Asset Allocation

Highlights Q2/2019 Performance Breakdown: Our recommended model bond portfolio underperformed the custom benchmark index by -19bps in the second quarter of the year. Winners & Losers: Our below-benchmark overall duration stance expressed through country underweights in the U.S. (-25bps) and Italy (-10bps) hurt Q2 returns. This dwarfed the gains from U.S. corporate bond overweights (+14bps) and selective sovereign bond overweights in Germany, Australia and the U.K. Scenario Analysis For Next Six Months: We are adding credit exposure to our model portfolio, increasing spread product allocations in U.S. high-yield and European corporates. In our Base Case scenario, the Fed is likely to deliver some “insurance” rate cuts in the next few months, but by less than the markets are currently discounting, while global growth momentum will stabilize. The resulting price action will favor relative returns from spread product versus government debt. Feature The first half of 2019 produced a surprising result across the global fixed income universe – practically everything delivered a positive total return. From U.S. Treasuries to Italian BTPs to U.S. investment grade industrial corporates to emerging market hard currency sovereigns, all the year-to-date returns are colored green on your Bloomberg screen. Those returns have occurred despite all the uncertainties that investors have had to navigate during the past three months, from shock Trump tariff tweets to persistent weakness in global manufacturing data to swift dovish turns by global central bankers (rate cuts in Australia and New Zealand, the Fed hinting at easing and the ECB signaling a potential restart of asset purchases). In this report, we review the performance of the BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy (GFIS) model bond portfolio during the eventful second quarter of 2019. We also present our updated scenario analysis, and total return projections, for the portfolio over the next six months. As a reminder to existing readers (and to new clients), the model portfolio is a part of our service that complements the usual macro analysis of global fixed income markets. The portfolio is how we communicate our opinion on the relative attractiveness between government bond and spread product sectors. This is done by applying actual percentage weightings to each of our recommendations within a fully invested hypothetical bond portfolio. Q2/2019 Model Portfolio Performance Breakdown: Credit Overweights Help Limit Damage From Below-Benchmark Duration Chart of the WeekBelow-Benchmark Duration Overwhelms Credit Overweights In Q2/19 Duration Losses Offset Credit Gains In Q1/2019 Duration Losses Offset Credit Gains In Q1/2019 The total return for the GFIS model portfolio (hedged into U.S. dollars) in the second quarter was 2.8%, underperforming the custom benchmark index by -19bps (Chart of the Week).1 The bulk of the underperformance came from the government bond side of the portfolio (-33bps) - a function of our below-benchmark duration tilt and underweight stance on sovereign bonds, both occurring against a backdrop of rapidly falling bond yields (Table 1). Partially offsetting that was the outperformance from our recommended overweights in U.S. corporate debt, which helped the spread product side of our model portfolio outperform the benchmark by +14bps. Table 1GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q2/2019 Overall Return Attribution Q2/2019 GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Performance Review: Duration Dominates Q2/2019 GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Performance Review: Duration Dominates The bar charts showing the total and relative returns for each individual government bond market and spread product sector are presented in Charts 2 and 3. Chart 2 Chart 3 The main individual sectors of the portfolio that drove the excess returns were the following: Biggest outperformers Overweight U.S. investment grade industrials (+5bps) Overweight U.S. high-yield Ba-rated (+4bps) Overweight U.S. high-yield B-rated (+4bps) Overweight U.S. investment grade financials (+2bps) Overweight German government bonds with maturity of 7-10 years (+2bps) Biggest underperformers Underweight U.S. government bonds with maturity beyond 10+ years (-10bps) Underweight Italy government bonds with maturity beyond 10+ years (-6bps) Underweight Japanese government bonds with maturity beyond 10+ years (-6bps) Underweight U.S. government bonds with maturity of 1-3 years (-5bps) Underweight U.S. government bonds with maturity of 3-8 years (-5bps) Chart 4 presents the ranked benchmark index returns of the individual countries and spread product sectors in the GFIS model bond portfolio for Q2/2019. The returns are hedged into U.S. dollars (we do not take active currency risk in this portfolio) and are adjusted to reflect duration differences between each country/sector and the overall custom benchmark index for the model portfolio. We have also color-coded the bars in each chart to reflect our recommended investment stance for each market during Q2/2019 (red for underweight, blue for overweight, gray for neutral).2 Ideally, we would look to see more blue bars on the left side of the chart where market returns are highest, and more red bars on the right side of the chart were returns are lowest. Chart 4 Our underweight tilts on European Peripheral sovereign debt were our biggest “miss” in the quarter, as Spanish and Italian yields plunged after the ECB signaled future rate cuts and a potential return to bond purchases in order to boost flailing European growth. We had been viewing Spain and Italy as growth-focused credit stories rather than yield plays, leaving us to maintain a cautious stand on both markets given worsening economic momentum (but with an imbedded “long Spain/short Italy” tilt by having a smaller relative underweight in Spain). In terms of our best “hits” in the quarter, our overweight stance on U.S. investment grade corporates and Australian government bonds performed relatively well. We also avoided a big “miss” by upgrading emerging market U.S. dollar-denominated sovereign debt to neutral from underweight on April 30.3 We also avoided a bigger hit to the portfolio through tactical adjustments made in late May, when we added back some interest rate duration to the portfolio given the increasing uncertainties from slowing global growth and rising U.S. trade policy hawkishness.4 We also reduced our U.S. corporate bond overweights at the same time, but the additional duration exposure was the more important factor – without those changes, the portfolio would have lagged the benchmark index by another -8bps in Q2. In terms of our best “hits” in the quarter, our overweight stance on U.S. investment grade corporates and Australian government bonds performed relatively well. Bottom Line: Our recommended model bond portfolio underperformed the custom benchmark index in the second quarter of the year, with the drag on performance from underweight exposure to U.S. Treasuries and Italian BTPs overwhelming the gains from credit overweights in the U.S. Future Drivers Of Portfolio Returns Looking ahead, the performance of the model bond portfolio will be driven by two main factors: our below-benchmark duration bias and our overweight stance on global corporate debt versus government bonds. In terms of the specific high-level weightings in the model portfolio, we currently have a moderate overweight, equal to three percentage points, on spread product versus government debt (Chart 5). This reflects a more constructive view on future global growth, with early leading economic indicators starting to bottom out to the benefit of growth-sensitive assets like corporate debt. Chart 5 That faster growth backdrop will also benefit our below-benchmark duration stance through a rebound in government bond yields. This should happen only slowly, however, as global central bankers are likely to keep their newly-dovish policy bias in place for some time until there are more decisive signs of accelerating growth AND inflation. Chart 6Overall Portfolio Duration: Below-Benchmark Overall Portfolio Duration: Below-Benchmark Overall Portfolio Duration: Below-Benchmark We are maintaining our below-benchmark duration tilt (0.5 years short of the custom benchmark), but we recognize that the underperformance from duration seen in the first half of 2019 will only be clawed back slowly over the next six months (Chart 6). As for country allocation, we continue to favor regions where looser monetary policy is most likely (core Europe, Australia, Japan and the U.K.). We are staying underweight the U.S., however, as the market’s expectations for the Fed are too dovish, with -82bps of rate cuts now discounted over the next twelve months. We are also keeping our underweight stance on Italian government bonds, which we now see as overvalued after the recent rally. We are maintaining our below-benchmark duration tilt (0.5 years short of the custom benchmark), but we recognize that the underperformance from duration seen in the first half of 2019 will only be clawed back slowly over the next six months We are, however, making some adjustments to the portfolio allocations to reflect our expectation of less negative news on global growth and easier monetary policies from global central bankers facing uncertainty alongside too-low inflation expectations: Increasing the overweight to U.S. high-yield corporates, boosting the allocation to Ba-rated and B-rated credit tiers by one percentage point each. This is funded by reducing our U.S. Treasury allocation by two percentage points. Upgrading euro area corporates to overweight, increasing the allocation to both investment grade and high-yield by one percentage point each. This is funded by reducing our German government bond allocation by two percentage points. Upgrading U.K. investment grade corporates to neutral, funded by reducing U.K. Gilt exposure by 0.5 percentage points. Upgrading Spanish government bonds to neutral, funded by reducing German exposure by 0.3 percentage points. These changes will boost the overall spread product allocation to 50% of the portfolio (an overweight of seven percentage points versus the benchmark index). This will also boost the overall yield of the portfolio to 3.2%, +6bps greater than that of the benchmark. That relative yield advantage looks even better in U.S. dollar terms, with currency hedging adding an additional +16bps to the relative portfolio yield given the current powerful carry advantage of the greenback (Chart 7). Chart 7Portfolio Yield: Small Positive Carry Portfolio Yield: Small Positive Carry Portfolio Yield: Small Positive Carry Chart 8Portfolio Risk Budget Usage: Cautious Portfolio Risk Budget Usage: Cautious Portfolio Risk Budget Usage: Cautious Even though we have decent-sized overall tilts on global duration and spread product allocation, our estimated tracking error (excess volatility of the portfolio versus its benchmark) remains low (Chart 8). We remain comfortable with a portfolio tracking error of 38bps, well below our self-imposed 100bps ceiling, as the internal weightings in the portfolio are helping keep overall portfolio volatility at a modest level. Scenario Analysis & Return Forecasts In April 2018, we introduced a framework for estimating total returns for all government bond markets and spread product sectors, based on common risk factors.5 Chart Chart For credit, returns are estimated as a function of changes in the U.S. dollar, the Fed funds rate, oil prices and market volatility as proxied by the VIX index (Table 2A). For government bonds, non-U.S. yield changes are estimated using historical betas to changes in U.S. Treasury yields (Table 2B). This framework allows us to conduct scenario analysis of projected returns for each asset class in the model bond portfolio by making assumptions on those individual risk factors. In Tables 3A & 3B, we present our three main scenarios for the next six months, defined by changes in the risk factors, and the expected performance of the model bond portfolio in each case. The scenarios, described below, are all driven by what we believe will be the most important driver of market returns over the rest of 2019 – the momentum of global growth and the path of U.S. monetary policy. Chart Chart Our Base Case: the Fed delivers -50bps of easing by the end of 2019, the U.S. dollar depreciates by -3%, oil prices rise by +10%, the VIX index hovers around 15, and there is a mild bear-steepening of the U.S. Treasury curve. This is a scenario where the Fed delivers a rate cut in July and one more “insurance cut” before year-end, while signaling that no other easing beyond that. The model bond portfolio is expected to beat the benchmark index by +57bps in this case. Global Growth Rebounds: the Fed stays on hold to year-end, the U.S. dollar is flat, oil prices increase +10%, the VIX index falls to 12 and there is a mild bear-flattening of the U.S. Treasury curve. This is a scenario where improving economic data outside the U.S. diminishes the fears of a U.S. recession, allowing the Fed to stand pat and keep rates unchanged as financial market volatility stays muted. The model bond portfolio is expected to outperform the benchmark by +50bps here. Global Downturn Intensifies: the Fed cuts the funds rate by -75bps by year-end, the U.S. dollar falls by -5%, oil prices decline -15%, the VIX index increases to 30 and there is a bull steepening of the U.S. Treasury curve. This is a scenario where U.S./global growth momentum continues to fade, prompting the Fed to deliver a series of curve-steepening rate cuts to try and stabilize elevated financial market volatility amid increasing recession risks. The model portfolio will severely underperform the benchmark by -41bps with this outcome. The scenario inputs for the four main risk factors (the fed funds rate, the price of oil, the U.S. dollar and the VIX index) are different than what was presented in our last model bond portfolio review in mid-April (Chart 9). Then, we were contemplating scenarios involving the Fed keeping rates stable and even potentially looking for an opportunity to deliver another rate hike by year-end. Now, given the Fed’s clear dovish shift after the downshift in global growth momentum, two of our three main scenarios involve rate cuts in the U.S. The only scenario where Treasury yields can fall further, however, is if the global economic downturn deepens – a scenario we view as more of a tail risk rather than a higher-probability possibility (Chart 10). Chart 9Risk Factors Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis Risk Factors Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis Risk Factors Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis Chart 10U.S. Treasury Yield Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis U.S. Treasury Yield Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis U.S. Treasury Yield Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis In terms of our conviction level among the main drivers of the model portfolio returns – duration allocation (across yield curves and countries) and asset allocation (credit versus government bonds) – we are most confident that credit returns will exceed those of sovereign debt over the next six months. In terms of our conviction level among the main drivers of the model portfolio returns – duration allocation (across yield curves and countries) and asset allocation (credit versus government bonds) – we are most confident that credit returns will exceed those of sovereign debt over the next six months. Bottom Line: We are adding credit exposure to our model portfolio, increasing spread product allocation in U.S. high-yield and European corporates. In our Base Case scenario, the Fed is likely to deliver some “insurance” rate cuts in the next few months, but by less than the markets are currently discounting, while global growth momentum will stabilize. The resulting price action will favor spread product over government bonds, helping boost the returns of our model portfolio.   Robert Robis, CFA, Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, CFA, Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The GFIS model bond portfolio custom benchmark index is the Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate Index, but with allocations to global high-yield corporate debt replacing very high quality spread product (i.e. AA-rated). We believe this to be more indicative of the typical internal benchmark used by global multi-sector fixed income managers. 2 Note that sectors where we made changes to our recommended weightings during Q2/2019 will have multiple colors in the respective bars in Chart 4. 3 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “It’s Time To Break Out The Fine China”, dated April 30, 2019, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “The Message From Low Bond Yields”, dated May 28, 2019, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q1/2018 Performance Review: A Rough Start”, dated April 10th 2018, available at gfis.bcareseach.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Q2/2019 GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Performance Review: Duration Dominates Q2/2019 GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Performance Review: Duration Dominates ​​​​​​​ Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Chart 1Looks Like 2016 & 1998 Looks Like 2016 & 1998 Looks Like 2016 & 1998 The Treasury market continues to price-in a recession-like outcome for the U.S. economy, embedding 83 basis points of Fed rate cuts over the next 12 months. But last week’s economic data challenge that narrative. First, the ISM Non-Manufacturing PMI held above 55 in June, even as its Manufacturing counterpart plunged toward the 50 boom/bust line (Chart 1). This divergence between a strong service sector and weak manufacturing sector is more reminiscent of prior mid-cycle slowdowns in 2016 and 1998 than of any pre-recession period. Second, nonfarm payrolls added 224k jobs in June, a strong rebound from the 72k added in May and enough to keep the 12-month growth rate at a healthy 1.5% (bottom panel). Still-low inflation expectations provide sufficient cover for the Fed to cut rates later this month, likely by 25 bps. But beyond that, continued strong economic data could prevent any further easing. Keep portfolio duration low and stay short the February 2020 fed funds futures contract. Feature Investment Grade: Overweight Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 144 basis points in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +368 bps. We removed our recommendation to hedge near-term corporate credit exposure after the Fed’s clear dovish pivot at the June FOMC meeting.1  At that time, we also noted that the surging gold price, weakening trade-weighted dollar and outperformance of global industrial mining stocks were all signaling that corporate spreads have peaked (Chart 2). Of our “peak credit spread” indicators, only the CRB Raw Industrials index has yet to turn the corner. The macro environment supports tighter spreads. But in the investment grade space, value only looks attractive for Baa-rated securities. Baa spreads remain 7 bps above our target (panel 3), while Aa and A-rated spreads are 1 bp and 4 bps below, respectively (panel 4). Aaa bonds are even more expensive, with spreads 19 bps below target (not shown).2  Investors should focus their investment grade corporate bond exposure on Baa-rated securities. Our measure of gross leverage – total debt over pre-tax profits – jumped in Q1, as corporate debt grew at an annualized pace of 8.5% while corporate profits contracted by an annualized 18% (bottom panel). Leverage will likely rise again in Q2, as profit growth will almost certainly remain weak, but should then level-off as global growth recovers. Chart Chart High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 154 basis points in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +603 bps. The average index option-adjusted spread tightened 56 bps on the month. At 366 bps, it remains well above the cycle-low of 303 bps. As with investment grade credit, we removed our recommendation to hedge near-term exposure following the June FOMC meeting (see page 3). Further, we see the potential for much more spread tightening in high-yield than in investment grade. Within investment grade, only the Baa credit tier carries a spread above our target. In High-Yield, Ba-rated spreads are 42 bps above our target (Chart 3), B-rated spreads are 108 bps above our target (panel 3) and Caa-rated spreads are 263 bps above our target (not shown).3  Junk spreads also offer reasonable value relative to expected default losses. The current Moody’s baseline forecast calls for a default rate of 2.7% over the next 12 months, not far from our own projection.4 This would translate into 224 bps of excess spread in the High-Yield index, after adjusting for default losses (panel 4). This is comfortably above zero, and only just below the historical average of 250 bps. We will continue to monitor job cut announcements, which have moderated so far this year (bottom panel), and C&I lending standards, which remain in net easing territory, to assess whether our default expectations need to be revised. MBS: Neutral Chart 4MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 2 basis points in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -11 bps. The conventional 30-year zero-volatility spread widened 1 bp on the month, as a 4 bps widening in the option-adjusted spread (OAS) was partially offset by a 3 bps decline in the compensation for prepayment risk (option cost). Falling mortgage rates hurt MBS in the first half of this year, as lower rates led to an increase in refi activity that drove MBS spreads wider (Chart 4). In fact, the conventional 30-year index OAS has risen all the way back to its average pre-crisis level (panel 3). However, as we noted in last week’s report, the nominal 30-year MBS spread remains very tight, at close to one standard deviation below its historical mean.5 The mixed valuation picture means we are not yet inclined to augment our recommended allocation to MBS, especially given the favorable environment for corporate bonds, where expected returns are higher. We are equally disinclined to downgrade MBS, given that refi activity could be close to peaking. All in all, we expect that the next move in the MBS/Treasury basis will be a tightening, as global growth improves and mortgage rates rise in the second half of the year. However, valuation is not sufficiently attractive to warrant more than a neutral allocation. Government-Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 26 basis points in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +133 bps. Sovereign debt outperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 208 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +419 bps. Local Authorities underperformed the Treasury benchmark by 6 bps, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +213 bps. Meanwhile, Foreign Agencies underperformed by 26 bps, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +103 bps. Domestic Agencies underperformed by 4 bps in June, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +25 bps. Supranationals outperformed by 1 bp on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +28 bps. Sovereign debt remains very expensive relative to equivalently rated U.S. corporate credit (Chart 5). While the sector would benefit if the Fed’s dovish pivot results in a weaker dollar, U.S. corporate bonds would still outperform in that scenario, given the more attractive starting point for spreads. We continue to recommend an underweight allocation to Sovereigns. Unlike the debt of most other countries, Mexican sovereign bonds continue to trade cheap relative to U.S. corporates (bottom panel). While this remains an attractive option from a valuation perspective, the President’s on again/off again tariff threats make it a risky near-term proposition. Municipal Bonds: Overweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 73 basis points in June, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -44 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Aaa-rated Municipal / Treasury yield ratio rose 2% in June, and currently sits at 81% (Chart 6). The ratio is close to one standard deviation below its post-crisis mean, but exactly equal to the average that prevailed in the late stages of the previous cycle, between mid-2006 and mid-2007. Recent muni underperformance has been broad-based across the entire maturity spectrum, but long-end (20-year and 30-year) yield ratios continue to look attractive relative to the rest of the curve. 20-year and 30-year Aaa-rated yield ratios are more than one standard deviation above their respective pre-crisis averages. Meanwhile, 10-year, 5-year and 2-year Aaa yield ratios are very close to average pre-crisis levels. State & local government balance sheets are in decent shape and a material increase in ratings downgrades is unlikely (bottom panel). We therefore recommend an overweight allocation to municipal bonds, but with a preference for 20-year and 30-year Aaa-rated securities. We showed in a recent report that value declines sharply if you move into shorter maturities or lower credit tiers.6 Treasury Curve: Maintain A Barbell Curve Positioning Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve bull-steepened in June, alongside a large drop in our 12-month Fed Funds Discounter from -75 bps to -90 bps (Chart 7). June’s bull-steepening was reversed last week, as the strong employment report caused our discounter to jump back up to -83 bps, resulting in a bear-flattening of the Treasury curve. All in all, the 2/10 Treasury slope steepened 6 bps in June, then flattened 8 bps in the first week of July. It currently sits comfortably above zero at 17 bps. The 5/30 slope steepened 11 bps in June, then flattened 6 bps last week. It currently sits at 70 bps. In last week’s report we reviewed the case for barbelling your U.S. bond portfolio.7 That is, favoring the short and long ends of the yield curve while avoiding the 5-year and 7-year maturities. This positioning continues to make sense. Not only does the barbell increase the average yield of your portfolio, but our butterfly spread models all show that barbells are cheap relative to bullets (see Appendix B). The 5-year and 7-year yields will also rise more than long-end and short-end yields when the market eventually moves to price-in fewer Fed rate cuts. In addition to our recommended barbell positioning, we advocate keeping a short position in the February 2020 fed funds futures contract. That contract is currently priced for a fed funds rate of 1.69% next February, the equivalent of three 25 basis point rate cuts spread over the next five FOMC meetings. The Fed is unlikely to deliver that much easing. TIPS: Overweight Chart 8Inflation Compensation Inflation Compensation Inflation Compensation TIPS underperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 11 basis points in June, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +28 bps. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate fell 5 bps on the month and currently sits at 1.69% (Chart 8). The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate fell 4 bps on the month and currently sits at 1.83%. As we have noted in recent research, FOMC members are monitoring long-dated inflation expectations and are committed to keeping policy easy enough to “re-anchor” them at levels consistent with the Fed’s 2% target.8 In the long-run, this will support a return of long-dated TIPS breakeven inflation rates (both 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward) to our 2.3% - 2.5% target range. However, for breakevens to move higher, investors will also need to see evidence that realized inflation can be sustained near 2%. On that note, the core PCE deflator grew at a healthy 2.3% (annualized) clip in May, following an even higher 3% (annualized) rate in April. However, it has only grown 1.6% during the past year. 12-month trimmed mean PCE is running almost exactly in line with the Fed’s target at 1.99%. In a recent report we noted that 12-month core PCE inflation has a track record of converging toward the trimmed mean.9   ABS: Underweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 13 basis points in June, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +51 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS widened 9 bps on the month, moving back above its minimum pre-crisis level (Chart 9). At 36 bps, the spread remains well below its pre-crisis mean of 64 bps. In addition to poor valuation, the sector’s credit fundamentals are shifting in a negative direction. Household interest payments continue to trend up, suggesting a higher delinquency rate going forward (panel 3). Meanwhile, the Fed’s Senior Loan Officer Survey revealed that average consumer lending standards tightened in Q1 for the second consecutive quarter. Tighter lending standards usually coincide with rising consumer delinquencies (bottom panel). Loan officers also reported slowing demand for credit cards for the fifth consecutive quarter, and slowing auto loan demand for the third consecutive quarter. Second quarter data will be made available in early August, but current trends are not promising. The combination of poor value and deteriorating credit quality leads us to recommend an underweight allocation to consumer ABS. Non-Agency CMBS: Neutral Chart 10CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 4 basis points in June, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +191 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS widened 2 bps on the month. It currently sits at 68 bps, below its average pre-crisis level but above levels seen in 2018 (Chart 10). The macro outlook for commercial real estate looks somewhat unfavorable, with lenders tightening standards (panel 4) amidst falling demand (bottom panel). However, on a positive note, commercial real estate prices recently accelerated and are now much more consistent with current CMBS spreads (panel 3). Despite the mixed fundamental picture, CMBS still offer excellent compensation relative to other similarly-rated fixed income sectors.10  Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 3 basis points in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +93 bps. The index option-adjusted spread widened 1 bp on the month and currently sits at 50 bps. The Excess Return Bond Map in Appendix C shows that Agency CMBS offer high potential return compared to other low-risk spread products. An overweight allocation to this defensive sector remains appropriate. Appendix A - The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing We follow a two-step process to formulate recommendations for bond portfolio duration. First, we determine the change in the federal funds rate that is priced into the yield curve for the next 12 months. Second, we decide – based on our assessments of the economy and Fed policy – whether the change in the fed funds rate will exceed or fall short of what is priced into the curve. Most of the time, a correct answer to this question leads to the appropriate duration call. We call this framework the Golden Rule Of Bond Investing, and we demonstrated its effectiveness in the U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing”, dated July 24, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. Chart 11 illustrates the Golden Rule’s track record by showing that the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury Master Index tends to outperform cash when rate hikes fall short of 12-month expectations, and vice-versa. Chart 11The Golden Rule's Track Record The Golden Rule's Track Record The Golden Rule's Track Record At present, the market is priced for 83 basis points of cuts during the next 12 months. We do not anticipate any rate cuts during this timeframe, and therefore recommend that investors maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration. We can also use our Golden Rule framework to make 12-month total return and excess return forecasts for the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury index under different scenarios for the fed funds rate. Excess returns are relative to the Bloomberg Barclays Cash index. Image Image To forecast total returns we first calculate the 12-month fed funds rate surprise in each scenario by comparing the assumed change in the fed funds rate to the current value of our 12-month discounter. This rate hike surprise is then mapped to an expected change in the Treasury index yield using a regression based on the historical relationship between those two variables. Finally, we apply the expected change in index yield to the current characteristics (yield, duration and convexity) of the Treasury index to estimate total returns on a 12-month horizon. The below tables present those results, along with 95% confidence intervals. Excess returns are calculated by subtracting assumed cash returns in each scenario from our total return projections. Appendix B - Butterfly Strategy Valuation The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As of July 5, 2019) Fade Recession Risk Fade Recession Risk Table 5 scales the raw residuals in Table 4 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As of July 5, 2019) Fade Recession Risk Fade Recession Risk Table 6 flips the models on their heads. It shows the change in the slope between the two barbell maturities that must be realized during the next six months to make returns between the bullet and barbell equal. For example, a reading of +56 bps in the 5 over 2/10 cell means that we would only expect the 5-year to outperform the 2/10 if the 2/10 slope steepens by more than 56 bps during the next six months. Otherwise, we would expect the 2/10 barbell to outperform the 5-year bullet. Table 6Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) Fade Recession Risk Fade Recession Risk Appendix C - Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the U.S. fixed income market. The Map employs volatility-adjusted breakeven spread analysis to show how likely it is that a given sector will earn/lose money during the subsequent 12 months. The Map does not incorporate any macroeconomic view. The horizontal axis of the Map shows the number of days of average spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps versus a position in duration-matched Treasuries. Sectors plotting further to the left require more days of average spread widening and are therefore less likely to see losses. The vertical axis shows the number of days of average spread tightening required for each sector to earn 100 bps in excess of duration-matched Treasuries. Sectors plotting further toward the top require fewer days of spread tightening and are therefore more likely to earn 100 bps of excess return. Chart 12 Ryan Swift, U.S. Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “The Fed’s Got Your Back”, dated June 25, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 For more details on how we arrive at our spread targets please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Value In Corporate Bonds”, dated February 19, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 For more details on how we arrive at our spread targets please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Value In Corporate Bonds”, dated February 19, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “Assessing Corporate Default Risk”, dated March 19, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Long Awkward Middle Phase”, dated July 2, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Full Speed Ahead”, dated April 16, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Long Awkward Middle Phase”, dated July 2, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The New Battleground For Monetary Policy”, dated March 26, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 9 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Hedge Near-Term Credit Exposure”, dated May 28, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 10  Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Search For Aaa Spread”, dated March 12, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation

Highlights Portfolio Strategy Rising lumber prices, melting interest rates and profit-augmenting industry productivity gains all signal that it no longer pays to be bearish the S&P home improvement retail (HIR) index. Poor revenue growth prospects, the ongoing global manufacturing contraction and downbeat financial variables all indicate that high-beta semi equipment stocks have ample downside. Recent Changes Downgrade the S&P semi equipment index to underweight on a tactical three-to-six month time horizon, today. Upgrade the S&P home improvement retail index to neutral and remove from the high-conviction underweight list, today. Put the S&P consumer discretionary sector on upgrade alert and remove from the high-conviction underweight list, today. Table 1 Beware Profit Recession Beware Profit Recession Feature July 10 marks the two year anniversary of our seminal “SPX 3,000?” report.1 We were very early both compared with the sell and buy side (to our knowledge the great Byron Wien is the only other strategist that had such a target) and as a reminder, at the time, the S&P 500 was trading near 2,400. A number of BCA peers and BCA clients alike confronted our über bullishness with disbelief, but our 3,000 target – based on our dividend discount model, an EPS and multiple sensitivity analysis and an equilibrium equity risk premium analysis – proved a prescient call. Throughout this period (we had actually been bullish since Brexit, when our profit growth models hooked up) we maintained our cyclical bullishness and never wavered (top panel, Chart 1). Now that SPX futures hit our 2019 target, we want to remain ahead of the curve, as Stan Druckenmiller once mused: “…you have to visualize the situation 18 months from now, and whatever that is, that's where the price will be, not where it is today”. Chart 1Rally Running On Fumes Rally Running On Fumes Rally Running On Fumes In early June we shaved our 2021 EPS to $140 and our end-2020 SPX target fell to a range of 1,890-2,310. We posited that the easy gains in equities were behind us and we are not willing to play 100-200 points to the upside for a potential 1,000 point drawdown, owing to a souring macro backdrop (five key reasons underpin our cautious broad equity market stance that we outline in our recent webcast). On the eve of earnings season, investors have been obsessing with the “Fed put”, but neglecting the looming profit recession (bottom panel, Chart 1). Moreover, while markets cheered the trade truce following the recent G20 meeting, odds are high that manufacturing will remain in the doldrums as the tariff rate on $200bn of Chinese imports went up from 10% to 25% on May 10, and no tariff rollback was agreed. As a result, highly-cyclical global trade and manufacturing will likely continue to weigh on the economy for the remainder of the year. A simple liquidity indicator points to profit growth trouble into early-2020, which stands in marked contract with sell-side analysts who anticipate 10% EPS growth. Chart 2 shows the gulf gap between industrial production and broad money growth. Since 1960, this liquidity indicator has been an excellent leading indicator of SPX profit momentum and the current message is to expect a sustained deceleration in the latter. Chart 2Earnings… Earnings… Earnings… BCA U.S. Equity Strategy’s four-factor macro S&P 500 profit growth model corroborates this signal and warns that a profit contraction is nearing (Chart 3). Chart 3…Trouble… …Trouble… …Trouble… Following up from last week, Goldman Sachs’ U.S. Current Activity Indicator is also flashing red for SPX profit growth. Similarly, our corporate pricing power gauge is sinking steadily and underscores that a profit recession is a high probability outcome (Chart 4). Meanwhile, a longtime friend that I call “the smartest man in California” brought a slight variation of Chart 5 to my attention recently and highlighted that: “Historically, periods of falling manufacturing PMI result in larger negative earnings growth surprises as market forecasters rarely anticipate the breadth and depth of slowdowns. Profit growth trends are set to weaken further in the coming six months. Without profit growth, equity markets lack the necessary ‘oxygen’ for a durable high-quality rally, and until there is an upturn in growth momentum, rallies should be faded.” Chart 4…Proliferating …Proliferating …Proliferating   Chart 5Expect Downward… Expect Downward… Expect Downward… Even net EPS revisions have taken a turn for the worse and are probing recent lows (Chart 6). Drilling beneath the surface is revealing. Trade-exposed sectors bear the brunt of the EPS downgrades. Tech (60% foreign sales exposure), materials, industrials, and energy are deeply in negative territory (Chart 7). On the flip side, defensive sectors are offsetting some of the cyclical sectors' weakness with health care, real estate, utilities and consumer staples hovering close to zero (Chart 8). Chart 6…Profit Surprises …Profit Surprises …Profit Surprises Chart 7Net Earnings Revisions… Net Earnings Revisions… Net Earnings Revisions… Chart 8…Sectorial Breakdown …Sectorial Breakdown …Sectorial Breakdown With regard to the contribution to profit growth for calendar 2019, the divergences have widened significantly since our last update in early-April, with the financials sector solely holding the broad market’s profit fate in its hands. In more detail, Chart 9 shows that financials are responsible for 79% of the overall anticipated profit growth, up from 45% in early-April, whereas technology, energy and materials each have a negative profit growth contribution north of 30%. Chart 9 Table 2 puts all these figures in perspective, and also updates the sector market capitalization and profit weights. Table 2S&P 500 Earnings Analysis Beware Profit Recession Beware Profit Recession In sum, the SPX profit growth backdrop remains anemic and absent a pickup in growth momentum the risk/reward tradeoff is skewed to the down side. On a cyclical 3-12 month time horizon we remain cautious on the broad equity market. This is U.S. Equity Strategy’s view, which stands in contrast to the more sanguine equity BCA House View. This week we are making a subsurface change in an early-cyclical subgroup, and trimming a highly cyclical tech subindex. Put Consumer Discretionary Stocks On Upgrade Alert, And… Consumer discretionary stocks have marked time over the past year. But, now that the Fed is ready to ease monetary policy it will no longer pay to be bearish (Chart 10). This early-cyclical sector benefits the most from lower interest rates, and vice versa. Thus, we are putting this sector on our upgrade watch list and removing it from our high-conviction underweight list. We anticipate to execute this upgrade in coming weeks via boosting the S&P internet retail index to overweight. This subgroup is already on upgrade alert. Before triggering these upgrades, however, today we recommend a subsurface consumer discretionary move. Chart 10Lower Interest Rate Beneficiary Lower Interest Rate Beneficiary Lower Interest Rate Beneficiary …Lift The Home Improvement Retailers To Neutral We are compelled to upgrade the S&P HIR index to a benchmark allocation and remove it from our high-conviction underweight list for a small relative loss. Similar to the parent GICS1 sector, HIR stocks are inversely correlated with interest rates (fed funds rate discounter shown inverted, middle panel, Chart 11), given the close residential real estate market links they enjoy (top panel, Chart 12). Now that the bond market forecasts that the Fed will cut rates four times by next July, home improvement retailers should be cheering this news. Chart 11Two Profit Boosters Two Profit Boosters Two Profit Boosters Chart 12Resilient Pricing Power Resilient Pricing Power Resilient Pricing Power Jumping lumber prices should be a boon to HIR same-store sales. Recent steep production curtailments in lumber yards have been a tonic to prices that have rebounded $100/tbf in a little over a month. Keep in mind, that building materials & construction supplies stores make a set margin on lumber sales and thus higher selling prices translate straight into higher profits; the opposite is also true (bottom panel, Chart 11). Home improvement retailers have been flexing their pricing power muscles recently and this represents another boost to their top line growth prospects (middle panel, Chart 12). While the recent tariff rate increase related input cost inflation has yet to hit the industry’s bottom line, it remains to be seen if HIR margins will take a hit or retailers will pass it on through further price hikes. Importantly, industry labor restraint is a welcome offset and has been a profit booster as measured by our expanding productivity gauge (bottom panel, Chart 12). Our HIR model captures all these positive forces and has likely put in a durable trough recently, signaling that a brightening backdrop looms for the S&P HIR index (Chart 13). Chart 13Model Says It No Longer Pays To Be Bearish Model Says It No Longer Pays To Be Bearish Model Says It No Longer Pays To Be Bearish But prior to getting carried away up the bullish lane, these Big Box retailers have to contend with some key headwinds, and prevent us from boosting exposure to an above benchmark allocation. Residential fixed investment has been contracting for five consecutive quarters and remains a far cry from the 2006 peak as a share of output (Chart 14). Similarly, existing home sales, a key HIR demand driver, have softened recently at a time when home inventories have jumped (inventories shown inverted, top panel, Chart 15).  Chart 14But, Some Headwinds… But, Some Headwinds… But, Some Headwinds… Chart 15…Persist …Persist …Persist As a result, remodeling activity has taken a backseat, at the margin, weighing on industry same-store sales growth (bottom panel, Chart 15). Home owners have avoided dipping into their currently rebuilt home equity to undertake renovation projects. Until the reflationary wave of lower mortgage rates rekindles single family home sales and thus remodeling activity, only a neutral weighting is warranted in the S&P HIR index. All of this has led to a sustained deterioration in HIR operating metrics with the sales-to-inventories ratio contracting at an accelerating pace. The implication is that before long, home improvement retailers may have to resort to margin-denting price concessions to clear the inventory overhang (middle panel, Chart 15). Netting it all out, rising lumber prices, melting interest rates and profit-augmenting industry productivity gains all signal that it no longer pays to be bearish the S&P HIR index.   Bottom Line: Lift the S&P HIR index to neutral and remove from the high-conviction underweight list for a relative loss of 5.9% since inception. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG – S5HOMI – HD, LOW. Downgrade Semi Equipment To Underweight     While the post G-20 trade related entente should have boosted semi equipment stocks that garner a large slice of their revenues in China, relative share prices are below Friday’s June 28 close. A tactical trading opportunity has re-emerged, and today we recommend trimming the S&P semi equipment index to underweight on a three-to-six month time horizon, but with a tight stop at the -7% relative return mark.  But before proceeding with our analysis, a brief recap of the recent history of our moves in this hyper-cyclical tech sub-index is in order. In late-November 2017 we recommended a high-conviction underweight position in the S&P semi equipment index at the height of the bitcoin fever.2 In mid-December 2018 we swung for the fences and upgraded this niche semi index to overweight as the street had finally capitulated and became extremely bearish on semi equipment stocks.3 Finally in early-March 2019 we booked handsome profits in this trade and moved to the sidelines (vertical lines denote recommendation changes, Chart 16).4 Semi equipment stocks are capital intensive, require precision manufacturing and their sales cycle is a carbon copy of the broad manufacturing cycle. The middle panel of Chart 17 shows this tight positive correlation with the ISM manufacturing index and sends a grim message for semi equipment manufacturers. Chart 16Time To Fade Semi Equipment Stocks Time To Fade Semi Equipment Stocks Time To Fade Semi Equipment Stocks Chart 17Chip Equipment Equities Follow The Manufacturing Cycle Chip Equipment Equities Follow The Manufacturing Cycle Chip Equipment Equities Follow The Manufacturing Cycle Global trade and manufacturing continue to contract and, specifically, the EM manufacturing PMI is below the 50 boom/bust line (second panel, Chart 18). Tack on elevated policy uncertainty, and the implication is that investors should sell semi equipment stock strength (top panel, Chart 18). Growth-sensitive financial variables also signal a challenging backdrop for relative share prices. Not only are emerging market stocks trailing their global peers year-to-date, but EM Asian currencies are also exerting downward pull on the relative share price ratio (third & bottom panels, Chart 18). Finally, with regard to industry operating metrics, the news is equally glum. Global semi cycles typically last four-to-five quarters and we only just passed the half way mark. Thus, there is more downside to industry sales momentum and we would lean against recent analyst relative revenue euphoria (middle panel, Chart 19). Asian DRAM prices are deflating, and this semi equipment industry pricing power proxy emits a similarly weak signal for top line growth (bottom panel, Chart 19). Chart 18Financial Variables Say Sell Financial Variables Say Sell Financial Variables Say Sell Chart 19Lean Against Recovering Top Line Growth Estimates Lean Against Recovering Top Line Growth Estimates Lean Against Recovering Top Line Growth Estimates Summing it all up, poor revenue growth prospects, the ongoing global manufacturing contraction and downbeat financial variables all indicate that semi equipment stocks have ample downside. Bottom Line: Downgrade the S&P semiconductor equipment index to underweight on a tactical basis (three-to-six month horizon), but set a tight stop at the -7% relative return mark. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG – S5SEEQ– AMAT, LRCX, KLAC.   Anastasios Avgeriou, U.S. Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes: 1      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Report, “SPX 3,000?” dated July 10, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “2018 High-Conviction Calls” dated November 27, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Signal Vs. Noise” dated December 17, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “The Good, The Bad And The Ugly” dated March 4, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps

Highlights Current activity indicators are now losing momentum, or outright rolling over. This confirms that European (and global) growth is now entering a down-oscillation. Why? It is the rate of decline in the bond yield that has driven the current up-oscillation in growth and it is mathematically impossible for the rate of decline in the bond yield to keep increasing, or even stay where it is. Equity investors should rotate from pro-cyclical to pro-defensive sectors. But the support to risk-asset valuations from low bond yields will keep the aggregate European equity market in a sideways channel. Feature Chart of the WeekThe Interest Rate Impulse And Credit Impulse Are Both Entering ##br##Down-Oscillations The Interest Rate Impulse And Credit Impulse Are Both Entering Down-Oscillations The Interest Rate Impulse And Credit Impulse Are Both Entering Down-Oscillations If the level of interest rates drove economic growth then, let’s face it, the economies of Japan and Switzerland would have reached the moon by now! In both Japan and Switzerland, the policy rate and long bond yield have been at ultra-low levels for decades (Chart I-2). This is true for both the nominal level and the real level of the interest rate and bond yield. But we all know that the level of interest rates does not drive economic growth. Chart I-2Japan And Switzerland Have Had Ultra-Low Bond Yields For Decades Japan And Switzerland Have Had Ultra-Low Bond Yields For Decades Japan And Switzerland Have Had Ultra-Low Bond Yields For Decades If Interest Rates Decline At A Reduced Pace, Growth Slows Most people understand that it is the change in interest rates that can drive economic growth. The main transmission mechanism is by adding to or subtracting from credit creation. For example if, in a given period, a -0.5 percent decline in the interest rate added €50 billion to credit creation, then the extra €50 billion would constitute additional economic demand. Many people struggle to understand the subtle and counterintuitive follow-on point. If interest rates decline, but at a reduced pace, it can slow economic growth. To understand why, let’s continue the example. If, in the following period, a further -0.5 percent decline in the interest rate added another €50 billion of credit-sourced demand, it would constitute the same rate of growth as in the first period. But a further -0.25 percent decline in the interest rate which added €25 billion to demand would result in the growth rate halving. The counterintuitive thing is that the interest rate has continued to decline, yet it has caused growth to slow! If interest rates decline, but at a reduced pace, it can slow economic growth. This counterintuitive dynamic is about to unfold in the European and global economy during the second half of this year. The pace of change in the interest rate (inverted) drives the credit impulse, and thereby drives short-term growth oscillations (Chart I-3). Of course, other influences on credit creation can sometimes swamp the interest rate impact. But not in the latest cycle. From the fourth quarter of 2018, both the pace of decline in the interest rate – or more precisely, the bond yield – and the credit impulse were in a synchronised and closely connected up-oscillation. Chart I-3The Pace Of Change In the Bond Yield (Inverted) Drives The Credit Impulse The Pace Of Change In the Bond Yield (Inverted) Drives The Credit Impulse The Pace Of Change In the Bond Yield (Inverted) Drives The Credit Impulse Unfortunately, it is mathematically impossible for the pace of decline in the bond yield to keep increasing, or indeed stay where it is. Hence, both the interest rate and credit impulses are now on the cusp of down-oscillations, which will bear on economies and financial markets in the second half of the year (Chart of the Week). Growth Rebounded, But Will Now Fade From the fourth quarter of 2018, European and global growth very clearly entered an up-oscillation. Let’s list all the evidence: First and foremost, quarter-on-quarter GDP growth rates picked up: by 2.5 percent in Germany; by 1 percent in the euro area; and by 1 percent in the developed economies (Chart I-4).1 The stark evidence that growth rebounded, but is now rolling over. The best current activity indicators rebounded: specifically the ZEW economic sentiment indicators for both Germany and the euro area (Chart I-5 and Chart I-6); the euro area composite PMI picked up too, albeit very modestly. Chart I-4Global Growth Rebounded... But Is Now Likely To Roll Over Global Growth Rebounded... But Is Now Likely To Roll Over Global Growth Rebounded... But Is Now Likely To Roll Over Chart I-5Current Activity Indicators ##br##Rebounded... Current Activity Indicators Rebounded... Current Activity Indicators Rebounded... Chart I-6...But Are Now Rolling Over ...But Are Now Rolling Over ...But Are Now Rolling Over The aforementioned interest rate impulses (inverted) and 6-month credit impulses picked up, and sharply in China (Chart I-7). Chart I-7Short-Term Impulses Rebounded... But Are Now Rolling Over Short-Term Impulses Rebounded... But Are Now Rolling Over Short-Term Impulses Rebounded... But Are Now Rolling Over The equity sector that is most exposed to growth – the industrials – strongly outperformed the broader market, especially in the euro area (Chart I-8). Chart I-8Industrials Outperformed Strongly... But Are Now Rolling Over Industrials Outperformed Strongly... But Are Now Rolling Over Industrials Outperformed Strongly... But Are Now Rolling Over In fact, just the first item on our list, the pick-up in GDP growth, should suffice to demonstrate the up-oscillation in growth, and that should be that. After all, GDP – after revisions – is the broadest measure of economic activity. Nevertheless, for the sceptics, the corroboration of four independent pieces of evidence should, once and for all, confirm that growth rebounded late last year and early this year. Now though, all of these indicators are losing momentum, or outright rolling over. This confirms that growth is now entering a down-oscillation. Why? To repeat, it is the rate of decline in the bond yield that has driven the current up-oscillation in growth and it is mathematically impossible for the rate of decline in the bond yield to keep increasing, or even stay where it is. The ultimate test of a good theory is its predictive power. In the case of investment strategy this means calling the markets right. Our bond yield and credit impulse oscillation framework passes this test with flying colours, especially at the last two turning-points. On February 1, 2018 at the onset of the last down-oscillation we correctly recommended: “Downgrade banks to underweight versus healthcare” Then on August 30 2018 at the onset of the last up-oscillation we correctly recommended:  “Take profits in the 35 percent outperformance of European healthcare versus banks” Now, at the onset of a new down-oscillation, we recommended last week that equity investors should as a first step go underweight European industrials and switch once again to the less economically-sensitive and less price-sensitive healthcare sector. Sector rotation has huge implications for equity market regional and country allocation. Nowadays, regional and country relative performance just comes from the dominant stock and sector fingerprints of each stock market. Next week, we will advise on what the onset of a new down-oscillation means for Europe as a region relative to the world as well as for equity market allocation within Europe. Enhancing The ‘Rule Of 4’ And The ‘Rule Of 3’ The level of interest rates does not drive economic growth, but the level of interest rates – or more precisely, bond yields – does drive the valuations of equities and other risk-assets. Moreover, it does so in a viciously non-linear way. Essentially, at a tipping point, higher bond yields can suddenly undermine the valuation support of equities, triggering a plunge in the stock market and other risk-assets which threatens a disinflationary impulse on the economy. How can we sense this tipping point? Previously we defined it as when the sum of the 10-year yields on the T-bond, German bund, and JGB is at 4 percent, the ‘rule of 4’. Conversely, when the sum is below 3 percent, the ‘rule of 3’, the seemingly rich valuation of equities and other risk-assets is well underpinned.2 Higher bond yields can suddenly undermine the valuation support of equities. Did this framework work? Yes, perfectly. On September 13 2018 when the global bond yield was approaching danger level, our framework was spot-on in forecasting that: “Using the 10-year T-bond yield as a roadmap, a short trip to the uplands of 3.5 percent would precede a longer journey down to 2 percent” Nevertheless, today we are enhancing the rule. The global bond yield must include China and it must include the aggregate euro area rather than just Germany. Hence, our enhanced metric is the simple average of the 10-year yields of the U.S., the euro area, and China. But to simplify matters, we can proxy the 10-year yield of the aggregate euro area with the 10-year yield of France. So calculate the simple average of the 10-year yields of the U.S., France, and China (Chart I-9). Chart I-9The Rules Of 4 And 3 Become The Rules Of 2.5 And 2 The Rules Of 4 And 3 Become The Rules Of 2.5 And 2 The Rules Of 4 And 3 Become The Rules Of 2.5 And 2 A value approaching 2.5 equates to danger for equities and risk-assets. A value below 2.0 equates to an underpinning for equities and risk-assets. Today, the value stands at 1.8. So to sum up, European (and global) growth will experience a down-oscillation in the second half of 2019, but the support to risk-asset valuations will keep the aggregate European equity market in a sideways channel. For equity investors, the big game in town will be sector rotation, as well as regional and country rotation. Of which, more next week. Stay tuned. Fractal Trading System*  This week we note that the spectacular rally in the Greek stock market this year is now ripe for a countertrend move. We prefer to play this on a hedged basis, so this week’s recommended trade is short Athex versus the Eurostoxx 600. Set the profit target at 7 percent with a symmetrical stop-loss. Chart I-10 Athex Composite Athex Composite The Fractal Trading System now has five open positions. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment’s fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com.   Dhaval Joshi, Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Based on a GDP weighted average of the U.S., euro area, and Japan. 2 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report ‘The Rule Of 4 Becomes The Rule Of 3’ dated March 21, 2019 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Fractal Trading System Recommendations Asset Allocation Equity Regional and Country Allocation Equity Sector Allocation Bond and Interest Rate Allocation Currency and Other Allocation Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields   Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

Highlights Corporate Spreads: The Fed’s dovish pivot prolongs the period of time before the yield curve inverts, thus extending the window for corporate bond outperformance. Investors should remain overweight corporate bonds, with a preference for securities rated Baa and below, where spreads remain wide relative to our fair value estimates. Yield Curve: Investors should barbell their U.S. bond portfolios, favoring long-maturity (> 10 years) and short-maturity (< 2 years) securities while avoiding the 5-year and 7-year notes. This positioning will boost average portfolio yield and will benefit from any future hawkish re-assessment of Fed policy. MBS: Lower mortgage rates have led to a jump in mortgage refinancings and wider MBS spreads. However, MBS spreads remain quite low compared to history. Maintain a neutral allocation to MBS in U.S. bond portfolios. Feature Last December, we laid out our key fixed income themes for 2019 in a Special Report.1 In that report we also introduced a framework for splitting the economic cycle into three phases based on the slope of the yield curve. Specifically, we use the 3-year/10-year Treasury slope to divide each cycle into the following three phases:2 Phase 1 runs from the end of the last recession until the 3/10 slope flattens to below 50 bps. Phase 2 encompasses the period when the 3/10 slope is between 0 bps and 50 bps. Phase 3 begins after the 3/10 slope inverts and ends at the start of the next recession. Clearly, as is illustrated in Chart 1, we are smack dab in the middle of a Phase 2 environment. This has implications for how we should think about positioning a U.S. bond portfolio. Chart 1Firmly In Phase 2 Firmly In Phase 2 Firmly In Phase 2 What Makes The Middle Phase Awkward? Table 1 shows annualized excess returns for Treasuries and corporate bonds (both investment grade and high-yield) in each phase of every cycle stretching back to the mid-1970s. Treasury excess returns are calculated relative to cash, as a proxy for the returns from taking duration risk. Corporate excess returns are relative to a duration-matched position in Treasury securities. Table 1Bond Performance In Different Yield Curve Regimes The Long Awkward Middle Phase The Long Awkward Middle Phase A look at Table 1 reveals why we call Phase 2 the “awkward” middle phase of the cycle. The excess returns earned from taking both duration and corporate spread risk tend to be underwhelming. On duration, we observe that in three of the four complete cycles in our sample, Treasury excess returns are lowest in Phase 2. This lines up well with intuition. The flatter yield curve means that Treasuries offer a lower term premium in Phase 2 than in Phase 1. Meanwhile, Phase 3 periods tend to coincide with rapid Fed rate cuts, and thus large capital gains. Phase 2 periods, in contrast, often contain Fed tightening cycles. On corporate credit, we observe that excess returns tend to be lower in Phase 2 than in Phase 1, but are usually still positive. Returns tend not to turn consistently negative until after the 3/10 slope inverts and we enter Phase 3. Overall, if we know nothing other than that we are in Phase 2 of the cycle, our results suggest that we should take less duration risk in our portfolio than in Phases 1 or 3. Overall, if we know nothing other than that we are in Phase 2 of the cycle, our results suggest that we should take less duration risk in our portfolio than in Phases 1 or 3. The results also suggest that we should prefer corporate credit over Treasuries, though to a lesser extent than in Phase 1. What Makes The Middle Phase Long? In last December’s Special Report, we argued that the U.S. economy would remain in a Phase 2 environment for a long time, at least until late 2019. Our reasoning was that, in the absence of inflationary pressures, the Fed would be reluctant to tighten policy enough to invert the 3/10 curve. The Fed’s recent dovish pivot, and the resultant steepening of the curve (see Chart 1), only prolongs the current Phase 2 environment. We now think it will be well into 2020, and possibly later, before the 3/10 slope inverts and the economy enters Phase 3. One obvious investment implication of an extended Phase 2 environment is that we should remain overweight corporate bonds relative to duration-matched Treasuries. However, we also need to consider valuation before drawing too firm of a conclusion. Charts 2A and 2B show spreads for each corporate credit tier, encompassing both investment grade and high-yield, along with our spread targets. The spread targets are the median levels observed in prior Phase 2 environments, adjusted for changes in the average duration of the bond indexes over time.3 The charts reveal that Aaa-rated bonds already look expensive, while Aa and A-rated bonds are close to fairly valued. Baa-rated bonds are 13 bps cheap relative to our target, while the high-yield credit tiers offer significantly more value. Chart 2AInvestment Grade Spread Targets Investment Grade Spread Targets Investment Grade Spread Targets Chart 2BHigh-Yield Spread Targets High-Yield Spread Targets High-Yield Spread Targets As discussed in last week’s report, the Fed’s dovish pivot will cause corporate spreads to tighten in the near-term, but it will take longer before Treasury yields respond by moving higher.4 For Treasury yields to move higher, investors must first become convinced that the Fed’s reflationary efforts are translating into stronger global economic growth. Ultimately, we expect this will occur in the second half of this year and Treasury yields will be higher 12 months from now, as the Fed will fail to deliver the 92 bps of rate cuts that are currently priced. The flat yield curve means that the yield give-up is small, and we expect global growth to improve in the second half of the year. Bottom Line: The Fed’s dovish pivot prolongs the period of time before the yield curve inverts, thus extending the window for corporate bond outperformance. Investors should remain overweight corporate bonds, with a preference for securities rated Baa and below, where spreads remain wide relative to our fair value estimates. Investors should also keep portfolio duration low. The flat yield curve means that the yield give-up is small, and we expect global growth to improve in the second half of the year. Barbell Your Portfolio Chart 3Barbell Your Portfolio Barbell Your Portfolio Barbell Your Portfolio For those unwilling or unable to deviate portfolio duration significantly from benchmark, there is another way to bet on the Fed delivering fewer cuts than are currently priced into the market. Investors can run a barbelled portfolio, favoring short-maturity (< 2 years) and long-maturity (> 10 years) securities, while avoiding the belly (5-year/7-year) of the curve. This sort of positioning has a few advantages. First, since the financial crisis, the yield curve has tended to steepen out to the 5-year/7-year point and flatten beyond that point whenever our 12-month Fed Funds Discounter rises (Chart 3). Conversely, whenever the market prices in more cuts/fewer hikes and our discounter falls, the yield curve has flattened out to the 5-year/7-year maturity point and steepened beyond that point. This correlation has been very consistent during the past few years, and continued to hold during the most recent decline in rate expectations. Notice that the 5-year yield has fallen by more than either the 2-year or 10-year yields since our Discounter's early-November peak (Table 2). Table 2The Belly Of The Curve Is Most Sensitive To Rate Expectations The Long Awkward Middle Phase The Long Awkward Middle Phase The upshot is that, if rate expectations rise during the next 12 months, as we expect, the 5-year and 7-year notes will endure the most damage. The second reason why a barbelled portfolio makes sense is that valuation is very attractive. Chart 4 shows that the 5-year yield is below the yield on a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. It also shows that this 2/5/10 butterfly spread is very low relative to our model’s fair value.5  Chart 42/10 Barbell Is Attractive Versus 5-Year Bullet 2/10 Barbell Is Attractive Versus 5-Year Bullet 2/10 Barbell Is Attractive Versus 5-Year Bullet We run similar fair value models for every possible bullet/barbell combination along the yield curve, and barbells appear universally cheap (see Appendix). Bottom Line: Investors should barbell their U.S. bond portfolios, favoring long-maturity (> 10 years) and short-maturity (< 2 years) securities while avoiding the 5-year and 7-year notes. This positioning will boost average portfolio yield and will benefit from any future hawkish re-assessment of Fed policy.   MBS & Housing: The Implications Of Lower Mortgage Rates Alongside bond yields, mortgage rates have fallen sharply during the past few months, a trend that has important implications for both MBS spreads and future housing data. We consider the outlook for both. MBS Spreads Lower mortgage rates encourage homeowners to refinance their loans, and any increase in refinancing activity puts upward pressure on MBS spreads. Not surprisingly, as mortgage rates have declined we have seen a jump in the MBA Refinance Index and a widening of nominal MBS spreads (Chart 5). Chart 5MBS Spreads Still Historically Tight MBS Spreads Still Historically Tight MBS Spreads Still Historically Tight While spreads have widened somewhat, they remain low compared to history (Chart 5, top panel). As such, we do not see a compelling buying opportunity in MBS. This is especially true relative to corporate credit where spreads are more attractive. Chart 6Limited Upside For Refis Limited Upside For Refis Limited Upside For Refis With the mortgage rate now below 4%, our rough calculation suggests that approximately 44% of the Bloomberg Barclays Conventional 30-year MBS index is refinanceable. A regression of the MBA Refi Index versus the refinanceable share suggests a fair value of 2014 for the Refi Index, slightly above its actual level of 1950 (Chart 6). We also calculate that a further drop in the mortgage rate to below 3.5%, where it troughed in mid-2016, would increase the refinanceable share to 77%. Our regression translates this 77% share to a level of 3309 on the Refi Index. It should be noted that when the refinanceable share rose to 77% in 2016, the MBA Refi Index peaked at 2870. This means that our simple regression analysis probably overstates the surge in refis that would occur if mortgage rates fell another 50 bps. In addition, we think it’s unlikely that mortgage rates will actually fall back to 3.5%, as they did in 2016, and as such, we are hesitant to position for further MBS spread widening. The improvement in housing actitivty is not uniform across all indicators. We recommend maintaining a neutral allocation to MBS for now. If mortgage rates drop and spreads widen further in the near-term, then a buying opportunity may present itself. Housing Activity Chart 7Housing Activity: A Mixed Picture Housing Activity: A Mixed Picture Housing Activity: A Mixed Picture The drop in mortgage rates will also have a significant impact on housing activity data. This is important because, as we have demonstrated in prior reports, housing activity data – particularly single-family housing starts and new homes sales – are reliable indicators of U.S. recessions and interest rates.6 By all measures, housing activity weakened significantly as mortgage rates surged in 2018. But it has improved somewhat now that mortgage rates have declined. However, the improvement is not uniform across all indicators (Chart 7): New home sales jumped sharply early this year, then fell back more recently. The current trend is neutral, with the latest monthly print very close to the 12-month moving average (Chart 7, top panel). Housing starts and permits are both trending below their respective 12-month moving averages, though by less than in 2018 (Chart 7, panel 2 & 3). Existing home sales have popped, and are now exerting upward pressure on the 12-month average (Chart 7, panel 4). Likewise for mortgage purchase applications (Chart 7, panel 5). Homebuilders also report that lower mortgage rates have led to a jump in sales activity (Chart 7, bottom panel).  With mortgage rates still low, the tentative rebound in housing activity data should continue in the coming months. Looking further out, we see significantly more upside in single-family housing starts and new home sales as builders shift construction toward lower-priced properties. The Bifurcated Housing Market Beyond the large swings in mortgage rates, another trend has significantly influenced housing activity in recent years. For the past few years, homebuilders have focused their attention on higher priced homes, and that segment of the market now looks oversupplied. Data from the American Enterprise Institute Housing Center show that the recent deceleration in home prices has been driven by falling prices for the most expensive homes. Homes in the lowest price tier have seen prices accelerate (Chart 8).7 The divergence is also evident in the supply data. New home inventories are roughly consistent with average historical levels, while existing home inventories are incredibly low (Chart 9). In fact, new home inventories now represent 6.4 months of demand while existing home inventories represent 4.3 months of demand (Chart 9, panel 3). Such a wide divergence is historically rare. Chart 8An Oversupply Of High ##br##Priced Homes... An Oversupply Of High Priced Homes... An Oversupply Of High Priced Homes... Chart 9...And An Undersupply Of Low Priced Homes ...And An Undersupply Of Low Priced Homes ...And An Undersupply Of Low Priced Homes   The divergence between an oversupply of new homes and an undersupply of existing homes is a result of new construction having focused on higher priced homes in recent years. The median price for a new home used to be only slightly above the median price for an existing home, but the difference shot up to above 75k during the past few years (Chart 9, bottom panel). More recently, the price differential between new and existing homes has started to fall, as builders are starting to recognize that the greater growth opportunity lies at the low-end of the market where demand is strong relative to supply. As this supply-side adjustment plays out, it will provide an additional boost to new homes sales and housing starts going forward. Appendix The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 3 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet. Table 3Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As of June 27, 2019) The Long Awkward Middle Phase The Long Awkward Middle Phase Table 4 scales the raw residuals in Table 3 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As of June 27 2019) The Long Awkward Middle Phase The Long Awkward Middle Phase Ryan Swift, U.S. Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “2019 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income”, dated December 11, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 We use the 3/10 Treasury slope in place of the more commonly referenced 2/10 slope because it is a close proxy that provides an additional 14 years of historical data. 3 For more details on how we arrive at our spread targets please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Value In Corporate Bonds”, dated February 19, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “The Fed’s Got Your Back”, dated June 25, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 For more details on our yield curve models please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “More Than One Reason To Own Steepeners”, dated September 25, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Low-tier homes are those in the bottom 40% of the price distribution in each metro area. High-tier homes are those that are both in the top 20% of the price distribution and exceed the GSE loan limit by more than 25%. For further details: http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/HPA_market_conditions_report_June_2019.pdf Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

GAA DM Equity Country Allocation Model Update The GAA DM Equity Country Allocation model is updated as of June 28, 2019.  The quant model has upgraded Sweden to the second largest overweight (from a slight underweight) mainly due to sharp improvement in the liquidity indicator. This is financed by reductions in the overweight of Germany, Italy and the downgrade of Switzerland to a slight underweight (from overweight), as shown in Table 1.  Table 1Model Allocation Vs. Benchmark Weights GAA Quant Model Updates GAA Quant Model Updates As shown in Table 2 and Charts 1, 2 and 3, the overall model outperformed the MSCI world benchmark by 39 bps in June, largely driven by 104 bps of outperformance from Level 2 model, offset by 10 bps of underperformance from Level 1.  Directionally, six out of the 12 choices generated positive alpha. The largest contributions to the outperformance in June came from the overweight in Italy and the underweight in Japan.  Since going live, the overall model has outperformed by 238 bps, with 511 bps of outperformance by the Level 2 model, offset by 2 bps of underperformance from Level 1. Table 2Performance (Total Returns In USD %) GAA Quant Model Updates GAA Quant Model Updates Chart 1GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World Chart 2GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level 1) GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level 1) GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level 1)   Chart 3GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) Please see also the website http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/trades/allocation_performance. For more details on the models, please see Special Report, “Global Equity Allocation: Introducing The Developed Markets Country Allocation Model,” dated January 29, 2016, available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Please note that the overall country and sector recommendations published in our Monthly Portfolio Update and Quarterly Portfolio Outlook use the results of these quantitative models as one input, but do not stick slavishly to them. We believe that models are a useful check, but structural changes and unquantifiable factors need to be considered too in making overall recommendations.   GAA Equity Sector Selection Model Chart 4Overall Model Performance Overall Model Performance Overall Model Performance The GAA Equity Sector Model (Chart 4) is updated as of June 28, 2019. The model’s relative tilts between cyclicals and defensives have changed compared to last month. The model increased its cyclical exposure by overweighting Materials on the backdrop of improvement in its momentum component. The model is therefore overweight two cyclical and two defensive sectors – Industrials, Materials, Consumer Staples and Utilities. The valuation component remains muted across all sectors. The growth component continues to favor defensive sectors so far, as an improvement in global growth hard data has not yet materialized. For more details on the model, please see the Special Report “Introducing the GAA Equity Sector Selection Model,” dated July 27, 2016, as well as the Sector Selection Model section in the Special Alert “GAA Quant Model Updates,” dated March 1, 2019 available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Table 3Model’s Performance (March 1, 2019 - Current) GAA Quant Model Updates GAA Quant Model Updates Table 4Current Model Allocations GAA Quant Model Updates GAA Quant Model Updates   Xiaoli Tang, Associate Vice President xiaoliT@bcaresearch.com Amr Hanafy, Research Associate amrh@bcaresearch.com    

Highlights Central banks globally have turned dovish, with the Fed virtually promising to cut rates in July. But this will be an “insurance” cut, like 1995 and 1998, not the beginning of a pre-recessionary easing cycle. The global expansion remains intact, with the fundamental drivers of U.S. consumption robust and China likely to ramp up its credit stimulus over the coming months. The Fed will cut once or twice, but not four times over the next 10 months as the futures markets imply. Underlying U.S. inflation – properly measured – is trending higher to above 2%. U.S. GDP growth this year will be around 2.5%. Inflation expectations will move higher as the crude oil price rises. Unemployment is at a 50-year low and the U.S. stock market at an historical peak. These factors suggest bond yields are more likely to rise than fall from current levels. The upside for U.S. equities is limited, but earnings growth should be better than the 3% the bottom-up consensus expects. The key for allocation will be when to shift in the second half into higher-beta China-related plays, such as Europe and Emerging Markets. For now, we remain overweight the lower-beta U.S. equity market, neutral on credit, and underweight government bonds. To hedge against the positive impact of China stimulus, we raise Australia to neutral, and re-emphasize our overweights on the Industrials and Energy sectors. Feature Overview Precautionary Dovishness – Or Looming Recession?   Recommendations Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Precautionary Dovishness – Or Looming Recession? Quarterly Portfolio Outlook: Precautionary Dovishness – Or Looming Recession? Central banks everywhere have taken a decidedly dovish turn in recent weeks. June’s FOMC statement confirmed that “uncertainties about the outlook have increased….[We] will act as appropriate to sustain the expansion,” hinting broadly at a rate cut in July. The Bank of Japan’s Kuroda said he would “take additional easing action without hesitation,” and hinted at a Modern Monetary Theory-style combination of fiscal and monetary policy. European Central Bank President Draghi mentioned the possibility of restarting asset purchases. There are two possible explanations. Either the global economy is heading into recession, and central banks are preparing for a full-blown easing cycle. Or these are “insurance” cuts aimed at prolonging the expansion, as happened in 1995 and 1998, or similar to when the Fed went on hold for 12 months in 2016 (Chart 1). Our view is that it is most likely the latter. The reason for this is that the main drivers of the global economy, U.S. consumption ($14 trillion) and the Chinese economy ($13 trillion) are likely to be strong over the next 12 months. U.S. wage growth continues to accelerate, consumer sentiment is close to a 50-year high, and the savings rate is elevated (Chart 2); as a result core U.S. retail sales have begun to pick up momentum in recent months (Chart 3). Unless something exogenous severely damages consumer optimism, it is hard to see how the U.S. can go into recession in the near future, considering that consumption is 70% of GDP. Moreover, despite weaknesses in the manufacturing sector – infected by the China-led slowdown in the rest of the world – U.S. service sector growth and the labor market remain solid. This resembles 1998 and 2016, but is different from the pre-recessionary environments of 2000 and 2007 (Chart 4). There is also no sign on the horizon of the two factors that have historically triggered recessions: a sharp rise in private-sector debt, or accelerating inflation (Chart 5). Chart 1Insurance Cuts, Or Full Easing Cycle? Insurance Cuts, Or Full Easing Cycle? Insurance Cuts, Or Full Easing Cycle? Chart 2Consumption Fundamentals Are Strong... Consumption Fundamentals Are Strong... Consumption Fundamentals Are Strong... Chart 3...Leading To Rebound In Retail Sales ...Leading To Rebound In Retail Sales ...Leading To Rebound In Retail Sales Chart 4Manufacturing Weak, But Services Holding Up Manufacturing Weak, But Services Holding Up Manufacturing Weak, But Services Holding Up   Chart 5No Signs Of Usual Recession Triggers No Signs Of Usual Recession Triggers No Signs Of Usual Recession Triggers China’s efforts to reflate via credit creation have been somewhat half-hearted since the start of the year. Investment by state-owned companies has picked up, but the private sector has been spooked by the risk of a trade war and has slowed capex (Chart 6). China may have hesitated from full-blown stimulus because the authorities in April were confident of a successful outcome to trade talks with the U.S., and a bit concerned that the liquidity was going into speculation rather than the real economy. But we see little reason why they will not open the taps fully if growth remains sluggish and trade tensions heighten.1 Chinese credit creation clearly has a major impact on many components of global growth – in particular European exports, Emerging Markets earnings, and commodity prices – but the impact often takes 6-12 months to come through (Chart 7). A key question is when investors should position for this to happen. We think this decision is a little premature now, but will be a key call for the second half of the year. Chart 6China's Half-Hearted Reflation China's Half-Hearted Reflation China's Half-Hearted Reflation Chart 7China Credit Growth Affects The World China Credit Growth Affects The World China Credit Growth Affects The World Chart 8Fed Won't Cut As Much As Market Wants... Fed Won't Cut As Much As Market Wants... Fed Won't Cut As Much As Market Wants... The Fed has so clearly signaled rate cuts that we see it cutting by perhaps 50 basis points over the next few months (maybe all in one go in July if it wants to “shock and awe” the market). But the futures market is pricing in four 25 bps cuts by April next year. With GDP growth likely to be around 2.5% this year, unemployment at a 50-year low, trend inflation above 2%,2 and the stock market at an historical high, we find this improbable. Two cuts would be similar to what happened in 1995, 1998 and (to a degree) 2016 (Chart 8). In this environment, we think it likely that equities will outperform bonds over the next 12 months. When the Fed cuts by less than the market is expecting, long-term rates tend to rise (Chart 9). BCA’s U.S. bond strategists have shown that after mid-cycle rate cuts, yields typically rise: by 59 bps in 1995-6, 58 bps in 1998, and 19 bps in 2002.3 A combination of rising inflation, stronger growth ex-U.S., a less dovish Fed that the market expects, and a rising oil price (which will push up inflation expectations) makes it unlikely – absent an outright recession – that global risk-free yields will fall much below current levels. Moreover, June’s BOA Merrill Lynch survey cited long government bonds as the most crowded trade at the moment, and surveys of investor positioning suggest duration among active investors is as long as at any time since the Global Financial Crisis (Chart 10). Chart 9...So Bond Yields Are Likely To Rise ...So Bond Yields Are Likely To Rise ...So Bond Yields Are Likely To Rise Chart 10Investors Betting On Further Rate Decline Investors Betting On Further Rate Decline Investors Betting On Further Rate Decline The outlook for U.S. equities is not that exciting. Valuations are not cheap (with forward PE of 16.5x), but earnings should be revised up from the currently very cautious level: the bottom-up consensus forecasts S&P 500 EPS growth at only 3% in 2019 (and -3% YoY in Q2). We have sympathy for the view that there are three put options that will prop up stock prices in the event of external shocks: the Fed put, the Xi put, and the Trump put. Relating to the last of these, it is notable that President Trump tends to turn more aggressive in trade talks with China whenever the U.S. stock market is strong, but more conciliatory when it falls (Chart 11). For now, therefore, we remain overweight U.S. equities, as a lower beta way to play an environment that continues to be positive – but uncertain – for stocks. But we continue to watch for the timing to move into higher-beta China-related markets as the effects of China’s stimulus start to come through. Chart 11Trump Turns Softer When Market Falls Trump Turns Softer When Market Falls Trump Turns Softer When Market Falls   Garry Evans Chief Global Asset Allocation Strategist garry@bcaresearch.com   What Our Clients Are Asking Chart 12Temporary Forces Drove Inflation Downturn Temporary Forces Drove Inflation Downturn Temporary Forces Drove Inflation Downturn Why Is Inflation So Low? After reaching 2% in July 2018, U.S. core PCE currently stands at 1.6%, close to 18 month lows. This plunge in inflation, along with increased worries about the trade war and continued economic weakness, has led the market to believe that the Fed Funds Rate is currently above the neutral rate, and that several rate cuts are warranted in order to move policy away from restrictive territory. We believe that the recent bout of low inflation is temporary. The main contributor to the fall in core PCE has been financial services prices, which shaved off up to 40 basis points from core PCE (Chart 12, panel 1). However, assets under management are a big determinant of financial services prices, making this measure very sensitive to the stock market (panel 2). Therefore, we expect this component of core PCE to stabilize as equity prices continue to rise. The effect of higher equity prices, and the stabilization of other goods that were affected by the slowdown of global growth in late 2018 and early 2019, may already have started to push inflation higher. Month-on-month core PCE grew at an annualized rate of 3% in April, the highest pace since the end of 2017. Meanwhile, trimmed mean PCE, a measure that has historically been a more stable and reliable gauge of inflationary pressures, is at a near seven-year high (panel 3). The above implies that the market might be overestimating how much the Fed is going to ease. We believe that the Fed will likely cut once this year to soothe the pain caused by the trade war on financial markets. However, with unemployment at 50-year lows, and inflation set to rise again, the Fed is unlikely to deliver the 92 basis points of cuts currently priced by the OIS curve for the next 12 months. This implies that investors should continue to underweight bonds. Chart 13Turning On The Taps Turning On The Taps Turning On The Taps Will China Really Ramp Up Its Stimulus? The direction of markets over the next 12 months (a bottoming of euro area and Emerging Markets growth, commodity prices, the direction of the USD) are highly dependent on whether China further increases monetary stimulus in the event of a breakdown in trade negotiations with the U.S. But we hear much skepticism from clients: aren’t the Chinese authorities, rather, focused on reducing debt and clamping down on shadow banking? Aren’t they worried that liquidity will simply flow into speculation and have little impact on the real economy? Now the government has someone to blame for a slowdown (President Trump), won’t they use that as an excuse – and, to that end, are preparing the population for a period of pain by quoting as analogies the Long March in the 1930s and the Korea War (when China ground down U.S. willingness to prolong the conflict)? We think it unlikely that the Chinese government would be prepared to allow growth to slump. Every time in the past 10 years that growth has slowed (with, for example, the manufacturing PMI falling significantly below 50) they have always accelerated credit growth – on the basis of the worst-case scenario (Chart 13, panel 1). Why would they react differently this time, particularly since 2019 is a politically sensitive year, with the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic in October and several other important anniversaries? Moreover, the government is slipping behind in its target to double per capita income in the 10 years to end-2020 (panel 2). GDP growth needs to be 6.5-7% over the next 18 months to achieve the target. The government’s biggest worry is employment, where prospects are slipping rapidly (panel 3). This also makes it difficult for the authorities to retaliate against U.S. companies that have large operations, such as Apple or General Motors, since such measures would hurt their Chinese employees. Besides a significant revaluation of the RMB (which we think likely), China has few cards to play in the event of a full-blown trade war other than fully turning on the liquidity tap again. Chart 14 Aren’t There Signs Of Bubbliness In Equity Markets? Clients have asked whether the current market environment has been showing any classic signs of euphoria. These usually appear with lots of initial public offerings (IPO), irrational M&A activity, and excess investor optimism. The IPO market has some similarities to the years leading up to the dot-com bubble, but it is important to look below the surface. The percentage of IPOs with negative earnings in 2018 was similar to the previous peak in 1999. However, the average first-day return of IPOs in 2019, while still above the historical average, has been much lower than that during the dot-com bubble period (Chart 14, panel 1). There is also a difference in the composition of firms going public. There are now many IPOs for biotech firms that have heavily invested in R&D, and so have relatively low sales currently but await a breakthrough in their products; by their nature, these are loss-making (panel 2). Cross-sector, unrelated M&A activity has also often been a sign of bubble peaks. It is a consequence of firms stretching to find inorganic growth late in the cycle. Such deals are characterized by high deal premiums, and are usually conducted through stock purchases rather than in cash. The current average deal premium is below its historical average (panel 3). Additionally, 2018 and 2019-to-date M&A deals conducted using cash represented 60% and 90% of the total respectively, compared to only 17% between 1996 and 2000. Investor sentiment is also moderately pessimistic despite the rally in the S&P 500 since the beginning of the year (panel 4). This caution suggests that investors are fearful of the risk of recession rather than overly positive about market prospects, despite the U.S. market being at an historical high. Given the above, we do not see any signals of the sort of euphoria and bubbliness that typically accompanies stock market tops. Will Japan Benefit From Chinese Reflation? Japan has been one of the worst-performing developed equity markets since March 2009, when global equities hit their post-crisis bottom in both USD (Chart 15) and local currency terms. Now with increasing market confidence in China’s reflationary policies, clients are asking if Japan is a good China play given its close ties with the Chinese economy. Our answer is No. Chart 15 Chart 16Downgrade Japan To Underweight Downgrade Japan To Underweight Downgrade Japan To Underweight   It’s true that Japanese equities did respond to past Chinese reflationary efforts, but the outperformances were muted and short-lived (Chart 16, panel 1). Even though Japanese exports to China will benefit from Chinese reflationary policy (panel 5), MSCI Japan index earnings growth does not have strong correlation with Japanese exports to China, as shown in panel 4. This is not surprising given that exports to China account for only about 3% of nominal GDP in Japan (compared to almost 6% for Australia, for example). The MSCI Japan index is dominated by Industrials (21%) and Consumer Discretionary (18%). Financials, Info Tech, Communication Services and Healthcare each accounts for about 8-10%. Other than the Communication Services sector, all other major sectors in Japan have underperformed their global peers since the Global Financial Crisis (panels 2 and 3). The key culprit for such poor performance is Japan’s structural deflationary environment. Wage growth has been poor despite a tight labor market. This October’s consumption tax increase will put further downward pressure on domestic consumers. There is no sign of the two factors that have historically triggered recessions: a sharp rise in private-sector debt, or accelerating inflation. As such, we are downgrading Japan to a slight underweight in order to close our underweight in Australia (see page 16). This also aligns our recommendation with the output from our DM Country Allocation Quant Model, which has structurally underweighted Japan since its inception in January 2016. Global Economy Chart 17Is Consumption Enough To Prop Up U.S. Growth? Is Consumption Enough To Prop Up U.S. Growth? Is Consumption Enough To Prop Up U.S. Growth? Overview: The tight monetary policy of last year (with the Fed raising rates and China slowing credit growth) has caused a slowdown in the global manufacturing sector, which is now threatening to damage worldwide consumption and the relatively closed U.S. economy too. The key to a rebound will be whether China ramps up the monetary stimulus it began in January but which has so far been rather half-hearted. Meanwhile, central banks everywhere are moving to cut rates as an “insurance” against further slowdown. U.S.: Growth data has been mixed in recent months. The manufacturing sector has been affected by the slowdown in EM and Europe, with the manufacturing ISM falling to 52.1 in May and threatening to dip below 50 (Chart 17, panel 2). However, consumption remains resilient, with no signs of stress in the labor market, average hourly earnings growing at 3.1% year-on-year, and consumer confidence at a high level. As a result, retail sales surprised to the upside in May, growing 3.2% YoY. The trade war may be having some negative impact on business sentiment, however, with capex intentions and durable goods orders weakening in recent months. Euro Area: Current conditions in manufacturing continue to look dire. The manufacturing PMI is below 50 and continues to decline (Chart 18, panel 1). In export-focused markets like Germany, the situation looks even worse: Germany’s manufacturing PMI is at 45.4, and expectations as measured by the ZEW survey have deteriorated again recently. Solid wage growth and some positive fiscal thrust (in Italy, France, and even Germany) have kept consumption stable, but the recent tick-up in German unemployment raises the question of how sustainable this is. Recovery will be dependent on Chinese stimulus triggering a rebound in global trade. Chart 18Few Signs Of Recovery In Global Ex-U.S. Growth Few Signs Of Recovery In Global Ex-U.S. Growth Few Signs Of Recovery In Global Ex-U.S. Growth Japan: The slowdown in China continues to depress industrial production and leading indicators (panel 2). But maybe the first “green shoots” are appearing thanks to China’s stimulus: in April, manufacturing orders rose by 16.3% month-on-month, compared to -11.4% in March. Nonetheless, consumption looks vulnerable, with wage growth negative YoY each month so far this year, and the consumption tax rise in October likely to hit consumption further. The Bank of Japan’s six-year campaign of maximum monetary easing is having little effect, with core core inflation stuck at 0.5% YoY, despite a small pickup in recent months – no doubt because the easy monetary policy has been offset by a steady tightening of fiscal policy. Emerging Markets: China’s growth has slipped since the pickup in February and March caused by a sharp increase in credit creation. Seemingly, the authorities became more confident about a trade agreement with the U.S., and worried about how much of the extra credit was going into speculation, rather than the real economy. The manufacturing PMI, having jumped to almost 51 in March, has slipped back to 50.2. A breakdown of trade talks would undoubtedly force the government to inject more liquidity. Elsewhere in EM, growth has generally been weak, because of the softness in Chinese demand. In Q1, GDP growth was -3.2% QoQ annualized in South Africa, -1.7% in Korea, and -0.8% in both Brazil and Mexico. Only less China-sensitive markets such as Russia (3.3%) and India (6.5%) held up. Interest rates: U.S. inflation has softened on the surface, with the core PCE measure slipping to 1.6% in April. However, some of the softness was driven by transitory factors, notably the decline in financial advisor fees (which tend to move in line with the stock market) which deducted 0.5 points from core PCE inflation. A less volatile measure, the trimmed mean PCE deflator, however, continues to trend up and is above the Fed’s 2% target. Partly because of the weaker historical inflation data, inflation expectations have also fallen (panel 4). As a result, central banks everywhere have become more dovish, with the Australian and New Zealand reserve banks cutting rates and the Fed and ECB raising the possibility they may ease too. The consequence has been a big fall in 10-year government bonds yields: in the U.S. to only 2% from 3.1% as recently as last September. Global Equities Chart 19Worrisome Earnings Prospects Worrisome Earnings Prospects Worrisome Earnings Prospects Remain Cautiously Optimistic, Adding Another China Hedge: Global equities managed to eke out a small gain of 3.3% in Q2 despite a sharp loss of 5.9% in May. Within equities, our defensive country allocation worked well as DM equities outperformed EM by 2.9% in Q2. Our cyclical tilt in global sector positioning, however, did not pan out, largely due to the 2% underperformance in global Energy as the oil price dropped by 2% in Q2. Going forward, BCA’s House View remains that global economic growth will pick up sometime in the second half thanks to accommodative monetary policies globally and the increasing likelihood of a large stimulus from China to counter the negative effect from trade tensions. This implies that equities are likely to rally again after a period of congestion within a trading range, supporting a cautiously optimistic portfolio allocation for the next 9-12 months. The “optimistic” side of our allocation is reflected in two aspects: 1) overweight equities vs. bonds at the asset class level; and 2) overweight cyclicals vs. defensives at the global sector level. However, corporate profit margins are rolling over and earnings growth revisions have been negative (Chart 19). Therefore, the “cautious” side of our allocation remains a defensive country allocation, reflected by overweighting DM vs. EM. Our macro view hinges largely on what happens to China. There is an increasing likelihood that China may be on a reflationary path to stimulate economic growth. We upgraded global Industrials in March to hedge against China’s re-acceleration. Now we upgrade Australia to neutral from a long-term underweight, by downgrading Japan to a slight underweight from neutral, because Australia will benefit more from China’s reflationary policies (see next page). Chart 20Australian Equities: Close The Underweight Australian Equities: Close The Underweight Australian Equities: Close The Underweight Upgrade Australian Equities To Neutral The relative performance of MSCI Australian equities to global equities has been closely correlated with the CRB metal price most of the time. Since the end of 2015, however, the CRB metals index has increased by more than 40%, yet Australian equities did not outperform (Chart 20, panel 1). Why? The MSCI Australian index is concentrated in Financials (mostly banks) and Materials (mostly mining), as shown in panel 2. Aussie Materials have outperformed their global peers, but the banks have not (panel 3). The banks are a major source of financing for the mining companies (hence the positive correlation with metal prices). They are also the source of financing for the Aussie housing markets, which have weighed down on the banks’ performance over the past few years due to concerns about stretched valuations. We have been structurally underweight Australian equities because of our unfavorable view on industrial commodities, and also our concerns on the Australian housing market and the problems of the banks. This has served us well, as Australian equities have done poorly relative to the global aggregate since late 2012. Now interest rates in Australia have come down significantly. Lower mortgage rates should help stabilize house prices, which suffered in Q1 their worst year-on-year decline, 7.7%, in over three decades. Australian equity earnings growth is still slowing relative to the global earnings, but the speed of slowing down has decreased significantly. With 6% of GDP coming from exports to China, Aussie profit growth should benefit from reflationary policies from China (panel 4). Relative valuation, however, is not cheap (panel 5). All considered, we are closing our underweight in Australian equities as another hedge against a Chinese-led re-acceleration in economic growth. This is financed by downgrading Japan to a slight underweight (for more on Japan, see What Our Clients Are Asking, on page 11). Government Bonds Chart 21Limited Downside In Yields Limited Downside In Yields Limited Downside In Yields Maintain Slight Underweight On Duration: After the Fed signaled at its June meeting that rates cuts were likely on the way, the U.S. 10-year Treasury yield dropped to 1.97% overnight on June 20, the lowest since November 2016. Overall, the 10-year yield dropped by 40 bps in Q2 to end the quarter at 2%. BCA’s Fed Monitor is now indicating that easier monetary policy is required. But that is already more than discounted in the 92 bps of rate cuts over the next 12 months priced in at the front end of the yield curve, and by the current low level of Treasury yields. (Chart 21). We see the likelihood of one or two “insurance” cuts by the Fed, but the current environment (with a record-high stock market, tight corporate spreads, 50-year low unemployment rate, and 2019 GDP on track to reach 2.5%) is not compatible with a full-out cutting campaign. In addition, the latest Merrill Lynch survey indicated that long duration is the most crowded global trade. Given BCA’s House View that the U.S. economy is not heading into a recession but rather experiencing a manufacturing slowdown mainly due to external shocks, the path of least resistance for Treasury yields is higher rather than lower. Investors should maintain a slight underweight on duration over the next 9-12 months. Chart 22Favor Linkers Over Nominal Bonds Favor Linkers Over Nominal Bonds Favor Linkers Over Nominal Bonds Favor Linkers Vs. Nominal Bonds: Global inflation expectations have dropped anew in the second quarter, with the 10-year CPI swap rate now sitting at 1.55%, 41 bps lower than its 2018 high of 1.96%. However, historically, the change in the crude oil price tends to have a good correlation with inflation expectations. BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy service revised down its 2019 Brent crude forecast to an average of US$73 per barrel from US$75, but this implies an average of US$79 in H2. (Chart 22). This would cause a significant rise in inflation expectations in the second half, supporting our preference for inflation-linked over nominal bonds. We also favor linkers in Japan and Australia over their respective nominal bonds. Corporate Bonds Chart 23Profit Growth Should Still Outpace Debt Growth Profit Growth Should Still Outpace Debt Growth Profit Growth Should Still Outpace Debt Growth We turned cyclically overweight on credit within a fixed-income portfolio in February. Since then, corporate bonds have produced 120 basis points of excess return over duration-matched Treasuries. We believe this bullish stance on credit will continue to pay dividends. The global leading economic indicators have started to stabilize while multiple credit impulses have started to perk up all over the world. Historically, improving global growth has been positive for corporate bonds (Chart 23, panel 1). A valid concern is the deceleration in profit growth in the U.S., as the yearly growth of pre-tax profits has fallen from 15% in 2018 Q4 to 7% in the first quarter of this year. In general, corporate bonds suffer when profit growth lags debt growth, as defaults tends to rise in this environment. Is this scenario likely over the coming year? We do not believe so. While weak global growth at the end of 2018 and beginning of 2019 is likely to weigh on revenues, the current contraction in unit labor costs should bolster profit margins and keep profit growth robust (panel 2). Additionally, the Fed’s Senior Loan Officer Survey shows that C&I loan demand has decreased significantly this year, suggesting that the pace of U.S. corporate debt growth is set to slow (panel 3). How long will we remain overweight? We expect that the Federal Reserve will do little to no tightening over the next 12 months. This will open a window for credit to outperform Treasuries in a fixed-income portfolio. We have also reduced our double underweight in EM debt, since an acceleration of Chinese monetary stimulus would be positive for this asset class. Commodities Chart 24Watch Oil And Be Wary Of Gold Watch Oil And Be Wary Of Gold Watch Oil And Be Wary Of Gold Energy (Overweight): Supply/demand fundamentals continue to be the main driver of crude oil prices. However, it seems as though the market is discounting something else. President Trump’s tweets, OPEC+ coalition statements, and concerns about future demand growth are contributing to price swings (Chart 24, panel 1). According to the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, weak demand has reduced oil prices by $2/barrel this year. That should be offset, however, by a much larger contribution from supply cuts, speculative demand, and a deteriorating geopolitical environment. We see crude prices tilted to the upside, as OPEC’s ability to offset any supply disruptions (besides Iran and Venezuela) is limited (panel 2). We expect Brent to average $73 in 2019 and $75 in 2020. Industrial Metals (Neutral): A stronger USD accompanied by weakening global growth since 2018 has put downward pressure on industrial metal prices, which are down about 20% since January 2018. However, we now have renewed belief that the Chinese authorities will counter with a reflationary response though credit and fiscal stimulus. That should push industrial metal prices higher over the coming 12 months (panel 3). Precious Metals (Neutral): Allocators to gold are benefiting from the current environment of rising geopolitical risk, dovish central banks, a weaker USD, and the market’s flight to safety. Escalated trade tensions, falling global yields, and lower growth prospects are some of the factors that have supported the bullion’s 18% return since its September 2018 low. Until evidence of a bottom in global growth emerges, we expect the copper-to-gold ratio – another barometer for global growth – to continue falling (panel 4). The months ahead could see a correction, as investors take profits with gold in overbought territory. Nevertheless, we continue to recommend gold as both an inflation hedge as well as against any uncertain escalated political tensions. Currencies Chart 25Stronger Global Growth Will Weigh On The Dollar Stronger Global Growth Will Weigh On The Dollar Stronger Global Growth Will Weigh On The Dollar U.S. dollar: The trade-weighted dollar has been flat since we lowered our recommendation from positive to neutral in April. We expect that the Fed will cut rates at least once this year, easing financial conditions, and boosting economic activity. This will eventually prove negative for the dollar. However as long as the global economy is weak the greenback should hold up. Stay neutral for now. Euro: Since we turned bullish on the euro in April, EUR/USD has appreciated by 1.5%. Overall, we continue to be bullish on EUR/USD on a cyclical timeframe. Forward rate expectations continue to be near 2014 lows, suggesting that there is little room for U.S. monetary policy to tighten further vis-à-vis euro area monetary policy, creating a floor under the euro (Chart 25, panel 1). EM Currencies: We continue to be negative on emerging market currencies. However, some indicators suggest that Chinese weakness, the main engine behind the EM currency bear market might be reaching its end. Chinese marginal propensity to spend (proxied by M1 growth relative to M2 growth), has bottomed and seems to have stabilized (panel 2). The bond market has taken note of this development, as Chinese yields are now rising relative to U.S. ones (panel 3). Historically, both of these developments have resulted in a rally for emerging market currencies. Thus, while we expect the bear market to continue for the time being, the pace of decline is likely to ease, making EM currencies an attractive buy by the end of the year. Accordingly, we are reducing our underweight in EM currencies from double underweight to a smaller underweight position. Alternatives Chart 26 Return Enhancers: Hedge funds historically display a negative correlation with global growth momentum. Despite growth slowing over the past year, hedge funds underperformed the overall GAA Alternatives Index as well as private equity. Hedge funds usually outperform other risky alternatives during recessions or periods of high credit market stress. Credit spreads have been slow to rise in response to the slowing economy and worsening political environment. A pickup in spreads should support hedge fund outperformance (Chart 26, panel 2). Inflation Hedges: As we approach the end of the cycle, we continue to recommend investors reduce their real estate exposure and increase allocations towards commodity futures. Our May 2019 Special Report4 analyzed how different asset classes perform in periods of rising inflation. Our expectation is that inflation will pick up by the end of the year. An allocation to commodity futures, particularly energy, historically achieved excess returns of nearly 40% during periods of mild inflation (panel 3). Volatility Dampeners: Realized volatility in the catastrophe bond market is generally low. In fact, absent any catastrophe losses, catastrophe bonds provide stable returns, with volatility that is comparable to global bonds (panel 4). In a December 2017 Special Report,5 we tested for how the inclusion of catastrophe bonds in a traditional 60/40 equity-bond portfolio would have impacted portfolio risk-return characteristics. Replacing global equities with catastrophe bonds reduced annualized volatility by more than 1.5%. Risks To Our View Chart 27What Risk Of Recession? What Risk Of Recession? What Risk Of Recession? Our main scenario is sanguine on global growth, which means we argue that bond yields will not fall much below current levels. The risks to this view are mostly to the downside. There could be a full-blown recession. Most likely this would be caused either by China failing to do stimulus, or by U.S. rates being more restrictive than the Fed believes. Both of these explanations seem implausible. As we argue elsewhere, we think it unlikely that China would simply allow growth to slow without reacting with monetary and fiscal stimulus. If current Fed policy is too tight for the economy to withstand, it would imply that the neutral rate of interest is zero or below, something that seems improbable given how strong U.S. growth has been despite rising rates. Formal models of recession do not indicate an elevated risk currently (Chart 27). We continue to watch for the timing to move into higher-beta China-related markets as the effects of China’s stimulus start to come through. Even if growth is as strong as we forecast, is there a possibility that bond yields fall further. This could come about – for a while, at least – if the Fed is aggressively dovish, oil prices fall (perhaps because of a positive supply shock), inflation softens further, and global growth remains sluggish. Absent a recession, we find those outcomes unlikely. The copper-to-gold ratio has been a good indicator of U.S. bond yields (Chart 28). It suggests that, at 2%, the 10-year Treasury yield has slightly overshot. In fact, in June copper prices started to rebound, as the market began to price in growing Chinese demand. Chart 28Can Bond Yields Fall Any Further? Can Bond Yields Fall Any Further? Can Bond Yields Fall Any Further? Chart 29Are Analysts Right To Be So Gloomy? Are Analysts Right To Be So Gloomy? Are Analysts Right To Be So Gloomy?   For U.S. equities to rise much further, multiple expansion will not be enough; the earnings outlook needs to improve. Analysts are still cautious with their bottom-up forecasts, expecting only 3% EPS growth for the S&P500 this year (Chart 29). This seems easy to beat. But a combination of further dollar strength, worsening trade war, further slowdown in Europe and Emerging Markets, and higher U.S. wages would put it at risk. Footnotes 1 Please see What Our Clients Are Asking on page 9 of this Quarterly for further discussion on why we are confident China will ramp up stimulus if necessary. 2 Trimmed Mean PCE inflation, a better indicator of underlying inflation than the Core PCE deflator, is above 2%. Please see What Our Clients Are Asking on page 8 of this Quarterly for details. 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Track Records,” dated June 18, available at usb.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report “Investors’ Guide To Inflation Hedging: How To Invest When Inflation Rises,” dated May 22, 2019 available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report “A Primer On Catastrophe Bonds,” dated December 12, 2017 available at gaa.bcaresearch.com   GAA Asset Allocation

Image Highlights Fed policy is likely to proceed in two stages: An initial stage characterized by a highly accommodative monetary policy, followed by a second stage where the Fed is raising rates aggressively in response to galloping inflation. The first stage, which will end in late 2021, will be heaven for risk assets. The subsequent stage, which will feature a global recession, will be hell. In the end, we expect the fed funds rate to reach 4.75%, representing thirteen more 25-basis point hikes than implied by current market pricing. For the time being, investors should maintain a pro-risk stance: Overweight global equities and high-yield credit relative to government bonds and cash. Regardless of what happens to the trade negotiations, China is stimulating its economy, which will benefit global growth. As a countercyclical currency, the dollar will weaken over the next 12 months. Cyclical stocks will outperform defensives. We expect to upgrade European and EM stocks this summer. Feature Dear Client, In lieu of next week’s report, I will be hosting a webcast on Wednesday, July 3rd at 10:00 AM EDT, where I will be discussing the major investment themes and views I see playing out for the rest of the year and beyond. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Macro Outlook Right On Stocks, Wrong On Bonds We turned structurally bullish on global equities following December’s sell-off, having temporarily moved to the sidelines last June. This view has generally played out well. In contrast, our view that bond yields would rise this year as stocks recovered has been one gigantic flop. What went wrong with the bond view? The answer is that central banks are reacting to incoming news and data differently than in the past. As we discuss below, this has monumental implications for investment strategy. A Not So Recessionary Environment If one had been told at the start of the year that investors would be expecting the fed funds rate to fall to 1.5% by mid-2020 – with a 93% chance that the Fed would cut rates at least twice and a 62% chance it will cut rates three times in 2019 – one would probably have assumed that the U.S. had teetered into recession and that the stock market would be down on the year (Chart 1). Chart 1 Instead, the S&P 500 is near an all-time high, while credit spreads have narrowed by 145 bps since the start of the year. Outside the manufacturing sector, the economy continues to grow at an above-trend pace and the unemployment rate is below most estimates of full employment. According to the Atlanta Fed, real final domestic demand is set to increase by 2.8% in Q2, up from 1.6% in Q1. Real personal consumption expenditures are tracking to rise at a 3.7% annualized pace (Chart 2). Chart 2 So why is the Fed telegraphing rate cuts when real interest rates are barely above zero? A few reasons stand out: Global growth has slowed (Chart 3). The trade war has heated up again following President Trump’s decision to further increase tariffs on Chinese goods. Inflation expectations have fallen in the U.S. as well as around the world (Chart 4). Chart 3Global Growth Has Slowed Global Growth Has Slowed Global Growth Has Slowed Chart 4Inflation Expectations Have Fallen Around The World Inflation Expectations Have Fallen Around The World Inflation Expectations Have Fallen Around The World   There’s More To The Story As important as they are, these three factors, even taken together, would not be enough to justify rate cuts were it not for an additional consideration: The Fed, like most other major central banks, has become increasingly worried that the neutral rate of interest – the rate consistent with full employment and stable inflation – is extremely low. This has resulted in a major shift in its reaction function. Nobody really knows exactly where the neutral rate is. According to the widely-cited Laubach Williams (L-W) model, the nominal neutral rate stands at 2.2% in the United States. This is close to current policy rates (Chart 5). The range for the longer-term interest rate dot in the Summary of Economic Projections is between 2.4% and 3.3%, which is higher than the L-W estimate. However, the range has trended lower since it was introduced in 2014 (Chart 6). Chart 5The Fed Thinks Rates Are Close To Neutral The Fed Thinks Rates Are Close To Neutral The Fed Thinks Rates Are Close To Neutral Chart 6 A Fundamental Asymmetry Given that inflation expectations are quite low and there is considerable uncertainty over the level of the neutral rate, it does make some sense for policymakers to err on the side of being too dovish rather than too hawkish. This is because there is an asymmetry in monetary policy in the current environment. If the neutral rate turns out to be higher than expected and inflation starts to accelerate, central banks can always raise rates. In contrast, if the neutral rate turns out to be very low, the decision to hike rates could plunge the economy into a downward spiral. Historically, the Fed has cut rates by over five percentage points during recessions (Chart 7). At the present rate of inflation, the zero-lower bound on interest rates would be quickly reached, at which point monetary policy would become largely impotent. Chart 7The Fed Is Worried About The Zero Bound The Fed Is Worried About The Zero Bound The Fed Is Worried About The Zero Bound The asymmetry described above argues in favor of letting the economy run hot in order to allow inflation to rise. A higher inflation rate going into a recession would let a central bank push real rates deeper into negative territory before the zero bound is reached. In addition, a higher inflation rate would facilitate wage adjustments in response to economic shocks. Firms typically try to reduce costs when demand for their products and services declines, but employers are often wary of cutting nominal wages. Even though it is not fully rational, workers get more upset when they are told that their wages will fall by 2% when inflation is 1% than when they are told their wages will rise by 1% when inflation is 3%. More controversially, a modestly higher inflation rate could improve financial stability. In a low-inflation, low-nominal-rate environment, risky borrowers are likely to be able to roll over loans for an extended period of time. This could lead to the proliferation of bad debt. Chart 8Higher Underlying Inflation Can Cushion Nominal Asset Price Declines Higher Underlying Inflation Can Cushion Nominal Asset Price Declines Higher Underlying Inflation Can Cushion Nominal Asset Price Declines Higher inflation can also cushion the blow from a burst asset bubble. For example, the Case-Shiller 20-City Composite Index fell by 34% between 2006 and 2012, or 41% in real terms. If inflation had averaged 4% over this period and real home prices had fallen by the same amount, nominal home prices would have declined by only 26%, resulting in fewer underwater mortgages (Chart 8). A New Reaction Function It is usually a mistake to base market views on an opinion about what policymakers should do rather than what they will do. On rare occasions, however, the opposite is true. And, where our Fed call is concerned, this seems to be the case. Where we fumbled earlier this year was in assuming the Fed would follow a more traditional, Taylor Rule-based monetary framework, which calls for raising rates as the output gap shrinks. Instead, the Fed has adopted a risk-based approach of the sort described above, reminiscent in many ways of the optimal control framework that Janet Yellen set out in 2012. The New Normal Becomes The New Consensus Chart 9 If one is going to conduct monetary policy in a way that errs on the side of letting the economy overheat, one should not be too surprised if the economy does overheat. Yet, the implied rate path from the futures curve suggests that investors are not taking this risk seriously. Chart 9 shows that investors are assigning a mere 5% chance that U.S. short-term rates will be above 3.5% in mid-2022. Why isn’t the market assigning more of a risk to an inflation overshoot? We suspect that most investors have bought into the consensus view that the real neutral rate is zero. According to this view, U.S. monetary policy had already turned restrictive last year when the 10-year Treasury yield climbed above 3%. If this view is correct, the recent decline in yields may stave off a recession, but it will not be enough to cause the economy to overheat. Many of the same investors also believe that deep-seated structural forces ranging from globalization, automation, demographics, to the waning power of trade unions, will all prevent inflation from rising much over the coming years even if the unemployment rate continues to fall. In other words, the Phillips curve is broken and destined to stay that way. But are these views correct? We think not.  Where Is Neutral? There is a big difference between arguing that the neutral rate may be low – and taking preemptive steps to remedy it – and arguing that it definitely is low. We subscribe to the former view, but not the latter. Our guess is that in the end, we will discover that the neutral rate is lower than in the past, but not nearly as low as investors currently think. Probably closer to 1.5% in real terms than 0%. As we discussed in detail two weeks ago, while a deceleration in trend growth has pushed down the neutral rate, other forces have pushed it up.1 These include looser fiscal policy (especially in the U.S.), a modest revival in private-sector credit demand, and dwindling labor market slack.  Since the neutral rate cannot be observed directly, the best we can do is monitor the more interest rate-sensitive sectors of the economy to see if they are cooling in a way that would be expected if monetary policy had become restrictive. For example, housing is a long-lived asset that is usually financed through debt. Hence, it is highly sensitive to changes in mortgage rates. History suggests that the recent decline in mortgage rates will spur a rebound in home sales and construction later this year (Chart 10). The fact that homebuilder confidence has bounced back this year and purchase mortgage applications have reached a cycle high is encouraging in that regard. The same goes for the fact that the vacancy rate is near an all-time low, housing starts have been running well below the rate of household formation, and the quality of mortgage lending has been quite strong (Chart 11). Chart 10Declining Yields Bode Well For Housing Declining Yields Bode Well For Housing Declining Yields Bode Well For Housing Chart 11U.S. Housing: No Oversupply Problem, While Demand Is Firm U.S. Housing: No Oversupply Problem, While Demand Is Firm U.S. Housing: No Oversupply Problem, While Demand Is Firm     Nevertheless, if the rebound in housing activity fails to materialize, it would provide evidence that other factors, such as job security concerns among potential homebuyers, are overwhelming the palliative effects of lower mortgage rates.  Have Financial Markets “Trapped” Central Banks? An often-heard argument is that central banks can ill-afford to raise rates for fear of unsettling financial markets. Proponents of this argument often mention that the value of all equities, corporate bonds, real estate and other risk assets around the world exceeds $400 trillion, five times greater than global GDP. There are at least two things wrong with this argument. First, an increase in financial wealth should translate into more spending, and hence a higher neutral rate of interest. Second, as we discussed earlier this year, the feedback loop between asset prices and economic activity tends to kick in only when monetary policy has already become restrictive.2  When policy rates are close to or above neutral, further rate hikes threaten to push the economy into recession. Corporate profits inevitably contract during recessions, which hurts risk asset prices. A vicious spiral can develop where falling asset prices lead to less spending throughout the economy, leading to lower profits and even weaker asset prices. In contrast, when interest rates are below their neutral level, as we believe is the case today in the major economies, an increase in policy rates will simply reduce the odds that the economy will overheat, which is ultimately a desirable outcome. U.S. Imbalances Are Modest Chart 12U.S. Corporate Debt (I): No Cause For Alarm U.S. Corporate Debt (I): No Cause For Alarm U.S. Corporate Debt (I): No Cause For Alarm Recessions usually occur when rising rates expose some serious imbalances in the economy. In the U.S. at least, the imbalances are fairly modest. As noted above, housing is on solid ground, which means that mortgage rates would need to rise substantially before the sector crumbles. Equities are pricey, but far from bubble territory. Moreover, unlike in the late 1990s, the run-up in stock prices over the past five years has not led to a massive capex overhang. Corporate debt is the weakest link in the financial system, but we should keep things in perspective. Even after the recent run-up, net corporate debt is only modestly higher than it was in the late 1980s, a period where the fed funds rate averaged nearly 10% (Chart 12). Thanks to low interest rates and rapid asset accumulation, the economy-wide interest coverage ratio is above its long-term average, while the ratio of debt-to-assets is below its long-term average (Chart 13). The corporate sector financial balance – the difference between what businesses earn and spend – is still in surplus. Every recession during the past 50 years has begun when the corporate sector financial balance was in deficit (Chart 14). Chart 13U.S. Corporate Debt (II): No Cause For Alarm U.S. Corporate Debt (II): No Cause For Alarm U.S. Corporate Debt (II): No Cause For Alarm Chart 14U.S. Corporate Debt (III): No Cause For Alarm U.S. Corporate Debt (III): No Cause For Alarm U.S. Corporate Debt (III): No Cause For Alarm     The Dollar, The Neutral Rate, and Global Growth In a globalized economy, capital flows can equalize, at least partially, neutral rates across countries. If any one central bank tries to raise rates – while others are standing pat or even cutting rates – the currency of the economy where rates are rising will shoot up, causing net exports to shrink and growth to slow.  In the case of the U.S. dollar, there is an additional issue to worry about, which is that there is about $12 trillion in overseas dollar-denominated debt. A stronger greenback would make it difficult for external borrowers to service their debts, leading to increased bankruptcies and defaults. Since financial and economic imbalances are arguably larger outside the U.S., a rising dollar would probably pose more of a problem for the rest of the world than for the United States. Although this is a serious risk, it is unlikely to materialize over the next 12-to-18 months, given our assumption that the dollar will weaken over this period. The U.S. dollar trades as a countercyclical currency, which is another way of saying that it tends to weaken whenever global growth strengthens (Chart 15). While the U.S. benefits from faster global growth, the rest of the world benefits even more. This stems from the fact that the U.S. has a smaller manufacturing base and a larger service sector than most other economies, which makes the U.S. a “low beta” economy. Hence, stronger global growth tends to cause capital to flow from the U.S. to the rest of the world, putting downward pressure on the greenback. Right now, China is stimulating its economy. The stimulus is a reaction to both slowing domestic growth, as well as worries about the potential repercussions of a trade war. It also reflects the fact that Chinese credit growth had sunk to a level only modestly above nominal GDP growth late last year. With the ratio of credit-to-GDP no longer rising quickly, the authorities had the luxury of suspending the deleveraging campaign (Chart 16). Chart 15The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency Chart 16Chinese Deleveraging Campaign Has Now Been Put On The Backburner Chinese Deleveraging Campaign Has Now Been Put On The Backburner Chinese Deleveraging Campaign Has Now Been Put On The Backburner   The combination of Chinese stimulus, the lagged effects from lower bond yields, and a turn in the global manufacturing cycle should all lift global growth in the back half of this year. This should cause the dollar to weaken. Trade War Worries Needless to say, this rosy outlook is predicated on the assumption that the trade war does not get out of hand. Our baseline envisions a “muddle through” scenario, where some sort of deal is hatched that allows the U.S. to bring down existing tariffs over time in exchange for a binding agreement by the Chinese to improve market access for U.S. companies and better secure intellectual property rights. The specifics of the deal are less important than there being a deal – any deal – that avoids a major escalation. Ultimately, the distinction between a “small” trade war and a “moderate” trade war is a function of how high tariffs end up being. Tariffs are taxes, and while no one likes to pay taxes, they are a familiar part of the global capitalist system. Chart 17 What is less familiar, and much more dangerous to global finance, are nontariff barriers that effectively bar countries from accessing critical inputs and technologies. Most global trade is in the form of intermediate goods (Chart 17). If a company cannot access the global supply chain, there is a good chance it may not be able to function at all. The current travails of Huawei is a perfect example of this. A full-blown trade war would create a lot of stranded capital. The stock market represents a claim on the existing capital stock, not the capital stock that would emerge after a trade war has been fought. Stocks would plunge in this scenario, with the U.S. and most other economies succumbing to a recession. Enough voters would blame Donald Trump that he would lose the election. While such an outcome cannot be entirely dismissed, it is precisely its severity that makes it highly unlikely. Inflation: Waiting For Godot? Global monetary policy is highly accommodative at present, and will only become more so if the Fed and some other central banks cut rates. Provided that the trade war does not boil over, global growth should accelerate, putting downward pressure on the U.S. dollar. A weaker dollar will further ease global financial conditions. In such a setting, global growth is likely to remain above trend, leading to a further erosion of labor market slack. Among the major economies, the U.S. is the closest to exhausting all remaining spare capacity (Chart 18). The unemployment rate has fallen to 3.6%, the lowest level since 1969. The number of people outside the labor force who want a job as a share of the working-age population is below the level last seen in 2000. The quits and job opening rates remain near record highs. Given the erosion in slack, why has inflation not taken off? To some extent, the answer is that the Phillips curve is “kinked.” A decline in the unemployment rate from say, 8% to 5%, does little to boost inflation because even at 5%, there are enough jobless workers keen to accept what employment offers they get. It is only once the unemployment rate falls well below NAIRU that inflation starts to kick in. In the 1960s, it was not before the unemployment rate fell two percentage points below NAIRU that inflation broke out (Chart 19). Chart 18U.S. Is Back To Full Employment U.S. Is Back To Full Employment U.S. Is Back To Full Employment Chart 19Inflation Took Off In The 1960s Amid An Overheated Economy Inflation Took Off In The 1960s Amid An Overheated Economy Inflation Took Off In The 1960s Amid An Overheated Economy   Wage growth has picked up. However, productivity growth has risen as well. As a result, unit labor costs – the ratio of wages-to-productivity – have actually decelerated over the past 18 months. Unit labor cost inflation tends to lead core inflation by up to one year (Chart 20).  Chart 20No Imminent Threat Of A Wage-Price Inflationary Spiral No Imminent Threat Of A Wage-Price Inflationary Spiral No Imminent Threat Of A Wage-Price Inflationary Spiral As the unemployment rate continues to drop, wage growth is likely to begin outstripping productivity gains. A wage-price spiral could develop. This is not a major risk for the next 12 months, but could become an issue thereafter. Could structural forces related to globalization, automation, demographics, and waning union power prevent inflation from rising even if labor markets tighten significantly further? We think that is unlikely. Globalization Regardless of what happens to the trade war, the period of hyperglobalization, ushered in by the fall of the Berlin Wall and China’s entry into the WTO, is over. As a share of global GDP, trade has been flat for more than ten years (Chart 21).  Chart 21Globalization Has Peaked Globalization Has Peaked Globalization Has Peaked Granted, it is not just the change in globalization that matters for inflation. The level matters too. In a highly globalized world, excess demand in one economy can be satiated with increased imports from another economy. However, this is only true if other economies have enough spare capacity. Even outside the United States, the unemployment rate in the G7 economies is approaching a record low (Chart 22). Chart 22The Unemployment Rate In The U.S. And Elsewhere Is Near Record Lows The Unemployment Rate In The U.S. And Elsewhere Is Near Record Lows The Unemployment Rate In The U.S. And Elsewhere Is Near Record Lows In any case, for a fairly closed economy such as the U.S., where imports account for only 15% of GDP, relative prices would need to shift a lot in order to incentivize households and firms to purchase substantially more goods from abroad. In the absence of dollar appreciation, this would require that the prices of U.S. goods increase in relation to the prices of foreign goods. In other words, U.S. inflation would still have to rise above that of the rest of the world. Automation Everyone likes to think that they are living in a special age of technological innovation. Yet, according to the productivity statistics, U.S. productivity has grown at a slower pace over the last decade than during the 1970s (Chart 23). As we argued in a past report, this is unlikely to be the result of measurement error.3  Perhaps the recent pickup in productivity growth will mark the start of a new structural trend. Maybe, but it could also just reflect a temporary cyclical revival. As labor has become less plentiful, companies have started to invest in more capital. Chart 24 shows that productivity growth and capital spending are highly correlated over the business cycle. Chart 23 Chart 24U.S. Productivity Growth And Capex Move In Lock-Step U.S. Productivity Growth And Capex Move In Lock-Step U.S. Productivity Growth And Capex Move In Lock-Step   It is less clear whether total factor productivity (TFP) growth — which reflects such things as technological know-how and business practices – has turned the corner. Over the past two centuries, TFP growth has accounted for over two-thirds of overall productivity growth. Recent data suggests TFP growth in the U.S. and around the world has remained sluggish (Chart 25). Chart 25ATotal Factor Productivity Remains Muted Across Developed Markets Total Factor Productivity Remains Muted Across Developed Markets Total Factor Productivity Remains Muted Across Developed Markets Chart 25BTotal Factor Productivity Remains Muted Across Developed Markets Total Factor Productivity Remains Muted Across Developed Markets Total Factor Productivity Remains Muted Across Developed Markets     Even if TFP growth does accelerate, it is not obvious that this will end up being deflationary. Increased productivity means more income, but more income means more potential spending. To the extent that stronger productivity growth expands aggregate supply, it also has the potential to raise aggregate demand. Thus, while faster productivity growth in one sector will cause relative prices in that sector to fall, this will not necessarily reduce the overall price level. Chart 26Rising Labor Share Of Income Occurring Alongside Labor Market Tightening Rising Labor Share Of Income Occurring Alongside Labor Market Tightening Rising Labor Share Of Income Occurring Alongside Labor Market Tightening Chart 27 True, faster productivity growth has the ability to shift income from poor workers to rich capitalists. Since the former spend more of their income than the latter, this could slow aggregate demand growth. However, the recent trend has been in the other direction, as a tighter labor market has pushed up labor’s share of income (Chart 26). Among workers, wage growth is now higher at the bottom end of the income distribution than at the top (Chart 27). Demographics For several decades, slower population growth has reduced the incentive for firms to expand capacity. Population aging has also shifted more people into their prime saving years. The combination of lower investment demand and higher desired savings pushed down the neutral rate on interest. Chart 28The Worker-To-Consumer Ratio Has Peaked Globally The Worker-To-Consumer Ratio Has Peaked Globally The Worker-To-Consumer Ratio Has Peaked Globally Now that baby boomers are starting to retire, they are moving from being savers to dissavers. Chart 28 shows that ratio of workers-to-consumers globally has begun to decline as the post-war generation leaves the labor force. As more people stop working, aggregate savings will fall. The shortage of savings will put upward pressure on the neutral rate. If central banks drag their feet in raising policy rates in response to an increase in the neutral rate, monetary policy will end up being too stimulative. As economies overheat, inflation will pick up. The Waning Power Of Unions The declining influence of trade unions is often cited as a reason for why inflation will remain subdued. There are a number of problems with this argument. First, unionization rates in the U.S. peaked in the mid-1950s, more than a decade before inflation began to accelerate. Second, while the unionization rate continued to decline in the U.S. during the 1980s and 1990s, it remained elevated in Canada. Yet, this did not prevent Canadian inflation from falling as rapidly as it did in the United States (Chart 29). The widespread use of inflation-linked wage contracts in the 1970s appears mainly to have been a consequence of rising inflation rather than the cause of it (Chart 30). Chart 29Inflation Fell In Canada, Despite A High Unionization Rate Inflation Fell In Canada, Despite A High Unionization Rate Inflation Fell In Canada, Despite A High Unionization Rate Chart 30Higher Inflation Led To More Inflation-Indexed Wage Contracts, Not The Other Way Around Higher Inflation Led To More Inflation-Indexed Wage Contracts, Not The Other Way Around Higher Inflation Led To More Inflation-Indexed Wage Contracts, Not The Other Way Around   Ultimately, the price level cannot increase on a sustained basis independent of other things such as the level of the money supply. Unions have influence over wages, but in the long run, central banks play the decisive role. Alt-Right Or Ctrl-Left, The Result Is Usually Inflation In a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations this week, Jay Powell noted that “The Fed is insulated from short-term political pressures – what is often referred to as our ‘independence’.”4 The operative words in his remarks were “short-term”. Powell knows full well that the Fed’s independence is not cast in stone. Even if Trump cannot legally fire or demote him, the President can choose who to nominate to the Fed’s Board of Governors. Early on in his tenure, Trump showed little interest in the workings of the Federal Reserve. He even went so far as to nominate Marvin Goodfriend – definitely no good friend of easy money – to the Fed board. Trump’s last two candidates, Stephen Moore and Herman Cain, were both political flunkies, happy to ditch their previous commitments to hard money in favor of Trump’s desire to see lower interest rates. Neither made it as far as the Senate confirmation process. Recent media reports have suggested that Trump will nominate Judy Shelton, a previously unknown economist whose main claim to fame is the promulgation of a bizarre theory about why the Fed should not pay interest on excess reserves (which, conveniently, would imply that overnight rates would need to fall to zero immediately).5  It is not clear whether Trump’s attempt to stack the Fed with lackeys will succeed. But one thing is clear: Countries with independent central banks tend to end up with lower inflation rates than countries where central banks are not independent (Chart 31). Chart 31 Whether it be Trump-style right-wing populism or left-wing populism (don’t forget, MMT is a product of the left, not the right), the result is usually the same: higher inflation. Investment Recommendations Overall Strategy The discussion above suggests the Fed will proceed along a two-stage path: An initial stage characterized by a highly accommodative monetary policy, followed by a second stage where the Fed is raising rates aggressively in response to galloping inflation. The first stage will be heaven for risk assets. The subsequent stage will be hell. The big question is when the transition from stage one to stage two will occur. Inflation is a highly lagging indicator. It usually does not peak until a recession has begun and does not bottom until a recovery is well under way (Chart 32). Chart 32 While some measures of U.S. core inflation such as the Dallas Fed’s “trimmed mean” have moved back up to 2%, this follows a prolonged period of sub-target inflation. For now, the Fed wants both actual inflation and inflation expectations to increase. Thus, we doubt that inflation will move above the Fed’s comfort zone before 2021, and it will probably not be until 2022 that monetary policy turns contractionary. It will take even longer for inflation to rise meaningfully in the euro area and Japan. Recessions rarely happen if monetary policy is expansionary. Sustained equity bear markets in stocks, in turn, almost never happen outside of recessionary periods (Chart 33). As such, a pro-risk asset allocation, favoring global equities and high-yield credit over safe government bonds and cash, is warranted at least for the next 12 months. Chart 33Recessions And Equity Bear Markets Usually Overlap Recessions And Equity Bear Markets Usually Overlap Recessions And Equity Bear Markets Usually Overlap The key market forecast charts on the first page of this report graphically lay out our baseline forecasts for equities, bonds, currencies, and commodities. Broadly speaking, we expect a risk-on environment to prevail until the end of 2021, followed by a major sell-off in equities and credit. Equities Stocks tend to peak about six months before the onset of a recession. In the 13-to-24 month period prior to the recession, returns tend to be substantially higher than during the rest of the expansion (Table 1). We are approaching that party phase. Table 1Too Soon To Get Out Third Quarter 2019 Strategy Outlook: The Long Hurrah Third Quarter 2019 Strategy Outlook: The Long Hurrah Global equities currently trade at 15-times forward earnings. Unlike last year, earning growth estimates are reasonably conservative (Chart 34). Chart 34Global Stocks Are Not That Expensive Global Stocks Are Not That Expensive Global Stocks Are Not That Expensive Outside the U.S., stocks trade at a respectable 13-times forward earnings. Considering that bond yields are negative in real terms in most economies – and negative in nominal terms in Japan and many parts of Europe – this implies a sizable equity risk premium.  We have yet to upgrade EM and European stocks to overweight, but expect to do so some time this summer, once we see some evidence that global growth is accelerating. International stocks should do especially well in common-currency terms over the next 12 months, if the dollar continues to trend lower, as we expect will be the case.  We are less enthusiastic about Japanese equities. First, there is still the risk that the Japanese government will needlessly raise the consumption tax in October. Second, as a risk-off currency, the yen is likely to struggle in an environment of strengthening global growth. Investors looking for exposure to Japanese stocks should favor the larger multinational exporters. At the global sector level, cyclicals should outperform defensives in an environment of stronger global growth, a weaker dollar, and ongoing Chinese stimulus. We particularly like industrials and energy. Financials should catch a bid in the second half of this year. According to the forwards, the U.S. yield curve will steepen by 38 bps over the next six months (Chart 35). Worries about an inverted yield curve will taper off. Curves will also likely steepen outside the U.S. as growth prospects improve. A steeper yield curve is manna from heaven for banks. Euro area banks trade at an average dividend yield of 6.4% (Chart 36). We are buying them as part of a tactical trade recommendation. Chart 35 Chart 36Euro Area Banks Are A Buy Euro Area Banks Are A Buy Euro Area Banks Are A Buy     Fixed Income The path to higher rates is lined with lower rates. The longer a central bank keeps rates below their neutral level, the more economies will overheat, and the larger the eventual inflation overshoot will be. The Fed’s dovish turn means that rates will stay lower for longer, but will ultimately go higher than we had originally envisioned. As a result, we are increasing our estimate of the terminal fed funds rate for this cycle by 50 bps to 4.75% and initiating a new trade going short the March 2022 Eurodollar futures contract. Our terminal fed funds rate projection assumes a neutral real rate of 1.5% and a peak inflation rate of 2.75%. Rates will rise roughly 50 basis points above neutral in the first half of 2022, enough to generate a recession later that year. The 10-year Treasury yield will peak at 4% this cycle. While the bulk of the increase will happen in 2021/22, yields will still rise over the next 12 months, as U.S. growth surprises on the upside. Thus, a short duration stance is warranted even in the near-to-medium term. The German 10-year yield will peak at 1.5% in 2022. We expect the U.S.-German spread to narrow modestly through to end-2021 and then widen somewhat as U.S. inflation accelerates relative to German inflation. The spread between Italian and German yields will decline in the lead-up to the global recession in 2022 and widen thereafter. U.K. gilt yields are likely to track global bond yields, although Brexit remains a source of downside risk for yields. Our base case is either no Brexit or a very soft Brexit, given that popular opinion has turned away from leaving the EU (Chart 37). Chart 37U.K.: In The Case Of A Do-Over, The Remain Side Would Likely Win U.K.: In The Case Of A Do-Over, The Remain Side Would Likely Win U.K.: In The Case Of A Do-Over, The Remain Side Would Likely Win Chart 38U.S. Default Losses Will Remain In Check U.S. Default Losses Will Remain In Check U.S. Default Losses Will Remain In Check   We expect only a very modest increase in Japanese yields over the next five years. Japanese long-term inflation expectations are much lower than in the other major economies, which will require an extended period of near-zero rates to rectify. We expect corporate credit to outperform government bonds over the next 12 months. While spreads are not likely to narrow much from present levels, the current yield pickup is high enough to compensate for expected bankruptcy risk. Our U.S. fixed-income strategists expect default losses on the Bloomberg Barclays High-Yield index on the order of 1.25%-1.5% over the next 12 months (Chart 38). In that scenario, the junk index offers 224 bps – 249 bps of excess spread, a solid positive return that is only slightly below the historical average of 250 bps.  Currencies And Commodities The two-stage Fed cycle described above will govern the trajectory of the dollar over the next few years. In the initial stage, where global growth is accelerating and the Fed is falling ever further behind the curve in normalizing monetary policy, the dollar will depreciate. Dollar weakness will be especially pronounced against the euro and EM currencies. Commodities and commodity currencies will see solid gains. Our commodity strategists are particularly bullish on oil, as they expect crude prices to benefit from both stronger global demand and increasingly tight supply conditions. The Chinese yuan will start strengthening again if a detente is reached in the trade talks. Even if a truce fails to materialize, the Chinese authorities will likely step up the pace of credit stimulus, rather than trying to engineer a significant, and possibly disorderly, devaluation.   In the second stage, where the Fed is desperately hiking rates to prevent inflation expectations from becoming unmoored, the dollar will soar. The combination of higher U.S. rates and a stronger dollar will cause global equities to crash and credit spreads to widen. The resulting tightening in financial conditions will lead to slower global growth, which will further turbocharge the dollar. Only once the Fed starts cutting rates again in late 2022 will the dollar weaken anew. Gold should do well in the first stage of the Fed cycle and at least part of the second stage. In the first stage, gold will benefit from a weaker dollar. In the initial part of the second stage, gold prices will continue to rise as inflation fears escalate. Gold will probably weaken temporarily once real interest rates reach restrictive territory and a recession becomes all but inevitable. We recommended buying gold on April 17, 2019. The trade is up 10.8% since then. Stick with it.   Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “A Two-Stage Fed Cycle,” dated June 14, 2019. 2      Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Low Odds Of An FCI Doom Loop,” dated January 4, 2019. 3      Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Weak Productivity Growth: Don't Blame The Statisticians," dated March 26, 2016. 4      Please see “Powell Emphasizes Fed’s Independence,” The New York Times, June 25, 2019. 5      Heather Long, “Trump’s potential Fed pick Judy Shelton wants to see ‘lower rates as fast as possible’,” The Washington Post, June 19, 2019.   Strategy & Market Trends MacroQuant Model And Current Subjective Scores Chart 39 Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights Like in any currency board, Hong Kong dollar money supply is not fully backed by foreign currency (FX) reserves. Yet, the Hong Kong authorities have large FX reserves to defend the currency peg for now. Regardless, mounting capital outflows and the ensuing currency defense will lead to higher interest rates. Contrary to Hong Kong, Singapore has a flexible exchange rate regime and will begin easing monetary policy soon. Interest rates in Singapore will drop relative to Hong Kong. We are therefore reiterating our short Hong Kong / long Singaporean property stocks strategy. Feature The recent popular protests in Hong Kong against the extradition bill will likely mark a regime shift – not only in the territory’s socio-political dynamics but also in its financial outlook. It seems the local authorities are still considering an adoption of the extradition bill. For now, the bill has been suspended, but it has not been withdrawn outright. In light of elevated political uncertainty over the one-country, two-systems model, it is reasonable to assume that capital outflows from Hong Kong will rise in the coming year or so.  In light of elevated political uncertainty over the one-country, two-systems model, it is reasonable to assume that capital outflows from Hong Kong will rise in the coming year or so. The question therefore becomes whether or not the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) has sufficient foreign currency (FX) reserves to defend the Hong Kong dollar’s peg. Even though Hong Kong's broad money supply is not fully backed by FX reserves, we see no major risk to the currency peg at the moment. That said, mounting capital outflows will necessitate higher interest rates, as least relative to U.S. ones, to defend the peg. This is negative for Hong Kong’s property market and share prices. Are Hong Kong Dollars Fully Backed By FX Reserves? Hong Kong operates a linked-exchange rate system, which stipulates that its monetary base must be fully backed by FX reserves. The monetary base includes (Table I-1): The balance of the clearing accounts of banks kept with the HKMA (called the Aggregate Balance, which represents commercial banks’ excess reserves). Exchange Fund bills and notes – securities issued by the Exchange Fund to manage excess reserves/liquidity in the interbank market. Certificates of Indebtedness which are equivalent to currency in circulation. These certificates are held by note-issuing banks in exchange for their FX deposits at the Exchange Fund. The Exchange Fund is a balance sheet vehicle of the HKMA. Government-issued coins in circulation. Chart I- Presently, Hong Kong’s FX reserves-to-monetary base ratio is 2.2 (Chart I-1on page 1). This ratio is well above the stipulated currency board rule of one: a unit of monetary base can be issued only when it is backed by an equivalent foreign currency asset. Chart I-1HK: FX Coverage Of Monetary Base Is Well Above 1 HK: FX Coverage Of Monetary Base Is Well Above 1 HK: FX Coverage Of Monetary Base Is Well Above 1 The reason the ratio is currently more than double where it technically should be is because the HKMA’s foreign exchange reserves also include the fiscal authorities’ foreign currency deposits at the Exchange Fund. Hence, the large pool of fiscal assets converted into foreign currency and sitting in the Exchange Fund has pushed the monetary base’s coverage ratio above two. As of December 31, 2018, the Exchange Fund’s foreign currency assets consisted of HK$743 billion of its own foreign currency reserves (net FX reserves), HK$1.17 trillion of the fiscal authorities’ foreign currency deposits, and HK$485 billion of foreign currency deposits by money issuing commercial banks (Table I-1). However, broad money supply in Hong Kong is not fully backed by foreign currency reserves (Chart I-2). At 0.45, this coverage ratio entails that each HK dollar of broad money supply is backed by 0.45 USD foreign currency reserves within the Exchange Fund. Broad money supply includes currency in circulation, demand, savings and time deposits, and negotiable certificates of deposits (NCDs) issued by licensed banks. Chart I-2HK: FX Coverage Of HK Dollars Is Only 0.45 HK: FX Coverage Of HK Dollars Is Only 0.45 HK: FX Coverage Of HK Dollars Is Only 0.45 Crucially, broad money supply does not include commercial banks’ reserves at the central bank in any economy, including Hong Kong. The pertinent measure of any exchange rate backing is the ratio of FX reserves to broad money supply (all local currency deposits plus cash in circulation). The motive is that households and companies can use not only cash in circulation but also their deposits to acquire foreign currency. With the ratio standing at 0.45, the Hong Kong monetary authorities do not have sufficient amounts of U.S. dollars to guarantee the exchange of each unit of local currency (cash in circulation and all deposits) into U.S. dollars in the event of a full-blown flight out of HK dollars. It is essential to clarify that the monetary authorities in Hong Kong have not deviated from the original framework of the currency board. This exchange rate mechanism was devised in 1983 in such a way that only the monetary base – not broad money supply – was supposed to be backed by foreign currency. In short, any currency board entails that only the monetary base – not broad money supply - is backed by FX reserves. Hong Kong is not an exception. Nevertheless, there is widespread perception in the financial community and among economists that all Hong Kong dollars are backed by foreign currency reserves, which is incorrect. Like in any banking system, when commercial banks in Hong Kong grant loans or buy assets from non-banks, they create local currency deposits “out of thin air.” These deposits are not backed by foreign currency, and commercial banks that create these deposits are not obliged to deposit FX reserves at the Exchange Fund. The credit boom in Hong Kong has accelerated since 2009 (Chart I-3, top panel). Consistently, since that time, the amount of local currency deposits has mushroomed – these deposits are not backed by foreign currency (Chart I-3, bottom panel).  Chart I-3Banks' Loans And Deposit Growth Go Hand-In-Hand Banks' Loans And Deposit Growth Go Hand-In-Hand Banks' Loans And Deposit Growth Go Hand-In-Hand On the whole, the currency board system in Hong Kong and elsewhere cannot guarantee full convertibility of broad money supply (all types of deposits). Therefore, these currency regimes are ultimately based on confidence. If and when confidence in the exchange rate plummets and economic agents rush to exchange a large share of their local currency cash in circulation and deposits into foreign currency, the monetary authorities’ FX reserves will not be sufficient. That said, there is presently no basis to argue that close to 45% of Hong Kong broad money supply (cash and coins in circulation and deposits of all types) is poised to panic-flood the currency market. Hence, we do not foresee a de-pegging of the HKD exchange rate for now. The currency will continue to trade within its HKD/USD 7.75-7.85 band. Bottom Line: Like in any currency board, the Hong Kong dollars are not fully backed by its FX reserves. However, the Hong Kong authorities have large FX reserves to defend the currency peg for some time. Liquidity Strains? According to the Impossible Trinity thesis, in an economy with an open capital account, the monetary authorities can control either interest rates or the exchange rate, but not both simultaneously. Provided Hong Kong has both an open capital account and a fixed exchange rate, the monetary authorities have little control over interest rates. Balance-of-payment (BoP) dynamics determine whether the HKMA has to buy or sell foreign currency to preserve the exchange rate peg. When the BoP is in surplus, the HKMA accumulates FX reserves, and vice versa.  The odds are rising that Hong Kong will begin experiencing capital outflows due to heightening political uncertainty over the one-country, two-systems model. Consistently, the BoP will swing from recurring surpluses to deficits and the HKMA will have to finance them by selling FX reserves (Chart I-4). By doing so, the monetary authorities will drain banks’ excess reserves, thereby tightening interbank liquidity. Chart I-4Balance Of Payments And FX Reserves Balance Of Payments And FX Reserves Balance Of Payments And FX Reserves Chart I-5Falling Excess Reserves = Higher Interbank Rates Falling Excess Reserves = Higher Interbank Rates Falling Excess Reserves = Higher Interbank Rates Notably, the HKMA’s FX reserves have plateaued, commercial banks’ excess reserves (the Aggregate Balance at the HKMA) have shrunk and money market rates have risen since 2016 (Chart I-5). Importantly, the latter has continued, even as U.S. interest rates have dropped over the past six months (Chart I-5, bottom panel). These dynamics are set to continue. To defend the HKD’s fixed exchange rate, interest rates in Hong Kong should rise and stay above those in the U.S. This will be the equivalent of pricing in a risk premium in Hong Kong rates due to higher political uncertainty in domestic politics as well as the ongoing U.S.-China trade confrontation. To defend the HKD’s fixed exchange rate, interest rates in Hong Kong should rise and stay above those in the U.S. On a positive note, the HKMA has ample room to mitigate liquidity strains resulting from FX interventions. In years when the BoP was in surplus, to prevent HKD appreciation the authorities purchased substantial amounts of U.S. dollars. As a result, the aggregate balance/excess reserves swelled, and Exchange Fund bills and notes were issued to absorb excess reserves (Chart I-6). Chart I-6HK Authorities Have Large Liquidity Firepower HK Authorities Have Large Liquidity Firepower HK Authorities Have Large Liquidity Firepower Going forward, with capital outflows causing tightening liquidity, the HKMA can redeem its own bills and notes to replenish the Aggregate Balance. This will ease interbank liquidity and preclude interest rates from shooting up dramatically. The HKMA’s liquidity firepower is sizable: the amount of Exchange Fund bills and notes is more than HK$1 trillion. This compares with aggregate balance (excess reserves) of HK$55 billion. Hence, potential interbank liquidity is HK$1.1 trillion (the Aggregate Balance plus the Exchange Fund’s bills and notes) (Chart I-6, top panel). There is no way to guesstimate potential capital outflows from Hong Kong. Hence, it is difficult to know what the equilibrium level of the interest rate spread over U.S. rates will be. The market will be re-balancing continuously, and the interest rate differential will fluctuate – i.e., it will be a moving target that ensures the fixed value of the currency. Bottom Line: Odds are that market-based interest rates in Hong Kong have to rise and stay above the U.S. ones for now. Heading Into Recession? With non-financial private sector debt close to 300% of GDP (Chart I-7) and property/construction and financial services sectors accounting for a large share of the economy, the Hong Kong economy is extremely sensitive to interest rates. Chart I-7Hong Kong: Leverage And Debt Servicing Hong Kong: Leverage And Debt Servicing Hong Kong: Leverage And Debt Servicing Chart I-8HK Economy Is In A Cyclical Downtrend HK Economy Is In A Cyclical Downtrend HK Economy Is In A Cyclical Downtrend Economic conditions have already been worsening, and any further rise in interest rates will escalate the economic downtrend: Private credit growth has decelerated and is probably heading into contraction (Chart I-8, top panel). The property market is one of the most expensive in the world. Property transactions have plunged and real estate prices will likely deflate (Chart I-8, middle panels). China’s weakening economy and subsiding Hong Kong business and investor confidence will hurt domestic demand. Retail sales volumes are already contracting (Chart I-8, bottom panel). Investment Implications The interest rate differential between Hong Kong and the U.S. has recently become positive after two and a half years of lingering below zero (Chart I-9). Odds are that it will remain positive at least over the next couple years. Therefore, even if U.S. interest rates decline further, Hong Kong rates will not. This has major investment ramifications: Hong Kong stocks will likely underperform U.S. and EM equity benchmarks, as its interest rate differential with the U.S. stays on the positive side and widens further (Chart I-10).  Chart I-9HK Interest Rate Spread Over U.S. Will Rise And Stay Positive HK Interest Rate Spread Over U.S. Will Rise And Stay Positive HK Interest Rate Spread Over U.S. Will Rise And Stay Positive Chart I-10Higher HK Interest Rates Herald HK Equity Underperformance Higher HK Interest Rates Herald HK Equity Underperformance Higher HK Interest Rates Herald HK Equity Underperformance The MSCI Hong Kong stock index is composed of financials (36% of market cap) and property stocks (26% of market cap). Therefore, domestic stocks are very sensitive to interest rates. Hong Kong companies are also very exposed to mainland growth. A recovery in the latter is not yet imminent. As a market neutral trade, we are reiterating our short Hong Kong property / long Singapore property stocks strategy. Chart I-11Favor Singapore Stocks Versus Hong Kong Ones Favor Singapore Stocks Versus Hong Kong Ones Favor Singapore Stocks Versus Hong Kong Ones All of this leads us to maintain our underweight stance on Hong Kong domestic stocks versus U.S. and EM equity indexes (Chart I-10). As a market neutral trade, we are reiterating our short Hong Kong property / long Singapore property stocks strategy. Hong Kong interest rates will rise above Singapore’s, leading to the former’s equity underperformance versus the latter across property, banks and probably the overall stock index (Chart I-11). For a more detailed discussion of Singapore, please see below.   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Lin Xiang, Research Analyst linx@bcaresearch.com           Singapore: Monetary Easing Is Imminent Singapore’s stock market is at risk of selling off in absolute terms. However, the monetary authorities (MAS) will soon commence policy easing. This will differentiate Singapore from Hong Kong. While both Singapore and Hong Kong suffer from property and credit excesses and are facing a cyclical downtrend, the former – unlike the latter – can and will lower interest rates and allow its currency to depreciate to reflate the system. As a result, we are reiterating our short Hong Kong / long Singaporean property stocks strategy. Cyclical Headwinds Persist While both Singapore and Hong Kong suffer from property and credit excesses and are facing a cyclical downtrend, the former – unlike the latter – can and will lower interest rates and allow its currency to depreciate to reflate the system. Singapore’s cyclical growth outlook is worsening: Chart II-1 shows that the narrow money impulse is in deep contraction and the private domestic banks loans impulse is dipping into negative territory anew. The property sector – which is an important driver of Singapore’s economy – is depressed. Residential units sold has dipped, the high-end condominium market is virtually frozen and housing mortgage growth has stalled. These create formidable risks for Singapore’s real estate stocks’ absolute performance (Chart II-2). The latter account for 15% of the Singaporean stock market. Chart II-1Singapore: Money / Credit Impulses Singapore: Money / Credit Impulses Singapore: Money / Credit Impulses Chart II-2Singapore: Real Estate Stocks Are At Risk Singapore: Real Estate Stocks Are At Risk Singapore: Real Estate Stocks Are At Risk Meanwhile, there has been no signs of improvement in both domestic demand and exports. The top panel of Chart II-3 shows that the marginal propensity to spend among both consumers and non-financial businesses is diminishing. Specifically, the impulse for overall consumer loans is negative, while retail sales are contracting (Chart II-3, bottom panel). As for the business sector, it is also slowing down. Manufacturing PMI and new orders are in a contraction zone (Chart II-4). Chart II-3Private Consumption Is Weakening Private Consumption Is Weakening Private Consumption Is Weakening Chart II-4Business Sector Is Hit Hard Business Sector is Hit Hard Business Sector is Hit Hard Finally, corporate profitability of listed non-financial and non-property firms has massively deteriorated in the last decade. Chart II-5 illustrates that both return on assets (ROA) and return-on-equity (ROE) have been in a downward trend and have lately plunged. Shrinking profit margins have been the result of escalating unit labor costs (Chart II-6). In other words, productivity gains among listed non-financial companies have lagged behind wage increases. Chart II-5Corporate Profitability Is At 20-Year Low Corporate Profitability Is At 20-Year Low Corporate Profitability Is At 20-Year Low Chart II-6Rising Unit Labor Costs = Shrinking Profit Margins Rising Unit Labor Costs = Shrinking Profit Margins Rising Unit Labor Costs = Shrinking Profit Margins Monetary Policy Will Be Relaxed Chart II-7The Central Bank Has Been Withdrawing Liquidity The Central Bank Has Been Withdrawing Liquidity The Central Bank Has Been Withdrawing Liquidity The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) conducts monetary policy by controlling the currency and by default allowing domestic interest rates to find their own equilibrium. Currently, the MAS’s monetary policy setting is restrictive – i.e. it is aiming to gradually appreciate the trade-weighted Singaporean dollar by withdrawing excess reserve from the banking system (Chart II-7, top panel). This in turn, is causing commercial banks to bid interbank rates higher (Chart II-7, bottom panel). Nevertheless, with the domestic growth deceleration intensifying and the private sector highly leveraged, the MAS will soon opt for policy easing. It will guide the trade-weighted exchange rate lower by injecting liquidity into the banking system and lowering interest rates. Bottom Line: The Singaporean economy needs lower rates and the MAS is not constrained by the currency peg as the HKMA is. Consequently, interest rates in Singapore will decline both in absolute terms and relative to Hong Kong ones. Investment Conclusion The cyclical downturn will deepen and Singapore share prices will drop in absolute U.S. dollar terms. Relative to the EM or the Asian benchmarks, we continue to recommend a neutral position on overall Singaporean equities for now. Importantly, Singapore is better positioned than Hong Kong because the former’s monetary authorities can lower interest rates and allow the currency to depreciate. Hong Kong monetary authorities cannot tolerate lower interest rates due to their peg to the U.S. dollar and budding capital outflows. Interest rates in Singapore will drop relative to Hong Kong. We are therefore reiterating our short Hong Kong / long Singaporean property stocks strategy (Chart I-11 on page 10).   Ayman Kawtharani, Editor/Strategist ayman@bcaresearch.com Footnotes Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations Image Image Equity Recommendations  

Highlights U.S. consumption remains robust despite the recent intensification of global growth headwinds. The G-20 meeting will not result in an escalation nor a major resolution of Sino-U.S. tensions. Kicking the can down the road is the most likely outcome. China’s reflationary efforts will intensify, impacting global growth in the second half of 2019. Fearful of collapsing inflation expectations, global central banks are easing policy, which is supporting global liquidity conditions and growth prospects. Bond yields have upside, especially inflation expectations. Equities have some short-term downside, but the cyclical peak still lies ahead. The equity rally will leave stocks vulnerable to the inevitable pick-up in interest rates later this cycle. Gold stocks may provide an attractive hedge for now. A spike in oil prices creates a major risk to our view. Stay overweight oil plays. Feature Global growth has clearly deteriorated this year, and bond yields around the world have cratered. German yields have plunged below -0.3% and U.S. yields briefly dipped below 2%. Even if the S&P 500 remains near all-time highs, the performance of cyclical sectors relative to defensive ones is corroborating the message from the bond market. Bonds and stocks are therefore not as much in disagreement as appears at first glance. To devise an appropriate strategy, now more than ever investors must decide whether or not a recession is on the near-term horizon. Answering yes to this question means bond prices will continue to rise, the dollar will rally further, stocks will weaken, and defensive stocks will keep outperforming cyclical ones. Answering no, one should sell bonds, sell the dollar, buy stocks, and overweight cyclical sectors. The weak global backdrop can still capsize the domestic U.S. economy. We stand in the ‘no’ camp: We do not believe a recession is in the offing and, while the current growth slowdown has been painful, it is not the end of the business cycle. Logically, we are selling bonds, selling the dollar and maintaining a positive cyclical stance on stocks. We also expect international equities to outperform U.S. ones, and we are becoming particularly positive on gold stocks. Oil prices should also benefit from the upcoming improvement in global growth. Has The U.S. Economy Met Its Iceberg? Investors betting on a recession often point to the inversion of the 3-month/10-year yield curve and the performance of cyclical stocks. However, we must also remember Paul Samuelson’s famous quip that “markets have predicted nine of the five previous recessions.” In any case, these market moves tell us what we already know: growth has weakened. We must decide whether it will weaken further. A simple probit model based on the yield curve slope and the new orders component of the ISM Manufacturing Index shows that there is a 40% probability of recession over the next 12 months. We need to keep in mind that in 1966 and 1998, this model was flagging a similar message, yet no recession followed over the course of the next year (Chart I-1). This means we must go back and study the fundamentals of U.S. growth. Chart I-1The Risk Of A Recession Has Risen, But It Is Not A No Brainer The Risk Of A Recession Has Risen, But It Is Not A No Brainer The Risk Of A Recession Has Risen, But It Is Not A No Brainer Chart I-2Lower Rates Will Help Residential Investment Lower Rates Will Help Residential Investment Lower Rates Will Help Residential Investment On the purely domestic front, the U.S. economy is not showing major stresses. Last month, we argued that we are not seeing the key symptoms of tight monetary policy: Homebuilders remain confident, mortgage applications for purchases are near cyclical highs, homebuilder stocks have been outperforming the broad market for three quarters, and lumber prices are rebounding.1 Moreover, the previous fall in mortgage yields is already lifting existing home sales, and it is only a matter of time before residential investment follows (Chart I-2). Households remain in fine form. Real consumer spending is growing at a 2.8% pace, and despite rising economic uncertainty, the Atlanta Fed GDPNow model expects real household spending to expand at a 3.9% rate in the second quarter (Chart I-3). This is key, as consumers’ spending and investment patterns drive the larger trends in the economy.2 Chart I-3Consumers Are Spending Consumers Are Spending Consumers Are Spending Chart I-4The Labor Market Is Still Doing Fine... The Labor Market Is Still Doing Fine... The Labor Market Is Still Doing Fine... Going forward, we expect consumption to stay the course. Despite its latest dip, consumer confidence remains elevated, household debt levels have fallen from 134% of disposable income in 2007 to 99% today, and debt-servicing costs only represent 9.9% of after-tax income, a multi-generational low. In this context, stronger household income growth should support spending. The May payrolls report is likely to have been an anomaly. Layoffs are still minimal, initial jobless claims continue to flirt near 50-year lows, the Conference Board’s Leading Credit index shows no stress, and the employment components of both the manufacturing and non-manufacturing ISM are at elevated levels (Chart I-4). If these leading indicators of employment are correct, both the employment-to-population ratio for prime-age workers and salaries have upside (Chart I-5), especially as productivity growth is accelerating. Despite these positives, the weak global backdrop can still capsize the domestic U.S. economy, and force the ISM non-manufacturing PMI to converge toward the manufacturing index. If global growth worsens, the dollar will strengthen, quality spreads will widen and stocks will weaken, resulting in tighter financial conditions. Since economic and trade uncertainty is still high, further deterioration in external conditions will cause U.S. capex to collapse. Employment would follow, confidence suffer and consumption fall. Global growth still holds the key to the future. Chart I-5 Following The Chinese Impulse As the world’s foremost trading nation, Chinese activity lies at the center of the global growth equation. The China-U.S. trade war remains at the forefront of investors’ minds. The meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping over the next two days is important. It implies a thawing of Sino-U.S. trade negotiations. However, an overall truce is unlikely. An agreement to resume the talks is the most likely outcome. No additional tariffs will be levied on the remaining $300 billion of untaxed Chinese exports to the U.S., but the previous levies will not be meaningfully changed. Removing this $300 billion Damocles sword hanging over global growth is a positive at the margin. However, it also means that the can has been kicked down the road and that trade will remain a source of headline risk, at least until the end of the year. Chart I-6The Rubicon Has Been Crossed The Rubicon Has Been Crossed The Rubicon Has Been Crossed Trade uncertainty will nudge Chinese policymakers to ease policy further. In previous speeches, Premier Li Keqiang set the labor market as a line in the sand. If it were to deteriorate, the deleveraging campaign could be put on the backburner. Today, the employment component of the Chinese PMI is at its lowest level since the Great Financial Crisis (Chart I-6). This alone warrants more reflationary efforts by Beijing. Adding trade uncertainty to this mix guarantees additional credit and fiscal stimulus. More Chinese stimulus will be crucial for Chinese and global growth. Historically, it has taken approximatively nine months for previous credit and fiscal expansions to lift economic activity. We therefore expect that over the course of the summer, the imports component of the Chinese PMI should improve further, and the overall EM Manufacturing PMI should begin to rebound (Chart I-7, top and second panel). More generally, this summer should witness the bottom in global trade, as exemplified by Asian or European export growth (Chart I-7, third and fourth panel). The prospect for additional Chinese stimulus means that the associated pick-up in industrial activity should have longevity. Global central banks are running a brand new experiment. We are already seeing one traditional signpost that Chinese stimulus is having an impact on growth. Within the real estate investment component of GDP, equipment purchases are growing at a 30% annual rate, a development that normally precedes a rebound in manufacturing activity (Chart I-8, top panel). We are also keeping an eye out for the growth of M1 relative to M2. When Chinese M1 outperforms M2, it implies that demand deposits are growing faster than savings deposits. The inference is that the money injected in the economy is not being saved, but is ready to be deployed. Historically, a rebounding Chinese M1 to M2 ratio accompanies improvements in global trade, commodities prices, and industrial production (Chart I-8, bottom panel). Chart I-7The Turn In Chinese Credit Will Soon Be Felt Around The World The Turn In Chinese Credit Will Soon Be Felt Around The World The Turn In Chinese Credit Will Soon Be Felt Around The World Chart I-8China's Stimulus Is Beginning To Have An Impact China's Stimulus Is Beginning To Have An Impact China's Stimulus Is Beginning To Have An Impact   To be sure, China is not worry free. Auto sales are still soft, global semiconductor shipments remain weak, and capex has yet to turn the corner. But the turnaround in credit and in the key indicators listed above suggests the slowdown is long in the tooth. In the second half of 2019, China will begin to add to global growth once again. Advanced Economies’ Central Banks: A Brave New World Chart I-9The Inflation Expectations Panic The Inflation Expectations Panic The Inflation Expectations Panic While China is important, it is not the only game in town. Global central banks are running a brand new experiment. It seems they have stopped targeting realized inflation and are increasingly focused on inflation expectations. The collapse in inflation expectations is worrying central bankers (Chart I-9). Falling anticipated inflation can anchor actual inflation at lower levels than would have otherwise been the case. It also limits the downside to real rates when growth slows, and therefore, the capacity of monetary policy to support economic activity. Essentially, central banks fear that permanently depressed inflation expectations renders them impotent. The change in policy focus is evident for anyone to see. As recently as January 2019, 52% of global central banks were lifting interest rates. Now that inflation expectations are collapsing, other than the Norges Bank, none are doing so (Chart I-10). Instead, the opposite is happening and the RBA, RBNZ and RBI are cutting rates. Moreover, as investors are pricing in lower policy rates around the world, G-10 bond yields are collapsing, which is easing global liquidity conditions. Indeed, as Chart I-11 illustrates, when the share of economies with falling 2-year forward rates is as high as it is today, the BCA Global Leading Indicator rebounds three months later. Chart I-10Central Banks Are In Easing Mode, Everywhere Central Banks Are In Easing Mode, Everywhere Central Banks Are In Easing Mode, Everywhere The European Central Bank stands at the vanguard of this fight. As we argued two months ago, deflationary pressures in Europe are intact and are likely to be a problem for years to come.3 The ECB is aware of this headwind and knows it needs to act pre-emptively. Four months ago, it announced a new TLRTO-III package to provide plentiful funding for stressed banks in the European periphery. On June 6th, ECB President Mario Draghi unveiled very generous financing terms for the TLTRO-III. Last week, at the ECB’s Sintra conference in Portugal, ECB Vice President Luis de Guindos professed that the ECB could cut rates if inflation expectations weaken. The following day, Draghi himself strongly hinted at an upcoming rate cut in Europe and a potential resumption of the ECB QE program. These measures are starting to ease financial conditions where Europe needs it most: Italy. An important contributor to the contraction in the European credit impulse over the past 21 months was the rapid tightening in Italian financial conditions that followed the surge in BTP yields from May 2018. Now that the ECB is becoming increasingly dovish, Italian yields have fallen to 2.1%, and are finally below the neutral rate of interest for Europe. BTP yields are again at accommodative levels. Chart I-11This Much Of An Easing Bias Boosts Growth Prospects This Much Of An Easing Bias Boosts Growth Prospects This Much Of An Easing Bias Boosts Growth Prospects With financial conditions in Europe easing and exports set to pick up in response to Chinese growth, European loan demand should regain some vigor. Meanwhile, the TLTRO-III measures, which are easing bank funding costs, should boost banks’ willingness to lend. The European credit impulse is therefore set to move back into positive territory this fall. European growth will rebound, and contribute to improving global growth conditions. The Fed’s Patience Is Running Out Chart I-12 The Federal Reserve did not cut interest rates last week, but its intentions to do so next month were clear. First, the language of the statement changed drastically. Gone is the Fed’s patience; instead, there is an urgency to “act as appropriate to sustain the expansion.” Second, the fed funds rate projections from the Summary of Economic Projections were meaningfully revised down. In March, 17 FOMC participants expected the Fed to stay on hold for the remainder of 2019, while six foresaw hikes. Today, eight expect a steady fed funds rate, but seven are calling for two rate cuts this year. Only one member is still penciling in a hike. Moreover, nine out of 17 participants anticipate that rates will be lower in 2020 than today (Chart I-12). The FOMC’s unwillingness to push back very dovish market expectations signals an imminent interest rate cut. Like other advanced economy central banks, the Fed’s sudden dovish turn is aimed at reviving moribund inflation expectations (Chart I-13). In order to do so, the Fed will have to keep real interest rates at low levels, at least relative to real GDP growth. Even if the real policy rate goes up, so long as it increases more slowly than GDP growth, it will signify that money supply is growing faster than money demand.4 TIPS yields are anticipating these dynamics and will likely remain soft relative to nominal interest rates. Chart I-13...As Inflation Expectations Plunge ...As Inflation Expectations Plunge ...As Inflation Expectations Plunge Since the Fed intends to conduct easy monetary policy until inflation expectations have normalized to the 2.3% to 2.5% zone, our liquidity gauges will become more supportive of economic activity and asset prices over the coming two to three quarters: Our BCA Monetary indicator has not only clearly hooked up, it is now above the zero line, in expansionary territory (see Section III, page 41). Excess money growth, defined as money-of-zero-maturity over loan growth, is once again accelerating. This cycle, global growth variables such as our Global Nowcast, BCA’s Global Leading Economic Indicator, or worldwide export prices have all reliably followed this variable (Chart I-14). After collapsing through 2018, our U.S. Financial Liquidity Index is rebounding sharply, and the imminent end of the Fed’s balance sheet runoff will only solidify this progress. This indicator gauges how cheap and plentiful high-powered money is for global markets. Its recovery suggests that commodities, globally-traded goods prices, and economic activity are all set to improve (Chart I-15). Chart I-14Excess Money Has Turned Up Excess Money Has Turned Up Excess Money Has Turned Up Chart I-15Improving Liquidity Conditions Argue That Nominal Growth Will Pick Up... Improving Liquidity Conditions Argue That Nominal Growth Will Pick Up... Improving Liquidity Conditions Argue That Nominal Growth Will Pick Up...   The dollar is losing momentum and should soon fall, which will reinforce the improvement in global liquidity conditions. A trough in our U.S. Financial Liquidity Index is often followed by a weakening dollar (Chart I-16). Moreover, the Greenback’s strength has been turbocharged by exceptional repatriations of funds by U.S. economic agents (Chart I-17). The end of the repatriation holiday along with a more dovish Fed and the completion of the balance sheet runoff will likely weigh on the dollar. Once the Greenback depreciates, the cost of borrowing for foreign issuers of dollar-denominated debt will decline, along with the cost of liquidity, especially if the massive U.S. repatriation flows are staunched. This will further support global growth conditions. Chart I-16...And That The Dollar Will Turn Down... ...And That The Dollar Will Turn Down... ...And That The Dollar Will Turn Down... Trade relations are unlikely to deteriorate further, China is likely to stimulate more aggressively; and easing central banks around the world, including the Fed, are responding to falling inflation expectations. This backdrop points to a rebound in global growth in the second half of the year. As a corollary, the deflationary patch currently engulfing the world should end soon after. As a result, this growing reflationary mindset should delay any recession until late 2021 if not 2022. However, as the business cycle extends further, greater inflationary pressures will build down the road and force the Fed to lift rates – even more than it would have done prior to this wave of easing. Chart I-17...Especially If Repatriation Flows Slow ...Especially If Repatriation Flows Slow ...Especially If Repatriation Flows Slow Investment Implications Bonds BCA’s U.S. Bond Strategy service relies on the Golden Rule of Treasury Investing. This simple rule states that when the Fed turns out to be more dovish than anticipated by interest rate markets 12 months prior, Treasurys outperform cash. If the Fed is more hawkish than was expected by market participants, Treasurys underperform (Chart I-18). Today, the Treasury market’s outperformance is already consistent with a Fed generating a very dovish surprise over the next 12 months. However, the interest rate market is already pricing in a 98% probability of two rates cuts this year, and the December 2020 fed funds rate futures imply a halving of the policy rate. The Fed is unlikely to clear these very tall dovish hurdles as global growth is set to rebound, the fed funds rate is not meaningfully above neutral and the household sector remains resilient. Chart I-18Treasurys Already Anticipate Large Dovish Surprises Treasurys Already Anticipate Large Dovish Surprises Treasurys Already Anticipate Large Dovish Surprises Reflecting elevated pessimism toward global growth, the performance of transport relative to utilities stocks is as oversold as it gets. The likely rebound in this ratio should push yields higher, especially as foreign private investors are already aggressively buying U.S. government securities (Chart I-19). As occurred in 1998, Treasury yields should rebound soon after the Fed begins cutting rates. Moreover, with all the major central banks focusing on keeping rates at accommodative levels, the selloff in bonds should be led by inflation breakevens, also as occurred in 1998 (Chart I-20), especially if the dollar weakens. Chart I-19Yields Will Follow Transportation Relative To Utilities Stocks Yields Will Follow Transportation Relative To Utilities Stocks Yields Will Follow Transportation Relative To Utilities Stocks Chart I-201998: Yields Rebounded As Soon As The Fed Began Cutting 1998: Yields Rebounded As Soon As The Fed Began Cutting 1998: Yields Rebounded As Soon As The Fed Began Cutting     Equities A global economic rebound should provide support for equities on a cyclical horizon. The tactical picture remains murky as the stock market may have become too optimistic that Osaka will deliver an all-encompassing deal. However, this short-term downside is likely to prove limited compared to the cyclical strength lying ahead. This is particularly true for global equities, where valuations are more attractive than in the U.S. Chart I-21Easier Liquidity Conditions Lead To Higher Stock Prices Easier Liquidity Conditions Lead To Higher Stock Prices Easier Liquidity Conditions Lead To Higher Stock Prices Even if the S&P 500 isn’t the prime beneficiary of the recovery in global growth, it should nonetheless generate positive absolute returns on a cyclical horizon. As Chart I-21 illustrates, a pickup in our U.S. Financial Liquidity Index often precedes a rally in U.S. stocks. Since the U.S. Financial Liquidity Index has done a superb job of forecasting the weakness in stocks over the past 18 months, it is likely to track the upcoming strength as well. A weaker dollar should provide an additional tailwind to boost profit growth, especially as U.S. productivity is accelerating. This view is problematic for long-term investors. The cheapness of stocks relative to bonds is the only reason why our long-term valuation index is not yet at nosebleed levels Chart I-22). If we are correct that the current global reflationary push will build greater inflationary pressures down the road and will ultimately result in even higher interest rates, this relative undervaluation of equities will vanish. The overall valuation index will then hit near-record highs, leaving the stock market vulnerable to a very sharp pullback. Long-term investors should use this rally to lighten their strategic exposure to stocks, especially when taking into account the risk that populism will force a retrenchment in corporate market power, an issue discussed in Section II. Gone is the Fed’s patience; instead, there is an urgency to “act as appropriate to sustain the expansion.” In this environment, gold stocks are particularly attractive. Central banks are targeting very accommodative policy settings, which will limit the upside for real rates. Moreover, generous liquidity conditions and a falling dollar should prove to be great friends to gold. These fundamentals are being amplified by a supportive technical backdrop, as gold prices have broken out and the gold A/D line keeps making new highs (Chart I-23). Chart I-22Beware What Will Happen To Valuations Once Rates Rise Again Beware What Will Happen To Valuations Once Rates Rise Again Beware What Will Happen To Valuations Once Rates Rise Again Chart I-23Strong Technical Backdrop For The Gold Strong Technical Backdrop For The Gold Strong Technical Backdrop For The Gold   Structural forces reinforce these positives for gold. EM reserve managers are increasingly diversifying into gold, fearful of growing geopolitical tensions with the U.S. (Chart I-24). Meanwhile, G-10 central banks are not selling the yellow metal anymore. This positive demand backdrop is materializing as global gold producers have been focused on returning cash to shareholders instead of pouring funds into capex. This lack of investment will weigh on output growth going forward. Chart I-24EM Central Banks Are Diversifying Into Gold EM Central Banks Are Diversifying Into Gold EM Central Banks Are Diversifying Into Gold This emphasis on returning cash to shareholders makes gold stocks particularly attractive. Gold producers are trading at a large discount to the market and to gold itself as investors remain concerned by the historical lack of management discipline. However, boosting dividends, curtailing debt levels and only focusing on the most productive projects ultimately creates value for shareholders. A wave of consolidation will only amplify these tailwinds. Our overall investment recommendation is to overweight stocks over bonds on a cyclical horizon while building an overweight position in gold equities. Our inclination to buy gold stocks transcends our long-term concerns for equities, as rising long-term inflation should favor gold as well. The Key Risk: Iran The biggest risk to our view remains the growing stress in the Middle East. BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy team assigns a less than 40% chance that tensions between the U.S. and Iran will deteriorate into a full-fledged military conflict. The U.S.’s reluctance to respond with force to recent Iranian provocations may even argue that this probability could be too high. Nonetheless, if a military conflict were to happen, it would involve a closing of the Strait of Hormuz, a bottleneck through which more than 20% of global oil production transits. In such a scenario, Brent prices could easily cross above US$150/bbl. Chart I-25Oil Inventories Are Set To Decline Oil Inventories Are Set To Decline Oil Inventories Are Set To Decline To mitigate this risk, we recommend overweighting oil plays in global portfolios. Not only would such an allocation benefit in the event of a blow-up in the Persian Gulf, oil is supported by positive supply/demand fundamentals and Brent should end the year $75/bbl. After five years of limited oil capex, Wood Mackenzie estimates that the supply of oil will be close to 5 million barrels per day smaller than would have otherwise been the case. Moreover, OPEC and Russia remain disciplined oil producers, which is limiting growth in crude output today. Meanwhile, in light of the global growth deceleration, demand for oil has proved surprisingly robust. Demand is likely to pick up further when global growth reaccelerates in the second half of the year. As a result, BCA’s Commodity and Energy Strategy currently expects additional inventory drawdowns that will only push oil prices higher in an environment of growing global reflation (Chart I-25). A falling dollar would accentuate these developments.   Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst June 27, 2019 Next Report: July 25, 2019   II. The Productivity Puzzle: Competition Is The Missing Ingredient Productivity growth is experiencing a cyclical rebound, but remains structurally weak. The end of the deepening of globalization, statistical hurdles, and the possibility that today’s technological advances may not be as revolutionary as past ones all hamper productivity. On the back of rising market power and concentration, companies are increasing markups instead of production. This is depressing productivity and lowering the neutral rate of interest. For now, investors can generate alpha by focusing on consolidating industries. Growing market power cannot last forever and will meet a political wall. Structurally, this will hurt asset prices.   “We don’t have a free market; don’t kid yourself. (…) Businesspeople are enemies of free markets, not friends (…) businesspeople are all in favor of freedom for everybody else (…) but when it comes to their own business, they want to go to Washington to protect their businesses.” Milton Friedman, January 1991. Despite the explosion of applications of growing computing power, U.S. productivity growth has been lacking this cycle. This incapacity to do more with less has weighed on trend growth and on the neutral rate of interest, and has been a powerful force behind the low level of yields at home and abroad. In this report, we look at the different factors and theories advanced to explain the structural decline in productivity. Among them, a steady increase in corporate market power not only goes a long way in explaining the lack of productivity in the U.S., but also the high level of profit margins along with the depressed level of investment and real neutral rates. A Simple Cyclical Explanation The decline in productivity growth is both a structural and cyclical story. Historically, productivity growth has followed economic activity. When demand is strong, businesses can generate more revenue and therefore produce more. The historical correlation between U.S. nonfarm business productivity and the ISM manufacturing index illustrates this relationship (Chart II-1). Chart II-1The Cyclical Behavior Of Productivity The Cyclical Behavior Of Productivity The Cyclical Behavior Of Productivity Chart II-2Deleveraging Hurts Productivity Deleveraging Hurts Productivity Deleveraging Hurts Productivity Since 2008, as households worked off their previous over-indebtedness, the U.S. private sector has experienced its longest deleveraging period since the Great Depression. This frugality has depressed demand and contributed to lower growth this cycle. Since productivity is measured as output generated by unit of input, weak demand growth has depressed productivity statistics. On this dimension, the brief deleveraging experience of the early 1990s is instructive: productivity picked up only after 1993, once the private sector began to accumulate debt faster than the pace of GDP growth (Chart II-2). The recent pick-up in productivity reflects these debt dynamics. Since 2009, the U.S. non-financial private sector has stopped deleveraging, removing one anchor on demand, allowing productivity to blossom. Moreover, the pick-up in capex from 2017 to present is also helping productivity by raising the capital-to-workers ratio. While this is a positive development for the U.S. economy, the decline in productivity nonetheless seems structural, as the five-year moving average of labor productivity growth remains near its early 1980s nadir (Chart II-3). Something else is at play. Chart II-3 The Usual Suspects Three major forces are often used to explain why observed productivity growth is currently in decline: A slowdown in global trade penetration, the fact that statisticians do not have a good grasp on productivity growth in a service-based economy, and innovation that simply isn’t what it used to be. Slowdown In Global Trade Penetration Two hundred years ago, David Ricardo argued that due to competitive advantages, countries should always engage in trade to increase their economic welfare. This insight has laid the foundation of the argument that exchanges between nations maximizes the utilization of resources domestically and around the world. Rarely was this argument more relevant than over the past 40 years. On the heels of the supply-side revolution of the early 1980s and the fall of the Berlin Wall, globalization took off. The share of the world's population participating in the global capitalist system rose from 30% in 1985 to nearly 100% today. The collapse in new business formation in the U.S. is another fascinating development. Generating elevated productivity gains is simpler when a country’s capital stock is underdeveloped: each unit of investment grows the capital-to-labor ratio by a greater proportion. As a result, productivity – which reflects the capital-to-worker ratio – can grow quickly. As more poor countries have joined the global economy and benefitted from FDI and other capital inflows, their productivity has flourished. Consequently, even if productivity growth has been poor in advanced economies over the past 10 years, global productivity has remained high and has tracked the share of exports in global GDP (Chart II-4). Chart II-4The Apex Of Globalization Represented The Summit Of Global Productivity Growth The Apex Of Globalization Represented The Summit Of Global Productivity Growth The Apex Of Globalization Represented The Summit Of Global Productivity Growth This globalization tailwind to global productivity growth is dissipating. First, following an investment boom where poor decisions were made, EM productivity growth has been declining. Second, with nearly 100% of the world’s labor supply already participating in the global economy, it is increasingly difficult to expand the share of global trade in global GDP and increase the benefit of cross-border specialization. Finally, the popular backlash in advanced economies against globalization could force global trade into reverse. As economic nationalism takes hold, cross-border investments could decline, moving the world economy further away from an optimal allocation of capital. These forces may explain why global productivity peaked earlier this decade. Productivity Is Mismeasured Recently deceased luminary Martin Feldstein argued that the structural decline in productivity is an illusion. As the argument goes, productivity is not weak; it is only underestimated. This is pure market power, and it helps explain the gap between wages and productivity. A parallel with the introduction of electricity in the late 19th century often comes to mind. Back then, U.S. statistical agencies found it difficult to disentangle price changes from quantity changes in the quickly growing revenues of electrical utilities. As a result, the Bureau Of Labor Statistics overestimated price changes in the early 20th century, which depressed the estimated output growth of utilities by a similar factor. Since productivity is measured as output per unit of labor, this also understated actual productivity growth – not just for utilities but for the economy as a whole. Ultimately, overall productivity growth was revised upward. Chart II-5Plenty Of Room To Mismeasure Real Output Growth Plenty Of Room To Mismeasure Real Output Growth Plenty Of Room To Mismeasure Real Output Growth In today’s economy, this could be a larger problem, as 70% of output is generated in the service sector. Estimating productivity growth is much harder in the service sector than in the manufacturing sector, as there is no actual countable output to measure. Thus, distinguishing price increases from quantity or quality improvements is challenging. Adding to this difficulty, the service sector is one of the main beneficiaries of the increase in computational power currently disrupting industries around the world. The growing share of components of the consumer price index subject to hedonic adjustments highlight this challenge (Chart II-5). Estimating quality changes is hard and may bias the increase in prices in the economy. If prices are unreliably measured, so will output and productivity. Chart II-6A Multifaceted Decline In Productivity A Multifaceted Decline In Productivity A Multifaceted Decline In Productivity Pushing The Production Frontier Is Increasingly Hard Another school of thought simply accepts that productivity growth has declined in a structural fashion. It is far from clear that the current technological revolution is much more productivity-enhancing than the introduction of electricity 140 years ago, the development of the internal combustion engine in the late 19th century, the adoption of indoor plumbing, or the discovery of penicillin in 1928. It is easy to overestimate the economic impact of new technologies. At first, like their predecessors, the microprocessor and the internet created entirely new industries. But this is not the case anymore. For all its virtues, e-commerce is only a new method of selling goods and services. Cloud computing is mainly a way to outsource hardware spending. Social media’s main economic value has been to gather more information on consumers, allowing sellers to reach potential buyers in a more targeted way. Without creating entirely new industries, spending on new technologies often ends up cannibalizing spending on older technologies. For example, while Google captures 32.4% of global ad revenues, similar revenues for the print industry have fallen by 70% since their apex in 2000. If new technologies are not as accretive to production as the introduction of previous ones were, productivity growth remains constrained by the same old economic forces of capex, human capital growth and resource utilization. And as Chart II-6 shows, labor input, the utilization of capital and multifactor productivity have all weakened. Some key drivers help understand why productivity growth has downshifted structurally. Chart II-7 Chart II-8Demographics Are Hurting Productivity Demographics Are Hurting Productivity Demographics Are Hurting Productivity Let’s look at human capital. It is much easier to grow human capital when very few people have a high-school diploma: just make a larger share of your population finish high school, or even better, complete a university degree. But once the share of university-educated citizens has risen, building human capital further becomes increasingly difficult. Chart II-7 illustrates this problem. Growth in educational achievement has been slowing since 1995 in both advanced and developing economies. This means that the growth of human capital is slowing. This is without even wading into whether or not the quality of education has remained constant. Human capital is also negatively impacted by demographic trends. Workers in their forties tend to be at the peak of their careers, with the highest accumulated job know-how. Problematically, these workers represent a shrinking share of the labor force, which is hurting productivity trends (Chart II-8). The capital stock too is experiencing its own headwinds. While Moore’s Law seems more or less intact, the decline in the cost of storing information is clearly decelerating (Chart II-9). Today, quality adjusted IT prices are contracting at a pace of 2.3% per annum, compared to annual declines of 14% at the turn of the millennium. Thus, even if nominal spending in IT investment had remained constant, real investment growth would have sharply decelerated (Chart II-10). But since nominal spending has decelerated greatly from its late 1990s pace, real investment in IT has fallen substantially. The growth of the capital stock is therefore lagging its previous pace, which is hurting productivity growth. Chart II-9 Chart II-10The Impact Of Slowing IT Deflation The Impact Of Slowing IT Deflation The Impact Of Slowing IT Deflation Chart II-11A Dearth Of New Businesses A Dearth Of New Businesses A Dearth Of New Businesses   The collapse in new business formation in the U.S. is another fascinating development (Chart II-11). New businesses are a large source of productivity gains. Ultimately, 20% of productivity gains have come from small businesses becoming large ones. Think Apple in 1977 versus Apple today. A large decline in the pace of new business formation suggests that fewer seeds have been planted over the past 20 years to generate those enormous productivity explosions than was the case in the previous 50 years. The X Factor: Growing Market Concentration Chart II-12Wide Profit Margins: A Testament To The Weakness Of Labor Wide Profit Margins: A Testament To The Weakness Of Labor Wide Profit Margins: A Testament To The Weakness Of Labor The three aforementioned explanations for the decline in productivity are all appealing, but they generally leave investors looking for more. Why are companies investing less, especially when profit margins are near record highs? Why is inflation low? Why has the pace of new business formation collapsed? These are all somewhat paradoxical. This is where a growing body of works comes in. Our economy is moving away from the Adam Smith idea of perfect competition. Industry concentration has progressively risen, and few companies dominate their line of business and control both their selling prices and input costs. They behave as monopolies and monopsonies, all at once.1 This helps explain why selling prices have been able to rise relative to unit labor costs, raising margins in the process (Chart II-12). Let’s start by looking at the concept of market concentration. According to Grullon, Larkin and Michaely, sales of the median publicly traded firms, expressed in constant dollars, have nearly tripled since the mid-1990s, while real GDP has only increased 70% (Chart II-13).2 The escalation in market concentration is also vividly demonstrated in Chart II-14. The top panel shows that since 1997, most U.S. industries have experienced sharp increases in their Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI),3 a measure of concentration. In fact, more than half of U.S. industries have experienced concentration increases of more than 40%, and as a corollary, more than 75% of industries have seen the number of firms decline by more than 40%. The last panel of the chart also highlights that this increase in concentration has been top-heavy, with a third of industries seeing the market share of their four biggest players rise by more than 40%. Rising market concentration is therefore a broad phenomenon – not one unique to the tech sector. Chart II-13 Chart II-14     This rising market concentration has also happened on the employment front. In 1995, less than 24% of U.S. private sector employees worked for firms with 10,000 or more employees, versus nearly 28% today. This does not seem particularly dramatic. However, at the local level, the number of regions where employment is concentrated with one or two large employers has risen. Azar, Marinescu and Steinbaum developed Map II-1, which shows that 75% of non-metropolitan areas now have high or extreme levels of employment concentration.4 Chart II- Chart II-15The Owners Of Capital Are Keeping The Proceeds Of The Meagre Productivity Gains The Owners Of Capital Are Keeping The Proceeds Of The Meagre Productivity Gains The Owners Of Capital Are Keeping The Proceeds Of The Meagre Productivity Gains This growing market power of companies on employment can have a large impact on wages. Chart II-15 shows that real wages have lagged productivity since the turn of the millennium. Meanwhile, Chart II-16 plots real wages on the y-axis versus the HHI of applications (top panel) and vacancies (bottom panel). This chart shows that for any given industry, if applicants in a geographical area do not have many options where to apply – i.e. a few dominant employers provide most of the jobs in the region – real wages lag the national average. The more concentrated vacancies as well as applications are with one employer, the greater the discount to national wages in that industry.5 This is pure market power, and it helps explain the gap between wages and productivity as well as the widening gap between metropolitan and non-metropolitan household incomes. Chart II-16 Growing market power and concentration do not only compress labor costs, they also result in higher prices for consumers. This seems paradoxical in a world of low inflation. But inflation could have been even lower if market concentration had remained at pre-2000s levels. In 2009, Matthew Weinberg showed that over the previous 22 years, horizontal mergers within an industry resulted in higher prices.6 In a 2014 meta-study conducted by Weinberg along with Orley Ashenfelter and Daniel Hosken, the authors showed that across 49 studies ranging across 21 industries, 36 showed that horizontal mergers resulted in higher prices for consumers.7 While today’s technology may be enhancing the productive potential of our economies, this is not benefiting output and measured productivity. Instead, it is boosting profit margins. In a low-inflation environment, the only way for companies to garner pricing power is to decrease competition, and M&As are the quickest way to achieve this goal. After examining nearly 50 merger and antitrust studies spanning more than 3,000 merger cases, John Kwoka found that, following mergers that augmented an industry’s concentration, prices increased in 95% of cases, and on average by 4.5%.8 In no industry is this effect more vividly demonstrated than in the healthcare field, an industry that has undergone a massive wave of consolidation – from hospitals, to pharmacies to drug manufacturers. As Chart II-17 illustrates, between 1980 and 2016, healthcare costs have increased at a much faster pace in the U.S. than in the rest of the world. However, life expectancy increased much less than in other advanced economies. Chart II-17 In this context of growing market concentration, it is easy to see why, as De Loecker and Eeckhout have argued, markups have been rising steadily since the 1980s (Chart II-18, top panel) and have tracked M&A activity (Chart II-18, bottom panel).9 In essence, mergers and acquisitions have been the main tool used by firms to increase their concentration. Another tool at their disposal has been the increase in patents. The top panel of Chart II-19 shows that the total number of patent applications in the U.S. has increased by 3.6-fold since the 1980s, but most interestingly, the share of patents coming from large, dominant players within each industry has risen by 10% over the same timeframe (Chart II-19, bottom panel). To use Warren Buffet’s terminology, M&A and patents have been how firms build large “moats” to limit competition and protect their businesses. Chart II-18Markups Rise Along With Growing M&A Activity Markups Rise Along With Growing M&A Activity Markups Rise Along With Growing M&A Activity Chart II-19How To Build A Moat? How To Build A Moat? How To Build A Moat?   Why is this rise in market concentration affecting productivity? First, from an empirical perspective, rising markups and concentration tend to lead to lower levels of capex. A recent IMF study shows that the more concentrated industries become, the higher the corporate savings rate goes (Chart II-20, top panel).10 These elevated savings reflect wider markups, but also firms with markups in the top decile of the distribution display significantly lower investment rates (Chart II-20, bottom panel). If more of the U.S. output is generated by larger, more concentrated firms, this leads to a lower pace of increase in the capital stock, which hurts productivity. Chart II-20 Chart II-   Second, downward pressure on real wages is also linked to a drag on productivity. Monopolies and oligopolies are not incentivized to maximize output. In fact, for any market, a monopoly should lead to lower production than perfect competition would. Diagram II-I from De Loecker and Eeckhout shows that moving from perfect competition to a monopoly results in a steeper labor demand curve as the monopolist produces less. As a result, real wages move downward and the labor participation force declines. Does this sound familiar? The rise of market power might mean that in some way Martin Feldstein was right about productivity being mismeasured – just not the way he anticipated. In a June 2017 Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, Peter Berezin showed that labor-saving technologies like AI and robotics, which are increasingly being deployed today, could lead to lower wages (Chart II-21).11 For a given level of technology in the economy, productivity is positively linked to real wages but inversely linked to markups – especially if the technology is of the labor-saving kind. So, if markups rise on the back of firms’ growing market power, the ensuing labor savings will not be used to increase actual input. Rather, corporate savings will rise. Thus, while today’s technology may be enhancing the productive potential of our economies, this is not benefiting output and measured productivity. Instead, it is boosting profit margins.12 Unsurprisingly, return on assets and market concentration are positively correlated (Chart II-22). Chart II-21 Chart II-22     Finally, market power and concentration weighing on capex, wages and productivity are fully consistent with higher returns of cash to shareholders and lower interest rates. The higher profits and lower capex liberate cash flows available to be redistributed to shareholders. Moreover, lower capex also depresses demand for savings in the economy, while weak wages depress middle-class incomes, which hurts aggregate demand. Additionally, higher corporate savings increases the wealth of the richest households, who have a high marginal propensity to save. This results in higher savings for the economy. With a greater supply of savings and lower demand for those savings, the neutral rate of interest has been depressed. Investment Implications First, in an environment of low inflation, investors should continue to favor businesses that can generate higher markups via pricing power. Equity investors should therefore continue to prefer industries where horizontal mergers are still increasing market concentration. Second, so long as the status quo continues, wages will have a natural cap, and so will the neutral rate of interest. This does not mean that wage growth cannot increase further on a cyclical basis, but it means that wages are unlikely to blossom as they did in the late 1960s, even within a very tight labor market. Without too-severe an inflation push from wages, the business cycle could remain intact even longer, keeping a window open for risk assets to rise further on a cyclical basis. Third, long-term investors need to keep a keen eye on the political sphere. A much more laissez-faire approach to regulation, a push toward self-regulation, and a much laxer enforcement of antitrust laws and merger rules were behind the rise in market power and concentration.13 The particularly sharp ascent of populism in Anglo-Saxon economies, where market power increased by the greatest extent, is not surprising. So far, populists have not blamed the corporate sector, but if the recent antitrust noise toward the Silicon Valley behemoths is any indication, the clock is ticking. On a structural basis, this could be very negative for asset prices. An end to this rise in market power would force profit margins to mean-revert toward their long-term trend, which is 4.7 percentage-points below current levels. This will require discounting much lower cash flows in the future. Additionally, by raising wages and capex, more competition would increase aggregate demand and lift real interest rates. Higher wages and aggregate demand could also structurally lift inflation. Thus, not only will investors need to discount lower cash flows, they will have to do so at higher discount rates. As a result, this cycle will likely witness both a generational peak in equity valuations as well as structural lows in bond yields. As we mentioned, these changes are political in nature. We will look forward to studying the political angle of this thesis to get a better handle on when these turning points will likely emerge. Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst   III. Indicators And Reference Charts Over the past two weeks, the ECB has made a dovish pivot, President Trump announced he would meet President Xi, and the Fed telegraphed a rate cut for July. In response, the S&P 500 made marginal new highs before softening anew. This lack of continuation after such an incredible alignment of stars shows that the bulls lack conviction. These dynamics increase the probability that the market sells off after the G-20 meeting, as we saw last December following the supposed truce in Buenos Aires. The short-term outlook remains dangerous. Our Revealed Preference Indicator (RPI) confirms this intuition. The RPI combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and policy measures. It provides a powerful bullish signal if positive market momentum lines up with constructive readings from the policy and valuation measures. Conversely, if stong market momentum is not supported by valuation and policy, investors should lean against the market trend. Cheaper valuations, a pick-up in global growth or an actual policy easing is required before stocks can resume their ascent. The cyclical outlook is brighter than the tactical one. Our Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicator for the U.S. and Japan continues to improve. However, it remains flat in Europe. The WTP indicator tracks flows, and thus provides information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. In aggregate, the WTP currently suggests that investors are still inclined to add to their stock holdings. Hence, we expect global investors will continue to buy the dips. Our Monetary Indicator is moving deeper into stimulative territory, supporting our cyclically constructive equity view. The Fed and the ECB are set to cut rates while other global central banks have been opening the monetary spigots. This will support global monetary conditions. The BCA Composite Valuation Indicator, an amalgamation of 11 measures, is in overvalued territory, but it is not high enough to negate the positive message from our Monetary Indicator, especially as our Composite Technical Indicator remains above its 9-month moving average. These dynamics confirm that despite the near-term downside, equities have more cyclical upside. According to our model, 10-year Treasurys are now expensive. Moreover, our technical indicator is increasingly overbought while the CRB Raw Industrials is oversold, a combination that often heralds the end of bond rallies. Additionally, duration surveys show that investors have very elevated portfolio duration, and both the term premium and Fed expectations are very depressed. Considering this technical backdrop, BCA’s economic view implies minimal short-term downside for yields, but significant downside for Treasury prices over the upcoming year. On a PPP basis, the U.S. dollar remains very expensive. Additionally, after forming a negative divergence with prices, our Composite Technical Indicator is falling quickly. Being a momentum currency, the dollar could suffer significant downside if this indicator falls below zero. Monitor these developments closely. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators   Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance   FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9U.S. Treasurys And Valuations U.S. Treasurys And Valuations U.S. Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes Yield Curve Slopes Yield Curve Slopes Chart III-11Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components Chart III-13U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets   CURRENCIES: Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-17U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals   COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning   ECONOMY: Chart III-28U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-30U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-31U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-32U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market Chart III-33U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption Chart III-34U.S. Housing U.S. Housing U.S. Housing Chart III-35U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging   Chart III-36U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China   Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Footnotes 1       Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "June 2019," dated May 30, 2019, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 2       Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report "Give Credit Where Credit Is Due," dated November 27, 2015, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 3       Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report "Europe: Here I Am, Stuck In A Liquidity Trap," dated April 25, 2019, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 4       Money demand is mostly driven by the level of activity and wealth. If the price of money – interest rates – is growing more slowly than money demand, the most likely cause is that money supply is increasing faster than money demand and policy is accommodative. 5       A monopsony is a firm that controls the price of its input because it is the dominant, if not unique, buyer of said input. 6       G. Grullon, Y. Larkin and R. Michaely, “Are Us Industries Becoming More Concentrated?,” April 2017. 7       The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is calculated by taking the market share of each firm in the industry, squaring them, and summing the result. Consider a hypothetical industry with four total firm where firm1, firm2, firm3 and firm4 has 40%, 30%, 15% and 15% of market share, respectively. Then HHI is 402+302+152+152 = 2,950. 8       J. Azar, I. Marinescu, M. Steinbaum, “Labor Market Concentration,” December 2017. 9     J. Azar, I. Marinescu, M. Steinbaum, “Labor Market Concentration,” December 2017. 10     M. Weinberg, “The Price Effects Of Horizontal Mergers”, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Volume 4, Issue 2, June 2008, Pages 433–447. 11     O. Ashenfelter, D. Hosken, M. Weinberg, "Did Robert Bork Understate the Competitive Impact of Mergers? Evidence from Consummated Mergers," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(S3), pages S67 - S100. 12    J. Kwoka, “Mergers, Merger Control, and Remedies: A Retrospective Analysis of U.S. Policy,” MIT Press, 2015. 13     J. De Loecker, J. Eeckhout, G. Unger, "The Rise Of Market Power And The Macroeconomic Implications," Mimeo 2018. 14     “Chapter 2: The Rise of Corporate Market Power and Its Macroeconomic Effects,” World Economic Outlook, April 2019. 15     Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report "Is Slow Productivity Growth Good Or Bad For Bonds?"dated May 31, 2017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 16     Productivity can be written as: Image 17     J. Tepper, D. Hearn, “The Myth of Capitalism: Monopolies and the Death of Competition,” Wiley, November 2018. EQUITIES:FIXED INCOME:CURRENCIES:COMMODITIES:ECONOMY: