Asset Allocation

Highlights Beware of asset managers' and leveraged funds' large net long positions in EM currencies. Overextended net long positions in EM and commodities currencies signify overbought conditions in EM risk assets in general. This in tandem with the poor outlook for EM/China growth makes the risk-reward of EM financial markets unattractive. Downgrade Korean equities from overweight to neutral, but continue to overweight Korean technology stocks relative to the EM benchmark. Also, maintain the short KRW / long THB trade. Take profits on the long Indian / short Indonesian stocks position. Consistently, downgrade Indian stocks to neutral and upgrade Indonesian bourses to neutral within an EM equity portfolio. Feature Investor positioning in EM currencies is elevated. From a contrarian perspective, this at minimum warrants a correction. Chart I-1 illustrates that asset managers' and leveraged funds' combined net long positions in the Mexican peso, the Brazilian real, the Russian ruble and South African rand are very elevated.1 This aggregate is weighted by notional value of outstanding open interest of each currency, and is shown as a percentage of open interest. Importantly, we have refined positioning data to separate asset managers and leveraged funds from other non-commercial and commercial institutions. Asset managers and leveraged funds reflect investment community sentiment the best. Besides, they are the most inclined to scale back their net long positions if and when these currencies begin to depreciate, i.e., they are more momentum driven. By doing so, they will reinforce the selloff. Currently bullish sentiment on EM and commodities is corroborated by the fact that asset managers' and leveraged funds' aggregate net long positions in non-EM commodities currencies such as the CAD, the AUD and the NZD are at the highest level since 2011 (Chart I-2). Typically, these currencies are at risk of a correction when positioning reaches such excessive levels. Chart I-1Asset Manager's And Leveraged Funds' Net Long Positions In EM Currencies Are Large Asset Manager's And Leveraged Funds' Net Long Positions In EM Currencies Are Large Asset Manager's And Leveraged Funds' Net Long Positions In EM Currencies Are Large Chart I-2Asset Manager's And Leveraged Funds' Net ##br##Long Positions In Commodities Currencies Asset Manager's And Leveraged Funds' Net Long Positions In Commodities Currencies Asset Manager's And Leveraged Funds' Net Long Positions In Commodities Currencies Chart I-3A and Chart I-3B show the same for individual currencies such as the MXN, the BRL, the RUB, the ZAR, the CAD, the AUD and the NZD. The overarching message is that investors' net long exposure to both EM and commodities currencies is large and depreciation risk for these exchange rates is substantial, at least in the near term. Chart I-3AAsset Managers And Leveraged Funds' Net ##br##Long Positions In Select Currencies Asset Managers And Leveraged Funds' Net Long Positions In Select Currencies Asset Managers And Leveraged Funds' Net Long Positions In Select Currencies Chart I-3BAsset Managers And Leveraged Funds' Net ##br##Long Positions In Select Currencies Asset Managers And Leveraged Funds' Net Long Positions In Select Currencies Asset Managers And Leveraged Funds' Net Long Positions In Select Currencies Yet, these positioning data do not reveal whether potential weakness will be a bull market correction or the beginning of bear market. Our bias remains that the potential selloff will evolve into a new phase of the bear market in EM currencies that began in 2011. In turn, as EM currencies depreciate, they will erode foreign investors' returns and trigger a selloff in other EM risk assets such as stocks, domestic bonds and credit markets. In short, investor sentiment on EM risk assets correlates with sentiment toward both EM and commodities currencies. Hence, bullish sentiment and overextended net long positions in EM and commodities currencies signify overbought conditions in EM risk assets in general. The Cyclical Outlook Chart I-4EM Currency Valuations Are Close To Neutral EM Currency Valuations Are Close To Neutral EM Currency Valuations Are Close To Neutral We are negative on the cyclical outlook for EM currencies for the following reasons: With a few minor exceptions, EM currencies are not cheap; their valuations are close to neutral Chart I-4 demonstrates the real effective exchange rate for aggregate EM excluding China, Korea and Taiwan. This is an equity market cap-weighted aggregate. It shows that EM exchange rate valuations are not depressed. The reason why we remove China, Korea and Taiwan from the calculation is because their respective bourses have large equity market-cap weights in the MSCI EM stock index, and thereby dominate the EM aggregate. Excluding these three markets, we get a less skewed perspective on EM currency valuations and assign higher weight to the high-yielding ones. Importantly, the best measure of currency valuation is, in our opinion, the real effective exchange rate based on unit labor costs (ULC). The rationale is that this measure captures changes in wages and productivity. The latter two are critical to competitiveness and, hence, reveal the true valuation of currencies. Unfortunately, there is no available ULC-based real effective exchange rate data for all individual EM currencies. Chart I-5A and Chart I-5B presents the measure for countries where data from reputable sources are available. By and large, the message is that, with the exception of the Mexican peso, EM currencies are not particularly cheap. Chart I-5AReal Effective Exchange Rates ##br##Based On Unit Labor Costs Real Effective Exchange Rates Based On Unit Labor Costs Real Effective Exchange Rates Based On Unit Labor Costs Chart I-5BReal Effective Exchange Rates ##br##Based On Unit Labor Costs Real Effective Exchange Rates Based On Unit Labor Costs Real Effective Exchange Rates Based On Unit Labor Costs The outlook for EM exchange rates has historically been contingent on growth and corporate profitability in developing economies. That said, EM exchange rate fluctuations have in recent years become dependent on U.S. real interest rates as the importance of portfolio fixed-income flows into EM has dramatically surged. Both drivers - EM growth and U.S. real yields - are likely to become headwinds for EM exchange rates going forward. EM growth will relapse anew as Chinese growth slows and EM shipments to China decline. Our new money impulse for China2 has historically been a good leading indicator for EM exchange rates, and it points to potentially considerable EM currency depreciation in the next six to nine months (Chart I-6). Meanwhile, U.S. interest rate expectations are very depressed. It will take only slightly stronger U.S. growth and inflation readings or some non-dovish guidance from the Federal Reserve for U.S. interest rate expectations to move higher. The latter will support the U.S. dollar and hurt EM currencies. Although industrial metals prices have recently spiked to new cyclical highs, we believe commodities prices - both for energy and industrial materials - will be lower in the medium term. Global oil stocks are breaking to new cyclical lows, heralding weakness in crude prices (Chart I-7). The fact that oil has failed to post gains amid a notable rally in the euro could be a sign of fundamental vulnerability. Chart I-6China's Money Impulse And EM Currencies China's Money Impulse And EM Currencies China's Money Impulse And EM Currencies Chart I-7Oil Prices Are Vulnerable Oil Prices Are Vulnerable Oil Prices Are Vulnerable As for industrial metals prices, our analysis has not changed: the considerable slowdown in China's broad money heralds a major top in industrial metals prices, as per Chart I-8. The mainland accounts for 50% of global industrial metals consumption, and its capex cycle is of critical importance. What explains the latest spike in base metals prices? Chart I-9 reveals that since early this year, iron ore prices have been negatively correlated with Chinese money market rates (interest rates are shown inverted and are advanced by 30 days Chart I-9). This year's correction and subsequent rebound in iron ore prices might be attributed to changes in mainland traders' positioning due to swings in domestic interest rates. Chart I-8China-Plays Are At Risk China-Plays Are At Risk China-Plays Are At Risk Chart I-9Chinese Interest Rates And Iron Ore Prices Chinese Interest Rates And Iron Ore Prices Chinese Interest Rates And Iron Ore Prices Going forward, either China's growth will decelerate sufficiently enough to weigh on industrial metals prices, or the authorities will resume policy tightening to rein in financial excesses. All in all, the risk-reward for iron ore and other industrial metals is negative. On the whole, lower energy and industrial metals prices will weigh on EM commodities currencies. As for Asian currencies, they are sensitive to global trade. We expect global trade and tradable goods prices to relapse due to the resumption of a slowdown in China/EM demand. Manufacturing-based Asian currencies will depreciate amid budding weakness in their manufacturing sector (Chart I-10). In addition, Chart I-11 shows global auto sales lead global semiconductor sales by several months. The basis for this correlation is that autos nowadays use a lot of semiconductors, and therefore auto cycles affect semiconductor demand. The boom in semi-cycle has been one of the pillars of Asian exports recovery. As the former moderates, the latter will relapse weighing on Asian non-commodities currencies. Chart I-10Asian Manufacturing ##br##And Exchange Rates Asian Manufacturing And Exchange Rates Asian Manufacturing And Exchange Rates Chart I-11Global Auto Sales Lead ##br##Global Semiconductor Sales Global Auto Sales Lead Global Semiconductor Sales Global Auto Sales Lead Global Semiconductor Sales Bottom Line: Our bet remains that EM currencies will depreciate versus both the U.S. dollar and the euro - and regardless of euro/U.S. dollar exchange rate fluctuations. We recommend a short position in a basket of the following EM currencies: ZAR, TRY, COP, CLP, BRL, IDR, MYR and KRW. For market-neutral portfolios, our currency overweights are MXN, RUB, PLN, CZK, TWD, INR and THB. Korean Equities: Downgrading To Neutral We recommend downgrading Korea to neutral from overweight within EM equity portfolios. North Korea will likely remain a source of uncertainty and volatility. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service does not expect war on the Korean peninsula as long-standing constraints to conflict are still in place, starting with Pyongyang's ability to cause massive civilian casualties north of Seoul via an artillery barrage. As such, the ultimate resolution to the conflict will be a peaceful one. However, getting from here (volatility) to there (negotiated resolution) requires more tensions. The U.S. has to establish a "credible threat" of war in order to move China and North Korea towards a negotiated resolution.3 And that process could take more time, which means more volatility in the markets.4 The overwhelming portion of Korea's equity rally has been driven by a phenomenal surge in one company's share price: Samsung. Excluding technology companies, the performance of MSCI Korea stock prices and their EPS has been mediocre. Samsung's explosive rally has been partially due to the exponential surge in DRAM prices (Chart I-12). On a macro level, we cannot forecast prices of individual semiconductors (such as DRAM). Nevertheless, our assessment is that the global semi cycle is entering a soft patch as per Chart I-11 above. Furthermore, Korea's cyclical growth has already peaked, and will slow going forward (Chart I-13). Broad money growth is still decelerating, entailing that no turnaround is in the cards (Chart I-13, bottom panel). Chart I-12Samsung Share Prices And DRAM Samsung Share Prices And DRAM Samsung Share Prices And DRAM Chart I-13Korea: Cyclical Profile Korea: Cyclical Profile Korea: Cyclical Profile Importantly, the new government has enacted a law to boost minimum wages by 16% in January 2018 and would need to increase by a similar rate annually to reach its 2020 target. Even though there are fiscal subsidies for businesses and minimum wages affect smaller businesses much more than larger ones, odds are that this will still boost overall wage growth, and hence weigh on companies' profit margins. Chart I-14Korean Won Is Expensive Versus The Yen Korean Won Is Expensive Versus The Yen Korean Won Is Expensive Versus The Yen Finally, the Korean won is modestly expensive, based on the unit labor costs-based real effective exchange rate (Chart I-14, top panel). The won is especially expensive versus the yen (Chart I-14, bottom panel). This is negative for Korean manufacturers and the currency. Investment Recommendations Downgrade Korean stocks from overweight to neutral, but continue to overweight Korean technology stocks relative to the EM benchmark. Close long Korea / short EM equities and long Korean banks / short Indonesian banks positions. These positions have produced small gains since their initiation (details on all our open positions are available at the end of each week's report on page 17). Maintain a short KOSPI / long Nikkei in common currency terms trade: Either the won will depreciate substantially versus the yen or the KOSPI will underperform the Nikkei in local currency terms. In both cases, this trade will be profitable. Continue to bet on lower bond yields in Korea via receiving 10-year swap rates. Deflationary pressures from weaker exports - that make up 35% of GDP - will weigh on economic growth, and the central bank will be forced to cut rates. Maintain a short Korean won / long Thai baht position. The won is a high-beta currency and will underperform the Thai baht in a selloff / Asian exports slowdown. The Thai currency will likely trade in a low beta fashion due to the country's large current account surplus and low exposure to both China and commodities. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Take Profits On Long Indian / Short Indonesian Equities Position This recommendation has generated 8.4% gain since its initiation on July 30, 2014, and we recommend booking profits. Indian share prices have outperformed their Indonesian peers over the past year (Chart II-1) but the outlook for top line growth appears to be slightly better in Indonesia than in India. Specifically: We have combined bank credit to businesses and households with government expenditures to calculate a credit and fiscal spending impulse for both countries. Chart II-2 illustrates that this impulse heralds a more positive outlook for listed companies' revenues in the case of Indonesia than India. Chart II-1Book Profits On Long Indian / ##br##Short Indonesian Stocks Position Book Profits On Long Indian / Short Indonesian Stocks Position Book Profits On Long Indian / Short Indonesian Stocks Position Chart II-2Credit And Fiscal Spending ##br##Impulse Favor Indonesia Over India Credit And Fiscal Spending Impulse Favor Indonesia Over India Credit And Fiscal Spending Impulse Favor Indonesia Over India Other cyclical variables are mixed in both economies: vehicle and two-wheeler sales are sluggish, manufacturing PMIs have rolled over, but imports of capital goods are improving (Chart II-3). In regard to valuation and profitability, both bourses are expensive in absolute terms (Chart II-4, top panel) but India's return on equity (RoE) is well below Indonesia's (Chart II-4, bottom panel). Such a 14% premium of Indian stocks over Indonesian ones along with a poor revenue outlook and lower RoE might prevent further share price outperformance by India. Chart II-3Mixed Cyclical Growth Dynamics Mixed Cyclical Growth Dynamics Mixed Cyclical Growth Dynamics Chart II-4India And Indonesian Equities: P/E Ratios And RoEs India And Indonesian Equities: P/E Ratios And RoEs India And Indonesian Equities: P/E Ratios And RoEs Although our negative outlook for commodities prices and expensive equity valuations entail a negative stance on Indonesian risk assets in absolute terms, we believe this bourse's underperformance versus the EM overall equity index and Indian stocks is late. It makes sense to reduce/eliminate an underweight allocation to Indonesian equities. Bottom Line: We recommend booking gains on the long Indian / short Indonesia equity position initiated on July 30, 2014. Consistently, we downgrade Indian stocks from overweight to neutral and upgrade Indonesian ones from underweight to neutral within an EM equity portfolio. Ayman Kawtharani, Associate Editor ayman@bcaresearch.com 1 CFTC is the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission. The data on South African rand is available from May 2015. 2 Presented and discussed in detail in July 26, 2017 and August 16, 2017 reports; the links are available on page 18. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "North Korea: Beyond Satire," April 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Can Pyongyang Derail The Bull Market?," August 16, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights Portfolio Strategy Execute a long S&P energy/short global gold miners pair trade to take advantage of the liquidity-to-growth handoff. Initiate another new trade, long S&P materials/short S&P utilities, to benefit from a shifting macro landscape. Synchronized global growth and commodity inflation are a boon for materials, but a bane for utilities. Recent Changes Initiate a long S&P energy/short global gold miners pair trade today. Initiate a long S&P materials/short utilities pair trade today. Table 1 Fraying Around The Edges? Fraying Around The Edges? Feature The S&P 500 failed to hold on to gains and drifted lower last week succumbing to Washington-related uncertainty. The transition from liquidity-to-growth remains the dominant macro theme which is prone to bouts of volatility. Nevertheless, a less hawkish Fed should, at the margin, underpin equities with easy monetary and financial conditions complementing the goldilocks equity backdrop (Chart 1). In fact, the St. Louis Fed Financial Stress Index (comprising "18 weekly data series: seven interest rate series, six yield spreads and five other indicators"1) is probing multi-decade lows. This primarily bond market-dependent indicator, has historically done an excellent job in leading the S&P 500 at major turning points at both peaks and troughs (Chart 2A). Recently, it has been more of a coincident indicator with equities, and currently waves the all-clear sign (St. Louis Fed Financial Stress Index shown inverted, Chart 2B). Chart 1Timid Fed Is Supportive Timid Fed Is Supportive Timid Fed Is Supportive Chart 2AExcellent Leading Properties Excellent Leading Properties Excellent Leading Properties Chart 2BAll Clear All Clear All Clear Nevertheless, we do not want to sound too complacent and following up from last week's brief discussion of rising geopolitical uncertainty and equity market performance, we are examining key post-WWII geopolitical events in more detail. The first three columns of Table 2, courtesy of BCA's Geopolitical Strategy Service2, update these episodes to mid-2017. While the S&P 500's drawdown from the three-month peak prior to the event to the three-month trough following the event averages out to roughly 10%, drilling beneath the surface is instructive. Table 2Geopolitical Crises And SPX Returns Fraying Around The Edges? Fraying Around The Edges? On average, broad equity market returns are muted one and three months post the event. Interestingly, on a six- and twelve-month horizon following the geopolitical incident, the S&P clearly shoots higher rising on average 5% and 8%, respectively (Table 2). Chart 3 shows the average profile of the S&P 500's returns during all of these post-WWII events, three months prior to the incident up to one year forward. Chart 3Geopolitical Opportunity? Geopolitical Opportunity? Geopolitical Opportunity? Two key takeaways stand out from this analysis. First, the coming quarter will likely prove volatile as the dust has yet to settle from the recent North Korea escalation. As a result, tactically buying some portfolio protection when the market is near all-time highs, as we cautioned last week3, is prudent and in order, especially given the seasonally challenging months of September and October. Second, on a cyclical horizon, the S&P 500 will likely resume its advance, ceteris paribus. Thus, if history at least rhymes and barring another major flare up of geopolitical risk, the path of least resistance will be higher for the overall equity market into mid-2018. This week we are executing two market neutral pair trades, one levered to the liquidity-to-growth handoff and the other to the synchronized global growth theme. Liquidity-To-Growth Handoff: Buy Energy/Sell Gold Producers A market-neutral way to benefit from the ongoing equity overshoot phase is to go long U.S. energy stocks/short global gold miners (Chart 4). This high-octane trade would benefit most from the handoff of global liquidity to economic growth. Relative share prices have plummeted since the mid-December 2016 peak, collapsing 34%. The selloff in oil prices along with a more accommodative Fed have propelled global gold miners and punished U.S. energy stocks. More recently, increasing geopolitical risks have also boosted flows into bullion and gold-related equities. However, if our thesis that growth will trump liquidity - posited three weeks ago4 - pans out in the coming months, then relative share prices should reverse. Gold prices serve as a global fear proxy, while energy prices move with the ebb and flow of global growth. Importantly, the oil/gold ratio (OGR) hit all-time lows in early 2016 and subsequently enjoyed a V-shaped recovery. But, year-to-date the OGR has relapsed on the back of rising policy uncertainty (policy uncertainty shown inverted, Chart 5). If this geopolitical uncertainty recedes, the upshot is that the OGR will rise in response. Chart 4Ready For A Bounce Ready For A Bounce Ready For A Bounce Chart 5Prefer Black Gold To Bullion Prefer Black Gold To Bullion Prefer Black Gold To Bullion Importantly, global trade is reaccelerating, also suggesting that the OGR should resume its advance (Chart 5). Chart 6 shows a simple growth/liquidity gauge using BCA's Global Synchronicity Indicator. Historically, this metric has been closely correlated with relative share price momentum, and the current message is to expect a sharp turn in oversold relative share prices. Moreover, were the liquidity thrust to convert into significantly higher output, then real interest rates should begin to reflect better growth prospects, and further boost the allure of the pair trade. As with bullion, the relative share price ratio is also overly sensitive to changes in real rates. In fact the 10-year TIPS yield does an excellent job in explaining relative share price fluctuation. Even a modest upturn in real interest rates will go a long way for relative share prices (Chart 7). Chart 6Ample Catch Up Space Ample Catch Up Space Ample Catch Up Space Chart 7Liquidity-To-Growth Beneficiary Liquidity-To-Growth Beneficiary Liquidity-To-Growth Beneficiary Meanwhile, on the relative operating front, the tide is also turning, favoring energy stocks versus gold miners. The oil and gas rig count has recovered smartly from the depths of the global manufacturing recession of late 2015/early-2016. On the flip side, demand for safe haven assets should ebb and further weigh on global gold ETF flows. Additional capital inflows into gold ETF funds from current levels would require either a sizable flare up in global geopolitical risk or another downdraft in global growth. Taken together, this relative demand indicator has surged, signaling that a catch up phase looms for the relative share price ratio (bottom panel, Chart 8). Similarly, relative pricing power is on the verge of climbing into expansionary territory. Extremely depressed pricing power for oil & gas field machinery is unlikely to deflate further, as recent anecdotes of new capital expenditure projects provide some glimmers of light for utilization rates. Conversely, bullion prices are pushing $1,300/oz. near the upper bound of the four year trading range, warning that at least a digestion phase lies ahead. The middle panel of Chart 8 shows that relative pricing power has been an excellent leading indicator of relative earnings. Our relative EPS models do an excellent job in capturing all of these different macro forces, and at the current juncture emit an unambiguously bullish signal: energy EPS will outshine gold producers' profits as the year draws to a close (Chart 9). Finally, relative valuations and technicals are both flashing a green light. Relative value is as compelling as it was during the depths of the Great Recession (middle panel, Chart 10), while our Technical Indicator is one standard deviation below the historical mean. Every time such extreme oversold levels are hit, relative performance has catapulted higher in the subsequent 3-6 months. Chart 8Relative Demand And Price Outlooks##br##Favor Energy Stocks Over Gold Miners Relative Demand And Price Outlooks Favor Energy Stocks Over Gold Miners Relative Demand And Price Outlooks Favor Energy Stocks Over Gold Miners Chart 9Earnings-Led##br## Outperformance Looms Earnings-Led Outperformance Looms Earnings-Led Outperformance Looms Chart 10Unloved ##br##And Oversold Unloved And Oversold Unloved And Oversold Bottom Line: Initiate a long S&P energy/short global gold miners pair trade to benefit from the passing of the baton from liquidity to growth. For investors seeking an alternative way to express this trade opportunity levered to the liquidity-to-growth theme, going long the S&P 1500 metals and mining index instead of the S&P energy sector would also produce similar results (bottom panel, Chart 9). New Pair Trade: Materials Vs. Utilities Macro conditions are ripe to initiate a market neutral trade: long materials/short utilities. This trade provides exposure to the budding shift in underlying portfolio strength away from defensives toward cyclicals5 and also from domestic to global-exposed market areas. In fact, our relative Cyclical Macro Indicators capture the shifting macro backdrop favoring a more cyclical portfolio tilt (Chart 11). The balance of macro evidence is skewing increasingly toward robust manufacturing growth at home and abroad. The ISM manufacturing and global PMI indexes have maintained their recent gains, signaling that the path of least resistance for the relative share price ratio is higher (Chart 12). Chart 11Reflation Trade Reflation Trade Reflation Trade Chart 12U.S. And... U.S. And... U.S. And... Reviving global growth is typically synonymous with rising inflation expectations and bond yields. BCA's view remains that a selloff in the bond markets is the most likely scenario in the coming months. The third panel of Chart 11 shows that relative share price momentum and the bond market are joined at the hip. This makes sense as materials stocks are reflationary beneficiaries, whereas the utilities sector acts as a fixed-income proxy. Not only does the pair trade benefit from rising bond yields in isolation, but also when the stock-to-bond (S/B) ratio is on fire. Currently, a wide gap has opened between the S/B and the materials/utilities ratios that will likely narrow via a catch up phase in the latter. Synchronized global growth suggests that a relative earnings-led recovery will buttress this pair trade higher. Chart 13 highlights four different ways of depicting coordinated EM and DM economic growth, giving us confidence that materials profits will outshine utilities EPS. Materials manufacturers have a sizable export component driving both the top and bottom line. In contrast, utilities are a domestic-only play. As a result, revving global trade and the significant fall in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar will buttress relative EPS prospects (Chart 14). In fact, irrespective of where the greenback ends the year, materials profits will get a lagged bump from a positive FX translation in the back half of the year. Chart 13...Global Growth Favor ##br##Materials Over Utilities ...Global Growth Favor Materials Over Utilities ...Global Growth Favor Materials Over Utilities Chart 14Cheapened Greenback = ##br##Buy Materials At The Expense Of Utilities Cheapened Greenback = Buy Materials At The Expense Of Utilities Cheapened Greenback = Buy Materials At The Expense Of Utilities The depreciating U.S. dollar is also a boon for commodity prices in general and base metals prices in particular. While natural gas prices are the marginal price setter for utilities pricing power, they represent an input feedstock cost to chemicals producers that dominate the materials sector. Taken together, a relative pricing power proxy suggests that materials stocks have the upper hand (bottom panel, Chart 14). Relative valuations and technical conditions also wave the green flag. Our valuation indicator has corrected back to the neutral zone and the technical indicator has unwound overbought conditions, offering a compelling entry point to the pair trade (Chart 15). Finally, our newly introduced relative EPS models encapsulate all of these diverging forces. Currently, the relative profit models signal that materials earnings are on track to outpace utilities profit generation for the remainder of the year (Chart 16). Chart 15Compelling Entry Point Compelling Entry Point Compelling Entry Point Chart 16Heed The Relative Profit Model Message Heed The Relative Profit Model Message Heed The Relative Profit Model Message Consequently, there is an opportunity to execute a long materials/short utilities pair trade in order to benefit from synchronized global growth and looming bond market selloff, and softening U.S. dollar and related commodity inflation. Bottom Line: Initiate a long S&P materials/short S&P utilities pair trade today. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy & Global Alpha Sector Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 https://www.stlouisfed.org/news-releases/st-louis-fed-financial-stress-index/stlfsi-key 2 Please see the August 16, 2017 Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report titled "Can Pyongyang Derail The Bull Market?", available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see the August 14, 2017 U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report titled "Three Risks", available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see July 31, 2017 U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report titled "Growth Trumps Liquidity", available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see the August 14, 2017 U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report titled "Three Risks" for a recap of our major portfolio moves since May 1, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor small over large caps and stay neutral growth over value.

Highlights Washington must establish a "credible threat" if it is to convince Pyongyang that negotiations offer the superior outcome; The process of establishing such a credible threat is volatile; U.S. Treasurys, along with Swiss and Japanese government bonds have been consistent safe haven assets; The risk of a U.S. attack against North Korea is a red herring, while the crisis itself is not; We suggest that investors hedge the risk with an equally-weighted basket of Swiss bonds and gold. Feature Brinkmanship between Pyongyang and Washington, D.C. has roiled markets over the past week. The uptick in rhetoric has not come as a surprise. Since last year, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy has stressed that souring Sino-American relations were the premier geopolitical risk to investors and that China's periphery, especially the Korean peninsula, would be the "decisive" factor for markets.1 North Korea's nuclear ambitions - which could be snuffed out immediately by a concerted and coordinated effort by China and the U.S. - are a derivative of the broader U.S.-China dynamic. The U.S. is unlikely to use military force to resolve its standoff with North Korea. There are long-standing constraints to war, ones that all of the interested parties know only too well from their experience in the Korean War of 1950-53. The first of these is that war is likely to bring a high death toll: Pyongyang can inflict massive civilian casualties in Seoul with a conventional artillery barrage; U.S. troops and Japanese troops and civilians would also likely suffer. Second, China is unlikely to remain neutral, given its behavior in the 1950s, its persistent strategic interest in the peninsula, and its huge increase in military strength relative to both the past and to the United States. However, the process by which the U.S. establishes a "credible threat" of military action is volatile.2 Such a credible threat is necessary if Washington is to convince Pyongyang that negotiations offer a superior outcome to the belligerent status quo. Viewed from this perspective - which is informed by game theory -President Donald Trump has not committed any grave mistakes so far, but has rather shrewdly manipulated the world's perception that he is mentally unhinged in order to enhance his negotiating leverage. It is unclear how long it will take Trump to convince North Korea that the threat of a U.S. preemptive strike is "credible." As such, it is unclear how long the current standoff will persist. From an investor perspective, it will be difficult to gauge whether the brinkmanship and military posturing are part of this "territorial threat display" or evidence of real preparations for an actual attack. As such, further volatility is likely. The ongoing crisis in North Korea is neither the first nor the last geopolitical crisis the world will face in today's era of paradigm shifts.3 We have long identified East Asia as the cauldron of investment-relevant geopolitical risks.4 This is a dynamic produced by the multipolar global context and the geopolitical disequilibrium in the Sino-American relationship. For now, investors have been able to ignore the rising global tensions (Chart 1) due to the ample liquidity emanating from central banks, but the day of reckoning is nigh (Chart 2). Chart 1Multipolarity Increases Conflict Frequency Multipolarity Increases Conflict Frequency Multipolarity Increases Conflict Frequency Chart 2Day Of Reckoning? Day Of Reckoning? Day Of Reckoning? Q&A On North Korea Back on April 19, we wrote a Special Report, "North Korea: Beyond Satire," which argued that North Korea had at last become a market-relevant geopolitical risk after decades of limited impact (Chart 3).5 Chart 3North Korean Provocations Rarely Affect Markets For Long North Korean Provocations Rarely Affect Markets For Long North Korean Provocations Rarely Affect Markets For Long Looking to the next steps, we introduced the "arc of diplomacy," a framework comparable to the U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations from 2010-15 (Chart 4). We predicted that the U.S. would ultimately ramp up threats for the purpose of achieving a diplomatic solution. The U.S. was constrained and would only go to war if an act of war were committed, or appeared imminent.6 Chart 4Arc Of Diplomacy: Tensions Ramp Up As Nuclear Negotiations Begin Can Pyongyang Derail The Bull Market? Can Pyongyang Derail The Bull Market? This assessment is now playing out. But not all clients are convinced of our logic, as we have found in our travels throughout Asia Pacific and elsewhere this month. Below we offer a short Q&A based on questions we have received from clients: Q: Diplomacy has already been tried, so why won't the U.S. attack? A: The U.S. public has less appetite for war, especially a preemptive strike, in the wake of the Iraq War, and has not suffered a 9/11 or Pearl Harbor-type catalyst. The U.S. will exhaust diplomatic options before joining a catastrophic second Korean War. And the diplomatic options are far from exhausted. The latest round of sanctions are tighter and more serious than past ones, but still leave categories untouched (like fuel supplies to the North) and are still very hard to enforce (like cutting illegal North Korean labor remittances). Enforcement is always difficult, and the U.S. is currently attempting to ensure that its allies enforce the sanctions strictly, not to mention its rivals (i.e. Russia and China). While we do not think China will ever impose crippling sanctions, we do think it can tighten them up considerably, which could be enough to change the North's behavior. Q: Why doesn't China just take North Korea out? A: China is a formal political, military, and ideological ally of North Korea, and has a strategic interest in maintaining a buffer space on the Korean peninsula - which it defended at enormous human cost in the Korean War. This interest remains in place. China is far more likely to aid and abet a nuclear-armed ally in North Korea than it is to endorse (much less participate in) regime change. The fallout from a new war, such as North Korean refugees flooding into China, is extremely undesirable for China, though it could handle the problem ruthlessly. China would also prefer not to have to occupy a collapsing North, which would be an extensive and dangerous entanglement. Therefore, expect China to twist Pyongyang's arm but not to break its legs. On a more topical note, China is consumed with domestic politics ahead of the nineteenth National Party Congress. It is perhaps more likely to take action after the congress in October-November. Q: Will U.S. allies cooperate with Trump? Why not bandwagon with China to gain economic benefit? A: South Korea is the best litmus test for whether Trump is causing U.S. allies to drift. The new South Korean President Moon Jae-In, who is politically left-of-center, has played his cards very carefully and started out on good footing with President Trump. A disagreement appears to be a likely consequence of Moon's agenda, which calls for extensive engagement with the North and a review of the U.S. THAAD missile defense deployment in Korea. So far, however, Moon is reaffirming the alliance, in his own way, and Trump has not (yet) expressed misgivings about him. If this changes significantly - as in, South Korea joining with China to give North Korea significant economic aid in defiance of U.S. sanctions efforts - then it would be a sign of division among the allies that would benefit North Korea and could even increase the risk of the U.S. taking unilateral action. The odds of that are still low, however. We have been short the Korean won versus the Thai baht since March 1, and the trade is up 6.03%. We also expect greater volatility and higher prices of credit default swaps to plague South Korea while the crisis continues over the coming months. We are closing our long Korean consumer stocks trade versus Taiwanese exporters for a loss of 4.24%. Q: What is Japan's role in the current crisis? What is the impact on Japan? A: Japan is one of the few countries whose relations with the U.S. have benefited under the Trump administration. The Japanese are in lock-step so far in reacting to North Korea. The government has been sounding louder alarms about North Korea for the past year, including by conducting evacuation drills in the case of attack. Japan has long been within range of North Korea's missiles, but its successes in nuclear miniaturization pose a much greater threat. Not only does North Korea pose a legitimate security risk, but Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe also stands to benefit at least marginally in terms of popular support and support for his controversial constitutional revision. This will, in turn, feed into the region's insecurities. Yen strength as a result of the crisis, however, would be a headwind to Japan's economic growth. Thus Abe has a tightrope to walk. We expect him to take actions to ensure the economy continues to reflate. Q: Is Trump rational? How do we know he won't push the nuclear button? A: Ultimately this is unknowable. It also involves one's philosophical outlook. Josef Stalin and Mao Zedong both committed atrocities by the tens of millions but did not use nuclear weapons. Nikita Khrushchev practically wrote the playbook that North Korea's Kim dynasty has used in making its belligerent nuclear threats. Yet Khrushchev ultimately agreed to détente. Kim Jong Un makes Trump look calm. The combination of Kim and Trump is worrisome; but so was the combination of Eisenhower and Khrushchev, one believing nuclear weapons should be used if needed, the other threatening wildly to use them. It may be the case that the threat of an atrocity, or (in Kim's case) of total annihilation, is enough to keep decisions restrained. As we go to press, Kim has ostensibly suspended his plan to fire missiles around Guam and U.S. officials have repeatedly stated that they would not attack unless attacked. Stairway To (Safe) Haven Revisited In expectation of increased frequency of geopolitical risks, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy has produced two quantitative analyses of safe haven assets over the past two years. The first, "Geopolitics And Safe Havens," unequivocally crowned gold as the ultimate safe haven (Table 1), while showing that the USD is not much of a defense against geopolitical events (Chart 5).7 Table 1Safe-Haven Demand Rises During Crises Can Pyongyang Derail The Bull Market? Can Pyongyang Derail The Bull Market? Table 1Safe-Haven Demand Rises During Crises Can Pyongyang Derail The Bull Market? Can Pyongyang Derail The Bull Market? As such, investors should fade the narrative that the failure of the USD to appreciate amidst the latest North Korean imbroglio is a sign of some structural weakness. The greenback continues to underperform due to weak inflation in the U.S., a fleeting condition that our macro-economist colleagues expect to reverse. Mathieu Savary, BCA's currency strategist, believes that more upside exists for the USD regardless of the geopolitical outcome: Chart 5Gold Loves Geopolitical Crises Can Pyongyang Derail The Bull Market? Can Pyongyang Derail The Bull Market? Chart 6DXY Is Cheap... DXY Is Cheap... DXY Is Cheap... Chart 7...But The Euro Is Not ...But The Euro Is Not ...But The Euro Is Not First, the dollar is currently trading at its deepest discount to the BCA Foreign Exchange Service augmented interest rate parity model since 2010 (Chart 6). The euro, which accounts for 58% of the DXY index, is its mirror image, being now overvalued by two sigma, the most since 2010 (Chart 7). Second, bullish euro bets will dissipate as Europe's economic outperformance versus the U.S. fades. Financial conditions have massively eased in the U.S., while they have tightened in Europe, resulting in the biggest upswing on euro area growth relative to the U.S. in over two years (Chart 8). Such an economic outperformance by the U.S. should lead to a strengthening greenback (Chart 9).8 Chart 8Easing Versus Tightening FCI Easing Versus Tightening FCI Easing Versus Tightening FCI Chart 9PMIs Point To USD Rally PMIs Point To USD Rally PMIs Point To USD Rally Our second attempt to quantify safe-haven assets, "Stairway To (Safe) Haven: Investing In Times Of Crisis," concluded that U.S. Treasurys, Swiss bonds, and Japanese bonds are the best performers in times of crisis.9 We considered 65 assets10 (Table 2) with five different methodologies and back-tested them empirically within the context of 25 financial and geopolitical events since January 1988. Some of these assets have been proven to perform as safe havens by previous academic research, some are commonly utilized in investment strategies, and others could provide alternatives (see Box 1 for further details). Table 2Scrutinizing The World For Safe Havens Can Pyongyang Derail The Bull Market? Can Pyongyang Derail The Bull Market? This report demystifies four key issues related to safe havens: Part I identifies what qualifies as a safe-haven asset. Unsurprisingly, the best performers are U.S. Treasurys along with Swiss and Japanese bonds due to their currency effects. Part II examines if safe havens change over time. We find that gold and Treasurys have changed places as safe havens, and that JGBs and Swiss bonds have a long history as portfolio protectors. Part III breaks down safe havens through an event analysis. We look at the country of origin, the nature of the crisis, and whether the risk is a "black swan" or "red herring" - two classifications of events that BCA's Geopolitical Strategy has established - all of which have an impact on their performance. But red herrings or black swans are only defined after the fact, thus requiring geopolitical analysis or market timing indicators to be able to act on them. Part IV demonstrates that timing plays a crucial part when investing in safe havens as their performance is coincident with that of equities. Box 1 Safe Havens - A Literature Review In a previous Geopolitical Strategy Special Report published in November 2015, it was established that shifts in economic and political regimes alter investors' preferences for safe-haven assets, and that Swiss bonds and U.S. 10-year Treasurys were at the top of that list.11 Also, statistical methods were used to demonstrate that gold had acted as a safe haven from the 1970s to the early 90s, but has since lost its status due in part to a new era of looming deflationary risks. Li and Lucey (2013) have identified a pattern in precious metals, through a series of quarterly rolling regressions testing the significance of the 1st, 5th and 10th percentile movements in U.S. equity movements against safe-haven assets, catching extreme negative events. For instance, the 1st percentile captures the very worst corrections that have occurred, the one that represent the bottom 1% of the equity performances. The 5th and 10th percentiles represent the 5% and 10% lowest returns for equities, respectively. The authors demonstrated that silver, platinum and palladium act as safe havens when gold does not.12 Similarly, Bauer and McDermott (2013) examined the 1st, 5th and 10th percentile movements in U.S. equity movements and proved that both gold and U.S. Treasurys can serve as safe havens, but that gold has the best record in times of extreme financial stress.13 Baele et al. (2015) concentrated on flight-to-safety episodes, which they characterized as events in which the VIX, TED spreads and a basket of CHF, JPY, and USD all increased drastically.14 They found that during flight-to-safety episodes, large cap stocks outperform small caps, precious metal and gold prices (measured in dollars) increase slightly, while bond returns exceed those of the equity market by 2.5-4 percentage points. Baur and Glover (2012) provide further evidence that gold can no longer be utilized as a safe haven due to increased speculation and hedging. Their main finding is that gold cannot be both an investment and a safe-haven asset. That is, gold can only be effective as a safe haven if the periods prior to the event had not generated significant investment demand for gold.15 Using high-frequency exchange rate data, Ranaldo and Soederlind (2010) conclude that the CHF, EUR and JPY have significant safe-haven characteristics, but not the GBP.16 The strongest safe havens are identified as the CHF and JPY, but the returns are partly reversed after a day of safe-haven protection. They also find that the nature of the crisis has a significant effect on safe-haven properties. For instance, a financial crisis and a natural disaster produced drastically different outcomes for the yen. Part I - Safety In Numbers Our first step in identifying safe-haven assets was to review each asset's performance against equities in times of crisis. As such, we conducted a series of threshold regressions to generate a list of true safe-haven assets - assets that have a statistically significant positive performance in times of turmoil. Our method is explained as follows: Step 1 - Percentile Dummies: Following methods from Li and Lucey (2013) and Bauer and McDermott (2013), we created dummy variables for the 1st, 5th and 10th percentile of the S&P 500 daily total returns since 1988. We then multiplied each of these dummies by their corresponding stock returns (see Box 1 for further detail). Step 2 - Regressions: Using the 64 potential safe-haven assets, we ran a series of regressions both in USD and the local currency, testing each asset's returns explained by the three percentile dummies.17 Step 3 - Identifying Safe Havens: We then quantified strong safe-havens as assets having significant coefficients for all three return thresholds (1st, 5th and 10th percentile of the S&P 500 daily total returns). Results - Seek Refuge In Currencies And Government Bonds: Our quantitative results are mainly consistent with what others have found in the past: the Japanese yen and most G10 government bonds are safe havens. Table 3 shows the safe-haven assets that generated negative coefficients versus equities for all three threshold percentiles. Table 3Seeking Protection Against Corrections Can Pyongyang Derail The Bull Market? Can Pyongyang Derail The Bull Market? In our threshold regressions expressed in USD terms, we found that the Japanese yen, Quality Stocks,18 and Japanese, Swiss and U.S. bonds acted as strong safe havens. Currencies play a crucial part in the performance of safe havens. In fact, in local-currency terms, a series of G10 government bonds (U.S., Canada, Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.K.) proved to be the most useful safe havens. In sum, true or strong safe havens are government bonds that have currencies that add to positive returns during times of crisis. Unsurprisingly, this select group of strong safe-haven assets is comprised of U.S., Japanese, and Swiss government bonds. Quality Stocks did provide positive and statistically significant results, but the returns were very low - for this reason, we excluded them from our basket of strong safe havens. While gold, the Swiss franc, and the U.S. dollar did generate positive returns during times of crisis, they failed to generate statistically significant results at all three thresholds. Bottom Line: Based on our econometric work, most G10 government bonds can act as safe havens. But due to strong currency effects, our models favor what are already commonly known as safe havens: U.S., Japanese, and Swiss government bonds. Simply put, the difference between this select group and other G10 bonds is that their currencies rise or are stable during turmoil, while the currencies of the other G10 bonds do not. Part II - Are Safe Havens Like Fine Wines? U.S., Japanese, and Swiss government bonds were not always the top assets providing protection against the downside in equities, however. To determine whether safe-haven properties change, we examined the evolution of the relationship between safe havens and U.S. equity markets over time with the following model: Step 1 - Rolling Regressions: Considering the results obtained in Part I, we restricted our sample to G10 governments in USD and local-currency terms, Quality Stocks, gold, JPY, EUR, and USD for this statistical procedure. We put these remaining assets, both in USD and local-currency terms, through a series of 1-year rolling regressions.19 Step 2 - Identifying Trends: Each regression generated a coefficient that explained the relationship between equities and safe havens (B1). We created a new time series by collecting the coefficients for each data point and smoothing them using a five-year moving average, thus depicting a long-term pattern in the evolution of safe havens. Results - A Regime Shift In Gold And Treasurys: Our findings show that safe-haven assets fall in and out of favor through time (Charts 10A, B & C). Most striking are the changes in U.S. Treasurys and gold. Only after 2000 did Treasurys start providing a good hedge for equity corrections. The contrary is true for gold - it acted as one of the most secure investments during corrections until that time, but has since become correlated with S&P 500 total returns. That said, gold's coefficient has been falling closer to zero lately, illustrating that it could soon resurface as a proper safe haven, especially if deflation risks begin to dissipate. Given that this is precisely the conclusion stated by our colleague Peter Berezin - BCA's Chief Global Strategist - and our own political analysis, we suspect that gold may be resurrected as a safe haven very soon.20 Chart 10ASafe Havens Don't Necessarily Age Well Safe Havens Don't Necessarily Age Well Safe Havens Don't Necessarily Age Well Chart 10BSafe Havens Don't Necessarily Age Well Safe Havens Don't Necessarily Age Well Safe Havens Don't Necessarily Age Well Chart 10CSafe Havens Don't Necessarily Age Well Safe Havens Don't Necessarily Age Well Safe Havens Don't Necessarily Age Well Another important finding is that the currency effect plays a key role during recent risk-off periods (Charts 11A & B). The best protector currencies are the ones that are negatively correlated with equity returns. According to our results, the CHF and the JPY have generally been risk-off currencies, while the USD has only been one since 2007, switching places with the euro. This reinforces the case for U.S., Japanese, and Swiss government bonds, which are supported by risk-off currencies. Chart 11ACurrencies Are Difference Makers Currencies Are Difference Makers Currencies Are Difference Makers Chart 11BCurrencies Are Difference Makers Currencies Are Difference Makers Currencies Are Difference Makers Bottom Line: Safe havens change over time. Gold fell out of favor due to global deflationary dynamics. With inflation on the horizon, we will keep monitoring the relationship between gold and equities for a possible return of the yellow metal as a safe haven. Since the July 4 North Korean ICBM test, for example, gold has rallied 4.8%. Part III - Red Herrings And Black Swans Since 1988, we identified 25 economic and (geo)political events that generated instant panic or acute uncertainty in the media and financial markets.21 We analyzed the short-term reactions of the safe-haven assets, both in USD and local-currency terms. This methodology allowed for the deconstruction of the impact of the events by the following factors: Country of origin of the crisis, the nature of the crisis, and whether the event was a "red herring" or a "black swan." Generally speaking, a red herring event is a crisis of some sort with little lasting financial impact. A black swan, on the other hand, is an event that has a very low probability of occurring but has a pronounced market impact if it does. Quantitatively, our definition of a black swan is an event that produces an immediate negative response in the S&P 500 below -1%, while creating a rise in either U.S., Japanese, or Swiss government bonds above 0% (Table 4). Of course, determining which event is a red herring or a black swan is only obvious post-facto and thus requires thorough geopolitical analysis. Table 4Understanding The Crises Can Pyongyang Derail The Bull Market? Can Pyongyang Derail The Bull Market? Results - Red Herrings And Black Swans Matter: Our event analysis solidifies our findings with regards to U.S., Japanese, and Swiss government bonds, but also builds a case for some European bonds as well as gold during black swan events. Our main findings can be summarized as follows. Fade The Red Herrings: Out of the sixteen geopolitical events, ten were identified as red herrings, in which safe havens underperformed the equity market. This, then, suggests that it is not always beneficial to buy safe-haven assets when tensions are rising. What is interpreted as a major geopolitical crisis - say, Ukraine in 2014 or Greece in 2015 - often ends up being a "red herring." Geopolitical Risk = Gold: Geopolitical black swan events, on the other hand, have a significant, negative impact on the market. During these events, gold emerges as the strongest hedge against a downturn in equities. U.S. Treasurys And The Swiss Franc Provide A Baseline: Under all black swan events considered - geopolitical and non-geopolitical - U.S. Treasurys and the Swiss franc had the strongest performance, generating positive returns on the day of the stock market crash in 85% of the cases. G10 Government Bonds Will Also Do: German, Dutch, Swiss and Swedish government bonds also provided protection during black swan events in local and common-currency terms, albeit to a lesser extent. U.S. And Swiss Bonds Outperform During Financial Episodes: During black swan financial crises, Swiss and U.S. government bonds stand out as the best safe havens due to their capacity to generate positive returns both in USD and local-currency terms in eight out of the nine examined crashes. Other findings that are interesting, yet less robust due to a limited sample size, include: When the crisis originated on U.S. soil, U.S. Treasurys and the dollar performed relatively poorly compared to other safe-haven assets. This is a somewhat surprising finding, as most investors believe that U.S. assets rally even at a time of U.S.-based crises, such as the 2011 budget crisis. We show that they may perform well, but in USD, non-U.S. based assets do better. When the crisis originated in Europe, European bonds performed very well both in USD and local-currency terms. When the crisis originated in Europe, Swiss and U.K. government bonds performed poorly in USD terms, but offered strong protection in local-currency terms. When the crisis originated in Russia, precious metals acted as a poor hedge. Bottom Line: It is crucial to gain an understanding of the nature of any potential crisis. Red herrings should always be faded, not hedged against, as they produce poor results in safe-haven assets. U.S. Treasurys, Swiss and Japanese government bonds have been very consistent safe-haven assets during previous periods of acute risk. Part IV: Timing Is Everything As a final step in our quantitative approach, we put our results through numerous timing exercises to test how the assets would perform in real time. Based on our Risk Asset Spectrum (Diagram 1), which summarizes our findings, one could argue that investing in times of crisis simply boils down to buying an equal-weighted basket of U.S. Treasurys, Swiss, and Japanese government bonds. Although this is technically true, such a strategy would require perfect foresight, unparalleled timing, or dumb luck - since black swan events are, by definition, very difficult to predict. Diagram 1Risk Asset Spectrum Can Pyongyang Derail The Bull Market? Can Pyongyang Derail The Bull Market? Proof Of The Ultimate Safe Haven: The first experiment we conducted was to illustrate how powerful safe havens can be when timed perfectly in a trading strategy. We started off by comparing two baskets. The first was a benchmark portfolio comprised of 60% U.S. equities and 40% U.S. bonds. The other contained the same two assets, but with 100% allocated to a basket comprised of U.S. Treasurys, Swiss, and Japanese government bonds during times of negative returns for equities. Of course, this strategy is not realistic and would be impossible to implement, since the trading rule depends on future events. But as Chart 12 shows, if one were able to predict every single period of negative returns for global equities and hold safe-haven assets instead, the trading rule would outperform almost 10-fold. Chart 12Safe Havens Work Wonders With Perfect Information... Safe Havens Work Wonders With Perfect Information... Safe Havens Work Wonders With Perfect Information... One-Month Lag Is Already Too Late: Repeating the same exercise, but with a one-month lag in the execution, produces drastically different results. More specifically, whenever the previous month's equity return is negative (t=0), the portfolio allocates 100% to a single safe-haven asset for the current month (t=1), otherwise it keeps the allocation identical to that of the benchmark. The rationale for using such a simple rule is that average investors are generally late in identifying a crisis and only react once they have validation that the market is in a correction. Chart 13 shows that being late by one month changes the performance of the safe haven basket from astronomically outperforming the benchmark to underperforming it. Chart 13... But Timing Is Everything ... But Timing Is Everything ... But Timing Is Everything Reaction Is Key: As a final timing exercise, we analyzed the reaction function of our assets to see how quickly they react after the correction in equities begins (Chart 14). Unsurprisingly, the top assets that we identified start appreciating as soon as the crisis hits (t=0). Gold is, on average, the quickest asset to react from investors seeking refuge. Swiss bonds come in as a close second, almost mirroring gold during the first few days of the correction. But both assets start to flatten out and even roll over after a few days. Japanese bonds react slightly later than gold and Swiss bonds, but keep increasing for a longer period of time and start plateauing around the 30th day after the crisis. U.S. Treasurys and Quality Stocks, on the other hand, remain rather flat and constant over the short term. These results attest to the importance of timing the crisis using the best safe-haven assets. Chart 14Safe Havens React Instantly Can Pyongyang Derail The Bull Market? Can Pyongyang Derail The Bull Market? Bottom Line: Timing plays a crucial part in investing in safe-haven assets, as their performance is coincident to that of equities. Investment Implications: Is Pyongyang A Red Herring Or A Black Swan? The results of our quantitative analysis are clear: hedging geopolitical risk depends on whether it is persistent or fleeting. So, is Pyongyang a red herring or a black swan? From our geopolitical analysis we make three key conclusions: The U.S. is not likely to preemptively attack North Korea; However, the U.S. has an interest in signaling that it may conduct precisely such an attack; Brinkmanship could last for a long time. Even if the risk of a U.S. attack against North Korea itself is a red herring, the crisis itself is not. In fact, between now and when a negotiated solution emerges, investors may face several new crises, which may include limited military attacks or skirmishes. While markets have faded such North Korean provocations in the past, the current context is clearly different. As such, we would suggest that investors hedge the risk with an equally-weighted basket of Swiss bonds and gold. Even though a "buy and hold" strategy with such a "Doomsday Basket" will likely underperform the market if tensions with North Korea subside, we are betting that it may take time for the U.S. and North Korea to get to the negotiating table. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com David Boucher, Associate Vice President Quantitative Strategist davidb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Geopolitics Of Trump," dated December 6, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. We upgraded North Korea to the status of a genuine market-relevant risk in "North Korea: A Red Herring No More?" in Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Partem Mirabilis," dated April 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Client Note, "Trump Re-Establishes America's 'Credible Threat'," dated April 7, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2017 available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Power And Politics In East Asia: Cold War 2.0," dated September 25, 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "North Korea: Beyond Satire," dated April 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. In particular, we argued, "the current saber-rattling is carefully orchestrated. But North Korea can no longer be consigned to the realm of satire. The very fact that the U.S. administration is adopting greater pressure tactics makes this year a heightened risk period. Investors should be especially wary of any missile tests that reveal North Korean long-range capabilities to be substantially better than is known to be the case today." Then, on May 13 and July 4, North Korea conducted its first ICBM launches; the UN Security Council agreed to a new round of even tighter economic sanctions on August 5; and the U.S. and North Korea engaged in an alarming war of words. 6 Specifically, we wrote: "Diplomacy is the only real option. And in fact it is already taking shape. The theatrics of the past few weeks mark the opening gestures. And theatrics are a crucial part of any foreign policy. The international context is looking remarkably similar to the lead-up to the new round of Iranian negotiations in 2012. The United States pounded the war drums and built up the potential for war before coordinating a large, multilateral sanctions-regime and then engaging in talks with real willingness to compromise." 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Geopolitics And Safe Havens," dated November 11, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Fade North Korea, And Sell The Yen," dated August 11, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, "Stairway To (Safe) Haven: Investing In Times Of Crisis," dated August 25, 2016, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 10 Forty-one assets were denominated in USD only, while G10 bonds, Credit Suisse Swiss Real Estate Fund, and European 600 real estate were used both in local-currency terms and USD, for a total of 65 assets. 11 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Geopolitics And Safe Havens," dated November 11, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 12 Sile Li and Brian M. Lucey, "What precious metals act as safe havens, and when? Some U.S. evidence," Applied Economic Letters, 2013. 13 Dirk G. Bauer and Thomas K.J. McDermott, "Financial Turmoil and Safe Haven Assets," 2013. 14 Lieven Baele, Geer Bekaert, Koen Inghelbrecht and Min Wei, "Flights to Safety," National Bank of Belgium Working Paper No. 230, 2015. 15 Dirk G. Baur and Kristoffer J. Glover, "The Destruction of Safe Haven Asset?,"2012. 16 Angelo Ranaldo and Paul Soederlind, "Safe Haven Currencies," Review of Finance, Vol. 10, pp. 385-407, 2010. Can Pyongyang Derail The Bull Market? Can Pyongyang Derail The Bull Market? 18 Quality stocks are defensive equity plays with high, steady earnings with an elevated return on investments. They are estimated by Deutsche Bank's Factor Index Equity Quality Excess Return in USD. Can Pyongyang Derail The Bull Market? Can Pyongyang Derail The Bull Market? 20 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Throwing The Baby (Globalization) Out With The Bath Water (Deflation)," dated July 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com, and BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "A Secular Bottom In Inflation," dated July 28, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 21 Since we were interested in the immediate, often unexpected, response to the event, we did not include economic recessions in our event analysis.

Highlights GFIS Portfolio: The GFIS model bond portfolio has lagged its benchmark index since inception last September and since our previous performance update in April. All of that underperformance can be accounted for this month, however, given the risk-off moves seen in global financial markets. As investors begin to shift their attention away from the current geopolitical blustering over North Korea and back towards the solid global economic upturn, our current tilts should begin to outperform again. Risk Management: We have successfully raised the amount of overall portfolio risk (tracking error) since our last portfolio performance update in April. The tracking error remains below our self-imposed limit of 100bps, however, giving us the ability to make further adjustments to our tilts as opportunities arise. Tactical Overlay: Our Tactical Overlay trades have delivered a positive average return over the past year, led by the current open trades that have produced an average gain of +30bps. Feature In this Special Report, we are presenting a performance update for our Global Fixed Income Strategy (GFIS) model bond portfolio. We did the first such update back in mid-April, and we will continue to publish periodic portfolio reviews going forward. As a reminder to our readers, the GFIS model portfolio is intended to be a tool for us to both communicate and evaluate our fixed income investment recommendations. By putting actual weightings to each of our country and sector calls, against a bond benchmark index with an overall portfolio risk limit, we are aiming to express the convictions of our views in a manner more in line with the actual day-to-day portfolio trade-offs faced by bond managers. The model portfolio is a relatively new addition to the GFIS service, starting only in September 2016, thus the return history is still limited. We have built out several pieces of the GFIS model portfolio framework over the past year, and the process is nearing completion. We now have a custom performance benchmark index that reflects the universe of fixed income sectors that we regularly cover in GFIS (essentially, the Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate Index plus riskier fixed income classes like High-Yield corporates). We also have performance measurement metrics and a way to regularly present the portfolio returns, while we have also added a risk management (tracking error) element to help size our relative tilts. The final piece will be to incorporate our corporate bond sector recommendations within the model portfolio, both as a source of potential return and a use of our risk budget (tracking error). We intend to add that final element in the coming weeks. Overall Performance Review: Winners & Losers Chart 1GFIS Model Portfolio Performance GFIS Model Portfolio Performance GFIS Model Portfolio Performance As of August 11th, the GFIS model portfolio has produced a total return of +0.93% (hedged into U.S. dollars) since inception on September 20, 2016 (Chart 1). This has underperformed our custom benchmark index by -14bps. Since our last performance review on April 18th, the model portfolio has lagged the benchmark by -10bps. The portfolio has suffered in the risk-off environment seen so far in August, with a -14bp underperformance seen month-to-date, equal to the entire underperformance since inception. Our core structural positions of maintaining a below-benchmark duration stance, while staying underweight government bonds versus overweight spread product, have all suffered of late (bottom two panels). Our government bond country allocation has been the biggest overall drag on returns (Table 1) since last September (-26bps versus our benchmark). Japan (+5bps) and Spain (+3bps) have been the biggest positive contributors since inception, while Italy, the U.K. and France have a combined underperformance of -31bps. That more than accounts for the entire underperformance of the government bond sleeve of the model portfolio since inception (Chart 2). Since our last portfolio update in April, our government bond allocations have lagged our benchmark index by -29bps. Small gains in Spain and Germany (+2bps each) have been dwarfed by underperformance in the U.S. (-16bps), Italy (-10bps) and France (-5bps). Across almost every country, our below-benchmark duration positioning has translated into a bear-steepening yield curve bias, as we have been recommending substantially reduced exposure to the 10+ year maturity buckets in the major countries (U.S., Germany, France, Italy, and Japan). The bull-flattening of global yield curves between March and June, led by a downturn in inflation expectations, was more than large enough to offset any of the potential benefits from our country allocation. Yield curves did began to bear-steepen in July after the European Central Bank (ECB) sent signals that a tapering of its asset purchase program next year was increasingly likely. That move has quickly reversed this month, however, as financial markets have shifted to a risk-off stance on the back of rising geopolitical tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Table 1A Detailed Breakdown Of The GFIS Model Portfolio A Performance Update For Our Model Bond Portfolio A Performance Update For Our Model Bond Portfolio Chart 2GFIS Model Portfolio Government Bond Performance Attribution By Country A Performance Update For Our Model Bond Portfolio A Performance Update For Our Model Bond Portfolio The news is better with regards to our global spread product allocations. Those have delivered a total return of +1.41% since last September (beating the benchmark by +12bps) and +0.98% since the last performance review in April (+19bps versus the benchmark). Our allocations to U.S. Investment Grade (IG) and High-Yield (HY) have combined for a +30bps outperformance since September and a +23bps outperformance since April (Chart 3). Euro Area corporate debt has been a modest drag, with the combined allocation to IG and HY debt underperforming by -7bps since September and -3bps since April. Emerging Market corporate debt contributed -2bps of underperformance, while U.K. IG corporates added +1bp of excess return. Chart 3GFIS Model Portfolio Spread Product Performance Attribution A Performance Update For Our Model Bond Portfolio A Performance Update For Our Model Bond Portfolio Among other spread sectors, U.S. Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) have generated a -12bps contribution to our excess return, although this entirely came from a period immediately after the inception of our model portfolio (Sept-Nov 2016) where we briefly moved to a tactical overweight stance. We have since maintained a structural underweight posture on U.S. MBS, but this has barely generated any relative performance (-1bp) since our last portfolio review in April. Net-net, the GFIS model portfolio has generally performed in line with where our recommendations are concentrated, both in absolute terms and on a relative basis between sectors. Our below-benchmark stance on overall duration has suffered as the government bond yield curves have exhibited more volatility than trend. At the same time, our structural overweights on global corporate debt, favoring the U.S. over non-U.S. equivalents, have contributed positively to the overall portfolio performance. In Charts 4-7, we show the relative performance of some individual countries and sectors that are part of our GFIS benchmark index. We specifically singled out our major asset allocation calls between sectors made over the past year, with a vertical line drawn at the date when the change was recommended. The data shown in all three charts is the relative performance of each tilt on a duration-adjusted basis and (where applicable) hedged back into U.S. dollars, indexed to 100 at the date of implementation in our model portfolio. Shown this way, we can evaluate the success of the timing of our calls. Our shift to an overweight stance on U.S. corporate debt versus U.S. Treasuries both for IG and HY in the first quarter of this year can be judged a success both in terms of timing and magnitude, with IG outperforming Treasuries by 217bps and HY outperforming by 826bps (Chart 4). Within our HY allocation, we left some performance on the table by concentrating our overweights on the higher-rated credit tiers (bottom panel), but this was a move we felt comfortable with (and still do) as a way of staying a bit up in quality at a time when lower-rated spreads were looking fully valued. In terms of our cross-Atlantic credit allocation, we shifted to an overweight stance on U.S. corporates versus Euro Area equivalents back on January 31st of this year (Chart 5). Since then, U.S. IG has underperformed Euro Area IG by -142bps, but U.S. HY has outperformed by a much larger 581bps. Taken together, these positions have contributed positively to the overall performance of the model portfolio. We continue to like U.S. corporates over Euro Area corporates from a valuation standpoint, thus we are keeping this tilt in the portfolio. Chart 4Our Overweights On##BR##U.S. Corporates Have Done Well Our Overweights On U.S. Corporates Have Done Well Our Overweights On U.S. Corporates Have Done Well Chart 5Our Combined Tilt Towards##BR##U.S. Corporates Has Outperformed Our Combined Tilt Towards U.S. Corporates Has Outperformed Our Combined Tilt Towards U.S. Corporates Has Outperformed With regards to our other major spread sector tilts, our shift to an underweight stance on U.S. MBS versus Treasuries back in November has essentially been a wash (Chart 6). Looking ahead, the combination of unattractive valuations and, more importantly, reduced buying of Agency MBS by the Federal Reserve as it begins to shrink its balance sheet will weigh on MBS performance in the next 6-12 months - we are staying underweight. At the same time, we are maintaining our long-held overweight stance on U.K. IG corporates versus Gilts (bottom panel). The Bank of England will be keeping interest rates unchanged over the next year given mixed readings on U.K. economic growth and the lingering uncertainties over the Brexit negotiations, thus going for the added carry of corporates versus expensive Gilts still makes sense. As for our cross-country government bond allocations, our underweight stance on Italy versus Spain, and our overweight stance on Japan versus Germany, have been volatile while delivering no excess performance (Chart 7). Chart 6Sticking With Our Tilts On##BR##U.S. MBS & U.K. IG Sticking With Our Tilts On U.S. MBS & U.K. IG Sticking With Our Tilts On U.S. MBS & U.K. IG Chart 7Our Cross-Country Government Bond##BR##Tilts Have Been Volatile Our Cross-Country Government Bond Tilts Have Been Volatile Our Cross-Country Government Bond Tilts Have Been Volatile Looking ahead, we continue to expect the global growth backdrop to be supportive of spread product over government debt over the next 6-12 months, particularly with central banks unlikely to shift to a restrictive monetary stance. At the same time, we should soon begin to claw back some of the underperformance of the government bond sleeve of the GFIS model portfolio coming from our below-benchmark duration stance, for several reasons: Our colleagues at BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service do not expect the current standoff between Pyongyang and Washington to devolve into a shooting war, even though the tough talk on both sides will likely continue for some time. As the military tensions begin to subside, this should reverse some of the safe-haven bid for government bonds seen in the past couple of weeks, causing yields to drift higher. The solid global growth backdrop, confirmed by the still-rising trend in leading economic indicators, will continue to force central banks to slowly shift to a less dovish policy stance. U.S. inflation will begin to rebound in the next few months, led by the lagged impact of the U.S. dollar weakness seen in 2017 and continued tightening of the U.S. labor market. This will prompt the Fed to hike rates in December and deliver more hikes in 2018, which is NOT currently priced into U.S. Treasuries. We expect the ECB to soon signal a reduction of the size of its asset purchase program starting in 2018, which will put upward pressure on core Euro Area bond yields, and widen Peripheral European spreads, as the market moves to price in a smaller amount of future bond supply that will be absorbed by the central bank. The combination of modest increases in global inflation, a rebound in investor risk sentiment, and an ECB taper announcement should all place bear-steepening pressures on developed market yield curves (ex-Japan). This will benefit the curve-steepening bias we have in the U.S., Euro Area and U.K., while also supporting our country allocation of a maximum overweight to low-beta Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs). Net-net, we see no reason to alter any of current portfolio tilts at the moment based on any change in our market views. Bottom Line: The GFIS model bond portfolio has lagged its benchmark index since inception last September and since our previous performance update in April. Our overweight credit allocations have performed well but our below-benchmark duration tilts have not. All of that underperformance can be accounted for this month, however, given the risk-off moves seen in global financial markets. As investors begin to shift their attention away from the current geopolitical blustering over North Korea and back towards the solid global economic upturn, our current tilts should begin to outperform again. A Very Brief Comment On Our Risk Management Framework In our prior portfolio update in April, we noted that the initial sizes we placed on the tilts in the GFIS model portfolio proved to be far too small to generate any meaningful outperformance.1 After that, we increased the sizes of our all our existing positions in the portfolio. We later introduced a "risk budget" into our framework that would allow us to measure the tracking error (excess volatility versus the GFIS benchmark index) of our portfolio to ensure that we were taking adequate levels of risk.2 So far, our changes have had the desired effect of raising the tracking error of the portfolio to more realistic levels to try and generate outperformance. The average allocations to our government bond underweights and our spread product overweights have increased since that April portfolio review (Chart 8). This has helped raise the tracking error of the model portfolio to 61bps from 25bps in April (Chart 9). This is still below our risk limit of 100bps of tracking error, giving us room to add positions to the model portfolio if we see opportunities come up. Chart 8We've Increased The Sizes Of##BR##Our Tilts Since April ... A Performance Update For Our Model Bond Portfolio A Performance Update For Our Model Bond Portfolio Chart 9...Which Has Boosted The Tracking##BR##Error Of The Model Portfolio ...Which Has Boosted The Tracking Error Of The Model Portfolio ...Which Has Boosted The Tracking Error Of The Model Portfolio Bottom Line: We have successfully raised the amount of overall portfolio risk (tracking error) since our last portfolio performance update in April. The tracking error remains below our self-imposed limit of 100bps, however, giving us the ability to make further adjustments to our tilts as opportunities arise. Tactical Overlay Bets Have Been Helpful In addition to our GFIS model bond portfolio, we also are running recommended trades in our Tactical Overlay portfolio. These are positions that typically have a shorter-term investment time horizon (0-6 months) than those in the model portfolio. They can also be in less-liquid markets that are not included in the custom bond benchmark index for the model portfolio, like U.S. TIPS or New Zealand government bonds. The Overlay is intended to produce ideas for more tactical traders than portfolio managers, although the trades can also be viewed as a compliment to the model bond portfolio. The performance of our Tactical Overlay can be seen in Table 2 (for our current open trades) and Table 3 (for our past closed trades). We have shown the trade performance going back to the inception date of our model bond portfolio in September 2016, to facilitate apples-for-apples comparisons. We are currently working on developing a trade sizing and risk management framework along the lines of our model portfolio. For now, we can only present average return numbers and not a meaningful cumulative return measure. Table 2The Current Open GFIS Tactical Overlay Trades Are Performing Well A Performance Update For Our Model Bond Portfolio A Performance Update For Our Model Bond Portfolio Table 3The Closed GFIS Tactical Overlay Trades Have Been A Mixed Bag A Performance Update For Our Model Bond Portfolio A Performance Update For Our Model Bond Portfolio Our closed Overlay trades since last September generated only an average total return of a mere +1bp, but this weighed down by a large losing position on shorting Portuguese government bonds versus German Bunds. The average trade return would have been +21bps, on fifteen closed trades, excluding that Portuguese bet. The notable winners were long positions in 10-year French government bonds versus German Bunds (+130bps), a long position on Australian Semi-Government debt versus Federal government debt (+159bps) and a long positon on Korean 5-year government bonds vs. 5-year JGBs on a currency-unhedged basis (+195bps). The other notable loser besides the Portuguese trade was a failed long position on Japanese CPI swaps (-111bps). The current open Overlay trades have performed much better, delivering an average gain of +30bps. 14 of the current 16 open trades have a positive gain, thus the batting average is solid. Notable winners are an overweight on U.S. TIPS versus U.S. Treasuries (+197bps) and our Canada/U.K. 2-year/30-year yield curve box trade (+110bps). The only serious losing trade at the moment is our long position in 5-year New Zealand government bonds versus 5-year German debt (-123bps), although this is the only trade in the table that is currency UN-hedged and is a bet on a stronger New Zealand dollar versus the euro as well as a relative bond spread trade. Net-net, our Tactical Overlay trades have generated a positive average return since last September. In the next few months, we will look to introduce a weighting scheme and risk budget for the Overlay trades to better present these trades as a true complement to our model bond portfolio. Bottom Line: Our Tactical Overlay trades have delivered a positive average return over the past year, led by the current open trades that have produced an average gain of +30bps. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "An Initial Look At The Performance Of Our Model Bond Portfolio", dated April 18th 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "Adding A Risk Management Framework To Our Model Bond Portfolio", dated June 20th 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index A Performance Update For Our Model Bond Portfolio A Performance Update For Our Model Bond Portfolio Appendix - Selected Sectors From The GFIS Model Portfolio Appendix 1 Appendix 1 Appendix 2 Appendix 2 Appendix 3 Appendix 3 Appendix 4 Appendix 4 Appendix 5 Appendix 5 Appendix 6 Appendix 6 Appendix 7 Appendix 7 Appendix 8 Appendix 8

Highlights Portfolio Strategy We reiterate our recent overweight calls in banks/financials and energy. Chemicals/materials and telecom services no longer deserve a below benchmark allocation. Pharma/health care and utilities are now in the underweight column. Recent Changes There are no changes to our portfolio this week. Table 1Sector Performance Returns (%) Three Risks Three Risks Feature Equities poked higher early last week on the eve of a robust earnings season as quarterly EPS vaulted to all-time highs (Chart 1), only to give up those gains and then some as North Korea jitters spoiled the party and ignited a mini selloff later in the week. While geopolitical uncertainty is dominating the news flow and an escalation is possible, we doubt North Korea tensions in isolation can significantly derail the stock market. With regard to the SPX's future return composition, our view remains intact that the onus falls on earnings to do the heavy lifting. In other words, the multiple expansion phase has mostly run its course, and explains the bulk of the board market's return since the 2011 trough (Chart 2). Now it is time for profits to shine. Chart 1Earnings-Led Advance Earnings-Led Advance Earnings-Led Advance Chart 2EPS Has To Do The Heavy Lifting EPS Has To Do The Heavy Lifting EPS Has To Do The Heavy Lifting Low double-digit EPS growth is likely in calendar 2018. Three key factors drive our sanguine profit view. First, as we posited three weeks ago, financials and energy will command a larger slice of the earnings pie, a backdrop not yet discounted in sell-side analysts' estimates (please see Table 2 from the July 24th Weekly Report). Second, irrespective of where the U.S. dollar heads in the coming months, SPX earnings will benefit from positive FX translation gains in Q3 and Q4. Finally, as the corporate sector flexes its operating leverage muscle, even modest sales growth will go a long way in terms of profit growth generation. Operating profit margins are poised to expand especially given muted wage inflation (Chart 3). Nevertheless, lack of profit validation is a key risk to our bullish S&P 500 thesis. Considering the post-GFC period, global growth scares (and resulting anemic earnings follow through) were the primary catalysts for the 2010, 2011 and late-2015/early-2016 equity corrections. The SPX fell 16%, 19% and 14% in each of those episodes, respectively. As a reminder, early in 2010 the Fed's QE ended and the ECB was scrambling to contain the government debt crisis as the Eurozone and the IMF bailed out Greece, Portugal and Ireland. In 2011, recession fears gripped the world economy, when then ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet tightened monetary policy twice in the euro area, while in the U.S. QE2 ended (Chart 4) and the debt ceiling fiasco spiraled out of control in the late-summer. More recently, a global manufacturing recession took hold in late-2015/early-2016 and the commodity drubbing re-concentrated investor's minds. Chart 3Margin Expansion Phase Margin Expansion Phase Margin Expansion Phase Chart 4Liquidity Removal = Market Turmoil Liquidity Removal = Market Turmoil Liquidity Removal = Market Turmoil A persistent flare up in geopolitical risk (i.e. in addition to the possible escalation of North Korea tensions) may lead consumers and CEOs alike to pull in their horns and short circuit the synchronized global economic recovery. Putting this risk in perspective is instructive. Table 2 documents the historical precedent of geopolitical crises since the mid-1950s, the maximum SPX drawdowns, and bid up of safe haven assets courtesy of our Geopolitical Strategy Service.1 Under such a backdrop, low-double digit EPS growth would be at risk, also causing some equity market consternation. Table 2Safe-Haven Demand Rises During Crises Three Risks Three Risks Table 2Safe-Haven Demand Rises During Crises, Continued Three Risks Three Risks Importantly, the Chinese Congress is quickly approaching in October and the dual tightening in Chinese monetary conditions (rising currency and interest rates) is unnerving. A related Chinese/EM relapse represents a risk to our bullish overall equity market thesis. Commodity producers/sectors would suffer a setback, jeopardizing the broad-based earnings recovery. Chart 5Mini Capex Upcycle Mini Capex Upcycle Mini Capex Upcycle Second, lack of tax reform is another risk we are closely monitoring that could put our upbeat SPX view offside. Lack of traction on this front as the year draws to a close will likely sabotage business confidence and put capex plans on the backburner anew. Moreover, this would shatter the confidence of small and medium businesses, especially given their greatest bugbears: high taxes and big government. Finally, repatriation tax holiday blues would cast a double dark shadow primarily over the tech and health care sectors: not only would shareholder-friendly activities like dividends and buybacks get postponed, but so would capex plans (Chart 5). One final risk worth monitoring is the handoff of liquidity to growth. Historically, there has been significant turmoil every time the Fed has removed balance sheet accommodation in the post-GFC era. We are in uncharted territory and the unwinding of the Fed's balance sheet, likely to be announced next month, may have unintended consequences. Unlike QE and QE2 ending, this time around the ECB is also on the cusp of removing balance sheet liquidity, at the margin. Chart 6A shows that the equity market may come under pressure if history at least rhymes. While we doubt that a larger than 10% correction is in the cards -- in line with the historical S&P 500 average drawdown during geopolitical crises (middle panel, Chart 6B)2 -- and our strategy will be to "buy the dip", the time to purchase portfolio insurance is now when the S&P 500 is near all-time highs, especially given the seasonally-weak and accident-prone months of September and October. Chart 6ADay Of Reckoning? Day Of Reckoning? Day Of Reckoning? Chart 6BAsset Class Returns During Crises Three Risks Three Risks We are comfortable with our overall early-cyclical portfolio exposure, while simultaneously maintaining a bit of defense in the form of our overweight consumer staples and underweight tech positions. This week we are recapping and reiterating all the major portfolio moves we have made since early May. Banking On Faster Growth Bank profit growth is supported by three main pillars: the quantity, price and quality of credit. All three are set to improve. Solid house price inflation and a tight labor market should ensure that consumer credit growth also firms (Chart 7A), pointing to the potential for a broad-based bank balance sheet expansion. Our U.S. bank loan growth model suggests that banks could enjoy the largest upswing in credit growth of the past 30 years (Chart 7B). Soaring consumer and business confidence, rising corporate profits and a potential capital spending revival are the key model drivers. BCA's view is that a better economy and rising inflation will materialize in the back half of the year, and serve as a catalyst to higher interest rates and a steeper yield curve. Banks profit from overall rising interest rates in two ways: reinvesting at higher yields and assets repricing at a faster pace than deposits. Thus, a steepening yield curve would signal that bank profit estimates should experience a re-rating, provided the yield lift at the long end of the curve was gradual and did not choke off growth via a sudden spike (Chart 7A). Chart 7ABanks Flexing Their Muscle Banks Flexing Their Muscle Banks Flexing Their Muscle Chart 7BBCA Bank Loans & Leases Growth Model BCA Bank Loans & Leases Growth Model BCA Bank Loans & Leases Growth Model In terms of credit quality, non-performing loans and charge-offs are sinking from already low levels. It would take a significant deterioration in the labor market to warn that credit quality was about to become a profit drag. Importantly, the reserve coverage ratio has climbed to near 100%, as non-current loans have fallen faster than banks have released reserves. Historically, credit quality improvement has been positively correlated with rising valuations (Chart 7A). Finally, even a modest easing in the regulatory backdrop along with a more shareholder friendly outlook now that the banks aced the Fed's stress test should help unlock excellent value in bank equities. Bottom Line: We reiterate our overweight stance in the S&P banks index that also lifted the S&P financials sector to overweight. Buy Energy Stocks Chart 8Energy EPS Model Says Buy Energy EPS Model Says Buy Energy EPS Model Says Buy Energy equities are down roughly 20% year-to-date versus the broad market, driven by rising U.S. shale oil production, inventory accumulation, and investor doubts about whether all nations will comply with OPEC's mandated production cuts. There are tentative signs that this relative performance bear phase is drawing to a close. Three main drivers support our modestly sanguine view of energy stocks. First, the long term inverse correlation between the U.S. dollar and the commodity complex has been reestablished; global growth suggests that a tightening interest rate cycle is brewing which should be supportive to energy stocks (top panel, Chart 8). Second, the steepest drilling upcycle in recent memory is showing signs of fatigue with Baker Hughes reporting flattening growth in domestic oil rig count; At least a modest deceleration in shale oil production is likely (Chart 8). Finally, our S&P energy sector Valuation Indicator has gravitated back to the neutral zone. Technicals are also washed out with our Technical Indicator breaching one standard deviation below its historical mean, a level that typically heralds a reversal. Recent anecdotes that the sell-side is throwing in the towel on their bullish oil forecasts for the remainder of the year are also contrarily positive. Bottom Line: Our newly introduced S&P energy sector relative EPS model encapsulates this cautiously optimistic industry backdrop (Chart 8), and gave us comfort to lift the S&P energy sector to a modest overweight position. DeREITing Chart 9Lighten Up On REITs Lighten Up On REITs Lighten Up On REITs REITs have marked time year-to-date, but recently operating conditions have downshifted a notch. Three key drivers argue for lightening up exposure on this newly formed S&P GICS1 sector. First, REITs had been unable to materially benefit from the 50bps fall in the 10-year Treasury yield from the mid-December peak to the mid-June trough. As the economy recovers from the first half lull, Treasury yields will resume their advance. This is a net negative for the fixed income proxy real estate sector (Chart 9). Second, real estate occupancy rates have crested and generationally high supply additions in the apartment space are all but certain to push vacancies higher still. The implication is that rental inflation will remain under intense downward pressure (Chart 9). Finally, according to the Fed's latest Senior Loan Officer Survey, bankers are less willing to extend CRE credit. If banks continue to close the credit taps, CRE prices will suffer a setback. Bottom Line: We reiterate our downgrade of the niche S&P real estate sector to a benchmark allocation. Positive Chemical Reaction? Chart 10Chemicals Are No Longer Toxic Chemicals Are No Longer Toxic Chemicals Are No Longer Toxic In the summer of 2014 we went underweight the S&P chemicals index, anticipating an earnings underperformance phase, driven by weak revenues as chemicals manufacturers were furiously adding capacity to benefit from lower domestic feedstocks. This view has largely panned out, and now three factors underpin our more neutral bias: synchronized global growth, receding global capacity and improving domestic operating conditions. The global manufacturing PMI has recently reaccelerated and jumped to a six year high. Similarly, the U.S. ISM manufacturing survey also vaulted higher. Synchronized global growth suggests that final demand is on the upswing and should bode well for chemical top- and bottom-line growth (Chart 10). This has driven a relative weakening of the U.S. dollar, much to the benefit of U.S. chemical producers, whose exports appear to be displacing German exports. Global chemicals M&A supports our expectation of demand-driven pricing power gains. We think the benefits of consolidation are twofold: First, reduced revenues of the past decade have left the industry with outsized cost structures; consolidation should sweep that away under the guise of synergy, driving margins higher. Second, industry overcapacity has historically impaired profitability due to soaring overhead and more competitive pricing; greater scale should impose greater capital discipline. Finally, domestic operating conditions have taken a turn for the better. This improving domestic final demand backdrop is reflected in higher resource utilization rates and solid pricing power gains have staying power (Chart 10). Bottom Line: Tentative evidence suggests that the bear market in chemicals producers is over. We reiterate our recent upgrade to neutral. Given that chemicals stocks comprise over 73% of the broad materials index, this bump also moved the S&P materials sector to a benchmark allocation. Utilities: Blackout Warning Chart 11Utilities Get Short Circuited Utilities Get Short Circuited Utilities Get Short Circuited While chemicals and materials are beneficiaries of an upgrading in global economic expectations, utilities sit at the opposite end of the table (global manufacturing PMI shown inverted, top panel, Chart 11), and therefore warrant a downgrade to a below benchmark allocation. Now that the Fed is ready to start unwinding its balance sheet, the ECB is preparing the waters for QE tapering and a slew of CBs are on the cusp of a new tightening interest rate cycle, there are high odds that still overvalued fixed income proxies will continue to suffer. Synchronized global growth and coordinated tightening in monetary policy spells trouble for bonds. Our sister publication U.S. Bond Strategy expects a bond selloff for the remainder of the year. Given that utilities essentially trade as a proxy for bonds, this macro backdrop leaves them vulnerable to a significant underperformance phase (Treasury yield shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 11). Importantly, the stock-to-bond (S/B) ratio and utilities sector relative performance also has a tight inverse correlation (S/B shown inverted, second panel, Chart 11). The implication is that downside risks remain acute. Without the support of continued declines in bond yields, or of indiscriminate capital flight from all riskier assets, utilities advances depend on improving fundamentals. The news on the domestic operating front is grim. Contracting natural gas prices, the marginal price setter for the industry, suggest that recent utilities pricing power gains are running on empty. Tack on waning productivity, with labor additions handily outpacing electricity production, and the ingredients for a margin squeeze are in place. Bottom Line: We reiterate our recent downgrade to underweight. Pharma: Tough Pill To Swallow Chart 12Pharma Relapse Pharma Relapse Pharma Relapse Pharma stock profits have moved in lockstep with consumer spending on pharmaceuticals and both have roughly doubled over the past decade. However, relative pharma consumer outlays have crested recently, causing a significant pharma profit underperformance (Chart 12). If our cautious drug pricing power thesis pans out as we portrayed in the July 31st Weekly Report, then pharma earnings will suffer and exert downward pressure on relative share prices (Chart 12). Industry balance sheet deterioration represents another warning signal. Net debt/EBITDA is skyrocketing at a time when the broad non-financial corporate (NFC) sector has been in balance sheet rebuilding mode (bottom panel). While this metric does not suggest that pharma stocks are in deep financial trouble, the deterioration in finances is undeniable, and, at the margin, a rising interest rate backdrop will likely slow down debt issuance for equity retirement and dividend payout purposes. Bottom Line: We recently trimmed the S&P pharmaceuticals index to underweight, which also took the S&P health care index to underweight. Telecom Services: Signs Of Life Chart 13Telecom: Climbing Out Of Deflation2 Telecom: Climbing Out Of Deflation Telecom: Climbing Out Of Deflation Investors have shunned telecom services stocks vehemently year-to-date (YTD) on the back of an abysmal profit showing. We had been fortunate enough to underweight this niche sector since late January, adding alpha to our portfolio. Nevertheless, we did not want to overstay our welcome and recently booked profits of 12% and lifted the S&P telecom services sector to the neutral column. Our Cyclical Macro Indicator has arrested its fall giving us comfort that at least a lateral move in relative share prices is likely in coming months (Chart 13). The steep recalibration of cost structures to the new pricing reality is buttressing our CMI, offsetting the sector's plummeting share of the consumer's wallet (Chart 13). Encouragingly, selling prices cannot contract at 10% per annum indefinitely, and on a three month-rate of change basis, pricing power has staged a V-shaped recovery (Chart 13). Anecdotally, Verizon's first full quarter post the new pricing plans was solid and suggests that the peak deflationary impulse is likely behind the industry. Impressive labor cost discipline along with even a modest pricing power rebound signal that a grinding higher margin backdrop is likely in the coming months, in line with our margin proxy reading. This will also stabilize relative profitability. In sum, the bearish S&P telecom services narrative is more than discounted in ultra-depressed relative valuations on cyclically quashed profit estimates. Green shoots on the industry's pricing power front and impressive management focus on cost structures argue against being bearish this niche sector. Bottom Line: We reiterate the recent bump to neutral in the S&P telecom services sector. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy & Global Alpha Sector Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Geopolitics And Safe Havens," dated November 11, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Ibid. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor small over large caps and stay neutral growth over value.

Highlights The rise in the yen sparked by the verbal confrontation between the U.S. and North Korea is creating an opportunity to buy USD/JPY. The DXY is set to stabilize and may even rebound, removing a key support for the yen. The U.S. economy is showing signs of strength, and the bond market is expensive, a backup in yields is likely. Rising U.S. bond yields should be poisonous for the yen Until higher bond yields cause an acute selloff in risks assets, an opportunity to buy USD/JPY is in place for investors. Feature After benefiting from the U.S. dollar's generalized weakness, the yen has received a renewed fillip thanks to the rising tensions between North Korea and the U.S. If the U.S. were indeed to unleash "fire and fury" on North Korea, safe-haven currencies like the yen or Swiss franc would obviously shine. While the verbal saber-rattling will inevitably continue, our colleagues Marko Papic and Matt Gertken - head and Asia specialist respectively of our Geopolitical Strategy service - expect neither the U.S. nor North Korea to go to war. Historically, North Korea has behaved rationally, and it only wants to use the nuclear deterrent as a bargaining chip. Meanwhile, the U.S does not want to invest the time, energy, and money required to enact a regime change in that country. Additionally, China is already imposing sanctions on Pyongyang, and Moon Jae-in, South Korea's new president, wants to appease its northern neighbor. With cooler heads ultimately likely to prevail, will the yen rally peter off, or should investors position themselves for additional USD/JPY weakness? We are inclined to buy USD/JPY at current levels. DXY: Little Downside, Potential Upside Most of the weakness in USD/JPY since July 10 has been a reflection of the 3.7% decline in the DXY between that time and August 2nd. However, the dollar downside is now quite limited and could even reverse, at least temporarily. The dollar is currently trading at its deepest discount since 2010 to our augmented interest rate parity model, based on real interest rate differentials - both at the long and short-end of the curve - as well as global credit spreads and commodity prices (Chart I-1). Crucially, the euro, which accounts for 58% of the dollar index, is its mirror image, being now overvalued by two sigma, the most since 2010 (Chart I-2). Confirming these valuations, investors have now fully purged their long bets on the USD, and are most net-long the euro since 2013. Chart I-1DXY Is Cheap... DXY Is Cheap... DXY Is Cheap... Chart I-2...But The Euro Is Not ...But The Euro Is Not ...But The Euro Is Not Valuations are only an indication of relative upside and downside; the macro economy dictates the directionality. While U.S. financial conditions have eased this year, they have tightened in Europe, resulting in the biggest brake on euro area growth relative to the U.S. in more than two years (Chart I-3). This is why euro area stocks have eradicated their 2017 outperformance against the S&P 500, why PMIs across Europe have begun disappointing, and why the euro area economic surprise index has rolled over - especially when compared to that of the U.S. The improvement in U.S. economic activity generated by easing financial conditions also has implications for the dollar. As Chart I-4 illustrates, the gap between the U.S. ISM manufacturing index and global PMIs has historically led the DXY by six months or so. This gap currently points to a sharp appreciation in the dollar. Chart I-3Easing Versus Tightening FCI Easing Versus Tightening FCI Easing Versus Tightening FCI Chart I-4PMIs Point To USD Rally PMIs Point To USD Rally PMIs Point To USD Rally If the dollar were indeed to stop falling, let alone appreciate, this would represent a hurdle for the yen to overcome, especially as the outlook for U.S. bond yields is pointing up. Bottom Line: Before North Korea grabbed the headlines, the USD/JPY selloff was powered by a weakening dollar. However, the dollar has limited downside from here. It is trading at a discount to intermediate-term models, while macroeconomic momentum is moving away from the euro area and toward the U.S. - a key consequence of the tightening in European financial conditions vis-à-vis the U.S. Additionally, the strong outperformance of the U.S. ISM relative to the rest of the world highlights that the dollar may even be on the cusp of experiencing significant upside. The Key To A Falling Yen: Treasury Yields Upside An end to the fall in the USD is important to end the downside in USD/JPY. However, rising Treasury yields are the necessary ingredient to actually see a rally in this pair. We are optimistic that U.S. bond yields can rise from current levels. The U.S. job market remains very strong. The JOLTS data this week was unequivocal on that subject. Not only are there now 6.2 million job openings in the U.S., but the ratio of unemployed to openings has hit its lowest level since the BLS began publishing the data, suggesting there is now a limited supply of labor relative to demand. Additionally, the number of unfilled jobs is nearly 30% greater than it was at its 2007 peak, pointing to an increasingly tighter labor market. We could therefore see an acceleration in wage growth going into the remainder of this business cycle, even if structural factors like the "gig-economy", the increasing role of robotics, or even the now-maligned "Amazon" effect limit how high wage growth ultimately rises. The Philips curve, when estimated using the employment cost index and the level of non-employment among prime-age workers, still holds (Chart I-5). Thus, a tight labor market in conjunction with continued job-creation north of 100,000 a month should put upward pressure on wages. Even when it comes to average hourly earnings, glimmers of hope are emerging. Our diffusion index of hourly wages based on the industries covered by the BLS cratered when wage growth slowed over the past year. However, it has hit historical lows and is beginning to rebound - a sign that average hourly earnings should also reaccelerate (Chart I-6). Chart I-5The Philips Curve Still Works Fade North Korea, And Sell The Yen Fade North Korea, And Sell The Yen Chart I-6Even AHE Are Set To Re-Accelerate Even AHE Are Set To Re-Accelerate Even AHE Are Set To Re-Accelerate The job market is not the only source of optimism, as U.S. capex should continue to be accretive to growth. Despite vanishing hopes of aggressive deregulation, the NFIB small business survey picked up this month. Even more importantly, various capex intention surveys as well as the CEO confidence index point to continued expansion of corporate investment (Chart I-7). Healthy profit growth is providing both the necessary signal and the source of funds to engage in this capex. This will continue to lift the economy. This is essential to our bond and our yen views, as it points to higher U.S. inflation. In itself, economic activity is not enough to generate higher prices. However, when this happens as aggregate capacity utilization in the economy is becoming tight, inflation emerges. As Chart I-8 shows, today, our composite capacity utilization indicator - based on both labor market conditions and the traditional capacity utilization measure published by the Federal Reserve - is in "no-slack" territory, a condition historically marked by bouts of inflation. Chart I-7U.S. Capex To Boost Growth Further U.S. Capex To Boost Growth Further U.S. Capex To Boost Growth Further Chart I-8No Slack Plus Growth Equals Inflation No Slack Plus Growth Equals Inflation No Slack Plus Growth Equals Inflation The recent increase to a three-year high in the "Reported Price Changes" component of the NFIB survey corroborates this picture, also pointing to an acceleration in core inflation (Chart I-9). But to us, the most telling sign that inflation will soon re-emerge is the behavior of the U.S. velocity of money. For the past 20 years, changes in velocity - as measured by the ratio of nominal GDP to the money of zero maturity - have lead gyrations in core inflation, reflecting increasing transaction demand for money. Today, the increase in velocity over the past nine months points to a rebound in core inflation by year-end (Chart I-10). Chart I-9The Pricing Behavior Of Small Businesses ##br##Points To An Inflation Pick Up The Pricing Behavior Of Small Businesses Points To An Inflation Pick Up The Pricing Behavior Of Small Businesses Points To An Inflation Pick Up Chart I-10Reaching Escape ##br##Velocity Reaching Escape Velocity Reaching Escape Velocity Expecting higher inflation is not the same thing as expecting higher interest rates and bond yields. However, we believe this time, higher inflation will result in higher yields. First, the Fed wants to push interest rates higher. Fed Chairwoman Janet Yellen and her acolytes have been very clear about this, with the "dot plot" anticipating rates to rise to 2.9% by the end of 2019. While the Fed's preference and reality can be at odds, this is currently not the case. Our Fed monitor continues to be in the "tighter-policy-needed" zone. While it is undeniable that it is doing so by only a small margin, higher inflation - as we expect - would only push this indicator higher. Moreover, the diffusion index of the components of the Fed monitor is already pointing toward an improvement in this policy gauge (Chart I-11). Chart I-11The Fed Monitor Will Pick Up The Fed Monitor Will Pick Up The Fed Monitor Will Pick Up Second, the Fed may have increased rates, and the spread between U.S. policy rates and the rest of the world may have widened, but the dollar has weakened this year. This counterintuitive result highlights that the Fed's effort has had little impact in tightening liquidity conditions. In fact, as we have mentioned, because of the lower dollar and higher asset prices, financial conditions have eased, suggesting liquidity remains plentiful. As such, like in 1987 or 1994, this is only likely to re-invigorate the Fed in its confidence that it can hike rates further, as liquidity conditions remain massively accommodative. Third, beyond the Fed's reaction function, what also matters are investors' expectations. At the time of writing, investors only expect 45 basis points of rate hikes over the upcoming 24 months, which is a reasonable expectation only if inflation does not move back toward the Fed's 2% target. However, our work clearly points toward higher inflation by year end. In a fight between the Fed's "dot plot" and the OIS curve, right now, we would take the side of the Fed. Fourth, it is not just 2-year interest rate expectations that seems mispriced, based on our view on U.S. growth, inflation, and the Fed. U.S. Treasury yields are also trading at a 36 basis points discount to the fair-value model developed by our U.S. Bond Strategy sister service (Chart I-12). Continued good news on the job front and an uptick in inflation would likely do great harm to Treasury holders. Finally, the oversold extreme experienced by the U.S. bond market in the wake of the Trump victory has been purged. While we are not at an oversold extreme, our Composite Technical Indicator never punched much into overbought territory during the Fed tightening cycle from 2004 to 2006 (Chart I-13). Moreover, with no more stale shorts, an upswing in U.S. economic and inflation surprises should help put upward pressure on U.S. bond yields. Confirming the intuition laid out above, the copper-to-gold ratio, a measure of growth expectations relative to reflation, has now broken out - despite the North Korean risks. In the past, such a development signaled higher yields (Chart I-14). With this in mind, let's turn to the yen itself. Chart I-12U.S. Bonds Are##br## Too Expensive U.S. Bonds Are Too Expensive U.S. Bonds Are Too Expensive Chart I-13Stale Shorts Have Been Purged, ##br##But Overbought Conditions Are Unlikely Stale Shorts Have Been Purged, But Overbought Conditions Are Unlikely Stale Shorts Have Been Purged, But Overbought Conditions Are Unlikely Chart I-14Where The Copper-To-Gold Ratio Goes, ##br## So Do Bond Yields Where The Copper-To-Gold Ratio Goes, So Do Bond Yields Where The Copper-To-Gold Ratio Goes, So Do Bond Yields Bottom Line: The U.S. economy looks healthy. The labor market is strong, and capex continues to offer upside. Because capacity utilization is tight and money velocity is accelerating, inflation should begin surprising to the upside through the remainder of 2017. With the market pricing barely two more hikes over the course of the next 24 months and U.S. bonds trading richly, such an economic backdrop should result in higher U.S. bond yields. Yen At Risk, Even If Volatility Rises JGB yields have historically displayed a low beta to global bond yields. As a result, when global bond yields rise, the yen tends to weaken. USD/JPY is particularly sensitive to yield upswings driven by actions in the Treasury market. This contention is even truer now than it has been. The Bank of Japan is targeting a fixed yield curve slope and does not want to see JGB yields rise much above 10 basis points. With the paucity of inflation experienced by Japan - core-core inflation is in a downtrend, ticking in at zero, courtesy of tightening financial conditions on the back of a stronger yen - this policy remains firmly in place. Emerging signs of weakness in Japan highlight that the BoJ is likely to remain wedded to this policy, even as Shinzo Abe's popularity hits a low for his current premiership. The recent fall in the leading indicator diffusion index suggests that industrial production - which has been a bright spot - is likely to roll over in the coming months (Chart I-15). This means the improvement in capacity utilization will end, entrenching already strong deflationary pressures in Japan. This only reinforces the easing bias of the BoJ, and truncates any downside for Japanese bond prices. Chart I-15The Coming Japanese IP Slowdown The Coming Japanese IP Slowdown The Coming Japanese IP Slowdown In short, while JGB yields might still experience some downside when global yields fall, they will continue to capture none of the potential upside. This makes the yen even more vulnerable to higher Treasury yields than it was before. Hence, based on our view on U.S. inflation and yields, USD/JPY is an attractive buy at current levels. But what if the rise in U.S. bond yields causes a correction in risk assets, especially EM ones? Again, monetary policy differences and the trend in yields will dominate. As Chart I-16 illustrates, USD/JPY has a much stronger correlation with dynamics in the bond markets than it has with EM equity prices. Chart I-16Yen: More Like Bonds Than Anything Else Yen: More Like Bonds Than Anything Else Yen: More Like Bonds Than Anything Else Chart I-17USD/JPY Falls Only When EM Selloffs Are So Acute That They Cause Bond Rallies USD/JPY Falls Only When EM Selloffs Are So Acute That They Cause Bond Rallies USD/JPY Falls Only When EM Selloffs Are So Acute That They Cause Bond Rallies Moreover, as the experience of the past three years illustrates, only once EM selloffs become particularly acute does USD/JPY weaken (Chart I-17). Essentially, the EM selloff has to be so severe that it threatens the Fed's ability to tighten policy, and therefore causes U.S. bond yields to fall. It is very possible that a rise in Treasury yields will ultimately generate this outcome, but in the meantime the rise in U.S. bond yields should create a tradeable opportunity to buy USD/JPY. Bottom Line: With Japan still in the thralls of deflation and the BoJ committed to fight it, JGB yields have minimal upside. Therefore, higher Treasury yields are likely to do what they do best: cause USD/JPY to rally. This might ultimately lead to a selloff in EM stocks, but in the meanwhile, a playable USD/JPY rally is likely to emerge. Thus, we are opening a long USD/JPY trade this week. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 The U.S. labor market continues to strengthen, with the JOLTS Survey's Job Openings and Hires both ticking up. The NFIB Survey also shows signs of strength as the Business Optimism Index steadied at lofty levels, coming in at 105.2. Unit labor costs disappointed, but this supports U.S. equities. Nonfarm productivity also outperformed, pointing to improving living standards. U.S. data has turned around, with data surprises improving relative to the euro area. These dynamics are likely to prompt a resumption of the greenback's bull market. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Look Ahead, Not Back - June 9, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 Euro area data has been mixed: German current account underperformed, with both exports and imports contracting on a monthly rate, and underperforming expectations. The trade balance, however, outperformed; German industrial production failed to meet expectations, even contracting on a monthly basis; Italian industrial production outperformed both on a monthly and yearly rate, but remains well below capacity European data has begun to show the pain inflicted by tightening financial conditions. Relative to the U.S., the economic surprise index has rolled over. If this trend continues, EUR/USD will struggle to appreciate more this year, and may even weaken if U.S. inflation can improve. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Bad Breadth - July 7, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 Recent data has been negative in Japan: Labor cash earnings yearly growth went from 0.6% in May to a contraction of 0.4% in June, underperforming expectations. Machinery orders yearly growth fell down sharply, contracting at a 5.2% rate and underperforming expectations. The Japanese economy continues to show signs of weakness, which means that the Bank of Japan will not let 10-year JGB yields rise above 10 basis points. In an environment of rising U.S. bond yields this will cause the yen to fall. However the question remains: Could a selloff in EM prompted by a rising dollar help the yen? This should not be the case, at least for now, as the yen is much more correlated with U.S. bond yields than it is with EM stock prices. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 A Market Update: June 23, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. has been mixed: BRC like-for-like retail sales yearly growth came in at 0.9%, outperforming expectations. However, the RICS Hosing Price Balance - a crucial bellweather for the British economy - came in at 1%, dramatically underperforming expectations. Also, the trade balance underperformed expectations, falling to a 12 billion pounds deficit for the month of June as exports sagged. As we mentioned on our previous report, we expect the pound to suffer in the short term, as the high inflation produced by the fall in the pound following the Brexit vote is starting to weigh on consumers. Furthermore, house prices are also suffering, and could soon dip into negative territory. All of these factors will keep the BoE off its hawkish rhetoric for longer than priced by the markets. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 AUD gains are reversing as the U.S. dollar rebounds from a crucial support level. This has also occurred due to mixed Chinese and Australian data: Chinese trade balance beat expectations, however, both exports and imports underperformed; Chinese inflation underperformed expectations; Australian Westpac Consumer Confidence fell to -1.2% from 0.4% in August; This is largely in line with our view that the rally in AUD was would only create a better shorting opportunity. Underlying structural and fundamental issues will remain a headwind for the AUD for the remainder of the year. Iron ore inventories in China are also at an all-time high, which paints a dim picture for Australian mining and exports going forward. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Bad Breadth - July 7, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 On Wednesday, the RBNZ left their Official Cash Rate unchanged at 1.75%. Overall, the bank signaled that it will continue its accommodative monetary policy for "a considerable period of time". Furthermore the RBNZ's outlook for inflation, specifically tradables inflation, remains weak. Finally, the bank also showed concern for the rise in the kiwi, stating that "A lower New Zealand Dollar is needed to increase tradables inflation and help deliver more balanced growth". Overall, we continue to be positive on the kiwi against the AUD. While the outlook for tradable-goods inflation might be poor, this is a variable determined by the global industrial cycle.. Being a metal producer, Australia is much more exposed to these dynamics than New Zealand, a food producer. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Bad Breadth - July 7, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 Data continues to look positive for Canada: Housing Starts increased by 222,300, beating expectations; Building permits also increased at a monthly pace of 2.5%, also beating expectations. CAD has experienced some downside as the stretched long positioning that emerged in the wake of the BoC's newfound hawkishness are being corrected. While we expect the CAD to outperform other commodity currencies, based on rate differentials and oil outperformance, USD/CAD should is likely to trend higher as U.S. inflation bottoms. EUR/CAD should trend lower by the end of this year as euro positioning reverts. As a mirror image, CAD/SEK may appreciate based on the same dynamics. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Bad Breadth - July 7, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 Last week we highlighted the possibility of a correction in EUR/CHF, given that it had reached highly overbought levels. This prediction turned out to be accurate, as EUR/CHF fell by almost 2% this week, as tensions between North Korea and the United States continue to escalate. Meanwhile on the economic front, Switzerland continues to show a tepid recovery: Headline inflation went from 0.2% in June to 0.3% in July, just in line with expectations. The unemployment rate continues to be very low at 3.2%, also coming in according to expectations. Inflation, house prices and various economic indicators are all ticking up, however, the economic recovery is still too weak to cause a major shift in monetary policy. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 The krone has fallen this week against the U.S. dollar, even as oil prices have remained relatively flat. This highlights a key theme we have mentioned before: USD/NOK is more sensitive to rate differentials than it is to oil prices. We expect these rate differentials to continue to widen, as the Norwegian economy remains weak, and inflation will likely remain below the Norges Bank target in the coming years. On the other hand, U.S. yields are set to rise, as a tight labor market will eventually lift wages higher and thus increase rate expectations. Meanwhile EUR/NOK, which is much more sensitive to oil prices than USD/NOK, will keep going down, as inventory drawdowns caused by the OPEC cuts should continue pushing up Brent prices. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 A Market Update: June 23, 2017 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 Data in Sweden was mixed: New Orders Manufacturing yearly growth fell from 7.3% to 4.4%. Industrial production yearly growth increased from 7.5% in May to 8.5% in June, outperforming expectations. The Swedish economy continues to exhibit signs of strong inflationary pressures. Overall we continue to be bullish on the krona, particularly against the euro, as the exit of Stefan Ingves at the end of this year should give way for a more hawkish governor, who would respond to the strength in the economy with a more hawkish stance. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017Xx Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Closed Trades

Highlights Dear Clients, We are publishing a Special Report prepared by my colleague Jonathan LaBerge who examines the case for allocating capital to EM stocks within a global equity portfolio. I hope you will find this report insightful. Best regards, Garry Evans The relative performance of emerging market equities is challenging the downward trend channel that has been in place for the past seven years. This has led to renewed interest in EM from global investors, and warrants a revisit of the role of emerging market equities within a global equity portfolio. While EM recorded the highest regional equity return last cycle (2002-07), they were surprisingly not the "ideal" regional equity market in an efficient portfolio allocation. Recently, several compositional changes within the EM equity universe give the appearance of much lower commodity exposure than is truly the case. But EM equities will still be correlated with broad commodities prices because the later reflect Chinese growth dynamics. Cyclical indicators for China's economy suggest that the broad trend in commodities prices is likely to be lackluster over the coming year, at best. Consequently, EM stocks offer a poor risk/return profile, justifying an underweight stance within a global equity portfolio. Feature Chart I-1Change In Trend, Or Another Failed Rally? Change In Trend, Or Another Failed Rally? Change In Trend, Or Another Failed Rally? In U.S. dollar terms, the relative performance of emerging market (EM) stocks has been in an uptrend for over 18 months, and now appears to be challenging the downward trend channel that has been in place for the past seven years (Chart I-1). This has led to a renewed interest in EM, particularly among global investors. This report takes the recent outperformance of EM stocks as an opportunity to revisit their past and future contribution to a global equity portfolio, and what this might mean for an allocation to EM equities over the coming year. We conclude that EM's return behavior during the last economic cycle (2002-2007), its continued link to commodities prices, and China's growth dynamics all contribute to a poor risk/return profile for EM over the coming year. Barring compelling signs of a durable commodity bull market, investors should underweight EM stocks within a global equity portfolio. EM Equities In A Global Context: Some Historical Perspective When examining whether emerging markets are attractive from the perspective of global equity allocation, a starting point is to analyze the fundamental drivers of regional earnings. One major driver of global earnings over the past 20 years has been commodities prices; Chart I-2 highlights how 12-month forward EPS for stocks in all major regions have been correlated with commodities since the late-1990s. Chart I-2ACommodities Prices Are Correlated With Earnings... Commodities Prices Are Correlated With Earnings... Commodities Prices Are Correlated With Earnings... Chart I-2B...Even In Developed Markets ...Even In Developed Markets ...Even In Developed Markets This can be largely explained by the fact that commodities tend to be a pro-cyclical asset class. However, the super cycle in commodities prices in the 2000s not only bolstered the earnings of global resource companies, it also powered earnings growth for export-oriented industrials as well as domestic demand plays in commodity-producing countries. Chart I-3Strong Correlation Between ##br##Commodities And EM Strong Correlation Between Commodities And EM Strong Correlation Between Commodities And EM Emerging markets were among the largest beneficiaries of the commodity boom; net commodity-exporting countries made up roughly 45% of EM market capitalization throughout the last economic cycle, whereas stocks in the resource sector made up between 25-30% of the index by weight. Unsurprisingly, the relative performance of EM stocks closely tracked commodities prices over this period (Chart I-3). But despite this, EM was surprisingly not the "ideal" regional equity market last cycle within an active portfolio, even though it had the highest return. Chart I-4A presents a scatterplot of annualized regional equity volatility and return from 2002 - 2007, measured in US$ terms. The chart also shows the ex-post Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) efficient frontier, with Chart I-4B presenting the efficient regional allocation at each point along the frontier. Chart I-4AEmerging Market Stocks Had The Highest Return Last Cycle... Global Equity Allocation: The Underwhelming Case For EM Global Equity Allocation: The Underwhelming Case For EM Chart I-4B...But Were Only The Favored Market For High-Risk Portfolios Global Equity Allocation: The Underwhelming Case For EM Global Equity Allocation: The Underwhelming Case For EM Chart I-5From 2002-2007, Earnings Drove More ##br##Of The Rally In DCM Than EM From 2002-2007, Earnings Drove More Of The Rally In DCM Than EM From 2002-2007, Earnings Drove More Of The Rally In DCM Than EM While the charts show that the efficient allocation to emerging market stocks did rise to a maximum of 100% during the last economic cycle, it did not become the dominant region until the portfolio became considerably more volatile than the global equity benchmark. Indeed, Chart I-4B shows that developed commodity markets (DCM) were the preferred commodity play for most of the efficient frontier, owing to their superior performance in risk-adjusted terms. This risk-adjusted outperformance may have occurred because DCM returns last cycle were driven more by earnings than by multiple expansion; Chart I-5 highlights that EM stock prices benefitted from multiple expansion last cycle by outpacing forward earnings, versus the opposite in the case of DCM. Since the onset of the U.S. recession in 2008, Chart I-6A and Chart I-6B highlight that the ex-post efficient portfolio has been much more skewed than during the last economic cycle. The charts show that the frontier since 2008 has been extremely short, with efficient allocations only accruing to three countries with typically defensive stock markets: the U.S., Japan, and Switzerland, with a heavy bias towards the former. From the perspective of a global equity portfolio, this historical review leads to two conclusions: 1) investors should not allocate to EM unless they are bullish on commodities prices and, 2) if investors are bullish towards commodities, developed commodity markets have historically been a better risk-adjusted bet than emerging markets as a commodity play. Chart I-6ASince 2008, The Efficient Frontier Has Been Highly Skewed... Global Equity Allocation: The Underwhelming Case For EM Global Equity Allocation: The Underwhelming Case For EM Chart I-6B...Towards Defensive Markets (Mostly The U.S.) Global Equity Allocation: The Underwhelming Case For EM Global Equity Allocation: The Underwhelming Case For EM Chart I-7These Trends Give The False Appearance ##br##Of Lower EM Commodity Exposure These Trends Give The False Appearance Of Lower EM Commodity Exposure These Trends Give The False Appearance Of Lower EM Commodity Exposure EM And Commodities Prices: Has The Relationship Really Changed? More recently, a narrative has developed in the market that EM stocks are now far less sensitive to commodities prices than used to be the case. Proponents of this theory point to the following changes in the composition of emerging market equity benchmarks: First, the market capitalization weight of net commodity exporting countries has fallen precipitously since the onset of the collapse in oil prices in 2014 (Chart I-7, panel 1). On average, net commodity exporters made up between 40-45% of EM equity market cap from 2000 to 2013, but their share now stands at 27%. Second, Chart I-7, panel 2, shows that the market cap weight of resource sectors (energy plus materials) in emerging markets has fallen from roughly 30% to 14% over the past five years, a trend that pre-dated the decline in the share of net commodity exporters. Third, the enormous rise in the market capitalization of technology companies as a share of total EM market cap has been specifically cited by many market participants (Chart I-7, panel 3), especially since EM is now heavily overweight the tech sector relative to the global average. Broadly speaking, a fourth compositional change within the EM equity benchmark generally captures all of the shifts noted above, and is the focus of our remaining analysis below: the rise in the weight of emerging Asia as a share of overall EM (Chart I-7, panel 4). Among emerging markets, net commodity exporters tend to be located outside of Asia (with the exception of Indonesia and Malaysia), and emerging Asia accounts for essentially all of EM tech market cap. Consequently, investors who argue that EM equities have largely or fully decoupled from commodities prices are essentially arguing that emerging Asian equities are far less affected by changes in commodity markets than they used to be. This idea is deeply flawed, as shown below: Based on export share, Chart I-8 highlights that emerging Asia is far more economically exposed to China than developed markets and EM ex-Asia. While China is gradually becoming more of a services-oriented economy, Chart I-9 highlights that the sum of primary industry (raw material extraction), secondary industry (manufacturing and construction), and real estate services still account for over half of China's economic activity, well above that of industrialized nations such as the U.S. This underscores that emerging Asia's trade exposure to China is fundamentally rooted in economic activity that is closely linked to commodity demand. Chart I-8Emerging Asia Has High ##br##Trade Exposure To China Emerging Asia Has High Trade Exposure To China Emerging Asia Has High Trade Exposure To China Chart I-9Chinese Growth Still Largely ##br##Reflects Industrial Activity Chinese Growth Still Largely Reflects Industrial Activity Chinese Growth Still Largely Reflects Industrial Activity Within the commodity-linked segment of China's economy, Chart I-10 shows that there is little evidence of a weaker relationship between output and commodities prices. Simple regression analysis underscores that the Li Keqiang index, a growth proxy for China's industrial sector, is strongly linked to the year-over-year % change in spot commodities prices since the beginning of the commodity bull market, and that this relationship has in fact been increasing in strength over time. In addition, Chart I-11 underscores that China remains by far the largest consumer of base metals globally. Demand in the global oil market is considerably more diversified than the market for base metals, but China is the second-largest end market for oil (14% of global oil consumption), and accounted for over a quarter of the growth in total oil demand in 2016.1 Chart I-10Moderating Chinese Growth Will ##br##Be Negative For Commodities Moderating Chinese Growth Will Be Negative For Commodities Moderating Chinese Growth Will Be Negative For Commodities Chart I-11China Is By Far The Most Important ##br##End Market For Base Metals China Is By Far The Most Important End Market For Base Metals China Is By Far The Most Important End Market For Base Metals Finally, Chart I-12 shows a regression model between forward earnings expectations for emerging Asia and commodities prices, both at the overall index level and even for the financial sector (which, along with real estate, accounts for almost 25% of emerging Asian market capitalization). The fit for both models is extremely strong and, similar to the increasing strength of the Li Keqiang / commodity price relationship, the chart shows that commodities prices have begun to lead the growth in forward earnings, when the relationship used to be much more coincident. Chart I-12Emerging Asian Earnings Are Strongly ##br##Correlated With Commodities Prices Emerging Asian Earnings Are Strongly Correlated With Commodities Prices Emerging Asian Earnings Are Strongly Correlated With Commodities Prices The bottom line for investors is that Charts I-8-12 show emerging Asian economies are strongly linked economically to China, and that China remains the dominant driver of aggregate commodity demand. This means that while EM stocks may not have as much direct commodity exposure as they used to, they will continue to experience a high correlation with commodities prices because that the latter will be driven by swings in China's business cycle. In brief, Chinese growth fluctuations are instrumental to emerging Asia's economic and equity market performance. This is the rationale behind the very strong link between earnings expectations for emerging Asia and commodities prices: the latter reflect cyclical variations in the Chinese economy. EM Stocks: A Lackluster Bet Given The Outlook For Commodities Our earlier discussion of EM's historical contribution to a global equity portfolio revived elements of Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT), at least from an ex-post perspective. Ex-ante, investors need to make judgements about the likely risk, return, and cross-correlation of an asset when assessing its likely contribution to a diversified portfolio. Regarding the latter factor, Chart I-13 highlights that EM's correlation with global ex-EM has actually fallen quite substantially over the past year, which is a potential argument in the minds of some investors in favor of an increased allocation to EM. When recalling the lessons from Modern Portfolio Theory, most investors tend to focus on the key insight that lowly-correlated assets are valuable from the perspective of constructing a portfolio with an attractive risk/return profile. While this is true, many investors often forget that this is only valid given an expectation of a positive return. The efficient allocation to an asset that has a strongly negative correlation with other assets but has a negative return expectation is basically zero. This means that global investors eying an increased allocation to emerging markets should be squarely focused on EM equities' absolute performance, which as we have highlighted above are likely to be closely linked to commodity returns. Over the coming 6-12 months, Chart I-14 paints an uninspiring picture for commodities prices based on two measures of China's money supply. In turn, interest rates lead money growth and the rise in the former over the past nine months heralds further deceleration in the latter. This implies that the Chinese economy will likely continue to moderate, which is negative for the broad trend in commodities prices. Chart I-13A Significant Decline, But Focus On Return ##br##Expectations, Not Correlation A Significant Decline, But Focus On Return Expectations, Not Correlation A Significant Decline, But Focus On Return Expectations, Not Correlation Chart I-14Interest Rates And Money Growth Paint ##br##A Poor Picture For Commodities Interest Rates And Money Growth Paint A Poor Picture For Commodities Interest Rates And Money Growth Paint A Poor Picture For Commodities As noted above, China's share of the global oil market is much lower than that of base metals, and we do not expect China's oil demand to shrink even if its industrial sector slumps. But from the perspective of allocating to EM equities within a global portfolio, Table I-1 highlights that broad spot commodity price indexes tend to be more relevant predictors of forward earnings growth than energy prices alone. This means that a rise in oil prices (were it to occur for idiosyncratic supply reasons) might be positive for major oil producers such as Russia,2 but is unlikely to provide a broad-based catalyst for EM stocks. Table I-1Explanatory Power Of Commodity Price Indexes In Modeling ##br##12-Month Forward Earnings Per Share Growth (2002-2016) Global Equity Allocation: The Underwhelming Case For EM Global Equity Allocation: The Underwhelming Case For EM Finally, our analysis above has focused on the fundamental drivers of EM stocks, and has shown how DM investors are likely to have little basis to be bullish about emerging markets earnings over the coming 6-12 months. Chart I-15 highlights how this is also true about the potential for EM multiple expansion relative to their global peers. The chart shows that periods of relative EM multiple expansion have, like relative earnings expectations, tended to be associated with rising commodities prices, implying that a significant re-rating of EM equities is unlikely over the coming year. This is in addition the fact that EM stocks are neither cheap nor expensive in absolute terms,3 meaning that there is less room for multiple expansion in EM than many investors believe. Chart I-15No Relative Multiple Expansion ##br##Without Rising Commodities Prices No Relative Multiple Expansion Without Rising Commodities Prices No Relative Multiple Expansion Without Rising Commodities Prices Investment Conclusions In terms of gauging the contribution of EM equities to a global equity portfolio, this report has highlighted the following points: While EM stocks had the highest return of any regional equity market during the last economic cycle (2002-2007), this return profile was accompanied by an outsized degree of volatility. For all but the riskiest portfolios, developed commodity markets were preferred as a commodity play over emerging markets. Several compositional changes within the EM equity universe give the outward appearance of much lower commodity exposure, but this exposure has merely become indirect. While EM's weight towards net commodity exporters and resource sectors has declined, this has shifted benchmark exposure to emerging Asia which has significant economic exposure to China and its industrial sector (the dominant driver of global commodities prices). As such, share prices in EM overall and emerging Asia in particular will still be strongly correlated with commodities prices even given the region's significant weight towards the technology sector.4 Cyclical indicators for China's economy suggest that broad commodity price gains over the coming year are likely to be lackluster, at best (and may very well be negative). Even if global oil prices were to rise, this is unlikely to provide a broad-based catalyst for EM stocks if industrial metals prices relapse, as we expect. These conclusions underscore that it is highly unlikely emerging market stocks will sustainably decouple from commodities prices over the cyclical investment horizon, and that the uptrend in EM relative performance since early-2016 has likely been driven significantly by expectations of further China's growth acceleration and commodity gains. In our judgement, these circumstances have created a poor risk/return profile for emerging market equities, justifying an underweight stance within a global equity portfolio over the coming year. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2017. 2 Note that we recommend an overweight stance towards Russian equities within an EM equity portfolio. 3 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report titled, "EM Equity Valuations Revisited," dated March 29, 2017, link available on page 15. 4 For a further discussion of the impact of the technology sector on the relative performance of emerging market stocks, please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report titled, "Can Tech Drive EM Stocks Higher?" dated May 17, 2017, link available on page 15.

Highlights Dear Clients, We are publishing a Special Report prepared by my colleague Jonathan LaBerge who examines the case for allocating capital to EM stocks within a global equity portfolio. I hope you will find this report insightful. Best regards, Arthur Budaghyan The relative performance of emerging market equities is challenging the downward trend channel that has been in place for the past seven years. This has led to renewed interest in EM from global investors, and warrants a revisit of the role of emerging market equities within a global equity portfolio. While EM recorded the highest regional equity return last cycle (2002-07), they were surprisingly not the "ideal" regional equity market in an efficient portfolio allocation. Recently, several compositional changes within the EM equity universe give the appearance of much lower commodity exposure than is truly the case. But EM equities will still be correlated with broad commodities prices because the latter reflect Chinese growth dynamics. Cyclical indicators for China's economy suggest that the broad trend in commodities prices is likely to be lackluster over the coming year, at best. Consequently, EM stocks offer a poor risk/return profile, justifying an underweight stance within a global equity portfolio. Feature Chart I-1Change In Trend, Or Another Failed Rally? Change In Trend, Or Another Failed Rally? Change In Trend, Or Another Failed Rally? In U.S. dollar terms, the relative performance of emerging market (EM) stocks has been in an uptrend for over 18 months, and now appears to be challenging the downward trend channel that has been in place for the past seven years (Chart I-1). This has led to a renewed interest in EM, particularly among global investors. This report takes the recent outperformance of EM stocks as an opportunity to revisit their past and future contribution to a global equity portfolio, and what this might mean for an allocation to EM equities over the coming year. We conclude that EM's return behavior during the last economic cycle (2002-2007), its continued link to commodities prices, and China's growth dynamics all contribute to a poor risk/return profile for EM over the coming year. Barring compelling signs of a durable commodity bull market, investors should underweight EM stocks within a global equity portfolio. EM Equities In A Global Context: Some Historical Perspective When examining whether emerging markets are attractive from the perspective of global equity allocation, a starting point is to analyze the fundamental drivers of regional earnings. One major driver of global earnings over the past 20 years has been commodities prices; Chart I-2 highlights how 12-month forward EPS for stocks in all major regions have been correlated with commodities since the late-1990s. Chart I-2ACommodities Prices Are Correlated With Earnings... Commodities Prices Are Correlated With Earnings... Commodities Prices Are Correlated With Earnings... Chart I-2B...Even In Developed Markets ...Even In Developed Markets ...Even In Developed Markets This can be largely explained by the fact that commodities tend to be a pro-cyclical asset class. However, the super cycle in commodities prices in the 2000s not only bolstered the earnings of global resource companies, it also powered earnings growth for export-oriented industrials as well as domestic demand plays in commodity-producing countries. Chart I-3Strong Correlation Between ##br##Commodities And EM Strong Correlation Between Commodities And EM Strong Correlation Between Commodities And EM Emerging markets were among the largest beneficiaries of the commodity boom; net commodity-exporting countries made up roughly 45% of EM market capitalization throughout the last economic cycle, whereas stocks in the resource sector made up between 25-30% of the index by weight. Unsurprisingly, the relative performance of EM stocks closely tracked commodities prices over this period (Chart I-3). But despite this, EM was surprisingly not the "ideal" regional equity market last cycle within an active portfolio, even though it had the highest return. Chart I-4A presents a scatterplot of annualized regional equity volatility and return from 2002 - 2007, measured in US$ terms. The chart also shows the ex-post Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) efficient frontier, with Chart I-4B presenting the efficient regional allocation at each point along the frontier. Chart I-4AEmerging Market Stocks Had The Highest Return Last Cycle... Global Equity Allocation: The Underwhelming Case For EM Global Equity Allocation: The Underwhelming Case For EM Chart I-4B...But Were Only The Favored Market For High-Risk Portfolios Global Equity Allocation: The Underwhelming Case For EM Global Equity Allocation: The Underwhelming Case For EM Chart I-5From 2002-2007, Earnings Drove More ##br##Of The Rally In DCM Than EM From 2002-2007, Earnings Drove More Of The Rally In DCM Than EM From 2002-2007, Earnings Drove More Of The Rally In DCM Than EM While the charts show that the efficient allocation to emerging market stocks did rise to a maximum of 100% during the last economic cycle, it did not become the dominant region until the portfolio became considerably more volatile than the global equity benchmark. Indeed, Chart I-4B shows that developed commodity markets (DCM) were the preferred commodity play for most of the efficient frontier, owing to their superior performance in risk-adjusted terms. This risk-adjusted outperformance may have occurred because DCM returns last cycle were driven more by earnings than by multiple expansion; Chart I-5 highlights that EM stock prices benefitted from multiple expansion last cycle by outpacing forward earnings, versus the opposite in the case of DCM. Since the onset of the U.S. recession in 2008, Chart I-6A and Chart I-6B highlight that the ex-post efficient portfolio has been much more skewed than during the last economic cycle. The charts show that the frontier since 2008 has been extremely short, with efficient allocations only accruing to three countries with typically defensive stock markets: the U.S., Japan, and Switzerland, with a heavy bias towards the former. From the perspective of a global equity portfolio, this historical review leads to two conclusions: 1) investors should not allocate to EM unless they are bullish on commodities prices and, 2) if investors are bullish towards commodities, developed commodity markets have historically been a better risk-adjusted bet than emerging markets as a commodity play. Chart I-6ASince 2008, The Efficient Frontier Has Been Highly Skewed... Global Equity Allocation: The Underwhelming Case For EM Global Equity Allocation: The Underwhelming Case For EM Chart I-6B...Towards Defensive Markets (Mostly The U.S.) Global Equity Allocation: The Underwhelming Case For EM Global Equity Allocation: The Underwhelming Case For EM Chart I-7These Trends Give The False Appearance ##br##Of Lower EM Commodity Exposure These Trends Give The False Appearance Of Lower EM Commodity Exposure These Trends Give The False Appearance Of Lower EM Commodity Exposure EM And Commodities Prices: Has The Relationship Really Changed? More recently, a narrative has developed in the market that EM stocks are now far less sensitive to commodities prices than used to be the case. Proponents of this theory point to the following changes in the composition of emerging market equity benchmarks: First, the market capitalization weight of net commodity exporting countries has fallen precipitously since the onset of the collapse in oil prices in 2014 (Chart I-7, panel 1). On average, net commodity exporters made up between 40-45% of EM equity market cap from 2000 to 2013, but their share now stands at 27%. Second, Chart I-7, panel 2, shows that the market cap weight of resource sectors (energy plus materials) in emerging markets has fallen from roughly 30% to 14% over the past five years, a trend that pre-dated the decline in the share of net commodity exporters. Third, the enormous rise in the market capitalization of technology companies as a share of total EM market cap has been specifically cited by many market participants (Chart I-7, panel 3), especially since EM is now heavily overweight the tech sector relative to the global average. Broadly speaking, a fourth compositional change within the EM equity benchmark generally captures all of the shifts noted above, and is the focus of our remaining analysis below: the rise in the weight of emerging Asia as a share of overall EM (Chart I-7, panel 4). Among emerging markets, net commodity exporters tend to be located outside of Asia (with the exception of Indonesia and Malaysia), and emerging Asia accounts for essentially all of EM tech market cap. Consequently, investors who argue that EM equities have largely or fully decoupled from commodities prices are essentially arguing that emerging Asian equities are far less affected by changes in commodity markets than they used to be. This idea is deeply flawed, as shown below: Based on export share, Chart I-8 highlights that emerging Asia is far more economically exposed to China than developed markets and EM ex-Asia. While China is gradually becoming more of a services-oriented economy, Chart I-9 highlights that the sum of primary industry (raw material extraction), secondary industry (manufacturing and construction), and real estate services still account for over half of China's economic activity, well above that of industrialized nations such as the U.S. This underscores that emerging Asia's trade exposure to China is fundamentally rooted in economic activity that is closely linked to commodity demand. Chart I-8Emerging Asia Has High ##br##Trade Exposure To China Emerging Asia Has High Trade Exposure To China Emerging Asia Has High Trade Exposure To China Chart I-9Chinese Growth Still Largely ##br##Reflects Industrial Activity Chinese Growth Still Largely Reflects Industrial Activity Chinese Growth Still Largely Reflects Industrial Activity Within the commodity-linked segment of China's economy, Chart I-10 shows that there is little evidence of a weaker relationship between output and commodities prices. Simple regression analysis underscores that the Li Keqiang index, a growth proxy for China's industrial sector, is strongly linked to the year-over-year % change in spot commodities prices since the beginning of the commodity bull market, and that this relationship has in fact been increasing in strength over time. In addition, Chart I-11 underscores that China remains by far the largest consumer of base metals globally. Demand in the global oil market is considerably more diversified than the market for base metals, but China is the second-largest end market for oil (14% of global oil consumption), and accounted for over a quarter of the growth in total oil demand in 2016.1 Chart I-10Moderating Chinese Growth Will ##br##Be Negative For Commodities Moderating Chinese Growth Will Be Negative For Commodities Moderating Chinese Growth Will Be Negative For Commodities Chart I-11China Is By Far The Most Important ##br##End Market For Base Metals China Is By Far The Most Important End Market For Base Metals China Is By Far The Most Important End Market For Base Metals Finally, Chart I-12 shows a regression model between forward earnings expectations for emerging Asia and commodities prices, both at the overall index level and even for the financial sector (which, along with real estate, accounts for almost 25% of emerging Asian market capitalization). The fit for both models is extremely strong and, similar to the increasing strength of the Li Keqiang / commodity price relationship, the chart shows that commodities prices have begun to lead the growth in forward earnings, when the relationship used to be much more coincident. Chart I-12Emerging Asian Earnings Are Strongly ##br##Correlated With Commodities Prices Emerging Asian Earnings Are Strongly Correlated With Commodities Prices Emerging Asian Earnings Are Strongly Correlated With Commodities Prices The bottom line for investors is that Charts I-8-12 show emerging Asian economies are strongly linked economically to China, and that China remains the dominant driver of aggregate commodity demand. This means that while EM stocks may not have as much direct commodity exposure as they used to, they will continue to experience a high correlation with commodities prices because that the latter will be driven by swings in China's business cycle. In brief, Chinese growth fluctuations are instrumental to emerging Asia's economic and equity market performance. This is the rationale behind the very strong link between earnings expectations for emerging Asia and commodities prices: the latter reflect cyclical variations in the Chinese economy. EM Stocks: A Lackluster Bet Given The Outlook For Commodities Our earlier discussion of EM's historical contribution to a global equity portfolio revived elements of Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT), at least from an ex-post perspective. Ex-ante, investors need to make judgements about the likely risk, return, and cross-correlation of an asset when assessing its likely contribution to a diversified portfolio. Regarding the latter factor, Chart I-13 highlights that EM's correlation with global ex-EM has actually fallen quite substantially over the past year, which is a potential argument in the minds of some investors in favor of an increased allocation to EM. When recalling the lessons from Modern Portfolio Theory, most investors tend to focus on the key insight that lowly-correlated assets are valuable from the perspective of constructing a portfolio with an attractive risk/return profile. While this is true, many investors often forget that this is only valid given an expectation of a positive return. The efficient allocation to an asset that has a strongly negative correlation with other assets but has a negative return expectation is basically zero. This means that global investors eying an increased allocation to emerging markets should be squarely focused on EM equities' absolute performance, which as we have highlighted above are likely to be closely linked to commodity returns. Over the coming 6-12 months, Chart I-14 paints an uninspiring picture for commodities prices based on two measures of China's money supply. In turn, interest rates lead money growth and the rise in the former over the past nine months heralds further deceleration in the latter. This implies that the Chinese economy will likely continue to moderate, which is negative for the broad trend in commodities prices. Chart I-13A Significant Decline, But Focus On Return ##br##Expectations, Not Correlation A Significant Decline, But Focus On Return Expectations, Not Correlation A Significant Decline, But Focus On Return Expectations, Not Correlation Chart I-14Interest Rates And Money Growth Paint ##br##A Poor Picture For Commodities Interest Rates And Money Growth Paint A Poor Picture For Commodities Interest Rates And Money Growth Paint A Poor Picture For Commodities As noted above, China's share of the global oil market is much lower than that of base metals, and we do not expect China's oil demand to shrink even if its industrial sector slumps. But from the perspective of allocating to EM equities within a global portfolio, Table I-1 highlights that broad spot commodity price indexes tend to be more relevant predictors of forward earnings growth than energy prices alone. This means that a rise in oil prices (were it to occur for idiosyncratic supply reasons) might be positive for major oil producers such as Russia,2 but is unlikely to provide a broad-based catalyst for EM stocks. Table I-1Explanatory Power Of Commodity Price Indexes In Modeling ##br##12-Month Forward Earnings Per Share Growth (2002-2016) Global Equity Allocation: The Underwhelming Case For EM Global Equity Allocation: The Underwhelming Case For EM Finally, our analysis above has focused on the fundamental drivers of EM stocks, and has shown how DM investors are likely to have little basis to be bullish about emerging markets earnings over the coming 6-12 months. Chart I-15 highlights how this is also true about the potential for EM multiple expansion relative to their global peers. The chart shows that periods of relative EM multiple expansion have, like relative earnings expectations, tended to be associated with rising commodities prices, implying that a significant re-rating of EM equities is unlikely over the coming year. This is in addition the fact that EM stocks are neither cheap nor expensive in absolute terms,3 meaning that there is less room for multiple expansion in EM than many investors believe. Chart I-15No Relative Multiple Expansion ##br##Without Rising Commodities Prices No Relative Multiple Expansion Without Rising Commodities Prices No Relative Multiple Expansion Without Rising Commodities Prices Investment Conclusions In terms of gauging the contribution of EM equities to a global equity portfolio, this report has highlighted the following points: While EM stocks had the highest return of any regional equity market during the last economic cycle (2002-2007), this return profile was accompanied by an outsized degree of volatility. For all but the riskiest portfolios, developed commodity markets were preferred as a commodity play over emerging markets. Several compositional changes within the EM equity universe give the outward appearance of much lower commodity exposure, but this exposure has merely become indirect. While EM's weight towards net commodity exporters and resource sectors has declined, this has shifted benchmark exposure to emerging Asia which has significant economic exposure to China and its industrial sector (the dominant driver of global commodities prices). As such, share prices in EM overall and emerging Asia in particular will still be strongly correlated with commodities prices even given the region's significant weight towards the technology sector.4 Cyclical indicators for China's economy suggest that broad commodity price gains over the coming year are likely to be lackluster, at best (and may very well be negative). Even if global oil prices were to rise, this is unlikely to provide a broad-based catalyst for EM stocks if industrial metals prices relapse, as we expect. These conclusions underscore that it is highly unlikely emerging market stocks will sustainably decouple from commodities prices over the cyclical investment horizon, and that the uptrend in EM relative performance since early-2016 has likely been driven significantly by expectations of further China's growth acceleration and commodity gains. In our judgement, these circumstances have created a poor risk/return profile for emerging market equities, justifying an underweight stance within a global equity portfolio over the coming year. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2017. 2 Note that we recommend an overweight stance towards Russian equities within an EM equity portfolio. 3 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report titled, "EM Equity Valuations Revisited," dated March 29, 2017, link available on page 15. 4 For a further discussion of the impact of the technology sector on the relative performance of emerging market stocks, please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report titled, "Can Tech Drive EM Stocks Higher?" dated May 17, 2017, link available on page 15.

Highlights The Mueller investigation is part of the "Trump Put;" General White House disarray and congressional incompetence combine to produce Goldilocks conditions for U.S. equities; Mexico's frontrunner in the upcoming elections, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, is no Chavez; Malaysian political risks are overstated, the ruling Barisan Nasional has pushed through painful reforms; With economic growth stabilizing, cheap valuations, and overstated political risks, Malaysia could be an intriguing investment opportunity. Feature This week, we turn to two emerging markets: Mexico and Malaysia. Our approach to EMs is to look for opportunities where politics may emerge as the alpha amidst appealing valuations. We rely on our sister strategy, BCA's Emerging Market Strategy, for fundamental analysis, to which we then add our political research. We find it striking that these two EMs are the very two that stood to suffer the most should U.S. Congress have passed a border adjustment tax (Chart 1). Not only have the Republicans forsworn the border tax, but these countries will benefit from other trends, as we explain below. Before we dive into Malaysia and Mexico, however, a short note on the latest developments in the White House is in order. Clients from St. Louis, Missouri to Auckland, New Zealand are asking us the same question this summer: when does the Mueller investigation become a headwind for the SPX? Chart 1Vulnerability To U.S. Import Tariffs And Border Adjustment Taxes Update On Emerging Markets: Malaysia, Mexico, And The United States Of America Update On Emerging Markets: Malaysia, Mexico, And The United States Of America The "Trump Put" Continues Our answer is that Special Counsel Robert Mueller's investigation may already be a tailwind to the U.S. equity market. The investigation, along with general White House disarray and congressional incompetence, makes up the ongoing "Trump Put."1 The American political imbroglio has combined with decent earnings and steady global growth to produce Goldilocks conditions for U.S. equities, while simultaneously weakening the USD and supporting Treasuries. The political fulcrum upon which all these assets turn is the failure of the Trump administration to deliver its promised fiscal stimulus (Chart 2). Tax reform, which was supposed to be the main vehicle of such stimulus, is increasingly looking like it will fail to live up to its hype. We still think it will pass, for three broad reasons: Chart 2Handcuffed Trump The Most Likely Scenario Handcuffed Trump The Most Likely Scenario Handcuffed Trump The Most Likely Scenario Trump's low popularity remains an albatross around the neck of GOP candidates in the November 2018 elections, with potentially ominous results. Our simple "line-of-best-fit" model between a Republican president's approval rating and the GOP's midterm performance produces a 38-seat loss in the upcoming election (Chart 3). Republicans need a legislative win and need it fast. The House has laid the groundwork for tax reform, passing the FY2018 budget resolution with reconciliation instructions focused on tax legislation. This means that the Obamacare replace and repeal effort has until October 1 to be resolved.2 Investors are conflating replacing and repealing Obamacare with tax reform. The former is an entitlement program, the latter a more popular measure that Republicans have always tried to move through Congress. It is very rare for U.S. policymakers to successfully reduce or remove an entitlement program. Cutting, even reforming, taxes is easier to justify politically. Chart 3The Clock Is Ticking For The GOP On Tax Reform Update On Emerging Markets: Malaysia, Mexico, And The United States Of America Update On Emerging Markets: Malaysia, Mexico, And The United States Of America Although we still maintain that tax reform, or mere tax cuts, will happen, they are unlikely to be as stimulative as originally advertised. Corporate and household tax rates are unlikely to be lowered by as much as originally touted. That is because Republicans in the House will demand "revenue offsets" to accomplish rate reduction, yet they have already lost key offsets like Obamacare repeal and the border adjustment tax.3#fn_3 The White House could change all that by using its considerable political capital among conservative grassroots voters and the bully pulpit to get fiscally conservative Republicans in the House to move a stimulative tax reform through Congress. But, as we noted two weeks ago, factional fighting in the White House and an ineffective chief of staff are considerable hurdles.4 A few days after we published that report, President Trump replaced Reince Priebus with retired General and Homeland Security Secretary John Kelly. While Kelly is likely to introduce some discipline into the White House, we doubt he will make the executive more effective in cajoling House Representatives to toe the administration's line on tax reform. This is because Kelly adds no legislative experience to a White House that is already quite low on it by recent historical standards (Chart 4). Chart 4Trump Administration Is On The Low End Of Congressional Experience Update On Emerging Markets: Malaysia, Mexico, And The United States Of America Update On Emerging Markets: Malaysia, Mexico, And The United States Of America Additionally, the Trump Administration continues to drag its feet on presidential appointments, hurting the effectiveness of the executive. Only 220 appointments had been sent to the Senate by July 19, compared to the average 309 during the same time period by the previous four presidents (Chart 5). The Senate is very slow in confirming the candidates, perhaps because of their unorthodox backgrounds and resumes. The average time to confirm a Trump nominee is 45 days, which is astonishing given that the Senate is controlled by Republicans. Chart 5The Trump Administration Is Dragging Its Feet On Appointments Update On Emerging Markets: Malaysia, Mexico, And The United States Of America Update On Emerging Markets: Malaysia, Mexico, And The United States Of America In addition to the ineffectiveness of the White House, investors fret that the ongoing Mueller investigation, which has just impaneled a grand jury, could undercut the rally in risk assets. By summoning a grand jury Mueller can subpoena documents and obtain testimony of witnesses under oath. Doing so will accelerate the investigation and perhaps take it down new avenues. For example, the Kenneth Starr investigation initially focused on the suicide of deputy White House counsel Vince Foster and the Whitewater real estate investments by Bill Clinton. But the trail led elsewhere. Ultimately, the "Starr Report" alleged that Clinton lied under oath regarding his extramarital affair with Monica Lewinsky. Impeachment proceedings ensued. That said, we are sticking with our conclusion from May that investors should look through any risk of impeachment or indictment for President Trump, at least as long as Republicans hold the House of Representatives (i.e., at least until the midterms in 2018).5 In particular, there are three main reasons to fade any near-term equity market volatility: President Mike Pence - Under both impeachment rules and the 25th amendment, the U.S. president would be replaced by the vice president. Vice President Pence's approval rating largely tracks that of President Trump and is in the 40% area, but investors should note that he once stood at nearly 60% during the campaign (Chart 6). As such, the worst-case scenario for investors in the event of a post-midterm impeachment is that Trump is replaced by Pence, an orthodox Republican, and that Pence has to deal with a split Congress. And that is not bad! It would grind reforms to a halt, but at least tax reform would be out of the way by then. Midterm Election - If the Trump White House becomes engulfed in scandal, Republicans in the House will fear losing their majority. Yes, the partisan drawing of electoral districts - "gerrymandering" - has reduced the number of competitive U.S. House districts from 164 in 1998 to 72 in 2016 (Chart 7). But the Democrats managed to win the House in 2006 and the Republicans managed to take it back in 2010, so there is no reason the roles cannot be reversed yet again. However, this is not a risk, it is an opportunity. It will motivate the GOP in Congress to lock in tax and health care reform well ahead of the midterm elections. Counter-Revolution - With Trump embattled and facing impeachment, the market may let out a sigh of relief because it would mark a clear defeat of populist politics in the U.S. Much as with electoral outcomes in Europe, investors may want to cheer the defeat of an unorthodox, anti-establishment movement in the U.S. As such, we would push against any "Russia scandal"-induced volatility in the U.S. markets, at least until the midterm election. We think the market would digest the volatility and realize that Trump's impeachment, were it to occur after midterm elections, would not arrest the Republican agenda before the midterms. After all, the GOP has waited over 15 years to make Bush-era tax cuts permanent and the opportunity to do so may evaporate within the next 12 months. In addition, given the performance of high tax-rate S&P 500 equities (Chart 8), investors appear to have already discounted the failure of meaningful tax reform in the market. This means that the "Trump Put" is in full effect: investors are bidding up risk assets not because they expect something to happen (tax reform, fiscal stimulus, financial deregulation, etc.), but because they expect nothing to happen (no fiscal stimulus, no fast Fed rate hikes, no onerous regulation for businesses, etc.). Chart 6Could Be Worse ##br##Than Pence Could Be Worse Than Pence Could Be Worse Than Pence Chart 7Gerrymandering Reduces##br## Competitive House Seats Gerrymandering Reduces Competitive House Seats Gerrymandering Reduces Competitive House Seats Chart 8Investors No Longer##br## Expect Tax Reform Investors No Longer Expect Tax Reform Investors No Longer Expect Tax Reform What about the long term? A scandal-ridden White House, escalating leaks against the administration, and a mounting bureaucratic revolt against the executive cannot be good for the U.S., can they? The news flow out of Washington increasingly looks like news from Ankara, Brasilia, or Pretoria. There are two diametrically opposed directions the U.S. can take. The first is deepening polarization and policy gridlock that leads to President Trump being replaced by an even greater bout of populism in 2020 or 2024. We described this scenario recently in a pessimistic note about the coming social unrest in America.6 The alternative is that Democrats and Republicans in Congress (particularly the Senate), representing the country's elites, decide to work together on legislation. Both parties recently united to pass veto-proof sanctions on Russia with a 98-2 vote that has bound the executive to future review by Congress. And some green shoots of bipartisanship appeared over the past two weeks on tax reform and even on health care. It is too soon to say which path American policymakers will take. Investors may have to wait until after the midterm election for genuine cooperation. But it would be very positive for the U.S. economy and prospects of reform if genuine bipartisanship emerged as a reaction to the incompetence, scandal, nationalism, and populism of the White House. Bottom Line: The intensifying Mueller investigation and ongoing White House incompetence will only further fuel the "Trump Put." This is positive for U.S. equities, neutral for bonds, and bad for the dollar, ceteris paribus. A significant pickup in inflation could overwhelm the "Trump Put" and cause the dollar to rally. As such, investors should focus on inflation prospects more than politics in the White House. What If Mexico Builds A Wall First? For every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction. The election of President Donald Trump, an unabashed nationalist who campaigned on an anti-immigrant platform, is spurring the campaign of Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, also known as AMLO, in the upcoming July 1, 2018 elections in Mexico. Obrador has been a left-wing firebrand of Mexican politics for years. He was the Head of Government of Mexico City (essentially the city's mayor) from 2000 to 2005 and contested a close election against Felipe Calderon in 2006, which he narrowly lost. He lost the 2012 election by a much wider margin, but still came second to current president Enrique Pena Nieto of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Obrador's election campaign calls for a confrontational attitude towards President Trump, the renegotiation of NAFTA, an increase to farm subsidies, and limitations on foreign investment in Mexico. He has said that he would reverse the opening of the energy sector to foreign investment through a referendum, but that he is in favor of public-private partnerships in the sector. That said, his left-wing firebrand persona is more PR than substance. In 2012, for example, he also campaigned on cutting government expenditure and ending monopolies - not exactly Chavista credentials. Nonetheless, he quit the left-leaning Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) to form a more left-wing movement. Obrador's new party, the National Regeneration Movement (MORENA), did well in the 2015 midterms and is currently leading in the polls ahead of the 2018 election (Chart 9). MORENA also did well in the State of Mexico, a PRI stronghold and Nieto's home state, in the June 4 election. The ruling PRI held the state for 90 years and is accused of election-rigging in order to, only narrowly, defeat an unknown MORENA candidate this year. Chart 9MORENA Has Lead In The Polls Update On Emerging Markets: Malaysia, Mexico, And The United States Of America Update On Emerging Markets: Malaysia, Mexico, And The United States Of America Given that the election is a year away, it is too soon to make a forecast. Nonetheless, it is clear that Obrador is the frontrunner for the presidency. There are three reasons why his election may be an over-hyped risk: The Congress: For much of Mexico's twentieth century history, the president was essentially a dictator due to the one-party rule of PRI. In the twenty-first century, however, Congress has become plural, forcing the president to cooperate with the body or see his reforms stalled. Given recent elections (Chart 10), it is highly unlikely that Obrador would have a congressional majority behind him, thus forcing him to temper his policies. Chart 10Mexico's Rising Political Plurality Update On Emerging Markets: Malaysia, Mexico, And The United States Of America Update On Emerging Markets: Malaysia, Mexico, And The United States Of America The PAN-PRD Alliance: An unlikely alliance of the conservative National Action Party (PAN) and the center-left PRD has emerged as a reaction to the rise of MORENA in the polls. (These two parties have a history of cooperating against PRI presidents.) The two parties come from completely opposite ideological spectrums, but successfully joined forces in several state elections in 2016. It is unlikely that the two parties will unify sufficiently to field a single candidate - they failed to do so in the June 4 State of Mexico elections - but they may get enough votes to form a plurality in Congress. Mexicans do not lean left: Unlike most of Latin America, Mexico is a conservative country. Most Mexicans either think of themselves as centrist or lean right (Chart 11). While our data stops in 2015, the historical trend is clear: Mexico is a right-leaning country. As such, it is highly unlikely that AMLO will be able to manipulate the country's democratic institutions - which have been strengthened over the past twenty years - to turn Mexico into Venezuela. Chart 11Mexicans Lean Right Update On Emerging Markets: Malaysia, Mexico, And The United States Of America Update On Emerging Markets: Malaysia, Mexico, And The United States Of America We would therefore fade any politically induced volatility in Mexican assets. Next year, investors should prepare to "sell the rumor and buy the news" (you read that right), as Mexican election fever grips the markets. Given current macroeconomic fundamentals, an entry point in Mexican assets may develop if they sell off ahead of the election - but they are not a buy at the moment. BCA's Emerging Market Strategy has pointed out in a recent report that:7 Inflation is well above the central bank's target and is broad based (Chart 12). Notably, wage growth is elevated (Chart 13). Given meager productivity growth, unit labor costs - calculated as wage-per-hour divided by productivity (output-per-hour) - are rising. This will depress companies' profit margins and make them eager to hike selling prices. This will, in turn, prevent inflation from falling and, consequently, hamper Banxico's ability to cut rates for now. Chart 12Inflation is Above Target Inflation is Above Target Inflation is Above Target Chart 13Wage Inflation Is High Wage Inflation Is High Wage Inflation Is High Meanwhile, the impact of higher interest rates will continue filtering through the economy. High interest rates entail a further slowdown in money and credit growth and, hence, in domestic demand. Both consumer spending and capital expenditure by companies are set to weaken a lot (Chart 14). This will weigh on corporate profits and share prices. Even though non-oil exports and manufacturing output are accelerating (Chart 15), non-oil exports - which make about 30% of GDP - are not large enough to offset the deceleration in domestic demand from monetary tightening. That said, the positive for Mexico is that the Mexican peso remains cheap (Chart 16) and may rally against other EM currencies. Our EM strategists suggest that investors should overweight MXN versus ZAR and BRL. Chart 14Domestic Demand to Buckle Domestic Demand to Buckle Domestic Demand to Buckle Chart 15Exports are Robust Exports are Robust Exports are Robust Chart 16Peso is Cheap Peso is Cheap Peso is Cheap If EM currencies depreciate or oil prices drop, it would be difficult to see MXN rally against the USD. However, MXN should outperform other currencies, especially given that political risks in Mexico are far lower than they are in Brazil and South Africa. Bottom Line: The Mexican markets may get AMLO-fever in 2018. Obrador is a clear frontrunner in the election to be held a year from now. However, AMLO will face off against constitutional, political, and societal constraints. As such, we would fade any politically induced risks in Mexican markets. Go strategically long MXN versus BRL and ZAR and look for an entry point into Mexican risk assets over the next 12 months. Malaysia: Hold Your Nose And Buy We have been broadly bearish on Malaysia since August 2015, but the upcoming elections - due by August 2018, but we expect to occur sooner rather than later - are likely to cause the markets to re-price Malaysian assets (Chart 17). The country's fundamentals are not rosy, and it remains vulnerable to a slowdown in China, a drop in commodities prices, and bad loans. Nevertheless, its underperformance is late, and this fact, combined with the political outlook, suggests that it will outperform for a while. Malaysia is in the midst of a long saga of party polarization that began amid the Asian Financial Crisis, when Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad ousted his ambitious deputy, Anwar Ibrahim. Both men hailed from the dominant party of the country's ethnic Malay majority: the United Malay National Organization (UMNO), which is the center of Barisan Nasional (BN). The BN is a multi-ethnic coalition that has held power in one form or another since independence in 1957. Anwar went on to lead the reformasi (reform) movement, creating an opposition coalition of strange bedfellows: his own urban Malay People's Justice Party (PKR), the ethnic Chinese DAP, and the Islamist PAS. In the 2008 general elections, the opposition shocked the BN, depriving it of a two-thirds super-majority for the first time since 1969. In the 2013 general elections, the opposition won the popular vote, though BN retained control of parliament due to inherent advantages in the electoral system (Chart 18). Hence the past two elections, particularly the last one in 2013, have shaken the political system to the core. Since the 2013 shock, the opposition has had its sights set on the 2018 election, and a series of blows to the Najib government have given cause for hope. First, exports and commodity prices plunged from 2014 to 2016, damaging the economy and giving the opposition a grand opportunity to attack the administration (Chart 19). Second, Najib was personally implicated in a massive scandal involving 1MDB, a sovereign wealth fund that Najib helped create and from which he allegedly embezzled $700 million (!). Street protests emerged in 2015 and suddenly Najib faced a revolt from the old guard within his own party (including Mahathir himself). Chart 17Malaysian Underperformance Is Late Malaysian Underperformance Is Late Malaysian Underperformance Is Late Chart 18Opposition Threatens UMNO's Dominance Update On Emerging Markets: Malaysia, Mexico, And The United States Of America Update On Emerging Markets: Malaysia, Mexico, And The United States Of America Chart 19Commodities Should Help Malaysian Exports Commodities Should Help Malaysian Exports Commodities Should Help Malaysian Exports The problem for the opposition, however, is timing. The 2008 election occurred before the worst of the global financial crisis had been felt; the 2013 election occurred before the full impact of the commodity bust; and now the ruling coalition's fortunes are recovering in time for the upcoming election - which, of course, the prime minister schedules to his advantage. Thus, the opposition once again faces an uphill battle in this election cycle: The Malaysian economy has beaten expectations, growing by 5.6% in the first quarter of 2017, the fastest rate in two years. This was driven mainly by exports and the manufacturing sector (Chart 20). Money supply growth is strong while the credit impulse has bottomed and is approaching positive territory (Chart 21). The 1MDB scandal has mostly dissipated. Najib publicly confessed that the $700 million found in his personal account was a donation from a foreign government, and Saudi Arabian authorities confirmed this, prompting Najib to return the money. Malaysia's attorney general, anti-corruption commission, and central bank have all cleared Najib of wrongdoing, and his popular support has recovered from the fever pitch of the scandal in 2015-16, as demonstrated by the net-gain for BN in by-elections since 2013, and the fact that the BN saw its share of seats rise from 27% to 37% in the 2016 Sarawak State Assembly elections. This state's local elections have tended to foreshadow national elections, and it has the largest representation of any state in the national parliament (31/222). The opposition is split. Najib has courted the Islamist opposition party, PAS, peeling it away from the opposition coalition. Without PAS, the opposition falls from 89 seats in parliament to 71 seats, which is 41 shy of a majority. Even in the best case scenario for the opposition in the upcoming election, in which the opposition holds all seats from 2013 and Bersatu gains all of UMNO's seats in Kedah and Johor, the opposition would still fall 16 seats shy of a majority. Chart 20Growth Is Strong Growth Is Strong Growth Is Strong Chart 21Credit Cycle Is Picking Up Credit Cycle Is Picking Up Credit Cycle Is Picking Up Bottom Line: Our baseline case holds that Najib and BN will retain control of the government in the upcoming election on the back of the fading scandal, economic recovery, and a shrewd practice of dividing political enemies. What Does A Najib Win Mean? Is a Najib/BN victory positive for Malaysian risk assets? We think so, at least relative to other EMs. While Malaysia would benefit in the long run from breaking the BN's monopoly over parliament, the immediate consequence of an opposition victory would be confusion as the various opposition parties have widely divergent interests ... and zero governing experience. On the other hand, Najib's government has undertaken some significant reforms, expanded infrastructure, and improved government finances, making his corrupt and pseudo-authoritarian government not as market unfriendly as one might expect: As a result of weak commodities, cuts in subsidies, and the introduction of a goods and services tax (GST) and a tourism tax, Malaysia's fiscal deficit has improved from 5.5% in 2013, when Najib took office, to 3.1% today (Chart 22). The government is on a path to close the deficit by the end of the decade. The GST has allowed the government to reduce its dependency on oil revenues. Non-tax revenues, which include oil royalties, have decreased from 35% in 2010 to only 20% of total revenue, while indirect taxes (which include GST) have increased from 17% to 28% of revenue (Chart 23, top three panels). There are plans to increase the goods covered by the GST in the near future. The government has cut subsidies in fuel and cooking gas, taking advantage of low oil prices. The government had also eliminated subsidies in cooking oil and sugar. Subsidies as a percent of total expenditures have declined from almost 20% in 2014 to only 9% today (Chart 23, bottom panel). The government has expanded infrastructure, completing a mass rail transit extension in Kuala Lumpur, connecting the two East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak via a 2,000 km highway, and attracting Chinese investment from the One Belt One Road program. The latter entails China building an East Coast Rail Link to connect the west and east coasts. Upon completion, this link will enable shippers to circumvent the port of Singapore and reach the South China Sea in a shorter time period. Chart 22Austerity Works Austerity Works Austerity Works Chart 23Tax Reforms Paid Off Tax Reforms Paid Off Tax Reforms Paid Off One perceived drawback of Najib's government is that in order to stay in power, he has had to court the Islamist PAS party, as mentioned above, specifically by allowing it to promote aspects of shariah law in the country's parliament. However, Malaysia is not at risk of being swept away by an imaginary rising tide of Islamic extremism. The country is very diverse, and Malay Muslims make up only a little more than half of the population. Malaysians are highly religious, but they are also highly tolerant, as they have lived among other races and religions since independence (Chart 24). Moreover, Islam is regulated and bureaucratized in Malaysia, which discourages the emergence of charismatic, anti-establishment religious leaders and the development of extremist movements. Finally, the government has an absolute need to win votes both in the Borneo states of Sabah and Sarawak, which have sizable Christian and non-Malay populations (adding up to more than half), and in the population centers of Kuala Lumpur and Penang. This means that it is not likely to allow PAS (or other Islamist movements) to go too far. Chart 24Malaysians Are Tolerant Update On Emerging Markets: Malaysia, Mexico, And The United States Of America Update On Emerging Markets: Malaysia, Mexico, And The United States Of America Bottom Line: Najib's government is corrupt and has authoritarian leanings, but has improved its management of the economy and public finances, and is not getting out of control with Islamism or populism. We would not expect a sustained market sell off in the face of a BN victory in upcoming polls. By contrast, if the opposition coalition wins a majority, it offers the long-term promise of a more inclusive and competitive political system that would be good for Malaysia, but would bring greater policy uncertainty in the short term. The opposition would likely have a low probability of achieving major reforms, as the BN party-state conglomerate would fight tooth and nail against it. A positive knee-jerk market response to an opposition win - on the expectation that "regime change" raises the probability of pro-market reforms - would likely be ephemeral. Investment Conclusion A key internal risk to the Malaysian economy stems from the country's fairly sizable debt, which may eventually become unsustainable. Yet at the moment, household and government debt are both rolling over even as growth is improving (Chart 25). A key external risk stems from China. Chinese politics are likely to shift from a tailwind for Chinese growth - fiscal stimulus and the need for stability ahead of the National Party Congress - to a headwind, as stimulus subsides and reforms are rebooted in 2018.8 We do not expect China's investment in Malaysia to fall sharply, since it is tied to a broad, long-term, strategic plan; nor do we see Malaysia as overexposed to Chinese imports or tourism. Nevertheless, Malaysia would suffer to some extent, and it is indirectly vulnerable as Malaysian exports to ASEAN and tourists from ASEAN are significant, and ASEAN would suffer from a Chinese slowdown. In short, China is a risk, albeit not as direct or major as one might think. The Malaysian ringgit has already become the best-performing currency this year. Yet this recent appreciation has not come near to reversing the currency's roughly 20% depreciation since 2014. A cheap currency, combined with robust external demand, should be a tailwind for Malaysian exports and the broader economy (Chart 26). Moreover, the rising price of key Malaysian exports like energy and palm oil should be positive for Malaysian equities (Chart 27). Chart 25Debt Is High, But Is Rolling Over Debt Is High, But Is Rolling Over Debt Is High, But Is Rolling Over Chart 26Cheap Currency Is A Tailwind For Exports Cheap Currency Is A Tailwind For Exports Cheap Currency Is A Tailwind For Exports Chart 27Commodities Support Equity Prices Commodities Support Equity Prices Commodities Support Equity Prices At the same time, valuations are attractive. Malaysian equities have underperformed the EM universe and its ASEAN peers since 2013 (see Chart 17 above). Malaysian equities have lost considerable value relative to their EM peers, and are trading at a discount relative to ASEAN peers. Compared to historical valuations, Malaysian equities are also trading at a discount (Chart 28 A and B). Chart 28aMalaysia Is Cheap Compared To Peers... Malaysia Is Cheap Compared To Peers... Malaysia Is Cheap Compared To Peers... Chart 28b...And Its Historical Valuation ...And Its Historical Valuation ...And Its Historical Valuation Bottom Line: The likely start of a new credit cycle, improving government finances, a persistently cheap currency, and the likelihood of an acceptable policy status quo should put a tailwind behind Malaysian risk assets. We recommend going long Malaysian equities relative to their EM peers. Jesse Anak Kuri, Research Analyst jesse.kuri@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst Emerging Markets Strategy stephang@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "How Long Can The 'Trump Put' Last?" dated June 14, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Reconciliation And The Markets - Warning: This Report May Put You To Sleep," dated May 31, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Will Congress Pass The Border Adjustment Tax?," dated February 8, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "The Wrath Of Cohn," dated July 26, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Break Glass In Case Of Impeachment," dated May 17, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Populism Blues: How And Why Social Instability Is Coming To America," dated June 9, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Emerging Market Strategy Weekly Report, "The Case For A Major Top In EM," dated July 12, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress," dated July 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.