BCA Indicators/Model

Highlights Duration Strategy: The recent market turmoil was a long overdue risk asset correction that does not change any fundamental underpinnings for rising global bond yields. Stay below-benchmark on overall global duration exposure, concentrated in an underweight stance on U.S. Treasuries. Country Allocations: Continue allocating duration risk for global government bond portfolios in favor of countries where central banks will have difficulty raising interest rates (Australia, U.K., Japan core Europe) relative to countries where rate hikes are more necessary and likely to happen (U.S., Canada). Feature Repricing "Central Banker Puts" Can Be Painful By a quirk of our scheduling, we have not published a regular Weekly Report since September, during what became a period of more turbulent global financial markets. While we trust that our clients have enjoyed the Special Reports that we have published instead, we are certain that many are asking an obvious question: have the more jittery markets triggered any change in BCA's views on global fixed income? The answer is "no". Just like the sharp "Vol-mageddon" risk asset selloff back in early February, the origin of the recent volatility spike was soaring U.S. Treasury yields driven by a rapid upward revision of Fed rate hike expectations (Chart of the Week). We had been expecting such an adjustment based on our positive assessment of the underlying momentum of both economic growth and inflation in the U.S. This remains a critical underpinning for our below-benchmark call on U.S. duration exposure, and our increased caution on U.S. spread product. Chart of the WeekRisk Assets Struggling As Bond Yields Rise Risk Assets Struggling As Bond Yields Rise Risk Assets Struggling As Bond Yields Rise There is more to the story than just the Fed, however. Throughout the course of 2018, we have been warning that global central banks moving away from accommodative monetary policies would be the greatest threat to market stability. This is not only a story of Fed rate hikes. A reduction in the pace of asset purchases by the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of Japan (BoJ), combined with outright contraction of the Fed's swollen balance sheet, has created a backdrop more conducive to volatile spikes - especially if the global economy is losing upward momentum at the same time. The OECD leading economic indicator has been steadily declining throughout 2018, a reflection of the more challenging backdrop for non-U.S. growth. It is no coincidence that, without the support from accelerating liquidity or positive economic momentum, many of last year's best performing investments (Italian government bonds, the Turkish lira, Emerging Market (EM) hard currency corporate debt) have been some of 2018's worst (Chart 2). Investors were willing to ignore the poor structural fundamentals underlying those markets when times were good, but have been much more cautious in 2018 with a less supportive macro environment. Chart 2The Darlings Of 2017 Are The Duds Of 2018 The Darlings Of 2017 Are The Duds Of 2018 The Darlings Of 2017 Are The Duds Of 2018 While there have been numerous political headlines that have caused bouts of market turbulence in the past few months - the escalating U.S.-China "tariff war", the Italian fiscal debate with the European Union - the short-term impact of these moves is magnified when global monetary policy is being tightened and global growth is cooling. The reason why central banks have been forced to turn more hawkish (or at least less dovish) is that diminished economic slack has forced their hands. For policymakers with an inflation-targeting mandate, the Phillips curve framework remains the primary analytical framework. When they see low unemployment, they get nervous. When they see low unemployment AND rising inflation, then become hawkish. Three-quarters of OECD countries now have an unemployment rate below the estimate of the full-employment NAIRU - the highest level in a decade - and realized inflation rates are accelerating in the major developed economies (Chart 3). Our own Central Bank Monitors are signaling the need for tighter monetary policy in most countries, while yields at the front-ends of government bond curves are steadily rising. Chart 3Central Bankers Still Believe In The Phillips Curve Central Bankers Still Believe In The Phillips Curve Central Bankers Still Believe In The Phillips Curve Looking ahead, we continue to see more upward pressure on global bond yields in the next 6-12 months. Market pricing for the future policy actions of the major central bank did not move much even with the surge in volatility earlier this month. The markets now understand that the "policymaker put" that central bankers have implicitly sold to investors has a much lower strike price when labor markets are tight and inflation is accelerating. It will take much larger selloffs to cause central banks to become less hawkish. We still see the decisions we made in late June, moving to a more cautious recommended stance on overall risk in fixed income portfolios, as appropriate. Staying below-benchmark on overall global duration risk, while underweighting those countries where the central banks are under the greatest pressure to tighten policy, is the most sensible way to allocate a fully-investment government bond portfolio. That means underweighting the U.S. and Canada and overweighting Japan, Australia and the U.K. (Chart 4). In terms of credit, we are maintaining an overall neutral stance, but favoring the U.S. versus European equivalents and a maximum underweight on EM credit. Chart 4Interest Rates Remain Unfazed By More Jittery Markets Interest Rates Remain Unfazed By More Jittery Markets Interest Rates Remain Unfazed By More Jittery Markets Bottom Line: The recent market turmoil was a long-overdue risk asset correction that does not change any fundamental underpinnings for rising global bond yields. Stay below-benchmark on overall global duration exposure, concentrated in an underweight stance on U.S. Treasuries. The Most Important Charts For Our Most Important Country Duration Views When determining our recommended fixed income country allocation, there are a few critical indicators we are watching to assess if those views should be maintained. We now go over each of those indicators for the most important developed economy bond markets: U.S. (Underweight): Watch TIPS Breakevens & The Employment/Population Ratio U.S. Treasuries have been the one major government bond market this year that has seen a rise in both inflation expectations and real yields. The breakeven inflation rate implied by the spread between 10-year nominal Treasuries and TIPS has gone up from 1.97% to 2.10% since the start of 2018, while the real 10-year TIPS yield has climbed from 0.44% to 1.09% over the same period. The rise in inflation expectations has occurred alongside an acceleration of U.S. economic growth and a generalized rise in inflation pressures. Reliable cyclical leading indicators like the ISM Manufacturing index and the New York Fed's Underlying Inflation Gauge are pointing to an acceleration of U.S. core CPI inflation towards the 2.5-3% range over the next year (Chart 5). This would be enough to push 10-year TIPS breakevens comfortably into the 2.3-2.5% range that we deem consistent with the Fed's price stability target (core PCE inflation at 2%). Chart 5U.S.: Both Real Yields & Inflation Expectations Are Rising U.S.: Both Real Yields & Inflation Expectations Are Rising U.S.: Both Real Yields & Inflation Expectations Are Rising Any larger move in inflation expectations would only occur if the Fed were to accommodate it by not continuing to hike rates at the current 25bps/quarter pace. That is unlikely with the strength of the U.S. labor market suggesting that the Fed is behind the curve on rate hikes. The U.S. employment/population ratio for prime age (25-54 years old) workers has almost returned back to the peak levels of the mid-2000s near 80% (bottom panel). The Fed had to push the real funds rate to over 3% during that cycle to get policy to a restrictive setting above the Fed's estimate of the r-star neutral real rate. While it is unlikely that the Fed will need to push the real funds rate to as high a level as in the mid-2000s, the current real rate has not even caught up to the Fed's r-star estimate, which is starting to slowly increase alongside the stronger U.S. economy. That implies a higher nominal funds rate would be needed to push up the real rate to neutral levels, with even more nominal increases needed if inflation continues to accelerate. With only 62bps of rate hikes over the next year currently discounted in the USD Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve, there is scope for Treasury yields to rise further over the next 6-12 months. Core Europe (Underweight): Watch Realized Inflation Relative to ECB Forecasts In the euro area, the evolution of unemployment, wage growth and core inflation compared to the ECB's positive forecasts will be the critical driver of the future direction of government bond yields. In its latest set of economic projections published last month, the ECB expects the overall euro area unemployment rate to be 8.3% in 2018, 7.8% in 2019 and 7.4% in 2020.1 With the actual unemployment rate falling to 8.1% in August, the realized outcomes are already exceeding the ECB's forecasts (Chart 6). The same can be said for euro area wages, where the growth in compensation per employee (2.45%) is already running above the 2018 ECB projection of 2.2%. The ECB expects no acceleration of wage growth in 2019 (2.2%), but a further ratcheting up in 2020 (2.7%). Chart 6Euro Area: Expect Higher Yields If ECB Forecasts Materialize Euro Area: Expect Higher Yields If ECB Forecasts Materialize Euro Area: Expect Higher Yields If ECB Forecasts Materialize In a recent Special Report, we identified a leading relationship between wage growth and core HICP inflation in the euro area of around nine months.2 This would suggest that core HICP inflation should rise towards 1.5% within the next six months based on the current acceleration of wage growth (second panel). This would be above the ECB's current projection for 2018 (1.1%), but in line with the 2019 forecast (1.5%). Core inflation is projected to rise to 1.8% in 2020. If unemployment and inflation even just match the ECB's forecasts, there is likely to be a material repricing of core European bond yields through higher inflation expectations. At 1.7%, 10-year EUR CPI swaps are well below the +2% levels that occurred during the past two ECB rate hike cycles in the mid-2000s and 2010-11 (third panel). Both wage and core price inflation in the euro area were around the ECB's current 2019-2020 projections during both of those prior tightening episodes, suggesting that the past may indeed be prologue when it comes to inflation expectations. Given growing U.S.-China trade tensions, and uncertainties over the future path for Chinese economic growth, there is a risk that the ECB's growth and unemployment forecasts are too optimistic. The euro area economy remains highly levered to exports, and to Chinese demand in particular. Furthermore, the ECB continues to provide very dovish forward guidance, with no rate hikes expected until at least September 2019. Yet with a mere 12bps of rate hikes over the next year currently discounted in the EUR OIS curve, there is scope for core European bond yields to rise further over the next 6-12 months if euro area inflation surprises to the upside. Italy (Underweight): Watch Non-Italian Bond Spreads & The Euro The Italian budget battle with the European Union has been a gripping drama for investors in recent months. Italian bond yields have been under steady upward pressure, with the benchmark 10-year yield getting as high as 3.78%. Yet the story remains as much about sluggish Italian growth as it is about Italian fiscal policy. The populist Italian government has pushed for larger deficits, but has toned down the anti-euro language that dominated the election campaign earlier this year. This is why there has been very minimal contagion from higher Italian bond yields into other Peripheral European bond yields or euro area corporate bond spreads, or into the euro itself which remains very firm on a trade-weighted basis (Chart 7). Chart 7Italy: A Story Of Weak Growth, Not Euro Break-Up Italy: A Story Of Weak Growth, Not Euro Break-Up Italy: A Story Of Weak Growth, Not Euro Break-Up We continue to view Italian government bonds as a growth-sensitive credit instrument, like corporate bonds. In other words, faster Italian economic growth implies greater tax revenues, smaller budget deficits and a less worrisome trajectory for Italy's debt/GDP ratio. The opposite holds true when Italian economic growth is slowing. This is why there is a reliable directional relationship between Italy-Germany bond yield spreads and the OECD's leading economic indicator (LEI) for Italy (top panel). With the Italy LEI still in a downtrend, we do not yet see a cyclical case for shifting away from an underweight stance on Italian government bonds. Yet if the 10-year Italian yield were to reach 4%, the implied mark-to-market loss would wipe out the capital of Italy's banks, who own large quantities of government bonds. In that scenario, the ECB would likely get involved to stem the crisis, possibly by further delaying rate hikes of ramping up asset purchases. This would especially be likely if there was significant widening of non-Italian credit spreads and a sharply weaker euro. Hence, watch those markets for signs that the Italy fiscal crisis could trigger a monetary policy response. U.K. (Overweight): Watch Real Wage Growth & Business Confidence In the U.K., our non-consensus call to stay overweight Gilts has not been based on any long-run value considerations. Real yields remain depressed and the Bank of England (BoE) has kept monetary policy settings at extremely accommodative levels. The BoE continues to expect that a rise in real wage growth is likely due to the very tight U.K. labor market. This would support consumer spending and eventually require higher interest rates. The only problem is that this is happening very slowly. The annual growth in U.K. wage growth is now up to 3.1%, the fastest rate since 2008. This is above the pace of headline CPI inflation of 2.5%, thus real wages are finally starting to perk up (Chart 8). A continuation of this trend would feed into faster consumer spending and, eventually, trigger BoE rate hikes. Chart 8U.K.: Brexit Uncertainty + Middling Inflation = BoE Doing Little U.K.: Brexit Uncertainty + Middling Inflation = BoE Doing Little U.K.: Brexit Uncertainty + Middling Inflation = BoE Doing Little One other big impediment to the BoE turning more hawkish is the uncertainty over the U.K. government's Brexit negotiations with the EU. The extended Brexit drama has weighed on both U.K. business and consumer confidence, both of which have struggled since the 2016 Brexit vote (third panel). With the March 2019 deadline for the U.K. "officially" leaving the EU fast approaching, the odds of no deal being reached in time are increasing. U.K. Prime Minister Theresa May is desperately trying to avoid a no-deal Brexit, but such an outcome would create further instability in U.K. financial markets and close any near-term window of opportunity for the BoE to try and hike rates. For now, we see the depressed confidence from Brexit uncertainty offsetting the bump up in real wage growth, leaving Gilts on a path to continue modestly outperforming as they have throughout 2018 (bottom panel). An announcement of a Brexit deal would be a likely trigger for us to downgrade Gilts to neutral, and perhaps even to underweight given the developing uptrend in real wage growth. Bottom Line: Continue allocating duration risk for global government bond portfolios in favor of countries where central banks will have difficulty raising interest rates (Australia, U.K., Japan core Europe) relative to countries where rate hikes are more necessary and likely to happen (U.S., Canada). Robert Robis, CFA, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.ecbstaffprojections201809.en.pdf 2 Please see BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy/Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "Will Rising Wages Cause An Imminent Change In Policy Direction In Europe And Japan?", dated October 5th 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com and gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Expect More Volatility, More Often Expect More Volatility, More Often Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

As promised in early September, this is the third installment of our four part Indicators series. In this Special Report, we follow a similar script to Part II but instead of sectors, we now cover the S&P 500, non-financial equities, cyclicals/defensives, small/large and growth/value, and document the most important Indicators in the same four broad categories (where applicable): earnings, financial statement reported data, valuations and technicals. Once again this is by no means exhaustive, but contains a plethora of Indicators we deem significant in aiding us in our decision making process of setting/changing a view on the overall market, cyclicals/defensives portfolio bent, and size and style preference. As a reminder, the charts in this Special Report are also available through BCA's Analytics platform for seamless continual updates. Finally, we are still aiming before the end of 2018, to conclude our Indicators series with Part IV that would feature our most sought after Macro Indicators per the eleven GICS1 S&P 500 sectors, along with value/growth, small/large and cyclicals/defensives. We trust you will find this comprehensive Indicator chartbook useful and insightful. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com Dulce Cruz, Senior Analyst dulce@bcaresearch.com S&P 500 Chart 1S&P 500: Earnings Indicators S&P 500: Earnings Indicators S&P 500: Earnings Indicators Chart 2S&P 500: Earnings Indicators S&P 500: Earnings Indicators S&P 500: Earnings Indicators Chart 3S&P 500: ROE And Its Components S&P 500: ROE And Its Components S&P 500: ROE And Its Components Chart 4S&P 500: Financial Statement Indicators S&P 500: Financial Statement Indicators S&P 500: Financial Statement Indicators Chart 5S&P 500: Financial Statement Indicators S&P 500: Financial Statement Indicators S&P 500: Financial Statement Indicators Chart 6S&P 500: Valuation Indicators S&P 500: Valuation Indicators S&P 500: Valuation Indicators Chart 7S&P 500: Technical Indicators S&P 500: Technical Indicators S&P 500: Technical Indicators Non-Financial Broad Market Chart 8U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market: ROE And Its Components U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market: ROE Ant Its Components U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market: ROE Ant Its Components Chart 9U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market: Financial Statement Indicators U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market: Financial Statement Indicators U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market: Financial Statement Indicators Chart 10U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market: Financial Statement Indicators U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market: Financial Statement Indicators U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market: Financial Statement Indicators Chart 11U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market: Valuation Indicators U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market: Valuation Indicators U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market: Valuation Indicators Chart 12U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market: Technical Indicators U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market: Technical Indicators U.S. Non-Financial Broad Market: Technical Indicators S&P Cyclicals Vs. Defensives Chart 13Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Earnings Indicators Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Earnings Indicators Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Earnings Indicators Chart 14Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Earnings Indicators Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Earnings Indicators Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Earnings Indicators Chart 15Cyclicals Vs Defensives: ROE And Its Components Cyclicals Vs Defensives: ROE And Its Components Cyclicals Vs Defensives: ROE And Its Components Chart 16Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Financial Statement Indicators Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Financial Statement Indicators Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Financial Statement Indicators Chart 17Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Financial Statement Indicators Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Financial Statement Indicators Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Financial Statement Indicators Chart 18Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Valuation Indicators Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Valuation Indicators Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Valuation Indicators Chart 19Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Technical Indicators Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Technical Indicators Cyclicals Vs Defensives: Technical Indicators S&P 600 Vs. S&P 500 Chart 20S&P 600 Vs.S&P 500: Earnings Indicators S&P 600 Vs S&P 500: Earnings Indicators S&P 600 Vs S&P 500: Earnings Indicators Chart 21S&P 600 Vs.S&P 500: Earnings Indicators S&P 600 Vs S&P 500: Earnings Indicators S&P 600 Vs S&P 500: Earnings Indicators Chart 22S&P 600 Vs.S&P 500: Valuation Indicators S&P 600 Vs S&P 500: Valuation Indicators S&P 600 Vs S&P 500: Valuation Indicators Chart 23S&P 600 Vs.S&P 500: Technical Indicators S&P 600 Vs S&P 500: Technical Indicators S&P 600 Vs S&P 500: Technical Indicators S&P 500 Growth Vs. Value Chart 24S&P 500 Growth Vs.Value: Earnings Indicators S&P 500 Growth Vs Value: Earnings Indicators S&P 500 Growth Vs Value: Earnings Indicators Chart 25S&P 500 Growth Vs.Value: Earnings Indicators S&P 500 Growth Vs Value: Earnings Indicators S&P 500 Growth Vs Value: Earnings Indicators Chart 26S&P 500 Growth Vs Value: Valuation Indicators S&P 500 Growth Vs Value: Valuation Indicators S&P 500 Growth Vs Value: Valuation Indicators Chart 27S&P 500 Growth Vs.Value: Technical Indicators S&P 500 Growth Vs Value: Technical Indicators S&P 500 Growth Vs Value: Technical Indicators Table 1S&P 500 Growth/S&P 500 Value Sector Comparison Table White Paper: U.S. Equity Market Indicators (Part III) White Paper: U.S. Equity Market Indicators (Part III) Table 2S&P 600/S&P 500 Sector Comparison Table White Paper: U.S. Equity Market Indicators (Part III) White Paper: U.S. Equity Market Indicators (Part III)

Highlights Our October house view meeting was mostly uneventful, ... : The backup in bond yields has so far proceeded in line with our expectations, and the BCA consensus is that they have not risen enough to pose a fundamental threat to equities. ... in contrast to the action in global equities: Single-day declines of 3-4% in headline equity indexes around the world gave investors a jolt, and revived the too-far/too-long talk about equity gains with a new intensity. We do not believe that the end of the U.S. equity bull market is at hand, ... : The components of our recession indicator do not suggest that a recession, or a bear market, is on the horizon. It appears that the fiscal stimulus package will keep the expansion going into 2020. ... but thinking through the factors that would lead us to downgrade equities will help put the ongoing data flow into context: In addition to the elements of our bear-market/recession indicator, we consider items that could pressure earnings, spur inflation, or indicate the presence of widespread exuberance. Feature BCA's strategists held their October View Meeting last Tuesday. The monthly meeting gathers all of the editorial staff together to determine the firm's internal consensus on the future direction of markets. The results are published in the form of our House View Matrix, and the discussion and debate of the rationales underpinning our views inform the content of the individual services' publications. The agenda this month focused squarely on interest rates, and consisted of two basic questions: 1) Why are Treasury yields rising, and what does it mean for other asset classes? 2) How worried should we be about the surge in Italian bond yields? Neither question provoked much disagreement. The room broadly agreed that Treasury yields have been rising for the welcome reason that robust U.S. growth calls for higher rates. The Fed has been doing its part at the short end via its gradual quarter-point-per-quarter rate-hike pace, and the bond market got into the act two weeks ago, breaking out to a new seven-year high on robust data releases and Chairman Powell's "long-way-from-neutral" remark (Chart 1). Our bond strategists expect that the Fed will walk back Powell's seemingly off-the-cuff comment, but its substance meshes easily with our assessment of a burgeoning economy that may well overheat in the face of supply constraints. Chart 1Breakout Breakout Breakout As we have recently argued, the implications for equities depend much more on the level of rates than on their direction. Until real rates begin to squeeze the economy, history suggests that their impact on stocks will be benign. All else equal, higher real rates are a by-product of a stronger economy, and increased economic strength has helped stocks more than the larger haircuts on future cash flows, mandated by a higher discount rate, have hurt them. Using real potential GDP as a proxy for the level at which higher rates would slow the economy, we estimate that the bull market won't meet its demise until the 10-year Treasury yield reaches 3.75-4%.1 Consensus was quickly reached on the Italian question. Although the situation bears close monitoring, BCA does not deem Italy to be a flash point for global financial markets. Our base case is that bond markets can easily handle the deficit back-and-forth between Rome and Brussels, and that the more worrisome outcome - Italy's exit from the Eurozone - is increasingly remote. A bond selloff could become self-perpetuating, but our Global Investment Strategy service believes that European policy makers would intervene if Italian sovereign yields broke above 4%.2 Some strategists expressed interest in downgrading the equity view to underweight. Although a considerable majority voted to maintain BCA's neutral stance, the final stages of the meeting were devoted to debating the merits of a more bearish take. That discussion led us to think about the factors that might encourage us to downgrade our view on equities. The rest of this week's report lays out those factors in the form of an equity-downgrade checklist to accompany the rates checklist we rolled out last month. Together, the two checklists will provide a real-time guide to the evolution of our key asset-allocation views. Our Base-Case Bull-Market Denouement While U.S. Investment Strategy has been slightly more constructive than the BCA consensus, we joined in the house-view downgrade of global equities in June without lament. We did so on the grounds that the latter stages of expansions and bull markets can be treacherous, and significant geopolitical uncertainties could make the current iteration especially so. Last week's swoon, and its remarkable intra-day equity volatility, revealed the wisdom of staying within sight of the shore. We nonetheless believe that it is too early to underweight equities and spread product. We remain constructive on the outlook because we expect the monetary policy cycle, the business cycle, and the credit cycle have yet to run their course. All three will continue to provide an equity tailwind for roughly another year, while allowing spread product to generate excess returns over Treasuries for another quarter or two. Our base case is that the cycles will turn once aggregate demand, ginned up by fiscal stimulus, runs into capacity constraints, stoking inflation pressures and compelling the Fed to impose more restrictive policy settings. Once tight policy is in place, the equity bull market will come to an end, followed by the expansion. The Equity Downgrade Checklist Recessions and bear markets regularly coincide (Chart 2), as multiple de-rating is typically not enough to effect a 20% decline on its own. Earnings have to contract as well, and they typically only do so within the context of a recession. The three components of our recession indicator3 - an inverted yield curve (Chart 3); year-over-year contraction in the index of leading economic indicators (Chart 4); and tight policy, defined as a target fed funds rate greater than the equilibrium fed funds rate (Chart 5) - comprise the first three items on our checklist (Table 1). We round out the recession section by watching for an uptick in the headline unemployment rate, which has led, or coincided with, every postwar recession (Chart 6). Chart 2Bear Markets And Recessions Tend To Coincide Bear Markets And Recessions Tend To Coincide Bear Markets And Recessions Tend To Coincide Chart 3The Yield Curve Has Called 8 Of The Last 7 Recessions... The Yield Curve Has Called 8 Of The Last 7 Recessions... The Yield Curve Has Called 8 Of The Last 7 Recessions... Chart 4... And So Have Leading Economic Indicators ... And So Have Leading Economic Indicators ... And So Have Leading Economic Indicators Chart 5Recessions Only Occur When Monetary Policy Is Tight Recessions Only Occur When Monetary Policy Is Tight Recessions Only Occur When Monetary Policy Is Tight Table 1Equity Downgrade Checklist Introducing Our Equity Downgrade Checklist Introducing Our Equity Downgrade Checklist Chart 6Beware An Uptick In The Unemployment Rate Beware An Uptick In The Unemployment Rate Beware An Uptick In The Unemployment Rate There is more to equity investing than trying to skirt bear markets, however. Our checklist therefore also focuses on elements that could induce corrections (declines of at least 10% that don't reach the 20% bear-market threshold). We focus on three broad categories of variables: those that could pressure earnings growth by undermining revenues, profit margins or both; those that promote uncomfortably high inflation; and those that indicate unsustainable investor over exuberance. We do not have any preconceptions about which, or how many, boxes would have be checked to inspire a downgrade; we are simply trying to obtain a holistic sense of the equity outlook. Earnings Headwinds Employee compensation constitutes the single largest component of corporate expenses, making wage increases a direct threat to profit margins. We view the employment cost index, including benefits, as offering the most comprehensive and accurate insight into companies' wage bill. It has been rising, albeit slowly, and the Fed would like to see it rise even more to ensure that the expansion's gains are shared more broadly across the income spectrum (Chart 7). It would seemingly be happy with wage growth in the mid-3% range, but anything beyond that, if not supported by an uptick in productivity, could lead to faster and/or larger rate hikes.4 Chart 7The Fed Wants Wages Higher, But Not Too Much Higher The Fed Wants Wages Higher, But Not Too Much Higher The Fed Wants Wages Higher, But Not Too Much Higher A stronger dollar makes American goods less competitive in the global marketplace. Extended advances confront U.S.-based multinationals with an unpalatable choice: cut prices to maintain share, or accept lesser share to maintain margins. Currency moves impact corporate profits with a lag, however, so the initial effects of the dollar's 7% advance since mid-February should only begin to surface in the third-quarter earnings season that kicked off on Friday. S&P 500 constituents have been dining out for a year on the dollar's 14% 2017 slide, and a march to 100 and beyond will give rise to a multi-quarter headwind (Chart 8). Chart 8From Tailwind To Headwind From Tailwind To Headwind From Tailwind To Headwind Interest accounts for a meaningful share of corporate expenses, especially given the post-crisis rise in corporate debt outstanding. Using BBB-rated bonds as a proxy for overall corporate indebtedness, we view 4.8 to 5%, a level corporations last contended with eight years (and a considerable amount of issuance) ago, as a range that might cause some indigestion (Chart 9). Chart 9Debt Service Costs Are Rising Debt Service Costs Are Rising Debt Service Costs Are Rising Rising wages squeeze profit margins, but they won't necessarily cut into profits if top-line growth is robust enough to overcome the cost increase. Wage gains have the potential to set off a virtuous circle in which spending increases enough to promote expanded payrolls and capital expenditures, leading to more spending, and so on. An elevated savings rate suggests that households have the capacity to help fuel the fire (Chart 10). If they decide to save that money instead, perhaps with an eye on the metastasizing pile of student debt, it could dampen the multiplier effect of higher wages. Chart 10Plenty Of Dry Powder For Consumption Plenty Of Dry Powder For Consumption Plenty Of Dry Powder For Consumption We do not have a hard-and-fast preconception for the point at which deterioration in the emerging markets would be felt in the U.S. Given the relatively closed U.S. economy - the oceans bordering it are big - we expect that the EM distress would have to be quite acute. Full-on decoupling is a chimera, however, even for the fairly insulated U.S., and weakened global demand will eventually make itself felt here. A major credit event or two in some of the larger EM economies would likely accelerate the process. Inflation Now that full employment has been achieved, and then some, the price-stability element of the Fed's mandate will come to the fore as the binding policy constraint. The Fed is still trying to nudge realized inflation and inflation expectations higher, to be sure, but its bias could turn on a dime. Force-feeding sizable fiscal stimulus to an economy already operating at capacity is a recipe for fueling upward inflation pressures. We expect that the Fed will eventually be obliged to hike rates at faster than a gradual pace to get the inflation genie back into the bottle. The Fed's 2% inflation target applies to the core PCE deflator, and growth above the top of the 2.5% range that's held for 20-plus years might make it uneasy if the inflation slope proves to be as slippery as we expect (Chart 11). Regarding inflation expectations, we are keeping a close eye on the long-maturity TIPS break-evens, the expected level of inflation implied by the difference in yields on nominal and inflation-protected Treasuries. Our bond strategists peg 2.3-2.5% as the break-even level consistent with the Fed's 2% inflation target, and expect that the Fed will turn more hawkish if break-evens breach the top end of the range (Chart 12). Inflation matters to the investing public, as well, and earnings multiples would surely contract if inflation fears break out among the general populace. Headline CPI growth that looked like it could persist in the mid-3s could easily spark a correction (Chart 13). Chart 11Mission Impossible(?): Limit Inflation ... Mission Impossible(?): Limit Inflation ... Mission Impossible(?): Limit Inflation ... Chart 12... While Nudging Inflation Expectations Higher ... While Nudging Inflation Expectations Higher ... While Nudging Inflation Expectations Higher Chart 13CPI Matters, Too CPI Matters, Too CPI Matters, Too Irrational Exuberance It is not easy to recognize over exuberance in real time, but it is a regular feature of cycle peaks. In a bull market that is already the longest in the postwar era, and an expansion that's on track to establish a postwar longevity record of its own, it would be surprising if things didn't ultimately get silly. We will have to rely on judgment to assess the overall climate of recklessness, but we can objectively track valuation levels relative to history. We are not troubled by a 15- or 16-handle forward P/E multiple (Chart 14). While other standard valuation metrics are elevated (Chart 15), they typically only compel our attention at +/- 2-standard-deviation extremes. Chart 14Nothing Irrational About P/E ... Nothing Irrational About P/E ... Nothing Irrational About P/E ... Chart 15... Or Other Valuation Metrics, On Balance ... Or Other Valuation Metrics, On Balance ... Or Other Valuation Metrics, On Balance Investment Implications There is a natural tension between market forecasts and investment strategy. The future is unknowable, and it is rarely prudent to position portfolios all-in based on necessarily uncertain forecasts. The divergence should be especially wide in the latter stages of a cycle, when a reversal could be right around the corner. Even though we are constructive on the economic and policy backdrops, we are positioned conservatively, equal-weighting equities, underweighting fixed income, and overweighting cash. We have created a checklist to track what it would take to make us turn bearish on equities because our inclination is to lean bullish, and try to capture what may be the last outsized returns for a while. Markets are never one-way, however, and we could flip back to overweight upon a 10-15% peak-to-trough decline if nothing altered our view about the bull market's remaining lifespan. We could also return to an equity overweight at current levels if Chinese policymakers were to pursue stimulus with the pedal-to-the-metal urgency that characterized their efforts in 2008 and 2016. We could even try to play a melt-up, with tight stops, if we thought one was about to take hold. We are keeping an open mind, as an investor always should. Doug Peta, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy dougp@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see the September 24, 2018 U.S. Investment Strategy Special Report, "When Will Higher Rates Hurt Stocks?" available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see the October 12, 2018 Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Bond Bears Maul Goldilocks," available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see the August 13, 2018 U.S. Investment Strategy Special Report, "How Much Longer Can The Equity Bull Market Last?" available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Fed Chair Jay Powell recently said that wage growth should approximately equal the sum of inflation and productivity gains. Given the 2% inflation target, and 1% trend productivity growth, the FOMC would likely be content with wage gains modestly above 3%.

Highlights U.S. data keep surging, ... : The September ISM surveys, and the latest employment situation report, demonstrated that the economy has considerable momentum. ... and the Fed has taken note, ... : Chairman Powell and other FOMC speakers reiterated that they see no reason to de-escalate their tightening campaign. ... so we still see rates going higher, ... : Conditions do not justify checking any of the boxes on our checklist of items that might lead us to change our below-benchmark duration view. Only the international-duress box has moved closer to being checked, but nothing short of dire EM conditions will deter the Fed from following its intended path. ... and expect that concerns about the yield curve will abate for a while: The strong data and Powell's comment potentially implying a higher terminal rate promoted a bear steepening all along the yield curve. Feature It is a testament to how smoothly U.S. equities have been rising that Thursday's and Friday's 1% intraday S&P 500 declines inspired CNBC to frame the screen in fire-engine red, accompanied by a Market Sell-Off graphic. We all have to make a living, though, and it's easy to sympathize with a desperate producer. Episode after episode of Goldilocks is hardly must-see TV. Friday's employment situation report provided no relief. September payroll additions fell well short of the consensus estimate, but upward revisions for July and August more than offset the headline disappointment. The three-month moving average of 190,000 net additions is squarely within the tight range that has prevailed for several years. Forward guidance has been leached of any sort of drama as everyone on the Fed is singing from the same sheet - the economy's great; risks are balanced; and we're doing a fantastic job, if we do say so ourselves - and pointing to a continuation of the gradual pace. The market story will become more lively when inflation comes on much more strongly than either markets or the Fed seem to imagine it could, but that is next year's business (at the earliest), and we remain constructive in the meantime. More Strong Data (Yawn) The narrative that fiscal stimulus will keep the economy humming throughout this year and next is old news. Additionally, fiscal stimulus delivers the most bang for the buck when an economy is operating below potential; now that the output gap is closed, the odds are tilted against material positive surprises. Against that backdrop, last week's non-manufacturing ISM survey was startlingly robust. According to the Institute for Supply Management, the 61.6 reading, just off of the series' all-time high, corresponds to 4.6% real GDP growth. The components of the survey were strong across the board (Chart 1), with employment activity making a new all-time high (Chart 1, second panel). The prices-paid and supplier-delivery series, which provide insight into margin pressures, are contrary indicators once they get too strong, but each has yet to break out (Chart 1, bottom two panels). The September manufacturing ISM survey cooled a bit from August, but remains around 60, in the neighborhood of last cycle's high. Taken together, the two ISM surveys indicate that businesses are feeling flush, despite the deceleration in the rest of the developed world (Chart 2). Chart 1Firing On All Cylinders Firing On All Cylinders Firing On All Cylinders Chart 2American Exceptionalism American Exceptionalism American Exceptionalism The September employment report suggests that households should remain optimistic as well. Payroll growth has churned steadily ahead for seven years, and our payrolls model is calling for a pronounced uptick through the first quarter of 2019 (Chart 3). Expressed as a share of the labor force, initial claims continue to melt (Chart 4, top panel), and even after incorporating continuing claims, it looks like there's a job for everyone who wants one (Chart 4, bottom panel). A pessimist would say there's only one way that initial claims can go from here, but as the gaps between the circles and the shading show, there's typically a decent lag between the trough in claims and the onset of a recession. Chart 3The Employment Outlook Is Strong ... The Employment Outlook Is Strong ... The Employment Outlook Is Strong ... Chart 4... Given Initial Claims' Ongoing Collapse ... Given Initial Claims' Ongoing Collapse ... Given Initial Claims' Ongoing Collapse The bottom line is that U.S. demand is poised to remain strong. Data from the ISM and NFIB surveys, and the consumer confidence series, indicate that businesses and households are both feeling their oats. Payrolls should keep expanding, and the tight-as-a-drum labor market will keep wages nosing higher. With an elevated savings rate providing ample dry powder for additional consumption (Chart 5), the expansion should sail right through 2019. Chart 5Plenty Of Dry Powder For Consumption Plenty Of Dry Powder For Consumption Plenty Of Dry Powder For Consumption "A Long Way From Neutral" Fed officials have kept up an especially busy schedule of appearances since the latest FOMC meeting two weeks ago. Despite the potential for cacophony, the speakers have been singing the same tune. All agree that the economy is strong, and that the Fed has been meeting its dual mandate with unusual aplomb. The victory laps are off-putting socially, but their economic import could be far greater than their social import if they signal some institutional complacency about inflation. Potential future challenges aside, the FOMC is clearly united in its near-term course. Dovish Chicago President Evans, who has publicly agonized in recent years about the dangers of too-low inflation while pleading with his colleagues not to move too fast, has made his peace with the committee's gradual rate-hike pace. In a speech last Wednesday, he stated that, "I am more comfortable with the inflation outlook today than I have been for the past several years." In a subsequent interview with Bloomberg, he said, "Getting policy up to a slightly restrictive setting - 3, 3¼% - would be consistent with the strong economy and good inflation that we are looking at. ... I'm quite comfortable with the expected path." The week before, New York Fed President Williams was effusive in his praise of the economy's health and the Fed's role in sustaining it. "[T]he U.S. economy is doing very well overall. From the perspective of the Fed's dual mandate ..., quite honestly, this is about as good as it gets. ... The Fed has attained its dual-mandate objectives of maximum employment and price stability about as well as it ever has." Williams' speech may have been most interesting in its downplaying of the usefulness of the neutral-rate concept. The co-developer of the preeminent Laubach-Williams neutral-interest-rate model, Williams now says the idea is overblown, having "gotten too much attention in commentary about Fed policy. Back when interest rates were well below neutral, r-star [the estimate of the neutral rate] appropriately acted as a pole star for navigation. But, as we have gotten closer to the range of estimates of neutral, what appeared to be a bright point of light is really a fuzzy blur, reflecting the inherent uncertainty in measuring r-star. More than that, r-star is just one factor affecting our decisions[.]" Williams' pivot would seem to suit Chairman Powell, who has shown little enthusiasm for neutral-rate models. His speech Tuesday on the Phillips curve relationship between inflation and unemployment was mostly anodyne, though he did repeatedly stress the importance of keeping inflation expectations anchored. His interview at a public forum on Wednesday was more revealing. While he continually expressed the view that he thinks the risks to the economy are balanced, he had much more to say about not hiking enough than he did about hiking too much. Now we've come to a situation where unemployment is close to a 20-year low and headed lower, by all accounts, and the really extraordinarily accommodative, low interest rates we needed when the economy was quite weak, we don't need those any more, they're not appropriate any more. We need interest rates to be gradually, very gradually, moving back toward normal, and that's what we've been doing now, for basically three years, and interest rates have just now, in real terms, moved above zero. Interest rates are still accommodative, but we're gradually moving to a place where they will be neutral. Not that they'll be restraining the economy - we may go past neutral, but we're a long way from neutral at this point, probably.1 Our Rates Checklist Treasuries sold off sharply on Wednesday on the non-manufacturing ISM release and reports of Powell's "long way from neutral" remark. The sell-off was in line with the key pillar of our bearish duration view: the Fed will hike more than markets currently expect. Higher bond yields last week suggest the divergence between our view and the markets' view is converging in our favor. Despite the backup in yields, though, market expectations of the terminal rate are still below 3%, indicating that market participants don't expect the 25-bps-a-quarter pace to continue beyond next June. The market still has a ways to go to catch up to our 3.5-4% terminal rate forecast (Chart 6), so we are not yet close to checking the first box of the checklist (Table 1). Chart 6Fighting The Fed Fighting The Fed Fighting The Fed Table 1Rates View Checklist Staying The Course Staying The Course From the inflation section of the checklist, inflation break-evens have drifted higher. They are moving in line with our rates view, but not so swiftly that it no longer applies (Chart 7). All of the labor market indicators support the view that rates are going higher. The unemployment rate remains on course to decline, ancillary indicators of the labor market remain quite healthy, and average hourly earnings kept the beat in the September employment release (Chart 8). Chart 7Bonds Have Yet To Adjust ... Bonds Have Yet To Adjust ... Bonds Have Yet To Adjust ... Chart 8... To Building Inflation Pressures ... To Building Inflation Pressures ... To Building Inflation Pressures Duress in selected EM economies is the only item that has moved against our rates view since we rolled out the rates checklist last month. It is nowhere near acute enough to show up in the United States, however, so we are still a long way from checking the box. The bottom line is that strength in the U.S. economy should support higher real rates and push up inflation pressures, while the market has yet to revise its terminal-rate estimates upward. The combination supports higher rates three to twelve months down the road, even if lopsided below-benchmark positioning argues for near-term retracement. Investment Implications Expansions do not die of old age, they die because the Fed murders them. While we agree with many bond bulls that the Fed will eventually tighten monetary conditions enough to induce a recession, we do not think it will do so any time soon. BCA's modeled estimate of the equilibrium fed funds rate has been creeping higher, in line with a terminal rate somewhere between 3.5 and 4%. Given the median FOMC member terminal-rate projection of 3 3/8%, and Chicago President Evans' view that the terminal rate is somewhere around 3%, the Fed's not prepared to choke off the expansion just yet. Only rising inflation, and/or rising inflation expectations, will push the Fed to tighten policy enough to really squeeze the economy. We expect that inflation pressures will begin to show themselves over the next twelve to eighteen months as capacity bottlenecks emerge, and the Phillips curve relationship finally asserts itself. Treasuries will be an overweight once the Fed intervenes forcefully to counteract those inflation pressures, but they will be an underweight for a while first. In other words, we think long yields have to rise before they can fall. In line with the BCA house view, we remain equal weight equities, underweight fixed income, and overweight cash. We remain somewhat more constructive than our colleagues on risk assets, however, so we tweak the equity recommendation to say that investors should maintain at least an equal-weight position. Bull markets tend to sprint to the finish line, and underweighting equities too soon could prove hazardous to a manager's relative performance. Doug Peta, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy dougp@bcaresearch.com 1 October 3rd interview with Judy Woodruff at The Atlantic Festival. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lEPcPIYTMY0 Quoted passage runs from 7:26 to 8:06.

Highlights Q3/2018 Performance Breakdown: The Global Fixed Income Strategy (GFIS) recommended model bond portfolio outperformed its custom benchmark in the third quarter of 2018 by +9bps. This raised the overall 2018 year-to-date performance to +6bps. Winners & Losers: The outperformance came mostly from our defensive duration positioning, which benefitted as global bond yields rose during the quarter, but also from successful country selection (overweight Australia & New Zealand, underweight the U.S., Canada & Italy). Our underweight tilts on EM credit were the largest drag on performance after the sharp EM rally in September. Scenario Analysis: The combination of defensive overall duration positioning and underweight allocations to EM and European credit should allow the model bond portfolio to outperform its custom benchmark index over the next year. Feature This week, we present the performance numbers of the BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy (GFIS) model bond portfolio for the 3rd quarter of 2018. We also update our scenario analysis of the future expected performance of the portfolio based on the risk-factor based return forecasting framework we introduced earlier this year. As a reminder to existing readers (and for new clients), the portfolio is a part of our service that is meant to complement the usual macro analysis of global fixed income markets. The model portfolio is how we communicate our opinion on the relative attractiveness between government bond and spread product sectors, by applying actual percentage weightings to each of our recommendations within a fully invested hypothetical bond portfolio. Broadly speaking, the portfolio did slightly outperform its benchmark index over the past three months, driven mostly by defensive duration positioning during a period of rising developed market bond yields. The portfolio would have done considerably better if not for a September rally in emerging market (EM) credit that flew in the face of our maximum underweight position in EM. We still have strong conviction in those two main themes - higher global bond yields and EM underperformance - and we fully expect our model portfolio to generate larger outperformance over the next year. Q3/2018 Model Portfolio Performance Breakdown: Duration Underweights Pay Off The total return of the GFIS model bond portfolio was +0.12% (hedged into U.S. dollars) in the third quarter of the year, which outperformed the custom benchmark index by +9bps (Chart of the Week).1 The main driver of the outperformance was our structural below-benchmark portfolio duration stance, which benefited as the overall Bloomberg Barclays Global Treasury Index yield rose to 1.54% - the highest level since April 2014. The portfolio's excess return got as high as +19bps on September 4th, before seeing some pullback in recent weeks as our main spread product tilt - underweight EM hard currency sovereign and corporate debt - enjoyed a counter-trend rally in September from the bearish spread widening seen since the start of 2018. Chart of the WeekDefensive Duration Stance = Q3 Outperformance Defensive Duration Stance = Q3 Outperformance Defensive Duration Stance = Q3 Outperformance Table 1GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q3/2018 Overall Return Attribution GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q3/2018 Performance Review: Inching Ahead GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q3/2018 Performance Review: Inching Ahead In terms of the specific breakdown between the government bond and spread product allocations in our model portfolio, the former generated +17bps of outperformance versus our custom benchmark index while the latter lagged the benchmark by -8bps (Table 1). The bar charts showing the total and relative returns for each individual government bond market and spread product sector are presented in Charts 2 and 3. Chart 2GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q3/2018 Government##BR##Bond Performance Attribution By Country GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q3/2018 Performance Review: Inching Ahead GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q3/2018 Performance Review: Inching Ahead Chart 3GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q3/2018 Spread##BR##Product Performance Attribution By Sector GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q3/2018 Performance Review: Inching Ahead GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q3/2018 Performance Review: Inching Ahead The main individual sectors of the portfolio that drove the excess returns were the following: Biggest outperformers Underweight Japanese government bonds (JGBs) with maturities beyond 10 years (+7bps) Underweight U.S. Treasuries with maturities beyond 7 years (+6bps) Underweight French government bonds with maturities beyond 7 years (+2bps) Underweight Italian government bonds (+2bps) Overweight JGBs with maturities up to 10 years (+1bp) Biggest underperformers Underweight EM USD-denominated sovereign debt (-3bps) Underweight EM USD-denominated corporate debt (-3bps) Underweight euro area investment grade corporate debt (-2bps) Underweight euro area high-yield corporate debt (-1bp) Chart 4 presents the ranked benchmark index returns of the individual countries and spread product sectors in the GFIS model bond portfolio. The returns are hedged into U.S. dollars (we do not take active currency risk in this portfolio) and also adjusted to reflect duration differences between each country/sector and the overall custom benchmark index for the model portfolio. We have also color coded the bars in each chart to reflect our recommended investment stance for each market during the third quarter (red for underweight, blue for overweight, gray for neutral weight). Chart 4Ranking The Winners & Losers From The Model Portfolio In Q3/2018 GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q3/2018 Performance Review: Inching Ahead GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q3/2018 Performance Review: Inching Ahead Spread product sectors dominate the left half of that chart, as credit spreads have tightened across the board since the early September peak. The best performing sector during Q3 in our model portfolio universe was EM hard currency sovereign debt, which has delivered a total return of +2.8% since September 4th (with spreads tightening by 50bps) after losing -0.7% in July and August. Similar performance stories occurred in corporate debt in the U.S. and Europe during the quarter. That credit outperformance comes after the sustained spread widening seen in virtually all global credit markets (excluding U.S. high-yield) since January of this year. The main drivers that prompted that widening - Fed tightening, a stronger U.S. dollar, diminishing asset purchases from the European Central Bank (ECB) and Bank of Japan (BoJ), some cyclical slowing of non-U.S. growth - are still in place. With our geopolitical strategists continuing to highlight the additional risks of U.S.-China and U.S.-Iran tensions intensifying after next month's U.S. Midterm elections, a cautious stance on global spread product - as we have maintained since downgrading our recommended overall credit exposure to neutral in late June - is still warranted.2 Outside of spread product, our model portfolio tilts generally lined up with the sector returns shown in Chart 4. We have overweights on two of the best performing government bond markets (Australia and New Zealand) and underweights on three of the worst performers (U.S., Canada, Italy). Interestingly, despite having overweights on two of the worst performing government bond markets - Japan and the U.K. - the excess return contribution from those countries did not hurt the model bond portfolio return in Q3 (+8bps and 0bps, respectively). This was due to the curve steepening bias embedded within our overweight country tilts (i.e. more duration allocated to shorter-maturity buckets, see the model portfolio details on Page 14), which benefitted as yield curves in those countries bear-steepened. Net-net, we are satisfied with the modest portfolio outperformance seen in Q3, given that the rally in global credit markets went against our more defensive posture on spread product exposure. Bottom Line: The GFIS recommended model bond portfolio outperformed its custom benchmark in the third quarter of 2018 by +9bps. This put the overall 2018 year-to-date performance into positive territory (+6bps). The outperformance came entirely from our defensive duration positioning, which benefitted as global bond yields rose during the quarter, and from successful country selection. Our underweight tilts on EM credit were the largest drag on performance after the sharp EM rally in September. Future Drivers Of Portfolio Returns Looking ahead, the performance of the model bond portfolio will continue to benefit from two primary trends: rising global bond yields and growth divergences that continue to favor the U.S. In terms of the specific weightings in the GFIS model bond portfolio, we still prefer owning U.S. corporate debt versus equivalents in Europe and EM. When we downgraded our recommended allocation to U.S. and investment grade corporates to neutral from overweight back in July, we also cut the portfolio exposure to euro area corporates, as well as to all EM hard currency debt, to underweight. The latter changes were necessary to maintain our desired higher exposure to U.S. corporate debt versus non-U.S. corporates, although it did leave the model portfolio with a small overall underweight stance on global spread product (Chart 5). Importantly, we are maintaining a below-benchmark stance on overall portfolio duration, which is now one full year shorter than our benchmark index duration (Chart 6), even as we have grown more cautious on credit exposure. This is because we still see potential medium-term upward pressure on bond yields coming from tightening monetary policies (Fed rate hikes, ECB tapering of bond purchases) and increasing inflation expectations. The majority of global central bankers are dealing with tight labor markets and slowly rising inflation rates. While global growth has cooled a bit from the rapid pace seen in 2017, it has not been by enough to force policymakers to shift to a more dovish bias. Chart 5Spread Product Allocation:##BR##Neutral U.S., Underweight Non-U.S. GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q3/2018 Performance Review: Inching Ahead GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q3/2018 Performance Review: Inching Ahead Chart 6Maintaining##BR##Below-Benchnmark Duration Maintaining Below-Benchnmark Duration Maintaining Below-Benchnmark Duration Our underweights on EM and euro area spread product have left the portfolio in a "negative carry" position where it yields 34bps less than the benchmark index (Chart 7). In a backdrop of stable markets and low volatility, being short carry will be a drag on the model bond portfolio performance as we saw over the past month. Yet we do not see the recent market calm as being sustainable, with all plausible outcomes pointing to more volatile markets, largely driven by U.S.-centric events (more Fed tightening, a stronger dollar, U.S. growth convergence to slower non-U.S. growth, increased trade protectionism, higher oil prices due to U.S.-Iran tensions). We continue to suggest a cautious allocation of investor risk budgets against this backdrop. We have been targeting a tracking error (relative volatility versus the benchmark) for our model bond portfolio in the 40-60bp range, well below our 100bps maximum. Our current allocations give us a tracking error right at the bottom of that range (Chart 8).3 Chart 7The Cost Of Being More Defensive On Credit The Cost Of Being More Defensive On Credit The Cost Of Being More Defensive On Credit Chart 8Maintaining A Cautious Allocation Of The Risk Budget Maintaining A Cautious Allocation Of The Risk Budget Maintaining A Cautious Allocation Of The Risk Budget Scenario Analysis & Return Forecasts Back in April of this year, we introduced a framework for estimating total returns for all government bond markets and spread product sectors, based on common risk factors.4 For credit, returns are estimated as a function of changes in the U.S. dollar, the Fed funds rate, oil prices and market volatility as proxied by the VIX index (Table 2A). For government bonds, non-U.S. yield changes are estimated using historical betas to changes in U.S. Treasury yields (Table 2B). This framework allows us to conduct scenario analysis based on projected returns for each asset class in the model bond portfolio universe by making assumptions on those individual risk factors. Table 2AFactor Regressions Used To Estimate##BR##Spread Product Yield Changes GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q3/2018 Performance Review: Inching Ahead GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q3/2018 Performance Review: Inching Ahead Table 2BEstimated Government Bond##BR##Yield Betas To U.S. Treasuries GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q3/2018 Performance Review: Inching Ahead GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q3/2018 Performance Review: Inching Ahead With these tools, we than can attempt to forecast returns for each bond sector under different scenarios. We can then use those forecasts to predict the expected return for our model bond portfolio under those same scenarios. In Tables 3A & 3B. we show three differing scenarios, with all the following changes occurring over a one-year horizon. Table 3AScenario Analysis For The GFIS Model Portfolio GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q3/2018 Performance Review: Inching Ahead GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q3/2018 Performance Review: Inching Ahead Table 3BU.S. Treasury Yield Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q3/2018 Performance Review: Inching Ahead GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q3/2018 Performance Review: Inching Ahead Our Base Case: the Fed delivers another 100bps of rate hikes, the U.S. dollar rises +5%, oil prices rise by +10%, the VIX index increases by five points from current levels, and U.S. Treasury yields rise by 40bps across the curve. A Very Hawkish Fed: the Fed delivers 150bps of rate hikes, the U.S. dollar rises by +10%, oil prices rise by +10%, the VIX index increases by ten points from current levels and there is a sharp bear flattening of the U.S. Treasury curve (2yr yield +75bps, 10yr yield +40bps). A Very Dovish Fed: the Fed only hikes rates by 25bps, the U.S. dollar falls by -5%, oil prices fall by -20%, the VIX index increases by fifteen points from current levels and there is a modest bull steepening of the U.S. Treasury curve. In this scenario, the Fed puts the rate hiking cycle on hold in response to a sharp tightening of U.S. financial conditions. Table 3A shows the expected returns for all three scenarios based on our risk-factor framework. The model bond portfolio is expected to outperform the custom benchmark index in all three scenarios we have laid out. This occurs even with the negative carry coming from the credit underweights in EM and Europe, with losses from credit spread widening projected to be larger than the yield give-up from being underweight. The excess returns are modest, however, with only 6bps of outperformance expected in our base case scenario and 13bps expected in the "Very Hawkish Fed" and "Very Dovish Fed" scenarios. This return distribution, with better outcomes occurring in the "tails", is a desirable property to have as it relates to the VIX/volatility forecasts embedded in the scenarios. Both of the non-base case scenarios have a higher VIX (Chart 9), even in the case of the "Very Dovish Fed" outcome where a severe U.S. financial market selloff (coming complete with a higher VIX) would be the necessary trigger for the Fed to reverse course and begin cutting interest rates (Chart 10). Such a backdrop would obviously hurt our below-benchmark duration stance, but would help our underweight EM/Europe spread product recommendations. Chart 9Risk Factors For Scenario Analysis Risk Factors For Scenario Analysis Risk Factors For Scenario Analysis Chart 10UST Yield Moves For Scenario Analysis UST Yield Moves For Scenario Analysis UST Yield Moves For Scenario Analysis Of course, our recommendations will not be static at current levels throughout the next twelve months. We increasingly expect that our next major allocation move will be downgrade U.S. spread product exposure and raise U.S. Treasury allocations, especially after the Fed delivers a few more 25bps-per-quarter rate hikes and the U.S. dollar rises further. This will provide a boost to the portfolio's expected returns through renewed spread widening and, potentially, a reduction of our below-benchmark overall duration stance as Treasury yields reach likely cyclical peaks. Bottom Line: The combination of defensive overall duration positioning and underweight allocations to EM and European credit should allow the model bond portfolio to outperform its custom benchmark index over the next year. Robert Robis, CFA, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 The GFIS model bond portfolio custom benchmark index is the Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate Index, but with allocations to global high-yield corporate debt replacing very high quality spread product (i.e. AA-rated). We believe this to be more indicative of the typical internal benchmark used by global multi-sector fixed income managers. 2 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Time To Take Some Chips Off The Table: Downgrade Global Spread Product Exposure To Neutral", dated June 26th 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 3 In general, we aim to target a tracking error no greater than 100bps. We think this is reasonable for a portfolio where currency exposure is fully hedged and less than 5% of the portfolio benchmark is in bonds with ratings below investment grade. 4 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q1/2018 Performance Review: A Rough Start", dated April 10th 2018, available at gfis.bcareseach.com. Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Feature GAA DM Equity Country Allocation Model Update The GAA DM Equity Country Allocation model is updated as of September 30, 2018. The quant model has not made significant allocation changes as shown in Table 1. As shown in Table 2 and Charts 1, 2 and 3, the overall model underperformed its benchmark by 53 bps in September, largely driven by Level 2 model which underperformed its benchmark by 156 bps. Japan was the largest underweight in the model, yet Japan was the best performing country in September, which contributed largely to the model's underperformance. Since going live, the overall model has outperformed its benchmarks by only 7 bps, driven by the Level 2 outperformance of 46 bps offset by the 8 bps of Level 1 underperformance. Even though the model underperformed significantly in both August and September, it's still within the back-tested range based on one-year and four-year changes. Table 1Model Allocation Vs. Benchmark Weights GAA Quant Model Updates GAA Quant Model Updates Table 2Performance (Total Returns In USD %) GAA Quant Model Updates GAA Quant Model Updates Chart 1GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World Chart 2GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level 1) GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level 1) GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level 1) Chart 3GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) Please see also the website http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/trades/allocation_performance. For more details on the models, please see Special Report, "Global Equity Allocation: Introducing The Developed Markets Country Allocation Model," dated January 29, 2016, available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Please note that the overall country and sector recommendations published in our Monthly Portfolio Update and Quarterly Portfolio Outlook use the results of these quantitative models as one input, but do not stick slavishly to them. We believe that models are a useful check, but structural changes and unquantifiable factors need to be considered too in making overall recommendations. GAA Equity Sector Selection Model Dear Client, As advised last month, we have suspended the GAA Equity Sector Selection Model due to the significant changes in the GICS sector classifications, implemented at the end of September. We will rebuild the model using the newly constituted sectors once full back data is available from MSCI, which we understand will be in December. We thank you for your understanding. Xiaoli Tang, Associate Vice President xiaoliT@bcaresearch.com Aditya Kurian, Senior Analyst adityak@bcaresearch.com

Highlights The Global Golden Rule (GGR): The gap between market expectations of global central bank policy rates and realized interest rate outcomes is a reliable predictor of government bond returns. Thus, "getting the policymaker call right" is the key to outperformance for bond investors. Implied Government Bond Yields: Given the strong correlation between policy rate surprises and government bond yield changes, we can use the GGR to forecast yields one year from now based on our own assumptions of how many rate hikes (cuts) will be delivered versus what is discounted in money market yield curves. Total Return Forecasts: We can use implied government bond yield changes from the GGR to generate expected 12-month total returns for government bond indexes of different maturities, taking into account different rate hike assumptions for various central banks. Feature Chart 1Global Monetary Divergences? Global Monetary Divergences? Global Monetary Divergences? This month marked the ten-year anniversary of the 2008 Lehman Brothers default, which set off a worldwide financial crisis and a massive easing of global monetary policy. Extraordinary measures - zero (or negative) interest rates, large-scale asset purchases and dovish forward guidance from policymakers - were all successful in suppressing both global bond yields and volatility over time, helping the global economy slowly heal from the crisis. Now, a decade later, such hyper-easy monetary policies are no longer required given low unemployment rates and rising inflation in the major developed economies. That can be seen today with the Federal Reserve shifting to "quantitative tightening" (letting bonds run off its swollen balance sheet) alongside steady rate hikes, the European Central Bank (ECB) set to stop net new buying of euro area bonds at year-end, and the Bank of Japan (BoJ) dramatically slowing its pace of asset purchases. BCA's Central Bank Monitors, which assess the cyclical pressure on policymakers to tighten or ease monetary policy, have collectively been calling for interest rate increases since the start of 2017. Yet our Central Bank Monetary Barometer, which measures the percentage of central banks that have tightened policy over the previous three months, shows that only 1 in 5 banks have actually delivered rate hikes of late (Chart 1). Thus, the risks are tilted towards more countries moving away from highly accommodative monetary conditions given tightening labor markets and rising inflation pressures. This now-global shift towards policy normalization has major implications for global bond investing. The focus is now returning back to more traditional drivers of government bond returns, like changes in central bank policy rates. We recently shared a Special Report published by our colleagues at our sister BCA service, U.S. Bond Strategy, describing a methodology they dubbed "The Golden Rule of Bond Investing".1 That report introduced a numerical framework that translates actual changes in the U.S. fed funds rate relative to market expectations into return forecasts for U.S. Treasuries. The historical results convincingly showed that investors who "get the Fed right" by making correct bets on changes in the funds rate versus expectations were very likely to make the right call on the direction of Treasury yields. In this Special Report, we extend that Golden Rule analysis to government bonds in the other major developed markets (DM). Our conclusion is that utilizing a "Global Golden Rule" (GGR) framework that links bond returns to unexpected changes in policy rates can help bond investors correctly forecast changes in non-U.S. bond yields. The report is set up in two sections. First, we illustrate how the GGR works and how it empirically tends to generally succeed over time for different DM bond markets. In the second section, we make use of the GGR to generate expected return forecasts for non-U.S. government bonds for a variety of interest rate "surprise" scenarios. ECB Policy Rate Surprises Dovish surprises from the ECB do reliably coincide with positive German government bond excess returns versus cash (Chart 2A). Chart 2AECB Policy Rate Surprise & Yields I ECB Policy Rate Surprise & Yields I ECB Policy Rate Surprise & Yields I Chart 2BECB Policy Rate Surprise & Yields II ECB Policy Rate Surprise & Yields II ECB Policy Rate Surprise & Yields II The 12-month ECB policy rate surprise and the 12-month change in the Bloomberg Barclays German Treasury index yield displays a strong positive correlation (Chart 2B). The excess returns during periods of dovish surprises is 14.4% on average and are positive 85% of the time. Hawkish surprises on the other hand, coincide with negative average excess returns of -1.5% (Chart 2C). In terms of total return, the picture is roughly the same except that under hawkish surprises, the average total return you would expect is now positive, given that it factors in coupon income (Chart 2D). Chart 2CGermany: Government Bond Index Excess Return & ECB Policy Rate Surprises (2004 - Present) The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 2DGermany: Government Bond Index Total Return & ECB Policy Rate Surprises (2004 - Present) The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Table 1Germany: 12-Month Government Bond Index Returns And Rate Surprises (2004 - Present) The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Looking ahead, the ECB should not deviate from its current dovish forward guidance of no interest rate hikes until at least the third quarter of 2019. That is somewhat consistent with the reading of the ECB monitor being almost equal to zero. Bank Of England (BoE) Policy Rate Surprises The GGR works well for the U.K. as can be seen in Chart 3A. Chart 3ABoE Policy Rate Surprise & Yields I BoE Policy Rate Surprise & Yields I BoE Policy Rate Surprise & Yields I Chart 3BBoE Policy Rate Surprise & Yields II BoE Policy Rate Surprise & Yields II BoE Policy Rate Surprise & Yields II The 12-month BoE policy rate surprise and the 12-month change in the Bloomberg Barclays U.K. Treasury index yield displays a strong positive correlation except for a major divergence in 1997-1998 (Chart 3B). Dovish surprises coincide with positive excess returns over cash 78% of the time and are on average equal to 6.2% over the full sample (Chart 3C and Chart 3D). As you would expect if the GGR applies, hawkish surprises coincide with negative excess returns. Chart 3CU.K.: Government Bond Index Excess Return & BoE Policy Rate Surprises (1993 - Present) The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 3DU.K.: Government Bond Index Total Return & BoE Policy Rate Surprises (1993 - Present) The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Table 2U.K.: 12-Month Government Bond Index Returns And Rate Surprises (1993 - Present) The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Looking ahead, outcomes will be biased toward dovish surprises over the next six months given the uncertain outcome of the U.K.-E.U. Brexit negotiations. Against that backdrop, the BoE will remain accommodative despite inflationary pressures building up. Bank Of Japan (BoJ) Policy Rate Surprises The GGR does not seem to work when it comes to the Japanese bond market. This reflects the fact that both the markets and the Bank of Japan (BoJ) have understood that chronic low inflation has required no changes in BoJ policy rates (Chart 4A, second panel). Chart 4ABoJ Policy Rate Surprise & Yields I BoJ Policy Rate Surprise & Yields I BoJ Policy Rate Surprise & Yields I Chart 4BBoJ Policy Rate Surprise & Yields II BoJ Policy Rate Surprise & Yields II BoJ Policy Rate Surprise & Yields II While the 12-month BoJ policy rate surprise and the 12-month change in the Bloomberg Barclays Japan Treasury index yield displayed a strong positive correlation pre-1998, the correlation has broken down since then (Chart 4B). Negative excess returns over cash both coincide with dovish and hawkish surprises, on average over time. Further, dovish surprises coincide with positive excess returns only 45% of the time (Chart 4C and Chart 4D). Chart 4CJapan: Government Bond Index Excess Return & BoJ Policy Rate Surprises (1994 - Present) The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 4DJapan: Government Bond Index Total Return & BoJ Policy Rate Surprises (1994 - Present) The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Table 3Japan: 12-Month Government Bond Index Returns And Rate Surprises (1994 - Present) The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Looking ahead, given that the BoJ will in all likelihood maintain its ultra-accommodative monetary policy stance in the near future, we do not expect the GGR to become more effective when applied to the Japanese bond market. Bank Of Canada (BoC) Policy Rate Surprises The GGR works relatively well for the Canadian bond market (Chart 5A). Chart 5ABoC Policy Rate Surprise & Yields I BoC Policy Rate Surprise & Yields I BoC Policy Rate Surprise & Yields I Chart 5BBoC Policy Rate Surprise & Yields II BoC Policy Rate Surprise & Yields II BoC Policy Rate Surprise & Yields II We observe a tight correlation between 12-month BoC policy rate surprises and the 12-month change in the Bloomberg Barclays Canada Treasury index yield, especially post-2010 (Chart 5B). Dovish surprises coincide with positive excess returns 81% of the time and 94% of the time if we look at total returns (Chart 5C and Chart 5D). Chart 5CCanada: Government Bond Index Excess Return & BoC Policy Rate Surprises (1993 - Present) The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 5DCanada: Government Bond Index Total Return & BoC Policy Rate Surprises (1993 - Present) The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Table 4Canada: 12-Month Government Bond Index Returns And Rate Surprises (1993 - Present) The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Looking ahead, the BoC will most likely continue to follow the tightening path of the Federal Reserve, admittedly with a lag. However, accelerating inflation at a time when there is no spare capacity in the Canadian economy suggests that the BoC could deliver more rate hikes than are already priced for the next 12 months. As shown in Table 4, hawkish surprises from the BoC do coincide with negative monthly excess returns of -2.8%. Reserve Bank Of Australia (RBA) Policy Rate Surprises The GGR applies extremely well to the Australian bond market (Chart 6A). Chart 6ARBA Policy Rate Surprise & Yields I RBA Policy Rate Surprise & Yields I RBA Policy Rate Surprise & Yields I Chart 6BRBA Policy Rate Surprise & Yields II RBA Policy Rate Surprise & Yields II RBA Policy Rate Surprise & Yields II The 12-month RBA policy rate surprise and the 12-month change in the Bloomberg Barclays Australia Treasury index yield displays the tightest correlation out of all the countries covered (Chart 6B). Dovish surprises coincide with positive excess returns 83% of the time and 96% of the time if we look at total returns (Chart 6C and Chart 6D). Turning to hawkish surprises, they reliably coincide with negative excess returns. Chart 6CAustralia: Government Bond Index Excess Return & RBA Policy Rate Surprises (1994 - Present) The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 6DAustralia: Government Bond Index Total Return & RBA Policy Rate Surprises (1994 - Present) The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Table 5Australia: 12-Month Government Bond Index Returns And Rate Surprises (1994 - Present) The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As can be seen on the bottom panel of Chart 6A, the RBA Monitor has been rapidly falling since 2016 and now stands in the "easier monetary policy" required. However, the RBA will likely have to see a rise in unemployment or a decline in realized inflation before it considers cutting rates, which raises a risk of "hawkish" surprises if the market begins to price in rate cuts. Reserve Bank Of New Zealand (RBNZ) Policy Rate Surprises The GGR works fairly well for Nez Zealand (NZ) government bonds (Chart 7A). Chart 7ARBNZ Policy Rate Surprise & Yields I RBNZ Policy Rate Surprise & Yields I RBNZ Policy Rate Surprise & Yields I Chart 7BRBNZ Policy Rate Surprise & Yields II RBNZ Policy Rate Surprise & Yields II RBNZ Policy Rate Surprise & Yields II 12-month RBNZ policy rate surprises and the 12-month change in the Bloomberg Barclays NZ Treasury yield exhibit a decent correlation (Chart 7B). Unusually, NZ is the only bond market covered in this report where both dovish and hawkish surprises coincide with positive excess returns on average, although positive episodes are much less frequent for hawkish surprises than for dovish surprises; respectively 55% and 86% (Chart 7C and Chart 7D). Chart 7CNZ: Government Bond Index Excess Return & RBNZ Policy Rate Surprises (2000 - Present) The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 7DNZ: Government Bond Index Total Return & RBNZ Policy Rate Surprises (2000 - Present) The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Table 6New Zealand: 12-Month Government Bond Index Returns And Rate Surprises (2000 - Present) The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Looking ahead, the RBNZ has already provided forward guidance indicating that the Overnight Cash Rate (OCR) will most likely stay flat until 2020 - an assessment that we agree with, so the odds are against any policy surprises over at least the next 6-12 months. Using The Global Golden Rule To Forecast Government Bond Returns The practical application of the GGR is that it can be used as a framework for generating expected changes in yields and calculating total return forecasts for global government bond indices. The strong correlation demonstrated in the previous section between the 12-month policy rate surprises and the 12-month change in the average yield from the government bond indexes allows us to translate our "assumed" policy rate surprise over the next 12 months into expected changes in yields along the curve. With these expected yield changes, we can simply generate expected total returns using the following formula: Expected Total Return = Yield - (Duration*Expected Change In Yield) + 0.5*Convexity*E(DY2) E(DY2) = 1-year trailing estimate of yield volatility It is important to note that we would not give too much importance to what this analysis yields for longer-dated bonds. As shown in the Appendices, once we move into longer government bond maturities, the correlation between the policy rate surprise and the change in yields declines or even becomes non-existent for some countries. This result should not be surprising, as longer-term yields are driven by other factors besides simply changes in interest rate expectations. Inflation expectations, government debt levels and demand from longer-term investors like pension funds all can have a more outsized influence on the path of longer-term bond yields relative to the shorter-end. That results in much more uncertainty when it comes to the total return forecasts for long-dated maturities calculated with this framework. Practically speaking, we are not encouraging our readers to blindly follow that yield and return expectations generated by the GGR, even for bond markets where it clearly seems to be working over time. Rather, the GGR can be integrated in a larger asset-allocation framework for a global fixed-income portfolio by providing one possible set of bond market outcomes. On a total return basis, the results presented below, interpreted alongside the readings on the BCA Central Bank monitors, suggest that investors should be underweight core Euro Area (Germany, France and Italy), Australia and New Zealand while remaining overweight the U.K. and Canada over the next twelve months. As for Japan, given the likelihood that BoJ will leave its policy rate flat, the results hint at a neutral allocation. Jeremie Peloso, Research Analyst jeremie@bcaresearch.com Robert Robis, CFA, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing", dated July 24, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "BCA Central Bank Monitor Chartbook: Divergences Opening Up," dated September 19, 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Global Golden Rule: Germany In light of the forward guidance ECB President Mario Draghi has been providing to the markets, it appears that the most likely scenario over the next 12 months is for the ECB to keep interest rates on hold. Based on the strong relationships between 12-month ECB policy rate surprises and 12-month changes in yields along the curve (Appendix A), a flat interest rate scenario would be bond bearish for German government bonds especially at the short end of the curve with the 1-year German yield expected to rise by 16bps (Table 7A). Table 7AGermany: Expected Changes In Bund Yields Over The Next 12 Months (BPs) The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Using the expected change in yields thus inferred by the policy rate surprise, the German government bond aggregate index is forecasted to return 0.45% over the next 12 months (Table 7B). Table 7BGermany: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Global Golden Rule: U.K. Markets are currently discounting only 21bps of rate hikes in the U.K. over the next year. Thus, even a scenario where the BoE delivers only a single 25bp rate hike would be bearish for U.K. Gilts, especially at the short-end of the curve. Applying the GGR, 1- and 3-year Gilt yields would be expected to rise by 20bps and 10bps respectively (Table 8A). Table 8AU.K.: Expected Changes In Gilt Yields Over The Next 12 Months (BPs) The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Interpolating these expected yield changes, the 1-3 year government bond index total return forecast would be 0.46%. On the other hand, if the BoE prefers to keep rates on hold given the uncertainty of the Brexit outcome, that same 1-3 year government bond index is forecasted to deliver 0.97% of total return over the next 12 months (Table 9B). This is our current base case scenario for Gilts. Table 8BU.K.: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Global Golden Rule: Japan Despite many rumors to the contrary earlier this year, the base case view remains that the BoJ will not change its stance on monetary policy anytime soon. As such, the expected changes in JGB yields under a flat interest rate scenario over the next 12 months are close to zero at the short end of the curve and rather bond bullish at the longer end of the curve; for instance, the 30-year JGB yield would be expected to rally by 9bps (Table 9A). Table 9AJapan: Expected Changes In JGB Yields Over The Next 12 Months (BPs) The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing In that most likely scenario, the Japanese government bond index is forecasted to deliver 0.83% of total return over the next 12 months. In the event that the BoJ surprises the markets by delivering one rate hike of 25bps, it would be bond bearish for JGBs and the total return forecasts for the government bond indices would be negative, regardless of the maturity (Table 9B). Table 9BJapan: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Global Golden Rule: Canada Will the Bank of Canada follow the footsteps of the Fed? The markets certainly seem to think so, with more than three 25bps rate hikes priced in for next 12 months in the OIS curve. Table 10ACanada: Expected Changes In Government Bond Yields Over The Next 12 Months (BPs) The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing That scenario would be outright bearish for Canadian government bonds, with 1- and 2-year yields rising by 16bps and 21bps, respectively (Table 10A). In terms of total returns, the GGR framework forecasts that with 75bps of rate hikes, the Canadian government bond aggregate index would deliver a positive return of 2.35% (Table 10B). This is because 75bps of hikes are currently discounted in the Canadian OIS curve, thus it would neither be a hawkish nor dovish surprise. Table 10BCanada: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Global Golden Rule: Australia The RBA Monitor just dipped below the zero line, implying that easier monetary policy is required based on financial and economic data. Table 11A shows that a rate cut delivered by the RBA in the next 12 months would be bond bullish for Aussie yields, especially at the long end of the curve, where the 30-year Aussie bond yield would fall by 34bps. Table 11AAustralia: Expected Changes In Aussie Yields Over The Next 12 Months (BPs) The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Of all the interest rate scenarios presented in Table 11B, the two rate cut scenarios would return the highest total returns. For instance, the Australian government bond aggregate index would return 2.80% and 3.90% in the event of one and two 25bps rate hikes, respectively. Table 11BAustralia: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Global Golden Rule: New Zealand Our view is that the Reserve Bank of New Zealand will stay on hold for a while longer, which is broadly the same message conveyed by the RBNZ Monitor being positive, but very close to 0. With that in mind, a flat interest rate scenario appears to be bond bearish for the NZ bond yields, except for the longer end of the curve (Table 12A). Table 12ANew Zealand: Expected Changes In NZ Yields Over The Next 12 Months (BPs) The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Table 12BNew Zealand: Government Bond Index Total The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing For New Zealand, the government bond aggregate bond index is the only index provided by Bloomberg Barclays, as opposed to the other countries in our analysis where different maturities are given. In the flat interest rate scenario, the total return forecast for the overall index would be of 2.53% over the next 12 months. Appendix A: Germany Chart 1Change In 1-Year German Bund Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 2Change In 2-Year German Bund Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 3Change In 3-Year German Bund Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 4Change In 5-Year German Bund Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 5Change In 7-Year German Bund Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 6Change In 10-Year German Bund Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 7Change In 30-Year German Bund Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Appendix B: France Chart 8Change In 1-Year French OAT Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 9Change In 2-Year French OAT Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 10Change In 3-Year French OAT Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 11Change In 5-Year French OAT Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 12Change In 7-Year French OAT Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 13Change In 10-Year French OAT Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 14Change In 30-Year French OAT Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Appendix C: Italy Chart 15Change In 1-Year Italian Gov't Bond Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 16Change In 2-Year Italian Gov't Bond Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 17Change In 3-Year Italian Gov't Bond Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 18Change In 5-Year Italian Gov't Bond Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 19Change In 7-Year Italian Gov't Bond Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 20Change In 10-Year Italian Gov't Bond Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 21Change In 30-Year Italian Gov't Bond Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month ECB Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Appendix D: U.K. Chart 22Change In 1-Year Gilts Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoE Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 23Change In 2-Year Gilts Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoE Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 24Change In 3-Year Gilts Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoE Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 25Change In 5-Year Gilts Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoE Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 26Change In 7-Year Gilts Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoE Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 27Change In 10-Year Gilts Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoE Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 28Change In 30-Year Gilts Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoE Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Appendix E: Japan Chart 29Change In 1-Year Japanese JGB Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoJ Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 30Change In 2-Year Japanese JGB Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoJ Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 31Change In 3-Year Japanese JGB Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoJ Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 32Change In 5-Year Japanese JGB Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoJ Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 33Change In 7-Year Japanese JGB Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoJ Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 34Change In 10-Year Japanese JGB Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoJ Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 35Change In 30-Year Japanese JGB Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoJ Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Appendix F: Canada Chart 36Change In 1-Year Canadian Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoC Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 37Change In 2-Year Canadian Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoC Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 38Change In 3-Year Canadian Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoC Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 39Change In 5-Year Canadian Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoC Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 40Change In 7-Year Canadian Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoC Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 41Change In 10-Year Canadian Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoC Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 42Change In 30-Year Canadian Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month BoC Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Appendix G: Australia Chart 43Change In 1-Year Aussie Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month RBA Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 44Change In 2-Year Aussie Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month RBA Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 45Change In 3-Year Aussie Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month RBA Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 46Change In 5-Year Aussie Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month RBA Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 47Change In 7-Year Aussie Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month RBA Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 48Change In 10-Year Aussie Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month RBA Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Appendix H: New Zealand Chart 49Change In 1-Year NZ Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month RBNZ Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 50Change In 2-Year NZ Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month RBNZ Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 51Change In 3-Year NZ Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month RBNZ Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 52Change In 5-Year NZ Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month RBNZ Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 53Change In 7-Year NZ Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month RBNZ Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Chart 54Change In 10-Year NZ Yield##BR##Vs. 12-Month RBNZ Policy Rate Surprise The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing

Highlights Recent estimates by ship trackers put the loss of Iranian exports at close to 1mm b/d as of mid-September vs April levels. This loss is higher (and sooner) than our previous baseline expectation, and prompts us to raise our estimate of lost Iranian oil exports to 1.25mm b/d by November, when U.S. sanctions kick in. Venezuela still is close to collapse, but may avoid a complete meltdown with Chinese companies stepping in to safeguard the $50 billion loaned to the country's oil industry.1 We expect production to fall below 1mm b/d next year - to less than half its end-2016 level. With Fed policy likely to continue tightening into 2019 as oil prices surge, the odds of an equity bear market and recession arriving in 2H19 - vs our 2H20 House view - also increase. Our dominant scenario now includes a supply shock and higher prices in 1Q19, which is followed by a U.S. SPR release and price-induced demand destruction (Chart of the Week). As a result, we are raising the odds of Brent prices reaching or exceeding $100/bbl by as early as 1Q19, and lifting our 2019 forecast to $95/bbl. Energy: Overweight. U.S. refining capacity utilization remains close to 19-year highs. At 97.1% of operable capacity, it is within a whisker of the four-week-moving-average highs of 97.3% recorded in August, driven by strong product demand ex U.S. Base Metals: Neutral. The U.S. Treasury granted permission to Rusal's existing customers to continue signing new contracts with the aluminum producer. The announcement stopped short of a full removal of sanctions, which are set to come into effect on October 23. Precious Metals: Neutral. The strong trade-weighted USD continues to hold gold prices on either side of $1,200/oz. We remain long as a portfolio hedge. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The USDA's Crop Production report forecasts record yields for corn and soybeans - 181.3 and 52.8 bushels/acre, respectively - which continues to weigh on prices. The bean harvest is expected to be a record. Feature Chart of the WeekBCA Ensemble Forecast Lifts Brent To $95/bbl, As Market Tightens BCA Ensemble Forecast Lifts Brent To $95/bbl, As Market Tightens BCA Ensemble Forecast Lifts Brent To $95/bbl, As Market Tightens With the loss of Iranian exports occurring faster and sooner than expected, and Venezuela remaining on the brink of collapse, senior energy officials from the U.S., Russia and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) are going to great lengths to reassure their domestic consumers everything - particularly on the supply side - is under control. We are inclined to believe their comfort level re global oil supply is inversely proportional to the amount of reassurance they provide their domestic audiences. The more they meet and talk - particularly to the media - the more concerned they are. And right now, they're pretty concerned. Rick Perry, the U.S. Energy Secretary, held a presser in Moscow following his meeting with Alexander Novak, Russia's Energy Minister, saying the U.S., KSA and Russia can lift output over the next 18 months to compensate for the loss of exports from Iran, Venezuela, and other unplanned outages.2 That might be true, but the market's already tightening far faster and far sooner than many analysts expected. Covering a supply shortfall in 18 months does nothing for the market over the next few months, particularly with demand remaining robust (Chart 2) and OECD inventories falling (Chart 3). Since 2017, our factor model shows Brent prices have been supported by two factors acting simultaneously together: Chart 2Fundamentals Support Strong Prices Odds Of Oil-Price Spike In 1H19 Rise; 2019 Brent Forecast Lifted $15 To $95/bbl Odds Of Oil-Price Spike In 1H19 Rise; 2019 Brent Forecast Lifted $15 To $95/bbl Chart 3Inventory Draws Will Accelerate Inventory Draws Will Accelerate Inventory Draws Will Accelerate Strong compliance of OPEC 2.0 members to the coalition's production-cutting agreement, which reduced the OPEC Supply-and-Inventory factor's role, and The pickup in global oil demand, particularly in EM economies, which pushed our Global Demand factor up. These effects were partly counterbalanced by the rise in our non-OPEC Supply factor - driven by strong growth in U.S. shale-oil output - which became the largest negative contributor to price movements. Global demand's been strengthening since the end of 1H17 on the back of stellar EM income growth. This remains the fundamental backdrop to global oil for now. While our base case remains relatively supportive for oil prices, we are raising the odds of a price spike resulting from a supply shock as early as 1Q19 on the back of larger- and faster-than-expected Iranian export losses, and continued declines in Venezuelan production. Should this occur, we believe it would trigger a U.S. SPR release, and produce demand destruction at a rate that could be faster than historical experience would suggest (Table 1). This further tightens balances, and leads us to raise our 2019 forecast for Brent crude oil to $95/bbl on average, up from $80/bbl last month, with WTI trading $6/bbl below that (Chart 4). This forecast is highly conditional, given our assumptions re supply-side variables, a U.S. SPR release, and demand destruction estimates. Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d) (Base Case Balances) Odds Of Oil-Price Spike In 1H19 Rise; 2019 Brent Forecast Lifted $15 To $95/bbl Odds Of Oil-Price Spike In 1H19 Rise; 2019 Brent Forecast Lifted $15 To $95/bbl Chart 4BCA's Oil Balances Tighter BCA's Oil Balances Tighter BCA's Oil Balances Tighter Oil Balances Tighten As Supply Contracts In our monthly balances update, we are incorporating a sharply accelerated loss of Iranian export barrels to the market, which already is evident. Bloomberg this week reported its tanker-tracking service registered a decline in Iranian exports of close to 1mm b/d between April, when sanctions were announced, and mid-September.3 At this rate, the assessment by Platts Analytics last week that as much as 1.4mm b/d of Iranian exports could be lost by the time U.S. sanctions kick in November 4 appears more likely.4 However, to be conservative, we are building in a loss of 1.25mm b/d in our balances, and have it developing over the July - November period in increments of 250k b/d, instead of the November - February interval we assumed in last month's balances. We will monitor this situation and revise our estimates as new information arrives. Also on the supply side, we are assuming the U.S. SPR releases 500k b/d starting a month after Brent prices go over $90/bbl in March 2019. This is in line with the SPR's enabling legislation, which limits drawdowns to 30mm b/d over a 60-day period, after the President authorizes such action to meet a severe energy supply interruption. Lastly, we continue to carry supply constraints arising from the lack of sufficient take-away capacity to get all of the crude produced in the Permian Basin to refining markets in our models. To wit: We continue to expect 1.2mm b/d of supply growth from the U.S. shales, driven largely by Permian production, vs an earlier expectation of 1.4mm b/d of growth. We expect the Permian to be de-bottlenecked by 4Q19. We expect the Big 3 producers Secretary Perry expects to fill supply gaps in 18 months - the U.S., Russia, and KSA - to produce 10.83mm, 11.4mm and 10.4mm b/d in 2H18, and 11.79mm, 11.43mm and 10.4mm b/d next year, respectively. They will get some help from OPEC's Gulf Arab producers - i.e., the core OPEC producers (Chart 5) - but, supply will continue to fall/stagnate in most of the rest of the world, particularly in offshore producers (Chart 6). Chart 5While Core OPEC Can Increase Supply... While Core OPEC Can Increase Supply... While Core OPEC Can Increase Supply... Chart 6... 'The Other Guys' Output Stagnates Odds Of Oil-Price Spike In 1H19 Rise; 2019 Brent Forecast Lifted $15 To $95/bbl Odds Of Oil-Price Spike In 1H19 Rise; 2019 Brent Forecast Lifted $15 To $95/bbl We also note the EIA and IEA have lowered their supply-growth estimates this month. The EIA this month reduced expected U.S. crude production growth by 210k b/d in 2019, and the IEA lowered its estimate of offshore production growth in Brazil from 260k b/d to just 30k b/d this year. These are non-trivial adjustments in a market that was tight prior to the downgrade in supply growth. Still, there are significant marginal disagreements on the supply side among the major data supporters (the EIA, IEA and OPEC), which can be seen in Table 2. Table 2Comparison Of Major Balances Estimates Odds Of Oil-Price Spike In 1H19 Rise; 2019 Brent Forecast Lifted $15 To $95/bbl Odds Of Oil-Price Spike In 1H19 Rise; 2019 Brent Forecast Lifted $15 To $95/bbl Demand Destruction Likely As Prices Spike In 1Q19 We expect the rate of growth in EM incomes and trade - a proxy for income - to slow slightly this year vs 2017, on the back of a strengthening USD. This will reduce the rate of growth in EM imports and the rate of growth in EM commodity demand, at the margin. However, y/y growth in EM incomes is expected to remain positive over the next 12 months in our baseline scenario, which will keep the level of commodity demand - particularly for oil and industrial metals - robust. This will drive global demand growth of ~ 1.6mm b/d this year, roughly unchanged from last month. Higher prices risk slowing next year's growth. This is where it gets tricky. An oil-supply shock occurring when global demand is strong most likely will produce a price spike, as we've been arguing for the past several weeks.5 This price spike, coupled with continued monetary-policy tightening by the Fed, raises the likelihood of demand destruction globally. Higher oil prices and a stronger USD act as a double-whammy on EM oil demand. The problem we have now is gauging the elasticity of oil demand, particularly in EM. Oil markets are fundamentally different now than at any point in the modern era - roughly beginning in the early 1960s with the ascendance of OPEC - because many big oil-importing EM economies removed or relaxed subsidies following the prices collapse of 2014 - 2016. Prominent among these states are China and India. OPEC states also took advantage of the price collapse to relax or remove subsidies, e.g., KSA.6 The price shock we anticipate, therefore, will be the first in the modern era in which EM consumers - the principal driver of oil demand in the world, accounting for roughly 70% of the demand growth we expect - are exposed directly to higher prices. How quickly they will respond to higher prices is unknown. For this reason, we're introducing what we consider a reasonable first approximation of how EM demand might respond to higher prices and a stronger USD into the scenarios we include in our ensemble forecast (Chart 7). As a first approximation - subject to at least monthly adjustment, as more data become available - we are modeling a 100k b/d loss of demand for every $10/bbl increase in crude oil prices.7 We will continue to iterate on this as new information becomes available. Chart 7Ensemble Scenarios Reflect New Risks Ensemble Scenarios Reflect New Risks Ensemble Scenarios Reflect New Risks Bottom Line: We've raised the odds of a supply shock in the oil markets that takes Brent prices to or through $100/bbl by 1Q19. Should this occur, we expect it will be met by a U.S. SPR release of 500k b/d a month after prices breach $90/bbl. This price spike will set off a round of demand destruction, which we expect will be quicker than history would suggest, given many large EM oil-consuming states have relaxed or eliminated fuel subsidies, leaving their consumers exposed to the price shock. This will be exacerbated by a stronger USD going forward, as the Fed likely looks through the price spike and continues with its policy-rate normalization. In this scenario, a U.S. recession could arrive in 2H19 vs our House view of 2H20 or later. In addition, we would expect an equity bear market to ensue sooner than presently anticipated. We recommend using Brent call spreads to express the view consistent with our research. At tonight's close, we will go long April, May and June 2019 calls struck at $85/bbl and short $90/bbl calls. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "Venezuela hands China more oil presence, but no mention of new funds," published by reuters.com September 14, 2018. 2 U.S. Energy Secretary Rick Perry made this claim at a press conference after meeting with Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak last Friday. Please see "Big Three oil states can offset fall in Iran supplies: Perry," published by reuters.com September 14, 2018. 3 Please see "Saudi Arabia Is Comfortable With Brent Oil Above $80," published by bloomberg.com September 18, 2018. 4 Please see "OPEC crude oil production rises to 32.89 mil b/d in Aug as cuts unwind: Platts survey" published by SP Platts Global September 6, 2018. 5 Please see "Oil-Supply Shock, Rising U.S. Rates Favor Gold As A Portfolio Hedge," published by BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report on September 13, 2018. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. For a discussion of the effect of a stronger USD on global oil demand, please see "Trade, Dollars, Oil & Metals ... Assessing Downside Risk," published by the Commodity & Energy Strategy August 23, 2018. 6 Please see the Special Focus in the World Bank's January 2018 Global Economic Prospects entitled "With The Benefit of Hindsight: The Impact of the 2014 - 16 Oil Price Collapse," beginning on p. 49. 7 In this simulation, we employ an iterative one-step-ahead forecasting methodology that reduces demand by 100k b/d for every $10/bbl increase in prices. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Odds Of Oil-Price Spike In 1H19 Rise; 2019 Brent Forecast Lifted $15 To $95/bbl Odds Of Oil-Price Spike In 1H19 Rise; 2019 Brent Forecast Lifted $15 To $95/bbl Trades Closed in 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2018 Odds Of Oil-Price Spike In 1H19 Rise; 2019 Brent Forecast Lifted $15 To $95/bbl Odds Of Oil-Price Spike In 1H19 Rise; 2019 Brent Forecast Lifted $15 To $95/bbl