Asset Allocation

Special Report

BCA Research is proud to announce a new feature to help clients get the most out of our research: an Executive Summary cover page on each of the BCA Research Reports. We created these summaries to help you quickly capture the main points of each report through an at-a-glance read of key insights, chart of the day, investment recommendations and a bottom line. For a deeper analysis, you may refer to the full BCA Research Report. Executive Summary Asian Inflation Has Diverged From US Inflation has been largely subdued in emerging Asia and will remain so for now. This argues for the outperformance of emerging Asian local bonds versus their EM peers, as well as DM/US bonds.   The most important macro driver of Asian domestic bond yields is inflation. Rising inflation usually also hurts local currencies – creating a toxic cocktail for bonds’ total returns in US dollar terms. Diverging currency dynamics in emerging Asia is what will determine the relative performances of individual bond markets. Chinese, Indian, and Malaysian currencies have a better outlook than currencies in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. Book profits on the short Korean won position: this trade has generated a 5.2% gain since its initiation on March 25, 2021. Recommendation   Initiation Date Return to Date Short KRW / Long USD 2021-03-25 5.2% Bottom Line: Regional fixed income managers should overweight China, Korea, India and Malaysia, and underweight Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines within an emerging Asian bond portfolio. In an overall EM domestic bond portfolio however, Thailand and the Philippines should be accorded a neutral allocation, given their better inflation outlook compared to their peers in EMEA and Latin America. Feature US Treasury yields will likely go up further. If history is any guide, EM Asian bond yields should also rise in tandem (Chart 1). The basis is that business cycles in Asia and the US usually move together. Yet, in this cycle, inflation in emerging Asia has diverged considerably from that of the US. US core consumer price inflation has surged while in Asia, core inflation remains largely contained (Chart 2). How should bond investors position themselves in Asian domestic bond markets? Chart 1Asian Bond Yields Usually Move In Line With US Treasury Yields... Chart 2...But Diverging Inflation Means Asian Bonds Will Outperform US Bonds Chart 3Relative Domestic Bond Performances In Asian Markets In this report, we will discuss some of the common factors that drive Emerging Asian bond markets. We will also highlight each individual market’s idiosyncrasies to explain our recommended allocation across local currency bond markets in emerging Asia for the coming year.     Our recommended allocation is as follows: China, Korea, India and Malaysia merit an overweight stance in an emerging Asia domestic bond portfolio, while Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines warrant an underweight allocation (Chart 3). That said, given a much more benign inflation outlook in Asia than elsewhere in EM, we recommend that Thailand and the Philippines be accorded a neutral allocation in an overall EM domestic bond portfolio. The Two Drivers For international investors in local bonds, total returns are predicated on two main drivers: (1) the direction and magnitude of change in bond yields; and (2) currency performance. In all Asian countries, the most potent macro factor that drives local bond yields is the country’s inflation. Rising inflation is usually a harbinger of higher bond yields (and hence, worsening bond performance); and falling inflation is an indicator of lower yields (Charts 4 and 5). Chart 4Inflation Is The Most Important Macro Driver … Chart 5… Of Bond Yields In Emerging Asia What’s more, rising inflation in a country is also often associated with a depreciating currency. Currencies in countries with higher/rising inflation in general do worse than in countries with lower/falling inflation. This aspect is especially important when doing a cross-country comparison. The fact that higher inflation negatively impacts both the drivers of bond performance – it pushes up yields and weakens the currency – can indeed be seen happening in Asian financial markets. Rising inflation leads to poor performance of domestic bonds’ total return in dollar terms; and falling inflation leads to a better performance. The upshot is that the potential inflation trajectory is key to any country’s domestic bond performance in both absolute and relative terms. Inflation In Asia Is Benign Most of the Asian countries have their core and trimmed mean consumer price inflation running at or well below their central banks’ targets (Charts 6 and 7). Their inflation outlook also remains largely benign.1 As such, bond yields in these countries are unlikely to rise materially in the near future. Chart 6Inflation Is Running At Or Below … Chart 7… Central Banks’ Target in Asia Notably, even the recent surge in US yields did not spook Asian bond yields. The yield differentials between individual Asian domestic and US yields have remained flattish in the past few months. All this implies that Asian domestic bonds, in general, would likely fare better relative to the rest of the EM and the US – where inflation is high and well above their central banks’ targets. Currency Is A Key Differentiator Given inflation, and therefore the bond yield trajectories among Asian economies are unlikely to deviate significantly from one another, the key differentiator of their bond market performance (on a total return basis) will be their exchange rates. In fact, Asian currencies do vary considerably in their outlooks as their fundamentals differ.  For instance, in China and Korea, higher bond yields are usually associated with an appreciating currency (Chart 8, top and middle panels). The key driver of bond yields in these economies is the business cycle. Accelerating growth often pushes up both the currency as well as interest rates. The opposite is also true: decelerating growth usually leads to a weaker currency and falling bond yields.  The consequence is that in these countries, bond performance is tempered by two opposing forces. For example, the effect of falling yields (which is a positive for total return) is often mitigated by the effect of a falling currency (which is a negative for total return), or the other way around. In contrast to China and Korea, ASEAN countries usually experience rising bond yields accompanied by a depreciating currency (Chart 9). A crucial reason for this is significantly higher foreign ownership of their domestic bonds. In periods of stress, when foreigners exit their bond holdings, this leads to both higher yields and a falling currency. During risk-on periods, foreigners’ purchases do the opposite. Chart 8Higher Bond Yields Coincide With A Stronger Currency In China And Korea Chart 9Higher Bond Yields Coincide With A Weaker Currency In ASEAN In this context, foreign ownership of domestic bonds in ASEAN countries has fallen in the past few years, but remains non-trivial: 19% in Indonesia, 24.2% in Malaysia, 19.9% in the Philippines, and 11.3% in Thailand. Hence, the currency view on ASEAN countries is crucial to get the outlook right for their domestic bond performance. Incidentally, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia have a weak currency outlook, while Malaysia’s is neutral. We discuss the individual currency outlooks in more detail in the respective country sections below. But in summary, this warrants a more positive stance on Malaysian domestic bonds compared to Indonesian, Thai and Filipino bonds. Finally, in case of India, bond yields and the rupee have little correlation (Chart 8, bottom panel). The main reasons for that are near absence of foreign investors in Indian government bond markets, and large captive domestic bond investors (its commercial banks). Yet, unlike China and Korea, India also has higher inflation and a persistent current account deficit. All these make the correlation of bond yields with the exchange rate different in India from both ASEAN as well as China and Korea. In the sections below, we discuss each country’s currency and overall bond outlook in more detail. We also explain the reasons behind our relative bond strategy. China: Overweight Chart 10Chinese Bond Yields Will Likely Fall More China’s economy will remain weak in the coming months. The hit to the economy from slowing property construction is material. Besides, COVID-induced rotational lockdowns are hurting consumption, income and investment in the service sector. The latest round of stimulus has so far not been sufficient to produce an immediate recovery. We expect growth to revive only in H2 2022. For now, the PBOC will reduce its policy rate further. This and the fact that the yield curve is positively slopped heralds more downside in Chinese government bond yields (Chart 10). Concerning the exchange rate, the ongoing US dollar rally could eventually cause a short period of yuan weakness. However, the latter will be small and short lived. In brief, Chinese domestic bonds will outperform both their Asian and EM peers in the coming months. Korea: Overweight The following factors argue for overweighting Korean bonds within both emerging Asian and EM domestic bond portfolios: Chart 11Korea Has No Genuine Inflation The Korean won has already depreciated quite a bit against the US dollar. While further downside is possible in the very near term, the medium-term outlook is positive. Even though headline and core inflation have exceeded the central bank’s target of 2%, trimmed mean consumer price inflation has not yet exceeded 2% (Chart 4, middle panel) and services CPI, excluding housing, seems to have rolled over. Importantly, no wage inflation spiral is evident. Unit labor costs have been falling in both the manufacturing and service sectors (Chart 11). Hence, there is little pressure for companies to hike prices. India: Overweight Indian bonds should continue to outperform other EM domestic bonds (Chart 3, middle panel). The combination of prudent fiscal policy, a benign inflation outlook and a cheap currency makes Indian bonds attractive to foreign investors. Even though yields will go up somewhat given a recovering economy, the rise will be capped as the inflation outlook remains benign. The reason for a soft inflation outlook is wages and expectations thereof are quite low (Chart 12). Global commodity prices will also likely soften in the months ahead. That will ease price pressures in India. The Indian rupee is cheap – it is now trading 12% below its fair value versus the US dollar (Chart 13). The rupee will likely be one of the best performers among EM currencies in the year ahead. Chart 12Low Urban And Rural Wages Will Keep A Lid on Indian Inflation Chart 13Indian Rupee Is Cheap   The spread of India’s 10-year bonds over that of GBI-EM Broad index is 190 basis points. The currency performance will likely offset any possible capital loss owing to rising yields, while a positive carry will boost total returns. Stay overweight. Indonesia: Underweight Indonesian relative bond yields versus both EM and the US have already fallen massively and at multi-year lows (Chart 14). The currently low yield differential between Indonesia and the aggregate EM local bonds as well as US Treasury yields is a negative for Indonesia’s relative performance going forward. Chart 15 shows that the rupiah is also vulnerable over the next several months as the Chinese credit and fiscal impulse has fallen to its previous lows while the rupiah has not yet depreciated. We believe raw material prices will correct in the coming months, weighing on the rupiah. Hence, the country’s local bonds’ relative performance is facing a currency headwind too. Chart 14Indonesian Relative Bond Yields Are Quite Low Chart 15Indonesian Rupiah Is Vulnerable   Notably, a weaker currency by itself could cause bond yields to rise – because that may prompt foreign bond holders to exit this market. For now, investors would do well to underweight this domestic bond market in an emerging Asian or global EM portfolio. Malaysia: Overweight Chart 16Malaysian Yield Curve Is Too Steep Given The Deflationary Macro Backdrop Malaysian domestic bonds will likely fare well as the nation’s economy is still working through credit excesses of the previous decade. Domestic demand weakness has been exacerbated by a constrained fiscal policy. All of this has paved the way for a strong disinflationary backdrop.   The job market has not recovered either: the unemployment rate is hovering at a high level. That in turn has put downward pressures on wages. Average manufacturing wages are weak. Dwindling wages have contributed to depressed household incomes, leading to weak consumption and falling house prices (Chart 16). Considering the economic backdrop, Malaysia’s yield curve is far too steep (Chart 16, bottom panel). Odds are that the curve will flatten going forward – yields at the long end of the curve are likely heading lower. At a minimum, they will rise less than most other EM countries. Notably, the ringgit is quite cheap, and is unlikely to depreciate much versus the US dollar. Hence, it will outperform many other Asian/EM currencies. That calls for an overweight position in Malaysian local bonds within an Asian/EM universe.  Thailand: Underweight To Neutral Given the high correlation between Thai bond yields and the baht (rising yields coincide with a weakening currency), the total return of Thai bonds in USD terms is highly dependent on the baht’s performance. (Chart 17). The baht outlook remains weak, as the two main drivers of the currency, exports and tourism revenues, remain sluggish and absent, respectively. As such, absolute return investors in Thai domestic bonds should continue to avoid this market. Asset allocators should underweight Thai domestic bonds in an emerging Asia basket. In an overall EM domestic bond portfolio, however, Thai bonds warrant a neutral allocation. That’s because Thailand has been a defensive bond market due to its traditionally strong current account, very low inflation, and lower holding of bonds by foreigners (now at 11.3% of total). In periods of stress, the baht usually falls less than most other EM currencies; and often Thai bond yields fall more (or rise less) than overall GBI-EM yields (Chart 18, top panel). Chart 18Thai Bonds' Relative Performance Can Get Better During Periods Of Risk-Off Chart 17Thai Domestic Bonds' Absolute Performance Is Highly Contingent On The Baht   The net result is that Thai bonds outperform their overall EM brethren in common currency terms during risk-off periods. This is what happened during the EM slowdown of 2014-15, and again during the pandemic scare in early 2020 (Chart 18, bottom panel). Given we are entering a period of volatility in risk assets, it makes sense to have a neutral positioning on Thai bonds in an EM domestic bond portfolio. The Philippines: Underweight To Neutral The Philippines also merits an underweight allocation in an emerging Asian domestic bond portfolio, but a neutral stance within EM. This is because of this market’s dependence on the appetite of foreign debt investors for Philippine debt securities. This appetite depends on how much extra yield the country offers over US Treasuries. Chart 19 shows that whenever the yield differential between the Philippines’ local bonds and US Treasuries widens to 400 basis points or more, the Philippines typically witnesses net debt portfolio inflows over the following year. On the other end, when the yield differential narrows to around 300 basis points or less, foreign fixed income inflows typically stop, and often turn into outflows during the following year. This is what is happening now. Chart 19Narrow Yield Differential With US Treasuries Is Hurting Philippines' Portfolio Inflows Chart 20Philippines Peso Is At Risk As The Current Account Has Slid Back Into Deficit Going forward, rising US yields would mean that the Philippines’ bond spreads over US Treasuries will continue to stay less than 300 basis points. Consequently, reduced foreign debt inflows will weigh on the peso. Notably, the Philippines’ current account balance has also slid back to deficit, which makes the peso more vulnerable (Chart 20). On a positive note, contained inflation means little upward pressure on bond yields. Further, there might be a lower need of new bond issuances this year as a substantial amount of proceeds from past bond issuances are lying unspent with the central bank. This would help put a cap on bond yields.  Investment Conclusions Emerging Asian local bonds will outperform their counterparts in Latin America and EMEA in common currency terms for now. In the medium and long run, emerging Asian bonds will outperform US/DM bonds on a total return basis in common currency terms. We will discuss rationale for the latter in our future reports. Considering both the overarching macro backdrop as well as their individual situations, it makes sense to overweight China, Korea, India and Malaysia in an emerging Asian domestic bonds portfolio. Whereas Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines warrant an underweight allocation. Yet, in an overall EM domestic bond portfolio, we recommend a neutral allocation for Thailand and the Philippines. The reason is they have a much better inflation outlook compared to economies in EMEA and Latin America. Chart 21Book Profit On Our Recommended Short Korean Won Trade Notably, among the Asian currencies, we have a positive bias on the Chinese yuan and the Indian rupee. On the contrary, we have been shorting the Korean won, the Thai baht, the Philippine peso and the Indonesian rupiah vis-à-vis the US dollar. That said, this week we recommend taking profits on the short Korean won position: this trade has generated a 5.2% gain since its initiation on March 25, 2021 (Chart 21). Our view on the won has played out well. While the exchange rate might continue depreciating in the near run, the risk/reward of staying short is not very attractive now. Finally, we recommend continuing to receive 10-year swap rates in China and Malaysia. Rajeeb Pramanik Senior EM Strategist rajeeb.pramanik@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     For a detailed discussion on each country’s inflation dynamics, please click on our reports on China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines.

  Dear Client, The subject of cryptocurrencies elicits more emotion that any topic I can think of. As is true for the broader investment community, there is no unanimity of opinion among BCA strategists on the matter. This week, our Global Asset Allocation team is publishing a report taking a favorable view on NFTs. My report is far less sanguine on NFTs and the broader crypto landscape. I hope you enjoy the spirited debate. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights The price of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies has become increasingly correlated with the direction of equities. Stocks should recover over the coming months as bond markets stabilize and corporate earnings continue to expand thanks to a resurgent global economy. This could give cryptos a temporary lift. The long-term outlook for cryptocurrencies remains daunting, however. In most cases, anything that cryptocurrencies can do, the existing financial system can do better. Many of the most hyped blockchain applications, from DeFi to NFTs, will turn out to be duds. Concerns that cryptocurrencies are harming the environment, contributing to crime, and enriching a small group of early investors at the expense of everyone else will lead to increased regulatory scrutiny. Our long-term target for Bitcoin is $5,000. Investors looking to hedge their risks should consider going long Cardano, Solana, and Polkadot (three up-and-coming “proof of stake” coins) versus Bitcoin, Litecoin, and Doge (three doomed “proof of work” coins). The Cost Of Crypto Who pays for cryptocurrencies? That may seem like a simple question with a simple answer: The people who buy them! Yet, as economists have long known, purchases can produce externalities – costs or benefits that are borne by someone other than the person making the purchase. Some purchases can produce positive externalities, such as when you buy nice flowers to plant in front of your house. Other purchases produce negative externalities, such as when you buy a product that harms the environment. The negative externalities arising from Bitcoin mining are well known. A single Bitcoin transaction consumes 14 times as much energy as 100,000 Visa transactions (Chart 1). Bitcoin’s annual electricity consumption exceeds that of Pakistan and its 217 million inhabitants (Chart 2). The growth in crypto mining is one reason why electricity prices are so high in many countries.    Crime is another negative externality that cryptocurrencies facilitate. Bitcoin first entered the popular lexicon in 2013 when its price briefly eclipsed $1,000 due to rising demand for the currency as a medium of exchange on Silk Road and other parts of the so-called dark web. Fast forward to today and crime continues to be a major problem for the crypto industry. According to Chainalysis, illicit addresses received $14 billion in 2021, almost double 2020 levels (Chart 3). Scamming revenue grew 82% while cryptocurrency theft rose 516%.   Don’t Feed The Whales There is another cost arising from cryptocurrencies that is rarely mentioned – a cost borne by people who have never bought cryptocurrencies and probably assume they are immune from the vagaries of crypto markets: The holders of regular fiat money. Early investors in today’s most popular cryptocurrencies are sitting on huge profits. A recent study found that 1% of Bitcoin holders control 27% of supply. Ownership is even more concentrated for most other cryptocurrencies (Chart 4). If these whales were to sell their coins, they could purchase billions of dollars of goods and services. But since there is no indication yet that the proliferation of cryptocurrencies has expanded the aggregate supply of goods and services, their purchasing power must come at someone else’s expense.1  Still Waiting Cryptocurrency proponents would counter that blockchain technologies will usher in a golden age of innovation. Based on this perspective, Bitcoin is a lot like Amazon, a company that created immense wealth for Jeff Bezos and other early shareholders, but has reshaped the global economy in a way that arguably left most people, including those who never bought Amazon stock, better off. The problem with this argument is that Bitcoin is nothing like Amazon. Chainalysis estimates that online merchants processed less than $3 billion in cryptocurrency transactions in 2020, a number that has barely grown over time (Chart 5). While updated numbers for 2021 will be released in February, our analysis of data from Coinmap suggests that the number of merchants accepting cryptocurrency increased less last year than in either 2017 or 2018 (Chart 6). This is consistent with anecdotal evidence which suggests that the vast majority of cryptocurrency transactions continue to be motivated by investment flows rather than e-commerce. A Feature Not A Bug “Just wait and see,” crypto evangelists say. “Sure, Bitcoin has been around since 2008, but new applications are just around the corner.” There are good reasons to be skeptical of such pronouncements. The Bitcoin network can barely process five transactions per second, compared to over 20,000 for the Visa network (Chart 7). The fee for a Bitcoin transaction can fluctuate significantly, and is typically much greater than for a debit card (Chart 8). Chart 7We Apologize For The Wait Chart 8It Costs A Lot To Fill Up The Crypto Tank Bitcoin’s sluggishness is inherent to how it was designed. Due to their decentralized nature, blockchains must rely on elaborate procedures to prevent bad actors from taking control. Bitcoin and other popular cryptocurrencies such as Doge use the so-called “proof of work” algorithm. To see how this algorithm works in simple terms, think of spam email. One way of eliminating spam is to require everyone to waste $10 in electricity to send a single email. That is effectively how Bitcoin functions. It is secure, but it is also very clunky. An alternative to “proof of work” is “proof of stake.” Smaller cryptocurrencies such as Cardano and Solana use this algorithm, and Ethereum is in the process of migrating to it. Continuing with the spam analogy, imagine requiring everyone to put $10 down before they send an email. If the email is opened, the $10 is returned. If the email is deleted, the $10 is forfeited. A Solution In Search Of A Problem Proof of stake systems are arguably superior to proof of work systems since the former do not require wasteful energy consumption. But are they superior to the current financial system? That is far from clear. Listening to crypto enthusiasts, one would think that everyone is still using paper money, or perhaps shells or cattle, to make transactions. In fact, the global financial system is already nearly 100% digital. Digital transfer systems such as Zelle in the US and Interac in Canada permit instantaneous transfers at very little cost. Granted, cross-border payments are far from seamless. However, this largely reflects anti-money laundering rules and other regulations that banks must follow rather than some inherent technological limitations with, say, the SWIFT system. The DeFi Delusion Decentralized Finance, or DeFi, has become a hot topic of late. Like most things involving cryptocurrencies, there is more hype than substance. The idea that there will ever be large-scale crypto-denominated lending is wishful thinking. To see why, put yourself in the position of someone contemplating lending 25 bitcoins to a borrower who is interested in buying a house for, say, $1,000,000. On the one hand, if the price of bitcoin drops, you will likely be repaid, but in depreciated coins. On the other hand, if the price of bitcoin rises, you might not be repaid at all since the value of the loan will exceed the value of the house. Any way you cut it, there is no incentive to make the loan. There are other potential DeFi applications, such as those involving smart contracts, that could potentially prove useful. The Ethereum blockchain, where many of these contracts reside, is secured by ether (ETH). The market cap of ETH is currently $370 billion. How much ether is held for investment purposes and how much is held by people looking to make transactions on the Ethereum blockchain? It is impossible to be sure, but it would not surprise us if investment demand accounts for well over 90% of ETH holdings. It would be as if the price of oil rose to $1,000 per barrel, with 90% of that value driven by investment demand. Most people would agree that this would not be a sustainable situation. NFTs: Why So Ugly? Chart 9NFTs Have Taken Off The popularity of non-fungible tokens (NFTs) has soared over the past year. During the past four weeks, more than $250 million of NFTs were traded on average every day, up from almost nothing at the beginning of 2021 (Chart 9). NFTs allow artists to transform their work into verifiable assets that can be listed and sold on the blockchain. Or at least that is the claim. When they were first introduced, the expectation was that the most desirable NFTs would turn out to be unique and beautiful. Instead, as the CryptoPunks collection aptly demonstrates, many turned out to be repetitive and ugly. Why? One plausible answer is that many NFT buyers are not really looking to acquire digital art. Instead, they are looking to buy supercharged proxies for the cryptocurrency in which the NFT is denominated. As evidence, consider that 99% of the discussions in NFT forums are about how much money NFT buyers hope to make rather than about the “art” itself. Shadow Crypto Supply If this interpretation is correct, it undermines one of the main selling points of cryptocurrencies: That they are limited in supply. Just like banks can create money out of thin air whenever they make loans, the blockchain can spawn synthetic assets such as NFTs that increase the effective supply of the underlying cryptocurrency.2 And that is just for a single cryptocurrency. There is nothing that obliges someone to list a smart contract on the Ethereum blockchain as opposed to any other blockchain. Indeed, there is no limit to the number of blockchains, and by extension, the number of cryptocurrencies that can be created. Chart 10 shows that there are currently more than 9,000 cryptocurrencies in circulation, up from 1,000 in 2017 and less than 100 in 2013. At least with gold, they are not adding any new elements to the periodic table. The Paradox Of Low Gas Fees Competition among blockchains will favor those that offer the lowest “gas fees,” that is, those that require only a small amount of cryptocurrency to update their ledgers. As users abandon blockchains with high gas fees, the prices of their cryptocurrencies will fall. The cryptocurrencies of the more efficient blockchains will benefit, but probably not as much as one might assume. Just as the demand for petrol would decline if automobiles became much more fuel efficient but miles driven did not rise much, falling gas fees could reduce demand for cryptocurrencies unless activity on their blockchains increased proportionately more than the decline in prices. Crypto prices may fall dramatically if governments offer blockchain networks as a public good. The rollout of Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) could pave the way for this development. Concluding Thoughts On The Current Market Environment And Long-Term Outlook For Cryptos The price of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies has become increasingly correlated with the direction of equities (Chart 11). As we noted in our first report of the new year, average returns for the S&P 500 in January have been negative since 2000. This year has been especially trying given the rapid ascent in bond yields. Our end-2022 target for the US 10-year Treasury yield is 2.25%. Hence, while we expect yields to rise over the remainder of the year, the process should be a lot more gradual than over the past few weeks. Equities often experience a period of indigestion when yields rise sharply. However, as we stressed last week, stocks typically rebound as long as yields do not end up rising to prohibitive levels. The bull-bear spread in this week’s AAII poll fell back to its pandemic lows, a positive contrarian indicator for stocks (Chart 12). With global growth still firmly above trend, corporate earnings should rise by enough to propel stocks into positive territory for the year. A rebound in stock prices, in turn, could give cryptocurrencies a temporary lift. Chart 11Cryptocurrency Prices Have Become Increasingly Correlated With Stocks Chart 12The Bull-Bear Ratio Is Back To Its Pandemic Lows   Nevertheless, the long-term outlook for cryptocurrencies remains daunting. In most cases, anything that cryptocurrencies can do, the existing financial system can do better. Many of the most hyped blockchain applications, from DeFi to NFTs, will turn out to be duds. Meanwhile, concerns that cryptocurrencies are harming the environment, contributing to crime, and enriching a small group of early investors at the expense of everyone else will lead to increased regulatory scrutiny. Chart 13New Money Versus Old Money The prices of the most popular cryptocurrencies do not reflect this eventuality. Even after falling 32% from its highs, the aggregate market capitalization of cryptocurrencies is still only slightly less than the value of the entire stock of US dollars in circulation (Chart 13). Our long-term target for Bitcoin is $5,000. Investors looking to hedge their risks should consider going long Cardano, Solana, and Polkadot (three up-and-coming “proof of stake” coins) versus Bitcoin, Litecoin, and Doge (three doomed “proof of work” coins).   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1     One way that holders of fiat money could suffer is if the presence of cryptocurrencies reduced the demand for dollars, euros, and other central bank issued currencies. If that were to happen, inflation would rise as people sought to dispose of unwanted fiat currency by buying goods and services. Alternatively, if central banks wanted to constrain inflation, they would have to shrink the money supply by selling income-generating assets. Either way, the public would be worse off. 2     For instance, consider Alice and Bob. Both wish to have a certain amount of exposure to ETH in their investment portfolios. Suppose Bob uses some of his ETH to buy an item from the “Dopey Duck” collection that Alice has just  minted. If Bob regards his NFT as a substitute for the ETH he previously held, he will not want to buy more ETH to replace the ETH he lost. In contrast, Alice will end up with more ETH than she previously owned, and hence, will need to sell some of it. All things equal, this will lead to a lower price for ETH. Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores

Highlights Global equities are poised to deliver mid-to-high single-digit returns this year, with the outlook turning bleaker in 2023 and beyond. Non-US markets are likely to outperform. We examine the four pillars that have historically underpinned stock market performance. Pillar 1: Technically, the outlook for equities is modestly bullish, as investor sentiment is nowhere near as optimistic as it usually gets near market tops. Pillar 2: The outlook for economic growth and corporate earnings is modestly bullish as well. While global growth is slowing, it will remain solidly above trend in 2022. Pillar 3: Monetary and financial conditions are neutral. The Fed and a number of other central banks are set to raise rates and begin unwinding asset purchases this year. However, monetary policy will remain highly accommodative well into 2023. Pillar 4: Valuations are bearish in the US and neutral elsewhere. Investors should avoid tech stocks in 2022, focusing instead on banks and deep cyclicals, which are more attractively priced. The Bedrock For Equities In assessing the outlook for the stock market, our research has focused on four pillars: 1) Sentiment and other technical factors, which are most pertinent for stocks over short-term horizons of about three months; 2) cyclical fluctuations in economic growth and corporate earnings, which tend to dictate the path for stocks over medium-term horizons of about 12 months; 3) monetary and financial conditions, which are also most relevant over medium-term horizons; and finally 4) valuations, which tend to drive stocks over the long run. In this report, we examine all four pillars, concluding that global equities are likely to deliver mid-to-high single-digit returns this year, with the outlook turning bleaker in 2023 and beyond. Pillar 1: Sentiment And Other Technical Factors (Modestly Bullish)   Chart 1US Equities: Breadth Is A Concern Scaling The Wall Of Worry Stocks started the year on a high note, before tumbling on Wednesday following the release of the Fed minutes. Market breadth going into the year was quite poor. Even as the S&P 500 hit a record high on Tuesday, only 57% of NYSE stocks and 38% of NASDAQ stocks were trading above their 200-day moving averages compared to over 90% at the start of 2021 (Chart 1). The US stock market had become increasingly supported by a handful of mega-cap tech stocks, a potentially dangerous situation in an environment where bond yields are rising and stay-at-home restrictions are apt to ease (more on this later). That said, market tops often occur when sentiment reaches euphoric levels. That was not the case going into 2022 and it is certainly not the case after this week's sell-off. The number of bears exceeded the number of bulls in the AAII survey this week and in six of the past seven weeks (Chart 2). The share of financial advisors registering a bullish bias declined by 25 percentage points over the course of 2021 in the Investors Intelligence poll. Option pricing is far from complacent. The VIX stands at 19.6, above its post-GFC median of 16.7.  According to the Minneapolis Fed’s market-based probabilities model, the market was discounting a slightly negative 12-month return for the S&P 500 as of end-2021, with a 3.6 percentage-point larger chance of a 20% decline in the index than a 20% increase (Chart 3). Chart 3Option Pricing Is Not Pointing To Elevated Complacency Chart 2Sentiment Is Not Exceptionally Bullish, Despite The S&P 500 Trading Close To All-Time Highs Equities do best when sentiment is bearish but improving (Chart 4). With bulls in short supply, stocks can continue to climb the proverbial wall of worry.   Whither The January Effect? Historically, stocks have fared better between October and April than between May and September (Chart 5). One caveat is that the January effect, which often saw stocks rally at the start of the year, has disappeared. In fact, the S&P 500 has fallen in January by an average annualized rate of 5.2% since 2000 (Table 1). Other less well-known calendar effects – such as the tendency for stocks to underperform on Mondays but outperform on the first trading day of each month – have persisted, however. Table 1Calendar Effects Bottom Line: January trading may be choppy, but stocks should rise over the next few months as more bears join the bullish camp. Last year’s losers are likely to outperform last year’s winners. Pillar 2: Economic Growth And Corporate Earnings (Modestly Bullish)   Economic Growth And Earnings: Joined At The Hip The business cycle is the most important driver of stocks over medium-term horizons of about 12 months. The reason is evident in Chart 6: Corporate earnings tend to track key business cycle indicators such as the ISM manufacturing index, industrial production, business sales, and global trade. Chart 6The Business Cycle Is The Most Important Driver Of Stocks Over Medium-Term Horizons Chart 7PMIs Signaling Above-Trend Growth Global growth peaked in 2021 but should stay solidly above trend in 2022. Both the service and manufacturing PMIs remain in expansionary territory (Chart 7). The forward-looking new orders component of the ISM exceeded 60 for the second straight month in December. The Bloomberg consensus is for real GDP to rise by 3.9% in the G7 in 2022, well above the OECD’s estimate of trend G7 growth of 1.4% (Chart 8). Global earnings are expected to increase by 7.1%, rising 7.5% in the US and 6.7% abroad (Chart 9). Our sense is that both economic growth and earnings will surprise to the upside in 2022. Chart 9Analysts Expect Single-Digit Earnings Growth Plenty Of Pent-Up Demand For Both Consumer And Capital Goods US households are sitting on $2.3 trillion in excess savings (Chart 10). Around half of these savings will be spent over the next few years, helping to drive demand. Households in the other major advanced economies have also buttressed their balance sheets. Chart 10Plenty Of Pent-Up Demand After two decades of subdued corporate investment, capital goods orders have soared. This bodes well for capex in 2022. Inventories remain at rock-bottom levels, which implies that output will need to exceed spending for the foreseeable future (Chart 11). On the residential housing side, both the US homeowner vacancy rate and the inventory of homes for sale are near multi-decade lows. Building permits are 11% above pre-pandemic levels (Chart 12). Chart 11Business Investment Should Be Strong In 2022 Chart 12Residential Construction Will Remain Well Supported Chart 13China's Credit Impulse Has Bottomed Chinese Growth To Rebound, Europe To Benefit From Lower Natural Gas Prices Chinese credit growth decelerated last year. However, the 6-month credit impulse has bottomed, and the 12-month impulse is sure to follow (Chart 13). Chinese coal prices have collapsed following the government’s decision to instruct 170 mines to expand capacity (Chart 14). China generates 63% of its electricity from coal. Lower energy prices and increased stimulus should support Chinese industrial activity in 2022. Like China, Europe will benefit from lower energy costs. Natural gas prices have fallen by nearly 50% from their peak on December 21st. A shrinking energy bill will support the euro (Chart 15). Chart 14Coal Prices Are Renormalizing In China Chart 15A Shrinking Energy Bill Will Support The Euro Omicron Or Omicold? While the Omicron wave has led to an unprecedented spike in new cases across many countries, the economic fallout will be limited. The new variant is more contagious but significantly less lethal than previous ones. In South Africa, it blew through the population without triggering a major increase in mortality (Chart 16). Preliminary data suggest that exposure to Omicron confers at least partial immunity against Delta. The general tendency is for viral strains to become less lethal over time. After all, a virus that kills its host also kills itself. Given that Omicron is crowding out more dangerous strains such as Delta, any future variant is likely to emanate from Omicron; and odds are this new variant will be even milder than Omicron. Meanwhile, new antiviral drugs are starting to hit the market. Pfizer claims that its new drug, Paxlovid, cuts the risk of hospitalization by almost 90% if taken within five days from the onset of symptoms. Bottom Line: While global growth has peaked and the pandemic remains a risk, growth should stay well above trend in the major economies in 2022, fueling further gains in corporate earnings and equity prices.   Pillar 3: Monetary And Financial Factors (Neutral)   Chart 17The Overall Stance Of Monetary Policy Will Not Return To Pre-Pandemic Levels For At Least Another 12 Months Tighter But Not Tight Monetary and financial factors help govern the direction of equity prices both because they influence economic growth and also because they affect the earnings multiple at which stocks trade. There is little doubt that a number of central banks, including the Federal Reserve, are looking to dial back monetary stimulus. However, there is a big difference between tighter monetary policy and tight policy. Even if the FOMC were to raise rates three times in 2022, as the market is currently discounting, the fed funds rate would still be half of what it was on the eve of the pandemic (Chart 17). Likewise, even if the Fed were to allow maturing assets to run off in the middle of this year, as the minutes of the December FOMC meeting suggest is likely, the size of the Fed’s balance sheet will probably not return to pre-pandemic levels until the second half of this decade.   A Higher Neutral Rate We have argued in the past that the neutral rate of interest in the US is higher than widely believed. This implies that the overall stance of monetary policy remains exceptionally stimulative. Historically, stocks have shrugged off rising bond yields, as long as yields did not increase to prohibitively high levels (Table 2). Table 2As Long As Bond Yields Don’t Rise Into Restrictive Territory, Stocks Will Recover If the neutral rate ends up being higher than the Fed supposes, the danger is that monetary policy will stay too loose for too long. The question is one of timing. The good news is that inflation should recede in the US in 2022, as supply-chain bottlenecks ease and spending shifts back from goods to services. The bad news is that the respite from inflation will not last. As discussed in Section II of our recently-published 2022 Strategy Outlook, inflation will resume its upward trajectory in mid-2023 on the back of a tightening labor market and a budding price-wage spiral. This second inflationary wave could force the Fed to turn much more aggressive, spelling the end of the equity bull market. Bottom Line: While the Fed is gearing up to raise rates and trim the size of its balance sheet, monetary policy in the US and in other major economies will remain highly accommodative in 2022. US policy could turn more restrictive in 2023 as a second wave of inflation forces a more aggressive response from the Fed.   Pillar 4: Valuations (Bearish In The US; Neutral Elsewhere)   US Stocks Are Looking Pricey… While valuations are a poor timing tool in the short run, they are an excellent forecaster of stock prices in the long run. Chart 18 shows that the Shiller PE ratio has reliably predicted the 10-year return on equities. Today, the Shiller PE is consistent with total real returns of close to zero over the next decade. Investors’ allocation to stocks has also predicted the direction of equity prices (Chart 19). According to the Federal Reserve, US households held a record high 41% of their financial assets in equities as of the third quarter of 2021. If history is any guide, this would also correspond to near-zero long-term returns on stocks. Chart 19Valuations Matter For Long-Term Returns (II)   … But There Is More Value Abroad Valuations outside the US are more reasonable. Whereas US stocks trade at a Shiller PE ratio of 37, non-US stocks trade at 20-times their 10-year average earnings. Other valuation measures such as price-to-book, price-to-sales, and dividend yield tell a similar story (Chart 20). Chart 20AUS Stocks Are Trading At A Significant Premium To Their Non-US Peers (I) Chart 20BUS Stocks Are Trading At A Significant Premium To Their Non-US Peers (II) Cyclicals And Banks Overrepresented Abroad Our preferred sector skew for 2022 favors non-US equities. Increased capital spending in developed economies and incremental Chinese stimulus should boost industrial stocks and other deep cyclicals, which are overrepresented outside the US (Table 3). Banks are also heavily weighted in overseas markets; they should also do well in response to faster-than-expected growth and rising bond yields (Chart 21). Table 3Deep Cyclicals And Financials Are Overrepresented Outside The US Chart 21Rising Bond Yields Will Help Bank Shares Bottom Line: Valuations are more appealing outside the US, and with deep cyclicals and banks set to outperform tech over the coming months, overseas markets are the place to be in 2022. Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores

Special Report

Highlights As investors’ hunt for yield continues, REITs emerge as an attractive asset class. Characterized by an attractive risk-adjusted return (comparable to public equities), and high dividend yields, REITs can add value to investors’ portfolios. The macro backdrop is supportive: Moderate levels of inflation and rising rates have historically been positive for REITs’ performance. Valuations, albeit currently looking frothy, are reflective of a recovery that was broad-based and swift. REITs’ risk premium is attractive, currently 540 basis points. Fundamentals remain supportive of a positive outlook on REITs. Even though cap rates (which historically have moved in lockstep with interest rates) could rise given our macro outlook, the cap-rate spread remains close to its historical average. The pandemic has accelerated some existing trends in the real-estate sector and established new ones. Those will create opportunities for investors. For example, the decline of retail and rise of e-commerce, working from home, and migration away from city centers are observable patterns with investable opportunities. Accordingly, the Global Asset Allocation (GAA) service upgraded the Real Estate sector to Overweight in its July 2021 Quarterly Outlook. In the near-term – given current elevated levels of inflation – we prefer REITs with short-term leases (such as self-storage and residential REITs) over those with long-term leases (such as retail and office) since the former can adjust rents more quickly. Structurally, we favor sectors supported by the growth of the digital economy. The post-pandemic environment should be positive for sectors such as data centers and industrial REITs. Feature In today’s environment of accommodative monetary policy, low interest rates, unattractive valuations and poor return prospects for income-generating assets, investors have been forced to dial up their risk appetite. Real estate stands out as a particularly attractive alternative. The Global Asset Allocation (GAA) service turned positive on real estate in July given the favorable macro backdrop in which: Inflation – while likely to come down from current elevated levels – will be higher in future than in recent decades; There is tight supply in some segments of commercial real estate (CRE); Rental growth is accelerating. This Special Report focuses on REITs, which are the simplest way for most investors to get liquid exposure to the real estate market.  The report is structured as follows. We first look at the broad US REITs market (mainly equity REITs) and analyze its historical risk-return characteristics, fundamentals, and valuations. We then assess how REITs fared in previous environments of rising rates and inflation. In the second section, we analyze various sectors of the REITs market, identifying likely losers and winners from our base-case expectations for inflation and growth, and based on our views of how long-term demand for real estate will shift following the pandemic. While we have concerns about potential weaknesses in some segments of commercial real estate (e.g., retail), we highlight opportunities in more technology-driven segments of CRE. Introduction The REITs market in the US as of Q3 2021 has a market value of close to $1.5 trillion. The bulk of this is equity REITs – trusts that own and operate income-producing assets and earn income mostly through rents. The remaining are mortgage REITs which lend money directly to real-estate owners or indirectly by purchasing mortgages or securitized securities such as mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and earn income on those investments. While technically considered equities, the business model of mortgage REITs makes them more like bonds than equities. The composition of the REITs market has changed over the years. While the traditional retail and residential segments dominated the market in the first years of the millennium, structural changes have shifted the balance towards segments such as infrastructure, data centers and industrial (Chart 1). The pandemic accelerated trends that were already in play: For example, the rise of e-commerce, digitalization of services, increased teleworking, and reshoring of manufacturing and supply chains. These have had adverse effects on traditional real estate segments such as retail. Historical Risk And Return, Valuations, Fundamentals & Correlations Since 1973, US all-equity1 REITs have outperformed both public equities and fixed-income assets (both government bonds and investment-grade corporate bonds) on an absolute basis, providing investors with an 11.9% annualized return versus 10.8%, 6.8%, and 7.6% respectively. On a risk-adjusted basis however, REITs’ performance was equal to that of their public equity counterparts, but lower than fixed-income assets because of REITs’ higher volatility. The negative skewness and excess kurtosis also indicate a high probability of large negative returns.  Mortgage REITs (split between Home Financing and Commercial Financing), on the other hand, have returned only 5.2% on an annualized basis, while racking up annualized volatility 3.5 percentage points higher than their all-equity counterparts (Table 1). Table 1Historical Risk-Return Characteristics In order to generate the sort of yields investors expect, mortgage REITs resort to leverage (about 6-8 times) which increases volatility (Chart 2). For example, REITs focusing on residential/home financing buy low credit-risk securities (with almost zero default risk), add leverage, and hedge changes in interest rates via derivatives. Mortgage REITs focusing on commercial financing use less leverage, but take on additional credit and default risk embedded in their underlying assets. Both types of REITs remain highly exposed to the economic cycle and financial conditions. Despite disappointing returns (mainly stemming from narrowing net interest spreads), mortgage REIT investors have been entranced by the high dividend yields. These have averaged 11.3% over the past four decades and are still close to 8% today, much higher than the yields of their all-equity counterparts and other assets (Chart 3). Chart 2Mortgage REITs Are Volatile... Chart 3...And Have High Dividend Yields   Table 2Attractive Dividend Yields Across Sectors Dividend yields for all-equity REITs are also attractive in today’s low-yielding investment environment, even though they are at all-time lows – currently they average 2.9%, 150 basis points higher than for public equities. In fact, all REIT sectors and subsectors (with the exception of the lodging/resorts sector) currently have dividend yields higher than those of public equities (Table 2). Even though REITs are considered equities, analyzing them requires different indicators. Whereas equity investors rely on multiples such as price-to-earnings (P/E) or price-to-book (P/B), for REITs price-to-funds from operations (P/FFO) is a more important valuation tool. FFO is favored over earnings since it adds back depreciation and amortization expenses, and adds to net income any gains (or subtracts any losses) from sales of underlying assets. REITs traded at a steady 17x FFO between the end of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the start of the pandemic. FFO fell by 30% in the first two quarters of 2020 compared to Q4 2019, pushing the P/FFO multiple to 24.7 – an all-time high.  But FFO as of Q3 2021 has inched back above its pre-pandemic level (Chart 4). The risk premium for REITs (calculated as the FFO yield minus the real 10-year treasury yield) – currently at 5.4% – remains higher than the pre-GFC bottom of 3.5%. (Chart 5). Chart 4Valuations Reflect A Swift Recovery Chart 5REITs Risk Premium Is Still Elevated     With the exception of the lodging/resorts sector, REITs’ FFO as of Q3 2021 is higher than one year ago. The occupancy rate for major sectors of the REITs market is starting to rise. Overall net operating income (NOI) for Q3 2021 was 4.5% higher than its pre-pandemic (Q4 2019) level (Chart 6). Chart 6Occupancy Rates Are Rising Again This however is the result of a large year-on-year increase in inorganic or non-same-store net operating income (NOI) – income from assets owned for less than 12 months (either recently acquired or developed) (Chart 7). M&A activity has been increasing, and amounted to almost $47 billion over the past four quarters – driven by activity in the infrastructure, self-storage, and free-standing2 segments (Chart 8). Chart 8...As M&A Activity Rose Chart 9REITs Have Low Leverage...   The real-estate sector has historically been seen as risky due to its high leverage, but leverage has been on the decline. Over the past decade, REITs’ reliance on equity capital has increased, with the equity/assets ratio rising from 32% in 2008 to 43% in 2021. The ratio of debt to book assets stands at around 49%, much lower than the 58% during the GFC (Chart 9). REITs have also extended the average maturity of their debt from 5 years in 2008 to over 7.5 years today. The fall in interest rates over the past two decades has benefited equity REITs: As rates fell, so did the interest they paid on their debt. Liquidity ratios also improved, with REITs’ coverage ratio (earnings relative to interest expense) at 6x, cash levels and undrawn lines of credit relative to interest expense close to 2x and 7x, respectively (Chart 10).  In summary, REITs are an attractive asset class, since leverage is lower, earnings continue to rise, and cap rates – while declining – remain high compared to the risk-free rate. REITs, however, remain highly correlated to public equities: The current 3-year rolling correlation between REITs and public equities is above its historical average of 0.57 (Chart 11). This high correlation undermines the diversification benefit of REITs to investors’ portfolios. Moreover, investors should note that the correlation between REITs and direct real estate (DRE) has averaged only 0.1 over the past four decades. Even when DRE is lagged to account for its appraisal-based methodology, correlation does not rise. Chart 10...And Ample Liquidity Buffers Chart 11REITs Remain Highly Correlated To Equities In a previous Special Report we showed however that, while both direct and indirect real estate exposure can add value to investors’ portfolios on a risk-adjusted basis, direct real estate should be favored given its low correlation to other financial assets (such as equities and bonds) as well as the illiquidity premium that investors with no need for immediate liquidity can harvest. The Macro Outlook Our base case is that interest rates will inch higher over the next 12 months and that inflation will moderate but remain higher than during the past decade. How would such an environment affect the outlook for real estate – and REITs in particular? Interest rates and cap rates tend move in lockstep (with the exception of a divergence from mid-2003 until the GFC). This implies that rising rates could lead to higher cap rates, and thus lower property values (Chart 12, panel 1). The current cap-rate spread (the difference between the cap rate and the 10-year Treasury yield) is close to its long-term average of 365 basis points. This should help mitigate downward pressure on property values and act as a buffer when rates rise (Chart 12, panel 2). As long as rising rates are reflective of strengthening economic growth – and we expect US growth to remain above trend for the next two years at least (Chart 13) – and do not hurt the health of corporate tenants or increase defaults, demand for real estate should rise. Chart 12Interest Rates And Cap Rates Tend To Move In Lockstep Chart 13Above-Trend Growth Should Bolster Demand For Real Estate Historically, rising rates coincided with strong performance from REITs. On average, REITs returned 25.4% during episodes of rising interest rates, even higher than the return from equities of 24.5%. However, that figure is distorted by some outliers:  REITs returned over 100% between 1976 and 1980, and in 2003-2007 (Table 3). The median return of REITS was only 7.1% versus 22.5% for equities. Excluding those two periods lowers REITs’ mean return to 9.4%. Valuation data begins only in 2000, but we can see that REITs were attractively valued in 2003, trading at about 9x P/FFO. By the peak of the market in Q1 2007, they were trading at more than 17x P/FFO. Table 3REITs Fared Well In Previous Periods Of Rising Interest Rates REITs however fared poorly in periods of rising inflation. In a Special Report published in mid-2019, we showed that REITs were a poor hedge against very high inflation and that, much like equities, once the economy overheats and inflation rises sharply (which we define as CPI above 3.3%), REITs produced negative excess returns over cash (Chart 14 and Table 4). For investors able to be more granular in REIT allocations, drilling down to sub-categories of the market might be beneficial, particularly given the low correlation between REIT sectors (Chart 15). Table 4REITs Are Not A Good Inflation Hedge (II) Chart 15Low Correlation Between REIT Sectors The real estate market is diverse. Each sector is driven by different dynamics, reacts differently to the business cycle and changes in consumer behavior, and therefore has different return characteristics. Annual returns by sector have ranged from 4% to 19% since 1994 (Table 5). Moreover, sectors do not react in the same way to rising interest rates or inflation. Properties with short-term leases, such as hotels, storage, and apartments, can reprice and adjust rents as prices rise. On the other hand, those on the other end of the lease spectrum, e.g., retail and healthcare, have less flexibility to do so (Diagram 1). REITs with shorter-term leases (an equally-weighted basket of lodging, self-storage, and residential) outperfomed those with longer-term leases (an equally-weighted basket of healthcare, industrial, retail, and office) during periods of rising interest rates (Chart 16). Table 5REIT Sector Historical Returns Diagram 1Short-Term Leases Outperform...   Chart 16...During Periods Of Rising Interest Rates Bottom Line: The REITs market has recovered after the slump early in the pandemic. Current multiples appear expensive. However, they may just reflect a recovery that has been broad-based and swift. Cap rates historically have moved in lockstep with rising rates. If rates rise, as we expect, cap rates are likely to rise in tandem, putting downward pressure on property prices. The cap rate spread however remains close to its historical average and this should act as a buffer when rates rise. Moderate levels of inflation and rising rates are usually a positive for REITs’ performance. However, just like equities, once inflation rises too high (historically above 3.3%), REITs’ returns fall. We prefer REITs with short-term leases compared to those with long-term leases, as the former can reprice and adjust rental pricing more quickly. The Post-Covid Environment The pandemic has accelerated some existing trends in the real-estate sector and established new ones. Some sectors will struggle in this new environment, while others will flourish. In this section, we describe the likely post-pandemic world and how it will impact various segments of the real-estate market. We also assess where there are opportunities that investors can capitalize on.   Retail The “death of retail” is not a new phenomenon. As technological advances led to the rise of e-commerce, consumer spending shifted from in-store to online. Over the past two decades, non-store retail sales in the US have grown at an annualized 9.5%, compared to 3.1% for in-store sales. E-commerce has risen to almost 14% of total retail sales (Chart 17). This shift is reflected in the halving of the weight of retail REITs in the REITs index over the past decade. The composition of the sector has also changed and is no longer dominated by regional malls and shopping centers but by free-standing properties: These include restaurants, theaters, fitness centers, pharmacies, etc.  (Chart 18). Chart 17The Rise Of E-Commerce... Chart 18...Had An Adverse Impact On The Retail Sector   The headwinds facing the sector – particularly shopping centers –  have not abated. The size of vacant shopping center space has increased to 220 million square feet, approximately 11% of total retail space available: This is close to its post-GFC high. Private multi-retail capex continues to decline and is below its post-GFC low (Chart 19). Retail REITs’ occupancy rate is among the lowest among CRE: 94% as of Q3 2021, although it is higher than during the past two recessions. Funds from operations (FFO) and net operating income (NOI) have been declining over the past few years, with the exception of free-standing properties which saw low but positive growth (Chart 20). Chart 19Plenty Of Vacant Inventory In Shopping Centers... Chart 20...But There Could Be Opportunities In Free-Standing Properties   The pandemic exacerbated some other underlying trends and threats. Smaller in-store retailers have shifted to an online presence, aided by companies like Shopify, which saw the numbers of merchants on its platform grow from 1.07 to 1.75 million in 2020. Consumers are also likely to favor shopping in smaller-scale, local shops as they find convenience in stores close to home. Additionally, given the positive correlation between household density and retail space, as households migrate from city centers to the suburbs there will be less need for retail space within city centers. Bottom Line: We recommend investors underweight the retail sector within their broad real estate exposure. The structural headwinds are not likely to disappear. Within retail, we would favor free-standing properties over shopping centers and regional malls.   Office There has long been a close link between office demand and employment. As the labor market tightens, demand for offices increases and rents tend to rise (Chart 21). Investors in office REITs have earned 9.6% annualized returns, 90 basis points annualized below the overall return of the all-equity REITs index, over the past two decades. The sector is currently flush with supply. Estimates show that almost 18% (close to 800 million square feet) of total office space is vacant, yet capex has continued to increase over the past decade (Chart 22). Chart 21The Pandemic Has Changed Office Demand Dynamics Chart 22...Leaving The Sector With Empty Space   The pandemic, however, might be the catalyst for change. After social restrictions were imposed and offices shut down, the BLS estimates that in May 2020 as many as 35-40% of US employees were telecommuting, strictly because of the pandemic (Chart 23). Since then, as restrictions were lifted and vaccination rates rose, this number has come down to 12%,3 as more employees returned to some sort of pre-pandemic normalcy. The US Household Pulse survey (published by the US Census Bureau), however, shows close to 40% of employees working at home as of the end of September (Chart 24). Chart 25Mobility Data Showing No Full Return To Offices The true number of employees who telework likely lies in between the BLS’s 15% and the Census Bureau’s 40%. A study by Jonathan Dingel and Brent Neiman estimated, based on job characteristics,4 that 37% of jobs in the US can be done entirely from home (46% if weighted by wages). Whether employees will favor a work-from-home versus a return-to-office environment is still unclear. Most surveys show a 50-50 split. High-frequency data such as the Google Mobility Trends show that the number of people going to their workplace has not yet returned to normal (Chart 25). It is likely however that office utilization rates will not return to pre-pandemic levels. This might incentivize firms to search either for offices with flexible leases or co-shared space. Chart 26Are Employers Leaving City Centers With Their Employees? Companies face the choice of downsizing and so reducing business costs, or keeping the same premises which would allow for lower office density and enable social distancing between employees who return to the office. Estimates by CBRE suggest that office demand will not fall by as much as the reduction in the time employees will be in the office. CBRE argues that, while the average US employee is likely to spend 24% less time in an office, demand for office space will fall by only 9%. This calculation factors in more space per employee to allow for social distancing and collaborative working. Additionally, as more employees move away from inner cities, employers could move with them. This trend is reflected in suburban office prices which have risen by 15.1% since the beginning of 2020, compared to those in central business districts (CBD) which have risen by a mere 0.2% (Chart 26). Bottom Line: Investors in office space should be wary of corporates which are unwilling to return to offices operating at full capacity, and instead focus on single-tenant assets with long-term leases.   Healthcare Chart 27Like Equities, Healthcare REITs Are A Defensive Play REITs within this sector are focused on hospitals, senior and nursing homes, and laboratories. Since 1994, healthcare REITs have returned 10.7% annualized, with 21.1% annual volatility. These numbers, however, mask the underlying reality. Healthcare, being a defensive sector, outperformed the broad REITs market only during the dot-com recession and the GFC. In the short-lived pandemic-driven recession in 2020, healthcare REITs underperformed the broad index by 15%. On the other hand, during bull markets, particularly post the GFC, healthcare REITs significantly underperformed the broad market (Chart 27). The sector also has a high dividend yield, which has averaged 6.7% over the past 25 years, 160 basis points higher than the broad index’s historic average (Chart 28). In a Special Report published last year, we explained the structural reasons for our longstanding overweight position on Healthcare equities. We expect demand for healthcare services to continue to rise as life expectancy increases, populations age, and retiring baby boomers spend their accumulated wealth (mainly on healthcare) (Chart 29). Chart 28Healthcare REITs Have High Dividend Yields Chart 29An Aging Population Will Support Demand For Healthcare Elder care facilities will play a major role in supporting the increasingly aging population over the coming years. The pandemic has emphasized the need for high-quality senior housing: In our previous report, we highlighted that lack of funding and mismanagement – particularly in for-profit nursing homes – were reasons why they had almost four times as many Covid infections as those run by the government or non-profits. Chart 30...Increasing Investment In Healthcare Facilities Chart 31Healthcare REITs' Fundamentals Are Recovering The private sectors has already began to step in to meet this demand: Healthcare private construction expenditure has risen over the past few years and is likely to rise further (Chart 30). Cap rates continue to inch lower, but still have a decent spread over 10-year Treasurys (Chart 31, panel 1). Fundamentals have also began to improve: FFO and NOI growth seem to have bottomed, after dipping into negative territory as a result of the pandemic (panels 2 & 3). The sector has been going through a phase of consolidation: There have been significant acquisitions over the past few quarters, particularly of distressed operators (panel 4). Bottom Line: There is a structural long-term case to favor REITs in this sector, particularly an aging population with ample savings to spend on healthcare. Federal support and oversight have helped bolster confidence (for both occupants of care homes and investors) during the pandemic, and are likely to continue.   Lodging/Resorts Chart 32Income Has Been The Only Source Of Return For Lodging REITs Chart 33The Travel Industry Has Not Yet Recovered Lodging REITs have been the worst performing sector over the past 27 years. Since 1994, they have returned only an annualized 4.1%, 640 basis points lower than the all-equity REITs index, with annual volatility 14 percentage points higher. They have steadily underperformed the market since 1997. Property prices within the sector have consistently declined, and income has been the only source of return (Chart 32). Lodging demand is closely linked to travel, which has been deeply impacted by the pandemic. The number of US domestic airline passengers is still only half that of the pre-pandemic period (Chart 33). With vaccines rolled out and most pandemic restrictions likely to be lifted eventually, the travel sector is set to rebound, albeit not equally across segments. Chart 34Personal Travel Likely To Recover Before Business Travel Chart 35The Hotel Industry's Recovery Personal and leisure travel is likely to return first: More people are now comfortable about going on vacation and want to make up for the “lost travel” of the past two years (Chart 34). Hotel occupancy rates, while still below 2019 levels, continue to rise, and revenue per available room (RevPAR) is close to 2019 levels (Chart 35). Business travel, on the other hand, might not recover as fast. The shift to remote working and videoconferencing is likely to push companies to review travel budgets. Business travel, which halved between 2019 and 2020, is forecast to return to its pre-pandemic level only in 2024/2025. This is likely to have a larger adverse impact on higher-end, major-city hotels. Chart 36The Pandemic's Effect On The Lodging Sector The industry has been facing other headwinds for the past few years. The threat from online lodging platforms, such as Airbnb, has put downward pressure on occupancy rates, which have been declining recently after having hovered around the mid-60% level over the past 30 years. Bottom Line: Real spending on hotels and motels remains 26% below trend (Chart 36). A revival in leisure travel, the easing of restrictions, and pent-up demand will support the sector in the short-term. However, domestic business travel and international tourism might be slow to recover. Investors in lodging and resorts should reduce exposure to major-city assets and focus instead on rural or resort-based getaways.   Residential Residential REITs are primarily focused on apartments, rather than single-family homes or manufactured (mobile) homes  – although the share of apartments has been declining over the past few years (Chart 37). Since 1994, residential REITs have outperformed the broad market by an annualized 1.8 percentage points. More recently, since the single-family homes segment was added to the sector (in December 2015), residential REITs have continued to outperform the broad market, driven by a 21.4% annualized return from the manufactured homes segment, 19.4% from single-family homes, and 12.3% from apartments. The sector’s outperformance should not come as a surprise. The housing sector has been undersupplied for decades: The ratio of annual housing starts to the total number of households is 1.2% –  0.7 percentage points below its pre-GFC average (Chart 38). This has pushed up prices, increasing unaffordability, particularly for first-time buyers (Chart 39). This increased the percentage of US housing inventory occupied by renters rather than owners (Chart 40). Chart 37Apartments Make Up The Majority Of Residential REITs Chart 38Housing Undersupply Is No New Issue...   Chart 39...Making Home Prices Unaffordable... Chart 40...Particularly For Young Adults   Chart 41The Pandemic Pushed Renters Outside Of Major Cities The pandemic, and its impact on shopping and work, has pushed city residents to the suburbs. This is reflected in the gap between the rental vacancy rate in large cities versus that in the suburbs (Chart 41). It is also noticeable in REITs’ performance: Ones dominated by suburban housing have outperformed those focused on city centers over the past year. Home prices, appreciating faster than rental growth, will remain a tailwind for residential REITs (Chart 42). Supply shortages will keep prices high. Fundamentals also remain supportive of a positive outlook on the sector: The cap rate on residential REITs is about 260 basis points over the 10-year Treasury yield, and both FFO and NOI growth seem to have troughed (Chart 43). Chart 42Rising Home Price Will Be A Tailwind For Residential REITs Bottom Line: Investors should favor the residential sector within the REITs market, favoring single-family homes and manufactured homes over apartments, and out-of-city over downtown properties. Chart 43Improving Fundamentals For The Residential Sector   Data Centers Data centers are facilities that provide space for customers’ servers and other network and computing equipment. Due to the high and complex technical set-up specifications, leases are usually longer (upwards of five years). Properties that support the digital economy have attracted a lot of demand over the past few years. New technologies such as artificial intelligence, virtual reality, and autonomous vehicles will prove a tailwind over the coming years. Since data first became available (January 2016), data centers have outperformed the REITs benchmark by almost 60 percentage points (Chart 44). The pandemic has accelerated those trends, as social restrictions led offices, schools, and stores to close. This led to an increase in internet traffic and data creation. Estimates by OpenValut show that broadband usage increased by 51% in 2020 compared to 2019, partly due to remote learning and teleworking. Demand for data centers is expected to continue to grow. Fundamentals for the sector remain supportive: The cap rate – albeit now lower than post the GFC– is still near that of the broad benchmark (Chart 45, panel 1) and both NOI and FFO continue to grow (panels 2 & 3). Chart 44Sectors Supporting A Digitalized Economy Will Be Long-Term Outperfomers Chart 45...Supporting Fundamentals' Growth     Bottom Line: Internet traffic remains the primary driver of the performance of data-center REITs. The move towards a more digitalized economy is likely to prove a tailwind for the sector. This should also immunize the sector over the economic cycle as dependence on data increases structurally. A new normal in remote working and learning, as well as continued investment in new technologies, support an allocation to the sector.     Industrial Technological advances, particularly the rise of e-commerce, have also helped the industrial sector, increasing the need for logistics and fulfillment centers. Research by Prologis shows that e-commerce requires more than 3x the logistics space of brick-and-mortar sales. That is why investment in the sector has been rising over the past decade (Chart 46). Demand shows no signs of cooling: The occupancy rate of industrial REITs is at an all-time high, 4 percentage points higher than its 20-year average (Chart 47). Rental growth for industrial properties – particularly down the value chain closer to the end-consumer – has been robust due to the scarcity of permittable land. Chart 46Increased Demand For Warehouses Has Translated Into More CAPEX... Chart 47...And Pushed Up Occupancy Rates   The pandemic has also revealed how vulnerable current supply chains are and has accelerated a trend BCA Research has highlighted for years: The decline of globalization. Going forward, companies will move to reshore some of their production to gain greater control over supply chains (Chart 48). This will amplify the need for industrial space. Bottom Line: We expect the industrial sector to continue to outperform the broad REITs market, supported by continued investment in fulfillment and logistics centers. Fundamentals remain strong: Same-store NOI is growing at over 6% a year, and acquisitions have increased, with more than $5.5 billion over the past four quarters (Chart 49). The industrial sector has been one of the quickest to revive projects put on hold during the pandemic, with the development pipeline as of Q3 2021 34% higher than in Q4 2019. Chart 48The End Of Globalization, And Supply Chain Reshoring Will Increase The Need For Industrial Space Chart 49Increased M&A Activity In The Industrial Sector Amr Hanafy Senior Analyst Amrh@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1  All-equity REITs refer to equity REITs plus infrastructure and timberland REITs. 2  Free-standing REITs own stand-alone properties away from malls and are a subsector of the retail sector. 3 This does not include those whose telework was unrelated to the pandemic, such as those who worked entirely from home prior to the pandemic. 4 Jonathan I. Dingel and Brent Neiman, "How Many Jobs Can Be Done At Home?" NBER Working Paper No. 26948, April 2020.

Dear Client, We are sending you our Strategy Outlook today where we outline our thoughts on the global economy and the direction of financial markets for 2022 and beyond. Next week, please join me for a webcast on Friday, December 10th at 10:00 AM EST (3:00 PM GMT, 4:00 PM CET, 11:00 PM HKT) to discuss the outlook. Also, we published a report this week transcribing our annual conversation with Mr. X, a long-standing BCA client. Please join my fellow BCA strategists and me on Tuesday, December 7th for a follow-up discussion hosted by my colleague, Jonathan LaBerge. Finally, you will receive a Special Report prepared by our Global Asset Allocation service on Monday, December 13th. Similarly to previous years, Garry Evans and his team have prepared a list of books and articles to read over the holiday period. This year they recommend reading materials on key themes of the moment, such as climate change, cryptocurrencies, supply-chain disruption, and gene technology. Included in this report are my team’s recommendations on what to read to understand the underlying causes of inflation. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist   Highlights Macroeconomic Outlook: Despite the risks posed by the Omicron variant, global growth should remain above trend in 2022. Inflation will temporarily dip next year as goods prices come off the boil. However, the structural trend for inflation is to the upside, especially in the US. Equities: Remain overweight stocks in 2022, favoring cyclicals, small caps, value stocks, and non-US equities. Look to turn more defensive in mid-2023 in advance of a stagflationary recession in 2024 or 2025. Fixed income: Maintain below-average interest rate duration exposure. The US 10-year Treasury yield will rise to 2%-to-2.25% by the end of 2022. Underweight the US, UK, Canada, and New Zealand in a global bond portfolio. Credit: Corporate debt will outperform high-quality government bonds next year. Favor HY over IG. Spreads will widen again in 2023. Currencies: As a momentum currency, the US dollar could strengthen some more over the next month or two. Over a 12-month horizon, however, the trade-weighted dollar will weaken. The Canadian dollar will be the best performing G10 currency next year. Commodities: Oil prices will rise, with Brent crude averaging $80/bbl in 2022. Metals prices will remain resilient thanks to tight supply and Chinese stimulus. We prefer gold over cryptos. I. Macroeconomic Outlook   Running out of Greek Letters Just as the world was looking forward to “life as normal”, a new variant of the virus has surfaced. While little is known about the Omicron variant, preliminary indications suggest that it is more transmissible than Delta. The emergence of the Omicron variant is coming in the midst of yet another Covid wave. The number of new cases has skyrocketed across parts of northern and central Europe, prompting governments to re-introduce stricter social distancing measures (Chart 1). New cases have also been trending higher in many parts of the US and Canada since the start of November. Despite the risks posed by Omicron, there are reasons for hope. BioNTech has said that its vaccine, jointly developed with Pfizer, will provide at least partial immunity against the new strain. At present, 55% of the world’s population has had at least one vaccine shot; 44% is fully vaccinated (Chart 2). China is close to launching its own mRNA vaccine next year, which it intends to administer as a booster shot. In a worst-case scenario, BioNTech has said that it could produce a new version of its vaccine within six weeks, with initial shipments beginning in about three months. New antiviral medications are also set to hit the market. Pfizer claims its newly developed pill cuts the risk of hospitalization by nearly 90% if taken within three days from the onset of symptoms. The drug-maker has announced its intention to produce enough of the medication to treat 50 million people in 2022. In addition, it is allowing generic versions to be manufactured in developing countries. The company has indicated that its antiviral pills will be effective in treating the new strain.   Global Growth: Slowing but from a High Level Assuming the vaccines and antiviral drugs are able to keep the new strain at bay, global growth should remain solidly above trend in 2022. Table 1 shows consensus GDP growth projections for the major economies. G7 growth is expected to tick up from 3.6% in 2021Q3 to 4.5% in 2021Q4. Growth is set to cool to 4.1% in 2022Q1, 3.6% in 2022Q2, 2.9% in 2022Q3, 2.3% in 2022Q4, and 2.1% in 2023Q1. Table 1Growth Is Slowing, But From Very High Levels According to the OECD, potential real GDP growth in the G7 is about 1.4% (Chart 3). Thus, while growth in developed economies will slow next year, it is unlikely to return to trend until the second half of 2023. Emerging markets face a more daunting outlook. The Chinese property market is weakening, and the recent collapse of the Turkish lira highlights the structural problems that some EMs face. Nevertheless, the combination of elevated commodity prices, forthcoming Chinese stimulus, and the resumption of the US dollar bear market starting next year should support EM growth. Relative to consensus, we think the risks to growth in both developed and emerging markets are tilted to the upside in 2022. Growth will likely start surprising to the downside in late 2023, however.   The United States: No Shortage of Demand US growth slowed to only 2.1% in the third quarter, reflecting the impact of the Delta variant wave and supply-chain bottlenecks. The semiconductor shortage hit the auto sector especially hard. The decline in vehicle spending alone shaved 2.2 percentage points off Q3 GDP growth. Chart 4Durable Goods Spending Is Still Above Pre-Pandemic Trend, While Services Spending Is Catching Up The fourth quarter is shaping up to be much stronger. The Bloomberg consensus estimate is for real GDP to expand by 4.9%. The Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow model is even more optimistic. It sees growth hitting 9.7%. The demand for goods will moderate in 2022. As of October, real goods spending was still 10% above its pre-pandemic trendline (Chart 4). In contrast, the demand for services will continue to rebound. While restaurant sales have recovered all their lost ground, spending on movie theaters, amusement parks, and live entertainment in October was still down 46% on a seasonally-adjusted basis compared to January 2020. Hotel spending was down 23%. Spending on public transport was down 25%. Spending on dental services was down 16% (Chart 5).   US households have accumulated $2.3 trillion in excess savings over the course of the pandemic. Some of this money will be spent over the course of 2022 (Chart 6). Increased borrowing should also help. After initially plunging during the pandemic, credit card balances are rising again (Chart 7). Banks are eager to make consumer loans (Chart 8). Chart 6Plenty Of Pent-Up Demand Chart 7Credit Card Spending Is Recovering Following The Pandemic Slump Household net worth has risen by over 100% of GDP since the start of the pandemic (Chart 9). In an earlier report, we estimated that the wealth effect alone could boost annual consumer spending by up to 4% of GDP. Chart 8Banks Are Easing Credit Standards For Consumer Loans Chart 9A Record Rise In Household Net Worth   Business investment will rebound in 2022, as firms seek to build out capacity, rebuild inventories, and automate more production in the face of growing labor shortages. After moving sideways for the better part of two decades, core capital goods orders have broken out to the upside. Surveys of capex intentions have improved sharply (Chart 10). Nonresidential investment was 6% below trend in Q3 – an even bigger gap than for consumer services spending – so there is plenty of scope for capex to increase. Residential investment should also remain strong in 2022 (Chart 11). The homeowner vacancy rate has dropped to a record low, as have inventories of new and existing homes for sale. Homebuilder sentiment rose to a 6-month high in November. Building permits are 7% above pre-pandemic levels. Chart 10Business Investment Should Be Strong In 2022 Chart 11Residential Construction Will Be Well Supported   US Monetary and Fiscal Policy: Baby Steps Towards Tightening Policy is unlikely to curb US aggregate demand by very much next year. While the Federal Reserve will expedite the tapering of asset purchases and begin raising rates next summer, the Fed is unlikely to raise rates significantly until inflation gets out of hand. As we discuss in the Feature section later in this report, the next leg in inflation will be to the downside, even if the long-term trend for inflation is to the upside. The respite from inflation next year will give the Fed some breathing space. A major tightening campaign is unlikely until mid-2023. Reflecting the Fed’s dovish posture, long-term real bond yields hit record low levels in November (Chart 12). Despite giving up some of its gains in recent days, Goldman’s US Financial Conditions Index stands near its easiest level in history (Chart 13). Chart 12US Real Bond Yields Hitting Record Lows Chart 13Easy Financial Conditions In The US US fiscal policy will get tighter next year, but not by very much. In November, President Biden signed a $1.2 trillion infrastructure bill into law, containing $550 billion in new spending. BCA’s geopolitical strategists expect Congress to pass a $1.5-to-$2 trillion social spending bill using the reconciliation process. The emergence of the Omicron strain will facilitate passage of the bill because it will allow the Democrats to add some “indispensable” pandemic relief to the package. All in all, the IMF foresees the US cyclically-adjusted primary budget deficit averaging 4.9% of GDP between 2022 and 2026, compared to 2.0% of GDP between 2014 and 2019 (Chart 14). It should also be noted that government spending on goods and services has been quite weak over the past two years (Chart 15). The budget deficit surged because transfer payments exploded. Unlike direct government spending, which is set to accelerate over the next few years, households saved a large share of transfer payments. Thus, the fiscal multiplier will increase next year, even as the budget deficit shrinks. Chart 15While Overall Consumption Has Recovered, Business Spending and Direct Government Expenditures Remain Below Trend Chart 16European Banks Have Cleaned Up Their Act Europe: Room to Grow The European economy faces near-term growth pressures. In addition to Covid-related lockdowns, high energy costs will take a bite out of growth. After having dipped in October, natural gas prices have jumped again due to delays in the opening of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, strong Chinese gas demand, and rising risks of a colder winter due to La Niña. The majority of Germans are in favor of opening the pipeline, suggesting that it will ultimately be approved. This should help reduce gas prices. Meanwhile, the winter will pass and Chinese demand for gas should abate as domestic coal production increases. The combination of increased energy supplies, easing supply-chain bottlenecks, and hopefully some relief on the pandemic front, should all pave the way for better-than-expected growth across the euro area next year. After a decade of housecleaning, European banks are in much better shape (Chart 16). Capex intentions have risen (Chart 17). Consumer confidence is even stronger in the euro area than in the US (Chart 18). Chart 18Consumer Confidence Is At Pre-Pandemic Levels In The Euro Area, Unlike In The US Euro area fiscal policy should remain supportive. Infrastructure spending is set to increase as the Next Generation EU fund begins operations. Germany’s “Traffic Light” coalition will pursue a more expansionary fiscal stance. The IMF expects the euro area to run a cyclically-adjusted primary deficit of 1.2% of GDP between 2022 and 2026, compared to a surplus of 1.2% of GDP between 2014 and 2019. For its part, the ECB will maintain a highly accommodative monetary policy. While net asset purchases under the PEPP will end next March, the ECB is unlikely to raise rates until 2023 at the earliest. In contrast to the US, trimmed-mean inflation has barely risen in the euro area (Chart 19). Moreover, unlike their US counterparts, European firms are reporting few difficulties in finding qualified workers (Chart 20). In fact, euro area wage growth slowed to an all-time low of 1.35% in Q3 (Chart 21). Chart 19Trimmed-Mean Inflation: Higher In The US Than In The Euro Area And Japan   Chart 21Wage Growth Remains Contained Across The Euro Area The UK finds itself somewhere between the US and the euro area. Trimmed-mean inflation is running above euro area levels, but below that of the US. UK labor market data remains very strong, as evidenced by robust employment gains, firm wage growth, and a record number of job vacancies. The PMIs stand at elevated levels, with the new orders component of November’s manufacturing PMI rising to the highest level since June. While worries about the impact of the Omicron variant will likely cause the Bank of England to postpone December’s rate hike, we expect the BoE to begin raising rates in February.   Japan: Short-Term Stimulus Boost A major Covid wave during the summer curbed Japanese growth. Consumer spending rebounded after the government removed the state of emergency on October 1 but could falter again if the Omicron variant spreads. The government has already told airlines to halt reservations for all incoming international flights for at least one month. On the positive side, the economy will benefit from new fiscal measures. Following the election on October 31, the new government led by Prime Minister Fumio Kishida announced a stimulus package worth 5.6% of GDP. As with most Japanese stimulus packages, the true magnitude of fiscal support will be much lower than the headline figure. Nevertheless, the combination of increased cash payments to households, support for small businesses, and subsidies for domestic travel should spur consumption in 2022. The capex recovery in Japan has lagged other major economies. This is partly due to the outsized role of the auto sector in Japan’s industrial base. Motor vehicle shipments fell 37% year-over-year in October, dragging down export growth with it. As automotive chip supplies increase, Japan’s manufacturing sector should gain some momentum. Despite the prospect of stronger growth next year, the Bank of Japan will stand pat. Core inflation remains close to zero, while long-term inflation expectations remain far below the BOJ’s 2% target. We do not expect the BOJ to raise rates until 2024 at the earliest.   China: Crosswinds The Chinese economy faces crosswinds going into 2022. On the one hand, the energy crisis should abate, helping to boost growth. China has reopened 170 coal mines and will probably begin re-importing Australian coal. Chinese coal prices have fallen drastically over the past 6 weeks (Chart 22). Coal accounts for about two-thirds of Chinese electricity generation. Chart 22Coal Prices Are Renormalizing In China Chart 23China's Property Market Has Weakened   The US may also trim tariffs on Chinese goods, as Treasury Secretary Yellen hinted this week. This will help Chinese manufacturers. On the other hand, the property market remains under stress. Housing starts, sales, and land purchases were down 34%, 21%, and 24%, respectively, in October relative to the same period last year. The proportion of households planning to buy a home has plummeted. Loan growth to real estate developers has decelerated to the lowest level on record (Chart 23). Nearly half of their offshore bonds are trading at less than 70 cents on the dollar. The authorities have taken steps to stabilize the property market. They have relaxed restrictions on mortgage lending and land sales, cut mortgage rates in some cities, and have allowed some developers to issue asset backed securities to repay outstanding debt. Most Chinese property is bought “off-plan”. The government does not want angry buyers to be deprived of their property. Thus, the existing stock of planned projects will be built. Chart 24 shows that this is a large number; in past years, developers have started more than twice as many projects as they have completed. The longer-term problem is that China builds too many homes. Like Japan in the early 1990s, China’s working-age population has peaked (Chart 25). According to the UN, it will decline by over 400 million by the end of the century. China simply does not need to construct as many new homes as it once did. Chart 24Chinese Construction: Halfway Done Chart 25Demographic Parallels Between China And Japan Japan was unable to fill the gap that a shrinking property sector left in aggregate demand in the early 1990s. As a result, the economy fell into a deflationary trap. China is likely to have more success. Unlike Japan, which waited too long to pursue large-scale fiscal stimulus, China will be more aggressive. The authorities will raise infrastructure spending next year with a focus on clean energy. They will also boost social spending. A frayed social safety net has forced Chinese households to save more than they would otherwise for precautionary reasons. This has weighed on consumption.  The fact that China is a middle-income country helps. In 1990, Japan’s output-per-worker was nearly 70% of US levels; China’s output-per-worker is still 20% of US levels (Chart 26). If Chinese incomes continue to grow at a reasonably brisk pace, this will make it easier to improve home affordability. It will also allow China to stabilize its debt-to-GDP ratio without a painful deleveraging campaign. II. Feature: The Long-Term Inflation Outlook   Two Steps Up, One Step Down We expect inflation in the US, and to a lesser degree abroad, to follow a “two steps up, one step down” trajectory of higher highs and higher lows. The US is currently near the top of those two steps. Inflation should dip over the next 6-to-9 months as the demand for goods moderates and supply-chain disruptions abate. Chart 27 shows that container shipping costs have started to come down. The number of ships anchored off the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach is falling. US semiconductor firms are working overtime (Chart 28). Chip production in Japan and Korea is rising swiftly. DRAM chip prices have already started to decline. Chart 27Signs Of Easing Supply Issues On The Rough Seas Chart 28Semiconductor Manufacturers Are Stepping Up Their Game Reflecting the easing of supply-chain bottlenecks, both the “prices paid” and “supplier delivery” components of the manufacturing ISM declined in November.  The respite from inflation will not last long, however. The US labor market is heating up. So far, most of the wage growth has been at the bottom end of the income distribution (Chart 29). Wage growth will broaden out over the course of 2022, pushing up service price inflation in the process. Chart 29Wage Growth Has Picked Up, But Mainly At The Bottom Of The Income Distribution Chart 30Rent Inflation Has Increased Rent inflation will also rise, as the unemployment rate falls further. The Zillow rent index has spiked 14% (Chart 30). Rents account for 8% of the US CPI basket and 4% of the PCE basket.   Biased About Neutral? Investors are assuming that the Fed will step in to extinguish any inflationary fires before they get out of hand. The widely-followed 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate has fallen back below the Fed’s comfort zone (Chart 31). Chart 31Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Not A Source Of Worry For The Fed Chart 32Both The Fed And Investors Have Lowered Their Estimate Of The Neutral Rate This may be wishful thinking. Back in 2012, when the Fed began publishing its “dots”, it thought the neutral rate of interest was 4.25%. Today, it considers it to be around 2.5% (Chart 32). Market participants broadly agree. Both investors and policymakers have bought into the secular stagnation thesis hook, line, and sinker. If the neutral rate turns out to be higher than widely believed, the Fed could find itself woefully behind the curve. Given the “long and variable” lags between changes in monetary policy and the resulting impact on the economy, inflation is liable to greatly overshoot the Fed’s target.   Structural Forces Turning More Inflationary Meanwhile, the forces that have underpinned low inflation over the past few decades are starting to fray: Globalization is in retreat: The ratio of global trade-to-manufacturing output has been flat for over a decade (Chart 33). Looking out, the ratio could decline as geopolitical tensions between China and the rest of the world continue to simmer, and more companies shift production back home in order to gain greater control over the supply chains of essential goods. Baby boomers are leaving the labor force en masse: As a group, baby boomers hold more than half of US household wealth (Chart 34). They will continue to run down their wealth once they retire. However, since they will no longer be working, they will no longer contribute to national output. Spending that is not matched by output tends to drive up inflation. Chart 33Globalization Plateaued Over a Decade Ago Social stability is in peril: The US homicide rate increased by 27% in 2020, the biggest one-year jump on record. All indications suggest that crime has continued to rise in 2021, coinciding with the ongoing decline in the incarceration rate (Chart 35). Amazingly, the murder rate and inflation are highly correlated (Chart 36). If the government cannot credibly commit to keeping people safe, how can it credibly commit to keeping inflation low? Without trust in government, inflation expectations could quickly become unmoored. Chart 35The Homicide Rate Has Tended To Rise When The Institutionalization Rate Has Declined Chart 36Bouts Of Inflation Tend To Coincide With Rising Crime The temptation to monetize debt will rise: Public-sector debt levels have soared to levels last seen during World War II. If bond yields rise as the Congressional Budget Office expects, debt-servicing costs will triple by the end of the decade (Chart 37). Faced with the prospect of having to divert funds from social programs to pay off bondholders, the government may apply political pressure on the Fed to keep rates low.​​​​​​   A Post-Pandemic Productivity Boom? Might faster productivity growth bail out the economy just like it did following the Second World War? Don’t bet on it. US labor productivity did increase sharply during the initial stages of the pandemic. However, that appears to have been largely driven by composition effects that saw many low-skilled, poorly-paid service workers lose their jobs. As these low-skilled workers have returned to the labor force, productivity growth has dropped. The absolute level of productivity declined by 5.0% at an annualized rate in the third quarter, leading to an 8.3% increase in labor costs. Productivity growth has been extremely weak outside the US (Chart 38). This gives weight to the view that the pandemic-induced changes in business practices have not contributed to higher productivity, at least so far. It is worth noting that a recent study of 10,000 skilled professionals at a major IT company revealed that work-from-home policies decreased productivity by 8%-to-19%, mainly because people ended up working longer. Increased investment spending should eventually boost productivity. However, the near-term impact of higher capex will be to boost aggregate demand, stoking inflation in the process. III. Financial Markets   A. Portfolio Strategy Above-Trend Global Growth Will Support Equities Our golden rule of investing is about as simple as they come: Don’t bet against stocks unless you think that there is a recession around the corner. As Chart 39 shows, recessions and equity bear markets almost always overlap. Chart 40Sentiment Towards Equities Is Already Bearish Equity corrections can occur outside of recessionary periods. In fact, we are experiencing such a correction right now. Yet, with the percentage of bearish investors reaching the highest level in over 12 months in this week’s AAII survey, chances are that the correction will not last much longer (Chart 40). A sustained decline in stock prices requires a sustained decline in corporate earnings; the latter normally only happens during economic downturns. Admittedly, it is impossible to know for sure if a recession is lurking around the corner. If the Omicron variant is able to completely evade the vaccines, growth will slow considerably over the coming months. Yet, even in that case, the global economy is unlikely to experience a sudden-stop of the sort that occurred last March. As noted at the outset of this report, pharma companies have the tools to tweak the vaccines, and most experts believe that the soon-to-be-released antivirals will be effective against the new strain. If economic growth remains above trend, earnings will rise (Chart 41). S&P 500 companies generated $53.82 per share in profits in Q3. The bottom-up consensus is for these companies to generate an average of $54.01 in quarterly profits between 2021Q4 and 2022Q3, implying almost no growth from 2021Q3 levels. This is a very low bar to clear. We expect global equities to produce high single-digit returns next year. Chart 41Analysts Increased Earnings Estimates This Year The Beginning of the End Our guess is that 2022 will be the last year of the secular equity bull market that began in 2009. In mid-2023 or so, the Fed will come around to the view that the neutral rate is higher than it once thought. Unfortunately, by then, it will be too late; a wage-price spiral will have already emerged. A nasty bear flattening of the yield curve will ensue: Long-term bond yields will rise but short-term rate expectations will increase even more. A recession will follow in 2024 or 2025. The most important real-time indicator we are focusing on to gauge when to turn more bearish on stocks is the 5y/5y forward TIPS breakeven rate. As noted earlier, it is still at the bottom end of the Fed’s comfort zone. If it were to rise above 3%, all hell could break loose, especially if this happened without a corresponding increase in crude oil prices. The Fed takes great pride in the success it has had in anchoring long-term expectations. Any evidence that expectations are becoming unmoored would cause the FOMC to panic.   B. Equity Sectors, Regions, And Styles Favor Value, Small Caps, and Non-US Markets in 2022 Until the Fed takes away the punch bowl, a modestly procyclical stance towards equity sectors, styles, and regional equity allocation is warranted. Chart 42The Relative Performance Of Value Stocks Has Closely Tracked Bond Yields This Year The relative performance of value versus growth stocks has broadly followed the trajectory of the 30-year Treasury yield this year (Chart 42). Rising yields should buoy value stocks, with banks being the biggest beneficiaries (Chart 43). In contrast, rising yields will weigh on tech stocks. Chart 43Rising Bond Yields Will Help Bank Shares But Hurt Tech Stocks   Chart 44The Winners And Losers Of Covid Waves If we receive some good news on the pandemic front, this should disproportionately help value. As Chart 44 illustrates, the relative performance of value versus growth stocks has tracked the number of new Covid cases globally. The correlation between new cases and the relative performance of IT and energy has been particularly strong. Rising capex spending will buoy industrial stocks. Industrials are overrepresented in value indices both in the US and abroad (Table 2). Along with financials, industrials are also overrepresented in small cap indices (Table 3). US small caps trade at 15-times forward earnings compared to 21-times for the S&P 500. Table 2Breaking Down Growth And Value By Sector Table 3Financials And Industrials Have A Larger Weight In US Small Caps Time to Look Abroad? Given our preference for cyclicals and value in 2022, it stands to reason that we should also favor non-US markets. Table 4 shows that non-US stock markets have more exposure to cyclical and value sectors. Table 4Cyclicals Are Overrepresented Outside The US Admittedly, favoring non-US stock markets has been a losing proposition for the past 12 years. US earnings have grown much faster than earnings abroad over this period (Chart 45). US stock returns have also benefited from rising relative valuations. Chart 45The US Has Been The Earnings Leader In Recent Years At this point, however, US stocks are trading at a significant premium to their overseas peers, whether measured by the P/E ratio, price-to-book, or price-to-sales (Chart 46). US profit margins are also more stretched than elsewhere (Chart 47).   Chart 47US Profit Margins Look Stretched Chart 48Non-US Stocks Tend To Do Best When The US Dollar Is Weakening The US dollar may be the ultimate arbiter of whether the US or international stock markets outperform in the 2022. Historically, there has been a close correlation between the trade-weighted dollar and the relative performance of US versus non-US equities (Chart 48). In general, non-US stocks do best when the dollar is weakening. The usual relationship between the dollar and the relative performance of US and non-US stocks broke down in 2020 when the dollar weakened but the tech-heavy US stock market nonetheless outperformed. However, if “reopening plays” gain the upper hand over “pandemic plays” in 2022, the historic relationship between the dollar and US/non-US returns will reassert itself. As we discuss later on, while near-term momentum favors the dollar, the greenback is likely to weaken over a 12-month horizon. This suggests that investors should look to increase exposure to non-US stocks in a month or two. Around that time, the energy shortage gripping Europe will begin to abate, China will be undertaking more stimulus, and investors will start to focus more on the prospect of higher US corporate taxes.    C. Fixed Income Maintain Below-Benchmark Duration The yield on a government bond equals the expected path of policy rates over the duration of the bond plus a term premium that compensates investors for locking in their savings at a fixed rate rather than rolling them over at the prevailing short-term rate. While expected policy rates have moved up in the US over the past 2 months, the market’s expectations of where policy rates will be in the second half of the decade have not changed much (Chart 49). Investors remain convinced of the secular stagnation thesis which postulates that the neutral rate of interest is very low. As for the term premium, it remains stuck in negative territory, much where it has been for the past 10 years (Chart 50). Chart 50Negative Term Premium Across The Board The Term Premium Will Increase The notion of a negative term premium may seem odd, as it implies that investors are willing to pay to take on duration risk. However, there is a good reason for why the term premium has been negative: The correlation between bond yields and stock prices has been positive (Chart 51). Chart 51Stocks And Bond Yields Have Not Always Been Positively Correlated When bond yields are positively correlated with stock prices, bonds are a hedge against bad economic news. If the economy falls into recession, equity prices will drop; the value of your home will go down; you may not get a bonus, or even worse, you may lose your job. But at least the value of your bond portfolio will go up! There is a catch, however: Bonds are a hedge against bad economic news only if that news is deflationary in nature. The 2001 and 2008-09 recessions all saw bond yields drop as the economy headed south. Both recessions were due to deflationary shocks: first the dotcom bust, and later, the bursting of the housing bubble. In contrast, bond yields rose in the lead up to the recession in the 1970s and early 80s. Bonds were not a good hedge against falling stock prices back then because it was surging inflation and rising bond yields that caused stocks to fall in the first place. This raises a worrying possibility that investors have largely overlooked: The term premium may increase as it becomes increasingly clear that the next recession will be caused not by inadequate demand but by Fed tightening in response to an overheated economy. A rising term premium would exacerbate the upward pressure on bond yields stemming from higher-than-expected inflation as well as upward revisions to estimates of the real neutral rate of interest. Again, we do not think that a “term premium explosion” is a significant risk for 2022. However, it is a major risk for 2023 and beyond. Investors should maintain a modestly below-benchmark duration stance for now but look to go maximally underweight duration towards the end of next year.   Global Bond Allocation BCA’s global fixed-income strategists recommend underweighting the US, Canada, the UK, and New Zealand in 2022. They suggest overweighting Japan, the euro area, and Australia. US Treasuries trade with a higher beta than most other government bond markets (Chart 52). Our bond strategists expect the US 10-year Treasury yield to hit 2%-to-2.25% by the end of next year. Chart 52High-And Low-Beta Bond Yields As discussed earlier, neither the ECB nor the BoJ are in a hurry to raise rates. Both euro area and Japanese bonds have outperformed the global benchmark when Treasury yields have risen (Chart 53). Chart 54UK Inflation Expectations Are Higher Than In Other Major Developed Economies While rate expectations in Australia have come down on the Omicron news, the markets are still pricing in four hikes next year. With wage growth still below the RBA’s target, our fixed-income strategists think the central bank will pursue a fairly dovish path next year. In contrast, they think New Zealand will continue its hiking cycle. Like Canada, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand has become increasingly concerned about soaring home prices and household indebtedness.  Inflation expectations are higher in the UK than elsewhere (Chart 54). With the BoE set to raise rates early next year, gilts will underperform the global benchmark.   Overweight High-Yield Corporate Bonds… For Now Chart 55High-Yield Spreads Are Pricing In A Default Rate Of Close To 4% The combination of above-trend economic growth and accommodative monetary policy will provide support for corporate bonds in 2022. For now, we prefer high yield over investment grade. According to our bond strategists, while high-yield spreads are quite tight, they are still pricing in a default rate of 3.8% (Chart 55). This is more than their fair value default estimate of 2.3%-to-2.8%. It is also above the year-to-date realized default rate of 1.7%.   As with equities, the bull market in corporate credit will end in 2023 as the Fed is forced to accelerate the pace of rate hikes in the face of an overheated economy and rising long-term inflation expectations.   D. Currencies and Commodities Dollar Strength Will Reverse in Early 2022 Since bottoming in May, the US dollar has been trending higher. The US dollar is a high momentum currency: When the greenback starts rising, it usually keeps rising (Chart 56). A simple trading rule that buys the dollar when it is trading above its various moving averages has delivered positive returns (Chart 57). This suggests that the greenback could very well strengthen further over the next month or two. Over a 12-month horizon, however, we think the trade-weighted dollar will weaken. Both speculators and asset managers are net long the dollar (Chart 58). Current positioning suggests we are nearing a dollar peak. Rising US rate expectations have helped the dollar this year. Chart 59 shows that both USD/EUR and USD/JPY have tracked the spread between the yield on the December 2022 Eurodollar and Euribor/Euroyen contracts, respectively. While the Fed will expedite the pace of tapering, the overall approach will still be one of “baby-steps” towards tightening next year. BCA’s bond strategists do not expect US rate expectations for end-2022 to rise from current levels. Chart 58Long Dollar Positions Are Getting Crowded Chart 59Interest Rates Have Played A Major Role On The Dollar's Performance This Year   The present level of real interest rate differentials is consistent with a much weaker dollar (Chart 60). Using CPI swaps as a proxy for expected inflation, 2-year real rates in the US are 42 basis points below other developed economies. This is similar to where real spreads were in 2013/14, when the trade-weighted dollar was 16% weaker than it is today. Chart 60AThe Dollar And Interest Rate Differentials (I) Chart 60BThe Dollar And Interest Rate Differentials (II) Meanwhile, growth outside the US will pick up next year as Europe’s energy crisis abates and China ramps up stimulus. If history is any guide, firmer growth abroad will put downward pressure on the dollar (Chart 61). Chart 61The Dollar Will Weaken As Global Growth Rotates From The US To The Rest Of The World Chart 62Dollar Headwinds Pricey Greenback The dollar’s lofty valuation has left it overvalued by nearly 20% on a Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) basis. The PPP exchange rate equalizes the price of a representative basket of goods and services between the US and other economies. Reflecting the dollar’s overvaluation, the US trade deficit has widened sharply. Excluding energy exports, the US trade deficit as a share of GDP is now the largest on record. Equity inflows have helped finance America’s burgeoning current account deficit (Chart 62). However, these inflows are starting to abate, and could drop further if global investors abandon their infatuation with US tech stocks.   Favor Commodity Currencies We favor commodity currencies for 2022, especially the Canadian dollar, which we expect to be the best performing G10 currency. Canadian real GDP growth will average nearly 5% in Q4 and the first half of next year. The Bank of Canada will start hiking rates next April. Oil prices should remain reasonably firm next year, helping the loonie and other petrocurrencies. Bob Ryan, BCA’s chief Commodity Strategist, expects the price of Brent crude to average $80/bbl in 2022 and 81$/bbl in 2023, which is well above the forwards (Chart 63). Years of underinvestment in crude oil production have led to tight supply conditions (Chart 64). Proven global oil reserves increased by only 6% between 2010 and 2020, having risen by 26% over the preceding decade.   As with oil, there has been little investment in mining capacity in recent years. While a weaker property market in China will weigh on metals prices, this will be partly offset by Chinese fiscal stimulus. Looking further ahead, the outlook for metals remains bright. Whereas the proliferation of electric vehicles is bad news for oil demand over the long haul, it is good news for many metals. The typical electric vehicle requires about four times as much copper as a typical gasoline-powered vehicle. Huge amounts of copper will also be necessary to expand electrical grids.   The RMB Will Be Stable in 2022 It is striking that despite the appreciation in the trade-weighted dollar since June and escalating concerns about the health of the Chinese economy, the RMB has managed to strengthen by 0.3% against the US dollar. Chinese export growth will moderate in 2022 as global consumption shifts from goods to services. Rising global bond yields may also narrow the yield differential between China and the rest of the world. Nevertheless, we doubt the RMB will weaken very much. China wants the RMB to be a global reserve currency. A weak RMB would run counter to that goal. Rather than weakening the yuan, the Chinese authorities will use fiscal stimulus to support growth.   Gold Versus Cryptos? Gold prices tend to move closely with real bond yields (Chart 65). Since August 2020, however, the price of gold has slumped from a high of $2,067/oz to $1,768/oz, even though real yields remain near record lows. The divergence between real yields and gold prices may partly reflect growing demand for cryptocurrencies. Investors increasingly see cryptos as not just a disruptive economic force, but as the premier “anti-fiat” hedge. Whether that view pans out remains to be seen. So far, the vast majority of the demand for cryptocurrencies has stemmed from people hoping to get rich by buying cryptos. To the extent that people are using cryptos for online purchases, it is usually for illegal goods (Chart 66).  Chart 65Gold Prices Tend To Correlate Closely With Real Interest Rates Crypto proponents like to say that the supply of cryptos is finite. While this may be true for individual cryptocurrencies, it is not true for the sector as a whole. Over the past 8 years, the number of cryptocurrencies has swollen from 26 in 2013 to 7,877 (Chart 67). At least with gold, they are not adding any new elements to the periodic table. At any rate, the easy money in the crypto space has already been made. Bitcoin has doubled in price seven times since the start of 2016. If it were to double just one more time to $120,000, it would be worth $2.2 trillion, equal to the entire stock of US dollars in circulation. Investors looking to hedge long-term inflation risk should shift back into gold. Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist pberezin@bcaresearch.com Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores

Highlights Indonesian domestic demand is struggling to recover in the face of a very tight policy settings. Exceptionally high real borrowing costs continue to hurt non-financial sectors. This will hurt banks too as credit is stymied and NPLs rise. Equity investors should fade the rebound and stay underweight Indonesia in an EM equity portfolio. Indonesia’s external accounts will deteriorate, as the Chinese slowdown weighs on resource prices. Softening commodity prices will herald a weakness in the rupiah. Currency investors should consider going short the rupiah versus the US dollar. Domestic bond investors should tactically downgrade Indonesia from neutral to underweight within an EM bond portfolio. Sovereign EM credit investors, however, should stay overweight Indonesia. Feature Chart 1Indonesian Stock Rebound Will Be Short-Lived After years of underperformance, Indonesian stocks have rebounded in absolute terms and inched up relative to the EM benchmark (Chart 1). Could this be the beginning of a sustainable outperformance? Our research indicates that the answer is no. The Indonesian economy is still struggling. Domestic demand remains lackluster, hamstrung as it is by very high real interest rates and a tight fiscal stance. A flexing export sector, the sole source of strength so far, is set to dissipate as well. Weaker exports will weigh on the nation's financial markets. A budding softness in EM financial markets – emanating from a slowing China and rising US bond yields – will be yet another headwind for Indonesian assets over the next several months. Investors therefore should fade the current rebound and remain underweight this bourse in EM equity portfolios. EM domestic bond portfolios should consider downgrading this market from neutral to underweight relative to its EM peers. Currency investors may consider shorting the rupiah versus the US dollar. Sovereign EM credit investors, however, should stay overweight Indonesia in an EM US dollar bond portfolio. Straightjacketed The main drag to Indonesia’s economic recovery is coming from prohibitively high interest rates in the country. Real borrowing costs for the private sector, of the order of 10% (Chart 2, top panel), are extremely restrictive for any economy to handle, let alone one trying to recover from a debilitating recession. The real rates in Indonesia are also much higher than anywhere else in Asia – for both the private sector as well as for the government (Chart 2, bottom panel). Chart 2The Economy Is Struggling In the Face Of Very High Real Interest Rates Chart 3Absence Of Fiscal Support Is Making The Recovery Harder The fiscal stance does not appear to be very supportive either. The government is planning to rein in the fiscal deficit next year to 4.8% of GDP from an expected 5.7% this year. The IMF projects that the cyclically- adjusted fiscal thrust in 2022 will be a negative 0.8% of potential GDP, and a further negative 1.5% in 2023 (Chart 3). The consequence of such restrictive settings is that domestic consumption and consumer confidence are languishing well below pre-pandemic levels (Chart 4). Consistently, loan demand is also very weak. Bank credit for both consumption and production purposes (both working capital and term loans) have barely risen after having shrunk outright last year (Chart 5). Chart 4Domestic Demand Is Soft As Consumer Confidence Remains Low Chart 5All Types Of Bank Credit Are Weak Chart 6Disinflationary Pressures Are Entrenched In The Economy Weak domestic demand is reinforcing deflationary forces. Inflation has been undershooting the lower band of the central bank target for almost two years now. Core and trimmed mean CPI measures have been averaging below 1% over the past year. Headline CPI is below the lower target band despite high oil and food prices (Chart 6, top panel). At the same time, nominal wages are barely rising (Chart 6, bottom panel). Hence, household income growth is subdued, which is sapping consumer demand. Notably, the very high real interest rates in Indonesia today are an outcome of monetary policy falling behind the disinflation curve. In the 2000s, the country’s consumer price inflation would often flare up to double digits, and the central bank used to keep interest rates consistently high. Over the past 10 years or so, however, inflationary pressures have gradually given way to deflationary forces. Even though the central bank has reduced its policy rate, it has not reduced it sufficiently enough to offset the drop in inflation. As a result, real interest rates have risen. Banks, on their part, also refused to fully pass along the rate cuts accorded by the central bank. As such, banks’ lending rates to the private sector, in both nominal and real terms, remained much higher compared to their peers elsewhere in Asia (Chart 2, above).  Part of the reason why the central bank has fallen behind the disinflation curve has to do with the exchange rate stability and Indonesia’s dependence on foreign debt capital inflows. The country needs to offer high real rates to continue to attract enough foreign capital so that it can finance the current account deficit. As long as the central bank has rupiah stability (as a means for price stability) as its mandate, it will not reduce real interest rates. Incidentally, a bill to include economic growth and employment within the central bank’s mandate was submitted to Parliament earlier this year. Discussion over the bill, however, has been delayed. This means that elevated real interest rates will prevail for now in Indonesia, hampering economic growth. Fading Bright Spot Chart 7The Surge In Exports Has Been All About Commodity Prices, Not Increasing Volumes In contrast to domestic demand, Indonesia’s exports did phenomenally well over the past few quarters. That said, there are signs that those heady days are coming to an end: The main reason exports did so well is that commodity prices went vertically up. Export volumes, on the other hand, stayed quite low. This is also evident in the case of coal and palm oil – Indonesia’s two main export items (Chart 7). Since it’s not the volume that drove up the export revenues, the latter is vulnerable to the whims of global commodity prices – of which Indonesia is a price-taker. And commodity prices, in general, have already begun to soften. China is by far the largest destination for Indonesian exports (22% of total), and demand in the Middle Kingdom has been among main reasons behind the recent surge in Indonesian exports. Yet, the fact that China’s credit and money impulses have turned negative is a major concern for Indonesian exports going forward. If history is of any guide, negative impulses will cause a contraction in Indonesian exports over the next year or so (Chart 8). Odds are therefore that the country’s trade surplus will roll over and the current account balance will slip back to a deficit (Chart 9, top panel). Chart 8Negative Chinese Credit And Money Impulses Will Cause Indonesian Exports To Shrink Chart 9Indonesia's Trade And Current Account Balances Have Peaked Chart 10A Slowing Chinese Credit & Fiscal Impulse Is Always A Bad Omen For The Rupiah Meanwhile, Indonesia’s financial account is struggling to stay in surplus as capital inflows have dwindled significantly over the past couple of years (Chart 9, middle panel). FDI inflows are also showing few signs of revival (Chart 9, bottom panel). This indicates that Indonesia’s envisioned reforms, under the ‘Omnibus bill’, are yet to gain much traction and produce meaningful improvements in the economy’s structural backdrop. All in all, the outlook for the country’s external accounts is much less sanguine in the months ahead. That will not bode well for the rupiah, which has benefitted from robust external accounts so far. A material drop in Chinese credit and fiscal impulse has never been positive for the Indonesian currency. In the months ahead, therefore, the path of least resistance for the rupiah appears to be down (Chart 10, top panel). The link is via commodity prices (Chart 10, bottom panel). Notably, most capital inflows into Indonesia are in the form of debt capital inflows. Equity inflows are paltry. The reason is straightforward: foreign bond investors like the extremely high real rates that the country has been offering, whereas the equity investors do not. Yet, in the past couple of years, even debt capital inflows have subsided (Chart 9, middle panel). Should foreign investors turn nervous about the rupiah outlook due to falling commodity prices and/or rising US interest rates, those debt inflows would further subside. Deteriorating capital inflows would cause further weakness in the rupiah in a self-fulfilling prophecy. Domestic Bonds Chart 11Indonesian Domestic Bonds' Outperformance Is Late Indonesian local currency bonds have significantly outperformed their EM counterparts over the past several months (Chart 11, top panel). We have been positive on Indonesian domestic bonds. Going forward, however, the nation’s local bonds will find it difficult to rally in absolute terms and will likely underperform their EM peers. One reason for this is that, given Indonesian yields are already close to post-pandemic lows, it will be harder for them to fall much more. The relative performance of domestic bonds versus their EM peers will also be beset by a vulnerable rupiah – as explained above. The bottom panel of Chart 11 shows that periods of a weaker rupiah are usually associated with Indonesia underperforming overall EM domestic bonds. This is because foreign investors (who hold 21% of Indonesian local bonds) usually head for the exit once the rupiah begins to depreciate. Finally, as was explained in our report last week, various EM assets classes are in for a period of volatility – prompted by a deepening slowdown in China and rising US bond yields. Periods of EM stress do not augur well for Indonesian local bonds’ relative performance vis-à-vis their EM brethren. This is because the relative yield differential of Indonesia with that of EM widens in such periods – as occurred during the 2013 taper tantrum, the 2015 EM slowdown, and the 2020 pandemic (Chart 11, bottom panel). Since another EM risk-off period is around the corner, investors will be well advised to book profits on Indonesian domestic bonds’ recent outperformance and tactically downgrade this market to underweight in an EM domestic bond portfolio. Sovereign Credit Unlike the case of local currency bonds, Indonesia's sovereign credit has metamorphosed into a defensive market over the past several years. Investors now consider Indonesian sovereign credit to be among the safest within EM. This is an upshot of low public debt, including very low foreign currency public indebtedness, and years of orthodox fiscal and monetary policies. Chart 12Indonesian Sovereign Bonds Now Outperform During Risk-Off Periods In previous risk-off periods (such as the GFC in 2008 and the taper tantrum in 2013), Indonesian sovereign credit would typically underperform their EM counterparts. Yet, in more recent episodes (such as the EM slowdown in 2015 and the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020), Indonesian sovereign credit massively outperformed the EM benchmark. These recent instances suggest that during the oncoming risk-off period investors should stay overweight Indonesian sovereign credit in an EM basket.  Notably, the regime change in Indonesia’s sovereign credit characteristics has led to its relative performance (versus overall EM) being decoupled from the rupiah (Chart 12). While the rupiah remains a cyclical currency, the significant improvement in sovereign creditworthiness has turned Indonesian credit markets into a defensive play within EM. Therefore, a weakness in the rupiah in the months ahead will not jeopardize its relative performance. Share Prices Chart 13Indonesian Bank Stocks Failed To Break Out, While Non-Banks Keep Falling The Indonesian equity market is structurally beset by an uneven playing field, where the country’s banking sector has benefitted at the expense of all others. This is a consequence of banks maintaining high real lending rates as well as very wide net interest rate margins for far too long. The outcome is evident in financial and non-financial sectors’ diverging performance over the past decade (Chart 13). Given that the bull market in bank stocks has been contingent on banks’ net interest margins (NIM), any reduction therein will hurt bank stocks (Chart 14). At the same time, maintaining current lending rates and net interest margins will continue to hurt non-financial sectors (i.e., borrowers). In other words, for non-financial sectors to benefit, it will have to come at the expense of banking sector. Since banks and the rest of the stock market have very similar weights in this bourse, this dynamic will make it hard for this market to rally overall in a sustainable manner. Notably, bank stocks have failed to breach their pre-pandemic highs. This is despite net interest margins being quite elevated. The reason is that high real borrowing costs in a weak economy not only discourage credit off-take, but also threaten to raise NPLs further. Indonesian bank stocks are quite expensive as well: their ‘price/book value’ ratio is 2.6 while that of their EM counterparts is 1.1. As such, they will be hard pressed to have another sustainable rally. The other half of Indonesian equity markets, non-financials, are expectedly doing worse in the face of persistently high borrowing costs. So are the small cap stocks – where non-financial firms make up 85% of the market cap (Chart 13, bottom two panels). Notably, since Indonesia is a commodity producer, Indonesian stock prices usually do well during periods of rising commodity prices. Yet, headwinds emanating from weak domestic demand prevented Indonesia from benefitting much from high commodity prices this past year (Chart 15). Going forward, with the dissipating commodity tailwind, the Indonesian market will likely falter anew. Chart 14Any Fall In The Elevated Net Interest Margins Will Hurt Bank Stocks Chart 15Extremely Restrictive Real Rates Prevented Indonesia From Benefitting From High Commodity Prices Furthermore, a period of overall EM volatility is also a negative for Indonesian stocks’ absolute and relative performances. Investment Conclusions An impending relapse in commodity prices will herald a weakness in the rupiah. Currency investors should consider going short the rupiah versus the US dollar. In view of the likely weakness in the rupiah, dedicated EM local currency bond portfolios should pare back their exposure to Indonesia and tactically downgrade this market from neutral to underweight. Expected softness in domestic demand in the face of high real rates, faltering commodity prices and an impending volatility in EM assets - all entail that investors should stay underweight this bourse in an EM equity portfolio.   Finally, given the new defensive stature of Indonesian sovereign credit, asset allocators should stay overweight Indonesia in dedicated EM US dollar bond portfolios. Rajeeb Pramanik Senior EM Strategist rajeeb.pramanik@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes

Special Report

Highlights Why have Value stocks underperformed so much during the past decade? The rise in intangible assets is likely the most important reason since traditional valuation metrics are no longer an accurate measure of intrinsic value. Value stocks today have a larger negative tilt to Quality than they did in the past. This has hurt Value due to Quality's outperformance. Value's underperformance is not just the result of the relative performance of a few sectors or industries, although this has played a role. Falling interest rates have not been the main driver of Value’s underperformance as they can only account for a small portion of returns. “Migration”, or mean-reversion in and out of value buckets, has declined since the Great Financial Crisis, possibly because of an increase in monopoly power. But even this cannot fully account for the underperformance since 2012. We propose that investors who wish to invest in Value screen for Quality. They should also express their Value tilts in sectors with few intangibles, such as Energy or Materials. More sophisticated stock pickers can adjust earnings and book values for intangibles. Asset allocators who invest only in indices should stay away from a structural allocation to Value. Feature Chart 1No Premium From Value Stocks Over The Last Four Decades Betting on cheap stocks has been a cornerstone of equity investing for decades. The rationale is simple: Stocks which are undervalued, according to some measure of intrinsic value, will eventually converge up to their fair value, on average, while stocks that are overvalued will converge down, on average. Historically, this bet on mean-reversion has proven successful – low price-to-book stocks have outperformed high price-to-book stocks by more than 3% per annum since 1927. However, the recent decades have put Value investing to the test. The Value factor, as defined by Fama and French, has not provided a structural premium in the US large cap space since the late 1970s (Chart 1, panel 1). Commercial Value indices haven’t been any more successful: Value aggregates by MSCI, Russell, and S&P have either underperformed or performed in line with the market benchmark over the same time frame (Chart 1, panel 2). The current situation presents a difficult dilemma. On the one hand, buying Value could be a tremendous opportunity. By several measures, Value stocks are the most undervalued they have been since the end of the tech bubble, right before they went on a historic run (Chart 2). Academic work has argued that these deep value spreads tend to be positively correlated with long-term outperformance of Value stocks.1 In a world of sky-high valuations and with equities and bonds projected to deliver very low returns over the next decade, a cheap return stream would be a fantastic addition to most portfolios. Chart 2Value Stocks Are Really Cheap   And yet, Value has become so popular, that many investors are now worried that the Value premium may no longer exist. This worry is not without merit. Several studies have shown that factors lose a sizable portion of their premium once they appear in academic literature2  (Chart 3). Other issues, such as the inability of valuation metrics to properly account for intrinsic value in the modern economy, have also led some investors to seriously question whether buying Value indices will deliver excess returns in the future. So what is the right answer? Why has Value underperformed so much? Is the beaten down Value factor a generational buying opportunity? Or will it continue its decline going forward? In this report we try to answer these questions. Using a company-level dataset from our BCA Research Equity Analyzer (EA), as well as drawing on the latest academic research, we assess the evidence behind Five Theories On Value’s Underperformance. Once we determine which explanations have merit and which do not, we conclude by providing some guidelines on how investors should consider the Value factor going forward in our Investment Implications section. A word of caution: We have constructed our sample of companies to roughly resemble the sample used by MSCI World. Thus, the conclusions from our analysis based on the EA dataset should be relevant to Value indices in general. However, be advised that the methodology that EA uses is different from other commercial Value indices. Specifically, the EA methodology is more aggressive in its positioning and uses a wider array of metrics. For clarity, Table 1 shows the metrics used by EA compared to other Value indices. If you wish to know more on how the methodology works, please refer to the Appendix. Table 1Value Factor Methodologies Also, please note that our report will not deal with the cyclical outlook for Value. While it is entirely possible that a period of cyclical growth could help Value stocks outperform, the question we are trying to answer is whether buying cheap versus expensive stocks still provides a structural premium over the long term. While the Global Asset Allocation service does not use the Value versus Growth framework for equity allocation, our colleagues from our Global Investment Strategy service have written extensively on why they believe investors should pivot to Value on a cyclical basis.3 Five Theories On Value’s Underperformance Chart 4More To The Underperformance Of Value Than Sector Tilts Theory #1: The underperformance of Value indices is purely a result of their sector composition Some investors suggest that Value stocks’ large underweight of mega-cap tech, as well as their overweight in Financials and Energy, have been responsible for Value’s woes over the past decade. However, our research suggests that this theory is not entirely correct. A Value index with the same sector and industry weightings as the Developed Markets (DM) benchmark has still underperformed by more than 15% since 2010 (Chart 4, panel 1). Sector and industry composition have been responsible for about a third of the underperformance of the DM Value index. What about excluding the FAANGM stocks? Again, the story is similar. Even when omitting these stocks from our investment universe, Value stocks have still underperformed by almost the same amount as a regular Value composite (Chart 4, panel 2). Finally, we can also look at the performance of cheap versus expensive stocks within each industry. Chart 5A shows that cheap stocks have underperformed expensive stocks in 18 and 17 out the 24 GICS Level 2 industries in DM and in the US, respectively, since 2012 (roughly corresponding to the peak in relative performance in the EA Value index). Even on an equally-weighted basis, which eliminates the effects of large companies, cheap stocks have underperformed expensive stocks in both the average and median industry (Chart 5B). Verdict: Myth. The underperformance of cheap versus expensive stocks has been broad. While sector and industry dynamics have certainly been an important factor, Value's underperformance is not just the result of a few companies, sectors, or industries. Chart 6Value Likes Rising Yields... Theory #2: The decline in interest rates is to blame for the underperformance of Value Another reason used to explain the underperformance of Value is the secular decline in interest rates. The reasoning goes as follows: Cash flows from growth stocks are set to be received further into the future, while cash flows from Value stocks are closer to the present. Using a Discounted Cash Flow model, one can show that all else being equal, a decline in the discount rate should result in a relatively higher increase in the present value for Growth stocks versus Value stocks. There is some evidence in support of this theory. While prior to 2010, Value and interest rates had an inconsistent relationship, the beta of cheap stocks to the monthly change in the 10-year US Treasury yield has increased markedly over the past 10 years (Chart 6, panel 1). On the other hand, the beta of expensive stocks to yields has become increasingly more negative. A similar situation occurs when we use the yield curve. Cheap stocks tend to exhibit higher excess returns whenever it steepens, while expensive stocks do so when it flattens (Chart 6, panel 2). Importantly, these relationships are not purely a result of Value’s exposure to banks. Value stocks excluding financials also show a strong positive relationship to both the 10-year yield and yield curve slope versus their growth counterparts (Chart 7). But while this relationship is statistically significant, it fails to be economically significant. Our analysis shows that the betas to either interest rates or the slope of the yield curve only explain a small fraction of the performance of cheap or expensive stocks (Chart 8). This result is in line with the research from Maloney and Moskowitz, which showed that the vast majority of the decline in Value in recent years could not be explained by interest rates.4 Chart 7...Even When Excluding Financials... Chart 8...But Yields Don't Explain Much   Verdict: Myth. Cheap stocks have an increasingly positive beta to both the 10-year yield and the slope of the yield curve, whereas expensive stocks have an increasingly negative beta. However, while these betas are statistically significant, they can only account for a small portion of Value's underperformance. Theory #3: A decline in market mean-reversion is responsible for the underperformance of Value In a seminal paper, Fama and French describe the process of migration.5 Migration is when stocks move across different value buckets: For example, when stocks in the cheap bucket migrate to the neutral and expensive buckets, and when stocks in the expensive bucket migrate to the neutral or cheap buckets. Historically, this process of mean-reversion has provided a significant share of the Value premium. However, migration has declined significantly over the past decade (Chart 9, panel 1). The amount of market cap migrating each month as a percentage of total market cap has declined from over 12% before the GFC to less than 8% currently. Importantly, this decline in migration has been broad-based. Neither cheap, neutral, nor expensive stocks are moving to other valuation cohorts at the same rates that prevailed in the past (Chart 9, panel 2). The market has become much more ossified: Value stocks remain Value stocks, Neutral stocks remain Neutral stocks, and Growth stocks remain Growth stocks.5 Chart 9What Happens In Value Now Stays In Value Chart 10Market Concentration Could Be The Reason Why Migration Has Declined Why has migration declined? One theory is that industries have increasingly become more monopolistic, which means that it has become harder for new entrants to gain market share (Chart 10). Meanwhile market leaders are able to grow at an above-average pace thanks to their large network effects.6 What has been the role of this decreased migration in the performance of Value? A paper written by Arnott, Harvey, Kalesnik, and Linainmaa showed that while the returns attributable to migration have decreased over the past 15 years, this change is still not strong enough to explain the deep underperformance in Value.7 Our own research assigns it a relatively larger weight, with migration accounting for a little less than half of the underperformance of Value since 20128 (Table 2). Table 2Return Attribution Of Cheap And Expensive Stocks Verdict: Somewhat True. Migration has declined since the GFC, possibly because of an increase in monopoly power. While this decline has certainly played a role in the underperformance of Value, it explains, at most, less than half of the drawdown since 2012. Theory #4: Value has underperformed because it is increasingly a play on junk stocks It is a well-known empirical fact that cheap stocks tend to have lower Quality than expensive stocks. Conceptually this makes sense: Companies with higher profitability, more stability, and less leverage should trade at a valuation premium, whereas low income, high-debt companies should trade at a discount. However, this gap in Quality between cheap and expensive stocks is not always the same. Consider the composition of cheap and expensive stocks in 2000 – the eve of the tech bubble crash. About a third of expensive stocks were also junk (low quality), whereas 36% were quality stocks (Chart 11). Today, this composition is much different: Only about a fifth of the market capitalization of expensive stocks is junk, whereas quality stocks now make up 44% of the overall expensive cohort. On the other hand, the Quality of cheap stocks has deteriorated: Cheap junk stocks are now 37% of the cheap cohort versus 29% in 2000. Importantly, the difference in Quality between cheap and expensive stocks tends to be a good predictor for value returns (Chart 12). A big gap in the Quality factor often implies lower returns of cheap versus expensive stocks, whereas a small gap implies higher returns. These results are in line with similar research which has shown that Quality, or Quality proxies like profitability, can be used to enhance the Value factor.9 Chart 12Value Does Well When The Quality Gap Is Small Why is this the case? As we have discussed in the past, Quality has been one of the best performing factors over the past 30 years - likely driven by powerful behavioral biases as well as by the incentives in the money management industry.10 As a result, taking an overly negative position on this factor over a long enough period eventually eats away at the Value premium. Verdict: True. Value stocks today have a larger negative tilt to Quality than they did in the past. This negative tilt has hurt Value as excess returns of cheap stocks tend to be dependent on their Quality gap to expensive stocks. Theory #5: Value has underperformed because traditional valuation metrics are no longer a reliable indicator of intrinsic value How exactly to measure whether a company is cheap or expensive has been a matter of debate since the very beginnings of Value investing. Benjamin Graham famously cautioned against using book value as a measure of intrinsic value, preferring a more holistic approach. Today most index providers use a combination of traditional valuation metrics like price-to-book and price-to-earnings to build Value indices. It is fair to ask if these measures are still relevant for today’s companies. Intangible investment has become a much larger part of the economy, having surpassed tangible investment in the US in the late 1990s (Chart 13). However, both US GAAP and IFRS are very restrictive on the capitalization of R&D activities, which are known to originate valuable intangible assets.11 Other types of intangible capital such as unique production processes or customer lists are normally also expensed within SG&A expenses and are never capitalized unless there is an acquisition. This means that both the book value and earnings of intangible-heavy companies could be inadequate estimates of their true intrinsic value. Is there any evidence that this is the case? Using our EA dataset, we confirm that expensive companies generally have higher R&D expenditures as a percent of sales than cheap companies (Chart 14). Importantly, we see that the performance of Value within low R&D stocks is much better than the performance within high R&D stocks (Chart 15). This is line with the work of Dugar and Pozharny, who found that the value relevance for both earnings and book values has declined for high intangible companies, while it has stayed stable for low-intangible companies.12 This suggests that traditional valuation measures are losing their relevance as intangible-heavy companies become a larger part of the economy.13 Chart 14Growth Stocks Spend More On Intangibles Chart 15Are Traditional Metrics Underestimating Intrinsic Value In High-Intangible Companies? The effect of intangibles on traditional valuation metrics can also give us a clue as to why Value has performed well in some industries but not in others. Using a measure of intangible intensity derived by Dugar and Pozharny14 – which includes identifiable intangible assets, intellectual capital (as proxied by R&D spending), and organizational capital (as proxied by SG&A spending) – we can see that Value has done relatively better in industries with lower intangible intensity while it has performed relatively worse in industries with higher intangible intensity (Chart 16). Verdict: True. Value performs better when considering only companies with low R&D expenses or industries with low-intangible intensity. This suggests that the rise in intangible assets might be responsible for the underperformance of cheap stocks, as traditional valuation metrics may no longer be an accurate measure of intrinsic value in intangible-heavy companies or industries. Investment Implications Chart 17Investors Can Invest In Value Within Low-Intangible Sectors What does our analysis mean for investors? Aside from the most well-known practices to improve the performance of Value – for example, using a wide array of valuation metrics, exploiting value in small stocks, or using equal-weighted indices to avoid the effect of sector weightings or large companies15 – we would recommend investors first screen cheap stocks for quality to avoid Value traps. Investors should also account for the failure of traditional metrics to measure intangible assets. This can be done in two ways: The first is to take Value tilts only on intangible-light sectors such as Energy and Materials – for example, allocating only to the cheapest oil and materials stocks. For the last decade, the cheapest Energy and Materials companies have outperformed their respective sectors, even while overall Value has cratered (Chart 17). Alternatively, more sophisticated stock pickers can adjust valuation ratios to account for intangibles. There is some promise to this approach. Arnott, Harvey, Kalesnik, and Linainmaa showed that even a crude adjustment to the HML (High-Minus-Low) index consistently outperforms the regular value factor16 (Chart 18). What about asset allocators who invest only in broad indices? We would recommend that they stay away from structural allocations to commercial Value indices altogether. While it is true that sector rotations or interest-rate movements could benefit value on a short-term basis, in the long term, the negative Quality tilt of Value stocks should be a drag on returns. Additionally, it remains a big risk that indices based on traditional measures are underestimating intangible value. This underestimation will only get worse as the economy becomes more digitalized. Investors who wish to take advantage of trends like higher inflation or rising interest rates should just bet on cyclical sectors. So far this has been the right approach. Just this year, even though interest rates have increased by more than 60 basis points, and both Financials and Energy have outperformed IT by 13% and 30% respectively, Value stocks have underperformed Growth stocks (Chart 19). Chart 18Adjusting For Intangibles Improves Value Chart 19Rates Rose, Financials And Energy Outperformed IT, And Yet Value Underperformed Growth Appendix A Note On Methodology The Equity Analyzer service is a stock picking tool that applies a top-down approach to bottom-up stock picking. The crux of the platform is the BCA Score, which is a weighted composite of 30 cross sectionally percentile ranked factors. Within this report we focus on the value (price-to-earnings, price-to-book, price-to-cash, price-to-cash flow and price-to-sales) and quality (accruals, profitability, asset growth, and return on equity) factors used in the BCA Score model. Each of the factors are cross sectionally-percentile ranked, within the specified universe, where a score of 100% is best ranked stock according to that particular score. From here, we create the value and quality scores used in this report by equal-weighting and combining the scores from each value and quality factors. It is important to note that a high score does not mean the underlying value is high, but that it exhibits a better characteristic for forecasting future excess returns. For example, the stock with the highest value score would be considered the cheapest. The scores are re-calculated each period and applied on a one-period forward basis when calculating returns. To keep the analysis comparable the MSCI Data and relevant to our clients, we limit the universe of stocks to only those with a market capitalization greater than 1 billion USD. Also, unless otherwise specified, the scores are market-cap weighted when aggregated and all returns are in US dollars.   Juan Correa-Ossa, CFA Editor/Strategist juanc@bcaresearch.com Lucas Laskey Senior Quantitative Analyst lucasl@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1  Please see Clifford Asness, John M. Liew, Lasse Heje Pedersen, and Ashwin K Thapar, “Deep Value,” The Journal of Portfolio Management, 47-64 (11-40), 2021.2   2  Please see Andrew Y. Chen and Mihail Velikov, “Zeroing in on the Expected Returns of Anomalies,” Finance and Economic Discussion Series 2020-039, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Report, “Pivot To Value,” dated September 18, 2020. 4 Please see Thomas Maloney and Tobias J. Moskowitz, “Value and Interest Rates: Are Rates to Blame for Value’s Torments?” The Journal of Portfolio Management, 47-6 (65-87), 2021. 5 Please see Eugene Fama and Kenneth French, “Migration,” Financial Analyst Journal, 63-3 (48-58), 2007. 6 Please see Robert D. Arnott, Campbell R. Harvey, Vitali Kalesnik and Juhani T. Linainmaa, “Reports of Value’s death May Be Greatly Exaggerated,” Financial Analyst Journal, 77-1 (44-67), 2021. 7  Please see Robert D. Arnott, Campbell R. Harvey, Vitali Kalesnik and Juhani T. Linainmaa (2021). 8  Much like us, Lev and Srivastava assign a relatively bigger role to the decline in migration. For more details, please see Baruch Lev and Anup Srivastava, “Explaining the Recent Failure of Value Investing,” NYU Stern School of Business (2019). 9  Please see Clifford Asness, Andrea Frazzini, Ronen Israel and Tobias Moskowitz, “Fact, Fiction, and Value Investing,” The Journal of Portfolio Management, 42-1 (34-52), 2015. 10 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, “Junk Disposal: The Quality Factor In Equity Markets,” dated September 8, 2020. 11 US GAAP requires both Research and Development costs to be expensed. IFRS prohibits capitalization of Research cost but allows it for Development costs provided that some conditions are met. For a further discussion on the accounting treatment of intangibles, please see Amitabh Dugar and Jacob Pozharny, “Equity Investing in the Age of Intangibles,” Financial Analyst Journal, 77-2 (21-42), 2021. 12 Please see Amitabh Dugar and Jacob Pozharny (2021). 13This also follows from research from Lev and Srivastava which showed that while capitalizing intangibles did not improve the value factor in the 1970s, it increased returns substantially after the 1990s. For more details, please see Baruch Lev and Anup Srivastava (2019). 14This measure excludes Banks, Diversified Financials, and Insurance. For more details, please see Amitabh Dugar and Jacob Pozharny (2021). 15Please see Clifford Asness, Andrea Frazzini, Ronen Israel and Tobias Moskowitz (2015). 16Please see Robert D. Arnott, Campbell R. Harvey, Vitali Kalesnik and Juhani T. Linainmaa (2021).  

Highlights US growth will slow next year, not because demand will falter, but because supply-side constraints will prevent the economy from producing as much output as households and businesses want to buy. If aggregate demand exceeds aggregate supply, the price level will rise. We argue that the US aggregate demand curve is currently quite steep. This implies that the price level may need to rise a lot to restore balance to the economy. In fact, if the aggregate demand curve is not just steep but upward-sloping, which is quite possible, there may be no price level that brings aggregate demand in line with supply; the US economy could go supernova. When supply is the binding constraint to growth, investors need to throw the old playbook for dealing with growth slowdowns out the window. Rather than positioning for lower bond yields, investors should position for higher yields. Rather than expecting a stronger dollar, investors should expect a weaker one. Rather than favoring growth stocks, large caps, and defensives, investors should favor value stocks, small caps, and cyclicals. The Binding Constraint To Growth Is Now Supply After a post-Delta wave rebound in Q4, the US economy is expected to slow over the course of 2022. The Bloomberg consensus is for US growth to decelerate from 4.9% in 2021Q4 to 4.1% in 2022Q1, 3.9% in 2022Q2, 3.0% in 2022Q3, and 2.5% in 2022Q4. Growth in the first quarter of 2023 is expected to dip further to 2.3%. We agree that US growth will slow next year but think the market narrative around this slowdown is misguided. Chart 1Plenty Of Pent-Up Demand The standard market playbook for dealing with an economic slowdown is to position for lower bond yields, a stronger US dollar, and a decline in commodity prices. On the equity side, the playbook calls for shifting equity exposure from cyclicals to defensives, favoring large caps over small caps, and growth stocks over value stocks. There are two major problems with this narrative. First, growth is peaking at much higher levels than before and is unlikely to return to trend at least until the second half of 2023. Second, and more importantly, US growth will slow due to supply-side constraints rather than inadequate demand. US final demand will remain robust for the foreseeable future. Households are sitting on $2.3 trillion in excess savings, equivalent to 15% of annual consumption (Chart 1). The household deleveraging cycle is over. After initially plunging during the pandemic, credit card balances are rising (Chart 2). Banks are falling over themselves to make consumer loans (Chart 3). Chart 2Revolving Credit On The Rise Again Chart 3Banks Are Easing Credit Standards For Consumers Chart 4A Record Rise In Household Net Worth Household net worth has risen by over 100% of GDP since the start of the pandemic (Chart 4). As we discussed two weeks ago, the wealth effect alone could boost annual consumer spending by up to 4% of GDP. Investment demand should remain strong. Business inventories are near record low levels (Chart 5). Core capital goods orders, a leading indicator for corporate capex, have soared (Chart 6). Chart 5Business Inventories Are Near Record Low Levels Chart 6Rise In Durable Goods Orders Bodes Well For Capex Chart 7The Homeowner Vacancy Rate Is Signaling The Need For More Homebuilding The Dodge Momentum Index, which tracks planned nonresidential construction, rose to a 13-year high in October. The home­owner vacancy rate is at multi-decade lows, signifying the need for more homebuilding (Chart 7). While increased investment will augment the nation’s capital stock down the road, the short-to-medium term effect will be to inflate demand. Policy Won’t Tighten Enough To Cool The Economy What is the mechanism that will push down aggregate demand growth towards potential GDP growth? It is unlikely to be policy. While budget deficits will narrow over the next few years, the IMF still expects the US cyclically-adjusted primary budget deficit to be nearly 3% of GDP larger between 2022 and 2026 than it was between 2014 and 2019 (Chart 8). Chart 9The Fed And Investors Still Believe In Secular Stagnation   As Matt Gertken, BCA’s Chief Geopolitical Strategist, writes in this week’s US Political Strategy report, the passage of the $550 billion infrastructure bill has increased, not decreased, the odds of President Biden and the Democrats passing their social spending bill via the partisan budget reconciliation process. On the monetary side, the Federal Reserve will finish tapering asset purchases next June and begin raising rates shortly thereafter. However, the Fed has no intention of raising rates aggressively. Most FOMC members see the Fed funds rate rising to only 2.5% this cycle (Chart 9). The “dots” call for only one rate hike in 2022 and three rate hikes in both 2023 and 2024. Investors expect rates to rise even less by end-2024 than the Fed foresees (Chart 10).   The Inflation Outlook Hinges On The Slope Of The Aggregate Demand Curve If policy tightening will not suffice in cooling demand, the economy will overheat and inflation will rise. But by how much will inflation increase? The answer is of great importance to investors. It also hinges on a seemingly technical question: What is the slope of the aggregate demand curve? As Chart 11 illustrates, prices will rise more if the aggregate demand curve is steep than if it is flat. Chart 12Wages Rose Faster Than Prices During The Inflationary Late-60s and 70s It is tempting to think of the aggregate demand curve in the same way one might think of the demand curve for, say, apples. When the price of apples rises, there is both a substitution and an income effect. An increase in the price of apples will cause shoppers to substitute away from apples towards oranges. In addition, if apples are so-called “normal goods,” shoppers will buy fewer apples in response to lower real incomes. This chain of reasoning breaks down at the aggregate level. When economists say the price level has risen, they are referring to all prices; hence, there is no substitution effect. Moreover, since one person’s spending is another’s income, rising prices do not necessarily translate into lower overall real incomes. Granted, if nominal wages are sticky, as they usually are in the short run, an unanticipated increase in prices will reduce real wage income. However, this will be offset by higher business income. Over time, wages tend to catch up with prices. In fact, wage growth usually outstrips price growth during inflationary periods. For example, real wages rose during the late-1960s and 70s but fell during the disinflationary 1980s (Chart 12). Textbook Reasons For A Downward-Sloping Aggregate Demand Curve According to standard economic theory, there are three main reasons why aggregate demand curves are downward-sloping: The Pigou Effect: Higher prices erode the purchasing power of money, resulting in a negative wealth effect. The Keynes Effect: Higher prices reduce the real money supply. This pushes up real interest rates, leading to lower investment spending. The Mundell-Fleming Effect: Higher real rates push up the value of the currency, causing net exports to decline. None of these three factors are particularly important for the US these days. Chart 13Base Money Has Swollen Since The Subprime Crisis Strictly speaking, the Pigou wealth effect applies only to “base money,” also known as “outside money.” Outside money includes cash notes, coins, and bank reserves. Inside money such as bank deposits are not included in the Pigou effect because while an increase in consumer prices decreases the real value of bank deposits, it also decreases the real value of commercial bank liabilities.1  In the US, the monetary base has swollen from 6% of GDP in 2008 to 28% of GDP as a result of the Fed’s QE programs (Chart 13). Nevertheless, even if one were to generously assume a wealth effect of 10% from changes in monetary holdings, this would still imply that a 1% increase in consumer prices would reduce spending by only 0.03% of GDP. Simply put, the Pigou effect is just not all that big. In contrast to the Pigou effect, the Keynes effect has historically had a significant impact on the business cycle. However, the importance of the Keynes effect faded following the Global Financial Crisis as the Fed found itself up against the zero lower bound on interest rates. When interest rates are very low, there is little to distinguish money from bonds. Rather than holding money as a medium of exchange (i.e., for financing transactions), households and businesses end up holding money mainly as a store of wealth. In the presence of the zero bound, the demand for money becomes perfectly elastic with respect to the interest rate (Chart 14). As a result, changes in the real money supply have no effect on interest rates, and by extension, interest-rate sensitive spending. And if a decline in the real money supply does not push up interest rates, this undermines the Mundell-Fleming effect as well. Could The Aggregate Demand Curve Be Upward-Sloping? The discussion above, though rather theoretical in nature, highlights an important practical point: The aggregate demand curve may be quite steep. This means that the price level might need to rise a lot to equalize aggregate demand with aggregate supply. Chart 15US Real Bond Yields Hitting Record Lows In fact, one can easily envision a scenario where a rising price level boosts spending; that is, where the demand curve is not just steep but upward-sloping. One normally assumes that higher inflation will prompt central banks to raise rates by more than inflation has risen, leading to higher real rates. However, if the Fed drags its feet in hiking rates, as it is wont to do given its concerns about the zero bound, rising inflation will translate into a decline in real rates. Lower rates will boost demand, leading to higher inflation, and even lower real rates. In addition, lower real rates will benefit debtors, who tend to have a higher marginal propensity to spend than creditors. This, too, will also boost aggregate demand. It is striking in this regard that real bond yields hit a record low this week, with the 10-year TIPS yield falling to -1.17% and the 30-year yield drooping to -0.57% (Chart 15). Black Holes Vs. Supernovas In the case where the aggregate demand curve is upward-sloping, there is no stable equilibrium (Chart 16). If demand falls short of supply, demand will continue to shrink as the price level declines, leading to ever-rising unemployment. Unless policymakers intervene with stimulus, the economy will sink into a deflationary black hole. In contrast, if demand exceeds supply, demand will continue to rise as the price level increases exponentially. The economy will go supernova. Tick Tock Young stars fuse hydrogen into helium, releasing excess energy in the process. After the star has run out of hydrogen, if it is big enough, it will start fusing helium into heavier elements such as carbon and oxygen. The process of nucleosynthesis continues until it reaches iron. That is the end of the line. Fusing elements heavier than iron requires a net input of energy. Unable to generate enough external pressure through fusion, the star loses its battle to gravity. The core collapses, spewing material deep into interstellar space (a good thing since your body is mainly made from this stardust). Observing the star from afar, one would be hard-pressed to see anything abnormal until it explodes. The path to becoming a supernova is highly non-linear. The same is true for inflation. Just like a star with an ample supply of hydrogen, the Fed can burn through its credibility for a while longer. During the 1960s, it took four years for inflation to take off after the economy had reached full employment (Chart 17). By that time, the unemployment rate was two percentage points below NAIRU. Most of today’s inflation is confined to durable goods. This is not a sustainable source of inflation. The durable goods sector is the only part of the CPI where prices usually fall over time (Chart 18). Chart 17Inflation Spiked In The 1960s Only Once The Unemployment Rate Had Fallen Far Below Equilibrium Chart 18Inflation Has Been Concentrated In Durable Goods, A Sector Where Prices Usually Fall Over Time To get inflation to go up and stay up in modern service-based economies, wages need to rise briskly. While US wage growth has picked up, the bulk of the increase has been among low-wage workers, particularly in the services and hospitality sector (Chart 19). Chart 19Wage Growth Has Picked Up, But Mainly At The Bottom Of The Income Distribution The most likely scenario for next year is that firms will simply ration output, fearful that raising prices too quickly will hurt brand loyalty and trigger accusations of price gouging. Shortages will persist, but this time they will be increasingly concentrated in the service sector. Such a state of affairs will not last, however. Competition for workers will cause wages to rise much more than they have so far. Keen to protect profit margins, firms will start jacking up prices. A wage-price spiral will develop. The US economy could go supernova. Investment Conclusions Chart 20Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Near The Bottom End Of The Fed's Comfort Zone US growth will slow next year, not because demand will falter, but because supply-side constraints will prevent the economy from producing as much output as households and businesses want to buy. This means that the old playbook for dealing with growth slowdowns needs to be thrown out the window. Rather than positioning for lower bond yields, investors should position for higher yields. Rather than expecting a stronger dollar, investors should expect a weaker one. Rather than favoring growth stocks, large caps, and defensives, investors should favor value stocks, small caps, and cyclicals. While inflation expectations have recovered from their pandemic lows, the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate is still near the bottom end of the Fed’s comfort zone (Chart 20). Rising inflation expectations will lift long-term bond yields, justifying a short duration stance in fixed-income portfolios. Higher bond yields will benefit value stocks. Chart 21 shows that there has been a strong correlation between the relative performance of growth and value stocks and the 30-year bond yield this year. Rising input prices will make the US export sector less competitive, leading to a weaker dollar. Historically, non-US stocks have done well when the dollar has been weakening (Chart 22). Chart 21The Relative Performance of Value Stocks Has Closely Tracked Bond Yields This Year Chart 22Non-US Stocks Tend To Do Best When The US Dollar Is Weakening As for the overall stock market, with the Fed still in the dovish camp, it is too early to turn negative on equities. An equity bear market is coming, but not until rising inflation forces the Fed to step up the pace of rate hikes. That will probably not happen until mid-2023. Short Gilt Trade Activated We noted last week that we would go short the 10-year UK Gilt if the yield broke below 0.85%. Our limit order was activated on November 5th and we are now short this security.   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist pberezin@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1  To distinguish between inside and outside money, one should ask where the liability resides. If the liability resides within the private sector, it is inside money. By convention, central bank reserves are classified as outside money. However, one could argue that since taxpayers ultimately own the central bank, an increase in the price level will benefit taxpayers by eroding the real value of the central bank’s liability. If one were to take this view, the Pigou effect would be even weaker. Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores

Highlights Equity valuations are extremely stretched versus bonds, so there is little wiggle room for bonds to sell off before pulling down large tracts of the stock market. We estimate that bond yields can rise by no more than 30 bps, before the Fed is forced to talk them back down again. Starting from an earnings yield that is extreme versus its history, we should prudently assume that the prospective long-term real return from equities will be far below the current earnings yield of 4.6 percent, and closer to zero, even if not actually negative. In capitalist economies, gluts may or may not lead to shortages; but shortages always lead to gluts. In other words, the current inflation is sowing the seeds of its own destruction. Hence, we reiterate our structural recommendation to overweight US T-bonds versus US TIPS. Fractal analysis: Cotton, and Polish equities. Feature Chart of the WeekTech Stocks Have Been Tracking The 30-Year T-Bond Price One-For-One Equity valuations are extremely stretched versus bonds. The upshot is that there is little wiggle room for bonds to sell off before pulling down large tracts of the stock market. This is not just an abstract hypothesis – it is an empirical fact, as recent market action is making painfully clear. Since February, the global tech sector has tracked the 30-year T-bond price almost one-for-one. The near perfect fit proves that the tech (and broader growth stock) rally has been entirely premised on the bond market rally. Hence, on the three occasions that bonds have sold off sharply – including in the last couple of weeks – tech stocks have sold off sharply too (Chart of the Week). Put simply, the performance of the tech sector is being driven by the change in its valuation, and the change in its valuation is being driven by the change in the bond yield (Chart I-2). Chart I-2Tech Stock Valuations Are Being Driven By The Bond Yield Of course, stock prices are also premised on earnings. So, given enough time, rising earnings can make valuations less stretched, adding more wiggle room for bonds to sell off. The trouble is that a change in earnings happens much more gradually than can a change in valuation – a 10 percent rise in earnings can take a year, whereas a 10 percent fall in valuation can happen in a week. Bond Yields Remain The Dominant Driver Of The Stock Market For the next few months at least, the movement in bond yields will remain the dominant driver of the most stretched parts of the stock market and, by extension, the overall market itself. This is especially true for the growth-heavy S&P 500 which, since March, has been tracking the 30-year T-bond price one-for-one (Chart I-3). Chart I-3The S&P 500 Has Also Been Tracking The 30-Year T-Bond Price One-For-One The key question for investors is, what is the upper limit to bond yields before stock market damage causes the Federal Reserve to talk them down again? To answer this question, our working assumption is that a 15 percent drawdown in growth stocks would damage the growth-heavy S&P 500 enough – and thereby worsen ‘financial conditions’ enough – for the Fed to change its tone. Based on this year’s very tight relationship between tech stocks and the 30-year T-bond yield, a 15 percent drawdown would occur if the 30-year T-bond yield increased to 2.4 percent from 2.1 percent today (Chart I-4). Chart I-4The Fed's 'Pain Point' Is Only 30 Basis Points Away This confirms our view that the resistance level to long-duration bond yields is around 30 bps above current levels, equivalent to around 1.8 percent on the 10-year T-bond yield. More About The ‘Negative Equity Risk Premium’ Our recent report The Equity Risk Premium Turns Negative For The First Time Since 2002 caused quite a stir. So, let’s elaborate and clarify the arguments we made about the equity risk premium (ERP) – the estimated excess return that stocks will deliver over bonds over a long investment horizon, such as 10 years. Many investors estimate the ERP by taking the stock market’s earnings yield – currently 4.6 percent in the US1 – and subtracting the real 10-year bond yield – currently -0.9 percent on US Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS). At first glance, this presents a very generous ERP of 5.5 percent. So, equities are attractively valued versus bonds, right? Wrong. The glaring error is that the earnings yield estimates the stock market’s prospective return only if the earnings yield starts and ends at the same level. If it does not, then the prospective return could be very different to the earnings yield. For example, imagine that the stock market was trading at a bubble price-to-earnings multiple of 100, meaning an earnings yield of 1 percent. Clearly, from such a bubble valuation, nobody would expect the market to return 1 percent. Instead, as the bubble burst, and valuations normalised, the prospective return would be deeply negative. It follows that when, as now, the earnings yield is extreme versus its history, we must build in some prudent normalisation to estimate the prospective return. The question is, how? One approach is to use history to inform us of the likely normalisation. Chart I-5 does this using the ‘best-fit’ relationship between the earnings yield at each point through 1990-2011 and subsequent 10-year real return from each starting point. Using the best-fit for this specific episode, the current earnings yield of 4.6 percent implies a prospective 10-year real return not of 4.6 percent, but of -1.1 percent. Chart I-5Based On History, The Current Earnings Yield Implies A Prospective 10-Year Real Return Much Less Than 4.6 Percent Yet this best-fit approach meets a common reproach – that the best-fit for this specific episode is massively distorted by the dot com bubble peak and the global financial crisis (GFC) trough occurring (by coincidence) almost 10 years apart. We can counter this reproach in two ways. First, the best-fit relationship is much better than the raw earnings yield even for undistorted 10-year periods such as 1995-2005 or 2011-2021. Better still, we can change the prospective return from 10 years to 7 years and thereby remove the dot com bubble peak to GFC trough distortion. Chart I-6 shows that this 7-year best-fit relationship also works much better than the raw earnings yield. Chart I-6Based On History, The Current Earnings Yield Implies A Prospective 7-Year Real Return Much Less Than 4.6 Percent Admittedly, the best-fit comes from just one episode in history, and there is no certainty that the 10-year and 7-year relationships that applied during that one episode should apply through 2021-31 and 2021-28 respectively. Nevertheless, starting from an earnings yield that is extreme versus its history, as is the case now, we should prudently assume that the prospective long-term real return from equities will be far below 4.6 percent, and closer to zero, even if not actually negative. Will The ‘Real’ Real Yield Please Stand Up Measuring the ERP also requires an estimate of the prospective real return on bonds. This part should be easy because the yield on the US 10-year TIPS – currently -0.9 percent – is the guaranteed 10-year real return of buying and holding that investment. It is derived by taking the yield on the 10-year T-bond – currently 1.5 percent – and subtracting the market’s expected rate of inflation over the next 10 years – currently 2.4 percent. But the equivalent real return on the much larger conventional bond market could be quite different. In this case, it will be the 10-year T-bond yield minus the actual rate of inflation over the next 10 years. To the extent that the actual rate of inflation turns out less than the expected rate of 2.4 percent, the real return on the T-bond will turn out higher than that on the TIPS. In fact, this has consistently turned out to be the case. The market has consistently overestimated the inflation rate over the subsequent 10 years, meaning that the real return on T-bonds has been around 1 percent higher than that on TIPS (Chart I-7). Chart I-7Will The 'Real' Real Yield Please Stand Up Yet given the current surge in inflation, and no end in sight for supply chain disruptions and bottlenecks, is it plausible that the next ten years’ rate of inflation will be lower than 2.4 percent? The answer is yes. Because, as my colleague Peter Berezin points out: in capitalist economies, gluts may or may not lead to shortages; but shortages always lead to gluts. And gluts always cause prices to collapse. In other words, the current inflation is sowing the seeds of its own destruction. Hence, we reiterate our structural recommendation to overweight US T-bonds versus US TIPS. The Cotton Is Stretched, And So Are Polish Equities Talking of shortages, cotton now adds to the list of commodities in which supply bottlenecks have raised prices to extremes. Cotton prices have reached a 10-year high due to weather conditions in the US (the world’s biggest cotton producer) combined with shipping disruptions. However, with cotton now exhibiting extreme fragility on its combined 130/260-day fractal structure, there is a high likelihood of a price reversal in the coming months when the shortage turns into a glut (Chart I-8). Chart I-8The Cotton Is Stretched Meanwhile, the bank-heavy Polish equity market has surged on the back of the spectacular outperformance of its banks sector. This strong uptrend has now reached the point of fragility on its 130-day fractal structure that has indicated several previous reversals (Chart I-9). Chart I-9Poland's Outperformance Is Stretched Accordingly, this week’s recommended trade is to underweight the Warsaw General Index versus the Eurostoxx 600, setting a profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 6 percent.   Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Based on the 12-month forward earnings yield. Fractal Trading System Fractal Trades 6-Month Recommendations Structural And Thematic Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades     Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Euro Area Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Europe Ex Euro Area   Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Asia Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Other Developed   Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-5Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations   Chart II-6Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations