Asset Allocation
Highlights ‘Value’ sector profits are in terminal decline. Bank profits are in terminal decline, because private sector credit is now ‘maxed out’, and the intermediation between borrowers and savers can be done more cost-effectively by the blockchain. Oil and gas profits are in terminal decline, because we now rely less on the energy stored in ‘chemical bonds’ of portable fossil fuels, and rely more on the energy of ‘moving electrons’ generated from unportable alternative energy sources. Basic resources profits are in terminal decline, because we now rely less on the ‘physical stuff’ that requires basic resources. As such, structurally overweighting the value-heavy European market versus the growth-heavy US market is a ‘widow maker’ trade. The caveat is that a vicious snapback out of growth into value is possible when a universally accepted treatment for Covid-19 is found. Or if bond yields spike. This would create a burst of outperformance from Europe, but any such snapback would be a brief interruption to the mega downtrend. Fractal trade: Long RUB/CZK. Feature Chart of the WeekValue' Has Underperformed For 12 Years... But The Mega Downtrend Isn't Over
Value' Has Underperformed For 12 Years... But The Mega Downtrend Isn't Over
Value' Has Underperformed For 12 Years... But The Mega Downtrend Isn't Over
I have just returned from a summer holiday, on which I took a clean break from the financial markets. A clean break that is highly recommended for anybody who looks at the markets day in, day out. Nevertheless, I made two market-relevant observations. First, that having to wear a face mask on an aeroplane was an unpleasant experience. Tolerable for a short-haul flight lasting a couple of hours, but something that would be unbearable for the duration of a long-haul flight. Second, that even the most popular bars and restaurants in the most popular places were operating at half capacity. They were fully booked, yet the requirements of physical distancing at the bar, and between tables, meant that their operating capacity and revenues had collapsed. Worse, the owners feared a further hit in the winter when eating and drinking in their outdoors spaces became impossible. The use of face masks and physical distancing cripples any economic activity that requires you to have your (uncovered) mouth and nose in proximity to others. These first-hand experiences simply confirm the message in An Economy Without Mouths Or Noses Will Lose 10 Percent Of Jobs.1 The use of face masks and physical distancing cripples any economic activity that requires you to have your (uncovered) mouth and nose in proximity to others – like flying, or drinking and eating out. Hence, if governments remove the financial incentives for employers to retain workers while the pandemic is still rampant, expect structural unemployment to rise sharply. In which case, expect bond yields to remain ultra-low, and where possible, go even lower. And expect ‘growth’ sectors to continue outperforming ‘value’ sectors. Explaining Recent Market Action Returning to the financial markets after a break, several things stood out. Apple has become America’s first $2 trillion company, while HSBC’s share price is within a whisker of its 2008 crisis low. This vignette encapsulates that growth sectors – broadly defined as tech and healthcare – have been roaring ahead, while value sectors – broadly defined as banks, oil and gas, and basic resources – have been struggling. Hence, the growth-heavy S&P500 has reached a new all-time high, while the value-heavy FTSE100 and other European indexes are still deeply in the red for 2020 and have recently drifted lower (Chart I-2). The combined effect is that the strong recovery in global stocks has taken a breather. Chart I-2US Market At All-Time High, But European Markets Still Deeply In The Red
US Market At All-Time High, But European Markets Still Deeply In The Red
US Market At All-Time High, But European Markets Still Deeply In The Red
In turn, the breather in the stock market explains the recent support to the dollar. Significantly, the 2020 evolution of the dollar is a perfect mirror-image of the stock market. Nothing more, nothing less. If the stock market gives back some of its gains, expect the countertrend strengthening in the dollar to continue (Chart I-3). Chart I-3The Dollar Is A Mirror-Image Of The Stock Market
The Dollar Is A Mirror-Image Of The Stock Market
The Dollar Is A Mirror-Image Of The Stock Market
Yet the best performing major asset-class in 2020 is not growth equities, nor is it gold. Instead, it is the US 30-year T-bond, which has returned a spectacular 32 percent (Chart I-4). Chart I-4The Best Performing Major Asset-Class Is The 30-Year T-Bond
The Best Performing Major Asset-Class Is The 30-Year T-Bond
The Best Performing Major Asset-Class Is The 30-Year T-Bond
Suddenly, everything becomes crystal clear. If the ultra-long bond has surged, then other ultra-long duration investments must also surge. Within equities, this means that growth sectors, whose profits are skewed to the very distant future, must receive a huge boost to their valuations. Whereas value sectors whose profits are not growing will receive a smaller (or no) valuation boost. In fact, the value sectors have a much bigger structural problem. Not only are their profits not growing. Their profits are in terminal decline. Since 2008, Overweighting Value Has Been A ‘Widow Maker’ In the 34 years through 1975-2008, value trebled relative to growth.2 Albeit, with the occasional vicious countertrend move, such as the dot com bubble. But through 2009-2020, the tables turned. For the past 12 years, value has structurally underperformed growth and given back around half of its 1975-2008 outperformance (Chart of the Week). This means that for the past 12 years ‘proxy’ value versus growth positions have also structurally underperformed. The best example of such a proxy position is overweighting the value-heavy European market or Emerging Markets versus the growth-heavy US market. Since 2008, underweighting the US market has been a ‘widow maker’ trade. A widow maker trade is when you are on the wrong side of a megatrend. A widow maker trade is when you are on the wrong side of a megatrend. It is a widow maker because it can kill your career, or your finances, or both. The big danger is that a widow maker trade can last for decades. As the uptrend in value versus growth lasted more than three decades, there is no reason to suppose that the downtrend cannot also last a very long time. What drove value’s outperformance for 34 years, and what is driving its underperformance for the past 12 years? The simple answer is the structural trend in profits. Until 2008, the profits of banks, oil and gas, and basic resources kept up with, or even beat, the profits of technology and healthcare. This, combined with the higher yield on these value sectors, resulted in the multi-decade 200 percent outperformance of value versus growth. But since 2008, while the profits of technology and healthcare have continued their strong uptrends, the profits of banks, oil and gas, and basic resources have entered major structural downtrends. It is our high conviction view that these declines are terminal, and the reasons are nothing to do with the pandemic (Chart I-5). Chart I-5Value Sector Profits Are In A Major Structural Downtrend
Value Sector Profits Are In A Major Structural Downtrend
Value Sector Profits Are In A Major Structural Downtrend
Sector Profit Outlooks In One Sentence Each When a sector’s profits flip from a multi-decade uptrend to a multi-decade downtrend, it is almost unheard of for them to reflip into a new uptrend. Essentially, the sector has entered a terminal decline. As strong believers in brevity, we can summarise the reason for the terminal declines in one sentence per sector, as follows: When a sector’s profits flip from a multi-decade uptrend to a multi-decade downtrend, it is almost unheard of for them to reflip into a new uptrend. Bank profits are in terminal decline, because private sector credit is now ‘maxed out’, and the intermediation between borrowers and savers can be done more cost-effectively by the blockchain (Chart I-6). Chart I-6Bank Profits In Terminal Decline
Bank Profits In Terminal Decline
Bank Profits In Terminal Decline
Oil and gas profits are in terminal decline, because we now rely less on the energy stored in ‘chemical bonds’ of portable fossil fuels, and rely more on the energy of ‘moving electrons’ generated from unportable alternative energy sources (Chart I-7). Chart I-7Oil And Gas Profits In Terminal Decline
Oil And Gas Profits In Terminal Decline
Oil And Gas Profits In Terminal Decline
Basic resources profits are in terminal decline, because we now rely less on the ‘physical stuff’ that requires basic resources (Chart I-8). Chart I-8Basic Resources Profits In Terminal Decline
Basic Resources Profits In Terminal Decline
Basic Resources Profits In Terminal Decline
Conversely: Technology profits can grow, because we now rely more on information, ideas, and advice, and over half of the world’s population is still not connected to the internet (Chart I-9). Chart I-9Technology Profits Continue To Grow
Technology Profits Continue To Grow
Technology Profits Continue To Grow
Healthcare profits can grow, because as economies (and people) mature, they spend a much greater proportion of their income on healthcare to improve the quality and quantity of life (Chart I-10). Chart I-10Healthcare Profits Continue To Grow
Healthcare Profits Continue To Grow
Healthcare Profits Continue To Grow
Nevertheless, a vicious snapback out of growth into value is possible. Indeed, it is to be expected when a universally accepted treatment for Covid-19 is found. Or if bond yields spike. But any such snapback, even if vicious, will be a brief countertrend rally in a terminal decline. This is because the megatrends driving down value sector profits were already in place long before the pandemic hit. The pandemic just gave the megatrends an extra nudge. This is our high conviction view. Fractal Trading System* This week’s recommended trade is long RUB/CZK, with the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss set at 5 percent. In other trades, the explosive rallies in precious metals reached exhaustion as anticipated by their fragile fractal structures. This has taken our short gold versus lead position into profit. However, short silver was stopped out before its rally eventually ended. The rolling 1 year win ratio now stands at 60 percent. Chart I-11RUB/CZK
RUB/CZK
RUB/CZK
When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report "An Economy Without Mouths Or Noses Will Lose 10 Percent Of Jobs", dated July 30, 2020 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 2 In total return terms. Fractal Trading System Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields
Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields
Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields
Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields
Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields
Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields
Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields
Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields
Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields
Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields
Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields
Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields
Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights Negative Rates: The persistence of the COVID-19 pandemic is intensifying pressure on policymakers in many countries to provide more stimulus. The odds that a new central bank will join the negative policy interest rate club are increasing. UK vs. New Zealand: Recent comments from Bank of England and Reserve Bank of New Zealand officials have hinted at the possibility of a shift to negative policy rates, should conditions warrant. The odds are greater for such a move in New Zealand. Go long 10-year New Zealand government bonds versus 10-year UK Gilts (currency-hedged into GBP) on tactical (0-6 months) basis. Feature Policymakers around the world are, once again, under increasing pressure to contemplate new responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, which continues to rage through much of the US and emerging world and is flaring up again across Europe. Additional fiscal policy measures will likely be necessary, but it is increasingly politically difficult in many countries to ramp up government support measures – or even extend existing programs - after the massive increase in deficits and debt undertaken this past spring. Chart of the WeekA Bull Market In Negative-Yielding Debt
A Bull Market In Negative-Yielding Debt
A Bull Market In Negative-Yielding Debt
An inadequate fiscal response will put even more pressure on monetary policy to give a boost to virus-stricken economies. Yet fresh options there are even more limited. Policy rates are already near 0% in all developed nations, with central banks promising to keep them there for at least the next couple of years. Central banks are also rapidly expanding their balance sheets to buy up assets via quantitative easing programs. A move to sub-0% policy rates may be the next option for central banks not already there like the ECB and the Bank of Japan. Although it remains questionable how much more stimulus monetary policy could hope to deliver. Government bond yields are at or near historic lows in most countries, while equity and credit markets continue to enjoy a spectacular recovery from the rout in February and March. The stock of global negative-yielding debt has risen to $16 trillion, according to Bloomberg, which remains close to the highs seen over the past few years (Chart of the Week). So who will be the next central bank to cross that bridge into negative rate territory? US Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell, Bank of Canada Governor Tiff Macklem and Reserve Bank of Australia Governor Philip Lowe have all publicly dismissed the need for negative rates in their economies. Recent comments from Bank of England (BoE) Governor Andrew Bailey and Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) Governor Adrian Orr, however, have suggested that negative rates could be a future policy choice, if needed. New Zealand looks like the more likely candidate to go to negative rates sometime in the next 3-6 months. Markets are increasingly discounting those outcomes. The UK Gilt yield curve is trading below 0% out to the 6-year maturity, while New Zealand nominal government bond yields are trading at or below a mere 0.3% out to 7-years (and where real yields on inflation-linked bonds have recently turned negative). Of the two, New Zealand looks like the more likely candidate to go to negative rates sometime in the next 3-6 months. A Negative Rates Checklist For The UK & New Zealand In a Special Report we published back in May, we looked back at the decisions that drove the move to negative policy rates by the ECB, Bank of Japan, Swiss National Bank and the Riksbank, with a goal of determining if such an outcome could happen elsewhere.1 We were motivated by the growing market chatter suggesting that the Fed would eventually be forced to cut the fed funds rate to sub-0% territory to fight the deep COVID-19 recession. Chart 2The Fundamental Case For Negative Rates
The Fundamental Case For Negative Rates
The Fundamental Case For Negative Rates
We concluded in that report that such a move was unlikely, but could occur if there was a contraction in US credit growth and/or a spike in the US dollar to new cyclical highs, both outcomes that would result in a major drop in US inflation expectations. Such moves preceded the shift to negative rates in those other countries during 2014-16, as a way to lower borrowing costs and weaken currencies. Since that May report, the US dollar has depreciated and US credit growth has continued to expand amid very stimulative financial conditions, thus the odds of the Fed having to cut the funds rate below 0% are very low. The Fed is far more likely to dovishly alter its forward guidance, or even institute yield curve control to cap US Treasury yields, to deliver additional monetary easing, if necessary. (NOTE: next week, we will be discussing the Fed’s next possible policy moves, and the potential impact on financial markets, in a Special Report jointly published with our colleagues at BCA Research US Bond Strategy). The pressure to consider negative interest rates in the non-negative rate developed market countries remains strong, however, after the major increase in unemployment rates and sharp falls in inflation seen earlier this year (Chart 2). Putting current levels of both into a simple Taylor Rule formula suggests that the “appropriate” level of nominal policy rates is currently negative in the US and Canada, mainly because of the double-digit unemployment rates in those countries. Taylor Rules for the UK and New Zealand remain slightly positive, however, at 0.2% and 0.9%, respectively. Yet the forecasts for inflation and unemployment from the BoE and RBNZ suggest a diverging dynamic between the two over the next couple of years. The BoE is forecasting a very sharp recovery from the 2020 recession, with the UK unemployment rate projected to fall back to 4.7% by 2022 from the surge to 7.5% this year. At the same time, the RBNZ’s forecasts are more cautious, with the New Zealand unemployment rate expected to fall to only 6.1% in 2022 from the projected 8.1% peak at the end of this year. Thus, the implied Taylor Rules using those forecasts suggest a need for negative rates in New Zealand, but a rising path for UK policy rates over the next two years (Chart 3). Clearly, markets are taking the RBNZ’s open talk about negative interest rates to heart, while remaining skeptical that the BoE’s optimistic path for the post-virus UK economy will come to fruition. Despite the diverging trajectory in policy rates implied by the two central banks’ forecasts, markets are pricing in a more similar path for rates. Forward overnight index swap (OIS) rates are discounting slightly negative rates in the UK and New Zealand to the end of 2022 (Chart 4). Clearly, markets are taking the RBNZ’s open talk about negative interest rates to heart, while remaining skeptical that the BoE’s optimistic path for the post-virus UK economy will come to fruition. Chart 3Mapping Central Bank Projections Into The Taylor Rule
Mapping Central Bank Projections Into The Taylor Rule
Mapping Central Bank Projections Into The Taylor Rule
Chart 4Markets Pricing Slightly Negative Rates In The UK & NZ
Markets Pricing Slightly Negative Rates In The UK & NZ
Markets Pricing Slightly Negative Rates In The UK & NZ
The individual cases of the UK and New Zealand as current candidates for negative interest rates can help derive a list of factors to monitor to determine if negative rates would be a more likely policy outcome for any central bank. Based on our read of recent comments from BoE and RBNZ officials, combined with our assessment of what took place in other countries that moved to negative rates in the past, we would include the following in any Negative Rates Checklist: Policymaker perceptions on the effective lower bound (ELB) on policy rates For central bankers, the ELB (or “reversal rate”) is defined as the policy rate below which additional rate cuts are deemed counterproductive to stimulating the economy. For example, cutting rates too low could limit the ability of the banking system to earn interest income, thus hindering banks’ appetite to make new loans. Chart 5Could The Effective Lower Bound Be Negative In the UK & NZ?
Could The Effective Lower Bound Be Negative In the UK & NZ?
Could The Effective Lower Bound Be Negative In the UK & NZ?
For most central banks, the belief is that the ELB is at or just above 0%. It is possible that because of a structural shift, a central bank could deem the ELB to be negative in that particular economy. That could be because of a sharp deterioration in trend economic growth or a rapid rise in debt or a belief that the banking system was strong enough to handle the income shock of negative rates. Currently, potential GDP growth rate estimates have been marked down in both the UK and New Zealand because of the 2020 COVID-19 recession (Chart 5). In New Zealand, taking the average of the RBNZ’s real GDP growth forecasts for the next three years as a proxy for trend growth suggests that trend growth is now around 1.2%, similar to the reduced estimates of UK potential GDP growth. In terms of debt levels, the ratio of total public and private non-financial debt to GDP is close to 400% in the UK, which is far greater than the 126% level of that same ratio in New Zealand. In terms of banking system health, banks in both countries are well capitalized. The Tier 1 capital ratio of the major UK banks is 14.5%, while the similar figure in New Zealand is 13.5%; both figures are provided by the BoE and RBNZ, respectively. Stress tests run by the central banks in recent months indicate that capital levels will remain adequate even after the likely hit from loan losses due to the severity of the 2020 economic downturn. Our assessment is that both the BoE and RBNZ can claim that the ELB is in fact below zero, based on the slow pace of trend economic growth in both. In the case of the UK, high debt levels also suggest that policy rates may have to go below 0% to generate any stimulus to growth via new borrowing activity. In both countries, the central banks can claim that the banking system can handle a period of negative rates, if policymakers go down that road to boost economic growth. Economic confidence is depressed An extended period of weak economic activity and depressed confidence can trigger a need to move to negative policy rates if rates were already at 0%. Currently, UK economic confidence is in tatters after the -20% decline in real GDP seen in the second quarter of 2020. The GfK consumer confidence index remains at recessionary low levels, while the BoE Agents’ survey of UK firms shows a collapse in plans for investment and hiring over the next year (Chart 6). Chart 6A Severe Hit To UK Growth & Confidence
A Severe Hit To UK Growth & Confidence
A Severe Hit To UK Growth & Confidence
New Zealand, the economy contracted -1.6% in the first quarter of the year with consensus forecasts calling for a -20% collapse in the second quarter. Yet economic confidence is surprisingly resilient. The Westpac survey of consumer confidence is falling, but the July reading was still above typical recessionary lows (Chart 7). The ANZ survey of business investing and hiring intentions has been surprisingly upbeat of late, rebounding from the April trough but still below pre-virus levels. Our assessment here is that the BoE has a stronger case for moving to negative rates, based on the deeper collapse in confidence in the UK compared to New Zealand. Inflation expectations are too low If inflation expectations remain too low once rates have hit 0%, then inflation-targeting central banks must consider more extraordinary options to revive inflation expectations. That could take the form of extended forward guidance on future interest rate moves, expanding the size and scope of quantitative easing programs, or cutting policy rates into negative territory. Currently, inflation expectations remain elevated in the UK. 5-year CPI swaps, 5-years forward, are now at 3.6%, while the Citigroup/YouGov survey of household inflation expectations 5-10 years out sits at 3.3% (Chart 8). In New Zealand, the RBNZ inflation survey shows inflation expectations have fallen into the bottom half of the central bank’s 1-3% target band. Chart 7Only A Very Modest Downturn In NZ
Only A Very Modest Downturn In NZ
Only A Very Modest Downturn In NZ
Chart 8Inflation Expectations Are Much Lower In NZ
Inflation Expectations Are Much Lower In NZ
Inflation Expectations Are Much Lower In NZ
Our assessment here is that only the RBNZ can argue for a move to negative rates because of weak inflation expectations. Our assessment here is that only the RBNZ can argue for a move to negative rates because of weak inflation expectations. Financial conditions turning more restrictive Chart 9The News Is Mixed On UK & NZ Financial Conditions
The News Is Mixed On UK & NZ Financial Conditions
The News Is Mixed On UK & NZ Financial Conditions
Another reason why a central bank could try negative rates is if asset prices were trading at depressed levels even after policy rates were at 0%. The current signals on financial conditions in the UK and New Zealand are generally stimulative, but more so in the latter. Currently, the MSCI equity index for New Zealand is nearing the all-time high reached in 1987, while the equivalent UK equity index is languishing near the lows of the past decade (Chart 9). The New Zealand dollar and British pound have both bounced off the cyclical lows seen earlier this year (more on that later). The annual growth rates of nominal house prices have started to pick up in both countries, but with a faster pace in New Zealand. Finally, corporate credit spreads have narrowed sharply since the end of the first quarter in both countries, with New Zealand spreads actually falling below the pre-virus levels seen this year. Our assessment here is that financial conditions in both countries remain generally stimulative, but more so in New Zealand. Neither central bank can point to restrictive financial conditions as a reason to move to negative rates. Signs of impairment of the transmission of policy interest rates to actual borrowing costs If bank lending growth was weakening and/or borrowing rates remained high relative to policy rates, this could be a sign that negative policy rates are necessary to induce greater loan demand by lowering borrowing costs. Chart 10NZ Lenders Are Not Passing On RBNZ Rate Cuts
NZ Lenders Are Not Passing On RBNZ Rate Cuts
NZ Lenders Are Not Passing On RBNZ Rate Cuts
Currently, the annual growth rate of bank lending is slowing in New Zealand, but remains positive at 4.5% (Chart 10). Loan growth in the UK is now a much more robust 7.4%, but some of that growth is due to UK companies drawing down lines of credit with their banks to survive during the COVID-19 lockdowns. A bigger issue is the lack of the full pass-through of the RBNZ’s recent cuts into borrowing rates, especially for home loans. The spread between 5-year fixed mortgage rates and the RBNZ cash rate is now an elevated 387bps, while the equivalent spread in the UK is much lower at 160bps. Our assessment here is that only the RBNZ can argue that an impaired transmission of policy rate cuts to actual borrowing rates could justify a move to negative rates. Scope For Currency Depreciation For any central bank, a benefit of a negative interest rate policy is that it can trigger more stimulus via a weaker currency. This can help boost economic growth by making exports more competitive, while also helping lift inflation by raising the cost of imports. On the growth side, a weaker currency would be somewhat more helpful for New Zealand where exports are 19% of GDP, compared to 16% in the UK. (Chart 11). That is an important distinction, as there is greater scope for the New Zealand dollar (NZD) to depreciate if the RBNZ went to negative rates than for the British pound (GBP) to weaken if the BoE did the same. Chart 11A New Experiment? Negative Rates With A Current Account Deficit
A New Experiment? Negative Rates With A Current Account Deficit
A New Experiment? Negative Rates With A Current Account Deficit
Chart 12BoE Does Not Need To Go Negative To Weaken The Pound
BoE Does Not Need To Go Negative To Weaken The Pound
BoE Does Not Need To Go Negative To Weaken The Pound
Perhaps the most interesting feature of this entire negative rates discussion is that, for the first time in the “negative rates era”, central banks of countries with current account deficits are considering pushing policy rates below 0%. For the first time in the “negative rates era”, central banks of countries with current account deficits are considering pushing policy rates below 0%. The UK and New Zealand both have similarly sized current account deficits, equal to -3.3% and -2.7% of GDP, respectively (middle panel). At the same time, both countries have net foreign direct investment surpluses roughly equal to those current account deficits, leaving their basic balances around 0 (bottom panel). In other words, both countries currently attract enough long-term foreign direct investment inflows to “fund” their current account deficits. Foreign investors may be less willing to continue buying as many New Zealand or UK financial assets if either country went to a negative interest rate to intentionally weaken the currency, as the RBNZ has publicly stated would be a desired outcome of such a move. Chart 13RBNZ Could Go Negative To Weaken The Kiwi
RBNZ Could Go Negative To Weaken The Kiwi
RBNZ Could Go Negative To Weaken The Kiwi
Our colleagues at BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy estimate that, on purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, the GBP/USD exchange rate is now -20% below its long-run fair value (Chart 12). The level of the currency is also broadly in line with the current level of interest rate differentials between the UK and the US (bottom panel). In other words, the GBP is already cheap and additional rate cuts would have limited impact in driving the currency lower. It is a different story for NZD/USD, which is fairly valued on a PPP basis but remains elevated relative to New Zealand-US interest rate differentials (Chart 13). Therefore, our assessment is that only the RBNZ can credibly generate meaningful currency weakness from a move to negative rates. Summing it all up Based on the elements of our Negative Rates Checklist, we deem it more likely for the RBNZ to go negative than the BoE. In the UK, there is less evidence pointing to a significantly impaired credit channel that could be remedied by negative rates, inflation expectations are elevated, and the pound is already at undervalued levels. In New Zealand, previous RBNZ rate cuts have not fully flowed through into bank lending rates, inflation expectations are low, and the New Zealand dollar is at fair value (and, therefore, has room to become cheaper via negative rates). Based on the elements of our Negative Rates Checklist, we deem it more likely for the RBNZ to go negative than the BoE. Bottom Line: The persistence of the COVID-19 pandemic is intensifying pressure on policymakers in many countries to provide more stimulus. The odds that a new central bank will join the negative policy interest rate club are increasing. Recent comments from Bank of England and Reserve Bank of New Zealand officials have hinted at the possibility of a shift to negative policy rates, should conditions warrant. The odds are greater for such a move in New Zealand. A Negative Rates Trade Idea: Go Long New Zealand Government Bonds Vs. UK Gilts Chart 14Go Long 10yr NZ Govt. Bonds Vs 10yr UK Gilts
Go Long 10yr NZ Govt. Bonds Vs 10yr UK Gilts
Go Long 10yr NZ Govt. Bonds Vs 10yr UK Gilts
Based on our analysis above, we are adding a new cross-country spread trade to our Tactical Overlay Trades list on page 18: going long 10-year New Zealand government bonds versus 10-year UK Gilts on a currency-hedged basis (i.e. hedging the NZD exposure into GBP). The trade is to be implemented using on-the-run cash bonds. The current unhedged NZ-UK 10-year yield spread is +36bps, but even on a hedged basis (using 3-month currency forwards) the yield differential is still positive at +23bps (Chart 14). We are targeting zero for the unhedged spread, to be realized sometime within the six months. We like this trade because it can win not only from a decline in New Zealand bond yields if the RBNZ goes to negative rates (as we think is increasingly likely), but also from a potential rise in Gilt yields if the BoE defies market pricing and does not go to negative rates. If both countries keep rates on hold, then the trade will earn a small positive spread over the current meagre level of Gilt yields. Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research Special Report, "Negative Rates: Coming Soon To A Bond Market Near You?", dated May 20, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index
Assessing The Leading Candidates To Join The Negative Rate Club
Assessing The Leading Candidates To Join The Negative Rate Club
Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
Highlights ESG-related equities have outperformed global benchmarks over the past two years, as well as during the recent equity selloff. Investor demand and institutional pressure will drive the financial industry to analyze nonfinancial disclosures more closely and take them more into account. The pathway to achieving that is not simple: Unification of reporting standards and improvement in the quality of disclosure are required. Governments can play a role by enforcing climate and sustainability disclosure for firms wanting bailout support. Key stakeholders in the financial system – especially asset managers and other providers of capital – will look to incorporate more sophisticated ESG analysis into their traditional frameworks. Introduction This report is an update to our Special Report published in late 2018 on the benefits of ESG investing. In that report we concluded that ESG indices have performed at least in line with, and may even have slightly outperformed, broad-market indices, while providing societal and environmental benefits.1 We can now also answer one of the questions we raised in that report: Whether ESG investing provides protection during recessions and bear markets. Since we published that report, the ESG space has continued to grow, with the number of new US “sustainable” fund launches, as tracked by Morningstar, increasing – albeit at a lower rate than in the previous two years (Chart 1).2 This can be attributed to an ever-increasing investor demand, predominantly from Europe, but growing rapidly in both the US and Asia, too. The Global Sustainable Investment Review estimates that ESG assets under management (using a relatively broad definition of ESG) totaled $30 trillion as of 2018.3 Chart 1The Industry Is Catering To Increasing Investor Demand
ESG Indices Outperformed Broad-Market Benchmarks In Most Regions During The Equity Selloff
ESG Indices Outperformed Broad-Market Benchmarks In Most Regions During The Equity Selloff
Our earlier report highlighted the increasing demand from investors to allocate capital based on environmental, social, and governance standards, or ESG. Simply put, we defined ESG investing as any investment activity that recognizes a certain set of principles, and screens securities based on those factors. While the term itself might be new, the core concept behind it is not. It encompasses a philosophy dating back hundreds of years, beginning with faith-based investing, to the more recent increased awareness of climate and governance issues. The COVID-19 pandemic – also considered an ESG risk – illustrated how quickly a health and environmental threat can turn into a social issue, as unemployment rates surged to new highs and economic activity came to a halt. In this report, we analyze how the performance of ESG indices has evolved since our last report, and in particular, during the recent February-March equity selloff. Additionally, we discuss the opportunities that governments, investors, and corporations can seize in the future. We also assess the various risks facing ESG investing, given that it is no longer a niche space. Performance Update Since we published our report in late 2018, ESG indices in most countries (with the exception of the US and Canada) have outperformed the broad market benchmarks.4 The global ESG index has outperformed the All-Country World (ACW) broad market index by 1% since (Chart 2). While this might not count as a remarkable outperformance, it answers some of the doubts cast on the merits of ESG investing. However, it is critical for investors to realize that ESG indices are not necessarily just another vehicle to invest in to try to outperform the market; rather, they are a sustainable alternative to traditional indices that do not detract from performance. Importantly, ESG indices either performed in line with or better than broad market indices during the equity selloff between February-March 2020. ESG indices in all major countries and regions, with the exception of the US, outperformed the benchmark during this period (Chart 2). Research by MSCI breaks down the active returns of various ESG country and region indices versus their corresponding broad market indices in Q1 2020. This analysis showed that the outperformance predominantly came from equity style tilts, followed by ESG-related factors and sector/industry tilts (Chart 3). Chart 2ESG Indices Outperformed Broad-Market Benchmarks In Most Regions During The Equity Selloff
ESG Indices Outperformed Broad-Market Benchmarks In Most Regions During The Equity Selloff
ESG Indices Outperformed Broad-Market Benchmarks In Most Regions During The Equity Selloff
ESG indices tilt towards higher-quality, low-beta, and high-yielding stocks relative to their benchmarks. As part of the index construction, some ESG indices exclude stocks not meeting the indices’ ESG eligibility criteria. This would include various names in the oil & gas industry, for example (for environmental criteria), as well as some tech giants (for social and governance reasons). The exclusion of some tech names partly explains the US index’s underperformance. Chart 3 shows that stock selection for the US MSCI ESG Leaders index – the one shown in Chart 2 – had a negative contribution to active returns over the first quarter. Chart 3Breaking Down ESG Performance
ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream
ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream
Index methodology plays a big role in determining expected performance. The methodology of the MSCI ESG index suite generally aims to reduce sector differences relative to the broad indices, thereby limiting systematic risk. However, even within the MSCI ESG suite, methodologies differ between indices (Tables 1 & 2).5 Table 1Index Methodology Determines Sector Tilts
ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream
ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream
Table 2Methodology Differences Matter
ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream
ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream
However, it is critical for investors to realize that ESG indices are not necessarily just another vehicle to invest in to try to outperform the market; rather, they are a sustainable alternative to traditional indices that do not detract from performance. It is also important for investors to understand that sustainability is a long-term issue. For example, as economies shut down when COVID-19 infections and deaths rose, investors rushed to sell their risky exposures: The five largest “traditional” US equity ETFs saw cumulative net equity outflows of as high as $22 billion during the three-week period between February 19 and March 13. By contrast, the five largest ESG equity funds experienced small, yet positive, inflows over the same period (Chart 4). This was also true globally, where sustainable funds tracked by Morningstar recorded inflows close to $45 billion dollars during this period, whereas equity funds overall recorded over $380 billion of outflows.6 The most likely reason for this is that investors see ESG investing as a defensive play, given its sector and factor tilts. Chart 4Small, Yet Steady Inflows During The Equity Selloff
ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream
ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream
Institutional Pressure Chart 5Analyzing Nonfinancial Disclosures Is A Must...
ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream
ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream
Investors – particularly those with longer investment horizons, such as pension funds and endowments – are becoming more committed to evaluating their investments more rigorously from an ESG standpoint. This means putting pressure on asset managers to screen and assess company performance using ESG factors. A survey by EY in June 2020 shows that only 2% of respondents conduct little-to-no review of nonfinancial disclosures relating to a company’s environmental and social performance, down from 36% in 2013 (Chart 5). However, absent a formal governing body, standardized reporting, and proper regulation regarding what should be labeled ESG, as well as how metrics are evaluated, asset managers struggle to comply. One of the key points we highlighted in our previous report is that consideration of ESG factors in investment decisions must go beyond simple reliance on ESG scores. The various ESG rating agencies rely on different metrics, factors, and datasets to rank companies and therefore produce very different benchmarks and funds, even though they may have the same objectives. This means that different investors using different ESG indices could end up with different allocations to the same universe of stocks. Therefore, analysis and inclusion based on ESG scores may be misleading and yield dissimilar results. A research paper by the MIT Sloan School of Management showed that the sources of differentiation of ESG rankings by ratings agencies stem from: 1) Scope Divergence: Ratings rely on different attributes to capture ESG performance; 2) Measurement Divergence: Relying on different indicators to measure the same attribute; and 3) Weight Divergence: Ranking the attributes differently in terms of importance. Of these, the paper found that the measurement divergence was the most important.7 Chart 6...With More Companies Now Reporting
ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream
ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream
Asset managers are not necessarily to blame. They simply lack adequate tools. The problem is not the dearth of disclosure, but rather its quality and comparability. In fact, over the past few years, more companies have begun reporting on their sustainability and social performance (Chart 6). However, the fact that reporting is voluntary, and companies rely on different reporting frameworks and standards, makes cross-country and inter-firm comparisons difficult. On the bright side however, there is a growing pressure for collaboration between the various reporting frameworks in order to bring about a single reporting standard. For example, a recently announced partnership between the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) – two of the many organizations responsible for creating sustainability reports and reporting on governance data – is an important step in bringing the various standard-setters together. This should promote greater reporting consistency, and highlight the importance of key non financial disclosures. Improved reporting will affect not only investors, but also providers of capital, including banks. Incorporating ESG factors into conventional investing frameworks will become a core step in assessing risk for asset allocators. Providers of capital will have to assess not only borrowers’ fundamentals and growth prospects, but also understand their governance policies and environmental footprint. A recently published report by the Bank of England (BoE) highlighted the potential impact of climate change – both through transition8 and physical risks9 – on UK banks, insurers, and the entire financial system. To highlight the extent of “climate-related exposure,” the analysis found that almost 10% of England’s mortgage value is on properties in flood-risk zones, and that loan exposures to high emission-intensive sectors represent almost 70% of the common equity Tier 1 capital of the UK’s largest banks.10 If a climate event occurs, or new regulations are implemented, the impact will be severe. Incorporating ESG factors into conventional investing frameworks will become a core step in assessing risk for asset allocators. Governments can play a role. As COVID-19 stimulus plans are rolled out – mainly in developed economies – governments are requiring companies in need of support or bailouts to improve their environmental and climate disclosures. This will make it easier for private-sector investors to incorporate ESG analysis. Large Canadian firms, for example, that apply for government loans, must now publish annual climate disclosure reports as well as other releases relating to environmental and sustainability goals. Additionally, further rounds of stimulus could be given to those investing in ESG-related areas – known as “green stimulus.” Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, G20 countries have committed over $300 billion to support various energy initiatives, of which approximately $150 billion was aimed at clean energy policies and renewable energy programs.11 This could set a precedent for future government support to aid the transition to a greener economy. It can perhaps also serve as an indicator of which areas can present opportunities for investment. Monetary policy is set to remain accommodative for the next few years. It is not unimaginable, then, that central banks’ unconventional monetary easing methods could involve purchasing green bonds,12 issued by both corporations and governments. This is something ECB president Christine Lagarde has hinted at, to aid in the world’s fight against climate change.13 Chart 7The Green Bond Market Is Growing
ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream
ESG Investing: From Niche To Mainstream
The green bond market continues to grow, with bond issuance in 2019 up over 55% year-on-year. This growth, however, has fallen somewhat in 2020 due to the economic slowdown (Chart 7), despite overall bond issuance increasing in the second quarter of the year, as companies rushed to raise cash and refinance at lower rates.14 The fact that proceeds issued by green bonds must explicitly be used for environmental projects is the most likely reason for the decline. Green bond issuance, in 2020, has totaled $112 billion as of July, with the US, Germany, France, and the Netherlands being the top four issuers. China, the top issuer in 2018 and 2019, slipped to sixth place in 2020, with its green bond issuance shrinking from $27 billion in 2019 to $6 billion year-to-date. Risks & Headwinds Investors should be wary of various short-to-medium term risks to ESG investment. In the short-term, a delay of climate-change targets is possible. A second wave of COVID-19 infections that would trigger further lockdowns might lead to a rollback in environmental regulation and a refocus of stimulus packages on all-out growth rather than on ESG and climate initiatives. Over the coming years, as ESG investing becomes more mainstream, investors will need to take greater care to spot “greenwashing.”15 For example, this includes funds labeled as “sustainable”, but which hold securities that do not fit under that umbrella. It would also include companies taking advantage of the absence of reporting regulations to report misleading or incomplete information. Such care will be crucial until a unified reporting framework is established. According to calculations by Morningstar, over 500 funds expanded their prospectuses to include ESG factors in their investment analysis in 2019, up from the roughly 50 funds which did so in 2018.16,17 Indeed, this is a sign that funds are responding to investor demand and adding appropriate ESG analysis. However, whether these funds use sustainability as a core factor in their investing is unclear. Therefore, investors should continue to undertake their own proper due diligence. Conclusions The path to fully incorporating ESG analyses into a traditional investing framework is heading in the right direction, but is not yet clear-cut. A unified framework that allows for consistent and comparable disclosures would fix one of the biggest hurdles that investors face. ESG-related equity indices have outperformed in most countries and regions since late 2018, as well as during the recent equity selloff. The full advantage to be derived from incorporating ESG factors should be unlocked as more accurate and comprehensive data becomes available. Investor demand for ESG-related investments will remain the dominant force in driving the shift to integrating ESG disclosures into traditional financial analysis. Amr Hanafy Senior Analyst amrh@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, “ESG Investing: No Harm, Some Benefit,” dated November 21, 2018 available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see https://www.morningstar.com/articles/989209/esg-funds-setting-a-record-pace-for-launches-in-2020 3 "Global Sustainable Investment Review 2018," Global Sustainable Investment Alliance, gsi-alliance.org. 4 For the purpose of this analysis, we use the MSCI ESG Leaders index suite. 5 "MSCI ESG Indexes," MSCI, msci.com. 6 Please see https://www.morningstar.com/articles/984776/theres-ample-room-for-sustainable-investing-to-grow-in-the-us 7 Florian Bergand, Julian F Kölbel, and Roberto Rigobon, "Aggregate Confusion: The Divergence of ESG Ratings," May 17, 2020. 8 Transition risks can be defined as the risks of economic dislocation and financial losses associated with the transition to a lower-carbon economy. 9 Physicals risks can be defined as those arising from the interaction between climate-related events and human and natural systems. 10"The Bank of England’s climate-related financial disclosure 2020," Bank Of England. 11 "G20," energypolicytracker.org. 12 Green bonds are fixed income securities in which the proceeds are exclusively and explicitly assigned to projects or activities to finance and combat environmental issues – such as those relating to climate change and depletion of biodiversity and natural resources. 13 "Lagarde Puts Green Policy Top Of Agenda in ECB Bond Buying," Financial Times, July 8, 2020. 14 "Credit Trends: Global Financing Conditions: Bond Issuance Is Expected To Finish 2020 Up 6% After A Strong Second Quarter," S&P Global Ratings, July 27, 2020. 15Greenwashing is the process of relying on false claims and impressions to provide misleading information about how certain activities, investments, services, products, etc., are environmentally sound and friendly. 16 https://www.morningstar.com/articles/973432/the-number-of-funds-considering-esg-explodes-in-2019 17 As of March 2020, data by Morningstar show that 3,297 global sustainable funds exist.
Highlights Portfolio Strategy Softening operating metrics, the falling US dollar, the reopening of the economy, all suggest that investors should avoid hypermarket stocks. A firming macro backdrop, the USD’s recent drop, along with the bearish signals from financial variables, all concur that investors should start a program of modestly shedding consumer staples exposure. Recent Changes Downgrade the S&P hypermarkets index to underweight, today. This move also pushes our S&P consumer staples sector to a modest below benchmark allocation. Table 1
Lessons From The 1940s
Lessons From The 1940s
Feature In our March 23 Weekly Report, when we identified 20 reasons to start buying equities, we published a cycle-on-cycle profile (Chart 1, top panel) of how the SPX performs following a greater than 20% drawdown. History suggested that, on average, new all-time highs would emerge sometime in early 2022! Unfortunately, this assessment proved offside as the S&P 500 made fresh all-time closing highs last week, less than five months from the March 23 trough. Chart 1Overstretched
Overstretched
Overstretched
Nevertheless, comparing the current unprecedented SPX rebound with the historical recessionary profile remains instructive as it highlights how excessively stretched equities currently appear. The bottom panel of Chart 1 warns that the SPX is vulnerable to a snapback, were the SPX to return to the historical mean or median recovery profile. Likely rising (geo)political risks could serve as a near-term catalyst for a healthy pullback. Importantly, all of the SPX’s return since the March lows is due to the multiple expansion and then some, as forward EPS have taken a beating (not shown). Equities are long duration assets and given the drubbing in the discount rate, the forward P/E multiple has done all the heavy lifting. Chart 2 puts some historical context to the S&P 500 forward P/E going back to 1979 using I/B/E/S data. Empirical data supports finance theory and shows that the 40-year bull market in bond prices has caused a structural upshift to the SPX forward P/E. Chart 2Moving In Opposite Directions
Moving In Opposite Directions
Moving In Opposite Directions
While low rates explain the near all-time highs in the SPX forward P/E, looking ahead we doubt that the SPX multiple can expand much further if we assume that the easy assist from ZIRP is behind us and will not repeat; i.e. the Fed will refrain from wrecking the US banking system by exploring NIRP. In contrast, our analysis suggests that a selloff in the bond market is the missing ingredient that will ignite a massive rotation out of growth stocks and into value and propel deep cyclicals versus defensives to uncharted territory. More specifically, the rallies in copper prices, crude oil and the CRB Raw Industrials index need confirmation from the bond market that they are demand, rather than supply driven. This backdrop will also shift equity returns within deep cyclicals away from a handful of tech stocks and toward other beaten down high operating leverage sectors (i.e. energy, industrials and materials) as we posited in our recent August 3 Special Report “Top 10 Reasons To Start Nibbling On Cyclicals At The Expense Of Defensives”. Zooming out and observing how investors have moved capital from one asset class to the next in the aftermath of QE5 is in order (Chart 3). First, the SPX enjoyed a V-shaped recovery from the March 23 lows. Then in early-May, as we first posited in our May 11 Weekly Report, the big EURUSD up-move was set in motion and investors started piling into short USD positions taking cue from the Fed’s QE5 that was directly targeting the US dollar with liquidity swaps. The debasing of the dollar served as a global reflator. Now the final piece of the QE5 puzzle is the bond market. Chart 3 highlights that in order for QE to work, counterintuitively a selloff in the bond market would confirm that the economy is healing and is ready to start standing on its own two feet. The jury is still out. With regard to the Fed’s remaining bullets, yield curve control (YCC) is one unorthodox tool that the FOMC could choose to deploy in the coming years. On that front, turning back in time and drawing parallels with the 1940s is instructive. In 1942 the Fed, at the behest of the Treasury, pegged long-term interest rates at 2.5% and ballooned its balance sheet in order to finance the government’s expenditures during WWII. The Fed surrendered its independence, and this YCC unwarrantedly stayed in place until 1951 when in the midst of the Korean War, the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord finally ended the peg of government long-dated bond interest rates.1 Chart 3Bonds Yields Are Left To Rally
Bonds Yields Are Left To Rally
Bonds Yields Are Left To Rally
Chart 4WWII-Like Starting Point
WWII-Like Starting Point
WWII-Like Starting Point
Chart 4 shows the ebbs and flows of the US government’s total debt-to-GDP ratio and fiscal deficit as a percentage of output since 1940. While the debt-to-GDP profile fell from 1945 onward owing partially to a tight fiscal ship that the US subsequently ran, it troughed when the US floated the greenback. Since then, the US has been fiscally irresponsible running large budget deficits and the debt-to-GDP ratio has never looked back and very recently went parabolic (top panel, Chart 4). Charts 5 & 6 take a closer look at some macro variables in the 1940s and Charts 7 & 8 compare them to today. Chart 5The…
The…
The…
Chart 6…1940s…
…1940s…
…1940s…
First, YCC did not prevent the late-1948 recession (Chart 5, shaded areas). Crudely put, monetary stimulus is not a panacea for boom/bust cycles. Second, M2 growth was climbing at a 30%/annum rate, the money multiplier was on a secular advance and money velocity was surging especially in the first half of the 1940s (Chart 6). As a result and as expected, YCC caused three significant inflationary jumps (bottom panel, Chart 6) that aided the US government in bringing down the massive debt-to-GDP ratio (i.e. inflating its way out of a debt trap) that it had accumulated via large deficits in the front half of the 1940s (top panel, Chart 5). Third, interest rates were a coiled spring and once the Treasury-Fed Accord was signed, they exploded higher (fourth panel, Chart 5). Finally, equities fared well during the first three years of YCC until the end of WWII, but then suffered an outsized setback until mid-1949, before recovering and taking out the 1945 highs in 1951 (bottom panel, Chart 5). Chart 7...Compared With…
...Compared With…
...Compared With…
Chart 8…Today
…Today
…Today
Were the Fed to embark on YCC in the near-future in order to monetize the US government’s deficits, there are a few parallels to draw with the 1940s especially given that the starting point of debt-to-GDP is similar to the WWII figure (top panel, Chart 4). The Fed would likely lose its independence. This would be a paradigm shift. The Fed would crowd out fixed income investors, and flood the market with US dollars. M2 money stock would continue to surge. Few investors will be chasing US dollar assets including equities. The path of least resistance would be significantly lower for the US dollar as foreign investors would flee. This debt monetization along with a depreciating currency and swelling money supply would result in inflation rearing its ugly head, especially given that import prices would soar. What is difficult to envision is how the economy would perform during an inflationary impulse. Our sense is that the risk of stagflation would rise significantly, especially given the current inverse correlation between M2 growth and the velocity of money.2 In the stagflationary 1970s, any liquidity injections via higher M2 growth failed to translate into rising money velocity. Importantly, the “Nixon shock” effectively ended the Bretton Woods system and floated the US dollar causing a 40% devaluation from peak-to-trough (Chart 9). Tack on the oil related supply shock and stagflation reigned supreme in the 1970s, owing to cost-push inflation. Chart 9Dollar The Reflator
Dollar The Reflator
Dollar The Reflator
In contrast during the 1940s, demand-pull inflation hit the economy rather hard, as the US was retooling its industrial base to win WWII alongside its allies. Also the US dollar was linked to gold since the Gold Reserve Act of 1934 and ten years later the Bretton Woods international monetary agreement ushered in the era of fixed exchange rates, which is a big difference from the 1970s.3 As a reminder, from a political perspective venturing down the inflation avenue is the least painful way of dealing with a debt burden, rather than pursuing tight fiscal policy which is synonymous with political suicide. From an equity perspective, owning commodity-levered sectors and other hard asset-linked equities including REITs would make sense as we highlighted in our recent inflation Special Report. Health care stocks would also shine in case of an inflationary spurt according to empirical evidence that we highlighted in the same Special Report. On the flip side, our inflation Special Report also revealed that shedding telecom services and utilities would be wise and most importantly avoiding technology stocks. Tech stocks are disinflationary beneficiaries as they are mired in constant deflation and have built business models not only to withstand, but also to thrive in deflation. Inflation is a tech killer as these growth stocks suffer when the discount rate spikes and causes valuations to move from a premium to a discount. Nevertheless, deflation/disinflation is more likely in the coming 12-to-18 months, whereas inflation is at least two-to-three years away as we mentioned in our recent inflation Special Report. This week we continue to augment our cyclicals versus defensives portfolio bent and take our defensive exposure down a notch by downgrading consumer staples to a modest below benchmark allocation via a downgrade in the S&P hypermarkets index. Downgrade Hypermarkets To Underweight… Last summer we upgraded the S&P hypermarkets index to overweight as we were preparing the portfolio to withstand a recessionary shock given that the yield curve had inverted. Fast forward to the March carnage in the equity markets and this defensive move served our portfolio well. However, we did not want to overstay our welcome and set a stop in order to exit this position that was triggered in late-March netting our portfolio 26% in relative gains. More recently, we have been adding cyclical exposure to the portfolio and lightening up on defensives and as a continuation of this shift we are now compelled to downgrade the S&P hypermarkets to underweight. The economy is reopening and thus it no longer pays to seek refuge in safe haven hypermarket equities. In fact most of the macro indicators we track suggest the recession is over that will sustain severe downward pressure on relative share prices. Chart 10 shows that the ISM manufacturing new orders subcomponent has slingshot from below 30 to north of 60, junk spreads are probing all-time lows, consumer confidence has troughed and small and medium enterprises hiring intentions are on the mend. Moreover, the extraordinary fiscal expansion has brought spending forward and PCE is all but certain to skyrocket when the Q3 GDP figures get released in late-October, signaling that the easy money has been made in Big Box retailers (top panel, Chart 11). Similarly, discretionary spending should pick up the slack from staple-related purchases, further dampening the need to own hypermarket shares (middle & bottom panels, Chart 11). Chart 10Rebounding Macro
Rebounding Macro
Rebounding Macro
Chart 11Returning to Normality
Returning to Normality
Returning to Normality
On the operating front, while WMT is making strides in its online presence and offering mix, non-store retail sales are on a tear dominated by King AMZN (as a reminder we are overweight the S&P internet retail index). This is a secular trend and should continue unabated and in a relative sense continue to weigh on hypermarket profitability (bottom panel, Chart 12). Finally, a significant tailwind is turning into a severe headwind for this industry: import price inflation. The US dollar has reversed course and it is in a freefall. Historically, the greenback has been an excellent leading indicator of import price inflation and the current message is grim for hypermarket razor thin profit margins (import prices shown inverted, Chart 13). Chart 12Amazonification Is On Track
Amazonification Is On Track
Amazonification Is On Track
Chart 13Currency Headwinds
Currency Headwinds
Currency Headwinds
Adding it all up, softening operating metrics, the falling US dollar, the reopening of the economy, all suggest that investors should avoid hypermarket stocks. Bottom Line: Trim the S&P hypermarkets index to underweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG S5HYPC – WMT, COST. …Which Pushes Consumer Staples To A Below Benchmark Allocation The downgrade in the S&P hypermarkets index tilts our S&P consumer staples sector to a modest below benchmark allocation. Countercyclical consumer staples stocks served their purpose and provided the support to our portfolio in the front half of the year when we needed them most. Now that the economic reopening is gaining steam and the government, the health care system and society are all ready to effectively deal with a flare up in the pandemic, the allure of defensive positioning has diminished. In other words, COVID-19 is currently a known known risk versus an unknown unknown risk early in the year, and defending against it now is more successful. Moreover, according to our mid-April research on what sectors investors should avoid during recessionary recoveries, consumer staples stocks trail the SPX on average by 660bps one year following the SPX trough. The current macro backdrop corroborates this analysis and underscores that the path of least resistance is lower for relative share prices. Not only is the ISM manufacturing survey on fire, but also consumer confidence is making an effort to trough (ISM manufacturing and consumer confidence shown inverted, Chart 14). Meanwhile, financial market variables emit a similarly bearish signal for safe haven staples stocks. Following a brief spike in the bond-to-stock ratio (BSR), the BSR has recently resumed its downdraft (top panel, Chart 15). Volatility has all but collapsed since soaring to over 80 in March, as the Fed has orchestrated a quashing of all asset class volatilities (middle panel, Chart 15). Lastly, the pairwise correlation between stocks in the S&P 500 has also nosedived bringing some semblance of normality back into equity markets (bottom panel, Chart 15). All three of these financial market variables will continue to exert downward pressure on relative share prices. Chart 14V-shaped Recovery…
V-shaped Recovery…
V-shaped Recovery…
Chart 15...Across The Board
...Across The Board
...Across The Board
On the US dollar front, while consumer goods manufacturers get a P&L translation gain from a depreciating currency, their export exposure is on par with the SPX and does not provide a relative advantage. In marked contrast, empirical evidence shows that relative profitability moves in tandem with the greenback and the USD recent weakness will undercut consumer staples profitability (bottom panel, Chart 16), especially via climbing input cost inflation. In sum, a firming macro backdrop, the US dollar’s recent drop, along with the bearish signals from financial variables, all concur that investors should start a program of modestly shedding consumer staples exposure. Bottom Line: Downgrade the S&P consumer staples index to underweight. Chart 16Mind the Gap
Mind the Gap
Mind the Gap
Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 https://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/special_reports/treasury_fed_accord/background 2 The velocity of money “is the number of times one dollar is spent to buy goods and services per unit of time. If the velocity of money is increasing, then more transactions are occurring between individuals in an economy.” Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 3 Our colleagues from The Bank Credit Analyst recently illustrated how a strong dollar is good for the US economy on a medium term basis. Current Recommendations Current Trades Strategic (10-Year) Trade Recommendations
Drilling Deeper Into Earnings
Drilling Deeper Into Earnings
Size And Style Views July 27, 2020 Overweight cyclicals over defensives April 28, 2020 Stay neutral large over small caps June 11, 2018 Long the BCA Millennial basket The ticker symbols are: (AAPL, AMZN, UBER, HD, LEN, MSFT, NFLX, SPOT, TSLA, V). January 22, 2018 Favor value over growth
Highlights Scarce Yield: The correlation of relative global government bond returns and yield levels is becoming more positive. The trend should continue if central bankers across the developed world stick to their promises to maintain very loose monetary policy settings for at least the next two years, forcing investors to chase scarce yields while worrying less about cyclical economic and inflation factors. Country Allocations: Maintain overweights to higher-yielding government bonds (Italy, the US, Canada) versus low-yielders (Germany, France, Japan) within USD-hedged fixed income portfolios. Upgrade higher-yielders Spain and Australia to overweight, at the expense of the low-yielding UK and Germany. Feature “What is the investment rationale for buying developed market government bonds now?” We begin this week with a question posed by a BCA client in a recent meeting. It was a perfectly logical inquiry given the current microscopic level of yields on offer almost everywhere. Why bother buying a 10-year US Treasury barely yielding more than 0.5%, or a 10-year Italian BTP yielding less than 1%, with both offering little compensation for future inflation or fiscal risks? Chart of the WeekYield Chasing Is Now The Only Winning Strategy
Yield Chasing Is Now The Only Winning Strategy
Yield Chasing Is Now The Only Winning Strategy
Our answer to the question – “because the Fed and ECB will do whatever is needed to prevent nominal bond yields from rising over the foreseeable future” – did little to influence the client’s view on the attractiveness of those yields (but did make her more comfortable about the equity and corporate credit exposures in her portfolio). In the current environment, where all countries are experiencing the ultimate exogenous negative growth shock – a deadly and highly contagious pandemic - the usual analysis of the cyclical economic and inflation dynamics of any single country now offers far less payoff to government bond investing. It is hard to find a country not suffering from weak growth, very low inflation, high unemployment (some of which is likely to be permanent) and ongoing uncertainty related to the spread of COVID-19. It is also hard to find a country where interest rates have not been cut to 0% (or even lower) and central banks have not ramped up bond buying activity. Increasingly, the relative performance of government bonds between countries reflects simple yield differentials, rather than differing monetary policy outlooks. Higher-yielding markets are outperforming the lower-yielding markets – a trend that has persisted throughout 2020 and is likely to intensify in the coming months (Chart of the Week). Growth? Inflation? Who Cares? Give Me Yield! Developed market government bond yields have been ignoring the usual message sent by cyclical economic indicators. The latest round of global manufacturing PMI data showed continued solid rebounds from the COVID-19 collapse in the US, UK, most of the euro area and other major regions. Nominal 10-year government bond yields in those countries typically track the path of the PMIs, but yields are now as much as 180bps (for US Treasuries) below the levels seen the last time PMIs were so elevated (Chart 2). There is an easy way to explain this discrepancy between bond yields and economic activity. In years past, markets would price in higher inflation expectations, and a greater probability of a future monetary tightening, when growth was improving. Today, policymakers worldwide are bending over backwards to let investors know that no interest rate increases should be expected for at least the next two years – even if growth is improving and inflation were to accelerate. This is having the effect of both lowering real bond yields and increasing inflation expectations, with central bankers also expressing a greater tolerance for future inflation that will limit “pre-emptive” rate increases. Our Central Bank Monitors continue to signal a need for easier monetary policies, even with the rebound in manufacturing data and economic optimism surveys witnessed in the US and UK lifting the Monitors there from the lows (Chart 3). Real bond yields are mirroring the trend in the Central Bank Monitors, indicating that some of the decline in real yields seen in the US, Europe, Canada and Australia is likely related to markets pricing in a lower-for-longer period of monetary policy rates, as we discussed in last week’s report.1 Chart 2Bond Yields Ignoring Improving PMIs
Bond Yields Ignoring Improving PMIs
Bond Yields Ignoring Improving PMIs
Chart 3Plunging Real Yields Reflect Pressure On CBs To Stay Dovish
Plunging Real Yields Reflect Pressure On CBs To Stay Dovish
Plunging Real Yields Reflect Pressure On CBs To Stay Dovish
Chart 4A Low-Volatility Backdrop Encourages Yield Chasing Behavior
A Low-Volatility Backdrop Encourages Yield Chasing Behavior
A Low-Volatility Backdrop Encourages Yield Chasing Behavior
With bond markets having little reason to expect a shift to more bond-unfriendly monetary policies, it is no surprise that higher yielding government bond markets are outperforming low-yielders at an accelerating rate. When there is little to be gained or lost from the duration exposure of government bonds, then the expected returns on government bonds will more closely track yield levels. Fixed income investors seeking the highest returns will be forced to chase the bonds with the highest yields. The current calm volatility backdrop is also fostering an environment of yield-chasing, carry-driven strategies. Measures of yield volatility like the MOVE index of US Treasury option prices and swaption volatilities in Europe have calmed dramatically from the spike seen during February and March (Chart 4). Liquidity in government bond markets has also improved, with bid/ask spreads on 30-year US Treasuries and UK Gilts now back to normal tight levels.2 In a world of low bond volatility and yield chasing behavior, markets with the highest yields should end up outperforming lower yielding markets. Chart 5"High" Yielders Are The Winners In A Low-Yield Environment
We’re All Yield Chasers Now
We’re All Yield Chasers Now
In Chart 5, we show the 2020 year-to-date government bond returns, for the 7-10 year maturity bucket, for the countries we include in our model bond portfolio (the US, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the UK, Japan, Canada and Australia). The returns are shown both currency unhedged (in USD terms) and hedged into US dollars, with the yield levels from the start of 2020 shown at the top of each bar. The ranking of the returns does generally follow the ranking of yields at the start of the year – the US, Canada, Australia and Italy outperforming low-yielding Germany, France and Japan. What is more interesting is how that correlation between yield levels and performance has evolved over the course of 2020, and even dating back to 2019. If a dynamic of strict yield chasing behavior was gaining steam, then the performance rankings of government bonds should increasingly reflect the rankings of available yields. One way to measure such a dynamic is with a statistic called a Spearman’s rank correlation. Simply put, the Spearman’s rank shows the correlation between the rankings of two sets of variables within each set, rather than the correlation of the variables themselves. If the correlation between the rankings is increasing, this suggests that the relationship between the two variables is becoming more dependent on the levels of the variables relative to each other. We present the Spearman’s rank correlation between yield levels and subsequent bond returns for the nine countries in our model bond portfolio universe in Chart 6. Weekly correlations are calculated using the ranking of the 10-year government bond yields from those nine countries and the rankings of the subsequent weekly total returns (currency unhedged) for those same markets. We present a rolling 52-week correlation coefficient in the chart, which shows a steadily rising trend over the past year of relative bond market performance becoming more dependent on relative initial yield levels. Chart 6High' Yielders Are The Winners In A Low-Yield Environment
High' Yielders Are The Winners In A Low-Yield Environment
High' Yielders Are The Winners In A Low-Yield Environment
While the Spearman’s rank correlation is still relatively low, around 0.2 on the latest data point of the 52-week moving average, that does represent the highest level seen over the past two decades. On the margin, the more recent observations are showing an even higher level of correlation – a trend that should continue given the current easy global monetary policy settings described above that should continue to promote yield-chasing behavior. Another way to measure how much more yield driven government bond markets have become is to look at the relative performance of investment strategies that focus on allocations informed by yield levels. A simple such strategy is presented in Chart 7, using a rule of going long the highest yielding 10-year bond in our list of nine countries at the start of each week and holding only that bond for the subsequent week. We show the return of that simple strategy relative to the return Bloomberg Barclays 7-10 year Global Treasury index in the top panel of the chart, all measured in US dollars on an unhedged basis. The simple strategy of picking the highest yielding bond has been delivering solid outperformance versus the benchmark over the past 2-3 years, with year-over-year relative returns of between 5-10%. The strategy performed very well during the last period similar to today in the post-crisis years of 2012-16, when global policy rates were near 0% and central banks were aggressively expanding their balance sheets through quantitative easing. The year-over-year returns of this simple strategy were always positive during the period (shaded in the chart), which included some major moves in the US dollar that influenced unhedged bond returns. A simple strategy of selecting only the highest yielding government bond has also delivered solid returns of late when focused on other bond maturities besides the 10-year point (Chart 8). The information ratios of these strategies, shown in the chart as the relative year-over-year return of each strategy versus the benchmark compared to the volatility of that relative performance, are all at similar levels in the 0.27-0.94 range. Chart 7Chase The Highest Yields During Global QE & Extended ZIRP
Chase The Highest Yields During Global QE & Extended ZIRP
Chase The Highest Yields During Global QE & Extended ZIRP
Chart 8Yield Chasing Strategies Outperforming Across All Maturities
Yield Chasing Strategies Outperforming Across All Maturities
Yield Chasing Strategies Outperforming Across All Maturities
The efficiency of these strategies will likely not return to the levels seen during that 2012-16 period of extended easy global monetary policy, given the much lower yield levels seen across all bonds including outright negative yields in places like Germany and Japan. However, in a more general sense, selecting higher yielding bonds over lower yielding ones should continue to deliver stronger returns than passive low-yielding benchmarks for as long as policymakers continue to err on the side of reflation (0% rates, more quantitative easing, even yield curve control to limit yields from rising) when setting monetary policy. Selecting higher yielding bonds over lower yielding ones should continue to deliver stronger returns than passive low-yielding benchmarks for as long as policymakers continue to err on the side of reflation. Bottom Line: The correlation of relative global government bond returns and yield levels is becoming more positive. The trend should continue if policymakers stick to their promises to maintain very loose monetary policy settings for at least the next two years, forcing investors to chase scarce yields regardless of cyclical economic and inflation trends. Investment Implications & Alterations To Our Model Bond Portfolio Chart 9Higher-Yielding Government Bonds Will Continue To Shine
Higher-Yielding Government Bonds Will Continue To Shine
Higher-Yielding Government Bonds Will Continue To Shine
The intensified yield chasing behavior has obvious implications for fixed income investors. Within dedicated global government bond portfolios, exposures should be concentrated in higher yielding markets at the expense of the low yielders. Already, the relative returns year-to-date (on a USD-hedged and duration-matched basis versus the Global Treasury index) reflect that conclusion, with the US (+692bps versus the index), Canada (+458bps) and Italy (+87bps) outperforming and Germany (-111bps), France (-77bps) and Japan (-472bps) lagging (Chart 9). Our current investment recommendations, both on a medium-term strategic basis and within our more flexible model bond portfolio, are generally in line with those rankings. Our recommendations already include overweights in the US, Canada, Italy and the UK; with underweights in Germany, France and Japan. We are currently neutral Spain and Australia. The view on Spain was a relative value consideration, as we preferred an overweight on Italy as our recommended exposure within the European peripherals. For Australia, we closed our long-standing overweight stance there back in May, primarily due to signs that the Australian economy was showing signs of recovery after what was a very modest initial wave of COVID-19 cases.3 Now, we see good reasons to upgrade Spain and Australia to overweight to gain even more exposure to high-yielding government bonds in a yield-scarce, yield-chasing world. Our recommendations already include overweights in the US, Canada, Italy and the UK; with underweights in Germany, France and Japan. In Chart 10, we present a scatter chart showing 10-year government bond yields, hedged into US dollars, plotted versus the latest trailing 1-year beta of yield changes to those of the 7-10 maturity bucket for the Global Treasury index. This is a simple way to present a reward versus risk relationship, using the yield beta as the measure of risk. The chart shows that Spain and Australia offer relatively attractive yields compared to other markets with similar yield betas. This offers a way to boost the expected yield from our recommended portfolio without raising the yield beta of the portfolio. Chart 10Upgrade Spain & Australia, Downgrade The UK In Global Bond Portfolios
We’re All Yield Chasers Now
We’re All Yield Chasers Now
Specifically, we see two allocation changes that can be made to our model bond portfolio to reflect this view on relative yields: Upgrade Spain to overweight, while reducing the weight on UK Gilts to neutral Upgrade Australia to overweight, funded by reducing the German underweight allocation even further. We see good reasons to upgrade Spain and Australia to overweight to gain even more exposure to high-yielding government bonds in a yield-scarce, yield-chasing world. The USD-hedged yield pickup on both of those switches is substantial, as can be seen in Table 1 where we present unhedged and USD-hedged yields for 2-year, 5-year, 10-year and 30-year government bonds across all developed markets. Switching from the UK to Spain generates a modest yield pick-up on an unhedged basis at the 10-year and 30-year maturity points. The pickup is far more attractive across all maturity points on a USD-hedged basis, ranging from +22bps for 2-year maturities to +101bps for 30-year bonds. Table 1Developed Market Bond Yields, Both Unhedged & Hedged Into USD
We’re All Yield Chasers Now
We’re All Yield Chasers Now
In fact, UK Gilt yields across the entire maturity spectrum are now some of the lowest on offer within the developed market space, both on an unhedged and USD hedged basis. This alone is enough reason to downgrade Gilt exposure, especially with the Bank of England continuing to shoot down the notion of a move to negative UK policy rates that could also drive longer-dated Gilt yields into negative territory. As for Australia, the recent severe COVID-19 outbreak in Melbourne, the country’s second largest city, has raised fears that a new and more extended period of lockdowns may be necessary Down Under. This goes against our original thesis for downgrading Australian bond exposure a few months ago, thus a return to overweight as a yield pickup also makes sense on a fundamental basis – particularly with the RBA already using extreme measures like yield curve control to anchor the level of 3-year Australian bond yields from the short end of the curve. The yield pick-up from our recommended switch from Germany to Australia is significant from the 2-year to 30-year maturity points, ranging between 94bps to 182bps on an unhedged basis and 20bps to 109bps on a USD-hedged basis. The changes to our recommended country allocations in our model bond portfolio can be found on pages 12-13. Bottom Line: Maintain overweights to higher-yielding government bonds (Italy, the US, Canada) versus low-yielders (Germany, France, Japan) within USD-hedged fixed income portfolios. Upgrade higher-yielders Spain and Australia to overweight, at the expense of the low-yielding UK and Germany. Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Are Bond Markets Throwing In The Towel On Long-Term Growth?", dated August 4, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 The bid-ask spreads shown are taken from the Bank of England’s latest Financial Stability Review, available here: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/financial-stability-report/2020/august-2020.pdf 3 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "Australia: All Good Streaks Must Come To An End", dated May 13, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations
We’re All Yield Chasers Now
We’re All Yield Chasers Now
Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
China: The Recovery And Equity Dichotomy China’s economic recovery has been gathering steam, and policymakers have become reasonably confident about the growth outlook. In fact, transaction activity in the property market has recovered to year-ago levels, auto sales and construction starts have bottomed following a 18 to 20-month contraction (Chart I-1). In line with this economic revival, authorities issued a statement following last week’s Politburo meeting contending that monetary policy should aim “to maintain adequate growth of money supply and credit.” This statement is a change in the monetary policy stance in May when the stated objective was to “significantly accelerate the growth rate of broad money supply and total social financing relative to last year.” This change in language highlights that authorities have become more comfortable with the recovery and are now becoming a bit concerned about amplifying credit and property market excesses. There will be no additional stimulus forthcoming, but policy tightening is not in the cards. In short, there will be no additional stimulus forthcoming, but policy tightening is not in the cards. Policymakers will therefore be in a wait-and-see mode for now, monitoring how economic conditions improve as the enacted stimulus works its way into the economy. Odds are high that the business cycle recovery will continue in China for now. Chart I-2 shows that the amount of credit and fiscal stimulus has been considerable, and that broad money and bank assets impulses remain in uptrend. All these should support the recovery into early next year. Chart I-1China: A Cyclical Recovery Is Underway
China: A Cyclical Recovery Is Underway
China: A Cyclical Recovery Is Underway
Chart I-2China: The Stimulus Will Continue Working Its Way Into Economy
China: The Stimulus Will Continue Working Its Way Into Economy
China: The Stimulus Will Continue Working Its Way Into Economy
As to the risks to Chinese growth emanating from depressed demand in the rest of the world, they are not substantial. First, global demand has already bottomed. Second, China’s total exports account for 17% of GDP, while investment expenditures and consumer spending account for 42% and 38% of GDP, respectively (Chart I-3). Hence, rising capital expenditures and household spending will offset the drag from exports. Finally, China exports many household and medical goods that are currently in very high demand worldwide due to the lockdowns and the pandemic. As a result, Chinese exports have recently done a bit better than global shipments in volume terms (Chart I-4). Chart I-3China Is Not Very Reliant On Exports
China Is Not Very Reliant On Exports
China Is Not Very Reliant On Exports
Chart I-4Chinese Exports Are Doing A Better Than Global Shipments
Chinese Exports Are Doing A Better Than Global Shipments
Chinese Exports Are Doing A Better Than Global Shipments
As to domestic growth drivers, output has been rising faster than consumer demand. Furthermore, capital spending and production by state-owned enterprises has been much stronger than that of private enterprises. However, with the stimulus in full force, both consumer demand and private investment will pick up in the second half of this year. An Equity Market Dichotomy Chart I-5Dichotomy Between Old And New Economy Stocks
Dichotomy Between Old And New Economy Stocks
Dichotomy Between Old And New Economy Stocks
On the surface, the strong rally in Chinese equity indexes has validated the economic recovery thesis. However, a closer examination of the equity performance of various equity sectors reveals that the rebound in cyclical sectors has been rather tame and that the large gains in the equity indexes have been primarily due to tech and new economy businesses, benefiting from working and shopping from home, and to health care stocks (Chart I-5). Chart I-6 illustrates that industrials, materials, autos and real estate stocks are only modestly above their March lows. More importantly, large bank stocks trading in Hong Kong are reaching new lows in absolute terms (Chart I-6, bottom panel). Chart I-6China: Cyclicals Stocks And Banks
China: Cyclicals Stocks And Banks
China: Cyclicals Stocks And Banks
Is such lackluster performance by Chinese cyclical stocks a warning sign to its business cycle recovery? Not necessarily. In our opinion, poor performance of cyclical stocks and banks in China reflects the long-term ramifications of repeated episodes of credit frenzy. A credit-driven growth recovery is always a double-edged sword for both borrowers and creditors. Companies that borrow and invest in new projects accumulate debt. Critically, it is unclear whether these investments will produce new recurring cash flows that would allow the debtors to service their debt. Hence, many companies that take on more debt and invest in financially non-viable projects undermine shareholder value. China has again doubled down on the same policies it has been deploying since the 2008 Lehman crisis. Namely, it has encouraged another boom in money and credit creation, as well as in infrastructure investment. Another outcome of this is that excess money creation leaks into the property market, further fueling the real estate bubble. As for banks, if debtors are unable to service their debt, bank shareholders will be at risk too. This does not mean that banks will be liquidated, but that their shareholders will be diluted. It is critical to put this round of stimulus into perspective: it comes amid already elevated debt levels, following a decade-long credit frenzy and a two decade-long capital spending boom (Chart I-7). Therefore, we doubt that the latest round of investments will be able to substantially increase shareholder value. On the whole, we believe the rally in Chinese stocks outside secular growth plays – such as Alibaba, Tencent – is cyclical not structural. The basis is that while more credit produces a cyclical recovery, it often undermines shareholder value. Chart I-6 on page 4 illustrates that Chinese cyclical stocks and bank share prices have been flat-to-down in the past 10 years despite recurring stimulus. Finally, the near-term risks for Chinese stocks do not stem from the domestic economy, but from geopolitics and a correction in US FAANG stocks. President Trump may escalate the confrontation with China in order to “rally the nation behind the flag” if his polling does not improve ahead of the November elections. Chart I-8 illustrates that the Americans’ view of China has deteriorated significantly in recent years. This might be exploited by President Trump to boost his re-election chances. A heightened confrontation could produce a correction in Chinese stocks. Chart I-7China Credit Excesses Are Getting Larger
China Credit Excesses Are Getting Larger
China Credit Excesses Are Getting Larger
Chart I-8Americans’ Perception Of China Has Deteriorated In Recent Years
China, Indonesia And Turkey
China, Indonesia And Turkey
Also, if the FAANG mania is either paused or reversed, then Chinese tech and mega-cap stocks will correct, pulling down the broad Chinese equity indexes. Bottom Line: The current round of stimulus in China has made the credit, money and property excesses even larger. As we have written over the years, easy money and credit generally fuel a misallocation of capital. Ultimately, this slows productivity growth on the macro level and destroys shareholder value on the company level. Small banks, not large ones, have been leading the massive money and credit boom for the past 10 years. Nevertheless, given that the cyclical recovery in China will endure for now, we continue overweighting Chinese investable stocks within an EM equity portfolio. Finally, we are closing our short CNY/long USD position given the change in our USD outlook on July 9. This position has produced a 4.2% loss since its initiation on December 9, 2015. A Stress Test For Bank Stocks Chart I-9China: Small and Medium Banks Versus Large 5 Ones
China: Small and Medium Banks Versus Large 5 Ones
China: Small and Medium Banks Versus Large 5 Ones
Small banks, not large ones, have been leading the massive money and credit boom for the past 10 years. Chart I-9 demonstrates that the risk-weighted assets of smaller banks have risen much faster, and are presently larger, than those of large banks. We have performed a new stress test for both the Big Five and small & medium listed banks. Concerning large banks, our base-case scenario calls for risk-weighted non-performing assets to rise to 13% of total. Accordingly, their equity will be diluted by 46% if they were to provision for these losses (Table I-1). Consequently, the true (adjusted) price-to-book (PBV) ratio will be 1.1. Assuming that the fair value of these large banks corresponds to a PBV ratio of one, then Big Five banks remain moderately (10%) overpriced. For small banks, our baseline scenario assumes a risk-weighted non-performing asset ratio of 13%. If these banks were to provision for these write offs, their equity will be diluted by 61%, pushing the adjusted PBV ratio to 2 (Table I-2). If we use a PBV fair value ratio of 1.3, then small and medium listed banks are substantially overpriced. Table I-1Stress Test Of 5 Large Banks
China, Indonesia And Turkey
China, Indonesia And Turkey
Table I-2Stress Test Of The Other 25 Listed Medium & Small Banks
China, Indonesia And Turkey
China, Indonesia And Turkey
Chart I-10Favor Large 5 Banks Over Small And Medium Ones
Favor Large 5 Banks Over Small And Medium Ones
Favor Large 5 Banks Over Small And Medium Ones
Bottom Line: Chinese banks stocks could rebound, but their structural outlook has deteriorated further following another round of credit binge. Among banks stocks, we reiterate our strategy of favoring large banks over smaller ones (Chart I-10). Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Lin Xiang, CFA Research Analyst linx@bcaresearch.com Indonesia: Struggling To Recover Indonesian stocks and the rupiah have rebounded in line with global risk assets. However, the rebound might be waning. The rupiah has begun weakening anew against the US dollar despite a major weakness in the latter. Relative to EM, Indonesian equities are underperforming again (Chart II-1). Chart II-1Indonesian Stocks Are Underperforming EM Again
Indonesian Stocks Are Underperforming EM Again
Indonesian Stocks Are Underperforming EM Again
Crumbling Economic Activity And Insufficient Stimulus Indonesia is experiencing its worst recession since the Asian Crisis in 1997. Consumer income has dwindled and consumer confidence collapsed (Chart II-2, top panel). In turn, passenger car and truck sales have contracted by 90% and 84%, respectively, from a year ago (Chart II-2, second and third panel). Meanwhile, domestic cement consumption plunged by 17% (Chart II-2, bottom panel). In the meantime, the Coronavirus pandemic is not subsiding and will continue weighing on the Indonesian economy. The authorities have been attempting to prop up domestic demand. Yet the total fiscal stimulus announced so far – which amounts to $48 billion or 4.3% of GDP – is unlikely to be enough, given the harsh nature of this recession. For instance, the commercial banks loan impulse has already dipped to -2.7% of GDP (Chart II-3, top panel). Provided that demand for credit stays weak and banks continue to be reluctant to lend, the credit impulse will drop even further. As a result, the negative credit impulse will offset the fiscal thrust. Chart II-2Indonesia: Domestic Demand Collapsed
Indonesia: Domestic Demand Collapsed
Indonesia: Domestic Demand Collapsed
Chart II-3Indonesia: Lending Rates Are High
Indonesia: Lending Rates Are High
Indonesia: Lending Rates Are High
On the monetary policy front, Bank Indonesia (BI) has been aggressively cutting its policy rate and injecting banking system liquidity into the market. The BI has been also purchasing government bonds on the secondary and primary markets, de facto conducting quantitative easing. Still, the ongoing monetary easing has not translated into lower lending rates for the real economy. In particular, although the BI lowered its policy rate by 200 basis points since July 2019, bank lending rates have only fallen by 100 basis points (Chart II-3, middle panel). This is a major sign that the monetary transmission mechanism is broken. Furthermore, the commercial banks’ lending rate, in real (inflation-adjusted) terms, remains elevated (Chart II-3, bottom panel). This is severely hurting credit demand (Chart II-3, top panel). The deflationary pressures on the Indonesian economy are intensifying. As a result, the deflationary pressures on the Indonesian economy are intensifying. The top panel of Chart II-4 shows that the GDP deflator is flirting with deflation. Meanwhile, both core and headline inflation have undershot the central bank’s target (Chart II-4, bottom panel). Bottom Line: Very low inflation and crumbling real growth have caused nominal GDP growth to drop below borrowing rates (Chart II-5). This is hitting borrowers’ ability to service their debt and is leading to swelling non-performing loans (NPLs). Chart II-4Indonesia Is Facing Very Low Inflation
Indonesia Is Facing Very Low Inflation
Indonesia Is Facing Very Low Inflation
Chart II-5Indonesia: Nominal GDP Growth Is Well Below Lending Rates
Indonesia: Nominal GDP Growth Is Well Below Lending Rates
Indonesia: Nominal GDP Growth Is Well Below Lending Rates
Bank Stocks Remain At Risk The outlook for bank stocks that make up 48% of the Indonesia MSCI equity index is bleak. Chart II-6 shows that non-performing loans and special-mention loans (which are composed of doubtful loans) were rising before the pandemic shock. This has forced commercial banks to boost their bad loans provisioning, which has hurt their profitability. Additionally, Indonesian commercial banks’ net interest margins (NIM) have been falling sharply (Chart II-7). This has occurred because, on the revenues side, interest earnings have mushroomed as debtors have halted their interest payments while, on the expenditures side, commercial banks were forced to keep on paying interests to depositors. To protect their profitability, commercial banks have kept their lending rates stubbornly high. However, doing so will end up backfiring – as elevated lending rates punish borrowers and end up causing NPLs to rise, leading to more profit weakness. Chart II-6Indonesia: Bad Loans Are On The Rise
Indonesia: Bad Loans Are On The Rise
Indonesia: Bad Loans Are On The Rise
Chart II-7Indonesia: Banks' Net Interest Margins Are Falling
Indonesia: Banks' Net Interest Margins Are Falling
Indonesia: Banks' Net Interest Margins Are Falling
Crucially, Bank Central Asia and Bank Rakyat – which now account for a whopping 37% of the Indonesia MSCI market cap – are vulnerable. Both commercial banks are heavily exposed to state-owned enterprises (SOE) and small and medium (SME) companies. Particularly, 40% of Bank Central Asia’s loan book is linked to SOEs and government-led projects across electricity, ports, airports and cement among other sectors. Meanwhile, 68% of Bank Rakyat’s loan book is leveraged to the SME sector and 20% to large companies, including SOEs. Worryingly, both SOEs and SMEs have been undergoing stress. Their profitability and debt servicing ability were questionable even before the COVID-19 pandemic. State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs): The debt servicing ability for these companies has deteriorated. The debt-to-EBITDA ratio has risen considerably while the EBITDA coverage of interest expenses is set to fall from already low levels (Chart II-8). Small & Medium Enterprises (SME): The debt serviceability of the top 40% of the MSCI-listed small cap stocks is also deteriorating. The top panel of Chart II-9 shows that these companies’ debt-to-EBITDA has risen substantially, and that the EBITDA-to-interest expense ratio has plunged (Chart II-9, bottom panel). Chart II-8Indonesian SOEs: Weak Debt Servicing Capacity
Indonesian SOEs: Weak Debt Servicing Capacity
Indonesian SOEs: Weak Debt Servicing Capacity
Chart II-9Indonesian SMEs: Weak Debt Servicing Capacity
Indonesian SMEs: Weak Debt Servicing Capacity
Indonesian SMEs: Weak Debt Servicing Capacity
Chart II-10Indonesia Equities: Banks, Non-Financials And Small Caps
Indonesia Equities: Banks, Non-Financials And Small Caps
Indonesia Equities: Banks, Non-Financials And Small Caps
All in all, both Bank Central Asia and Bank Rakyat are set to experience a considerable new NPL cycle emanating from the poor profitability of SOEs and SMEs. Importantly, Bank Central Asia and Bank Rakyat’s respective NPLs at 1.3% and 2.6% were relatively low at the start of this year and have much room to rise. Neither are their valuations appealing. At a price-to-book value of 4.4 Bank Central Asia is expensive. As for Bank Rakyat while its multiples are not as high as Bank Central Asia’s (which is trading at a price-to-book value of 1.8), it is not particularly cheap either, considering its enormous exposure to Indonesia’s struggling SME sector. Bottom Line: The outlook for bank stocks is murky (Chart II-10). Apart from banks, the rest of the Indonesian stock market has been performing very poorly and there is no obvious evidence that this will change (Chart II-10, bottom two panels). Investment Conclusions Continue underweighting the Indonesian stock market. Bank stocks remain at risk. Moreover, there is evidence that retail investors have been active in the stock market as of late. When the stock market does relapse, retail investors will likely rush to sell their holdings, thereby magnifying the equity selloff. Dedicated EM local currency bonds and credit portfolios should continue underweighting Indonesia. Investors in Indonesia’s corporate US dollar bonds should tread carefully as the largest issuers are those SOEs that have experienced deteriorating creditworthiness. Chart II-11Return On Capital Drives EM Currencies
Return On Capital Drives EM Currencies
Return On Capital Drives EM Currencies
If the US dollar continues to depreciate, the rupiah could stabilize and rebound but it will underperform other EM and DM currencies. Return on capital (ROC) is the ultimate driver of EM currencies. Given the magnitude of the recession Indonesia is in and the slow recovery it will experience, its ROC will remain weak. This will weigh on the rupiah (Chart II-11). We continue shorting the rupiah against an equally weighted basket of the euro, Swiss franc and Japanese yen. Ayman Kawtharani Editor/Strategist ayman@bcaresearch.com Turkey: The Ramifications Of A Money Plethora Turkey is facing another currency turmoil. At the core of significant currency depreciation pressures is an overflow of money. Chart III-1 demonstrates that narrow money (M1) and broad money (M3) are booming at 90% and 50%, respectively, from a year ago. These measures exclude foreign currency deposits. Bank loan annual growth has surged to 45% and commercial bank purchases of government bonds are skyrocketing (Chart III-2). Chart III-1Turkey's Money Overflow
Turkey's Money Overflow
Turkey's Money Overflow
Chart III-2Rampant Credit Creation By Commercial Banks
Rampant Credit Creation By Commercial Banks
Rampant Credit Creation By Commercial Banks
In turn, the Central Bank of Turkey’s (CBRT) funding of commercial banks has surged (Chart III-3). By providing ample liquidity the CBRT has enabled commercial banks to engage in a credit frenzy and levy of government debt. The latter has capped local currency bond yields at a time when the private sector and foreign investors have been reluctant to finance the government bond given its current yields. At the core of significant currency depreciation pressures is an overflow of money. Consistent with this expanding money bubble, inflation in Turkey remains in a structural uptrend (Chart III-4). Core and service sector consumer price inflation is close to 12% and will rise even further due to the overflow of money in the economy. Besides, residential property prices are already soaring, in local currency terms, as residents are fleeing from liras. Chart III-3Central Bank's Funding Of Banks
Central Bank's Funding Of Banks
Central Bank's Funding Of Banks
Chart III-4Structurally Rising Inflation
Structurally Rising Inflation
Structurally Rising Inflation
Still, the central bank refuses to acknowledge these inflationary pressures and to tighten its policy stance. Monetary authorities remain well behind the inflation curve. The policy rate, in real terms (deflated by core CPI), is -2%. In the past, when real policy rates have dropped to this level, the exchange rate has often tumbled, as in 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2018 (Chart III-5). Chart III-5Numerous Headwinds For The Lira
Numerous Headwinds For The Lira
Numerous Headwinds For The Lira
In regard to balance of payments, the current account deficit is widening again due to the plunge in exports and tourism revenues and the recovering imports (Chart III-5, bottom panel). Historically, a widening current account deficit has weighed on the currency. Lastly, the central bank is not in the position to defend the exchange rate much longer. Not only has it depleted its own reserves but it has also used up $70 billion of commercial banks deposits and entered a $55 billion foreign exchange swap. Hence, its is massively short on US dollars. Bottom Line: As part of our broader currency strategy, on July 9, we replaced our short Turkish lira versus the US dollar position with a short in TRY versus a basket of the euro, CHF and JPY. This switch has proved to be very profitable and we continue recommending it. Consequently, investors should continue underweighting Turkish stocks, local currency bonds and credit markets relative to their EM counterparts. Fixed-income investors should consider betting on higher inflation expectations, i.e. going long domestic inflation adjusted yields and shorting nominal yields. Andrija Vesic Associate Editor andrijav@bcaresearch.com Footnotes Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations
Highlights Chart 1How Much Lower For Real Yields?
How Much Lower For Real Yields?
How Much Lower For Real Yields?
Treasury yields moved lower last month even as the overall bond market priced-in a more reflationary economic environment. Spread product outperformed Treasuries and inflation expectations rose, but nominal bond yields still fell as plunging real yields offset the rising cost of inflation compensation (Chart 1). This sort of market behavior is unusual, but it is also easily explained. The market is starting to believe in the economic recovery, and it is pushing inflation expectations higher as a result. However, it also believes that the Fed will keep the nominal short rate pinned at zero even as inflation rises. Falling real yields result from rising inflation expectations and stable nominal rate expectations. This combination of market moves can’t go on forever. Eventually, inflation expectations will rise enough that the market will price-in policy tightening. This will push real yields higher, starting at the long-end of the curve. However, it’s difficult to know when this will occur, especially with the Fed doing its best to convey a dovish bias. In this environment, we advise investors to keep portfolio duration near benchmark and to play the reflation trade through real yield curve steepeners (see page 11). Real yield curve steepeners will profit in both rising and falling real yield environments, as long as the reflation trade remains intact. Feature Investment Grade: Overweight Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview
Investment Grade Market Overview
Investment Grade Market Overview
Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 177 basis points in July, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -361 bps. Spreads continue to tighten and investment grade corporate bond valuation is turning expensive, particularly for the highest credit tiers. The 12-month breakeven spread for the overall corporate index has been tighter 29% of the time since 1996 (Chart 2). The similar figure for the Baa credit tier is a relatively cheap 38% (panel 3). With the Fed providing a strong back-stop for investment grade corporates – one that has now officially been extended until the end of the year – we should expect spreads to turn even more expensive, likely returning to the all-time stretched valuations seen near the end of 2019. With that in mind, we want to focus our investment grade corporate bond exposure on high quality Baa-rated bonds. These are bonds that offer greater expected returns than those rated A and above, but that are also unlikely to be downgraded into junk (panel 4). Subordinate bank bonds are prime examples of securities that exist within this sweet spot.1 At the sector level, we also recommend overweight allocations to Healthcare and Energy bonds,2 as well as underweight allocations to Technology3 and Pharmaceutical bonds.4 Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation*
A Different Kind Of Reflation Trade
A Different Kind Of Reflation Trade
Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward*
A Different Kind Of Reflation Trade
A Different Kind Of Reflation Trade
High-Yield: Neutral Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview
High-Yield Market Overview
High-Yield Market Overview
High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 425 basis points in July, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -466 bps. All junk credit tiers delivered strong returns on the month with the exception of the lowest-rated (Ca & below) bonds (Chart 3). These securities underperformed Treasuries by 267 bps, as a rising default rate weighs on the weakest credits. We are sticking with our relatively cautious stance toward high-yield, favoring bonds only from those issuers that will be able to access the Fed’s emergency lending facilities if need be. This includes most of the Ba-rated credit tier, some portion of the B-rated credit tier, and very few bonds rated Caa & below. We view the Fed back-stop as critically important because junk spreads are far too tight based on fundamentals alone. For example, current market spreads imply that the default rate must come in below 4.5% during the next 12 months for the junk index to deliver a default-adjusted spread consistent with positive excess returns versus Treasuries (panel 3).5 This would require a rapid improvement in the economic outlook. At the sector level, we advise overweight allocations to high-yield Technology6 and Energy7 bonds. We are underweight the Healthcare and Pharmaceutical sectors.8 MBS: Underweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview
MBS Market Overview
MBS Market Overview
Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 2 basis points in July, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -46 bps. The conventional 30-year MBS index option-adjusted spread (OAS) tightened 12 bps in July, but it still offers a pick-up relative to other comparable sectors. The MBS OAS of 86 bps is greater than the 75 bps offered by Aa-rated corporate bonds (Chart 4), the 47 bps offered by Aaa-rated consumer ABS and the 72 bps offered by Agency CMBS. Despite this spread advantage, we are concerned that the elevated primary mortgage spread is a warning that refinancing risk could flare later this year (bottom panel). Even if Treasury yields are unchanged, a further 50 bps drop in the mortgage rate due to spread compression cannot be ruled out. Such a move would lead to a significant increase in prepayment losses. With that in mind, we are concerned about the low level of expected prepayment losses (option cost) priced into the MBS index (panel 3). A refi wave in the second half of this year would undoubtedly send that option cost higher, eating into the returns implied by the lofty OAS. Government-Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview
Government-Related Market Overview
Government-Related Market Overview
The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 77 basis points in July, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -325 bps. Sovereign debt outperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 285 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -567 bps. Foreign Agencies outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 62 bps in July, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -706 bps. Local Authority debt outperformed Treasuries by 74 bps in July, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -368 bps. Domestic Agency bonds underperformed by 4 bps, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -62 bps. Supranationals outperformed by 5 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -14 bps. The US dollar’s recent weakness, particularly against EM currencies, is a huge boon for Sovereign and Foreign Agency returns (Chart 5). However, US corporate spreads will also perform well in an environment of improving global growth and dollar weakness and, for the most part, value remains more compelling in the US corporate space (panel 3). Within the Emerging Market Sovereign space: South Africa, Mexico, Colombia, Malaysia, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Indonesia, Russia and Chile all offer a spread pick-up relative to quality and duration-matched US corporate bonds. Of those attractively priced countries, Mexico stands out as particularly compelling on a risk/reward basis.9 Municipal Bonds: Overweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview
Municipal Market Overview
Municipal Market Overview
Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 115 basis points in July, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -473 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). Municipal bond spreads versus Treasuries tightened in July, but remain elevated compared to typical historical levels. In fact, both the 2-year and 10-year Aaa Muni yields are above equivalent-maturity Treasury yields, despite municipal debt’s tax exempt status (Chart 6). Municipal bonds are also attractively priced relative to corporate bonds across the entire investment grade credit spectrum, as we demonstrated in a recent report.10 In that report we also mentioned our concern about the less-than-generous pricing offered by the Fed’s Municipal Liquidity Facility (MLF). At present, MLF funds are only available at a cost that is well above current market prices (panel 3). This means that the MLF won’t help push Muni yields lower from current levels. Despite the MLF’s shortcomings, we stick with our overweight allocation to municipal bonds. For one thing, federal assistance to state & local governments will be included in the forthcoming stimulus bill. The Fed will also feel increased pressure to reduce MLF pricing the longer the passage of that bill is delayed. Further, while the budget pressure facing municipal governments is immense, states hold very high rainy day fund balances (bottom panel). This will help cushion the blow and lessen the risk of ratings downgrades. Treasury Curve: Buy 5-Year Bullet Versus 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview
Treasury Yield Curve Overview
Treasury Yield Curve Overview
The Treasury curve bull flattened in July. The 2/10 and 5/30 Treasury slopes flattened 6 bps and 13 bps, reaching 44 bps and 99 bps, respectively. Unusually, the bull flattening of the Treasury curve that occurred last month was not the result of a deflationary market environment. Rather, the inflation compensation curve bear flattened – the 2-year and 10-year CPI swap rates increased 25 bps and 16 bps, respectively – while the real yield curve underwent a large parallel shift down. It will be difficult for the nominal yield curve to keep flattening if this reflationary back-drop continues. Eventually, rising inflation expectations will pull up real yields at the long-end of the curve. For this reason, we retain our bias toward duration-neutral yield curve steepeners on a 6-12 month horizon. Specifically, we advise going long the 5-year bullet and short a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. In a recent report we noted that valuation is a concern with this positioning.11 The 5-year yield is below the yield on the duration-matched 2/10 barbell (Chart 7), and the 5-year bullet looks expensive on our yield curve models (Appendix B). However, the 5-year bullet traded at much more expensive levels during the last zero-lower-bound period between 2010 and 2013 (bottom panel). With short rates once again pinned at zero, we expect the 5-year to once again hit extreme levels of overvaluation. TIPS: Overweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview
TIPS Market Overview
TIPS Market Overview
TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 95 basis points in July, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -309 bps. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate rose 21 bps on the month to hit 1.56%. The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate rose 18 bps on the month to hit 1.71%. TIPS breakeven inflation rates have moved up rapidly during the past couple of months, and the 10-year breakeven is now within 6 bps of the fair value reading from our Adaptive Expectations Model (Chart 8).12 TIPS will soon turn expensive if current trends continue. That is, unless stronger CPI inflation sends our model's fair value estimate higher. We place strong odds on the latter occurring. Month-over-month core CPI bottomed in April, as did the oil price. In addition, trimmed mean inflation measures suggest that core has room to play catch-up (panel 3). As mentioned on page 1, we continue to recommend real yield curve steepeners as a way to take advantage of the ongoing reflation trade. With the Fed now targeting a temporary overshoot of its 2% inflation goal, we would expect the cost of 2-year inflation protection to eventually trade above the cost of 10-year inflation protection (panel 4). With the Fed also keeping a firmer grip over short-dated nominal yields than over long-dated ones, this means that short-maturity real yields will come under downward pressure relative to the long-end (bottom panel).13 ABS: Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview
ABS Market Overview
ABS Market Overview
Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 25 basis points in July, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +23 bps. Aaa-rated ABS outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 15 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +22 bps. Non-Aaa ABS outperformed by 111 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +22 bps. Aaa ABS are a high conviction overweight, given that spreads remain elevated compared to historical levels and that the sector benefits from Fed support through the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF). However, spreads are even more attractive in non-Aaa ABS (Chart 9) and we recommend owning those securities as well. This is despite the fact that only Aaa-rated bonds are eligible for TALF. We explained our rationale for owning non-Aaa consumer ABS in a recent report.14 We noted that the stimulus received from the CARES act caused real personal income to increase significantly during the past four months and, faced with fewer spending opportunities, households used that windfall to pay down consumer debt (bottom panel). Granted, further fiscal stimulus is needed to sustain recent income gains. But we expect the follow-up stimulus bill to be passed soon. Our Geopolitical Strategy service has shown that the new bill will likely contain sufficient income support for households.15 Non-Agency CMBS: Neutral Chart 10CMBS Market Overview
CMBS Market Overview
CMBS Market Overview
Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 112 basis points in July, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -395 bps. Aaa CMBS outperformed Treasuries by 43 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -111 bps. Non-Aaa CMBS outperformed by 256 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -1042 bps (Chart 10). We continue to recommend an overweight allocation to Aaa non-agency CMBS and an underweight allocation to non-Aaa CMBS. Our reasoning is simple. Aaa CMBS are eligible for TALF, meaning that spreads can still tighten even as the hardship in commercial real estate continues. Without Fed support, non-Aaa CMBS will struggle as the delinquency rate continues to climb (panel 3).16 Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 17 basis points in July, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -42 bps. The average index spread tightened 5 bps on the month to 72 bps, still well above typical historical levels (bottom panel). The Fed is supporting the Agency CMBS market by directly purchasing the securities as part of its Agency MBS purchase program. The combination of strong Fed support and elevated spreads makes the sector a high conviction overweight. Appendix A: Buy What The Fed Is Buying The Fed rolled out a number of aggressive lending facilities on March 23. These facilities focused on different specific sectors of the US bond market. The fact that the Fed has decided to support some parts of the market and not others has caused some traditional bond market correlations to break down. It has also led us to adopt of a strategy of “Buy What The Fed Is Buying”. That is, we favor those sectors that offer attractive spreads and that benefit from Fed support. The below Table tracks the performance of different bond sectors since the March 23 announcement. We will use this to monitor bond market correlations and evaluate our strategy’s success. Table Performance Since March 23 Announcement Of Emergency Fed Facilities
A Different Kind Of Reflation Trade
A Different Kind Of Reflation Trade
Appendix B: Butterfly Strategy Valuations The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com US Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As Of July 31, 2020)
A Different Kind Of Reflation Trade
A Different Kind Of Reflation Trade
Table 5 scales the raw residuals in Table 4 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As Of July 31, 2020)
A Different Kind Of Reflation Trade
A Different Kind Of Reflation Trade
Table 6 flips the models on their heads. It shows the change in the slope between the two barbell maturities that must be realized during the next six months to make returns between the bullet and barbell equal. For example, a reading of 57 bps in the 5 over 2/10 cell means that we would only expect the 5-year to outperform the 2/10 if the 2/10 slope steepens by more than 57 bps during the next six months. Otherwise, we would expect the 2/10 barbell to outperform the 5-year bullet. Table 6Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs)
A Different Kind Of Reflation Trade
A Different Kind Of Reflation Trade
Appendix C: Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the US bond market. It is a purely computational exercise and does not impose any macroeconomic view. The Map’s vertical axis shows 12-month expected excess returns. These are proxied by each sector’s option-adjusted spread. Sectors plotting further toward the top of the Map have higher expected returns and vice-versa. Our novel risk measure called the “Risk Of Losing 100 bps” is shown on the Map’s horizontal axis. To calculate it, we first compute the spread widening required on a 12-month horizon for each sector to lose 100 bps or more relative to a duration-matched position in Treasury securities. Then, we divide that amount of spread widening by each sector’s historical spread volatility. The end result is the number of standard deviations of 12-month spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps or more versus a position in Treasuries. Lower risk sectors plot further to the right of the Map, and higher risk sectors plot further to the left. Chart 11Excess Return Bond Map (As Of July 31, 2020)
A Different Kind Of Reflation Trade
A Different Kind Of Reflation Trade
Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Case Against The Money Supply”, dated June 30, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 For our outlook on Energy bonds please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 1: A Model Of Energy Bond Excess Returns”, dated July 14, 2020 and US Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 2: Buy The Dip In High-Yield Energy”, dated July 21, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Take A Look At High-Yield Technology Bonds”, dated June 23, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Assessing Healthcare & Pharma Bonds In A Pandemic”, dated June 9, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 We assume a 25% recovery rate and target a spread of 150 bps in excess of default losses. For more details on this calculation please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “No Holding Back”, dated June 16, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Take A Look At High-Yield Technology Bonds”, dated June 23, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 1: A Model Of Energy Bond Excess Returns”, dated July 14, 2020 and US Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 2: Buy The Dip In High-Yield Energy”, dated July 21, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Assessing Healthcare & Pharma Bonds In A Pandemic”, dated June 9, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 9 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Treasury Market Amid Surging Supply”, dated May 12, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 10 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Bonds Are Vulnerable As North America Re-Opens”, dated May 26, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 11 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Take A Look At High-Yield Technology Bonds”, dated June 23, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 12 For more details on our model please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “How Are Inflation Expectations Adapting?”, dated February 11, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 13 For more details on our recommended real yield curve steepener trade please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Negative Oil, The Zero Lower Bound And The Fisher Equation”, dated April 28, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 14 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “No Holding Back”, dated June 16, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 15 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, “A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update)”, dated July 31, 2020, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 16 We discussed our CMBS outlook in more detail in US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “No Holding Back”, dated June 16, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation
Dear Client, There will be no Weekly Report on August 10, as the US Equity Strategy team will be on vacation for the week. Our regular publication schedule will resume on Monday August 17, 2020 with a Special Report by my colleague Chester Ntonifor, BCA’s Chief FX Strategist on the interplay of the style bias and the US Dollar. We trust that you will find this Report both informative and insightful. Kind Regards, Anastasios Feature Before getting to our analysis on why cyclicals will best defensives, we want to address our definition of cyclicals and defensives, where we think tech stands and why, discuss what our current positioning is and what time horizon we are targeting for this portfolio bent. Cyclicals And Defensives Definition Table 1 is a stripped down version of our current recommendations table and shows that our cyclicals definition is one of deep cyclicals including industrials, materials, energy and the information technology sector. Utilities, consumer staples, health care and telecom services (which is currently categorized as a GICS2) comprise our defensives universe. Table 1US Equity Strategy's Cyclicals Vs. Defensives Current Recommendations
Top 10 Reasons To Start Nibbling On Cyclicals At The Expense Of Defensives
Top 10 Reasons To Start Nibbling On Cyclicals At The Expense Of Defensives
Tech Is Still Cyclical Importantly, we still consider the tech sector a deep cyclical and not a safe haven sector. While the COVID-19 fallout has acted as an accelerant especially to a faster absorption of goods and services of the tech titans, that is not a de facto change in the behavior of these still cyclical stocks. As a reminder tech stocks have 60% export exposure or 20 percentage points higher than the broad market. The implication is that US tech trends should follow the ebbs and flows of the global economy. Contrary to popular belief that technology equities behaved defensively recently, empirical evidence gives credence to our hypothesis that technology stocks remain cyclical: from the Feb 19 SPX peak until the March trough the IT sector underperformed all four defensive sectors (Chart of the Week). In marked contrast, tech has left in the dust defensive sectors since the March bottom, cementing its cyclical status. Chart of the WeekTech Remains A Cyclical Sector
Tech Remains A Cyclical Sector
Tech Remains A Cyclical Sector
Current Positioning With regard to our broader technology positioning, we are currently neutral the S&P tech sector, overweight the S&P internet retail index (which Amazon dominates) that sits under the S&P consumer discretionary sector and underweight the S&P interactive media & services index (which includes Alphabet and Facebook) that falls under the newly formed S&P communications services sector. Thus, our broadly defined tech sector exposure remains neutral. Meanwhile, last week we boosted the S&P materials sector to overweight and that move pushed our cyclicals/defensives bent marginally to preferring deep cyclicals to defensives (please see market cap weights in Table 1). Timing Is Key This portfolio bent may run into some near-term trouble as we expect a flare up of (geo)political risks (please see here and here), but once the election uncertainty lifts, hopefully in late-November/early-December, from that point onward and on a 9-12 month time horizon cyclicals should really start to flex their muscles versus defensives. The purpose of this Special Report is to identify the top ten drivers of the looming cyclicals versus defensives outperformance phase on a cyclical time horizon. What follows is one page one chart per key reason, in no particular order of importance. 1.) Dollar The Reflator Time and again we have highlighted the boost that internationally exposed sectors get from a weakening greenback. Cyclicals are the primary beneficiaries of such a backdrop as a lot of these deep cyclical companies garner over 50% of their sales from abroad. We recently updated in a Special Report the breakdown of GICS1 sectors’ foreign sourced revenues and more importantly their performance during US dollar bear markets. Cyclicals clearly have the upper hand. Chart 1 shows this tight inverse correlation, irrespective of what USD index we use. Finally, looking ahead a falling greenback will act as a relative profit reflator (US dollar shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 1), especially given that most of the defensive sectors are landlocked in the US and do not get a P&L fillip from positive translation gains. Chart 1CHART 1
CHART 1
CHART 1
2.) Global Growth Recovery Not only does the debasing of the US dollar bode well for Income Statement (I/S) relative translation gains, but also serves as a tonic to global growth. In other words, a final demand recovery is in the works on the back of a pending virtuous cycle: a depreciating dollar lifts global growth, and an increase in trade brings more US dollars in circulation further weakening the greenback (top panel, Chart 2). Our Global Trade Activity Indicator also corroborates the USD message and underscores a global growth recovery into 2021 (second panel, Chart 2). Tack on the meteoric rise in the G10 economic surprise index (third panel, Chart 2) and factors are falling into place for a synchronized global economic recovery including a V-shaped US rebound from the depths of the recession in Q2 (ISM manufacturing survey shown advanced, bottom panel, Chart 2). Chart 2CHART 2
CHART 2
CHART 2
3.) US Capex To The Rescue The latest GDP report made for grim reading. US capex collapsed 27% last quarter in line with the fall it suffered in Q1/2009. Not even bulletproof software investment escaped unscathed and contracted for the first time in seven years, albeit modestly. However, if the looming recovery resembles the GFC episode when real non-residential investment soared 40 percentage points from that nadir in the subsequent five quarters, then a slingshot rebound will ensue by the end of 2021. Importantly, our US capex indicator has an excellent track record in leading the relative share price ratio and confirms that a capex trough is already in store, tracing out the bottom hit during the Great Recession (top panel, Chart 3). Regional Fed surveys also signal that a capex boom looms in the coming quarters (middle panel, Chart 3). And, so do cheery CEOs that expect a sizable investment recovery in the next six months, according to the Conference Board survey (bottom panel, Chart 3). All of this is a harbinger of a cyclicals outperformance phase at the expense of defensives. Chart 3CHART 3
CHART 3
CHART 3
4.) Chinese Capex On The Upswing (Fiscal Easing) Across the pacific, Chinese excavator sales have gone vertical. While we take Chinese data with a grain of salt, Komatsu hydraulic excavator demand growth in China has averaged 45% on a year-over-year basis in the quarter ending in June. This Japanese company’s data, which has been unaffected by the US/Sino trade war, corroborates the Chinese official statistics (top panel, Chart 4). Infrastructure spending is also on the rise in China following an abrupt halt in projects started early in 2020. This revving of the investment spending engine is bullish for the broad commodity complex including US cyclicals (bottom panel, Chart 4). Chart 4CHART 4
CHART 4
CHART 4
5.) Chinese Monetary Easing None of the above investment recovery would have been possible had the Chinese authorities not opened up the liquidity spigots. Monetary easing via the sinking reserve-requirement-ratio (RRR) has been instrumental in engineering an economic rebound (RRR shown inverted, third panel, Chart 5). The credit-easing channel has been also important in funneling cash toward investment, and the climbing Li Keqiang index is evidence that sloshing liquidity is being put to good use (bottom & second panels, Chart 5). Finally, Chinese loan demand data also confirms that an economic recovery is in the offing and heralds a US cyclicals versus defensives portfolio tilt (top panel, Chart 5). Chart 5CHART 5
CHART 5
CHART 5
6.) Firming Financial Market Data (Chinese And EM Equity Market Outperformance) Typically, financial market data are early in sniffing out a turn in economic data. This anticipatory nature of financial markets is currently signaling that EM in general and Chinese economic growth in particular will make a significant comeback in the coming quarters. Importantly, Chinese bourses and the MSCI EM equity index (in USD) have recently started to outperform the ACWI and the SPX (Chart 6). Both of these equity markets are more cyclically exposed than the defensive US and global indexes because of the respective sector composition and have paved the way for a sustainable rise in the US cyclicals/defensives share price ratio (Chart 6). Chart 6CHART 6
CHART 6
CHART 6
7.) Transition From Deflation To Inflation Similarly to the EM and Chinese equity market outperformance of their DM peers, commodity prices are putting in a bottom and forecasting a brighter global trade backdrop for the rest of the year (top panel, Chart 7). The depreciating US dollar is also underpinning the commodity complex and this should serve as a catalyst for an exit from the recent global disinflationary backdrop, especially corporate wholesale price deflation. Domestically, the prices paid subcomponent of the ISM manufacturing survey is firming and projecting that relative pricing power will favor cyclicals versus defensives (bottom panel, Chart 7). Chart 7CHART 7
CHART 7
CHART 7
8.) Profit Expectations Have Turned The Corner Sell-side extreme pessimism has given way to mild optimism as depicted by the now positive relative Net Earnings Revisions (NER) ratio (third panel, Chart 8). Importantly, despite the spike in the relative NER ratio, the bar has not risen enough both on a relative profit growth and revenue growth basis in order to short circuit the recovery in the relative share price ratio (second & bottom panels, Chart 8). Chart 8CHART 8
CHART 8
CHART 8
9.) Alluring Valuations The relative Valuation Indicator remains below the neutral zone offering a cushion to investors that are contending to execute a cyclicals versus defensives portfolio bent (Chart 9). Chart 9CHART 9
CHART 9
CHART 9
10.) Enticing Technicals Lastly, cyclicals are still unloved compared with defensives as our relative Technical Indicator (TI) highlights in Chart 10. In fact, our relative TI also hovers below the neutral zone, near a level that has marked previous playable recovery rallies (bottom panel, Chart 10). Chart 10CHART 10
CHART 10
CHART 10
But Monitor Three Key Risks Over the coming 12 to 18 months, investors should prepare their portfolios for an outperformance phase of cyclical sectors relative to defensives. Nonetheless, we are closely monitoring a number of key risks that can put our view offside. First, the relentless rise of ex-Vice President Biden in the polls on PREDICTIT, the rapidly increasing probability of a “Blue Sweep” in the upcoming elections, and the non-negligible risk of a contested election (as discussed in a joined Special Report with our sister Geopolitical Strategy service last week), all pose a short-term threat to the benign election backdrop priced into stocks. Were a risk-off phase to materialize in the next three months, as we expect, then cyclicals would take the back seat versus defensives, at least temporarily (bottom panel, Chart 11). Second, what worries us most is that Dr. Copper and crude oil (another global growth barometer), especially compared with gold, have yet to confirm the global growth recovery. In other words, the fleeting oil-to-gold and copper-to-gold ratios underscore that the liquidity-to-growth handoff has gone on hiatus. While we are not ready to throw in the towel yet, these relative commodity signals are disconcerting, and were they to deteriorate further, they would definitely undermine our optimistic view on global growth (top and second panels, Chart 11). Finally, it is disquieting that our relative profit growth models have no pulse. They represent a significant risk to the relative earnings-led rebound which the rest of the indicators we track are anticipating (third panel, Chart 11). Chart 11Three Key Risks We Are Monitoring
Three Key Risks We Are Monitoring
Three Key Risks We Are Monitoring
Bottom Line: On balance, a looming global growth recovery and pending global capex upcycle, a softening US dollar, commodity price inflation and Chinese monetary easing will more than offset the trifecta of rising election-related risks, the current unresponsiveness of our relative profit growth models and the lack of confirmation of a liquidity-to-growth transition. This will pave the way for a cyclicals outperformance phase at the expense of defensives. Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com
Markets have shrugged off the rise in COVID-19 cases in the US and new clusters in other places such as Spain, Hong Kong, Melbourne, and Tokyo (Chart 1). The MSCI All-Country World Index is now only 4% off its all-time high in February. We don’t see the markets ignoring reality for much longer. Economic activity remains very subdued (Chart 2), which will eventually cause a significant rise in bankruptcies and problems for banks. Nevertheless, the unprecedented monetary and fiscal stimulus will be increased further in coming weeks, which should prevent a big shift towards pessimism for a while. The crunch time will come in the northern-hemisphere winter, when COVID cases in North America and Europe are likely to rise sharply again. Risk assets at their current levels are not pricing in those risks. Recommended Allocation
Monthly Portfolio Update: Winter Is Coming – But Maybe Not Yet
Monthly Portfolio Update: Winter Is Coming – But Maybe Not Yet
Chart 1COVID Cases Are Still On The Rise
COVID Cases Are Still On The Rise
COVID Cases Are Still On The Rise
Chart 2Activity Remains Subdued
Monthly Portfolio Update: Winter Is Coming – But Maybe Not Yet
Monthly Portfolio Update: Winter Is Coming – But Maybe Not Yet
Markets are driven by the second derivative of growth. It is not surprising, then, that equities began to rally in March, exactly when economic data stopped deteriorating, even though it remained atrocious (Chart 3). Real interest rates have also continued to fall, even as risk assets rallied; this further fueled the rally, since the theoretical value of equities rises as the rate at which they are discounted falls (Chart 4). Chart 3Data Stopped Deteriorating In March
Data Stopped Deteriorating In March
Data Stopped Deteriorating In March
Chart 4Real Interest Rates Have Continued To Fall
Real Interest Rates Have Continued To Fall
Real Interest Rates Have Continued To Fall
But the question now is: Can the data continue to improve? PMIs will fall back towards 50, and economic releases are unlikely to surprise so strongly on the upside. In the US, as a result of the rise in COVID-19 cases and renewed (albeit mostly moderate) government restrictions on activity, consumer confidence has started to weaken again and initial unemployment claims to pick up (Charts 5 and 6). Even though the Fed will remain ultra-dovish, real rates will not fall much further from their current level, which is the lowest since TIPS started trading in the late 1990s. Chart 5Consumer Confidence Is Weakening Again
Consumer Confidence Is Weakening Again
Consumer Confidence Is Weakening Again
Chart 6The Jobs Market Has Stopped Improving
The Jobs Market Has Stopped Improving
The Jobs Market Has Stopped Improving
Chart 7Will Money Supply Growth Peak?
Will Money Supply Growth Peak?
Will Money Supply Growth Peak?
Money supply growth has grown rapidly, as a result of the increase in central-bank balance-sheets and the rush of companies to borrow to shore up their cash positions (Chart 7). The increase in excess liquidity has also been a force behind the rise in risk assets. But money supply growth is likely to slow from now. At least partly offsetting these risks will be further fiscal stimulus. BCA Research’s Geopolitical strategists see Congress approving a big new package of around $2.5 trillion, mainly because of widespread popular support for an extension of more generous unemployment benefits (Table 1). Agreement should come before the scheduled recess on August 10 (if it doesn’t, this would trigger a market selloff). The recent agreement between European Union leaders on a EUR750 billion fiscal package was a major breakthrough, since it represented joint borrowing backed by the rich northern European countries to provide transfers to the poorer periphery. Table 1There Is Much Public Support For Fiscal Stimulus
Monthly Portfolio Update: Winter Is Coming – But Maybe Not Yet
Monthly Portfolio Update: Winter Is Coming – But Maybe Not Yet
Further upside may come as the many investors who have missed the rally since March capitulate and buy risk assets. Investor sentiment is currently unusually polarized. Speculative individuals and hedge funds are very bullish (Chart 8). But more conservative pension funds, wealth managers, and individual investors, mostly remain cautious, as evidenced by the AAII weekly survey, in which many more investors say they expect the stock market to fall over the next six months than to rise (Chart 9). Cash levels remain high by historical standards (Chart 10). Although only a minority of investors turned positive in March, a recent academic study demonstrated how hedge funds and small active institutions have a disproportionate influence on price movements (Chart 11). A downside risk, then, would be if these investors decided to take profits or turned more bearish. Chart 8Hedge Funds Are Bullish...
Hedge Funds Are Bullish...
Hedge Funds Are Bullish...
Chart 9...But Retail Investors Very Cautious
...But Retail Investors Very Cautious
...But Retail Investors Very Cautious
Chart 10Cash Holdings Remain Elevated
Cash Holdings Remain Elevated
Cash Holdings Remain Elevated
Chart 11Some Smaller Investors Have A Big Impact
Monthly Portfolio Update: Winter Is Coming – But Maybe Not Yet
Monthly Portfolio Update: Winter Is Coming – But Maybe Not Yet
We have argued, since the pandemic began, that investors should not take high-conviction bets in such an uncertain environment. They should, rather, design portfolios which are robust under various scenarios. After the 43% rise in global equities since March, we cannot recommend an above-benchmark weighting, since downside risks are not priced in. We remain neutral on global equities. However, fixed-income instruments look even more unattractive at the current low level of rates; we remain underweight. We recommend hedging via a large overweight in cash, which leaves dry powder for when a better buying opportunity arises. Currencies: A key (as always) to the macro view is what happens to the US dollar. Many of the drivers of the dollar – interest-rate differentials, valuation, momentum, and relative money-supply growth – point to it weakening further (Chart 12). The trade-weighted dollar is already off 9% from its March peak. We turned bearish on the USD in our Quarterly published at the beginning of July. It is too early, however, to declare that the dollar bull market, which began in 2012, is definitely over. Chart 12Dollar Indicators Are Bearish...
Dollar Indicators Are Bearish...
Dollar Indicators Are Bearish...
Chart 13…But Short USD Is Now A Consensus
Monthly Portfolio Update: Winter Is Coming – But Maybe Not Yet
Monthly Portfolio Update: Winter Is Coming – But Maybe Not Yet
A new downturn in the global economy would push the dollar back up again, since it is a safe-haven currency. Shorting the dollar, especially against the euro, is now a consensus position, and so a near-term reversal is quite likely (Chart 13). But, over the next 12-18 months, a move above 1.22 for the euro and towards 100 for the yen is possible. We will continue to analyze whether the dollar could be entering a bear market, since this would necessarily make us more structurally positive on commodities and emerging markets. Equities: A pickup in global growth and a weakening US dollar might prove positive for cyclicals and value stocks in the long run, which would cause European and EM equities to outperform. Given the current uncertainty, however, we cannot recommend that stance and therefore continue to prefer “growth defensives” such as Health Care and Technology, which implies an overweight on the overall US market. Valuations in the Health Care sector remain attractive (Chart 14). Companies in the (broadly defined) Tech sector are beneficiaries of the pandemic, generally have robust balance-sheets, and should continue to see strong earnings growth for some years. And, while Technology is clearly expensive, valuations are still nowhere as excessive as in 2000 (Chart 15). For Tech to crash would require either that it go ex-growth, or that there is significant regulatory action. Chart 14Health Care Still Attractively Valued
Health Care Still Attractively Valued
Health Care Still Attractively Valued
Chart 15Tech Still Way Below Bubble Levels
Tech Still Way Below Bubble Levels
Tech Still Way Below Bubble Levels
Chart 16Europe No Longer So Dominated By Financials
Europe No Longer So Dominated By Financials
Europe No Longer So Dominated By Financials
Neither of these seems likely for now. Euro zone equities are less dominated than they were by Financials, but remain more cyclical than the US, with very few internet-related names (Chart 16). Fixed Income: Central banks will remain very dovish and, as Fed chair Jerome Powell has emphasized, are not even thinking about thinking about tightening policy. This suggests that nominal rates will rise only moderately, even if growth continues to pick up. The Fed still has plenty of room to ease further if needed, since the programs it rolled out in March have barely been taken up yet (Table 2). We thus recommend a neutral position on duration. We find TIPS attractive as a hedge against an eventual spike in inflation. The 10-year breakeven inflation rate implied in TIPS remains around 100 basis points below being compatible with the Fed achieving its 2% PCE inflation target in the long run (Chart 17). The announcement in September of the results of the Fed’s 18-month review of its policy framework, which is likely to intensify its efforts to achieve the inflation target, could push breakevens up a bit further. In credit, we continue to recommend buying whatever central banks are buying, mostly investment-grade corporate bonds and the top end of the US junk bond market. Though spreads have fallen a long way, they are still well above end-2019 levels, and look attractive in a world of such low government bond yields (Chart 18). Table 2Usage Of The 2020 Federal Reserve Emergency Lending Facilities
Monthly Portfolio Update: Winter Is Coming – But Maybe Not Yet
Monthly Portfolio Update: Winter Is Coming – But Maybe Not Yet
Chart 17TIPS Still Pricing Low Inflation For A Decade
TIPS Still Pricing Low Inflation For A Decade
TIPS Still Pricing Low Inflation For A Decade
Chart 18Credit Spreads Could Fall Further
Credit Spreads Could Fall Further
Credit Spreads Could Fall Further
Commodities: The weakening US dollar and continued expansion of Chinese stimulus (Chart 19) should be positive for industrial metals prices over the next six to nine months. Oil prices also have some further upside, since the OPEC 2.0 agreement to restrict supply is being adhered to, and demand will gradually pick up (although air travel will remain depressed, more commuters are using their cars as they avoid public transport). BCA Research’s Energy Service forecasts Brent crude to average $44 in the second half of this year, and $65 in 2021 (up from the current $43). Gold has already run up a lot and is now close to a record high price in real terms, with sentiment very optimistic (Chart 20). Chart 19China Stimulus Positive For Metals
China Stimulus Positive For Metals
China Stimulus Positive For Metals
Nonetheless, in an environment of very low real rates, it represents a good hedge against extreme tail risks, and therefore we continue to recommend a moderate position as an insurance. Chart 20Gold Looking Rather Toppish
Gold Looking Rather Toppish
Gold Looking Rather Toppish
Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com Recommended Asset Allocation
GAA DM Equity Country Allocation Model Update The GAA DM Equity Country Allocation model is updated as of July 31, 2020. The model has not made any meaningful adjustment to the top overweight countries with the top four remaining the US, Spain, Australia, and Sweden. Within the underweight countries, however, the UK has dropped out of the top four, replaced by Germany. Japan, France, and Switzerland remain in the top 4 underweight countries, as shown in Table 1. Table 1Model Allocation Vs. Benchmark Weights
GAA Quant Model Updates
GAA Quant Model Updates
As shown in Table 2 and Charts 1, 2 and 3, the overall model outperformed the MSCI World benchmark by 73 bps in July, with positive contributions from both the Level 1 and the Level 2 models. The Level 2 model outperformed its benchmark by 176 bps, thanks largely to the underweight in Japan and the UK, as well as the overweight in Sweden. The Level 1 model outperformed by 27 bps due to the large overweight in the US. Since going live, the overall model has outperformed its MSCI World benchmark by 390 bps, with 714 bps of outperformance from the Level 2 model, and 74 bps of outperformance from the Level 1 model. Table 2Performance (Total Returns In USD %)
GAA Quant Model Updates
GAA Quant Model Updates
Chart 1GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World
GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World
GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World
Chart 2GAA US Vs. Non US Model (Level 1)
GAA US Vs. Non US Model (Level 1)
GAA US Vs. Non US Model (Level 1)
Chart 3GAA Non US Model (Level 2)
GAA Non US Model (Level 2)
GAA Non US Model (Level 2)
GAA Equity Sector Selection Model The GAA Equity Sector Model (Chart 4) is updated as of July 31, 2020. The model’s relative tilts between cyclicals and defensives did not change compared to last month. The model continues to maintain its cyclical stance driven by an improvement in its global growth proxy and remains exposed to cyclical sectors. Over the past month, the model outperformed its benchmark by 32 basis points. Year-to-date, the model has outperformed its benchmark by 144 basis points, and 149 basis points since inception. Chart 4Overall Model Performance
Overall Model Performance
Overall Model Performance
Table 3Overall Model Performance
GAA Quant Model Updates
GAA Quant Model Updates
The model’s global growth proxy improved – driven by appreciating EM currencies and rising metal prices, and therefore continues to remain positive on cyclical sectors. Global monetary easing and low rates should keep the liquidity component favoring a mixed bag of cyclical and defensive sectors. The valuation component remains muted across all sectors except Energy. However, multiple sectors continue to be near the expensive and cheap zones – mainly Info Tech and Consumer Discretionary (expensive), and Real Estate and Consumer Staples (cheap). The model awaits confirming momentum signals to change recommendations for those sectors. Table 4Current Model Allocations
GAA Quant Model Updates
GAA Quant Model Updates
The model is now overweight four cyclical sectors in total. These are Information Technology, Consumer Discretionary, Communication Services, and Materials. For more details on the model, please see the Special Report “Introducing the GAA Equity Sector Selection Model”, dated July 27, 2016, as well as the Sector Selection Model section in the Special Alert “GAA Quant Model Updates”, dated March 1, 2019 available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Xiaoli Tang Associate Vice President xiaoliT@bcaresearch.com Amr Hanafy Senior Analyst amrh@bcaresearch.com