US and Iran may rejoin the 2015 nuclear deal, which would add about 1.0mm b/d of production to the market – Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea did not prevent the original nuclear deal. These production increases would take prices from the current $105 per barrel level to $85 per barrel by the second half of 2022 and keep it there throughout 2023, according to our base case view. This change marks an increase on our earlier expectation of an average $79.75 per barrel in 2023 in our previous forecast. European Investment Strategy: European equities are likely to continue to underperform in the near-term. Even if Russia and Europe avoid a full embargo of Russian energy shipments to the West, the disruption caused by a rupture of natural gas flows via Ukraine will keep European gas prices at elevated levels. Additionally, investors will continue to handicap the needed risk premia to compensate for the low but real threat of an energy crisis, which would prove particularly debilitating for Hungary, Poland, Germany, Czechia and Italy (Chart 2). Moreover, European equities sport a strong value and cyclical profile with significant overweight positions in financial and industrial equities. Industrials will suffer from higher input costs. European financials will suffer from a decline in yields as hawks in the European Central Bank are already softening their rhetoric on the need to tighten policy. However, due to the likely temporary nature of the dislocation, we do not recommend selling Europe outright and instead will stick with our current hedges, such as selling EUR/JPY and EUR/CHF. The evolution of the military situation on the ground will warrant a re-valuation of this hedging strategy next week. The euro will soon become a buy. Chart 2EU Economy Highly Vulnerable To Any Large Energy Cutoff Foreign Exchange Strategy: The Ukraine crisis will lead to a period of strength for the US dollar (DXY). Countries requiring foreign capital will be most at risk from an escalation in tensions. We still suspect the DXY will peak near 98-100, but volatility will swamp fundamental biases. Geopolitical Strategy: On a strategic basis, stick with our long trades in gold, arms manufacturers, UK equities relative to EU equities, and the Japanese yen. On a tactical basis, stick with long defensive sectors, large caps, Japanese equities relative to German, and Mexican equities relative to emerging markets. We will revisit these trades next week, after the European energy question becomes clearer, to determine whether to book profits on our bearish tactical trades.   – The BCA Research Team