Utilities

Special Report

Highlights In this report, we build and present models designed to predict the odds of Chinese investable equity sector outperformance, based on a set of macroeconomic and equity market factors. BCA Research's China Investment Strategy service will aim to use our newly developed sector outperformance probability models to help investors to better understand the drivers of performance at any given moment, and to make more active equity sector recommendations in the future. Among the top six factors explaining historical periods of sector performance, three were macroeconomic in orientation, and two were directly related to the broad Chinese equity market. We see this as strongly supportive of the potential returns to be earned from active top-down sector rotation within China’s investable market. Cyclical stocks are very depressed relative to defensives, and we would favor them versus defensives over the coming year if China strikes a trade deal with the US and the Chinese economy incrementally improves, as we expect. Feature In our June 19 Special Report, we reviewed the predictability and cyclicality of equity sector earnings in China's investable & domestic markets, and examined the relevance of earnings in predicting relative sector performance over the past decade. We noted that a few sectors scored highly in terms of earnings predictability and the relevance of those earnings in predicting relative performance. But we also highlighted that most of China's equity sectors, in both the investable and domestic markets, either demonstrated earnings trends that were difficult to predict based on the trend in overall market earnings or exhibited relative performance that was difficult to explain based on the relative earnings profile. Our models are designed to predict equity sector relative performance using a series of macroeconomic and equity market factors. In short, our June report underscored that China’s equity sectors warranted a closer examination, with a particular emphasis on understanding the specific macroeconomic or equity market factors that have historically predicted relative sector performance. Today’s report examines this question in depth, focused on China’s investable equity market. We hope to extend our research to the A-share market in the near future. Our approach focuses on constructing and presenting models that quantify a checklist-based approach to determining the odds of equity sector performance. The aim is to use these models to better understand the drivers of performance at any given moment, and to make more active equity sector recommendations in the future. These recommendations will not mechanically follow the models; rather, we plan to use them as a stand in for what typically would be expected given the macro and financial market environment, and as a basis to investigate “abnormal” relative performance. We conclude by highlighting the substantial underperformance of cyclical vs defensives sectors over the past two years, and argue that it is highly unlikely that cyclicals will underperform defensives over the coming 12 months if China strikes a trade deal with the US and the economy incrementally improves, as we expect. We also explain the importance of monitoring the relative performance of health care & utilities stocks over the coming few months, and present a unique sector-based barometer for gauging China’s reflationary stance. The latter two relative performance trends are likely to assist investors in positioning for the big call: the outperformance of Chinese investable stocks vs the global benchmark. Detailing Our Approach In our effort to better understand historical periods of sector outperformance, we have chosen to model the probability of outperformance of each level 1 GICS sector (plus banks) based on a set of macro and equity market variables. Specifically, we use an analytical tool called a logistic regression, which forecasts the probability of a discrete event rather than forecasting the value of a dependent variable. We utilized this approach when building our earnings recession model for China (first presented in our January 16 Special Report1), and investors will often see it (in its conceptually different but practically similar probit form) employed when analyzing the likelihood of an economic recession. The New York Fed’s US recession model is a notable example of the latter,2 which has received much attention by market participants over the past year following the inversion of the US yield curve. The “events” that we modeled are historical periods of individual Chinese investable sector outperformance from 2010 to 2018, relative to the MSCI China index (the “broad market”). Charts I-1A and I-1B illustrate these periods with shading in each panel. We then attempt to explain these episodes of outperformance with the following macro predictors: Chart I-1AThis Report Builds Models Aimed At... Chart I-1B...Predicting The Shaded Regions Of These Charts Periods of accelerating economic activity, represented by our BCA's China Activity Index Periods of rising leading indicators of economic activity, represented by our BCA Li Keqiang Leading Indicator Episodes of tight monetary policy, defined as periods where China’s 3-month interbank repo rate is rising Periods of accelerating inflation, measured both by headline and core inflation We also include several equity market variables: uptrends in relative sector earnings, periods of rising broad market stock prices, uptrends in broad market earnings, and episodes of extreme technical conditions and relative over/undervaluation for the sector in question. In the case of energy stocks, we also include oil prices as a predictor. Charts I-2A and I-2B illustrate these periods as well as the macro & market variables that we have included as predictors. Chart I-2AWe Use These Macroeconomic And Equity Market Factors... Chart I-2B...To Predict Periods Of Equity Sector Outperformance Our approach also accounts for the existence of any leading or lagging relationships between the macro and market variables we have used as predictors and sector relative performance. In most cases the predictors lead relative sector performance, but in some cases it is the opposite. In the case of the latter, we have limited the lead of any variable in our models to 3 months in order to reduce the need to forecast. The link between tight monetary policy and industrial sector performance is one exception to this rule that we detail below. Finally, our approach also limits the extent to which we consider a leading relationship between our predictors and relative sector performance, in order to avoid picking up overlapping economic cycles. This issue, and the evidence supporting the existence of a 3½-year credit cycle in China, are detailed in Box 1. Box 1 Accounting For China’s 3½-Year Credit Cycle Over the course of the analysis detailed in this report, judgments concerning how much of a lead or lag to allow when accounting for any leading or lagging relationships between sector relative performance and either macroeconomic & stock market predictors were necessary. In cases where sector relative performance led any of our predictors, we capped the lead at 3-months to reduce the need to forecast the predictors when using the models. As explained below, the 8-month lead between industrial sector relative performance and tight monetary policy was the only exception to this rule. We also did not include any leading relationship between relative sector stock performance and the trend in relative sector EPS, and allowed at most a co-incident relationship. Limits were also required in the cases where our predictors led relative sector performance. While more lead time is usually better from the perspective of investment strategy, Chart I-B1 presents strong evidence of a 3½ -year credit cycle in China. Chart I-B2 illustrates the problem with including significant lags between predictors and relative sector performance when economic cycles are short. The chart shows the lead/lag correlation profile of the stylized cycle shown in Chart I-B1, and highlights that lags greater than 12-14 months risk picking up the impact of the previous economic cycle. Given this, we have limited the extent to which our predictors can lead relative sector performance in our models, and in practice lead times are generally less than one year. Chart I-B1Over The Past Decade, China Has Experienced A 3½-Year Credit Cycle Chart I-B2With Short Cycles, Excessive Lags Risk Picking Up The Previous Cycle The Key Drivers Of Chinese Investable Equity Sectors Pages 12-23 present the results of each sector’s outperformance probability model, along with a list of factors that were found to be useful predictors and a summary of the results. The importance of the factors included in the models is shown in each of the tables at the top right of pages 12-23 by a score of 1-3 stars, (loosely representing key levels of statistical significance) as well as each factor’s optimal lead or lag. A minus sign shows that the predictor leads sector relative performance, whereas a plus sign shows that it lags. Rising core inflation in China is the most important signal of sector performance that emerged from our analysis. Chart I-3China’s Sectors Linked Strongly To Core Inflation, Monetary Policy, And Growth Chart I-3 summarizes the significance of the factors in predicting sector performance in general, by summing up each predictor’s number of stars across all of the models. The chart shows that rising core inflation in China is the most important signal of sector performance that emerged from our analysis, followed by tight monetary policy, rising economic activity, rising broad market stock prices, oversold technical conditions, and rising broad market earnings. Chart I-3 highlights two important points: If regarded through the lens of causality alone, the strong relationship between rising core inflation and sector performance is somewhat surprising: normally, pricing power is subordinate to revenue/sales/demand as the primary factor driving fundamental performance. However, given that inflation is a lagging economic variable, we suspect that the significance of inflation in our models actually reflects the middle phase of the economic cycle in which sectors tend to best exhibit meaningful out/underperformance. It is also a stronger predictor of periods of tight monetary policy in China than headline inflation.3 This is an encouraging result for investors, as it suggests good odds that future episodes of meaningful sector outperformance can be identified given a particular macro view. Among the top six factors explaining historical periods of sector performance, three were macroeconomic in orientation, and two were directly related to the broad Chinese equity market. While Chinese equity sector performance can sometimes be idiosyncratic, we see this as strongly supportive of the idea that investors can earn positive excess returns by actively shifting between China’s equity sectors using a top-down approach. Turning to the specific results of our sector models, we present the following big-picture findings of our research: Defining China’s Cyclical & Defensive Sectors From a top-down perspective, the most important element of sector rotation typically involves shifting from defensive to cyclical stocks when economic activity is set to improve (and vice versa). In China, it is clear from the results of our models that the investable energy, materials, industrials, consumer discretionary, and information technology sectors are cyclical sectors. The relative performance of these sectors exhibits a positive relationship to pro-cyclical macro variables, or broad market trends. Following last year’s GICS changes, we also include the media & entertainment industry group (within the new communication services sector) in this list. Correspondingly, investable consumer staples, health care, financials, telecom services, utilities, and real estate are defensive sectors in China. Chart I-4Cyclical Stocks Are Bombed Out Versus Defensives Chart I-4 illustrates how these sectors have performed over the past decade by grouping them into equally-weighted cyclical and defensive stock price indexes, as well as the relative performance of cyclicals versus defensives. The chart makes it clear that cyclical stock performance is essentially as weak as it has ever been relative to defensives over the past decade, with the exception of a brief period in 2013. Panel 2 highlights that all of the underperformance of cyclicals over the past two years has been due to de-rating, rather than due to underperforming earnings. The Atypical Case Of Financials & Real Estate The fact that financial and real estate stocks are defensive in China is somewhat curious. In the case of financials, the abnormality is straightforward: most global equity portfolio managers would consider financials to be cyclical, and our work suggests that this is not true for the investable market. Our explanation for this apparent discrepancy is also straightforward: while small and medium banks in China have obviously grown in prominence over the past decade, large state-owned or state-affiliated commercial banks are still dominant in the provision of credit to China's old economy. In most cases China’s large banks lend to state-owned enterprises with implicit government guarantees, meaning that the earnings risk for Chinese banks has typically been lower than for the investable market in the aggregate. It remains to be seen whether this will remain true in a world where Chinese policymakers are keen to slow the pace at which China’s macro leverage ratio rises and to render the existing stock of debt more sustainable for the non-financial sector. Indeed, over a multi-year time horizon, the risk are not trivial that banks will be forced to recapitalize as a result of forced changes to loan terms (eg: significant increases in the amortization period of existing loans) or the recognition of sizeable loan losses, which would clearly increase the cyclicality of the Chinese investable financial sector. Chart I-5A Seeming Contradiction: Real Estate Is High-Beta, But Defensive On the real estate front, the anomaly is not that real estate stocks respond defensively to macroeconomic and stock market variables, it is that real estate stock prices are considerably more volatile than this defensive characterization would suggest. Globally (and especially in the US), real estate stocks are often viewed as bond proxies and thus are typically low-beta, but Chart I-5 shows that this is not the case in China. In our view, this issue is reconciled by the fact that Chinese investable real estate stocks are also highly positively linked to Chinese house price appreciation, with relative performance typically leading a pickup in house prices by up to 1 year. This strongly leading relationship has meant that real estate stocks have often outperformed the broad market as economic activity is slowing, in anticipation that policy easing will lead to an eventual recovery in house prices. Chart I-6Still Following The Defensive Playbook This Year In effect, investable real estate stocks are a high-beta sector that have acted counter-cyclically due to the historical interplay between economic activity, monetary policy, and the housing market. Real estate performance this year has not deviated from this playbook (Chart I-6), and so for now we are content to include real estate stocks in our defensive index. But similar to the case of financials, we can conceive of scenarios in which ongoing Chinese financial sector reform may change this relationship in the future. The Unique Monetary Policy Sensitivity Of Industrials And Consumer Staples Pages 14 and 16 highlight that industrials and consumer staples stocks have typically been sensitive to periods of tight monetary policy. In the case of industrials the relationship is negative, whereas consumer staples relative performance has been positively linked to these periods. In both cases, relative performance has led periods of tight monetary policy, significantly so in the case of industrials (by an average of 8 months). While the relative performance of banks, tech, and real estate stocks have also been linked to periods of tight monetary policy, industrials and consumer staples are the only sectors that have tended to lead these periods. Chart I-7Diverging Corporate Health Explains Industrials/Staples Monetary Policy Sensitivity This is a revelatory finding, and in our view it is explained by divergences in corporate health and leverage for the two sectors. We reviewed Chinese corporate health in our August 28 Special Report,4 and noted that the food & beverage sub-industry was a clear (positive) outlier based on our corporate health monitors. In particular, Chart I-7 highlights that food & beverage corporate health is markedly better than that for machinery companies or for industrial firms in general, supporting the notion that high (low) leverage is impacting the relative performance of industrials (consumer staples). The Leading Nature Of Health Care & Utilities Health care and utilities exhibit similar key drivers of relative performance: in both cases, periods of rising economic activity, rising core inflation, and rising broad market stock prices are all negatively associated with performance. Health care and utilities relative performance also happens to lead all three of those predictors, by 1-3 months on average depending on the variable in question. Our modeling work highlights that these are the only sectors whose relative performance has led multiple factors, suggesting that health care & utilities stocks are particularly interesting market bellwethers to monitor. Core Inflation Matters More Than Headline, Except For Energy & Real Estate As highlighted in Chart I-3, rising core inflation has been a much more important signal about relative sector performance than headline inflation. Chart I-8In China, Food Prices (Not Energy) Account For Headline/Core Differences The two exceptions to this rule relate to the energy and real estate sectors, with the former positively linked to headline inflation and the latter negatively linked. In both cases, we suspect that the relationship is a behavioral rather than a fundamental one. For energy, while rising headline inflation in developed countries is usually associated with rising energy prices, this is not true in the case of China. Chart I-8 highlights that differences between headline and core inflation over the past decade have almost always been driven by rising food prices. This implies that some investors (incorrectly) view energy stocks as a hedge against increases in consumer prices, even if those increases are not driven by rising fuel costs. In the case of real estate, investor expectations of eroding real disposable income and its impact on the housing market are likely the best explanation for the negative link between real estate relative performance and rising headline inflation. Whereas rising core inflation likely reflects a durable improvement in economic momentum (and thus would be positively correlated with income growth), episodes of rising Chinese headline inflation often reflect supply shocks that investors may perceive to be detrimental to household spending power (and thus expected housing demand). Investment Conclusions Our work aimed at explaining historical periods of Chinese investable sector outperformance has three investment implications in the current environment. Cyclicals will probably outperform defensives over the coming year if China strikes a trade deal with the US and the Chinese economy incrementally improves, as we expect. First, within China’s investable market, Chart I-4 illustrated that cyclical stocks are very depressed relative to defensives. Given our view that Chinese investable stocks are likely to outperform their global peers over a 6-12 month time horizon, we would also favor cyclicals to defensives over that period. For investors who are not yet overweight cyclical stocks in China, we would advise waiting for concrete signs that growth has bottomed (which should emerge sometime in Q1) before putting on a long position as we remain tactically neutral towards Chinese versus global stocks. But the key point is that it is highly unlikely that cyclicals will underperform defensives over the coming year if China strikes a trade deal with the US and the Chinese economy incrementally improves, as we expect. Second, the fact that investable health care and utilities stocks have particularly leading properties suggests that they should be monitored closely over the coming few months. A technical breakdown in the relative performance of these sectors would be an important sign that market participants are anticipating a bottoming in China’s economy, which may give investors a green light to position for a bullish cyclical stance. For now, both of these sectors continue to outperform (Chart I-9), supporting our decision to remain tactically neutral towards Chinese stocks. Third, the heightened negative sensitivity of industrials and positive sensitivity of consumer staples to monetary policy suggests that the relative performance trend between the two sectors may serve as a reflationary barometer for China’s economy. Chart I-10 shows that industrials outperformed staples last year once the PBOC shifted into easing mode, and anticipated the recovery in the pace of credit growth. However, industrials soon began to underperform staples, which also seems to have anticipated the fact that the recovery in credit was set to be less powerful than what has occurred during previous cycles. The fact that the relative performance trend is off its recent low is notable, and may suggest that China’s existing reflationary stance will be sufficient to stabilize economic activity if a trade deal with the US is indeed finalized in the near future. Chart I-9Key Defensive Sectors Are Still Outperforming, Supporting Our Neutral Tactical Stance Chart I-10Industrials Vs. Staples Anticipated That Easing Would Only Be Measured As a final point, BCA Research's China Investment Strategy service will aim to use our newly developed sector outperformance probability models to make more active equity sector recommendations in the future. These recommendations will not mechanically follow the models; rather, we plan to use the models as a stand in for what typically would be expected given the macro and financial market environment, and as a basis to investigate “abnormal” relative performance. We hope you will find these models to be a helpful quantification of the risk versus return prospects of allocating among China’s investable sectors. As always, we welcome any feedback that you may have about our approach.   Energy Chart II-1 Table II-1   Unsurprisingly, our energy sector model highlights that periods of energy outperformance are strongly linked to periods of rising crude oil prices. However, what is surprising is that periods of accelerating headline inflation in China are even more closely linked to periods of energy sector outperformance than episodes of rising oil prices, and that these periods of accelerating inflation are not generally caused by rising energy prices. The lack of a clear economic rationale for this relationship implies that some investors (incorrectly) view energy stocks as a hedge against increases in consumer prices, even if those increases are largely driven by rising food prices. The model also highlights that periods of strong undervaluation have historically been significant in predicting future energy sector outperformance, with a lag of roughly 8 months. The probability of energy sector outperformance has fallen sharply according to our model, but for now we continue to recommend a long absolute energy sector position on a 6-12 month time horizon. BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy service expects oil prices to trade at $70/barrel on average next year,5 Chinese headline inflation continues to rise, and we noted in our October 2 Weekly Report that energy stocks are heavily discounted.6 Barring a durable decline in oil prices below $55/barrel, investors should continue to favor China’s energy sector. Materials Chart II-2 Table II-2 Our model highlights that the materials sector is one of the clearest plays on accelerating industrial activity within the investable universe. Among the macro variables that we tested, periods of investable materials outperformance are strongly positively linked with periods when our BCA Activity Index and our leading indicator for the index have been rising. Periods of materials sector outperformance have also been positively correlated with prior periods of oversold technical conditions and rising broad market stock prices, underscoring that materials are a strongly pro-cyclical sector. We currently maintain no active relative sector trades, but our model suggests that investors should be underweight the investable materials sector relative to the broad investable index. Industrials Chart II-3 Table II-3 Periods of industrial sector outperformance have historically been positively correlated with relative industrial sector earnings, broad market stock prices, and prior oversold technical conditions. They have been negatively correlated with periods of tight monetary policy, rising core inflation, and prior overbought technical conditions. Since 2010, periods of industrial sector performance have led periods of tight monetary policy by 8 months, the longest lead of relative equity performance to any macro variable that we tested in our model (and the longest lead that we allowed). Industrial sector performance has also been strongly negatively linked with periods of rising core inflation. These findings, and the fact that our Activity Index and its leading indicator have not been highly successful at predicting periods of industrial sector outperformance, strongly suggest that industrials, while pro-cyclical, are primarily driven by expectations of easy monetary policy. We noted in an August 2018 Special Report that state-owned enterprises have become substantially leveraged over the past decade,7 and in a more recent report we highlighted that industries such as machinery have experienced a significant deterioration in corporate health over the past decade.8 This helps explain why industrial sector performance is so negatively impacted by tight policy. Our model suggests that the best time to be overweight industrial stocks is the early phase of an economic rebound, when Chinese stock prices are rising but market participants are not yet expecting tighter policy. These conditions may present themselves sometime in Q1, but probably not over the coming 0-3 months. Consumer Discretionary Ex-Internet & Direct Marketing Retail Chart II-4 Table II-4 Besides materials, China’s investable consumer discretionary sector has historically been the most positively associated with coincident and leading measures of industrial activity. Rising core inflation is also highly positively related to consumer discretionary outperformance, which may reflect improved pricing power for the sector. The strong link with industrial activity is in contrast to depictions of China’s consumer sector as being less correlated to money & credit trends than the overall economy, and is supportive of our view that industrial activity forms one of the three pillars of China’s business cycle.9 We ended the estimation period of our model as of December 2018, in order to avoid including the distortive effects of last year’s changes to the global industry classification standard (which resulted in Alibaba’s inclusion and overwhelming representation in the investable consumer discretionary sector). As such, the results of our model apply today to consumer discretionary stocks ex-internet & direct marketing retail. For now, the absence of an uptrend in our Activity Index and in core inflation is signaling underperformance of discretionary stocks outside of internet & direct marketing retail. Outperformance this year largely reflects a significant advance in consumer durable and apparel: by contrast, automobiles & components have underperformed the broad market by roughly 14% year-to-date. Consumer Staples Chart II-5 Table II-5 Historically, periods of consumer staples outperformance have been predicted by a falling Activity Index, periods of tight monetary policy, and over/undervalued conditions. The impact of monetary policy is particularly heavy in the model, suggesting that consumer staples are somewhat the mirror image of industrials in terms of the impact of leverage on relative equity performance. This too is supported by our August 28 Special Report,10 which noted that corporate health for the food & beverage sector was the strongest among the sectors we examined. However, the model failed to capture what has been very significant staples outperformance this year, highlighting the occasional limits of a rule-of-thumb approach to sector allocation. Investable consumer staples are reliably low-beta compared with the broad market, and we are not surprised that investors have strongly favored the sector this year amid enormous economic and policy uncertainty. An eventual improvement in economic activity, coupled with fairly rich valuation, should work against consumer staples stocks sometime in the first quarter of 2020. Investors who are positioned in favor of China-related assets should also be watching closely for any signs of a technical breakdown in the relative performance trend of investable staples. Health Care Chart II-6 Table II-6 Among the macro variables tested in our model, periods of health care outperformance are negatively related to coincident and leading measures of industrial activity and strongly negatively related to rising core inflation.  Health care outperformance is also strongly negatively related to periods of rising broad market stock prices, and positively related to prior oversold technical conditions. These results clearly signify that investable health care is a defensive sector, to be owned when the economy is slowing and when investable stocks in general are trending lower. Our model suggests that health care stocks are likely to continue to outperform, as they have been since the beginning of the year. A substantive US/China trade deal that meaningfully reduces economic uncertainty remains the key risk to health care outperformance over a 6- to 12-month time horizon. Financials Chart II-7 Table II-7 Our model highlights that periods of financial sector outperformance over the past decade have been negatively associated with periods of rising core inflation (a strong relationship), and with periods of rising index earnings. Oversold technical conditions have also helped explain future episodes of financial sector outperformance. The link between core inflation and the outperformance of financials appears to represent a behavioral rather than a fundamental relationship. When modeling periods of rising financial sector relative earnings, the trend in broad market EPS is more predictive than that of core inflation, highlighting that the latter’s explanatory power is due to investor behavior. The results of our model, and the fact that core inflation leads Chinese index earnings, suggests that financials are fundamentally counter-cyclical and that investors see rising Chinese core inflation as confirmation that an economic expansion is underway (and that broad market earnings are likely to rise). Our model is currently predicting financial sector outperformance, but investable financials have modestly underperformed since the beginning of the year. This appears to have been caused by the underperformance of financial sector earnings this year as overall index earnings growth has decelerated, contrary to what history would suggest. We suspect that the ongoing shadow banking crackdown is related to financial sector earnings underperformance, and we would advise against an overweight stance towards investable financials until signs of improving relative earnings emerge. Banks Chart II-8 Table II-8 Our model shows that periods of banking sector outperformance are more linked to macro variables than has been the case for the overall financial sector. Specifically, bank performance is negatively correlated with leading indicators of economic activity and rising core inflation, and especially negatively correlated with periods of tight monetary policy. Banks have also typically outperformed following periods of oversold technical conditions. Similar to financials, bank earnings are typically counter-cyclical, but relative bank earnings have not been good predictors of relative bank performance over the past decade. Still, the negative association of relative stock prices with leading economic indicators, rising core inflation and rising interest rates underscores that investors should normally be underweight banks if they expect overall Chinese stock prices to rise. Also similar to the overall financial sector, our model is currently predicting outperformance for bank stocks, but investable banks have underperformed year-to-date. The shadow banking crackdown is also likely impacting investable bank earnings, leading to a similar recommendation to avoid bank stocks until relative earnings look to be trending higher. “Tech+”   Chart II-9 Table II-9 Our technology model has worked well at predicting periods of tech sector outperformance over the past several years, particularly from 2015 – 2017. The model suggests that, in addition to being negatively related to prior overbought conditions, periods of technology sector outperformance are associated with improving growth conditions, easy monetary policy, and rising prices. In other words, tech stocks are a growth & liquidity play. Owing to last year’s changes to the GICS, the results of our model apply today to Chinese investable internet & direct marketing retail, the media & entertainment industry group (within the new communication services sector), and the now considerably smaller information technology sector (the sum of which could be considered the “tech+” sector). The model has been predicting tech sector outperformance since May (in response to easier monetary policy), which has occurred for the official information technology sector. However, the BAT (Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent) stocks are only up fractionally in relative terms from their late-May low. Our expectation that China’s economy is likely to bottom in Q1 means that we may recommend upgrading “tech+” stocks relative to the investable benchmark in the coming months. Telecom Services Chart II-10 Table II-10 Our model for telecommunication services (now a level 2 industry group within the communication services sector) illustrates that telecom stocks have historically been counter-cyclical. Periods of telecom outperformance have been negatively associated with periods of rising core inflation, rising broad market stock prices, and rising broad market EPS. It is notable that telecom services stocks are driven more by cycles in overall stock prices than by cycles in economic activity. This suggests that investors tend to focus on the fact that telecom stocks are reliably low-beta compared with the overall investable market, causing out(under)performance of telecoms when the broad market is falling(rising). Similar to financials & banks, telecom stocks have not outperformed this year, in contrast to what our model would suggest. Earnings also appear to be the culprit, with the level of 12-month trailing earnings having fallen nearly 10% since the summer. China Mobile accounts for a sizeable portion of the telecom services index, and the company’s recent earnings weakness seems to be due to depreciation charges stemming from forced investment on 5G spending (mandated by the Chinese government). Our sense is that this will have only a temporary effect on telecom services EPS, meaning that investors should continue to expect the sector to behave in a counter-cyclical fashion over the coming year. Utilities Chart II-11 Table II-11 The early performance of our utilities model was mixed, as it generated several false sell signals during the 2011 – 2013 period despite recommending, on average, an overweight stance. However, over the past five years, the model has performed extremely well in terms of explaining periods of relative utilities performance. The model highlights that utilities are straightforwardly counter-cyclical. The relative performance of utilities stocks is positively related to its relative earnings trend, and negatively related to economic activity, rising core inflation, and broad market stock prices.  Consistent with a decline in the overall MSCI China index, the model has correctly predicted utilities outperformance this year. We expect utilities to underperform over a 6-12 month time horizon, but would advise against an aggressive underweight position until hard evidence of a bottom in Chinese economic activity emerges. Real Estate Chart II-12 Table II-12 Our model for the relative performance of investable real estate has been among the most successful of those detailed in this report, which is somewhat surprising given the macro factors that the model shows drive real estate performance. While periods of relative real estate performance are modestly (negatively) associated with periods of tight monetary policy, rising headline inflation is the most important macro predictor of real estate underperformance. Among market factors driving performance, real estate stocks reliably underperform when broad market EPS are trending higher, and they historically outperform for a time after becoming relatively undervalued. Real estate relative performance is also strongly linked to periods of rising house prices, but the former tends to significantly lead the latter. Given that core inflation has better predicted episodes of tight monetary policy than headline inflation, investor expectations of eroding real disposable income is likely the best explanation for the negative link between real estate relative performance and rising headline inflation. Whereas rising core inflation likely reflects a durable improvement in economic momentum (and thus would be positively correlated with income growth), episodes of rising Chinese headline inflation often reflect supply shocks that investors may perceive to be detrimental to household spending power (and thus expected housing demand). Beyond the negative link between higher inflation and interest rates on investable real estate performance, the strong negative association with broad market earnings underscores that investors treat real estate as a defensive sector. We thus expect real estate stocks to continue to outperform in the near term, but underperform over a 6-12 month time horizon.   Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President jonathanl@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1. Please see China Investment Strategy, "Six Questions About Chinese Stocks," dated January 16, 2019. 2. Please see Federal Reserve Bank of New York, The Yield Curve as a Leading Indicator at https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/capital_markets/ycfaq.html 3. This is despite frequent concerns among investors that the PBOC is inclined to tighten in response to detrimental supply shocks. 4. Please see China Investment Strategy, "Messages From BCA’s China Industry Watch," dated August 28, 2019. 5. Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy, "Policy Uncertainty Lifts USD, Stifles Global Oil Demand Growth," dated October 17, 2019. 6. Please see China Investment Strategy, "China Macro & Market Review," dated October 2, 2019. 7. Please see China Investment Strategy, "Chinese Policymakers: Facing A Trade-Off Between Growth And Leveraging," dated August 29, 2018. 8. Please see China Investment Strategy, "Messages From BCA’s China Industry Watch," dated August 28, 2019. 9. Please see China Investment Strategy, "The Three Pillars Of China’s Economy," dated May 16, 2018. 10. Please see China Investment Strategy, "Messages From BCA’s China Industry Watch," dated August 28, 2019. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Special Report

In late-summer 2010, we published a Special Report overviewing long-term U.S. equity sector relative performance during deflationary periods. Since then, inflation – core PCE deflator to be more specific – only briefly flirted with the Federal Reserve’s 2% target in mid-2018, while long-term inflation expectations never managed to re-anchor higher. Worrisomely, there are now budding signs that inflation will weaken in the coming quarters rather than rear its ugly head. Pundits – us included – are still waiting for inflationary pressures to finally pass-through. Worrisomely, there are now budding signs that inflation will weaken in the coming quarters rather than rear its ugly head (Chart 1). The late-2018 tightening in financial conditions will exert downward pressure on year-over-year CPI growth, albeit with a slight lag (top panel, Chart 1). More broadly, the ongoing deceleration in the U.S. economy, as evidenced by the sharp decline in the ISM manufacturing PMI (and most of its subcomponents), represents a serious headwind for inflation (second panel, Chart 1). Given weak global growth, the appreciating U.S. dollar – a countercyclical currency – will also weigh on inflation going forward (not shown). Further, we don’t view the recent perky inflation prints as sustainable. In fact, core goods CPI – which accounts for 25% of core CPI and has been the main driver lately – is expected to roll over and contract over the next 18 months (third panel, Chart 1). Chart 1Still Looking For Inflation? U.S. Equity Strategy’s corporate pricing power proxy has also sharply sunk corroborating that the path of least resistance is lower for core inflation (bottom panel, Chart 1). In other words, if Marty McFly could ride the DeLorean to travel back in time once more, he would certainly approve of deflation/disinflation being a major equity theme at BCA, and would even ask us to delve deeper into our prior analysis. That is precisely what we do in this Special Report. We acknowledge the current disinflationary trend and provide more details on the historical relative performance of the different equity sectors in such periods. We introduce a simple trading rule based on these deflationary episodes, which we define as two or more consecutive quarters of negative corporate sector price deflator growth (Chart 2). We treat single quarters of positive growth within broader deflationary trends as outliers, which translate into the occasional quarterly rebounds within the shaded areas. Chart 2Deflationary Periods The next pages provide some more color on the sectors historical relative performance. Notably, we add a brief overview of the annualized returns realized by heeding the signals from two consecutive quarters of negative corporate sector price deflator growth. Since 1960, there have been 27 such signals, with a median duration of 15 months and the shortest one being six months. As such, we feel comfortable using 6-, 12- and 24-month horizons to go long (short) the sectors we identified did well during deflationary (inflationary) periods, whenever signaled. Table 1 summarizes the results of this empirical exercise. Table 1 Sector Relative Performance And Deflation (From 1960 To Present) Our hypothesis during disinflationary periods is that defensives outshine cyclicals. The results for the GICS11 relative sector performance are consistent with our hypothesis. Specifically, following our deflationary signal, defensives are up 1.4% on a 6-month horizon, while cyclicals are down 2.5%. We also note an inflection point around the 12-month mark as cyclicals start to recover their losses moving from -2.5% to just -0.21%, while defensives are giving up their gains moving from 1.38% to 0.76%. This finding is consistent with the median deflation period duration of 15 months, as highlighted earlier. Similarly, if we look 24 months out, we observe that cyclicals are outperforming the market by 0.5% (largely driven by tech), and defensives are lagging the market by -1.2% (dragged by telecom and utilities) signaling that the market has recovered. Diagram 1Performance Time Line Importantly, we are currently in a deflationary environment as defined by our two-quarter signal that commenced mid-2018, and U.S. Equity Strategy has been actively reducing cyclical exposure over the past six months and highlighting that investors should be cautious on the prospects of the broad equity market. Turning back to Table 1, we also see some divergences in the GICS1 sector performance vs. some of our expectations. Utilities should outperform during disinflation periods, owing to two factors: (1) steady cash flow growth, (2) falling interest rates boost the allure of high yielding competing assets. Another notable outlier is the S&P consumer discretionary index. Specifically, the roughly 2% underperformance in the six months following our deflationary signal took us by surprise, as discretionary spending should at the margin get a boost from declining interest rates. To conclude, we also present a time line that summarizes results from Table 1 as well as the sector specific comments. Importantly, the time line is a road map that should be only used “as a rule of thumb” guide to navigate a deflationary environment. Keep in mind, that even though the median duration for a deflationary period is 15 months, it can still last anywhere from just under a year to over four years. As always, context is key. Finally, stay tuned for an update on our traditional U.S. equity sector profit margin outlook report that is due in the upcoming months. What follows are additional details of our analysis on a per sector basis, along with charts on sector specific pricing power and revenue turnover.     Jeremie Peloso, Research Analyst JeremieP@bcaresearch.com   Arseniy Urazov, Research Associate ArseniyU@bcaresearch.com   Consumer Staples (Overweight) The S&P consumer staples index performs well during deflationary periods. Likely explanatory variables are the safe haven status of this index along with an ongoing industry consolidation. Our sector pricing power proxy reveals that staples have not experienced a contraction in pricing power since 2003. While relative share prices are staging a recovery, they are still one standard deviation below the historical time trend. Further gains are likely given impressive returns on a 6-, 12-, and 24-month time horizon following our deflationary signal. We remain overweight the S&P consumer staples index. Energy (Overweight) Among the cyclical sectors, S&P energy is the second largest underperformer, declining 3.4% on average in relative terms in the six months following our deflationary signal. The underperformance is also evident in our PP proxy. Energy companies’ PP declines right as the economy enters deflation, which is consistent with our expectations, as oil plays a key role in virtually any inflation/deflation measure. One caveat at the current juncture is the recent oil price spike that may serve as a catalyst to unlock excellent value in bombed out energy equities. As a result of the drone attacks on Saudi Arabia’s production and refining facilities we expect geopolitical premia to get built into crude oil prices on a sustained basis. We are currently overweight the S&P energy index. Health Care (Overweight) During deflationary periods the S&P health care sector has outperformed the broad market, similar to its defensive sibling, the S&P consumer staples sector. On top of the safe haven nature of the health care industry, pricing power has never crossed below the zero line during the entire history of the data series. This remarkable feat also applies to the sector’s sales growth. We are currently overweight the S&P health care index. Industrials (Overweight) On the eve of deflation, industrials equities start wrestling with two opposing forces: cheapened raw materials versus slowing economic activity. In the end, economic softness wins the tug-of-war as this deep cyclical index underperforms the market on 6-, 12- and 24-month time horizon by -1.4%, -1.0% and -0.5%, respectively. The sector’s pricing power usually displays a sharp decline as we enter a deflationary zone weighing on industrials revenue prospects and thus relative performance. We are currently overweight the S&P industrials sector. Financials (Overweight) Being an early cyclical sector, it is not surprising that the S&P financials sector tends to underperform the broad market on 6-, 12- and 24-month horizon following our two-quarter deflation signal. The largest underperformance for financials comes late into the deflationary period. In fact, had we excluded utilities from our analysis, the S&P financials sector would have been the worst performing sector across the board on a 12- and 24-month time horizon. The heavyweight banks subgroup accounting for roughly 42% of the S&P financials market capitalization weight explains the underperformance. As a reminder banks underperform when the price of credit is falling owing to deflation/disinflation. Given that our fixed income strategists expect a selloff in the bond market, we remain overweight the S&P financials index. Technology (Neutral – Downgrade Alert) Back in 2010, we reiterated that tech equities were deflationary winners, a fact that has not changed since then. The frenetic pace of innovation in and of itself, has prepared the sector to cope with episodes of deflation. Within cyclicals, technology is by far the best performing sector in our Table 1, but the present-day geopolitical and trade tensions compel us to be neutral on the sector with a potential downgrade coming down the line via a software subgroup downgrade. Tech pricing power is resilient during deflationary episodes. However, tech sales growth, which appears to have peaked for the cycle, swings violently, warning of potential turbulence ahead if a down oscillation is looming. We are neutral the S&P technology sector, which is also on our downgrade watch list. Telecommunication Services (Neutral) Traditionally defensive telecom services stocks have been struggling recently, saddled with rising debt, fighting to remain relevant and avoid becoming a “dumb pipe”. The industry’s pricing power proxy also highlights the point as telecom companies never managed to regain their footing since the GFC. Another important point is that the index materially underperforms the market across all the time horizons we examined returning: -1.5%, -2.0% and -4.4%. Our hypothesis was that telecom carriers should outperform during deflationary periods owing to stable cash flow growth generation and a high dividend yield profile. But, empirical evidence shows the opposite. Likely, the four decades-long sustained underperformance of this now niche safe haven industry suggests that sector specific dynamics are at fault. We are currently neutral the S&P telecommunication services index. Materials (Underweight) Despite the massive demand from China and, more generally, from the EM complex for commodities over the past several years, the S&P materials sector never actually managed to break free from its structural downtrend. The sector is one of the major disinflationary losers as evident from the chart. Importantly, since the mid-70s, most of the periods when materials managed to outperform the broad market occurred outside the shaded areas and recessions. On average, materials sector pricing power also tends to decline sharply when global growth weakens, as is currently the case. And, with a slight delay, materials sector revenue growth will likely suffer a setback, warning that revenue growth has crested for the cycle. We reiterate our recent downgrade of the S&P materials sector to underweight. Consumer Discretionary (Underweight – Upgrade Alert) Contrary to our hypothesis, S&P consumer discretionary stocks underperform during disinflationary periods that weigh on interest rates. Likely decelerating economic activity trumps that fall in interest rates and consumers gravitate toward staple goods and services and away from discretionarfy purchases. Table 1 reveals that consumer discretionary stocks actually suffer the most early in a deflationary period (-2.0%), and then sharply recover 12 months out and turn marginally positive (0.1%). We are currently underweight the S&P consumer discretionary index, but have it on upgrade alert as a potential buying opportunity. Utilities (Underweight) As for the final sector of this Special Report, we had highlighted that the S&P utilities is a notable outlier in our analysis as it does not behave according to our expectations. Likely, some industry specific dynamics are at play as high-yielding safe haven utilities stocks severely underperform during deflationary periods. The sector returns -3.5%, -4.3%, and -4.5% versus the broad marekt on a 6-, 12, and 24-month time horizon, respectively. In theory, two factors should have pushed the relative share price higher: (1) steady cash flow growth and (2) falling interest rates, both of which boost the allure of high yielding competing assets. Neither one was sufficient to break away from the structural downtrend that has been haunting the sector over the years. We are currently underweight the S&P utilites index.   Footnotes 1    We are using GICS 2 Telecommunication Services index instead of the parent GICS 1 Communication Services index due to the lack of data as the index was only recently introduced.

Special Report

Highlights China’s infrastructure investment growth rate could rebound moderately from its current nominal 3% pace, but will remain well below the double-digit rate it has registered for most of the past decade.  A lack of funding for local governments and their financing vehicles will somewhat cap the upside in infrastructure fixed-asset investment (FAI) in the next six to nine months. Special bond issuance will be insufficient to ensuring a major recovery in infrastructure spending. Investors should tread cautiously on infrastructure plays in financial markets. Feature Chart I-1Chinese Infrastructure Investment: Double-Digit Growth Again? Nominal infrastructure investment growth in China has slowed from over 15% in 2017 to 3% currently (Chart I-1). This is the weakest growth rate since 2005 excluding the late 2011-early 2012 period. Over the past decade, each time the Chinese economy experienced a considerable slowdown, infrastructure construction was ramped up to revive growth. Infrastructure spending growth skyrocketed in 2009 and was also boosted in 2012. In 2015-2016, it was not allowed to decelerate with the issuance of nearly RMB 2 trillion of special infrastructure bonds. This time the government has also reacted. Since mid-2018, the Chinese authorities have dramatically raised local governments’ special bonds balance limits, prompted local governments to front-load their issuance this year, and also encouraged the private sector to participate in public-private partnership (PPP) infrastructure projects. Will Chinese infrastructure FAI growth accelerate over the next six to nine months from its current nominal 3% pace to double digits? The short answer is no. We believe Chinese infrastructure investment growth could rebound moderately in the next six to nine months, but will still remain below the double-digit growth seen in the past and well below the 18% average growth of the past 15 years. For purposes of this report, the composition of “infrastructure” includes three categories – (1) Transport, Storage and Postal Service, (2) Water Conservancy, Environment & Utility Management, and (3) Electricity, Gas & Water Production and Supply. Chart I-2 presents the breakdown of the nominal infrastructure FAI by category. Funding Constraint Preceding both the 2011-2012 and 2018 infrastructure investment slumps, the Chinese central government increased its scrutiny on local government debt and tightened funding conditions for infrastructure projects. As a result, all three categories of infrastructure spending experienced a sharp deceleration (Chart I-3). Overall, financing and qualitative limitations that Beijing imposes on local government infrastructure spending hold the key to the outlook. We believe Chinese infrastructure investment growth could rebound moderately in the next six to nine months, but will still remain below the double-digit growth seen in the past and well below the 18% average growth of the past 15 years. Looking forward, without a considerable recovery in available financing, there will be no meaningful rebound in Chinese infrastructure investment and construction activity. For now, we are not very optimistic on financing. Chart I-4 shows the breakdown of the major funding sources of Chinese infrastructure investment. All of them are likely to face considerable funding constraints over the next six to nine months. Chart I-3Chinese Infrastructure Investment Growth Has Decelerated Across The Board   1. Self-Raised Funds Self-raised funds contribute nearly 60% of overall infrastructure funding. They include net local government special bond issuance, PPP financing and government-managed funds’ (GMFs) revenues excluding proceeds from special bond issuance. A. Local government special bond issuance, which is exclusively used to fund infrastructure projects, has been the major source of financing for local governments in the past 12 months. The authorities significantly boosted net local government bond issuance to RMB 1.2 trillion in the first six months of this year from only RMB 361 billion in the same period in 2018. However, the amount of special bond issuance in the second half of this year will unlikely be significant enough to boost infrastructure FAI greatly. First, the central government has not only set a limit on the aggregate local government special bond balance, but it also set limits for each of the 31 provinces/provincial-level cities.1 In the past three years, nearly all provinces did not use up their special bond issuance quotas. This resulted in an outstanding aggregate amount of special bonds of only about 85% of the limit.2 In both 2017 and 2018, local governments were left with RMB 1.1 trillion special bond issuance quota unused for that year. Second, based on the limit on outstanding amount special bonds set by the central government for the end of 2019, local governments could issue another RMB 0.8-1 trillion of special bonds in the second half of this year. In comparison, in 2018, the issuance was heavily concentrated in the second half of the year with RMB 1.6 trillion. Our estimate shows there will be only RMB 400-600 billion increase in net total special bond issuance in 2019 versus 2018.3 This will translate into a merely 2-3% growth in Chinese infrastructure investment. Third, net local government special bond issuance made up only 15% of overall infrastructure FAI over the past 12 months. Hence, there is still a huge financing gap to be filled (Chart I-5). B. Public-private partnerships (PPP) are unlikely to meet the financing shortage either. PPPs have become an important financing model for Chinese local governments to fund infrastructure investments since 2014. Nevertheless, to control rising local government debt risks, the central government has tightened regulations on PPP projects since early last year. A series of tightened rules have resulted in a sharp deceleration in both PPP investment and overall infrastructure investment growth. Consequently, PPPs contributions to total infrastructure FAI have plunged from over 30% in 2017 to 10% currently (Chart I-6). Chart I-5Special Bond Issuance Accounted For Only 15% Of Infrastructure FAI Chart I-6Public-Private Partnerships: Too Small To Meet The Financing Shortage   So far, the rules on PPP projects on local governments remain tight. In March, the central government tightened its rule on local government participation in PPP projects. The new rule states that, if a local government has already spent more than 5% of its overall general expenditures on PPP projects excluding sewage and waste disposal PPP projects, it will not be allowed to invest in any new PPP projects. Before March, the threshold was over 10%. In early July, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) demanded all PPP projects undertake a thorough feasibility study. The NDRC emphasized that PPP projects that do not follow standard procedures will not be allowed. Chart I-7Government-Managed Funds: Headwinds From Falling Land Sales C. Government-managed funds (GMF) excluding special bond issuance accounts, which contribute about 15% of overall infrastructure financing, are also facing constraints. According to the country’s Budget Law, the GMF budget refers to the budget for revenues and expenditures of the funds raised for specific developmental objectives. In brief, GMFs constitute de-facto off-balance-sheet government revenues and spending. Land sales by local governments are one major revenue source for GMFs. Contracting property floor space sold is likely to depress real estate developers’ land purchases, further reducing local governments’ revenues from selling land (Chart I-7). This will curb local governments’ ability to finance their infrastructure projects through GMFs. 2. Domestic Loans Domestic loans contribute to about 15% of overall infrastructure financing. Infrastructure projects are generally long term in nature. Presently, the impulse of non-household medium- and long-term (MLT) lending has stabilized but has not yet improved (Chart I-8). While not all of MLT loans are used for infrastructure, sluggish MLT lending reflects commercial banks’ reluctance to finance infrastructure projects. We believe a decelerating economy, mounting local government debt, and often-low returns on infrastructure projects will continue to constrain loan funding of infrastructure projects from both banks and the private sector. 3. General Government Budget The general government budget (which includes central and local governments) accounts for about 15% of overall infrastructure financing. The general budget is also facing headwinds from declining revenue due to recent tax cuts and lower corporate profit growth (Chart I-9). Chart I-8Sluggish Medium/Long-Term Bank Lending Chart I-9Government General Budget: Large Deficit   Bottom Line: Funding constraints will likely linger, making any recovery in Chinese infrastructure investment growth moderate over the next six to nine months. Local government special bonds will not be a game-changer. Their net issuance accounted for only 15% of overall infrastructure FAI over the past 12 months. While local governments could issue another RMB 0.8-1 trillion of special bonds in the second half of 2019, it would be well below the RMB 1.4 trillion of special bond issuance that was rolled out in the second half of 2018. FAI In Transportation: In Nominal Terms… The transportation sector accounts for about 31% of total Chinese infrastructure investment. It includes railway, highway, urban public transit, air and water transport. Table I-1 shows the 13th five-year (2016-2020) transportation investment plan released by the government in February 2017,4 which excludes urban public transit. The authorities planned to invest RMB 15 trillion in the transportation sector over the five-year period between 2016 and 2020, with highways accounting for over half of the investment, followed by railways (23%), air transportation (4.3%) and water transportation (3.3%). The table also shows our calculation of the realized investment amount in these four sub-sectors for the period of January 2016 to June 2019. Local government special bonds will not be a game-changer. Their net issuance accounted for only 15% of overall infrastructure FAI over the past 12 months. Table I-1 suggests the remaining FAI for the transportation sector for the July 2019 to December 2020 period will be considerably smaller than the FAI amount over the past 18 months. This entails a major drag on infrastructure investment at least over the next 18 months. It is important to emphasize that this is conditional on the central planners in Beijing sticking to their five-year plan for infrastructure FAI. As of now, there has been no announcement of revisions to these five-year FAI targets. Bottom Line: China has already completed the overwhelming majority of its planned transportation FAI for 2016-2020. Consequently, without revisions to the targets and budgets by central planners in Beijing, transportation investment will likely contract year-on-year over the next 18 months. …And Real Terms Table I-2 summarizes the 2020 targets for major Chinese infrastructure development (urban rail transit, railway, highway and airport) in real terms. Chart I-10Transportation 2020 Targets: Not Far Away In real terms, the annual growth of transportation infrastructure will likely be 4.2% in both 2019 and 2020. We illustrated in the previous section that the five-year budget plan had been front-loaded, leaving a very small budget for transportation investment over the next 18 months. This may suggest that without considerably exceeding the budget, transportation infrastructure will fail to achieve the 4.2% annual growth in real terms both this year and next. In brief, more funding should be dispatched/allowed by the central planners in Beijing for infrastructure FAI not to shrink. Second, urban rail transit, high-speed railways, highways and airports will reach their respective 2020 targets, while non-high-speed railway construction will likely be a little bit off its 2020 target. Third, based on the 2020 targets, urban rail transit will enjoy very fast growth over the next one and a half years. Fourth, the growth of high-speed railways and highways will be very low, at around 1-2% in real terms (Chart I-10). Finally, while the number of airports will increase at a faster pace, their contribution to overall infrastructure investment will remain insignificant as they only account for about 1.4% of overall infrastructure investment. Bottom Line: In real terms, transport infrastructure growth will likely be only about 4% over the next six to nine months. Future Infrastructure Investment Focus Urban rail transit, environmental management and public utility management will likely be the major driving forces for Chinese infrastructure investment over the next 18 months. Urban rail transit line length will likely register fast growth of around 10% over the next six to nine months. As the central government enforces increasingly stringent rules on environmental protection, investment in environmental management will likely experience continued growth acceleration (Chart I-11). China has already completed the overwhelming majority of its planned transportation FAI for 2016-2020. Consequently, without revisions to the targets and budgets by central planners in Beijing, transportation investment will likely contract year-on-year over the next 18 months. Meanwhile, as the country’s urbanization continues and more townships and city suburbs become urbanized,5 public utility management investment will also grow moderately. Public utility management investment, contributing a massive 45% of overall infrastructure investment, includes sewer systems, sewer treatment facilities, waste treatment and disposal, streetlights, city roads construction, parks, bridges and tunnels in the city. Investment Implications Investors should not hold their breath expecting a major upswing in infrastructure FAI and a major rally in related financial markets. Chinese steel demand is sensitive to construction of railways and urban rail transit lines (Chart I-12, top panel). In turn, mainland cement demand is dependent on highway construction (Chart I-12, bottom panel). Chart I-11Environment Management: Will Continue Booming Chart I-12Chinese Infrastructure Spending Will Moderately Boost Steel & Cement Demand...   Chart I-13...And Steel & Cement Prices At The Margin The infrastructure sector accounts for about 10-15% of total Chinese steel use, and about 30-40% of Chinese cement consumption. Nevertheless, given that we believe Chinese infrastructure spending will only have a moderate recovery, the positive effect on steel and cement prices will be muted as well (Chart I-13). The same holds true for spending on industrial machinery, equipment, chemicals and various materials. Notably, risks to this baseline scenario of a muted recovery are to the downside because of the lack of funding. Barring a substantial increase in the special bond issuance quota this year or a major credit binge, infrastructure FAI growth could in fact stall. Ellen JingYuan He, Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1  Please note that the central government only set the special bond balance limit (not the quota) for local governments. The often-cited “quota” in the news is derived by calculating the difference between the current limit and the previous year’s limit. The “quota” used in this report is the difference between the current special bond balance limit and the actual special bond balance of the previous year end. 2  At the end of 2018, Chinese special bond balance was RMB 7.4 trillion, only 85.8% of the special bond balance limit of RMB 8.6 trillion. This ratio was 84.6% in 2017 and 85.5% in 2016. On average, the ratio was 85.3% in the past three years. 3  Given that the central government is aiming to somewhat stimulate infrastructure spending by increasing special bond issuance, we assume special bond balance at the end of 2019 to reach 88%-90% of the limit (RMB 10.8 trillion) that it has set for 2019. This will be higher than the 85% average of the past three years. In turn, this means that the special bond balance at the end of this year will likely be RMB 9.5-9.7 trillion. Since the balance at the end of last year was RMB 7.4 trillion, this results that net special bond issuance will be around RMB 2.1-2.3 trillion in 2019. Given the net special bond issuance last year was RMB 1.7 trillion, it follows that there will only be a RMB 400-600 billion increase in total special bond issuance in 2019 versus 2018. 4  Please see www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017-02/28/content_5171576.htm, published February 28, 2017, by the Chinese central government website. 5  Please see Emerging Markets Strategy/China Investment Strategy Special Report “Industrialization-Driven Urbanization In China Is Losing Steam,” dated January 2, 2019, available on ems.bcaresearch.com

Highlights Portfolio Strategy Macro headwinds, deficient demand along with rising chemicals stockpiles that have dealt a blow to industry pricing power warn that chemicals stocks are on the verge of a breakdown. Downgrade to a below benchmark allocation. At the margin deteriorating domestic conditions, along with a sustained softness in global growth indicators that are prone to an additional setback given the rising trade policy uncertainty suggest that it is prudent to move to the sidelines on the long materials/short utilities pair trade. Recent Changes Downgrade the S&P chemicals index to underweight, today. This also pushes the S&P materials sector’s weight back down to neutral. Close the long S&P materials/short S&P utilities pair trade, today. Table 1 Feature The SPX suffered its first 5% pullback for the year early last week, and now that President Trump has opened Pandora’s Box, there are high odds that equities will continue to seesaw, at least, until the late-June G20 meeting when the heads of states meet again. Since early-March we have been, and remain, cautious on the short-term equity market outlook as a slew of our tactical indicators have soured. Chart 1 shows three additional non-confirming equity market breakout indicators that are exerting downward pull on the SPX. Stock correlations have increased (shown inverted, top panel, Chart 1), junk spreads have widened (shown inverted, middle panel, Chart 1) and the NYSE’s FANG+ Index has run out of steam (bottom panel, Chart 1). Now the risk is, as we first highlighted in the middle of last week, that the back half of the year global growth reacceleration phase goes on hiatus as this trade policy uncertainty further shatters CEO confidence and global exports remain downbeat (Chart 2). Chart 1Non-Confirming Indicators   Chart 2Stalled Export Engine Worrisomely, a number of our cyclical indicators are also firing warning shots. Not only did the ISM’s manufacturing new orders-to-inventories ratio breach parity, but also BCA’s boom/bust indicator took a turn for the worse (Chart 3). Importantly, while a lot of ink is spent on how the U.S. economy is beyond full employment, labor markets are tight and the output gap has closed, resource utilization has petered out – interestingly at a lower high compared with the previous two peaks. This backdrop points to more stock market turmoil in the coming months, similar to the mid-2015 message (Chart 4). Chart 3Cyclical Trouble Brewing   Chart 4No Tightness Here Tack on China’s cresting credit impulse and factors are falling into place for a tumultuous back half of the year (bottom panel, Chart 3). Keep in mind that the two ultimate “risk off” indicators we track remain tame and underscore that investor complacency remains elevated: the TED spread is at 16bps and the Japanese yen has barely budged of late. This is worrying and suggests that investors expect a positive U.S./China trade resolution (USD/JPY shown inverted, Chart 5). Chart 5No Real Risk Off Phase Yet Were the equity markets to spin out of control however, the “Fed put” remains in place and would save the day. While the Fed has taken down the median dots and projects no hikes for the rest of the year and a single hike next year, the message from the bond market is diametrically opposite. Thus, we are de-risking our portfolio and this week we are downgrading a deep cyclical sector to neutral and also closing an explicit cyclical/defensive pair trade. Chart 6 shows that over 40bps of cuts are priced in by May 2020, according to the OIS curve. Historically, this has been an excellent leading indicator of the annual delta in the fed funds rate. Our takeaway is that the Fed remains the only game in town and were another mini-riot point to occur, then the Fed would not hesitate to step in and put a floor under the equity market. Chart 6The Bond Market Has The Stock Market’s Back In sum, the risks are rising for a prolonged consolidation phase in equities on the back of a trade war escalation that pushes out the global growth recovery to early-2020. Thus, we are de-risking our portfolio and this week we are downgrading a deep cyclical sector to neutral and also closing an explicit cyclical/defensive pair trade. Chemical Reaction We have been on the sidelines on the heavyweight S&P chemicals index of late (it comprises 74% of the S&P materials sector), but factors have now fallen into place and warrant a below benchmark allocation. First, global macro headwinds will continue to weigh on this deep cyclical index as the risk of a full blown trade war will likely take a bite out of final demand. Chemical producers garner 60% of their revenues from abroad (a full 20 percentage points higher than the SPX) and thus are extremely sensitive to the ebbs and flows of emerging markets economic growth in general and China in particular. Adding it all up, macro headwinds, deficient demand along with rising chemicals stockpiles that have dealt a blow to industry pricing power warn that chemicals stocks are on the verge of a breakdown. Chart 7 shows that U.S. chemical products exports are contracting and if the greenback sustains its recent upward trajectory given heightened global trade policy uncertainty, further global market share losses are likely at a time when the overall chemicals market will be shrinking. With regard to China specifically, the recent drop in the credit impulse is far from reassuring (bottom panel, Chart 3) and, assuming that the Chinese authorities will await a riot point prior to really opening up the credit spigots, more pain lies ahead for U.S. chemical exports. Second, the picture is not brighter on the domestic front. Importantly, the American Chemical Council’s Chemical Activity Barometer is nil, warning that domestic end-demand is also ailing (Chart 8). Chart 7Hazard Warning Chart 8Toxic Profit Prospects Tack on a surprisingly persistent jump in industry headcount (bottom panel, Chart 9), and the implication is that waning productivity will slash chemicals profits (bottom panel, Chart 8). Finally, a number of other operating metrics are languishing. Chemicals railcar loads are outright contracting and the softening ISM manufacturing survey points to further downside in the coming months (middle panel, Chart 9). The chemicals shipments-to-inventories ratio is also in contraction territory as this downbeat demand has been met with a buildup in inventories both at the wholesale and manufacturing levels. As a result, a liquidation phase has ensued and chemicals selling prices have sunk into the deflation zone (middle & bottom panels, Chart 10). Chart 9Deficient Demand Chart 10Liquidation Phase Adding it all up, macro headwinds, deficient demand along with rising chemicals stockpiles that have dealt a blow to industry pricing power warn that chemicals stocks are on the verge of a breakdown. Bottom Line: Trim the S&P chemicals index to underweight. Given the 74% weight chemicals stock have in the S&P materials sector, this move also pushes the S&P materials sector’s (Chart 11) weight to neutral from overweight, and we crystalize modest losses of 5.2% in this niche deep cyclical sector. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the S&P chemicals index are: BLBG: S5CHEM – DWDP, ECL, SHW, PPG, IFF, CE, ALB, LIN, APD, DOW, LYB, FMC, CF, MOS, EMN. Chart 11Trim Materials Back Down To Neutral Materials/Utilities: Move To The Sidelines While we were early in identifying a reflationary impulse from the Chinese authorities and put on an explicit cyclicals/defensives pair trade to capitalize on this opportunity at the end of January, the long materials/short utilities pair trade has failed to live up to its expectations, and today we recommend moving to the sidelines. Such a move is part of our de-risking of the portfolio given the rising global macro headwinds on the horizon we identified earlier. More specifically on the domestic front, our Economic Impulse Indicator (EII) suggests that beneath the surface some cracks are appearing in the U.S. economy. The EII encapsulates six parts of the U.S. economy and on a second derivative basis, softness is apparent (top panel, Chart 12). The ISM manufacturing survey corroborates this message and is also flirting with the boom/bust 50 line, signaling that it is prudent to take some risk off the table (bottom panel, Chart 12). The bond market is sniffing out this deteriorating domestic backdrop and the recent 25bs drop in the 10-year Treasury yield has breathed life into utilities and sucked the oxygen out of materials. Fixed income proxies are also benefiting from the drubbing in Citi’s Economic Surprise Index to the detriment of growth-sensitive deep cyclicals. The melting stock-to-bond ratio reflects all these domestic forces and warns against preferring materials to utilities stocks (Chart 13). Chart 12Move To The Sidelines Chart 13Mushrooming Domestic… The specter of a re-escalation in the trade war will not only continue to weigh on some domestic indicators, but gauges monitoring the health of the global economy will also suffer a setback. Already, our Global Activity Indicator has lost its spark, underscoring that global export volumes will continue to contract. King Dollar is also flexing its muscles, especially versus vulnerable twin deficit emerging market countries which saps economic growth. Tack on the derivative deflationary effect the appreciating greenback has on the commodity complex and materials stocks are at a great disadvantage versus domestic focused utilities (Chart 14). A number of additional global growth indicators are waning and signal that relative profitability will move in favor of utilities and at the expense of materials in the coming months. BCA’s global synchronicity indicator, which gauges the number of countries with a PMI above versus below 50 is sinking like a stone. In fact, the overall global manufacturing PMI is just barely above the expansion/contraction line and global industrial production is decelerating. All of this is a net negative for the deep cyclical materials sector, but a net positive for defensive utilities stocks that sport nil foreign sales exposure (Chart 15). Chart 14…And Global Growth… Chart 15…Worries But before getting outright bearish on this pair, there is a powerful offset. Likely, most of the bad news is reflected in bombed out relative valuations and oversold technicals. This actually also prevents us from fully reversing the trade and buying utilities at the expense of materials. A move to the sidelines is more appropriate (Chart 16). At the margin deteriorating domestic conditions, along with a sustained softness in global growth indicators that are prone to an additional setback given the rising trade policy uncertainty suggest that it is prudent to move to the sidelines on the long materials/short utilities pair trade. Bottom Line: Book losses of 5.3% in the long S&P materials/short S&P utilities pair trade and move to the sidelines.   Anastasios Avgeriou, U.S. Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com Chart 16Saving Grace   Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps

Key Portfolio Highlights The S&P 500 has started 2019 with a bang as dovish cooing from the Fed has proven a tonic for equities. While we have not entirely retraced the path to the early-autumn highs, our strategy of staying cyclically exposed, based on our view of an absence of a recession in 2019, has proven a profitable one as investor capitulation reached extreme levels (Charts 1 & 2). Chart 1CapitulationChart 2Selling Is Exhausted Importantly, risk premia have been deflating as the end-of-year spike in volatility has subsided and junk spreads have narrowed from the fear-induced heights in December (Chart 3). Chart 3Risk Premia Renormalization Nevertheless, in order for the reflex rebound since the late-December lows to morph into a durable rally, the macro/policy backdrop has to turn from a headwind to a tailwind. We are closely monitoring three potential positive catalysts: A definitively more dovish Fed, which would help restrain the greenback A continuation of the earnings juggernaut A positive U.S./China trade resolution With respect to the first of these, the S&P 500 convulsed following the December 19 Fed meeting and suffered a cathartic 450 point peak-to-trough fall two months ago. The Fed likely made a policy error, and Fed Chair Powell’s resolve is getting tested as has happened with every Chair since Volcker (Charts 4 & 5). Chart 4Powell's Resolve Getting Tested Chart 5Fed Policy Mistake The rising odds of a pause in the Fed tightening cycle, at least for the first half of the year, will likely serve as a welcome respite for equities. Our second catalyst has been gaining steam through the Q4 earnings season which has seen continuation of the double-digit earnings growth of the prior three quarters. Our earnings model points to a moderation of earnings growth in the year to come, in line with sell-side expectations (Chart 6). Our 2019 year-end target remains 3,000 for the SPX, based on $181 2020 EPS and a 16.5x multiple.1 This represents a 6% EPS CAGR, assuming 2018 EPS ends near $162. Chart 6EPS Growth > 0 In Chart 7, we show that financials, health care and industrials are responsible for 61% of the SPX’s expected profit growth in 2019 while technology’s contribution has fallen to a mere 7.2%. While the risk of disappointment encompases financials, health care and industrials, there are high odds that tech surprises to the upside as it has borne the brunt of recent negative earnings revisions (Charts 8 & 9). Chart 8Earnings Revisions... Chart 9...Really Weigh On Tech Lastly, the negativity surrounding the slowdown in China is likely fully reflected in the market (Chart 10), implying an opportunity for a break out should a positive resolution to the U.S./China trade spat be delivered. China’s reflation efforts suggests that the Chinese authorities remain committed to injecting liquidity into their economy (Chart 11). Chart 10China Slowdown Baked In The Cake Chart 11Reflating Away Already, the PBOC balance sheet, with over $5.5tn in assets, is expanding anew. Empirical evidence suggests that SPX momentum and the ebb and flow of the PBOC balance sheet are joined at the hip, and the current message is positive (Chart 12). All of these underlie our style preferences for cyclicals over defensives2 and international large caps over domestically-geared small caps. Chart 12Heed The PBoC Message Chris Bowes, Associate Editor chrisb@bcaresearch.com S&P Financials (Overweight) The divergence between the directions for our CMI and valuation indicator (VI) for S&P financials has reached stunning levels, with the former accelerating into pre-GFC territory and the latter falling to two standard deviations below fair value. Our technical indicator (TI) is sending a relatively neutral message, though this does not diminish the most bullish signal in our cyclical indicator’s history (Chart 13). Chart 13S&P Financials (Overweight) The ongoing strength of the U.S. economy is the driver of such a positive indicator, particularly with respect to the key S&P banks sub index. Our total loans & leases growth model and BCA’s C&I loan growth model (second & bottom panels, Chart 14) are in positive territory. The latter is significant given that C&I loans are the single biggest credit category in bank loan books. Importantly, C&I loans have gone vertical recently topping the 10.5% growth mark despite softening capex intentions and CEO confidence. Further, multi-decade highs in consumer confidence are offsetting the Fed’s tightening cycle and suggest that consumer loans, another key lending category, will also gain traction (third panel, Chart 14). In the context of the generationally high employment rate, the implied lower defaults should drive amplified profit improvement from this credit growth. We reiterate our overweight recommendation. Chart 14Loan Growth Drives Profits S&P Industrials (Overweight) The still-solid domestic footing has maintained our industrials CMI close to its cyclical highs, which are also some of the most bullish in the history of the indicator. However, stock prices have not responded accordingly and our VI has descended mildly from neutral to undervalued. Our TI sends a much more definitive message and stands at a full standard deviation into oversold territory (Chart 15). Chart 1515. S&P Industrials (Overweight) While their cyclical peers S&P financials are almost exclusively a domestic play, S&P industrials have been weighed down by trade flare ups for most of the past year (bottom panel, Chart 16). Accordingly, much of the benefit of positive domestic capex indicators and the more tangible capital goods orders maintaining a supportive trajectory has failed to show up in relative EPS growth (second & third panels, Chart 16), though the latter has recently hooked much higher. Chart 16Industrial Earnings Growth Has Recovered S&P Materials (Overweight) Our materials CMI has made a turn, rising off its lowest level in 20 years. This has coincided with our VI bouncing off its cyclical low, though it remains in undervalued territory. The signal is shared by our TI which has only recently recovered from a full standard deviation into the oversold zone, a level that has historically presaged S&P materials rallies (Chart 17). Chart 17S&P Materials (Overweight) When we upgraded the S&P materials sector to overweight earlier this year, we noted that China macro dominates the direction of U.S. materials stocks. On the monetary front, the Chinese monetary easing cycle continues unabated and the near 150bps year-over-year drop in the 10-year Chinese Treasury yield will soon start to bear fruit (yield change shown inverted and advanced, bottom panel, Chart 18). The renminbi also moves in lockstep with relative share prices. The apparent de-escalation in the U.S./China trade tensions has boosted the CNY/USD and is signaling that a playable reflation trade is in the offing in the S&P materials sector (top panel, Chart 18). Chart 18Chinese Data Drives Materials Performance S&P Energy (Overweight) Our energy CMI has moved horizontally for the past six quarters, though this followed a snap-back recovery from the extremely depressed levels of 2016 and 2017. Meanwhile both our VI and TI have descended steeply into buying territory with the former approaching two standard deviations below fair value (Chart 19). Chart 19S&P Energy (Overweight) As with the CMI, the relative share price ratio for the S&P energy index has moved laterally since our mid-summer 2017 upgrade to overweight. Interestingly, the integrated oil & gas energy subindex neither kept up with the steep oil price advance until the end of September, nor with the recent drubbing in crude oil prices (top panel, Chart 20). Put differently, oil majors never discounted sustainably higher oil prices, and are also refraining from extrapolating recent oil prices weakness far into the future. Chart 2020. The Stage Is Set For A Recovery In Crude Prices Nevertheless, the roughly 30% per annum growth in U.S. crude oil production is unsustainable and, were production to remain near all-time highs and move sideways in 2019, then the growth rate would fall back to the zero line. Such a paring back in the growth rate would likely balance the oil market and pave the way for an oil price recovery (oil production shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 20). This echoes BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy service, which continues to forecast higher oil prices into 2019, a forecast which should set the stage for a sustainable rebound next year in S&P energy profits, the opposite of what analysts currently expect (Chart 7). S&P Consumer Staples (Overweight) An improving macro environment is reflected in our consumer staples CMI that has vaulted higher in recent months. However, the strong recent relative outperformance has also shown up in our VI which, though still in undervalued territory, has recovered significantly. Our TI has fully recovered and now sends a neutral message (Chart 21). Chart 21S&P Consumer Staples (Overweight) The surging S&P household products sector has been carrying the S&P consumer staples index on its back as solid pricing efforts have been dragging results and forward guidance higher. While household product sales have been enjoying a multi-year growth phase (second panel, Chart 22), it has largely been driven by volumes. However, the recent resurgence in pricing power (third panel, Chart 22) has given volume gains an added kick, pushing sales further. Meanwhile, exports have continued their two-year ascent despite the tough currency environment and the upshot is that relative EPS growth will likely remain upbeat (bottom panel, Chart 22). In light of challenged EM consumer spending growth, this signal is very encouraging. Chart 22Household Products Is Carrying Staples S&P Health Care (Neutral) Our health care CMI has been treading water recently. Further, a recovery in pharma stocks has taken our VI from undervalued to a neutral position, while our TI sends a distinctly bearish message as health care stocks have been overbought (Chart 23). Chart 23S&P Health Care (Neutral) Healthcare stocks have outperformed in the back half of 2018. Recently a merger mania that has swept through the pharma and biotech spaces has underpinned relative share prices. The last three months have seen an explosion of deals, including the largest biopharma deal ever (Bristol-Myers Squibb buying Celgene for approximately $90 billion) with other global deals falling not too far behind (Takeda buying Shire for $62 billion mid-last year). Such exuberance has clearly confirmed that merger premia are alive and well in the S&P pharma index. It is not merely rising premia that have taken pharma higher either. Pricing power has entered the early innings of a recovery (top panel, Chart 24) while the key export channel points to increasingly bright days ahead (second panel, Chart 24). However, the rise of regulatory pressure from the Trump administration may cause better pricing to prove fleeting. Chart 24Merger Mania In Pharma Further, pharma’s consolidation phase has come at a cost to sector leverage ratios that have dramatically expanded (bottom panel, Chart 24). Such profligacy may come to haunt the sector should the pricing power recovery falter. S&P Technology (Neutral) Our technology CMI has been moving laterally for the better part of the last three years, though the S&P technology index has ignored the macro headwinds and soared higher over that time. Our VI remains on the overvalued side of neutral, despite the recent tech selloff while our TI has been retrenching into oversold territory (Chart 25). Chart 25S&P Technology (Neutral) Until the end of last year, we maintained a barbell portfolio within the sector by recommending an overweight position in the late-cyclical and capex-driven technology hardware, storage & peripherals and software indexes while recommending an underweight position in the early-cyclical semi and semi equipment indexes. However, we recently upgraded the niche semi equipment to overweight for three reasons. First, trade policy uncertainty has dealt a blow to this tech subindex. Not only are 90% of sales foreign sourced, but a large chunk is also China-related sales. Second, emerging market financial indicators are showing some signs of life, underscoring that semi equipment demand may turn out to be marginally less grim than currently anticipated (second panel, Chart 26). Third, long term semi equipment EPS growth estimates have recently collapsed to a level far below the broad market, indicating that the sell side has thrown in the towel on this niche sector (third panel, Chart 26). Chart 26A Bottom In Semi Equipment Overall, and despite our more bullish view on semi equipment, we continue to recommend a neutral weighting in S&P technology. S&P Utilities (Underweight) Our utilities CMI has recovered recently, bouncing off its 25-year low, driven by the modest easing in interest rates, (Chart 27). This has also manifested in a recovery in the S&P utilities index as this fixed income proxy has reacted to the recent fall in Treasury yields (change in yields shown inverted, top panel, Chart 28) and jump in natural gas prices. Further, utilities are typically seen as a domestic defensive play and the recent trade troubles have made utilities soar in a flight to safety. Chart 27S&P Utilities (Underweight) We think the tailwinds lifting utilities are transitory and likely to shift to headwinds. First, one of our key themes for the back half of the year is rising interest rates; a move higher in yields will have a predictably negative impact on these high-dividend paying equities. Second, a flight to safety looks fleeting; the ISM manufacturing new orders index usually moves inversely in lock step with utilities and the most recent message is negative for the S&P utilities index (ISM manufacturing new orders index shown inverted, second panel, Chart 28). Meanwhile, S&P utilities earnings estimates have continued to trail the broad market, having taken a significant step down this year (third panel, Chart 28). Chart 28Rising Rates In Late-2019 Will Be A Headwind For Utilities Our VI and TI share this bearish message as the VI is deeply overvalued and the TI is in overbought territory (Chart 27). S&P Real Estate (Underweight) Our real estate CMI has recently started to turn up, though this is off the near decade-low set last year and remains deeply depressed relative to history (Chart 29). This is principally the result of the backup in interest rates since late last year and the lift they have given to the sector, which has been a relative outperformer over the past six months (top panel, Chart 30). Much like the S&P utilities sector in the previous section, and in the context of BCA’s higher interest rate view, we continue to avoid this sector. Chart 29S&P Real Estate (Underweight) Along with the modest reprieve in borrowing rates, multi family construction continues unabated (second panel, Chart 30), likely driven by all-time highs in CRE prices (third panel, Chart 30). In the absence of an outright contraction in construction, recent weakening in occupancy (bottom panel, Chart 30) will likely prove deflationary to rents, and thus profit prospects. Chart 30Falling Occupancy Will Hurt REIT Profits Our VI suggests that REITs are modestly overvalued, though the recent outperformance has driven our TI to an overbought condition (Chart 29). S&P Consumer Discretionary (Underweight) Our consumer discretionary CMI has ticked up recently, pushed higher by resiliency in consumer data. However, the S&P consumer discretionary index has clearly responded, pushing against 40-year highs relative to the S&P 500 and taking our VI to two standard deviations above fair value (Chart 31). Much of this should be attributed to Amazon (roughly 30% of the S&P consumer discretionary index) and their exceptional 12% outperformance relative to the broad market over the past year. Chart 31S&P Consumer Discretionary (Underweight) While we have an underweight recommendation on the S&P consumer discretionary index, we have varying intra-segment preferences, highlighted by the recent inception of a pair trade going long homebuilders and short home improvement retailers (HIR). Housing starts and building permits are extremely sensitive to interest rates, depend on first time home buyers and move in lockstep with the homeownership rate. Currently, interest rates are easing, the homeownership rate is coming out of its GFC funk and first time home buyers are slated to make a comeback this spring selling season. This is a boon for homebuilders at the expense of HIR (top & middle panels, Chart 32). Further, the price of lumber is a key determinant of relative profitability: lumber represents an input cost to homebuilders whereas it is an important selling item in Big Box building & supply retailers that make a set margin on it. The recent drubbing in lumber prices should ease margin pressures on homebuilders but eat into HIR profits (momentum in lumber prices shown inverted and advanced in bottom panel, Chart 32). Chart 32Long Homebuilders / Short Home Improvement Retailers S&P Communication Services (Underweight) As the newly-minted communication services has little more than four months of existence, we do not have adequate history to create a cyclical macro indicator. However, we have created Chart 33 with a number of valuation indicators, though we caution that they too are less reliable than the other indicators presented in the preceding pages, owing to a dearth of history. Chart 33S&P Communication Services (Underweight) Rather, we refer readers to our still-fresh initiation of coverage on the sector3 and look forward to being able to deliver something more substantive in the future. Size Indicator (Favor Large Vs. Small Caps) Our size CMI has been hovering near the boom/bust line, as it has for most of the last two years (Chart 34). Despite the neutral CMI reading, we downgraded small caps in the middle of last year,4 and moved to a large cap preference, based on the diverging (and unsustainable) debt levels of small caps vs. their large cap peers (bottom panel, Chart 35). This size bias remains a high conviction call for 2019. Chart 34Favor Large Vs. Small Caps Macro data too has turned against small caps. Recent NFIB surveys have shown that small business optimism has continued to fall through the end of the year, albeit from a very high level (top panel, Chart 35). This has coincided with the continued slide of small cap stocks relative to their large cap peers. Chart 35Small Caps Have A Big Balance Sheet Problem Further, the percentage of small businesses with planned labor compensation increases continues to set new all-time highs and deviates substantially from the national trend (second panel, Chart 35). This divergence becomes more worrying when plotted against those same firms increasing prices (third panel, Chart 35), which has trailed for some time and recently flattened. The inference is that margin pressure is intensifying and likely to continue for the foreseeable future. In the context of the absence of small cap balance sheet discipline during the past five years, ongoing large cap outperformance seems ever more likely. Footnotes 1      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “ Catharsis,” dated January 14, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “ Don't Fight The PBoC,” dated February 4, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Daily Insight, “New Lines Of Communication,” dated October 1, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Daily Insight, “Small Caps Have A Big Balance Sheet Problem,” dated May 10, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.

  A playable market-neutral opportunity has resurfaced to buy materials at the expense of utilities stocks and in yesterday’s Weekly Report, we outline our top seven reasons why investors should put on this pair trade on a tactical (3-6 month) horizon. As noted in our previous Insight Report, negative sentiment has weighted heavily on the cyclicals/defensives share price ratio and the same is true of the S&P materials/S&P utilities ratio. However, there is increasing pressure on the Chinese to either strike a deal with the U.S. and resolve the trade tussle or put together a comprehensive fiscal package alongside the already easing monetary backdrop in order to aid their decelerating economy. Importantly, the V-shaped recovery in the Li Keqiang index is signaling that the opening of the monetary taps and up-to-now piecemeal fiscal easing are starting to pay dividends. The upshot is that materials have the upper hand versus utilities. Bottom Line: We initiated a new long S&P materials/short S&P utilities pair trade yesterday on a tactical (3-6 month) horizon. Please see our Weekly Report for more details.  

Highlights Portfolio Strategy We highlight our top seven reasons of why it pays to initiate a long materials/short utilities pair trade this week. Enticing long-term residential real estate prospects, a vibrant labor market, the recent improvement in house affordability, encouraging industry operating metrics and rock bottom valuations, all signal that a durable advance looms for the S&P homebuilding index. Recent Changes Initiate a long S&P Materials/short S&P Utilities pair trade today on a tactical (3-6 month) horizon.   Table 1 Feature The S&P 500 pierced through the 50-day moving average last week and managed to hold the line above this key technical level. Stocks are still absorbing the December shock, and our sense is that it may take a while before the SPX clears 2,800 where it faced stiff resistance all last year (Chart 1). This is a ripe trading environment. Chart 12,800 Is Stiff Resistance However, in order for a breakout to materialize, we reiterate the three potential positive catalysts we identified last week: A continuation of the earnings juggernaut A positive U.S./China trade resolution A definitively more dovish Fed, which would help restrain the greenback On the earnings front, Charts 2 & 3 update our GICS1 sector EPS growth models with one caveat: due to a lack of data we continue to show telecom services instead of communications services. While most sectors are projected to decelerate following 2018’s fiscal easing-related profit growth boost, the energy sector is the one that clearly stands out. Chart 2Sector EPS Growth... Chart 3...Models Update Last week we highlighted that sell-side analysts are anticipating energy profits to contract in 2019;1 this is in line with our S&P energy EPS growth model that continues to point toward EPS contraction (third panel, Chart 2). Nevertheless, we expect upward surprises in this deep cyclical sector given BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy service bullish oil forecast for the year. With regard to the three profit heavyweight sectors, tech, financials and health care, our EPS growth models are more or less in line with the street’s estimates (please refer to Table 2 in last week’s Weekly Report). Tech profits in particular are kissing off the zero growth line according to our regression model (top panel, Chart 3), and we continue to recommend a barbell positioning approach, overweighting the S&P software (high-conviction) and tech hardware, storage & peripherals indexes at the expense of the S&P semiconductors index. As a reminder we are neutral the broad S&P tech sector. Beyond profit growth, looking at our S&P 500 GICS1 sector Valuation Indicator (VI) and Technical Indicator (TI) provides a more complete sector positioning picture. Chart 4 is a valuation versus technical map of the 11 sectors, using our proprietary VI and TI as inputs. The map plots the VI on the y-axis and the TI on the x-axis. Both indicators depict Z-scores (please look forward to our upcoming Cyclical Indicator Update report that will highlight long-term GICS1 sector time series of our VI and TI). The S&P utilities sector is the most stretched and simultaneously very expensive sector. Real estate is just behind utilities and we continue to dislike both of these niche interest rate-sensitive sectors. The S&P consumer discretionary sector also makes it in this top right quadrant and is the most expensive GICS1 sector; we remain underweight this early cyclical sector. On the flip side, energy, materials and financials populate the bottom left quadrant; as a reminder we are overweight all three sectors. The S&P energy sector is the most undervalued and unloved of all GICS1 sectors. Netting it all out, we continue to prefer deep cyclical to defensive sectors as we still see the most opportunity in this tilt on all three fronts: earnings, valuations and technicals. Importantly, most of the bad/negative China slowdown news is likely reflected in the downtrodden cyclical/defensive ratio and a slingshot recovery is looming (China slowdown story count shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 5). Chart 5China Slowdown Baked In The Cake In that light, this week we are initiating a new cyclical/defensive pair trade that is primed to generate alpha, and also update a niche early cyclical group. Buy Materials/Sell Utilities A playable market-neutral opportunity has resurfaced to buy materials at the expense of utilities stocks. Below we outline our top seven reasons why investors should put on this pair trade on a tactical (3-6 month) horizon. Chart 6The Dollar's Trough While global growth is decelerating, this news is last year’s story, especially now that even the IMF came out and downgraded global output growth. This is contrarily positive as cyclical stocks have more than discounted a softer growth outlook. If anything, the surprise this year would be for global growth to pick up momentum on the back of a positive U.S./China trade dispute resolution. The top panel of Chart 6 shows our Global Trade Activity Indicator (GTAI) that is making an effort to trough. Historically, the GTAI has been an excellent leading indicator of the long materials/short utilities price ratio and the current message is that the latter has bottomed. As the Fed is backing off aggressively raising interest rates this year and this has dealt a modest blow to the U.S. dollar. As a reminder, a depreciating greenback is conducive to rising global growth and vice versa. Were the U.S. dollar to complete its reverse head and shoulders technical formation courtesy of a more dovish Fed, this will prove a boon for relative share prices (middle panel, Chart 6). Related to the softening currency is a pickup in commodity price inflation. In fact, already metal prices are outpacing natural gas prices. The latter is the marginal price setter for utilities. This relative pricing power gauge is signaling that the worst is behind this pair trade ratio and a relative profit-led advance is in the offing (bottom panel, Chart 6). While the China slowdown narrative is well telegraphed to the markets (Chart 5), there is increasing pressure on the Chinese to either strike a deal with the U.S. and resolve the trade tussle or put together a comprehensive fiscal package alongside the already easing monetary backdrop in order to aid their decelerating economy. Importantly, the V-shaped recovery in the Li Keqiang index is signaling that the opening of the monetary taps and up-to-now piecemeal fiscal easing are starting to pay dividends. The upshot is that materials have the upper hand versus utilities (Li Keqiang index shown advanced, Chart 7). Chart 7...Chinese Reflation... Domestic conditions are also fertile ground for the relative share price ratio. While the ISM manufacturing survey took a beating last month, the latest release of the Philly Fed manufacturing business outlook ticked higher (both current activity and six-month forecast), reversing last month’s downbeat sentiment reading (Chart 8). BCA’s view remains that there will be no recession in 2019, which underpins materials at the expense of utilities. Chart 8...No U.S. Recession... High-frequency financial market indicators also suggest that the path of least resistance is higher for this cyclicals vs. defensives share price ratio. Inflation expectations have rebounded following an over 50bps collapse late last year, and financial conditions have also started to ease, partially reversing December’s spike (Chart 9). At the margin, materials are an inflation beneficiary/hedge and also investors shed defensive utilities stocks when financial conditions start to ease (junk bond spread shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 9). Finally, our EPS growth models do an excellent job in capturing all these relative macro drivers and underscore that a reversal in bombed out technicals and depressed valuations looms (Chart 10).​​​​​​ Chart 9...Financial Market Indicators... Chart 10...And Compelling Valuations & Technicals Say Buy Materials/Sell Utilities In sum, a softer U.S. dollar, positive global/China growth surprises, commodity price inflation, an easing in financial conditions and no 2019 U.S. recession, all suggest that a relative earnings led advance will unlock excellent relative value and push the materials/utilities ratio higher in the coming months. Bottom Line: Initiate a new long S&P materials/short S&P utilities pair trade today on a tactical (3-6 month) horizon. Will Homebuilders Go Through The Roof? While we were admittedly a bit early in buying homebuilders in late-September, relative share prices have come full circle and are in the black since inception.2 We maintain our overweight stance in this niche consumer discretionary sub index and reiterate our long S&P homebuilding/short S&P home improvement retail pair trade that we initiated last week.3 Domestic long-term housing prospects remain compelling, especially given that the GFC wrung out all the residential real estate excesses. Currently, household formation is still running higher than housing starts and building permits (top panel, Chart 11). Similarly the homeownership ratio remains low by historical standards (it has yet to return to the long-term mean, not shown) and suggests that there is pent up housing demand. Chart 11Robust Long-term Housing Fundamentals Further, housing valuations are not pricey as both the price-to-rent and price-to-income ratios are a far cry from the 2005/06 peak (bottom panel, Chart 11). BCA’s view remains that wages will continue to rise this year and the economy will avoid recession. Historically, a vibrant labor market and residential construction are joined at the hip (unemployment rate and unemployment insurance claims shown inverted, Chart 12). Chart 12Labor Market And Residential Construction Move In Lockstep Tack on the recent fall in the 30-year fixed mortgage rate courtesy of a marginally more dovish Fed, and first-time home buyers will return this spring selling season (second panel, Chart 11). Already there is tentative evidence that potential home-owners have rushed to take advantage of the near 50bps drop in interest rates since the early November peak. The Mortgage Bankers Association's (MBA) mortgage applications purchase survey hit a multi-year high this month and signals that the there is a long runway ahead for the S&P homebuilding share price ratio (bottom panel, Chart 13). Chart 13Buyers Are Coming Back On the homebuilding operating front there are also some encouraging signs. Lumber prices, are down $300/tbf since mid-summer. This wholesale lumber liquidation phase provides profit margin relief to homebuilders given that framing lumber is a key input cost to housing construction (second panel, Chart 14). Chart 14Firming Operating Metrics Importantly, bankers are still willing extenders of residential real estate credit according to the latest Fed Senior Loan Officer survey. Indeed, mortgage credit is expanding at a healthy clip and there are high odds that this recent pick up in mortgage loan origination will remain upbeat owing to the decrease in the price of credit (third & bottom panels, Chart 14). Finally, sell-side analysts’ exuberance on homebuilding profits has returned to earth and now industry long-term profit growth is trailing the overall market. This significantly lowered profit hurdle coupled with depressed relative valuations suggest that investors seeking early cyclical equity exposure can still park capital in homebuilding stocks (Chart 15). Chart 15Homebuilders Are Still Cheap Adding it all up, enticing long-term residential real estate prospects, a vibrant labor market, the recent improvement in house affordability, encouraging industry operating metrics and rock bottom valuations, all signal that a durable advance looms for the S&P homebuilding index. Bottom Line: Maintain the overweight stance in the S&P homebuilding index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HOME – PHM, LEN, DHI. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Dissecting 2019 Earnings” dated January 22, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Indurated” dated September 24, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Dissecting 2019 Earnings” dated January 22, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.     Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps