Business Cycles
The November Empire State Manufacturing Survey sent a positive signal about the state of US manufacturing activity. The headline general business conditions index jumped 11 points to 30.9, beating expectations of a more muted 2.2 point rise. The improvement…
The Bank of Mexico raised rates by 25 bps on Thursday, marking the fourth consecutive rate increase this year and bringing the benchmark rate to 5%. These hikes come as the central bank attempts to temper rising inflation. At 6.24% y/y, CPI headline inflation…
Highlights Japan’s long-term weaknesses – a shrinking population, low productivity growth, excess indebtedness – are very well known. However, it still punches above its weight in the realm of geopolitics. Abenomics – sorry, Kishidanomics – can still deliver some positive surprises every now and then. As the global pandemic wanes, and China faces a historic confluence of internal and external risks, investors should begin buying the yen on weakness. Japanese industrials also are an attractive play in a global portfolio. While the yen will likely fare better than the dollar over the next 6-9 months, it will lag other procyclical currencies. Feature Japan has always been an “earthquake society,” in which things seem never to change until suddenly everything changes at once. The good news for investors is that that change occurred in 2011 and the latest political events reinforce policy continuity. Why “Abenomics” Remains The Playbook Over ten years have passed since Japan suffered a triple crisis of earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear meltdown. In fact, the Fukushima nuclear crisis merely punctuated a long accumulation of national malaise: the country had suffered two “Lost Decades” and was in the thrall of the Great Recession, a rare period of domestic political change, and a rise in national security fears over a newly assertive China. The nuclear meltdown marked the nadir. The result of all these crises was a miniature policy revolution in 2012 – Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) returned to power and initiated a range of bolder policies to whip the country’s deflationary mindset and reboot its foreign and trade relations. The new economic program, “Abenomics,” consisted of easy money, soft budgets, and pro-growth reforms. It succeeded in changing Japan. Both private debt and inflation, which had fallen during the lost decades, bottomed after the 2011 crisis and began to rise under Abe (Chart 1). By the 2019 House of Councillors election, however, Abe was running out of steam. Consumption tax hikes, the US-China trade war, and COVID-19 thwarted his plans of national revival. In particular, Abe hoped to capitalize on excitement over the 2020 Tokyo Olympics to hold a popular referendum on revising the constitution. Constitutional revision is necessary to legitimize the Self-Defense Forces and thus make Japan a “normal” nation again, i.e. one that can maintain armed forces. But the global pandemic interrupted. Until the next heavyweight prime minister comes along, Japan will relapse into its old pattern of a “revolving door” of prime ministers who come and go quickly. For example, the only purpose of Abe’s immediate successor, Yoshihide Suga, was to tie off loose ends and oversee the Olympics before passing the baton (Chart 2). Chart 1Abenomics Was Making Progress
Abenomics Was Making Progress
Abenomics Was Making Progress
Chart 2
The next few Japanese prime ministers will almost inevitably lack Abe’s twin supermajority in parliament, which was exceptional in modern history (Chart 3). It will be hard for the LDP to expand its regional grip given that it holds a majority in all 11 of the regional blocks in which the political parties contend for seats based on their proportion of the popular vote (Table 1).
Chart 3
Table 1LDP+ Komeito Regional Performance
Japan: Foreign Threats, Domestic Reflation
Japan: Foreign Threats, Domestic Reflation
Short-lived, traditional prime ministers will not be able to create a superior vision for Japan and will largely follow in Abe’s footsteps. In September Prime Minister Fumio Kishida replaced Suga – a badly needed facelift for the ruling Liberal Democrats ahead of the October 31 election. The LDP retained its single-party majority in the Diet, so Kishida is off to a tolerable start (Chart 4). But he is far from charismatic and will not last long if he fumbles in the upper house elections in July 2022. This gives him a little more than half a year to make a mark.
Chart 4
Kishida will oversee a roughly 30-40 trillion yen stimulus package, or supplemental budget, by the end of this year. Japanese stimulus packages are almost always over-promised and under-delivered. However, given the electoral calendar, he will put together a large package that will not disappoint financial markets. His other goal will be to build on recent American efforts to cobble together a coalition of democracies to counter China and Russia. Japan’s Grand Strategy In Brief Chart 5Japan Exposed To China Trade
Japan Exposed To China Trade
Japan Exposed To China Trade
Japan’s grand strategy over centuries consists of maintaining its independence from foreign powers, controlling its strategic geographic approaches to prevent invasion, and stopping any single power from dominating the eastern side of the Eurasian landmass. Originally the hardest part of this grand strategy was that it required establishing unitary political control over the far-flung Japanese archipelago. However, since the Meiji Restoration, Tokyo has maintained centralized government. Since then Japan has focused on controlling its strategic approaches and maintaining a balance among the Asian powers. During the imperialist period it tried to achieve these objectives on its own. After World War II, the United States became critical to Japan’s grand strategy. Through its broad alliance with Washington, Tokyo can maintain independence, make sure critical territories are not hostile (e.g. Taiwan and South Korea), and deter neighboring threats (North Korea, China, Russia). It can at least try to maintain a balance of power in Eurasia. Yet these constant national interests underscore Japan’s growing vulnerabilities today: China’s economy is now two-times larger than Japan’s and Japan is more dependent on China’s trade than vice versa (Chart 5). Under Xi Jinping, Beijing is actively converting its wealth into military and strategic capabilities that threaten Japan’s security. Rising tensions across the Taiwan Strait are fueling nationalism and re-armament in Japan. Russia’s post-Soviet resurgence entails an ever-closer Russo-Chinese partnership. It also entails Russian conflicts with the US that periodically upset any attempts at Russo-Japanese détente. North Korea’s asymmetric war capabilities and nuclearization pose another security threat. South Korea’s attempts to engage with the North and China, and compete with Japan, are unhelpful. All of these realities drive Japan closer to the United States. Even the US is increasingly unpredictable, though not yet to the point of causing serious doubts about the alliance. If the US were fundamentally weakened, or abandoned the alliance, Japan would either have to adopt nuclear weapons or accommodate itself to Chinese hegemony to meet its grand strategy. Nuclearization would be the more likely avenue. The stability of Asia depends greatly on American arbitration. Japan’s Strategy Since 1990 Beneath this grand strategy Japan’s ruling elites must pursue a more particular strategy suited to its immediate time and place. Ever since Japan’s working population and property bubble peaked in the early 1990s, the country’s relative economic heft has declined. To maintain stability and security, the central government in Tokyo has had to take on a very active role in the economy and society. The first step was to stabilize the domestic economy despite collapsing potential growth. This has been achieved through a public debt supercycle (Chart 6). Unorthodox monetary and fiscal policy largely stabilized demand, at the cost of the world’s highest net debt-to-GDP ratio. The economic adjustment was spread out over a long period of time so as to prevent a massive social and political backlash. Unemployment peaked in 2009 at 5.5% and never rose above this level. The ruling elite and the Liberal Democrats maintained control of institutions and government. The second step was to ensure continued alliance with the United States. Japan could deal with its economic problems – and the rise of China – if it maintained access to US consumers and protection from the US military. To maintain the alliance required making investments in the American economy, in US-led global institutions, and cooperating with the US on various initiatives, including controversial foreign policies. As in the 1950s-60s, Japan would bulk up its Self-Defense Forces to share the burden of global security with the United States, despite the US-written constitution’s prohibition on keeping armed forces. The third step was to invest abroad and put Japan’s excess savings to work, developing materials and export markets abroad while employing foreign workers and factories to become Japan’s new industrial base in lieu of the shrinking Japanese workforce (Chart 7). Chart 6Japan's Public Debt Supercycle
Japan's Public Debt Supercycle
Japan's Public Debt Supercycle
Chart 7
Japan’s post-1990 strategy has staying power because of the massive pressures on Japan listed above: China’s rise, Russo-Chinese partnership, North Korean threats, and American distractions. Investors tend to underrate the impact of these trends on Japan. Unless they fundamentally change, Japan’s strategy will remain intact regardless of prime minister or even ruling party. Russia’s role is less clear and could serve as a harbinger of any future change. President Vladimir Putin and Abe had the best chance in modern memory to resolve the two countries’ territorial disputes, build on mutual interests, and maybe even sign a peace treaty. But Russia’s clash with the West proved an insurmountable obstacle. New opportunities could emerge at some later juncture, as Japan’s interest in preventing China from dominating Eurasia gives it a strong reason to normalize ties with Russia. Russia will at some point worry about overdependency on China. But this change is not on the immediate horizon. Japan’s Tactics Since 2011
Chart 8
Japan is nearly a one-party state. Brief spells of opposition rule, in 1993 and 2009-11, are exceptions that prove the rule. The Liberal Democrats did not fall from power so much as suffer a short “time out” to reflect on their mistakes before voters put them right back into power. However, these timeouts have been important in forcing the ruling party to adjust its tactics for changing times, as with Abenomics. Kishida will not have enough political capital to change direction. The emphasis will still be on defeating deflation and rekindling animal spirits and corporate borrowing (as opposed to relying exclusively on public debt). Kishida has talked about a new type of capitalism and a more active redistribution of wealth, in keeping with the current zeitgeist among the global elite. However, Japan lacks the impetus for dramatic change. Wealth inequality is not extreme and political polarization is non-existent (Chart 8). The LDP is wary of losing votes to the populist Japan Innovation Party, or other regional movements, but populism does not have as fertile ground in countries with low inequality. The desire to boost wages was a central plank of Abenomics (Chart 9) and an area of success. It will come through in Kishida’s policies as well. But the ultimate outcome will depend on how tight the labor market gets in the upcoming economic cycle. Similarly Kishida can be expected to encourage, or at least not roll back, women’s participation in the labor force, as labor markets tighten (Chart 10). As the pandemic wanes it is also likely that he will reignite Abe’s loose immigration policy, which saw the number of foreign workers triple between 2010 and 2020. This inflow is perhaps the surest sign of any that insular and xenophobic Japan is changing with the times to meet its economic needs. Chart 9Kishidanomics To Build On Abe's Wage Growth
Kishidanomics To Build On Abe's Wage Growth
Kishidanomics To Build On Abe's Wage Growth
Chart 10Women Off To Work But Fertility ##br##Relapsed
Women Off To Work But Fertility Relapsed
Women Off To Work But Fertility Relapsed
The only substantial difference between Kishidanomics and Abenomics is that Abe compromised his reflationary fiscal efforts by insisting on going forward with periodic hikes to the consumption tax. Kishida is under no such expectation. Instead he is operating in a global political and geopolitical context in which ambitious public investments are positively encouraged even at the expense of larger budget deficits (Chart 11). Yet interest rates are still low enough to make such investments cheaply. The stage is set for fiscal largesse. Chart 11Fiscal Largesse To Continue
Fiscal Largesse To Continue
Fiscal Largesse To Continue
Kishida can be expected to promote large new investments in supply-chain resilience, renewable energy, and military rearmament. The US and EU may exempt climate policies from traditional budget accounting – Japan may do the same. Even more so than China and Europe, Japan has a national interest in renewable energy since it is almost entirely dependent on foreign imports for its fossil fuels. The green transition in Japan is lagging that of Germany but the Japanese shift away from nuclear power has gone even faster, creating an import dependency that needs to be addressed for strategic reasons (Chart 12). Monetary-fiscal coordination began under Abe and can increase under Kishida. What is clear is that public investment is the top priority while fiscal consolidation is not. Military spending is finally starting to edge up as a share of GDP, as noted above. For many years Japanese leaders talked about military spending but it remained steady at 1% of GDP. Now, at the onset of the US-China cold war, the Japanese are spending more and say the ratio will rise to 2% of GDP (Chart 13). Tensions with China, especially over Taiwan, will continue to drive this shift, though North Korea’s weapons progress is not negligible.
Chart 12
Chart 13
The Biden administration is prioritizing US allies and the competition with China, which makes the Japanese alliance top of mind. Tokyo’s various attempts to talk with Beijing in recent years have amounted to nothing, with the exception of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which is far from ratification and implementation. Japan’s relations with China are driven by interests, not passing attitudes and emotions. If Biden proves too dovish toward China – a big “if” – then it will be Japan pushing the US to take a more hawkish line rather than vice versa. Japan will take various strategic, economic, technological, and military actions to defend itself from the range of external threats it faces. These actions will intimidate and provoke China and other neighbors, which will help to entrench the “security dilemma” between the US and China and their allies. For example, Japan will eagerly participate in US efforts to upgrade its military and its regional alliances and partnerships, including via the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with India and Australia. The Biden administration might force Japan to play nice with South Korea and patch up their trade war. But that is a price Japan can pay since American involvement also precludes any shift by South Korea fully into China’s camp. If China should invade Taiwan – which we cannot rule out over the long run – Japan’s vital supply lines and national security would fall under permanent jeopardy. Japan would have an interest in defending Taiwan but its willingness to war with China may depend on the US response. However, both Japan and the US would have to draw a stark line in defense of Japanese territory, not least Okinawa, where US troops are based. Both powers would mobilize and seek to impose a strategic containment policy around China at that point. Until The Next Earthquake … For Japan to abandon its post-1990 strategy, it would need to see a series of shocks to domestic and international politics. If China’s economy collapsed, Korea unified, or the US abandoned the Asia Pacific region, then Tokyo would have to reassess its strategy. Until then the status quo will prevail. At home Japan would need to see a split within the Liberal Democrats, or a permanent break between the LDP and their junior partner Komeito, combined with a single, consolidated, and electorally viable opposition party and a charismatic opposition leader. This kind of change would follow from major exogenous shocks. Today it is nowhere in sight – the last two shocks, in 2011 and 2020, reinforced the LDP regime. Theoretically some future Japanese government could adopt a socialist platform that relies entirely on public debt rather than trying to reboot private debt. It could openly embrace debt monetization and modern monetary theory rather than trying to raise taxes periodically to maintain the appearance of fiscal rectitude. But if it tried to distance itself from the United States and improve relations with Russia and China, such a strategy would not go very far. It would jeopardize Japan’s grand strategy. For the foreseeable future, Japan’s economic security and national security lie in maintaining the American alliance and continuing an outward investment strategy focused on emerging markets other than China. Macroeconomic Developments The key message from an economic context is that fiscal stimulus is likely to be larger in Japan than the market currently expects. The IMF is penciling in a fiscal deficit of around 2% of potential GDP next year, which will be a drag on growth (Chart 14). More likely, Kishida will cobble together a slightly larger package to implement most of the initiatives he has proposed on the campaign trail. Meanwhile, a large share of JGBs are about to mature over the next couple of years, providing room for more issuance, which the BoJ will be happy to assimilate (Chart 15). Chart 14More Fiscal Stimulus In Japan Likely
More Fiscal Stimulus In Japan Likely
More Fiscal Stimulus In Japan Likely
Chart 15Lots Of JGBs Mature In The Next Few Years
Lots Of JGBs Mature In The Next Few Years
Lots Of JGBs Mature In The Next Few Years
Real numbers on the size of the fiscal package have been scarce, but it should be around 30-40 trillion yen, spread over a few years. With Japan’s net interest expense at record lows (Chart 16), and a lot of the spending slated for worthwhile productivity-enhancing projects such as supply chains, green energy, education and some boost to the financial sector in the form of digital innovation and consolidation, we expect fiscal policy in Japan will remain moderately loose, with the BoJ staying accommodative. The timing of more fiscal stimulus is appropriate as Japan has managed to finally put the pandemic behind it. The number of new Covid-19 cases is at the lowest recorded level per capita, and Japan now has more of its population vaccinated than the US. As a result, the manufacturing and services PMIs, which have been the lowest in the developed world, could stage a coiled-spring rebound. This will be a welcome fillip for Japanese assets (Chart 17). Chart 16Little Cost To Issuing More Debt
Little Cost To Issuing More Debt
Little Cost To Issuing More Debt
Chart 17The Japanese Recovery Has Lagged
The Japanese Recovery Has Lagged
The Japanese Recovery Has Lagged
Consumption could also surprise to the upside in Japan. With the consumption tax hike of 2019 and the 2020 pandemic now behind us, pent-up demand could finally be unleashed in the coming quarters. Rising wages and high savings underscore that Japan could see a vigorous rebound in consumption, as was witnessed in other developed economies. This will be particularly the case as inflation stays low. The big risk for Japan from a macro perspective is an external slowdown, driven by China. A boom in foreign demand has been a much welcome cushion for Japanese growth, especially amidst weak domestic demand. The risk is that this tailwind becomes a headwind as Chinese growth slows, especially as a big share of Japanese exports go to China. Our view has been that policy makers in China will be able to ring-fire the property crisis, preventing a “Lehman” moment. As such, while China’s slowdown is a reality and downside risks warrant monitoring, we also expect China to avoid a hard landing. Meanwhile, Japanese exports are also diversified, with other developed and emerging markets accounting for the lion’s share of total exports. For example, exports to the US account for 19% of sales while EU exports account for 9%. Both exports and foreign machinery orders remain quite robust, suggesting that the slowdown in China will not crush all external demand (globally, export growth remains very strong). It is noteworthy that many countries now have “carte blanche” to boost infrastructure spending, especially in areas like renewable energy and supply chain resiliency. Japan continues to remain a big supplier of capital goods globally. This will ensure that an economic recovery around the world will buffer foreign machinery orders. Market Implications Japanese equities have underperformed the US over the last decade, and Kishidanomics is unlikely to change this trend. But to the extent that more fiscal stimulus helps lift aggregate demand, a few sectors could begin to see short-term outperformance. More importantly, the underperformance of certain Japanese equity sectors have not been fully justified by the improving earnings picture (Chart 18). This suggests some room for catch-up. Banks in particular could benefit from a steeper yield curve in Japan, rising global yields and proposed reform in the sector (Chart 19). We will view this as a tactical opportunity however, than a strategic call. Our colleagues in the Global Asset Allocation service have clearly outlined key reasons against overweighting Japan, and are currently neutral. More importantly, industrials also look poised to see some pickup in relative EPS growth, as global industrial demand stays robust. An improvement in domestic demand should also favor small caps over large caps. Chart 18ADismal Earnings Explain Some Underperformance Of Japanese Equities
Dismal Earnings Explain Some Underperformance Of Japanese Equities
Dismal Earnings Explain Some Underperformance Of Japanese Equities
Chart 18BDismal Earnings Explain Some Underperformance Of Japanese Equities
Dismal Earnings Explain Some Underperformance Of Japanese Equities
Dismal Earnings Explain Some Underperformance Of Japanese Equities
Chart 19Japanese Banks Will Benefit From A Steeper Yield Curve
Japanese Banks Will Benefit From A Steeper Yield Curve
Japanese Banks Will Benefit From A Steeper Yield Curve
Foreigners have huge sway over the performance of Japanese assets, especially equities. Foreign holders account for nearly 30% of the Japanese equity float. This is important not only for the equity call but for currency performance as well since portfolio flows dominate currency movements. Historically, the yen and the Japanese equity market have been negatively correlated. This was due to positive profit translation effects from a lower currency. However, it is possible that Japanese domestic profits are no longer driven only by translation effects, but rather by underlying productivity gains. This could result in less yen hedging by foreign equity investors, which would restore a positive relationship between the relative share price performance and the currency. As for the yen, the best environment for any currency is when the economy can generate non-inflationary growth. Japan may well be entering this paradigm. Historically, now has been the exact environment where the yen tends to do well, as the economy exits deflation and enters non-inflationary growth (Chart 20). Chart 20The Yen And Japanese Growth
The Yen And Japanese Growth
The Yen And Japanese Growth
Markets have been wrongly focusing on nominal rather than real yields in Japan and the implication for the yen. Therefore the risk to a long yen view is that the Bank of Japan keeps rates low as global yields are rising. However, in an environment where global inflationary pressures normalize (say in the next 6-9 months) and temper the increase in global yields, this could provide room for short covering on the yen. In our view, the yen is already the most underappreciated currency in the G10, as rising global yields have led to a massive accumulation of short positions. Finally, from a valuation standpoint, the yen is the cheapest G10 currency according to our PPP models, and is also quite cheap according to our intermediate-term timing model (Chart 21). With the yen being a risk-off currency, it also tends to rise versus the dollar not only during recessions, but also during most episodes of broad-based dollar weakness. This low-beta nature of the currency makes it a good portfolio hedge in an uncertain world. Chart 21The Yen Is Undervalued
The Yen Is Undervalued
The Yen Is Undervalued
Given the historic return of geopolitical risk to Japan’s neighborhood, as the US and Japan engage in active great power competition with China, the yen is an underrated hedge. Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Chester Ntonifor Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy chestern@bcaresearch.com
Highlights Liquidity conditions in Bangladesh are easy and growth has revived. Exports are set to recover as well. Foreign reserve accumulation will continue, which will have positive implications for the economy and stock prices. Steadily rising capital expenditure has improved the economy’s productivity and competitiveness. Progress towards gender and income equality has also been impressive. Growth will stay strong and steady, which warrants higher equity multiples. Bangladeshi stocks also have low correlation with their EM and Emerging Asian counterparts, providing diversification benefits. Absolute return investors should buy this market on dips. Dedicated EM/Frontier market equity portfolios should consider overweighting Bangladeshi stocks. Feature A new business cycle appears to be unfolding in Bangladesh. Domestic demand has picked up. Exports are slated to rise as well. The country’s structural progress also continues to be impressive. Not surprisingly, stocks have gone up in tandem. Yet, high and rising oil prices may lead to a pause in the rally. Absolute-return investors with a time horizon of more than one year should therefore consider accumulating equities on dips. Dedicated equity investors should consider adding the very ‘low-correlation’ Bangladeshi equity market to an EM Asia/EM equity portfolio (Chart 1). External Tailwinds Bangladesh’s foreign reserves have surged to a new high. This has been a very positive development for both the economy and stock prices (Chart 2). Chart 1Bangladeshi Stocks Will Benefit From Liquidity Tailwinds
Bangladeshi Stocks Will Benefit From Liquidity Tailwinds
Bangladeshi Stocks Will Benefit From Liquidity Tailwinds
Chart 2Foreign Reserves, M1 And Stock Prices
Foreign Reserves, M1 And Stock Prices
Foreign Reserves, M1 And Stock Prices
Chart 3Both Current And Capital Account Balances Have Improved
Both Current And Capital Account Balances Have Improved
Both Current And Capital Account Balances Have Improved
The country’s balance of payments (BoP) has improved substantially in the last couple of years. The improvement can be attributed to both current and capital accounts: The current account deficit has narrowed significantly since 2018. The improvement will likely persist as the outlook of its two main components are both promising: Remittances have surged to an all-time high of $25 billion over the past 12-months. In the coming year too, it will likely stay buoyant thanks to a 2% incentive scheme that the government introduced on inward remittances (Chart 3, top panel). The second major component, the trade deficit, will likely stabilize. This is because exports are set to pick up, in part due to rising orders from the EU, Bangladesh’s prime export destination (Chart 4). The recent surge in trade credit inflows also implies a significant rise in export revenues in the coming months (Chart 5). That said, high oil prices, if they remain as such, will lead to higher import bills. Crude and petroproducts make up about 10% of Bangladesh’s import costs and can be a headwind to the trade balance, and by extension, stock prices. Chart 6 shows that stock prices accelerate when oil prices are low, but struggle when oil prices rise. Chart 4Strong EU Orders Means Exports Are Set To Accelerate Further
Strong EU Orders Means Exports Are Set To Accelerate Further
Strong EU Orders Means Exports Are Set To Accelerate Further
Chart 5A Surge In Trade Credit Also Implies Strong Export Numbers Ahead
A Surge In Trade Credit Also Implies Strong Export Numbers Ahead
A Surge In Trade Credit Also Implies Strong Export Numbers Ahead
Capital account inflows have risen sharply too. The rise is due mainly to surging trade financing inflows (as mentioned above), and elevated government foreign borrowing (Chart 3, bottom panel). Going forward, trade financing inflows can remain at a high level if the country continues to obtain the same volume of export orders. The government’s foreign borrowing may also persist. Notably, this long-term financing is mostly used to import capital goods – something that the country needs for its investment and infrastructure projects (Chart 7). With Bangladesh’s ever-rising capital expenditure, such long-term capital inflows – either in the form of government borrowing, or FDI, or a combination of two – will likely continue. If so, this will not only help boost the country’s BoP in the short-term, but it will also be a long-term positive for Bangladesh since capital spending will help improve productivity. Chart 6Stocks Struggle Whenever Oil Prices Rise Too Much
Stocks Struggle Whenever Oil Prices Rise Too Much
Stocks Struggle Whenever Oil Prices Rise Too Much
Chart 7Government's Foreign Borrowings Help Finance Infrastructure Projects
Government's Foreign Borrowings Help Finance Infrastructure Projects
Government's Foreign Borrowings Help Finance Infrastructure Projects
Overall, odds are that the BoP will stay in healthy surplus, thus allowing the central bank continue to accumulate foreign exchange reserves. This has major ramifications for the domestic economy. Rising foreign reserves augment domestic money supply. Stronger money supply is bullish for the economy, and in turn, stock prices (Chart 2, above). Growth Has Revived Domestic demand has revived. Manufacturing has risen to well-above pre-pandemic levels. Robust economic activity is also vouched for by strong electricity generation (Chart 8). What’s more, the recovery will likely have legs as a new credit cycle could well be unfolding. For one, banks are flush with excess reserves – usually a precursor to rising credit going forward. This is because the Bangladeshi central bank uses excess reserves to achieve its monetary policy objectives1 (Chart 9). Chart 8Bangladesh's Domestic Growth Has Revived Well Beyond Pre-Pandemic Levels
Bangladesh's Domestic Growth Has Revived Well Beyond Pre-Pandemic Levels
Bangladesh's Domestic Growth Has Revived Well Beyond Pre-Pandemic Levels
Chart 9A Deluge Of Excess Reserves Will Help Kickstart A New Credit Cycle
A Deluge Of Excess Reserves Will Help Kickstart A New Credit Cycle
A Deluge Of Excess Reserves Will Help Kickstart A New Credit Cycle
Chart 10Banks' NPL Problems Have Abated Marginally
Banks' NPL Problems Have Abated Marginally
Banks' NPL Problems Have Abated Marginally
Incidentally, the central bank is planning to engineer an acceleration in its domestic credit growth rate to 17.8% by June 2022, up from 10.3% in June 2021. It is also planning to augment the broad money growth to 15% from 13.6% in June 2021 as part of its 2021-22 policy objectives. That means the monetary policy setting will remain very accommodating in the foreseeable future, paving the way for a new credit cycle. Notably, the country’s inflation is under control, with both headline and core CPI hovering around 5 - 6% over the past few years. Wage growth has also been broadly in line with consumer inflation and shows no sign of accelerating. Contained wages and consumer price inflation will make the central bank’s plan to run easy policy more feasible. Meanwhile, the banks’ bad loan problems have abated somewhat. As per the latest data from the IMF, the banking system’s gross NPL ratio has fallen to 8.1%, and its net NPL ratio to 4.6% as of Q1 this year (Chart 10, top panel). The lingering NPLs are concentrated in a handful of state-owned banks whose role in the economy has steadily diminished and which now hold about 20% of the banking sector loans. Banks' capital adequacy ratios are also decent at 11.6% and 7.8% (for Tier I capital) respectively (Chart 10, bottom panel). Hence, banks will likely be more willing to expand their loan books going forward which should help propel economy. Chart 11Bangladesh Has Notched Up Impressive Growth Without Any Credit Gush
Bangladesh Has Notched Up Impressive Growth Without Any Credit Gush
Bangladesh Has Notched Up Impressive Growth Without Any Credit Gush
Remarkably, over the past decade, Bangladesh has been able to notch up a robust growth rate of 7%+ without any credit gush in the economy. Domestic credit, at 48% of GDP, is at the same level as it was ten years ago (Chart 11). Hence, should a new credit cycle unfold, Bangladeshi’s growth rate will likely move up a notch higher than it has been in the recent past. The country’s fiscal stance is not going to be tight either. The parliament has passed a budget for the 2021-22 fiscal year (July – June) that envisages a nominal spending growth of 6.3%. Incidentally, government debt is rather low at 23% of GDP. Including the debt held by all the public corporations (concentrated in public financial corporations), gross public debt goes up to 56% of GDP - still a manageable figure. Real government borrowing costs are low as well. The 10-year nominal bond yield is at 6%; in real terms (deflated by non-food CPI), it is 0%. Thus, fiscal authorities have the wherewithal to ramp up borrowing and spending to stimulate the economy should there be a need. Robust Structural Backdrop Structurally, the Bangladeshi economy is remarkably resilient. The growth rate has not only been very steady but has also seen acceleration over the past quarter century. This is in sharp contrast to the boom-and-bust cycles experienced in most other developing nations (Chart 12). Even during the recent pandemic, Bangladesh has been one of the rare countries where growth has remained positive. Importantly, factors behind this stable growth are likely to persist: Bangladesh has done very well to ramp up its capital expenditure to a substantial 32% of GDP, one of the highest rates globally (Chart 13, top panel). This has helped the economy gain competitiveness over time – which is evident in the continued improvement in its net exports volume (Chart 13, bottom panel). Chart 12Bangladeshi Economy Has Been Devoid Of Boom-Bust Cycles
Bangladeshi Economy Has Been Devoid Of Boom-Bust Cycles
Bangladeshi Economy Has Been Devoid Of Boom-Bust Cycles
Chart 13Strong And Rising Capex Has Led To Higher Competitiveness
Strong And Rising Capex Has Led To Higher Competitiveness
Strong And Rising Capex Has Led To Higher Competitiveness
Strong capex has also been instrumental for the economy to grow at a very robust 6-7% rate for decades at a stretch and yet keep inflation under control. This indicates that productive capacity and labor productivity have been rising. Inflation is often a binding constraint to fast growth over a prolonged period of time. Bangladesh’s productivity growth rates have indeed risen to among the highest rates globally, the pandemic-hit last year being a deviation from the long-term trend (Chart 14). What’s more, given the sustained investment in productive capacity and the still low absolute level of labor productivity – compared to other East and South-east Asian economies – Bangladesh should continue to see robust productivity gains in the foreseeable future. Bangladesh specializes in a staple consumer product: textiles. Rising productivity has helped export volumes quintuple over the past two decades; handily beating both emerging markets and global exports volume growth. Incidentally, in common currency terms, the relative wage ratio between Bangladesh and China has been flat at a low level. This has helped Bangladesh remain competitive and continue to expand its global export market share (Chart 15). Chart 14Bangladesh's Productivity Growth Rate Is Among The Best Globally
Bangladesh's Productivity Growth Rate Is Among The Best Globally
Bangladesh's Productivity Growth Rate Is Among The Best Globally
Chart 15Bangladesh Has Been Consistently Gaining Market Share In Global Trade
Bangladesh Has Been Consistently Gaining Market Share In Global Trade
Bangladesh Has Been Consistently Gaining Market Share In Global Trade
The country’s demographic outlook is also positive. The working age population as a share of the total is projected to rise for another decade.2 Together, strong productivity growth and a rising labor force will ensure an enviable potential growth rate of around 7 - 8% over the next decade. Inclusive, Sustainable Growth Economic factors aside, strong and steady growth in Bangladesh also owes much of its achievements to social progress. Over the past few decades, the country has attained significant improvements in various human development areas: Bangladesh boasts of one of the highest female participation rates in its labor force in the Muslim world. At 36%, this is almost twice as high as the Middle East & North Africa (20%), Pakistan (22%), and neighboring India (21%) – as per the World Bank. In the fledgling textile industry in Bangladesh, over 75% of workers are women. The country pioneered microcredit, which by design mostly goes to women. The social fabric of the country is changing as women are now much more likely to make family / economic decisions. Spending on children’s food, health and education has gone up. Women’s fertility rates have gone down significantly. At the same time, infant / maternal mortality rates have witnessed one of the fastest declines seen anywhere globally. Chart 16Bangladesh’s Income Inequality Has Remained Low As Growth Has Been Inclusive
Bangladeshi Equities: Buy On Dips
Bangladeshi Equities: Buy On Dips
Bangladesh’s income inequality – as measured by the Gini index – is one of the lowest in the world (Chart 16). What’s more, despite strong growth, inequality has not risen over the past 25 years. This is in stark contrast to many other advanced and developing countries. Such inclusive growth has rendered the society more equitable, making growth itself more sustainable. Bangladeshis have largely embraced their more liberal linguistic identity over their religious identity. For context, Bengali-speaking Bangladesh was born out of an extremely violent secession from the Urdu-speaking people of Pakistan in 1971 as the former realized that culturally their linguistic identity supersedes their religious identity.3 As such, the vast majority of Bangladeshis practice a moderate form of Islam. This factor has helped to encourage such social changes as the empowerment of women and the expansion of microcredit as religious / cultural opposition has been low. These major traits of this society, including those of gender and income equality, are likely to persist in the foreseeable future. Therefore, odds are that the strong growth will continue to remain inclusive and therefore sustainable. Investment Conclusions The Bangladeshi equity market exhibits a very low and often a negative correlation with both the EM and Emerging Asian markets. In particular, periods of global risk aversions, such as in 2014-15 and early 2020 saw the correlations turn negative. This increases market attractiveness to asset allocators as it will allow them to reap diversification benefits (Chart 17). That said, this bourse has risen significantly over the past year or so and has outperformed its EM counterparts (Chart 1 in page 1). Its valuations have also risen and are now on par with their EM peers (Chart 18). As such, there could well be a period of indigestion / consolidation – especially if our view of a stronger dollar and rising US bond yields transpires, and oil prices remain elevated over the next several months. Chart 17Bangladeshi Stocks' Correlation With EM Turns Negative During Bear Markets
Bangladeshi Stocks' Correlation With EM Turns Negative During Bear Markets
Bangladeshi Stocks' Correlation With EM Turns Negative During Bear Markets
Chart 18Bangladeshi Stock Valuations Have Risen, But Are Not Excessive
Bangladeshi Stock Valuations Have Risen, But Are Not Excessive
Bangladeshi Stock Valuations Have Risen, But Are Not Excessive
Putting it all together, we recommend that absolute return investors with a time horizon of over one year should adopt a strategy of ‘buying on dips’ for Bangladeshi stocks. Dedicated EM/frontier market equity portfolios should consider overweighting Bangladeshi stocks. Finally, regarding the currency, the Bangladeshi taka will likely remain more or less stable over the next year or so. The taka rarely depreciates unless the country’s BoP begins to deteriorate materially. As explained above, that is not in the cards. Rajeeb Pramanik Senior EM Strategist rajeeb.pramanik@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Bangladeshi central bank tries to control the ‘quantity’ of money/credit, rather than the ‘price (i.e., interest rate)’ to conduct its monetary policy. To explain, it controls the ‘reserve money’ growth and thereby impact the ‘broad money (M2)’ growth - to achieve its objectives on economic growth, inflation, and the exchange rate. 2 As per the United Nations’ World Population Prospects 2019. The same metric for Vietnam, Bangladesh’s main exports competitor, has peaked in 2015. 3 For a detailed account of the geopolitical outlook of Bangladesh and the larger South Asia, please see South Asia: A New Geopolitical Theatre from BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy team.
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