Asset Allocation

Highlights The coronavirus scare is the catalyst for the recent correction, not the cause. The true cause is that the stock market had reached a point of groupthink-triggered instability and therefore needed the slightest catalyst to correct. Bond yields will stay depressed for (at least) the first half of 2020. Long-term investors should use corrections to overweight equities versus bonds, provided bond yields stay near or below current levels. The pound and UK-exposed investments will come under near-term pressure as UK/EU trade deal tensions ratchet up. But ultimately, UK-exposed investments will enjoy a major leg up later this year if both the UK and EU blink. Feature Chart of the WeekThe Next Up-Leg In The Pound And UK-Exposed Investments Will Occur Later In 2020 Corrections, Catalysts, And Coronavirus Markets have suffered a correction, begging the question: what caused it? The question is a good one, because identifying the cause can help to inform our response. Yet the danger is that the knee-jerk narrative pinpoints the catalyst rather than the true cause. In which case our response will be wrong too. For example, consider the following two narratives: Tree foliage collapses because of 40 mph winds. Tree foliage collapses because it is autumn. The first narrative is exciting, satisfying, and headline grabbing, but it only pinpoints the catalyst for the foliage collapse: the puff of wind. The second explanation is dull and less newsworthy, but it pinpoints the true cause: in autumn, tree foliage is unstable. Likewise, the coronavirus scare is the catalyst for the recent correction. The true cause is that the stock market had reached a point of groupthink-triggered instability and therefore needed the slightest catalyst to correct. The catalyst could have come from anywhere at any time. If it hadn’t been the coronavirus scare, it would have been the next worry… or the one after that. On January 9 in Markets Are Fractally Fragile we warned that usually cautious value investors had become momentum traders – undermining market liquidity and stability. When this happens, there is a two in three chance of a tactical reversal (Chart I-2). Chart I-2When Markets Are Fractally Fragile, There Is A 2 In 3 Chance Of A Tactical Reversal We also warned that the bond yield 6-month impulse – the change in the change – had recently become a severe 100 bps headwind to growth. At this severity of headwind, there is a nine in ten chance that bond yields have reached a near-term peak (Chart I-3). Chart I-3When The Bond Yield 6-Month Impulse Becomes A Severe Headwind, There Is A 9 In 10 Chance Of A Near-Term Peak In Yields In combination, we warned that equities would underperform bonds by about 4 percent on a tactical horizon. Now that this anticipated correction has happened, what next? Long-term investors should use corrections to overweight equities versus bonds.  First, irrespective of coronavirus – or any other catalyst – the recent severe headwind to growth from the bond yield impulse suggests that bond yields will stay depressed for (at least) the first half of 2020. Second, the good news is that the ultra-low bond yields justify and underpin the valuation of equities. Hence, at the current level of bond yields, long-term investors should use corrections to overweight equities versus bonds. Brexit Is “Done”. Or Is It? Rumour has it that Boris Johnson will banish the word Brexit from the UK government lexicon after January 31, because Brexit is now “done”. Good luck with that. When Britain wakes up bleary-eyed on Saturday February 1, what will have changed? Not a lot. The UK will have lost its voice and votes in the EU decision making institutions. Yet in practical terms nothing will have changed, because the UK and EU will enter an 11-month ‘standstill’ transition period in which existing arrangements will continue: the free movement of people, financial contributions, and full access to the single market without tariffs or customs checks. The Conservative government made a manifesto pledge not to extend the 11-month transition, so the more important question is: what will change when the standstill period ends on December 31? The answer depends on what sort of trade deal the UK and EU can negotiate in the limited space of 11 months. Or indeed whether they can negotiate a trade deal at all. Therein lies the problem. A free trade deal with the EU will require a mutual commitment to a ‘level playing field’. If the UK wants to diverge on food standards, environmental protection, labour rights, and state aid – as the Brexit purists yearn – then there is zero chance that the EU will agree to a free trade deal.  This leaves two options, neither of which is appealing. The first is for the UK to end the 11-month standstill period without a trade deal. Technically, this would not be ‘no deal’ because the withdrawal agreement would still bind both sides on citizens’ rights, financial contributions, and arrangements for Northern Ireland. A free trade deal with the EU will require a mutual commitment to a ‘level playing field’.  However, for UK companies, the option of ending the standstill period without a trade deal would constitute a painful dislocation from the single market involving tariffs and customs checks. It would also hurt the EU economies most exposed to the UK, notably Ireland and the Netherlands. Moreover, a full customs and tariff border in the Irish Sea would endanger the very existence of a ‘United’ Kingdom which included Northern Ireland.   The second option is for the UK to accept a trade deal on EU terms, recognising that the EU is the larger and more economically powerful party in the negotiation. The EU will offer the UK a tariff-free and quota-free trade deal conditional on strict level playing field conditions where the UK chooses to diverge from EU standards, combined with a mechanism to adjudicate on any level playing field disputes. Though economically better than no trade deal at all, the Brexit purists would claim it isn’t Brexit. Meanwhile, even without tariffs and quotas, UK companies whose just-in-time supply chains depended on the EU would still suffer disruption, as the level playing field was policed at every border crossing. So this option would satisfy nobody in the UK. The bigger practical problem is a lack of time to leave the EU regulatory orbit smoothly. Nobody believes that eleven months is enough time to implement a system in Northern Ireland that prevent a hard border in the Irish Sea; or indeed to implement a new UK immigration system if free movement were to end at the end of 2020. So what’s the resolution? The answer is the same as it has always been for Brexit – a gradual ratcheting up of tension ahead of a hard deadline to focus minds and force progress. Followed by a ‘fudged resolution’ at the eleventh hour in which both sides blink – because neither side is prepared to go over the cliff-edge. Recall that to get the withdrawal agreement over the line, the UK blinked by allowing Northern Ireland to be treated differently; but the EU also blinked by allowing the withdrawal agreement to be reopened. And once this happened, the pound and UK-exposed investments enjoyed a major leg up (Chart I-1 and Chart I-4-Chart I-7). Chart I-4The FTSE 250 Is A UK-Exposed ##br##Investment Chart I-5The FTSE 100 Is Not A UK-Exposed Investment Chart I-6UK General Retail Is A UK-Exposed Investment Chart I-7UK Clothing And Accessories Is Not A ##br##UK-Exposed Investment In the next fudged resolution, the UK could blink by retaining full regulatory alignment with the EU in most areas for a little while longer, and where it doesn’t the EU could blink by becoming flexible in its interpretation of ‘level playing field’. Obviously, nobody would call this an extension to the transition, but the UK would, in most practical terms, still be in the single market on January 1 2021. UK-exposed investments will enjoy their next major leg up later this year In this playbook, the pound and UK-exposed investments will come under near-term pressure, as UK/EU trade deal tensions ratchet up. But ultimately, UK-exposed investments will enjoy their next major leg up later this year if both the UK and the EU blink (Chart I-8). Chart I-8The Pound Still Has A Brexit Discount Fractal Trading System* There are no new trades this week. The rolling 1-year win ratio now stands at 62 percent. Chart I-9EUR/GBP When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated   December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com.   Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System   Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields   Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

Special Report

Highlights BCA’s “Golden Rule of Bond Investing” framework, which links developed economy government bond returns to central bank policy rate “surprises” versus market expectations, also works in China. The relationship between unexpected changes in China’s de facto short-term policy rate and government bond yields has been surprisingly strong over the past decade. Any additional easing by the PBoC this year is likely to be focused on reducing lending rates to the real economy, not interbank rates (which drive government bond yields). As such, yields at the short-end are likely to be flat until later this year at the earliest, whereas yields at the long-end are likely to move modestly higher, at most. The persistent historical gap between economic growth and bond yields in China makes it difficult to forecast the structural outlook for yields using conventional methods. To the extent that Chinese policymakers succeed at shifting the drivers of growth from investment to consumption, we believe that bond yields are more likely to structurally rise than fall. Over the coming 6-12 months, investors should underweight Chinese government bonds versus Chinese equities and onshore corporate bonds. Within a regional government bond portfolio, however, investors should overweight USD-hedged China versus US and developed markets ex-US, as well as in unhedged terms. Feature Last year’s inclusion of Chinese onshore government and policy bank bonds in the Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate Index was a significant milestone of China’s journey to internationalize its capital markets. Other bond benchmark providers have since followed suit, highlighting that the trend of increased passive exposure to Chinese assets is likely to continue. Over the past year, the bulk of the market discussion concerning the addition of China to the major bond indices has focused on estimating the size of potential capital inflows that could be triggered and the related impact on onshore bond yields. By contrast, comparatively little work has been done to analyze the core drivers of Chinese government bond yields, and how they compare to the factors that influence yields in the developed markets that dominate the bond indices. This Special Report attempts to fill a hole in the analysis of Chinese bonds. This Special Report attempts to fill that hole in the analysis of Chinese bonds. We look at the predictability of China’s government bond market through the lens of BCA’s “golden rule” framework, and find a surprisingly strong relationship between changes in China’s de facto short-term policy rate and government bond yields. We then present our cyclical (6-12 month) and secular outlooks for government yields given this relationship, and conclude by presenting four specific investment recommendations pertaining to China’s fixed-income market with two audiences in mind: mainland/onshore investors who are focused on returns in unhedged RMB terms, and global fixed-income investors who are primarily focused on hedged US-dollar regional bond exposure. The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing, With Chinese Characteristics In a July 2018 Special Report,1 BCA’s Chief US Bond Strategist, Ryan Swift, elegantly distilled the cyclical US government bond call into a simple question: During the next 12-months, will the Federal Reserve move interest rates by more or less than what is currently priced into the market? Chart 1The (US) Golden Rule Of Bond Investing In Practice Ryan argued that a predictive framework for US Treasury returns built around the answer to this question has historically worked so well that it should be referred to as the “Golden Rule of bond investing” (Chart 1). In a follow-up report, our Global Fixed Income Strategy service confirmed that the Golden Rule also largely works in non-US developed market economies, with the exception of Japan due to the absence of any meaningful fluctuation in policy rates over the past two decades.2 The Golden Rule provides a very strong framework to aid fixed-income investors with their cyclical (i.e. 6-12 month) asset allocation decisions, by quantitatively linking government bond returns relative to cash – in other words, the excess return earned by taking duration risk - to policy rate “surprises” compared to what is discounted in shorter-term money markets. The practical application is that a decision to allocate to longer-maturity government bonds is reduced to a bet on whether a central bank will adjust policy rates by more or less than the market expects. The first question we address in this report is to what degree does the Golden Rule apply in China (in yield space rather than in return space), along with an explanation of any differences that may exist. However, we must first note why the Golden Rule of bond investing works, particularly in the US. The first reason is that there is a strong relationship between the US 3-month T-bill rate and Treasury yields of all other maturities. Conceptually, all fixed income investors have a choice when buying US government bonds: they can purchase a 3-month Treasury bill and simply perpetually roll over the position as it matures, or they can purchase a Treasury bond of a longer maturity. This means that yields on longer maturity Treasury bonds simply reflect investor expectations for the average 3-month T-bill rate over the life of the bond, plus some positive risk premium to compensate for the inherent uncertainty of the path and tendency of short-term yields. This helps explain the close link between cyclical changes in 3-month T-bill rates and yields on longer maturity Treasurys. Chart 2In The US, The 3-Month T-Bill Rate Perfectly Tracks The Fed Funds Rate The second reason for the Golden Rule’s success is that there is a very tight relationship between the effective Fed funds rate and the 3-month T-bill rate. While it is the (higher) discount rate that is the theoretical no-arbitrage ceiling for the 3-month rate, in practice T-bill rates trade extremely close to the Fed funds rate (Chart 2). This means that Fed funds rate “surprises” (relative to traded market expectations) are akin to surprises in the 3-month rate, which in turn strongly influence the expected future path of short-term interest rates and thus yields on longer maturity Treasurys. In China, we noted in a February 2018 Special Report3 that the 7-day interbank repo rate is now the de jure short-term policy rate in China following the establishment of an interest rate corridor system in 2015. Chart 3 presents our first test of the Golden Rule in China (in yield space rather than in return space), by plotting the annual change in the level of Chinese government bond yields alongside the 7-day repo rate “surprise” over the past year from 2010 to the present. Here, we use the first principal component of zero coupon Chinese government bond yields to represent the average level of yields (rather than selecting a particular maturity), and we use the 12-month RMB swap rate (versus 7-day repo) to represent market expectations for the policy rate. The chart highlights that the fit is good, as measured by a 50% R-squared between the two series. However, deviations in the relationship do exist, with the most notable exception having occurred in 2017: Chinese government bond yields rose considerably more than what the annual surprise in the 7-day repo rate would have suggested. Chart 3In China, The Golden Rule Works Decently Well Using 7-Day Repo... Chart 4...And Extremely Well Using 3-Month SHIBOR Chart 4 helps resolve a good portion of the 2017 discrepancy, and clarifies the link between Chinese monetary policy and government bond yields. Chart 4 is similar to Chart 3, except that it replaces the 7-day repo rate surprise with that of 3-month SHIBOR (which trades very closely to the 3-month repo rate). The chart illustrates an even closer fit between the two series (with an R-squared close to 80%), and shows that the 3-month SHIBOR surprise does a meaningfully better job at explaining the 2017 rise in Chinese government bond yields. The Golden Rule of bond investing works surprisingly well in China. The fact that the annual surprise in 3-month SHIBOR has done a better job at predicting changes in bond yields over the past decade underscores that the 3-month repo rate is the de facto short-term policy rate in China, a point that we have made in several previous reports. We have noted that the spike in the 3-month/7-day repo rate spread that occurred in late-2016 and lasted until mid-2018 happened because of China’s crackdown on shadow banking activity. This crackdown caused a funding squeeze for China’s small & medium banks, which caused a material rise in lending rates and government bond yields. This episode highlights that future changes in the 3-month repo rate are likely to reflect both underlying changes in net liquidity provided to large commercial banks (measured by the 7-day repo rate), and any dislocations in the interbank market that have the potential to push up lending rates and government bond yields. Bottom Line: BCA’s “Golden Rule” framework, which links developed economy government bond returns to central bank policy rate “surprises” versus market expectations, works for China as well – using the correct measure of the PBOC policy rate. This provides a useful investment framework for Chinese government bonds, which are now significant part of major global bond market benchmarks. The Cyclical Outlook For Chinese Government Bond Yields Given the establishment of the relationship between Chinese short-term interbank rates and government bond yields detailed above, we are now able to more precisely discuss the likely cyclical trajectory of Chinese government bond yields as a function of Chinese monetary policy. Two opposing forces have the potential to affect China’s government bond market this year. The first, a stabilization and modest rebound in Chinese economic activity, may exert upward pressure on yields due to expectations of eventual policy tightening. The second, continued attempts by the PBoC to ease corporate lending rates, may exert downward pressure on yields as it will reflect not just easy but easier monetary conditions. Yields at the long-end are likely to move modestly higher this year, at most. For investors, the raises the obvious question of whether Chinese government bond yields are likely to move up, down, or trend sideways this year. In our view, yields at the short-end are likely to be flat until later this year at the earliest, whereas yields at the long-end are likely to move modestly higher, at most. Yields at the short-end of China’s government bond curve are likely to stay flat for most of this year. There are two reasons why yields at the short-end of China’s government bond curve are likely to stay flat for most of this year. The first is that the PBoC is generally a reactive central bank and has historically lagged a pickup in economic activity, as illustrated in Chart 5. The chart shows the historical path of 3-month SHIBOR in the year following a bottom in economic activity in 2009, 2012, and 2015, and makes it clear that there has been no precedent for a significant rise in interbank rates in the first nine months of an economic recovery. The 2012 episode did see a very sharp rise in 3-month SHIBOR once the PBoC shifted into tightening mode, but we doubt that this experience will be repeated again unless economic growth accelerates much more aggressively than we expect. The second reason why we expect yields at the short-end of the curve to remain muted this year is because any additional easing by the PBoC is likely to be focused on reducing corporate lending rates, not interbank rates. Chart 6 highlights that while there is a strong correlation between changes in Chinese government bond yields and average lending rates in the economy, the former leads the latter. In the past, this relationship has existed because changes in interbank rates have coincided with reductions in the now obsolete benchmark lending rate, with the former usually occurring earlier than the latter. But in a scenario where the PBoC reduces the loan prime rate (LPR) and keeps net banking sector liquidity roughly constant, the extremely tight relationship shown in Chart 4 suggests that short-term bond yields are unlikely to be affected by a reduction in lending rates. Any meaningful decline in short-term yields below short-term interbank rates would simply prompt banks to stop buying these bonds. Chart 5The PBoC Is Generally A Reactive Central Bank Chart 6Average Lending Rates Lag Short-Term Bond Yields Chart 7China's Yield Curve Is Generally Pro-Cyclical Additional easing by the PBoC does have the potential to impact the long-end of the government bond curve if investors view these actions as a sign that interbank rates will remain low for some time. This view is reinforced by the fact that China’s yield curve is not particularly flat, and thus has room to move lower. However, Chart 7 also shows that China’s yield curve, defined here as the second principal component of zero coupon Chinese government bond yields, is positively correlated with the relative performance of investable Chinese equities. This suggests that there is a procyclical element to the curve. We suspect that this procyclical element will dominate a potential decline in expectations for future short-term interest rates, but that yields at the long-end are likely to move modestly higher this year, at most. Bottom Line: Any additional easing by the PBoC this year is likely to be focused on reducing lending rates to the real economy, not interbank rates (which drive government bond yields). As such, yields at the short-end are likely to be flat until later this year at the earliest, whereas yields at the long-end are likely to move modestly higher, at most. The Secular Outlook For Chinese Government Bond Yields A common approach to forecasting the likely structural trend for nominal government bond yields is to estimate the trajectory of real long-term potential output growth and to add the monetary authority’s inflation target. This framework is based on the idea that interest rates are in equilibrium when the cost of borrowing is roughly equal to nominal income growth, a condition that results in no change in the burden to service existing debt. Chart 8China's Potential Growth Is Likely To Trend Lower... Based on this framework, we would expect Chinese government bond yields to trend down over time, or possibly flat if the PBoC were to tolerate higher inflation over the coming decade. Chart 8 illustrates the IMF’s forecast of falling real potential growth in China over the coming several years, which is consistent with a shift in the composition of growth from investment to consumption as well as China’s looming demographic crisis. But Chart 9highlights an obvious problem with applying this framework to forecast the secular trend in Chinese government bond yields: over the past decade, yields have persistently averaged below actual nominal GDP growth, both in China and in the developed world. In the latter case, it is an open question whether this will continue to be true in the future, but in China’s case it is clear that government bond yields have little connection (in magnitude) to the pace of GDP growth. This reflects the longstanding strategy of Chinese policymakers to promote investment via persistently low interest rates, as has occurred in other manufacturing and export-oriented Asian economies (Chart 10). Chart 9...But Bond Yields Are Well Below GDP Growth, Just Like In Developed Markets Chart 10In Industrial Asian Economies, Low Bond Yields Are A Policy Choice   The persistent historical gap between economic growth and bond yields in China makes it difficult to forecast the structural outlook for yields using conventional methods, and largely limits us to inference. To the extent that Chinese policymakers succeed at shifting the drivers of growth from investment to consumption, bond yields are more likely to rise than fall over time. This is because as long as interest rates remain well below the pace of income growth, the incentive to excessively borrow (and invest) is likely to persist. Chart 11China Needs Higher Interest Rates, But Only To A Point However, even in a scenario where Chinese government bond yields structurally trend higher, we expect the rise to be modest. Chart 11 highlights that China’s “private sector” debt service ratio is extremely elevated, underscoring that the country’s ability to tolerate significantly higher bond yields is not strong. In addition, since 2015, China’s debt service ratio has been mostly flat despite rising a rising debt-to-GDP ratio, which has been achieved through lower short-term interest rates. To the extent that policymakers fail to make meaningful progress in shifting China’s growth drivers away from investment over the coming few years, lower (potentially sharply lower) bond yields would appear to be all but inevitable to cope with what would become a permanently growing drag on economic activity from the servicing of debt. For now, we would characterize this scenario as a risk to our base case view, but it is a risk that we will be closely monitoring over the coming years. Bottom Line: The persistent gap between Chinese nominal GDP growth and government bond yields is likely contributing to the problem of excessive leveraging. To the extent that Chinese policymakers succeed at shifting the drivers of growth from investment to consumption, bond yields are more likely to structurally rise than fall. Investment Conclusions Our analysis above points to four recommendations for investors over the coming year: Overweight Chinese stocks versus Chinese government bonds in RMB and USD terms Overweight Chinese onshore corporate bonds versus duration-matched Chinese government bonds in RMB terms Overweight 7-10 year USD-hedged Chinese government bonds versus their US and developed market (DM) counterparts For offshore US dollar-based investors, long 7-10 year Chinese government bonds in unhedged terms Regarding the first two recommendations, our view that yields are likely to be flat at the short-end and modestly higher at the long-end suggests that investors can expect total returns on the order of 2-3% from Chinese government bonds this year. Barring a major and lasting economic slowdown from the 2019-nCoV outbreak, we expect Chinese domestic and investable equities to outperform government securities over the coming 6-12 months. Onshore corporate bonds have a similar outlook: onshore spreads are pricing in (massively) higher default losses than we believe is warranted, meaning that they will outperform duration-matched government equivalents without any changes in yield. Chart 12Within Global Fixed-Income, Hedged Chinese 10-Year Yields Are Relatively Attractive Chart 13Unhedged Yield Spreads Predict Hedged Relative Performance Versus The US For global fixed-income investors, Charts 12-14 present USD-hedged 10-year Chinese government yields versus the US and DM/DM ex-US, along with the historical relative return profile of USD-hedged Chinese bonds versus hedged and unhedged returns. In hedged space, Chinese 10-year government bond yields are modestly attractive: 2.2% versus 1.6% in the US and 1.8% in DM ex-US. China’s historically low yield beta to the overall level of global 10-year bond yields (Chart 15) suggests that Chinese yields should perform well in 2020 – a year where we expect global bond yields to drift higher as economic growth rebounds. Combined with relatively attractive valuation, this bodes well for the relative performance of Chinese debt versus DM equivalents. A low yield beta against a backdrop of drifting higher global yields implies that longer-maturity Chinese government bonds will outperform their DM equivalents. Chart 14Unhedged Yield Spreads Predict Hedged Relative Performance Versus DM Chart 15China's Yield Beta Has Been Rising, But Is Still Japan-Like   We would also recommend longer-maturity Chinese government bonds in unhedged terms versus a USD-hedged global government bond portfolio. Chart 16 highlights that the relative return of this trade is strongly (negatively) linked to USD-CNY, and we expect further (albeit more modest) gains in RMB over the cyclical horizon. Chart 16Modest Further RMB Upside Means Unhedged Chinese Bonds Will Outperform As a final point, investors should note that today’s report is part of a heightened focus on China’s fixed income market, in terms of both forecasting fixed income returns and analyzing the cyclical and structural implications of the increasing investability of China’s financial markets. More research on this topic is likely to come in 2020 and beyond: Stay Tuned!   Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com         Footnotes 1    Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report "The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing," dated July 24, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2   Please see Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report "The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing," dated September 25, 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 3   Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report "Seven Questions About Chinese Monetary Policy," dated February 22, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com

Special Report

Dear clients, Please note that in next week’s China Macro And Market Review, we will include a section explaining our view on the coronavirus outbreak and its economic as well as financial market implications. We maintain our overweight stance on both Chinese investable and A-share equities, over a tactical (0-3 months) and cyclical (6-12 months) time horizon. Please stay tuned. Jing Sima, China Strategist   Highlights BCA’s “Golden Rule of Bond Investing” framework, which links developed economy government bond returns to central bank policy rate “surprises” versus market expectations, also works in China. The relationship between unexpected changes in China’s de facto short-term policy rate and government bond yields has been surprisingly strong over the past decade. Any additional easing by the PBoC this year is likely to be focused on reducing lending rates to the real economy, not interbank rates (which drive government bond yields). As such, yields at the short-end are likely to be flat until later this year at the earliest, whereas yields at the long-end are likely to move modestly higher, at most. The persistent historical gap between economic growth and bond yields in China makes it difficult to forecast the structural outlook for yields using conventional methods. To the extent that Chinese policymakers succeed at shifting the drivers of growth from investment to consumption, we believe that bond yields are more likely to structurally rise than fall. Over the coming 6-12 months, investors should underweight Chinese government bonds versus Chinese equities and onshore corporate bonds. Within a regional government bond portfolio, however, investors should overweight USD-hedged China versus US and developed markets ex-US, as well as in unhedged terms. Feature Last year’s inclusion of Chinese onshore government and policy bank bonds in the Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate Index was a significant milestone of China’s journey to internationalize its capital markets. Other bond benchmark providers have since followed suit, highlighting that the trend of increased passive exposure to Chinese assets is likely to continue. Over the past year, the bulk of the market discussion concerning the addition of China to the major bond indices has focused on estimating the size of potential capital inflows that could be triggered and the related impact on onshore bond yields. By contrast, comparatively little work has been done to analyze the core drivers of Chinese government bond yields, and how they compare to the factors that influence yields in the developed markets that dominate the bond indices. This Special Report attempts to fill a hole in the analysis of Chinese bonds. This Special Report attempts to fill that hole in the analysis of Chinese bonds. We look at the predictability of China’s government bond market through the lens of BCA’s “golden rule” framework, and find a surprisingly strong relationship between changes in China’s de facto short-term policy rate and government bond yields. We then present our cyclical (6-12 month) and secular outlooks for government yields given this relationship, and conclude by presenting four specific investment recommendations pertaining to China’s fixed-income market with two audiences in mind: mainland/onshore investors who are focused on returns in unhedged RMB terms, and global fixed-income investors who are primarily focused on hedged US-dollar regional bond exposure. The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing, With Chinese Characteristics In a July 2018 Special Report,1 BCA’s Chief US Bond Strategist, Ryan Swift, elegantly distilled the cyclical US government bond call into a simple question: During the next 12-months, will the Federal Reserve move interest rates by more or less than what is currently priced into the market? Chart 1The (US) Golden Rule Of Bond Investing In Practice Ryan argued that a predictive framework for US Treasury returns built around the answer to this question has historically worked so well that it should be referred to as the “Golden Rule of bond investing” (Chart 1). In a follow-up report, our Global Fixed Income Strategy service confirmed that the Golden Rule also largely works in non-US developed market economies, with the exception of Japan due to the absence of any meaningful fluctuation in policy rates over the past two decades.2 The Golden Rule provides a very strong framework to aid fixed-income investors with their cyclical (i.e. 6-12 month) asset allocation decisions, by quantitatively linking government bond returns relative to cash – in other words, the excess return earned by taking duration risk - to policy rate “surprises” compared to what is discounted in shorter-term money markets. The practical application is that a decision to allocate to longer-maturity government bonds is reduced to a bet on whether a central bank will adjust policy rates by more or less than the market expects. The first question we address in this report is to what degree does the Golden Rule apply in China (in yield space rather than in return space), along with an explanation of any differences that may exist. However, we must first note why the Golden Rule of bond investing works, particularly in the US. The first reason is that there is a strong relationship between the US 3-month T-bill rate and Treasury yields of all other maturities. Conceptually, all fixed income investors have a choice when buying US government bonds: they can purchase a 3-month Treasury bill and simply perpetually roll over the position as it matures, or they can purchase a Treasury bond of a longer maturity. This means that yields on longer maturity Treasury bonds simply reflect investor expectations for the average 3-month T-bill rate over the life of the bond, plus some positive risk premium to compensate for the inherent uncertainty of the path and tendency of short-term yields. This helps explain the close link between cyclical changes in 3-month T-bill rates and yields on longer maturity Treasurys. Chart 2In The US, The 3-Month T-Bill Rate Perfectly Tracks The Fed Funds Rate The second reason for the Golden Rule’s success is that there is a very tight relationship between the effective Fed funds rate and the 3-month T-bill rate. While it is the (higher) discount rate that is the theoretical no-arbitrage ceiling for the 3-month rate, in practice T-bill rates trade extremely close to the Fed funds rate (Chart 2). This means that Fed funds rate “surprises” (relative to traded market expectations) are akin to surprises in the 3-month rate, which in turn strongly influence the expected future path of short-term interest rates and thus yields on longer maturity Treasurys. In China, we noted in a February 2018 Special Report3 that the 7-day interbank repo rate is now the de jure short-term policy rate in China following the establishment of an interest rate corridor system in 2015. Chart 3 presents our first test of the Golden Rule in China (in yield space rather than in return space), by plotting the annual change in the level of Chinese government bond yields alongside the 7-day repo rate “surprise” over the past year from 2010 to the present. Here, we use the first principal component of zero coupon Chinese government bond yields to represent the average level of yields (rather than selecting a particular maturity), and we use the 12-month RMB swap rate (versus 7-day repo) to represent market expectations for the policy rate. The chart highlights that the fit is good, as measured by a 50% R-squared between the two series. However, deviations in the relationship do exist, with the most notable exception having occurred in 2017: Chinese government bond yields rose considerably more than what the annual surprise in the 7-day repo rate would have suggested. Chart 3In China, The Golden Rule Works Decently Well Using 7-Day Repo... Chart 4...And Extremely Well Using 3-Month SHIBOR Chart 4 helps resolve a good portion of the 2017 discrepancy, and clarifies the link between Chinese monetary policy and government bond yields. Chart 4 is similar to Chart 3, except that it replaces the 7-day repo rate surprise with that of 3-month SHIBOR (which trades very closely to the 3-month repo rate). The chart illustrates an even closer fit between the two series (with an R-squared close to 80%), and shows that the 3-month SHIBOR surprise does a meaningfully better job at explaining the 2017 rise in Chinese government bond yields. The Golden Rule of bond investing works surprisingly well in China. The fact that the annual surprise in 3-month SHIBOR has done a better job at predicting changes in bond yields over the past decade underscores that the 3-month repo rate is the de facto short-term policy rate in China, a point that we have made in several previous reports. We have noted that the spike in the 3-month/7-day repo rate spread that occurred in late-2016 and lasted until mid-2018 happened because of China’s crackdown on shadow banking activity. This crackdown caused a funding squeeze for China’s small & medium banks, which caused a material rise in lending rates and government bond yields. This episode highlights that future changes in the 3-month repo rate are likely to reflect both underlying changes in net liquidity provided to large commercial banks (measured by the 7-day repo rate), and any dislocations in the interbank market that have the potential to push up lending rates and government bond yields. Bottom Line: BCA’s “Golden Rule” framework, which links developed economy government bond returns to central bank policy rate “surprises” versus market expectations, works for China as well – using the correct measure of the PBOC policy rate. This provides a useful investment framework for Chinese government bonds, which are now significant part of major global bond market benchmarks. The Cyclical Outlook For Chinese Government Bond Yields Given the establishment of the relationship between Chinese short-term interbank rates and government bond yields detailed above, we are now able to more precisely discuss the likely cyclical trajectory of Chinese government bond yields as a function of Chinese monetary policy. Two opposing forces have the potential to affect China’s government bond market this year. The first, a stabilization and modest rebound in Chinese economic activity, may exert upward pressure on yields due to expectations of eventual policy tightening. The second, continued attempts by the PBoC to ease corporate lending rates, may exert downward pressure on yields as it will reflect not just easy but easier monetary conditions. Yields at the long-end are likely to move modestly higher this year, at most. For investors, the raises the obvious question of whether Chinese government bond yields are likely to move up, down, or trend sideways this year. In our view, yields at the short-end are likely to be flat until later this year at the earliest, whereas yields at the long-end are likely to move modestly higher, at most. Yields at the short-end of China’s government bond curve are likely to stay flat for most of this year. There are two reasons why yields at the short-end of China’s government bond curve are likely to stay flat for most of this year. The first is that the PBoC is generally a reactive central bank and has historically lagged a pickup in economic activity, as illustrated in Chart 5. The chart shows the historical path of 3-month SHIBOR in the year following a bottom in economic activity in 2009, 2012, and 2015, and makes it clear that there has been no precedent for a significant rise in interbank rates in the first nine months of an economic recovery. The 2012 episode did see a very sharp rise in 3-month SHIBOR once the PBoC shifted into tightening mode, but we doubt that this experience will be repeated again unless economic growth accelerates much more aggressively than we expect. The second reason why we expect yields at the short-end of the curve to remain muted this year is because any additional easing by the PBoC is likely to be focused on reducing corporate lending rates, not interbank rates. Chart 6 highlights that while there is a strong correlation between changes in Chinese government bond yields and average lending rates in the economy, the former leads the latter. In the past, this relationship has existed because changes in interbank rates have coincided with reductions in the now obsolete benchmark lending rate, with the former usually occurring earlier than the latter. But in a scenario where the PBoC reduces the loan prime rate (LPR) and keeps net banking sector liquidity roughly constant, the extremely tight relationship shown in Chart 4 suggests that short-term bond yields are unlikely to be affected by a reduction in lending rates. Any meaningful decline in short-term yields below short-term interbank rates would simply prompt banks to stop buying these bonds. Chart 5The PBoC Is Generally A Reactive Central Bank Chart 6Average Lending Rates Lag Short-Term Bond Yields Chart 7China's Yield Curve Is Generally Pro-Cyclical Additional easing by the PBoC does have the potential to impact the long-end of the government bond curve if investors view these actions as a sign that interbank rates will remain low for some time. This view is reinforced by the fact that China’s yield curve is not particularly flat, and thus has room to move lower. However, Chart 7 also shows that China’s yield curve, defined here as the second principal component of zero coupon Chinese government bond yields, is positively correlated with the relative performance of investable Chinese equities. This suggests that there is a procyclical element to the curve. We suspect that this procyclical element will dominate a potential decline in expectations for future short-term interest rates, but that yields at the long-end are likely to move modestly higher this year, at most. Bottom Line: Any additional easing by the PBoC this year is likely to be focused on reducing lending rates to the real economy, not interbank rates (which drive government bond yields). As such, yields at the short-end are likely to be flat until later this year at the earliest, whereas yields at the long-end are likely to move modestly higher, at most. The Secular Outlook For Chinese Government Bond Yields A common approach to forecasting the likely structural trend for nominal government bond yields is to estimate the trajectory of real long-term potential output growth and to add the monetary authority’s inflation target. This framework is based on the idea that interest rates are in equilibrium when the cost of borrowing is roughly equal to nominal income growth, a condition that results in no change in the burden to service existing debt. Chart 8China's Potential Growth Is Likely To Trend Lower... Based on this framework, we would expect Chinese government bond yields to trend down over time, or possibly flat if the PBoC were to tolerate higher inflation over the coming decade. Chart 8 illustrates the IMF’s forecast of falling real potential growth in China over the coming several years, which is consistent with a shift in the composition of growth from investment to consumption as well as China’s looming demographic crisis. But Chart 9highlights an obvious problem with applying this framework to forecast the secular trend in Chinese government bond yields: over the past decade, yields have persistently averaged below actual nominal GDP growth, both in China and in the developed world. In the latter case, it is an open question whether this will continue to be true in the future, but in China’s case it is clear that government bond yields have little connection (in magnitude) to the pace of GDP growth. This reflects the longstanding strategy of Chinese policymakers to promote investment via persistently low interest rates, as has occurred in other manufacturing and export-oriented Asian economies (Chart 10). Chart 9...But Bond Yields Are Well Below GDP Growth, Just Like In Developed Markets Chart 10In Industrial Asian Economies, Low Bond Yields Are A Policy Choice   The persistent historical gap between economic growth and bond yields in China makes it difficult to forecast the structural outlook for yields using conventional methods, and largely limits us to inference. To the extent that Chinese policymakers succeed at shifting the drivers of growth from investment to consumption, bond yields are more likely to rise than fall over time. This is because as long as interest rates remain well below the pace of income growth, the incentive to excessively borrow (and invest) is likely to persist. Chart 11China Needs Higher Interest Rates, But Only To A Point However, even in a scenario where Chinese government bond yields structurally trend higher, we expect the rise to be modest. Chart 11 highlights that China’s “private sector” debt service ratio is extremely elevated, underscoring that the country’s ability to tolerate significantly higher bond yields is not strong. In addition, since 2015, China’s debt service ratio has been mostly flat despite rising a rising debt-to-GDP ratio, which has been achieved through lower short-term interest rates. To the extent that policymakers fail to make meaningful progress in shifting China’s growth drivers away from investment over the coming few years, lower (potentially sharply lower) bond yields would appear to be all but inevitable to cope with what would become a permanently growing drag on economic activity from the servicing of debt. For now, we would characterize this scenario as a risk to our base case view, but it is a risk that we will be closely monitoring over the coming years. Bottom Line: The persistent gap between Chinese nominal GDP growth and government bond yields is likely contributing to the problem of excessive leveraging. To the extent that Chinese policymakers succeed at shifting the drivers of growth from investment to consumption, bond yields are more likely to structurally rise than fall. Investment Conclusions Our analysis above points to four recommendations for investors over the coming year: Overweight Chinese stocks versus Chinese government bonds in RMB and USD terms Overweight Chinese onshore corporate bonds versus duration-matched Chinese government bonds in RMB terms Overweight 7-10 year USD-hedged Chinese government bonds versus their US and developed market (DM) counterparts For offshore US dollar-based investors, long 7-10 year Chinese government bonds in unhedged terms Regarding the first two recommendations, our view that yields are likely to be flat at the short-end and modestly higher at the long-end suggests that investors can expect total returns on the order of 2-3% from Chinese government bonds this year. Barring a major and lasting economic slowdown from the 2019-nCoV outbreak, we expect Chinese domestic and investable equities to outperform government securities over the coming 6-12 months. Onshore corporate bonds have a similar outlook: onshore spreads are pricing in (massively) higher default losses than we believe is warranted, meaning that they will outperform duration-matched government equivalents without any changes in yield. Chart 12Within Global Fixed-Income, Hedged Chinese 10-Year Yields Are Relatively Attractive Chart 13Unhedged Yield Spreads Predict Hedged Relative Performance Versus The US For global fixed-income investors, Charts 12-14 present USD-hedged 10-year Chinese government yields versus the US and DM/DM ex-US, along with the historical relative return profile of USD-hedged Chinese bonds versus hedged and unhedged returns. In hedged space, Chinese 10-year government bond yields are modestly attractive: 2.2% versus 1.6% in the US and 1.8% in DM ex-US. China’s historically low yield beta to the overall level of global 10-year bond yields (Chart 15) suggests that Chinese yields should perform well in 2020 – a year where we expect global bond yields to drift higher as economic growth rebounds. Combined with relatively attractive valuation, this bodes well for the relative performance of Chinese debt versus DM equivalents. A low yield beta against a backdrop of drifting higher global yields implies that longer-maturity Chinese government bonds will outperform their DM equivalents. Chart 14Unhedged Yield Spreads Predict Hedged Relative Performance Versus DM Chart 15China's Yield Beta Has Been Rising, But Is Still Japan-Like   We would also recommend longer-maturity Chinese government bonds in unhedged terms versus a USD-hedged global government bond portfolio. Chart 16 highlights that the relative return of this trade is strongly (negatively) linked to USD-CNY, and we expect further (albeit more modest) gains in RMB over the cyclical horizon. Chart 16Modest Further RMB Upside Means Unhedged Chinese Bonds Will Outperform As a final point, investors should note that today’s report is part of a heightened focus on China’s fixed income market, in terms of both forecasting fixed income returns and analyzing the cyclical and structural implications of the increasing investability of China’s financial markets. More research on this topic is likely to come in 2020 and beyond: Stay Tuned!   Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com         Footnotes 1    Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report "The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing," dated July 24, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2   Please see Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report "The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing," dated September 25, 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 3   Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report "Seven Questions About Chinese Monetary Policy," dated February 22, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Special Report

Highlights Historically, the stocks with the lowest volatility have outperformed the stocks with the highest volatility, a trend that defies some of the most fundamental theories in finance. The low-volatility factor has outperformed the market in absolute return terms, with a substantial reduction in downside risk, in every major equity market. Compensation structure, benchmarking, analyst bias, and the preference for lottery-like stocks are all plausible explanations for why the low-volatility anomaly persists. Shifting some exposure from bonds to minimum-volatility equities might be an attractive way to keep returns high while remaining hedged against downside risk in a world of low interest rates. Feature Chart 1The Low-Volatility Anomaly Conventional wisdom suggests that achieving the right mix between risk and return requires a tradeoff: Take on too little risk, and returns will be subpar, but take on too much, and a large loss becomes likely. However, the empirical evidence shows that no such tradeoff exists in the equity market: Historically, the return of stocks with the lowest volatility has been better than the return of stocks with the highest volatility (Chart 1, top panel). Even when using a measure of systematic risk such as beta, there appears to be very little relationship between risk and return – a result that emphatically contradicts what is predicted by the CAPM (Chart 1, bottom panel). The success of low risk stocks – a well-documented phenomenon known as the low-volatility anomaly1  – challenges some of the most fundamental premises of finance and economics. After all, how could taking on less risk result in better returns? In this report, we dive into this anomaly, with the intent of answering the following questions: What kind of portfolios can exploit this anomaly? What are the risk/return characteristics to this factor and what sectors is it exposed to? Why does this factor work? How can investors use the low-volatility factor in their asset allocation process? To answer these questions we explore the historical performance of the MSCI minimum-volatility index. Additionally, we explore the academic research surrounding the low-volatility anomaly. Finally, we look into how low-volatility equities have performed as a hedge for a global equity portfolio when compared to government bonds. Low Volatility Vs. Minimum Volatility There are two types of portfolios that are generally used to exploit the low-volatility anomaly: Low-volatility portfolios are built first by sorting the stock universe according to the stocks' trailing standard deviation, and then by buying the stocks with the lowest standard deviation. Usually the index buys the bottom quintile of stocks ranked by volatility. Minimum-volatility portfolios are built through an optimization procedure, by which funds are allocated to the stock mix that would have minimized the historical volatility of a portfolio (subject to certain constraints). Chart 2No Dramatic Difference Between Low Vol And Min Vol The main advantage of minimum-volatility portfolios over low-volatility portfolios is that they do not consider only low-volatility stocks but also stocks with low covariance between each other. However, the construction of these portfolios also requires estimating large covariance matrices, which are prone to a significant degree of noise, and thus often have to be adjusted by statistical methods.2 That being said, there is little performance difference between these two methodologies in practice, though minimum-volatility portfolios do tend to be much more constrained than low-volatility portfolios (Chart 2). In this report we will focus on the more popular MSCI minimum-volatility portfolios, given that their historical data is more readily available.   Risk-Return Characteristics Of Minimum Volatility At the global level, minimum volatility has outperformed not only the market since 1990, but also the most popular equity factors, with the exception of momentum (Chart 3, top panel). The outperformance relative to the benchmark has proved to be robust, as minimum volatility has beaten the returns for the benchmark in the biggest developed markets as well as emerging markets for almost two decades (Chart 3, bottom panel). The most attractive feature of minimum volatility is the significant reduction in risk it provides. Since 1988, the annualized volatility of minimum volatility has been 10%, a considerable improvement vis-à-vis the market and relative to other popular equity factors (Chart 4, top panel). Meanwhile, even though return skew of minimum volatility has been more negative than the benchmark, minimum volatility achieved a substantial reduction in tail risk with a 10% conditional VaR of only 5% (Chart 4, middle and bottom panel). Chart 3Min Vol Outperformance Is Broad-Based Chart 4Min Vol Provides A Substantial Reduction In Risk In addition to its risk reduction, minimum volatility also has a countercyclical relative return profile, outperforming during bear markets, and underperforming slightly during bull markets (Chart 5, top panel). This return profile occurs partly due to the sector skew of this factor, which overweights defensive sectors such as Utilities and Consumer Staples relative to the global benchmark3 (Chart 5, middle panel). At the global level, this defensive tilt exposes minimum volatility to significant duration risk, given that the stocks in this index tend to have bond-like properties (Chart 5, bottom panel). The negative relationship between interest rates and the low-volatility factor has been well documented by the academic literature: Some studies estimate that up to 80% of the outperformance of low-volatility equities can be explained by exposure to duration risk.4 Chart 5Global Min Vol Is Sensitive To Interest Rates Chart 6Min Vol Is Expensive     On average, minimum volatility also tends to overweight stocks with a higher dividend yield than the market (Chart 6, panel 1). This yield difference accounts for roughly a quarter of the return difference between minimum volatility and the benchmark since 1990. However, high dividend yield and minimum volatility are not synonymous: Over the past decade, minimum volatility has selected stocks that are more expensive than the benchmark, a stark difference from high dividend yield portfolios, which exclusively select very cheap stocks (Chart 6, panel 2). The current high overvaluation of minimum volatility relative to the market could spell bad news for this factor in the near future: While valuation and returns do not have a straightforward relationship, extreme levels of valuation relative to the benchmark have historically resulted in subsequent underperformance of this factor relative to the market (Chart 6, panels 3 and 4). Why Does The Low-Volatility Factor Work? Analyst Forecasts It has been shown empirically that equity analysts tend to have an optimistic bias, due to the need of the analyst to maintain good relationships with the companies they cover. Moreover, investors do not adjust for this bias, meaning that the stocks of companies that receive an overly optimistic forecast tend to rise initially when the forecast is released, but then mean-revert once the forecast does not materialize. Chart 7Analyst Bias Is Larger In High-Vol Stocks It seems that this dynamic might be more pervasive in high-volatility stocks. In their paper “When Sell-Side Analysts Meet High-Volatility Stocks: An Alternative Explanation for the Low-Volatility Puzzle,” Hsu et al. show that analysts’ positive bias is larger for more volatile stocks, even when adjusting for confounding variables like size, sector and country5 (Chart 7).  It is easy to see why this might be the case: An extremely optimistic bias on a low variance stock would look unrealistic to most investors. Thus, analysts are more prone to express a large positive bias on high variance stocks, where bias is harder to detect. Ultimately, this bias causes these stocks to become chronically overvalued. Salary Structure of Managers Chart 8Institutions Favor High Vol The payoff structure of fund managers has also been suggested as a possible cause of the low-volatility anomaly.6 The structure of compensation for fund managers often resembles an option: A bonus is granted if the portfolio returns are higher than a certain threshold. In such a structure, the compensation of portfolio managers resembles a call option: The probability of a payoff increases with volatility, creating an incentive to invest in high-volatility stocks.  However, this preference for high-volatility stocks will overbid them, causing them to underperform. There is some evidence that this is in fact the case. Once the effect of size is neutralized, stocks with high institutional ownership tend to be more volatile than stocks with low institutional ownership (Chart 8). Moreover, a study on the exposure of hedge funds to popular risk factors from 2000 to 2016, showed that hedge funds have a large short exposure to the anomaly, indicating that they favor high-volatility over low-volatility stocks.7   Lottery Stocks Chart 9The Low-Volatility Anomaly Is Most Prevalent In Lottery-Like Stocks Not all high-volatility stocks are chronic underperformers. In the paper “The Low Volatility Anomaly and the Preference for Gambling,” Hsu et al. identify that the low-volatility anomaly is largest in stocks with strong lottery-like characteristics (the authors define lottery-like as the stocks that had the highest maximum daily return the previous month)8 (Chart 9). Meanwhile, other high-volatility stocks are much more likely to have higher or equal returns than their low-volatility counterparts. Why is this the case? Investors tend to have a preference for “home-run” stocks, which have a large probability of a small loss, but a small probability of a large gain – a well-documented behavioral bias known as the long-shot bias.9 This bias might cause investors to overbid for lottery-like stocks, causing them to underperform as a cohort. This phenomenon might be related to the incentives in the money management industry. Flows to equity funds tend to be very skewed to the very best performing funds. This means that fund managers have a high incentive to invest in stocks that have the potential of an extremely high payoff. Benchmarking Chart 10Benchmarking Could Be To Blame For The Low-Vol Anomaly While the low-volatility anomaly has been found in other asset classes,10 it is interesting to note that the anomaly occurs only within asset classes and not across asset classes. Indeed, the traditional risk-return relationship is conserved when looking at a multi-asset universe (Chart 10, top panel). One possible solution to this puzzle might be the effect of benchmarking. Within an asset class, benchmarked managers are not only measured according to their return relative to their benchmark but also to their tracking risk (volatility of return difference). Under this structure, investors do not have a large incentive to exploit the alpha from low-volatility or low-beta stocks, since such a strategy would result in a relatively high tracking error.11 This high tracking error will make the excess return of low-volatility stocks relatively less attractive for benchmarked managers, even if these stocks are clearly superior in terms of raw risk-adjusted returns (Chart 10, bottom panel). How Can Minimum Volatility Be Used In Asset Allocation? Chart 11Sensitivity Of Min Vol To Interest Rates Has Increased In The Last Decade The interest rate sensitivity of low-volatility stocks has been a topic of significant interest for academic researchers. A study that attempted to measure this sensitivity found that equities in the lowest volatility decile have an interest-rate exposure equivalent to a 66% equity/34% bond portfolio.12 Moreover, this sensitivity has increased in recent years: Factor analysis shows that while the beta of the excess returns of minimum volatility to the equity market has remained constant, the beta to the bond market has increased significantly over the last decade13 (Chart 11, top panel). Interestingly this process seems to have accelerated as bond yields fell below dividend yields – a result which might arise because the market starts perceiving bonds, and low-volatility equities as close substitutes when they provide a similar cash flow (Chart 11, bottom panel). At first glance, this relatively high duration risk appears to be a red flag, particularly if you share our view that interest rates have reached a multi-year bottom. After all, an environment where interest rates rise would imply that minimum volatility would underperform global equities on a structural basis.  However, the sensitivity of minimum volatility to interest rates can be used to the advantage of an asset allocator. Specifically, in a world of low bond yields, it could be attractive for an investor to shift some of the exposure he or she has from bonds to minimum-volatility equities. Why would an investor do this? As we discussed in our October 2019 report, low bond yields will cause bonds to generate returns that are much lower than their historical averages. This means that using government bonds as a hedge for an equity portfolio is likely to result in a severe drag on performance.14 On the other hand, while minimum-volatility equities do not have the same hedging potency as bonds, their returns are much higher, which suggests that at the right allocation they could prove to be a better hedge. In a world of low bond yields, it could be attractive for an investor to shift some of the exposure he or she has from bonds to minimum-volatility equities. How has such a strategy worked historically? Chart 12 shows how allocating incremental amounts of global minimum-volatility equities to an equity portfolio compares to adding incremental amounts of global government bonds. Overall, allocating an additional 3% of minimum-volatility equities to a portfolio had the same effect as adding 1% of government bonds in terms of downside protection and volatility reduction, but with a much higher return. This effect was robust throughout the sample period. Consider a portfolio with 30% government bonds, 30% minimum volatility and 40% global equities. With the exception of the 1990-1994 period, this portfolio had roughly the same 10% conditional VaR in all sub periods as a portfolio with 40% government bonds and 60% equities, but a significantly higher return (Chart 13). Moreover, the volatility of the portfolio that includes minimum volatility has also been lower than the 60/40 portfolio since 2000. Chart 12Min Vol Provides Protection With A Relatively High Return Chart 13Min-Vol Protection Has Been Robust Bottom Line The low-volatility anomaly contradicts what is perhaps the most fundamental pillar in finance: The tradeoff between risk and return. As such, this anomaly might be the most puzzling inefficiency in markets. But will it persist? The evidence suggests that the anomaly is caused by strong institutional incentives, which are likely to continue. Thus, investors should strongly consider investing in low-volatility stocks in the future. However, the following points should be taken into account: Investors who are evaluated according to their information ratio should avoid low/minimum-volatility stocks, given that their large volatility difference with the benchmark will result in a relatively high tracking error. Relatively high valuations and an uptrend in interest rates may hurt the performance of low/minimum-volatility stocks relative to the broad equity market in the near future. However, the interest-rate exposure of low/minimum-volatility stocks might prove attractive to multi-asset investors. Specifically, investing in minimum-volatility equities and reducing bond exposure might be a way to boost returns while remaining hedged.   Juan Correa Ossa, CFA Senior Analyst juanc@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1  The discovery of the low-volatility anomaly predates the discovery of both the size and value anomalies. For more details, please see Michael C. Jensen, Fischer Black, and Myron S. Scholes, “The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Some Empirical Tests,” Studies in the Theory Of Capital Markets, Praeger Publishers Inc., 1972. 2 For more details on the construction of minimum-volatility portfolios, please see Tzee-man Chow, Jason C. Hsu,Li-Lan Kuo, and Feifei Li, “A Study of Low Volatility Portfolio Construction Methods,” The Journal of Portfolio Management, Vol. 40, No. 4, 2014. 3 However, research has shown that the low-volatility anomaly still holds within sectors, suggesting that its outperformance is not only a result of sector bias. For more details, please see Raul Leote de Carvalho, Majdouline Zakaria, Lu Xiao, and Pierre Moulin, “Low Risk Anomaly Everywhere - Evidence from Equity Sectors,” (November 19, 2014). 4 Please see Joost Driessen, Ivo Kuiper, Korhan Nazliben, and Robbert Beilo, “Does Interest Rate Exposure Explain the Low-Volatility Anomaly?” Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 103, 2019. 5 Please see Jason C. Hsu, Hideaki Kudoh and Toru Yamada, “When Sell-Side Analysts Meet High-Volatility Stocks: An Alternative Explanation for the Low-Volatility Puzzle,”  Journal Of Investment Management (JOIM), Second Quarter 2013. 6 Please see Nardin L. Baker and Robert A. Haugen, “Low Risk Stocks Outperform within All Observable Markets of the World,” (April 27, 2012). 7 Please see David Blitz, “Are Hedge Funds on the Other Side of the Low-Volatility Trade?”  The Journal of Alternatives Investments, Vol. 21, No. 1, Summer 2018. 8 Please see Jason C. Hsu and Vivek Viswanathan, “The Low Volatility Anomaly and the Preference for Gambling,” Risk-Based and Factor Investing, pages 291-303; (2015). 9 There is some debate as to whether the long-shot bias is truly irrational in financial markets, where payoffs and probabilities are not known with precision. 10 Researchers have found that the low-volatility anomaly exists in the government and corporate bond market. For more details please see, Raul Leote de Carvalho, Patrick Dugnolle, Lu Xiao, and Pierre Moulin, “Low-Risk Anomalies in Global Fixed Income: Evidence from Major Broad Markets,” The Journal of Fixed Income, vol. 23, No. 4, Spring 2014. 11 Please see Malcolm Baker, and Brendan Bradley, and Jeffrey Wurgler, “Benchmarks as Limits to Arbitrage: Understanding the Low-Volatility Anomaly,” Financial Analysts Journal, Vol. 67, No. 1, 2011. 12 Please see Joost Driessen, Ivo Kuiper, and Korhan Nazliben, and Robbert Beilo, “Does Interest Rate Exposure Explain the Low-Volatility Anomaly?” Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 103, 2019. 13 We calculate sensitivity for US stocks instead of global stocks due to the effects of currency returns. 14 Please see Global Asset Allocation Strategy Report “Safe Haven Review: A Guide To Portfolio Protection In The 2020s,” dated October 29 2019, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights Portfolio Strategy There are high odds that China’s real GDP deceleration will continue for the next decade, casting a shadow over the profit prospects of the S&P 1500 metals & mining index. A structural below benchmark allocation is warranted. Rising total mutual fund assets under management, improved trading revenue prospects, rising investor confidence along with a revival in IPO and M&A activity, all signal that it still pays to be overweight the S&P capital markets index. Recent Changes There are no changes in our portfolio this week. Table 1 Feature “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing.” - Charles Owen "Chuck" Prince III (ex-CEO of Citigroup) The SPX remains near all time highs and the invincible tech sector continues to lead the pack. Two weeks ago we showed that the market capitalization concentration of the top five stocks in the S&P 500 surpassed the late-1990s parallel (Chart 1), and Table 2 shows that late in the cycle a handful of stocks explain a sizable part of the broad market’s return.1 However, in terms of valuation overshoot the current forward P/E of these top five stocks is roughly half the late-1990s parabolic episode (Chart 2). Chart 1Vertigo Warning Chart 2Unlike The Late-1990s While the overall market does not fully resemble the excesses of the dot.com bubble era, at least not yet, there are elements that are eerily reminiscent of the late-1990s. Table 2Contribution To Late Cycle Rallies In The SPX Chart 3Correlation Breakdown Contrary to popular belief, during manias historical correlations break down and the forward multiple becomes positively correlated with the discount rate. So in the late 1990s, the fed funds rate and the 10-year yield jumped 200bps in a short time span and the SPX forward P/E soared 40% from roughly 18x to 25x (Chart 3) before collapsing to 14x soon thereafter. Simultaneously, the US dollar was roaring as real interest rates were 4%, but the NASDAQ 100 outperformed the emerging markets, another break in historical correlations. As Chuck Prince mused in 2007, there is a narrative in the equity market today that, “as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance”. While the overall market does not fully resemble the excesses of the dot.com bubble era, at least not yet, there are elements that are eerily reminiscent of the late-1990s. We filtered for large cap stocks that are at all-time highs and have increased in value at a minimum 10x since 2010. Among the stocks that met these criteria, five really stand out, Apple, Tesla, Lam Research, Amd & Salesforce, and comprise our “ATLAS” index; the mania in these stocks will likely end in tears (Chart 4). Even their forward P/E ratio has gone exponential, hitting a 60 handle last year similar to top five SPX stocks in the late-1990s. Chart 4ATLAS: Holding The World On His Shoulders Currently, SPX profits are barely growing and the sole reason equities are higher is the massive injection of liquidity via the drubbing in interest rates and the restart of QE. From peak-to-trough the 10-year yield fell 175bps in nine months, and the Fed commenced expanding its balance sheet by $60bn/month since last September; yet profits have barely budged. Ultimately, profits have to show up and the news on this front remains grim. The current non-inflationary trend-growth backdrop is a “goldilocks” scenario especially for tech stocks that thrive during disinflationary periods. While stocks can go higher defying weak EPS fundamentals as they have yet to reach a fully euphoric state according to our Complacency-Anxiety Indicator (Chart 5), a sell-off in the bond market will likely cause some consternation in equities in general and tech stocks in particular similar to early- and late-2018. Chart 5Not Max Complacent Yet Other catalysts that can suddenly cause “the music to stop” are either the recent coronavirus becoming an epidemic or a geopolitical event that would result in a risk off backdrop. Ultimately, profits have to show up and the news on this front remains grim. Our mid-January “Three EPS Scenarios” analysis still suggests that the SPX is 9% overvalued.2 This week we are updating our capital markets view and adding a sixth long-term theme and a related investment implication to our mid-December 2019, Special Report titled, “Top US Sector Investment Ideas For The Next Decade”.3 Sixth Big Theme For The Decade And Investment Implications China’s ascendancy on the world scene was a mega driver of equity markets in the 2000s following its inclusion in the WTO. The commodity super-cycle captured investors’ imaginations and China’s insatiable appetite for commodities caused a massive bubble in the commodity complex in general and commodity-related equities in particular. Nevertheless, the Great Recession posed a severe threat to China and the authorities injected an extraordinary amount of stimulus into the economy (15% of GDP over two years). This succeeded in doubling real GDP growth, but only temporarily. The unintended consequence was an enormous debt binge fueled by cheap money. Moreover, this debt burden along with falling labor force growth and productivity forced the government to re-think its policies as they caused a steady down drift in real output growth. The sixth big theme for the 2020s is a sustained deceleration of Chinese real GDP growth to a range of 4% to 2% (Chart 6). Not only is the debt overhang weighing on real output growth, but Chinese leaders are adamant about transitioning the economy to developed market status, which is synonymous with higher consumption expenditures at the expense of gross fixed capital formation. Chart 6From Boom… Chart 7…To Bust In other words, China remains committed to weaning its economy off of investment and reconfiguring it toward consumption (Chart 7). This is a strategic plan but it is possible that the Chinese economy can achieve this transition in due time. While this will not happen overnight, the implication is steadily lower real GDP growth as is common among large, mature, developed market economies. China will remain one of the top commodity consumers in the world, as urbanization is ongoing, but the intensity of commodity consumption will continue to decelerate (Chart 8). At the margin, this change in consumption behavior will have knock on effects on the broad basic resources sector in general and the S&P 1500 metals & mining index in particular. Were this Chinese backdrop to pan out in the coming decade as we expect, it would sustain the relative underperformance of metals & mining equities as Chart 6 & 7 depict. Chart 8Commodity Consumption Deceleration Will… Chart 9…Continue To Weigh On Metals & Mining Profits Importantly, these commodity producers will have to adjust their still bloated cost structures to lower run rates which is de facto negative both for relative sales and profit growth (Chart 9). Tack on the large negative footprint mining extraction has on the environment, and if ESG investing (our fifth big theme for the decade4) also takes off, investors should avoid the S&P 1500 metals & mining index on a secular basis. Bottom Line: There are high odds that China’s real GDP deceleration will continue for the next decade, casting a shadow over the profit prospects of the S&P 1500 metals & mining index. A structural below benchmark allocation is warranted. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG S15METL – NEM, FCX, NUE, RS, RGLD, STLD, CMC, ATI, CRS, CLF, CMP, X, KALU, WOR, MTRN, HCC, AKS, SXC, HAYN, CENX, TMST, ZEUS. Capital Markets Update Capital markets stocks have come out of hibernation recently and are on the cusp of breaking out – in a bullish fashion – of their 18-month trading range. A number of the indicators we track signal that an earnings-led outperformance period is in the cards for this financials sub-group and we reiterate our overweight stance. Sloshing liquidity has pushed investors out the risk spectrum and high yield bond option adjusted spreads are flirting with multi-year lows. Such a tame junk bond market backdrop coupled with easy financial conditions are conducive to rising M&A activity (Chart 10). Importantly, the Fed’s Senior Loan Officer Survey paints an improving profit backdrop for investment banks. Not only are bankers willing extenders of credit, but demand for credit for the majority of loan categories that the Fed tracks is squarely in positive territory (top panel, Chart 11). Chart 10Subsiding Risks Are A Boon To Capital Markets Chart 11Positive Profit Catalysts This is likely a consequence of last year’s drubbing in the price of credit. M&A activity usually goes hand in hand with loan growth, underscoring that business combinations are on track to accelerate (third panel, Chart 10). This will revive a lucrative business line for capital markets firms. Total mutual fund assets are expanding at a brisk rate and hitting fresh all-time highs, signaling an uptick in risk appetite (third panel, Chart 11). Rising investor confidence will facilitate both new and secondary share issuance, an important source of fee generation for capital markets firms. Moreover, equity trading volumes have sprang back to life in recent weeks underscoring that the recent impressive Q4 earnings results will likely continue into Q1/2020 (bottom panel, Chart 10). Meanwhile, the three Fed rate cuts last year should work through the economy and at least stem further losses in the ISM manufacturing survey. The US/China trade détente will also lead to a stabilization in global growth. In fact, the V-shaped recovery in the global ZEW survey suggests that capital markets profits will likely outpace the broad market this year (second & bottom panels, Chart 11). Finally, the recent surge in the stock-to-bond ratio reflects a massive psychological shift, from last year’s recessionary fears to growing investor confidence that tail risks are abating (Chart 12). Still depressed valuations neither reflect the firming capital markets profit outlook nor the rising industry ROE (bottom panel, Chart 12). Adding it all up, accelerating total mutual fund assets under management, improved trading revenue prospects, rising investor confidence and a revival in IPO and M&A activity, all signal that it still pays to be overweight the S&P capital markets index.  Bottom Line: Stay overweight the S&P capital markets index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG S5CAPM – GS, CME, SPGI, MS, BLK, SCHW, ICE, MCO, BK, TROW, STT, MSCI, NTRS, AMP, MKTX, CBOE, NDAQ, RJF, ETFC, BEN, IVZ. Chart 12Valuation Re-Rating Looms     Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com     1     Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Three EPS Scenarios” dated January 13, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2     Ibid. 3     Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Special Report, “Top US Sector Investment Ideas For the Next Decade” dated December 16, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4     Ibid.   Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Stay neutral cyclicals over defensives (downgrade alert) Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps (Stop 10%)

Highlights Most central banks still consider economic risks asymmetrical to the downside. This means that even if global growth rebounds in earnest, policy is likely to stay pat over the next three to six months. The conclusion is that relative growth fundamentals rather than central bank policy will likely drive FX price action in the next few months. Our bias remains that the growth impulse will be strongest outside the US during the first half of this year. Stay short the DXY index. The BoJ’s inaction this week makes long yen bets cheap insurance against a rise in FX volatility.  Remain short USD/JPY and go short CHF/JPY. The pound remains a buy on dips but will likely underperform the euro over the next few months. EUR/GBP should touch 0.88. The BoC kept rates on hold, but erred on the dovish side, in line with our expectations. Stay short CAD/NOK and long AUD/CAD. We were stopped out of our long NOK/SEK trade for a profit of 1.8%. We will look to rebuy the cross at lower levels. Feature Chart I-1Currency Markets Have Priced In A Benign Recovery The powerful bounce in global equity markets since the August lows has pushed many stock indices into overbought territory. Chart I-1 shows that the rise in global stocks has already discounted an improvement in global manufacturing in order of magnitude similar to the 2012 and 2016 episodes. However, currency markets have been discounting a much more benign outcome (bottom panel). The divergence between currency and equity performance is a marked change from what has prevailed during past cycles. For example, trough to peak, AUD/JPY, a key barometer of greed versus fear in currency markets, appreciated 40% during the 2012 episode, and 25% in 2016-2017, along with rising equity prices. The performance of even more high-octane currency pairs such as the RUB/JPY, the ZAR/JPY, or even the BRL/JPY, was explosive. More muted currency action this time around therefore calls into question the durability of this recovery. Perhaps given that equities are long-duration assets, it is quite plausible that the drop in interest rates in 2019 has increased their relative appeal, boosting nominal values. While that makes sense, most bond markets have also seen higher yields over the past few months, making this explanation questionable. Alternatively, the easing in trade tensions and/or the Federal Reserve’s liquidity injections may have rekindled animal spirits among domestic investors. Or perhaps, a synchronized recovery has narrowed G10 growth differentials, muting currency performance in the process but boosting share prices. The rise in global stocks has already discounted an improvement in global manufacturing. However, currency markets have been discounting a much more benign outcome. Either way, the resolution to this dissonance will be either through marked improvement in global economic data in the coming months (which will support pro-cyclical currencies), or a period of indigestion for stock markets (which will lift volatility) – or a combination of both. At a minimum, this suggests tweaking currency portfolios in anticipation of these dynamics.   On Volatility And The Dollar Everyone understands that currency markets are about relative trends. Therefore, the implicit assumption that the dollar will weaken as global growth picks up is that the epicenter of this recovery will be outside the US. Chart I-2 shows that economic data is not yet surprising to the upside outside the US, even though there has been marked improvement on a rate-of-change basis. Beneath the surface, the strongest data surprises have been in the euro area, Switzerland, New Zealand and Australia, while disappointments have been in Canada and the UK. In hindsight, the chart also highlights why the Canadian dollar was the best performing G10 currency in 2019, while the Swedish krona was the weakest. Chart I-2Growth Dispersion Has Fallen The drop in economic dispersion has pushed currency volatility near record lows (Chart I-3). Every seasoned investor does and should pay attention to low volatility. This is because what destroys portfolios is not exuberance, but complacency. This might sound like a tautology, but during the last three episodes of volatility dropping to these levels, the dollar soared and pro-cyclical currencies suffered severe losses. Everyone remembers 1997-1998, 2007-2008 and 2014-2015. Will this time be the same? While a rise in volatility is usually associated with a higher dollar, there are three key differences this time around. First, real rates turned positive in the US relative to its G10 counterparts in 2014 (Chart I-4). This meant the US dollar, which has typically been a funding currency (not least because it is a reserve currency), became the object of carry trades. It is a fair contention that any capital that wanted to find its way into US Treasurys has had more than five years of positive real carry to do so. With real relative yields in the US now rolling over, which way will capital gravitate? Chart I-3Volatility Near Record Lows Chart I-4Real Rates Lower In The US The dollar has been in a bull market since 2011, which has shifted valuations towards expensive quartiles. This is a key difference from previous low-volatility episodes when the dollar was much earlier into bull-market territory (Chart I-5). The dollar tends to run in long cycles, and a spike in volatility can either mark the beginning or the end of a cycle. As we have emphasized numerous times in previous reports, being long the US dollar is a consensus trade. Our primary basis for this is CFTC positioning data. However, a timelier leading indicator to watch is the gold-to-bond ratio. Currencies are about confidence, and a key measure of confidence in the US dollar is the total return in the US 10-year Treasury compared to gold bullion, which has collapsed (Chart I-6). The budget deficit in the US is about to explode, while it was low and falling during prior dollar riot points.   Chart I-5The Dollar Is Expensive Chart I-6Tug Of War Between US Bonds And Gold More importantly, currency markets are likely to gyrate with relative fundamentals. The slowdown in the global economy was driven by the manufacturing sector, so it is fair to assume that this is the part of the economy that is ripe for mean reversion. Historically, cyclical swings in most economies tend to be driven by manufacturing and exports rather than services (and consumption). More specifically, the currencies that have borne the brunt of the manufacturing slowdown should logically be the ones to experience the quickest reversals. This is already being manifested in a very steep rise in their bond yields vis-à-vis those in the US. For example, yields in Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Japan have risen significantly versus those in the US since the bottom. A synchronized recovery in global growth will go a long way in further eroding the US’ yield advantage. Currencies are about confidence, and a key measure of confidence in the US dollar is the total return in the US 10-year Treasury compared to gold bullion. Bottom Line: Remain short the DXY index with an initial target of 90 and a stop loss at 100.  The Yen As Portfolio Insurance Should our thesis that the dollar is in a downtrend for 2020 be correct, it is unlikely to occur in a straight line. This argues for having some portfolio insurance. The Bank of Japan’s inaction this week may have been a red herring, since one of the most potent moves in asset markets in recent months has been the +130-basis-point move in favor of Japanese yields (Chart I-7). The gap between the USD/JPY and real rates has opened up a rare arbitrage opportunity. Should a selloff in global risk assets materialize, the yen will strengthen. On the other hand, if global growth does eventually accelerate, the yen could weaken on its crosses but strengthen vis-à-vis the dollar. This keeps short USD/JPY bets in an enviable “heads I win, tails I do not lose too much” position. The rise in Japanese yields has been driven by three key pivotal developments: For most of the past five years, the BoJ was one of the most aggressive central banks in terms of asset purchases. This was a huge catalyst for a downturn in the trade-weighted yen (Chart I-8). With a renewed expansion in the Fed’s balance sheet, monetary policy is tightening on a relative basis in Japan. Total annual asset purchases by the BoJ are currently running at about ¥20 trillion, while JGB purchases are running at ¥15 trillion. This is a far cry from the central bank’s soft target of ¥80 trillion, and unlikely to change anytime soon. Chart I-7Japanese Bond Yields Have Surged Chart I-8The Yen And QE Movements in the yen are as influenced by external conditions as what is happening domestically, given Japan’s huge export sector. Credit default swap spreads of cyclical sectors are collapsing to new lows, symptomatic of an improving profit outlook (Chart I-9). This suggests it is the growth component driving Japanese yields higher (Japanese CPI swaps have indeed been flat). This also mirrors the recent outperformance of Asian cyclical sectors relative to defensive ones. The Abe government announced a huge fiscal package last year, in part driven by the disastrous typhoons as well as the upcoming Olympics. This allowed the BoJ to upgrade its growth forecasts in its latest policy minutes. The relative performance of construction and engineering stocks are an important barometer for when the funds are flowing into the economy (Chart I-10). Chart I-9Default Risk Easing In Japan Chart I-10Fiscal Stimulus And Construction Stocks As a defensive currency, the yen tends to weaken as global growth improves, given it is usually used to fund carry trades. That said, our contention is that the yen will surely weaken at the crosses, but could still strengthen versus the dollar. As mentioned above, one catalyst is the divergence from the traditional relationship with real rates. More importantly, the USD/JPY and the DXY tend to have a positive correlation, because the dollar drives the yen most of the time. Meanwhile, net short positioning in the yen versus the dollar makes it attractive from a contrarian standpoint (Chart I-11). Given extremely low volatility, this places short USD/JPY bets as an attractive vehicle to play a rise in volatility. Chart I-11Investors Are Short The Yen More conservative investors could go short CHF/JPY. The recent rise in the Swiss franc threatens the nascent recovery in inflation (Chart I-12), while weakness in the Japanese yen will help lift domestic tradeable goods prices. This puts more pressure on the Swiss National Bank rather than the BoJ. Meanwhile, as a safe haven, the yen is cheaper than the franc. This is confirmed by many of our in-house models. In simple terms, relative inflation with the US has been lower in Japan over the last several decades, but the franc has been stronger. In simple terms, relative inflation with the US has been lower in Japan over the last several decades, but the franc has been stronger (Chart I-13). Meanwhile, over the last two years, a rise in volatility has benefited the yen more than the franc. Chart I-12Strong Franc Is A Headwind For Swiss Inflation Chart I-13The Yen Is Cheaper ##br##Insurance Bottom Line: The yen is the most attractive safe-haven currency at the moment. Remain short USD/JPY and sell CHF/JPY. Housekeeping We were stopped out of our long NOK/SEK trade for a profit of 1.8%. We will look to rebuy this cross at lower levels. The trade is mostly about carry, and we are both positive on the NOK and SEK. This makes market timing important. NOK/SEK at 1.04 will be attractive. There were no new insights from the Norges bank this week, in the context of all the central bank meetings. We will also be looking to opportunistically buy the pound, but buying EUR or GBP volatility might be a better bet. For now, despite the robust labor report, economic surprises in the UK remain negative (Chart I-14). Stay tuned. Chart I-14GBP Is Vulnerable Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the US have been mixed: Industrial production fell by 1% year-on-year in December. The preliminary Michigan consumer sentiment index fell slightly to 99.1 in January. MBA mortgage applications fell by 1.2% for the week ended January 17th. However, existing home sales surprised to the upside, rising 3.6% month-on-month in December. Chicago Fed national activity index fell to -0.35 from 0.41 in December. Initial jobless claims increased to 211K for the week ended January 17th, better than expectations. The DXY index increased by 0.4% this week. There are growing concerns over whether China's coronavirus would significantly drag down global growth. While this is a hiccup in the short term, we remain positive and believe that global growth will accelerate this year on easy financial conditions and faded trade war risks. Report Links: On Oil, Growth And The Dollar - January 10, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area have been mostly positive: The current account balance came in at €33.9 billion in November. Headline and core inflation were both unchanged at 1.3% year-on-year respectively in December. The ZEW economic sentiment survey soared to 25.6 from 11.2 in January. The euro fell by 0.8% against the US dollar this week. On Thursday, the ECB maintained interest rates at -0.5%. The key takeaway from the ECB is that they are grappling with a review of their monetary policy objective in a manner that might increase accommodation. A switch to an explicit 2% inflation target and/or including a climate change objective into quantitative easing decisions heralds a much more dovish ECB. We are tightening our stop on long EUR/CAD to 1.42. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver - October 11, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan have been negative: Industrial production fell by 8.2% year-on-year in November. The trade deficit widened to ¥152.5 billion in December. Imports and exports both fell by 4.9% and 6.3% year-on-year, respectively. All industry activity index increased by 0.9% month-on-month in November. Both the coincident index and the leading economic index fell to 94.7 and 90.8, respectively in November. The Japanese yen appreciated by 0.3% against the US dollar this week. The BoJ kept interest rates unchanged, in line with expectations. More importantly, the outlook report revised the growth forecast upward to 0.9% from 0.7% for the fiscal year 2020. Moreover, the BoJ revised down the inflation forecast by 10 bps due to lower crude oil prices. Please refer to our front section this week for a more in-depth analysis on the Japanese yen. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Signposts For A Reversal In The Dollar Bull Market - November 1, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the UK have been positive: Retail sales grew by 0.9% year-on-year in December. The Rightmove house price index increased by 2.7% year-on-year in January. The ILO unemployment rate was unchanged at 3.8% in November. Average earnings grew by 3.2% year-on-year in November. This followed a 3-month improvement in employment of 208K, after what had been a dismal employment report for most of 2019. The British pound appreciated by 0.7% against the US dollar this week. The biggest volatility in European currencies in the next few weeks is likely to emerge in the EUR/GBP cross. European economic data has had the best positive surprises in the last few weeks, in part due to base effects.  However, the ECB’s transcript this week suggests leaning against any currency strength. In the UK, the pound will still trade partly on politics for now. Buying GBP and EUR volatility looks like a good bet. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? - Sept. 20, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia have been positive: The Westpac consumer confidence index fell by 1.8% in January. Consumer inflation expectations increased to 4.7% from 4% in January. 28.9K new jobs were created in December, above consensus. This was a combination of 29.2K part-time jobs but a loss of 0.3K full-time jobs. The participation rate was unchanged at 66% in December, while the unemployment rate fell further to 5.1%. The Australian dollar fell by 0.6% against the US dollar this week. The positive jobs report placed a bid under AUD, but that quickly dissipated as the coronavirus scare started to dominate headlines. We discussed AUD in depth last week and are buyers at 68 cents. Our primary rationale is that this is a potent contrarian bet. Report Links: On AUD And CNY - January 17, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand have been negative: Visitor arrivals fell by 3.5% year-on-year in November. Net migration fell to 2610 from 3400 in November. The performance services index fell to 51.9 from 52.9 in December. The New Zealand dollar fell by 0.5% against the US dollar this week. While we believe that the kiwi dollar will outperform the US dollar this year amid improving global growth, domestic constraints including decreasing net migration might limit upside potential. Stay long AUD/NZD and SEK/NZD. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 USD/CNY And Market Turbulence - August 9, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada have been soft: Manufacturing sales fell by 0.6% month-on-month in November. Headline inflation was unchanged at 2.2% year-on-year in December. Core inflation however, fell to 1.7% from 1.9% in December. New house prices grew by 0.1% year-on-year in December. The Canadian dollar fell by 0.8% against the US dollar this week. On Wednesday, the BoC decided to put interest rates on hold, while opening the door for possible rate cuts later this year if the Canadian data disappointed. In short, like most other central banks, the BoC is data dependent. Our story for CAD is simple – if the epicenter of a growth rebound is outside the US, CAD will underperform its antipodean counterparts. Stay long AUD/CAD. Report Links: The Loonie: Upside Versus The Dollar, But Downside At The Crosses Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Making Money With Petrocurrencies - November 8, 2019 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 There have been scant data from Switzerland this week: Producer prices fell by 1.7% year-on-year in December, compared with a decrease of 2.5% the previous month. Money supply (M3) grew by 0.7% year-on-year in December. The Swiss franc has been more or less flat against the US dollar this week. We continue to favor the Swiss franc as global risks persist, including concerns about the coronavirus. However, as discussed in the front section of this report, the yen is a better hedge than the franc at the current juncture. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Notes On The SNB - October 4, 2019 What To Do About The Swiss Franc? - May 17, 2019 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 There was scant data out of Norway this week: The Labor Force Survey recorded an increase in the unemployment rate to 4% in November.  The Norwegian krone fell by 1.3% against the US dollar this week amid lower energy prices. On Thursday, the Norges Bank kept interest rates on hold at 1.5%, as widely expected. Moreover, the Bank Governor Øystein Olsen said that "The Committee’s current assessment of the outlook and the balance of risks suggests that the policy rate will most likely remain at the present level in the coming period," implying no change in the policy rate in the near-term. This suggests that going forward, relative fundamentals rather than policy decisions will dictate NOK’s path. Our bias is that a valuation cushion offers a margin of safety for long NOK positions. Remain short USD/NOK and CAD/NOK. Report Links: On Oil, Growth And The Dollar - January 10, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Making Money With Petrocurrencies - November 8, 2019 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 There was scant data out of Sweden this week: After rising from 6% to 6.8% in November, the unemployment rate fell back to 6% in December. The Swedish krona fell by 0.2% against the US dollar this week. Going forward, improving global growth, diminished trade tensions, and fewer concerns about a near-term recession all underpin the Swedish economy and the krona. SEK is the most potent G10 cross to play a global manufacturing rebound. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades

Highlights An analysis on India is available on page 12. There is extreme complacency in global financial markets. With currency markets’ implied volatility at a record low, we recommend going long EM currency volatility. The latter will rise in the next six month regardless the direction of global risk assets. For now, we remain long the EM MSCI equity index with a stop point at 1050. In India, nominal income growth has fallen below lending rates. The latter have not declined despite monetary easing. The authorities will force banks to reduce their lending rates, which will hurt bank stocks. Feature “…we have probably seen the end of the boom-bust cycle.” Bob Prince, Co-CIO of Bridgewater World Economic Forum, Davos January 22, 2020 Low Volatility = Complacency Chart I-1Go Long Currency Volatility The comment above by co-CIO of the largest hedge fund declaring the end of boom-bust cycle is consistent with lingering complacency in global financial markets. Any time an influential person made a similar declaration in the past, it marked a major turning point in financial markets. Remarkably, implied volatility for the US dollar has plummeted to a record low, as it has for EM currencies and a wide range of equity markets. Chart I-1 illustrates the implied volatility for EM currencies and the US dollar. Such low levels of implied currency market volatility historically preceded major moves in currency markets and often led to a material selloff in broad EM financial markets. It does not mean that the world economy will crash but financial markets volatility in general and currency market volatility in particular are bound to rise considerably in the months ahead. The risk-reward profile of going long EM currency or US dollar volatility appears very attractive. Today we recommend investors to go long EM currency volatility. The latter will rise regardless the direction of global risk assets. Concerning overall strategy, EM financial markets are entering a testing period. How broader EM risk assets and currencies perform in the coming weeks will signal how durable and long-lasting the current EM rally will be. Given global risk assets are overbought, a correction or consolidation phase is overdue. If EM equities, currencies and credit markets outperform, or at least do not underperform their DM peers in the course of this indigestion phase, it will beckon more upside for EM risk assets in 2020. If during budding market turbulence EM risk assets and currencies underperform their DM peers, it will signal their vulnerability in 2020.Implied volatility for the US dollar has plummeted to a record low, as it has for EM currencies. Implied volatility for the US dollar has plummeted to a record low, as it has for EM currencies. For now, we remain long the EM MSCI equity index with a stop point at 1050. We will upgrade our EM equity and credit market allocations versus DM if the EM universe generally exhibits relative resilience in the coming weeks, and more of our indicators confirm China’s growth recovery. Hints Of Recovery… December economic data out of China were strong, and it seems that the credit and fiscal stimulus are finally beginning to lift growth: Chinese imports and nominal industrial output – among the most reliable measures of the Chinese business cycle – posted very robust growth numbers in December (Chart I-2). DRAM and NAND semiconductor prices are climbing, and China’s container freight index is also in revival mode (Chart I-3). These high-frequency (daily and weekly) data confirm improving business activity in both the global semiconductor sector and in overall world trade. Chart I-2China's December Economic Data Were Strong Chart I-3Asia's Trade Is Recovering   There are tentative signs of amelioration in our proxies for marginal propensity to spend by households and enterprises in China (Chart I-4). A more decisive improvement in these indicators is needed to reinforce the positive outlook for China’s growth. …But Doubts Still Linger Despite the recent improvement in Chinese economic data and the rebound in China-related plays, there are a number of financial market indicators that are not yet confirming a sustainable business cycle recovery in China and global trade. In particular: First, apart from semiconductor stocks, global cyclical equity sectors and sub-sectors – industrials, materials, and freight and logistics – have begun, once again, underperforming defensive sectors (Chart I-5). Outperformance by these cyclical sectors against defensives is essential in confirming that global and Chinese capital spending – which were the primary sources of the most recent slowdown – are picking up again. Chart I-4China: Tentative Improvement In Household And Corporate Marginal Propensity To Spend Chart I-5Global Equities: Cyclicals Are Again Underperforming Defensives   Notably, the relative performance of EM share prices to the global equity benchmark historically tracks the relative performance of global materials versus the global overall stock index.1 However, the two have recently diverged (Chart I-6). In short, global materials are not corroborating sustainability in the recent EM outperformance. If EM equities, currencies and credit markets outperform, or at least do not underperform their DM peers in the course of this indigestion phase, it will beckon more upside for EM risk assets in 2020. Second, the rebound in Chinese and EM shares prices is not corroborated by Chinese onshore government bond yields, which are dipping to new cyclical lows (Chart I-7). In other words, interest rate expectations in China are falling – i.e., they are not confirming a robust recovery. Chart I-6Unsustainable Decoupling Chart I-7A Message From The Chinese Fixed-Income Market   Third, EM ex-China currencies have not yet broken out versus the US dollar (Chart I-8). Consistently, the broad trade-weighted US dollar has not yet broken down. Chart I-9 illustrates that the greenback’s advance-decline line has not yet fallen below its 200-day moving average, a condition that has historically been required to confirm the dollar’s cyclical bear market. Chart I-8EM Currencies: No Breakout Yet Chart I-9The US Dollar Is At A Critical Juncture   We view these exchange rate patterns as a litmus test to validate turning points in the global business cycle. Finally, the technical profiles of the KOSPI, EM small cap stocks and copper prices are inconclusive (Chart I-10). These markets have rebounded but seem to be confronting a critical technical test. If they decisively break above these technical levels, it will be a sign that the EM bull market will be lasting and durable. Otherwise, caution is still warranted. Bottom Line: There is a good amount of complacency among global investors at a time when there are several market signals that are still challenging the view of enduring revival in China/EM growth. Corporate Profits Will Be The Arbiter Ultimately, economic growth and corporate profits will determine the direction of not only share prices but also EM sovereign and corporate credit spreads as well as their currencies. So far, the EM equity rebound of the past 12 months has been solely due to multiples expansion amid a deepening EM profit recession: Earnings per share in US dollar terms has been contracting by 10% from a year ago, and the rate of change has so far not turned around (Chart I-11). Chart I-10The KOSPI And Copper Are Facing A Resilience Test Chart I-11EM Equities: A Profitless Rally?   Going forward, however, EM corporate profits growth is set to improve. Our indicator for semiconductor companies’ revenues is heralding a revival in semi sector profits (Chart I-12, top panel). The rate-of-change improvement in commodities prices is also foreshadowing potential amelioration in corporate earnings growth among energy producers and materials (Chart I-12, middle and bottom panels). Chart I-12EPS Growth In EM Technology, Energy And Materials We are negative on EM bank profits due to their need to recognize and provision for non-performing loans as well as the authorities’ mounting pressures on them to reduce lending rates. The latter will shrink banks’ elevated net interest rate margins. The profit profile of other EM equity sectors is illustrated in Chart I-13A and I-13B. Chart I-13AEM EPS Growth By Sectors Chart I-13BEM EPS Growth By Sectors   Provided technology, materials and energy stocks account for 33% of the MSCI EM aggregate equity index’s earnings (banks account for another 28% of total profits), it is safe to assume that the growth rate of EM EPS will move from -10% currently to zero or mildly positive territory by mid-2020. Nevertheless, beyond the next several months, our leading indicators on the EM profit outlook are not positive. China’s narrow money growth leads EM EPS by 12 months, and currently suggests the EPS recovery will be both muted and short-lived (Chart I-14). The technical profiles of the KOSPI, EM small cap stocks and copper prices are inconclusive. Further, China’s broad money impulse points to a peak in the credit impulse in the first half of the year (Chart I-15). Given that EM share prices bottomed a year ago, simultaneously with China’s credit impulse, odds are that EM equities could slump with a rollover in the latter. Chart I-14EM EPS: Marginal Improvement Ahead But No Robust Recovery Chart I-15China: A Signpost Of A Potential Top In The Credit Impulse   Chart I-16DM Central Banks' Assets And EM Stocks And Currencies: No Stable Correlation What if the current liquidity-driven rally continues? In our report last week titled A Primer On Liquidity, we elaborated at great length about the different liquidity measures and how they influence financial asset prices. Empirically, changes in DM central banks’ balance sheets have had no stable correlation with either EM share prices or EM local currency bonds, as demonstrated in Chart I-16. There have been periods over the past 10 years when EM risk assets and currencies have performed poorly, despite an accelerating pace of QE programs worldwide (Chart I-16). The true and critical driver for EM equity and currency performance has been EM’s own domestic fundamentals and China’s business cycle (please refer to Chart I-11 on page 7). To be sure, we are not suggesting that DM central bank policies have not affected global and EM financial markets at all. They have done so in spades. By purchasing and withdrawing about $9 trillion in high-quality securities from the marketplace, the monetary authorities have shrunk the stock of available financial assets. Consequently, even though QE programs have expanded broad money supply only modestly,2 the upshot has been that more money has been chasing fewer financial assets. Also, low interest rates reduce the opportunity cost of owning risk assets. These two phenomena have led investors to bid up prices of various securities, including EM ones. Nevertheless, despite the ongoing and indiscriminate global search for yield, EM share prices in US dollar terms and EM ex-China currencies (including carry, i.e. on a total-return basis) are still below their 2010 levels. Such poor performance of EM risk assets has been a corollary of just how bad EM fundamentals have been. Bottom Line: EM corporate profits will improve on a rate-of-change basis in the coming months. However, forward-looking indicators do not yet point to a robust recovery in EM corporate profits as occurred in 2017. Investment Conclusions We are maintaining our long EM equities position with a stop point at 1050 for the MSCI EM stock index (7% below the current level). If EM share prices, credit markets and currencies outperform their DM peers during a correction/consolidation phase, we will upgrade EM allocations to overweight in global equity and credit portfolios. At the moment, EM is confronting a resilience test. Within the EM equity universe, our overweights are Russia, Korea, Thailand, Mexico, UAE, Pakistan and central Europe. Our recommended equity underweights include Indonesia, the Philippines, Hong Kong domestic stocks, South Africa, Turkey and Colombia. In sovereign credit and local bond markets, our overweights are Mexico, Russia, Thailand, Malaysia, Pakistan and Ukraine. In turn, South Africa, Turkey, Philippines and Indonesia warrant an underweight stance. Today we are upgrading Indian bonds from neutral to overweight (see page 17).  In the currency space, we continue holding a short position versus the US dollar in the following basket of currencies: BRL, ZAR, CLP, COP, IDR, PHP and KRW. As always, the full list of our positions is presented at the end of report (please refer to pages 18-19 and on our website).   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com India: Beware Of Private Banks And Consumer Perils Indian private banks and consumer staple stocks have been holding up the Indian equity market at a time when the rest of the bourse has been sluggish. Both sectors, however, are extremely expensive and thus tremendously sensitive to minor profit disappointments. Remarkably, private banks now trade at a price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio of 31 and price-to-book value (PBV) ratio of 4. Indian consumer staple stocks, on the other hand, trade at a P/E ratio of 41 (Chart II-1 and Chart II-2). Chart II-1Indian Private Bank Stocks Are Expensive Chart II-2Indian Consumer Staple Stocks Are Very Pricey   Chart II-3A Credit Boom Among Indian Private Banks Given that private banks have been specializing in both mortgages and non-mortgage consumer lending, the call on both private bank and consumer staple stocks is contingent on consumer financial health. The loan book of private banks has expanded tremendously: since 2010 it has grown at a compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of 20% and 14% in nominal and real (inflation-adjusted) terms, respectively (Chart II-3).3 In turn, the share of household loans is reasonably large at around 52% of private banks total loan book.  Unfortunately, India’s consumer sector appears to be fragile at the moment. Employment and wage growth have downshifted – the Manpower employment index is at a 14-year low (Chart II-4). Consequently, household disposable income growth has decelerated to 9% in nominal terms (Chart II-5). Critically, households’ ability to service debt has deteriorated as nominal disposable household income growth has fallen slightly below borrowing costs, i.e., bank lending rates (Chart II-5). This development is precarious not only because it makes it more difficult for consumers to service their debt – causing NPLs to rise – but it also dampens consumer credit demand. Consequently, private banks’ considerable exposure to consumers could reverse the fortunes of the former as consumers face increasing difficulties servicing their debt. Moreover, with borrowing costs above nominal income growth, banks in India could face adverse selection problem. The latter is a phenomenon when loan demand primarily comes from riskier borrowers who are in desperate need for funding. In such a case, non-performing loans are bound to mushroom. Chart II-4India's Labor Market Is In Doldrums Chart II-5India: Household Nominal Income And Lending Rate Overall, household spending is in the doldrums. Two- and three-wheeler and passenger car unit sales have all been contracting. In the meantime, consumer demand for non-durable goods has also weakened, as reflected by stalling non-durable consumer goods production. Residential property demand has plummeted. According to the Reserve Bank of India’s December Financial Stability Report – quoting data from PropTiger DataLabs – housing sales units contracted by 20% in September from a year ago. In turn, growth in house prices has been anemic (Chart II-6). Prices are now growing below core inflation, i.e. property prices are deflating in real terms. Households’ ability to service debt has deteriorated as nominal disposable household income growth has fallen slightly below borrowing costs. Going forward, odds are that employment and wage growth will remain weak in India. The basis is the corporate sector is also struggling and still reluctant to invest and hire. Chart II-7 illustrates that the number of investment projects has collapsed, while capital goods production and capital goods imports are both shrinking (Chart II-7). Chart II-6India: Housing Market Is Feeble Chart II-7India: Companies Are Not Investing   Overall, the entire Indian economy is suffering from high borrowing costs in real (adjusted for inflation) terms (Chart II-8, top panel). Chart II-8Lending Rates Have Not Declined Despite Monetary Easing Importantly, the monetary policy transmission mechanism has not been working effectively in India. Even though the central bank has cut its policy rate by 135 basis points in 2019, prime borrowing did not budge (Chart II-8, middle panel). Consequently, loan growth has decelerated sharply (Chart II-8, bottom panel). On the whole, for the economy to recover, it requires considerably lower borrowing costs or a substantial fiscal boost. Indian central and state fiscal aggregate budget deficit is already wide at 6% of GDP. With public debt-to-GDP ratio at 68%, there is some but not enormous room for boosting government expenditures drastically. This makes reducing commercial bank lending rates the most feasible mechanism to jump-start the economy. Consequently, the authorities will become more aggressive in forcing commercial banks to cut their lending rates. This seems to be taking place as in September 2019 the RBI asked Indian commercial banks to link lending rates on certain types of loans more closely to the central bank’s policy rate to ensure more effective monetary policy transmission. Yet doing so will squeeze down commercial banks’ net interest rate margins – which have widened – and will hit banks’ profits. Alternatively, if lending rates do not fall, non-performing loans (NPLs) will increase because only risky borrowers will be willing to borrow while existing debtors will struggle to service their debt at current elevated interest rates. This will also depress bank profits. These two negative scenarios are probably reflected in low valuations of public bank share prices, but they are not yet priced in among private banks stocks. Given the latter’s exuberant valuations, only a small drop in net interest rate margins or a small rise in NPLs, will be enough to drag their share prices lower. Investment Conclusions Chart II-9India Vs. EM Relative Equity Performance Is Often About Oil Travails of the Indian economy will persist for now. Much more policy support is required to turn the business cycle around. EM equity investors should keep a neutral allocation to Indian stocks within an EM equity portfolio. Indian share prices often outperform their EM peers when oil prices drop and lag when crude prices rally (Chart II-9). Given our negative view on oil prices,4 we are reluctant to downgrade this bourse to underweight. Private banks are susceptible to a drawdown as either their net interest rate margins will drop or they will face rising non-performing loans. Consumer staples stocks are expensive and, hence, are vulnerable to marginal profit disappointments. We are upgrading our allocation to Indian domestic bonds from neutral to overweight within an EM local bond portfolio. Consistently, we are closing our yield curve steepening trade in India. This position has produced a 30 basis points gain since July 2016. Low inflation, weak real growth, a struggling credit system and ineffective transmission of monetary easing argue for even lower interest rates in India. The surge in food prices should be viewed as a relative price shock, not inflation. Higher food prices will curb the spending power of consumers and weaken their expenditures on non-food items. In addition, core inflation remains very low. Ayman Kawtharani Editor/Strategist ayman@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1  Please click on the link to access EM: Perception versus Reality report. 2  Commercial banks’ reserves at central banks do not constitute and are not a part of narrow or broad money supply. 3  The calculation is based on the annual reports of four large Indian private banks: HDFC Bank, ICICI Bank, Kotak Mahindra Bank, and Axis Bank. 4   This is the Emerging Markets Strategy team’s view and it differs for BCA’s house view on oil. Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Highlights We continue to have a positive view on global equities over the next 12 months, but see heightened risks of a near-term correction. Despite dwindling spare capacity, government bond yields are still lower today than they were shortly after the financial crisis. Many investors argue that bond yields cannot rise much because asset values would plunge if yields rose sharply, while debt burdens would quickly become unsustainable. We disagree. We think there is greater scope for yields to rise than is widely believed. Investors should maintain below-benchmark duration in fixed-income portfolios, favoring inflation-linked over nominal bonds and positioning for steeper yield curves. Gold should also do well next year. As long as bond yields are rising in response to stronger growth, as will be the case for the next two years, equities will fare well. The stock market will buckle, however, once stagflation sets in around 2022. Stocks Need To Work Off Overbought Conditions Before Moving Higher Again In last week’s report, entitled “Time For A Breather,” we downgraded our tactical three-month view on global equities from overweight to neutral on the grounds that stocks had run up too hard, too fast. Net long positions in equity futures among asset managers and levered funds are now at levels that have historically preceded corrections (Chart 1). Chart 1Stocks Are At A Heightened Risk Of A Correction Chart 2Breadth Is Quite Narrow   Chart 3The Equity Risk Premium Is Fairly High, Especially Outside The US The rally has been lopsided, characterized by very narrow breadth. The top five stocks in the S&P 500 (Apple, Microsoft, Alphabet, Amazon, and Facebook) now comprise 18% of market cap, a higher share than in the late 1999/early 2000s (Chart 2). As my colleague, Anastasios Avgeriou, has pointed out, Apple’s $30 billion one day market cap gain on January 9th was greater than the market cap of the median stock in the S&P 500 index. Despite our near-term concerns, we continue to maintain a positive 12-month view on global equities. Easier financial conditions, a turn in the global inventory cycle, modestly looser fiscal policy in the UK and euro area, and re-upped fiscal/credit stimulus in China should all support global growth this year. Faster growth, in turn, will lift corporate earnings. The equity risk premium also remains quite high, particularly outside the US (Chart 3). A Fragile Trade Truce A de-escalation in the trade war should provide a further tailwind to equities. The “phase one” agreement signed on Wednesday features a commitment by China to purchase an additional $200 billion in US goods and services over the next two years relative to 2017 levels. In return, the US will halve tariffs, to 7.5%, on the $120 billion tranche in Chinese imports and suspend any further tariff hikes. No firm schedule exists to begin “phase two” talks, and at this point, it is quite likely that no negotiations will take place until after the US presidential election. Nevertheless, the tail risk of an out-of-control trade war has receded for the time being, which is positive for stocks. Better Chinese Trade Data Adding to growing optimism over the global economy and diminished trade tensions, Chinese trade data surprised on the upside this week. Exports rose 7.6% in December, well above the consensus estimate of 2.9%. Imports surged 16.3%, easily surpassing the consensus estimate of 9.6%. While base effects explain some of the improvement, the overall tone of the trade data is consistent with the strengthening Chinese PMIs and improvement in industrial production and retail sales (Chart 4). Chart 4Chinese Trade Data Is Improving Chart 5Better News Out Of China Has Propelled The Yuan Higher Versus The US Dollar Better news out of China has pushed the yuan to the strongest level against the US dollar since last summer (Chart 5). The Chinese currency is the most important driver of other EM currencies. If the yuan continues to strengthen, as we expect, EM assets – particularly EM stocks and local-currency bonds – should do well this year. How High Can Bond Yields (Realistically) Go? Despite rising over the past few months, global government bond yields are lower today than they were shortly after the financial crisis ended (Chart 6). The decline in yields has occurred alongside dwindling spare capacity. In most countries, the unemployment rate today is below 2007/08 lows (Chart 7). Many investors argue that bond yields cannot rise much from current levels because asset values would plunge if yields rose sharply, while debt burdens would quickly become unsustainable. If such an unfortunate turn of events were to occur, central bankers would have to shelve any tightening plans, just as Jay Powell had to do in late 2018. Chart 6Bond Yields Are Lower Today Than They Were After The Great Recession Chart 7Unemployment Rates Are Below Their Pre-Recession Lows In Most Economies Convexity Fears One argument often heard these days is that asset prices have become hypersensitive to changes in interest rates. There is some basis for thinking this. As Box 1 explains, the relationship between asset returns and interest rates tends to be “convex,” meaning that any given change in interest rates will have a bigger effect on returns if rates are low to begin with, as they are today. The effect is particularly pronounced for long duration assets such as long-term bonds, equities, or real estate. Nevertheless, while the theoretical presence of convexity in asset returns is crystal clear, many commentators overstate its practical importance. As Chart 8 shows, the average maturity of government debt stands at seven years. At that level of maturity, the effects of convexity tend to be quite small.1   Chart 8Average Debt Maturity Is Below 10 Years In Most Countries Granted, the overall stock of debt has increased in relation to GDP. However, much of that additional debt has been absorbed by central banks, reducing the amount of government debt available for the private sector. What about equities? The ratio of stock market capitalization-to-GDP has risen to 59%, up from a low of 24% in 2009, and close to its 2000 highs (Chart 9). Does that mean that stocks will sink if yields rise from current levels? Not necessarily. Remember that the discount rate is not the only thing that affects the present value of a stream of income. The expected growth rate of that income also matters. In fact, in the standard dividend discount model, it is simply the difference between the discount rate and the growth rate of dividends that determines how much a stock is worth. If higher bond yields coincide with rising growth expectations, stock prices do not need to fall at all. Chart 9Equity Market Cap Is Approaching Previous Highs Chart 10 shows that the monthly correlation between equity returns and bond yields remains as high as ever. This suggests that favorable economic news, to the extent that it leads investors to revise up the expected growth rate for earnings, usually more than compensates for a rising discount rate (Chart 11). Chart 10Correlation Between Equity Returns And Bond Yields Remains High Chart 11Earnings Estimates Tend To Move In Sync With Swings In Bond Yields So why are so many investors worried that higher bond yields will undercut stocks? The answer has less to do with convexity and more to do with the fear that bond yields will reach a level that chokes off growth. The combination of a rising discount rate and a falling growth rate would be toxic for equities and other risk assets. Debt Worries Likewise, it is not so much that corporate bond investors are worried that rising yields will cause interest payments to swell. After all, interest costs are still quite low as a share of cash flows for most firms (Chart 12). Rather, the fear is that higher yields will imperil growth, causing those cash flows to evaporate. Government debt is also much less of a problem than often assumed, at least in countries that issue bonds in their own currencies. The standard rule for debt sustainability says that the debt-to-GDP ratio will always converge to a stable level if the interest rate is below the growth rate of the economy.2 This is easily the case in almost all economies today (Chart 13). Chart 12US Corporate Sector: Interest Payments Are Not A Worry Chart 13Bond Yield Minus GDP Growth: Please Mind The Gap The only places where central banks are severely constrained in raising rates are in economies such as Canada, Sweden, and Australia where debt-financed housing bubbles have formed (Chart 14). However, even in these countries, the quality of mortgage underwriting has generally been strong, implying that a banking crisis would likely be avoided. Chart 14Canada, Sweden, And Australia Stand Out As Having Very Frothy Housing Markets It’s Really About The Neutral Rate The discussion above suggests that the main constraint to higher bond yields is the economy itself. If bond yields rise enough, the interest rate-sensitive sectors of the economy will weaken, and a recession will ensue. As long as bond yields are rising in response to stronger growth, as will be the case for the next two years, equities will be fine. Unfortunately, no one knows where the neutral rate – the interest rate demarcating the boundary between expansionary and contractionary monetary policy – really lies. Chart 15Rising Labor Share Of Income Occurring Alongside Labor Market Tightening Slower trend growth has probably reduced the neutral rate, as has the shift to a more “capital-lite” economy. On the flipside, other forces have probably raised the neutral rate over the past few years. A tighter labor market has increased workers’ share of national income (Chart 15). Since workers spend more of every dollar of income than companies, this has raised aggregate demand. Fiscal policy has also been loosened, while elevated asset prices have likely incentivized some spending that would otherwise not have taken place. Even though we do not know the exact value of the neutral rate, we do know that the unemployment rate has been falling in most countries for the past 10 years, a period during which bond yields were generally higher than today. This suggests that monetary policy remains in expansionary territory. True, global growth did slow in 2018, just as the Fed was raising rates. However, this probably had more to do with the natural ebb and flow of the global manufacturing cycle, exacerbated by the Chinese deleveraging campaign and the brewing trade war. If global growth recovers this year, as we expect, estimates of the neutral rate will rise. This will allow equity prices to increase even in an environment of modestly higher bond yields. Inflation Is Coming… Eventually While stronger economic growth will lift bond yields this year, the big move in yields will only come when inflation breaks out. Core inflation tends to track unit labor costs (Chart 16). Unit labor cost inflation has remained range-bound for most of the recovery in the United States, which explains the failure of inflation to take flight. Unit labor cost inflation has been even more moribund elsewhere. Chart 16Core Inflation Tends To Track Unit Labor Costs Chart 17Correlation Between Labor Market Slack And Wage Growth Remains Intact   Looking out, barring a major surge in productivity, rising wage growth should lead to accelerating unit labor cost inflation, first in the US and then in the rest of the world, which will translate into higher price inflation. We doubt that such a price-wage spiral will erupt this year. If anything, US wage growth has leveled off recently, with the year-over-year change in average hourly earnings falling back below the 3% mark. Nevertheless, the long-term correlation between labor market slack and wage growth remains intact (Chart 17). As wage growth reaccelerates, unit labor cost inflation will drift higher, setting the stage for a period of rising price inflation. Investors should maintain below-benchmark duration in global fixed-income portfolios, favoring inflation-linked over nominal bonds and positioning for steeper yield curves. Gold should also do well next year. As long as bond yields are rising in response to stronger growth, as will be the case for the next two years, equities will be fine. The stock market will buckle, however, once stagflation sets in around 2022. Box 1 Asset Prices And Interest Rates: The Role Of Convexity Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1Assuming semi-annual compounding, the price of a 10-year bond with a 5% coupon rate falls by 7.9% if the yield increases from 1% to 2%, which is only slightly higher than the 7.6% decline that would be incurred if the yield increases from 4% to 5%. 2One might add that if the interest rate is below the growth rate of the economy, a higher starting point for the debt stock will allow for more debt issuance without leading to a higher debt-to-GDP ratio. As we have shown before, the steady-state debt-to-GDP ratio can be expressed as  p/(r-g), where r is the interest rate, g is trend GDP growth, and p is the primary (i.e., non-interest) budget balance. Thus, for example, if the government wanted to achieve a stable debt-to-GDP ratio of 50% and r-g is -2%, it would need to run a primary budget deficit of 0.5*0.02=1% of GDP. However, if the government targeted a stable debt-to-GDP ratio of 200%, it could run a primary budget deficit of 2*0.02=4% of GDP.   Global Investment Strategy View Matrix MacroQuant Model And Current Subjective Scores Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights We expect both the Australian dollar and Chinese RMB to move higher in the coming months. A key catalyst is broad-based weakness in the US dollar. The composition of goods benefiting from the US-China Phase I deal are a small portion of Australia’s export basket, limiting substitution. Remain long AUD/NZD and AUD/CAD. Place a limit buy on AUD/USD at 0.68. Feature The three key obstacles that have been hijacking currency markets are finally being addressed. First, the lack of dollar liquidity that was creating a funding crisis in repo markets has been curtailed via significant expansion of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet. The Libor-OIS spread - a measure of banking stress - is rapidly narrowing (Chart I-1). Second, the US-China trade deal has cemented a cap on economic policy uncertainty for now. At minimum, this should allow for an increase in cross-border flows, which tends to be positive for growth. As a counter-cyclical currency, the US dollar will continue to depreciate as global growth improves. The third obstacle giving way is political risk. The biggest uncertainty for the dollar was the surge in far-left populist candidates, especially Elizabeth Warren. The result would be a highly polarized election campaign, heightening uncertainty. The near-term reaction would be a surge in safe-haven demand, even though far-left policies could significantly knock down expected returns on US assets, which would be negative for the dollar. Chart I-1An Improvement In Dollar Liquidity Chart I-2The Dollar And Election Outcomes Chart I-2 shows that the ebb and flow in the dollar in recent months has eerily matched the probability of a Donald Trump–Elizabeth Warren contest. With a centrist like former Vice President Joe Biden now likely the next democratic nominee, the likelihood of a knee-jerk rally in the dollar has subsided. Unless these risks flare up again, this suggests that for the next few months, US dollar long positions face asymmetric downside risk. This creates a growing number of trading opportunities on the short side. Australian Growth And The Fires One of the FX market’s current favorite short positions is the Australian dollar (Chart I-3). Granted, most incoming data over the past year have been negative for the Aussie dollar, and typical global reflation indicators are just beginning to show tentative signs of a bottom. Among our favorite indicators on whether or not easing liquidity conditions are fuelling higher global growth are the copper-to-gold and oil-to-gold ratios. The signal is usually strongest when they are moving in tandem with US bond yields, another global growth barometer. The message so far has been one of stabilization rather than a renewed reflation cycle (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Lots Of AUD Shorts Chart I-4Reflation Barometers The devastating fires that are sweeping through Australia are the worst in decades. As we go to press, the death toll has risen to at least 25, and the cumulative damage is expected to exceed A$4.4 billion.1 Given that we are still in the middle of the summer months, both are likely to keep ramping up. Tourist arrivals are already down significantly, and both business and consumer confidence are approaching fresh lows. This augurs a swift and powerful policy response. Tourist arrivals are already down significantly, and both business and consumer confidence are approaching fresh lows. This augurs a swift and powerful policy response. So far, at A$2 billion, the fiscal pledge will do little to alter Australia’s economic fortunes (Chart I-5). But given the scale of this season’s fires, the effects are rapidly spilling over into urban populated areas and tourist hot spots compared to the past. This suggests more fiscal stimulus will be forthcoming.  Chart I-5The Fiscal Impulse Is Minuscule Naturally, the odds of the Reserve Bank of Australia cutting rates at its next policy meeting are rapidly rising. The RBA views the risks from climate change through the lens of financial stability.2 With insurance companies slated to rack up significant losses, along with the immediate impact of slower economic growth, lower rates will likely be the policy of choice. The probability of a rate cut next month is currently being priced at 55%. That said, we would still be buyers of the AUD today despite an impending rate cut. Bottom Line: The latest fires have hit the Australian economy at a time when growth is weak. We expect the RBA to cut rates. How To Trade The Aussie For most small, open economies, external conditions tend to be more important for asset prices than what is happening domestically. In the case of the Australian dollar, the commodity cycle has been the most important driver (Chart I-6). Similarly, the most important catalyst for multiple expansion in Australian equities is Chinese credit demand. This makes sense, since over 35% of Australian exports go to China (Chart I-7), generating tremendous income for domestically-listed concerns. Chart I-6AUD Tracks Commodities Chart I-7Australian Equities And Chinese Credit Australian exports have remained resilient in recent weeks, and are unlikely to be affected much by the Phase I trade deal. This is because the composition of goods that have been spared additional tariffs or seen much-reduced export duties are mostly consumer goods that make up a small portion of Australia’s export basket. This means that the path of least resistance for Aussie assets will continue to be dictated by Chinese reflationary efforts. On that front, we have seen a number of green shoots, notably the rise in the manufacturing PMI, retail sales, imports and exports. Last night’s credit numbers were also robust. Meanwhile, interest rates in China continue to be lowered. For most small, open economies, external conditions tend to be more important for asset prices.In the case of the Australian dollar, the commodity cycle has been the most important driver. Our favorite indicator for Chinese domestic demand is the lag between the drop in bond yields (more and more credit is being intermediated through the bond market) and the pick-up in import demand. This suggests a very healthy recovery in Chinese consumption (Chart I-8). Chart I-8Chinese Imports And Bond Yields How to trade the Aussie will depend on time horizons. In the near-term, improving global growth will likely be accompanied by a weakening dollar. This means the most potent trade in the short term will be long AUD/USD. Given our bias that we will get a dovish surprise from the RBA next month, we are instituting a limit-buy on AUD/USD at 68 cents today. Over the longer term, we believe the Australian dollar will outperform its commodity-currency counterparts. In our portfolio, we are already both long AUD/CAD and AUD/NZD. This bullish view is predicated on three key developments: Commodity Prices: One bright spot for the Aussie dollar has been rising terms of trade. However, the media often focuses on rising steel and iron ore prices as a catalyst for rising terms of trade in Australia. While true, often overlooked is the rising share of liquefied natural gas in the export mix (Chart I-9). Beijing has a clear environmental push to shift its economy away from coal electricity generation and towards natural gas. Given that reducing if not outright eliminating pollution is a long-term strategic goal in China, this will be a multi-year tailwind. As the market becomes more liberalized and long-term contracts are revised to reflect higher spot prices, the Aussie dollar will get a boost (Chart I-10). In a nutshell, this is a bet that terms of trade in Australia will continue to outpace those in Canada and New Zealand over the medium-term. Chart I-9LNG Will Be A Game-Changer For Australia Chart I-10A Terms-Of-Trade Tailwind Construction Activity: All things equal, natural disasters tend to be ultimately positive for GDP, since the destruction in the capital stock does not go into the GDP equation, but reconstruction efforts do. This is especially the case when the economy is running well below capacity. The downturn in Australian housing on the back of macro-prudential measures has been negative for consumption via the wealth effect and the outlook for residential construction activity. At a minimum, this downturn should stabilize as reconstruction efforts pick up (Chart I-11). Meanwhile, policy has become supportive for Aussie homebuyers at the margin. The government now guarantees first-time homebuyers in Australia below a certain income threshold access to the housing market, with just a 5% down payment instead of the standard 20%. Should labor market conditions improve, it will also help household income levels. Already, the Liberal-National coalition has left in place “negative gearing”3 and kept the capital gains tax exemption from selling properties at 50% (the pledge from the center-left Labour party was to reduce it to 25%). Aussie home prices are further along their downward adjustment path than, say, Canada or New Zealand.  Most importantly, Aussie home prices are further along their downward adjustment path than, say, Canada or New Zealand. The mirror image has been that Aussie banks have massively underperformed those in Canada (Chart I-12). Over the medium term, we could see a reversal of these fortunes. Chart I-11Capex Should Rise In Australia Chart I-12Aussie Banks Versus Canadian Banks Valuation And Sentiment: We will show in an upcoming report that while currency valuation is a poor timing tool, it is excellent for calibrating longer-term returns. One of our favorite metrics for gauging the Australian dollar’s fair value is its real effective exchange rate relative to its terms of trade. On this basis, the Aussie dollar is cheap by about 18% (Chart I-13). In terms of currency performance, a lot of the bad news already appears priced in the Australian dollar, which is down 15% from its 2018 peak, and 37% from its 2011 peak. Meanwhile, Australian dollar short positions appeared to have already hit a nadir. This suggests outright short AUD bets are at risk from either upside surprises in global growth or simply the forces of mean reversion (Chart I-14). Chart I-13AUD Is Cheap Chart I-14Still Lots Of AUD Shorts Bottom Line: Place a limit buy on AUD/USD at 0.68. Remain long AUD/NZD and AUD/CAD. Notes On The RMB The currency details from the Phase I trade deal were vague, suggesting monitoring export balances and FX reserves, data that is already available publicly. Our guess is that there was some kind of handshake accord agreed upon to ensure that the RMB does not depreciate significantly in the coming months. More importantly, the RMB will also be a beneficiary from increased cross-border trade, given that it has been trading like a pro-cyclical currency. The USD/CNY has been moving tick-for-tick with emerging market equities, Asian currencies, and even some commodity prices (Chart I-15). It has also closely mirrored the broad trade-weighted dollar (Chart I-16).  Chart I-15CNY And EM Assets Chart I-16CNY And The Dollar This has implications for developed market currencies, since the RMB is often a signaling mechanism on the efficacy of China’s reflationary efforts. Fundamentally, the RMB has more upside. In a world of rapidly falling yields, Chinese rates remain attractive. Historically, the USD/CNY has moved in line with interest rate differentials between the US and China. The current divergence pins the USD/CNY near 6.7 (Chart I-17). Chart I-17USD/CNY Could Touch 6.7 Bottom Line: Remain positive on the RMB.  Housekeeping The Canadian dollar is one of the strongest currencies this year. The most recent catalyst was good news from the Bank of Canada’s business outlook survey, a key input into policy decisions. Canadian firms are now expecting an acceleration in both domestic and international sales throughout 2020, particularly outside the energy sector (Chart I-18, top panel). Chart I-18BoC Business Outlook Survey Hiring intentions among surveyed firms edged up in Q4. Meanwhile, many firms reported facing capacity pressures, particularly related to a shortage of labor (Chart I-18, middle panel). This will allow the BoC to overlook weak labor market data in October and November. That said, it is not all clear blue skies for the CAD. The balance of opinion for capex intentions among surveyed Canadian firms plunged in Q4 (Chart I-18, bottom panel). We will be monitoring these developments but remain short CAD/NOK and long AUD/CAD for the time being.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Keith Bradsher and Isabella Kwai, “Australia’s Fires Test Its Winning Growth Formula,” The New York Times, January 13, 2020. 2 Please see “Financial Stability Risks From Climate Change,” Financial Stability Review, Reserve Bank Of Australia, October 2019. 3 The practice of using investment properties that are generating losses to offset one’s income tax bill. Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the US have been mixed: On the labor market front, nonfarm payrolls increased by 145K in December, the smallest increase since May. Average hourly earnings growth slowed to 2.9%, while the unemployment rate was unchanged at 3.5%. Lastly, initial jobless claims fell to 204K for the week ended January 10th. The NFIB business optimism index declined to 102.7 from 104.7 in December. Headline inflation increased to 2.3% year-on-year in December, while core inflation was unchanged at 2.3%. Both the NY Empire State and Philly Fed manufacturing indices rose to 4.8 and 17, respectively in January. The DXY index fell by 0.3% this week. While both headline and core inflation remain close to target, the bearish job report last Friday is likely to reduce the scope for the Fed to raise rates in the near term. Report Links: On Oil, Growth And The Dollar - January 10, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area have been mixed: The seasonally-adjusted trade balance fell by €4.8 billion to €19.2 billion in November. Industrial production fell by 1.5% year-on-year in November. German GDP grew by 0.6% year-on-year in 2019, down from 1.5% the previous year. Car registrations rose by a remarkable 21.7% in December. The euro rose by 0.3% against the US dollar this week. "Incoming data since the last monetary policy meeting pointed to continued weak but stabilizing euro area growth dynamics," according to the ECB Meeting Accounts this Thursday. Moreover, both private and government consumption accelerated in 2019, while capex and exports slowed down. A pickup in global growth will be bullish the euro. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver - October 11, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan have been mixed: Both the coincident and leading indices fell to 95.1 and 90.9, respectively in November. That said, they were above expectations. The current account balance fell to ¥1,437 billion from ¥1,817 billion in November. The trade balance shifted from a surplus of ¥254 billion to a small deficit of ¥2.5 billion. The Eco Watchers' Survey recorded an improvement of current conditions to 39.8 in December, while the outlook index marginally dropped to 45.7. Preliminary machine tool orders continued to plunge by 33.6% year-on-year in December. However, machinery orders increased by 5.3% year-on-year in November. The Japanese yen depreciated by 0.4% against the US dollar this week. The recent Eco Watchers' Survey was cautiously positive on the Japanese outlook. We continue to recommend the Japanese yen as a safe-haven hedge. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Signposts For A Reversal In The Dollar Bull Market - November 1, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the UK have been weak: Core CPI fell to 1.4% while core PPI declined to 0.9%. The total trade balance (including EU) rose from a deficit of £1.3 billion to a surplus of £4 billion in November. Industrial production fell by 1.6% year-on-year in November; manufacturing production also fell by 2% year-on-year in November. The notable improvement was in car registrations that rose 3.4% year-on-year in December. The British pound fell by 0.2% against the US dollar this week. The recent drop in inflation has undoubtedly put more pressure on the BoE to reduce rates in the coming policy meeting late January. The market is now pricing in a 66% probability for a rate cut, up from 40% a week ago, while a 25 bps cut is fully priced in by May.  Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? - Sept. 20, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia have been mostly negative: The AiG services PMI fell to 48.7 from 53.7 in December. Retail sales increased by 0.9% month-on-month in November. Melbourne Institute headline inflation fell to 1.4% from 1.5% year-on-year in December. Home loans increased by 1.8% month-on-month in November, higher than expectations of a 1.4% increase. The Australian dollar is flat this week. The ongoing wildfires continue to impact the Australian economy, particularly the tourism industry. Please refer to our front section for a more in-depth analysis on Australia. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns - April 19, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand have been soft: Building permits fell by 8.5% month-on-month in November. REINZ house prices grew by 1.2% month-on-month in December. The New Zealand dollar has been flat versus the US dollar this week. The recent quarterly survey from the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research (NZIER) showed that a net 21% of firms surveyed expected business conditions to deteriorate, an improvement from 40% in the previous survey. Improving data has led speculators to close NZD shorts. Stay long AUD/NZD. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 USD/CNY And Market Turbulence - August 9, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada have been positive: The unemployment rate fell further to 5.6% from 5.9% in December. Average hourly wage growth slowed to 3.8% from 4.4% year-on-year in December. 35.2K new jobs were created compared to a loss of 71.2K jobs the previous month. The Canadian dollar increased by 0.1% against the US dollar this week. The recent BoC Business Outlook Survey indicator edged up in Q4, lowering the probability that the BoC will cut interest rates next week. That said, the forecast for weak investment spending is worrisome. Report Links: The Loonie: Upside Versus The Dollar, But Downside At The Crosses Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Making Money With Petrocurrencies - November 8, 2019 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 There was scant data out of Switzerland this week: The unemployment rate was unchanged at 2.3% in December. The Swiss franc has appreciated by 1% against the US dollar, making it the best performing G10 currency this week. It is an open question whether the US Treasury’s move to put the Swiss franc on the currency manipulation watch list was a catalyst.  What is clear is that interventions in recent weeks have been weak. Meanwhile, the last inflation reading from Switzerland was positive, reducing the urge for the SNB to intervene. EUR/CHF is approaching our limit buy position at 1.06. Stay tuned. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Notes On The SNB - October 4, 2019 What To Do About The Swiss Franc? - May 17, 2019 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway have been mixed: The producer price index fell by 2.2% year-on-year in November. Both headline and core inflation fell to 1.4% and 1.8% year-on-year, respectively in December. The trade surplus increased to NOK 25.6 billion from NOK 18.8 billion in December. The Norwegian krone has been flat against the US dollar this week. Both inventory reports from API and EIA have been bearish on oil prices, which put a cap on petrocurrencies this week. However, going forward, we continue to believe that the combination of expansionary monetary and fiscal policy will support commodity demand growth in 2020, which is bullish for the Norwegian krone. Report Links: On Oil, Growth And The Dollar - January 10, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Making Money With Petrocurrencies - November 8, 2019 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden have been mixed: Industrial production increased by 0.4% year-on-year in November. Manufacturing new orders fell by 1.2% year-on-year in November. Headline inflation was unchanged at 1.8% year-on-year in December. The Swedish krona rose by 0.2% against the US dollar this week. The Swedish government cut the forecast of GDP growth to 1.1% this year, down from the previous figure of 1.4% in September. Moreover, it forecasted negative rates going forward. That said, valuations and improving global growth will remain strong catalysts for long SEK positions. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades

Highlights The euro area bond yield 6-month impulse recently hit 100 bps, constituting the strongest headwind to growth for three years. Nine times out of ten, the strong headwind to nominal growth pushes the bond yield to a lower level six months later. Downgrade banks and materials to underweight. Downgrade the Eurostoxx 50 to underweight versus the S&P 500 and the Nikkei 225. Upgrade Switzerland to overweight, and upgrade Denmark to neutral. Downgrade Sweden to neutral, and downgrade Spain and Austria to underweight. Fractal trade: short NZD/JPY. Feature Chart of the WeekIf You Get The Bond Yield Right, You'll Get Banks Right Too The analysis in this report differs from the BCA house view which is overweight European versus US equities and expects modestly higher bond yields in the next six months. The euro area 10-year bond yield stands at a miserly 50 bps, though admittedly this does mark a 60 bps increase from its record low of -10 bps last August (Chart I-2).1 However, if you look only at the level or the change in the bond yield you will miss the bigger story. As we explained in Four Impulses, Three Mistakes, the bond yield’s impact on growth accelerations and decelerations comes neither from its level nor from its change – instead, the impact comes from the change in its change, the bond yield impulse.2 Chart I-2The Recent Rise In Bond Yields Followed A Sharp Decline In The Preceding Six Months The Strongest Headwind Impulse For Three Years The euro area bond yield 6-month impulse recently hit 100 bps, its highest mark, and therefore its strongest headwind to growth, for three years. The impulse hit such a high mark because the recent rise in yields followed a sharp decline in yields in the preceding six months. The euro area bond yield 6-month impulse recently hit 100 bps, its highest mark, and therefore its strongest headwind to growth, for three years.  Since the turn of the century, the euro area bond yield 6-month impulse has reached the 100 bps strong headwind mark ten times. Nine times out of the ten, the strong headwind to nominal growth pushed the yield to a lower level six months later. That’s the bigger story. The one exception was in 2006 at the frothy end of the credit bubble which bears no resemblance to today. In any case, nine times out of ten are odds that we wouldn’t want to bet against right now (Chart I-3). Chart I-3Nine Times Out Of Ten, A Strong Headwind Bond Yield Impulse Pushes Yields To A Lower Level Six Months Later Suffice to say, in the vast majority of these cases the lower bond yield also hurt bond yield proxies in the equity market such as banks and materials. The Bond Yield Drives Sector Strategy Investment is complex but it is not complicated. The words complex and complicated are often used interchangeably but they mean different things. Complex means something that is not fully predictable or analysable, whereas complicated means something that is made up of many parts. A car’s movement in traffic is complex, but it is not complicated. A car engine is complicated, but it is not complex. Unlike a car engine, investment is not complicated. This is because investment has just a few key parts that drive everything, albeit these parts are themselves highly complex. The objective of investment is to identify the few key parts that drive everything and to conquer their complexity. One key part is the bond yield. The Chart of the Week and Chart I-4 should leave you in no doubt that if you get the bond yield right, you will also get the relative performance of banks right, whether you are in Europe, Japan, or, for that matter, anywhere. Chart I-4If You Get The Bond Yield Right, You'll Get Banks Right Too The connection between the bond yield and bank performance is twofold. First, to the extent that a higher bond yield reflects higher nominal economic growth, it also likely reflects higher growth in bank credit, which effectively constitutes bank ‘sales’. Second, a higher bond yield also typically signifies a steeper yield curve, which lifts bank net interest (profit) margins. And vice versa for a lower bond yield. Investment is complex but it is not complicated. Likewise, Chart I-5 should also leave you in no doubt that if you get the bond yield right you will also get commodity prices right. Again, this is not surprising. The higher nominal economic growth reflected in a higher bond yield could come from stronger real demand or from higher inflation, either of which would be bullish for commodity prices. And vice versa for a lower bond yield. Albeit the causality can sometimes go the other way, from a commodity price shock via inflation to the bond yield. Chart I-5If You Get The Bond Yield Right, You'll Get Commodity Prices Right Too However, the bond yield’s movement itself is highly complex because it is subject to numerous feedback loops. One feedback loop is that the valuation of equities and other risk-assets depends inversely and exponentially on the bond yield level. A higher yield will ultimately undermine equity and other risk-asset prices and thereby unleash a deflationary impulse, and vice versa. A separate feedback loop comes via the direct impact on economic accelerations and decelerations which, as we have just seen, depends on the bond yield impulse – which is to say, its second derivative. Mathematicians will immediately recognise this setup as a second order differential equation with delayed negative feedback. They will tell you that it describes a complex adaptive system (CAS) which you cannot predict or analyse with any certainty. The best you can do is understand the probabilities that the system goes in one direction or the other. Based on the euro area bond yield impulse at a strong headwind mark, and the previous ten outcomes from this setup, there is a high probability that the post-August burst of outperformance from banks and materials is now over. Accordingly, we are now downgrading both banks and materials to underweight. Sector Strategy Drives Regional And Country Strategy To repeat, investment is highly complex but it is not highly complicated. If you get the bond yield right you will get your equity sector strategy right. And if you get your equity sector strategy right you will automatically get your regional and country allocation right too. This is because each major stock market has a distinguishing ‘long’ sector in which it contains up to a quarter of its total market capitalisation, as well as a distinguishing ‘short’ sector in which it has a significant under-representation. The combination of this long sector and short sector gives each equity index its distinguishing fingerprint which drives relative performance (Table I-1): Table 1The Sector Fingerprints Of Major Regional Stock Markets FTSE 100 = long energy, short technology. Eurostoxx 50 = long banks, short technology. Nikkei 225 = long industrials, short banks and energy. S&P 500 = long technology, short materials. MSCI Emerging Markets = long technology, short healthcare. Specifically, the Eurostoxx 50 has an 11 percent overrepresentation to banks and materials versus both the S&P 500 and the Nikkei 225. Against the S&P 500 it is at the expense of technology and against the Nikkei 225 it is at the expense of industrials. It follows that if banks and materials underperform technology and industrials, the Eurostoxx 50 must underperform the S&P 500 and the Nikkei 225. Chart I-6 and Chart I-7 should convince you that there are no ifs, buts, or maybes. Chart I-6Euro Stoxx 50 Vs. S&P 500 = Global Banks In Euros Vs. Global Technology In Dollars Chart I-7Euro Stoxx 50 Vs. Nikkei 225 = Global Banks In Euros Vs. Global Industrials In Dollars Accordingly we are now downgrading the Eurostoxx 50 to underweight versus the S&P 500 and the Nikkei 225. Exactly the same principle applies to the stock markets within Europe. Relative performance comes from nothing more than the stock market’s long and short sector fingerprint combined with sector performance (Table I-2 and Table I-3). Table I-2The Sector Fingerprints Of Euro Area Stock Markets Table I-3The Sector Fingerprints Of Non Euro Area European Stock Markets Based on the expected underperformance of banks and materials, we are now upgrading Switzerland to overweight, and upgrading Denmark to neutral. Also, we are downgrading Sweden to neutral, and downgrading Spain and Austria to underweight (Chart I-8). Chart I-8Spain = Long Banks Fractal Trading System* This week's recommended trade is short NZD/JPY. Set the profit target at 2.3 percent with a symmetrical stop-loss. The rolling 1-year win ratio now stands at 61 percent. Chart I-9NZD/JPY When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com.   Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 This is the weighted average of 10-year government bond yields in the euro area, weighted by the stock of government issued debt. 2 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report “Four Impulses, Three Mistakes” October 31, 2019 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 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