Consumer
Highlights The RBA will not hike as quickly as markets expect. Weak wage growth and high underemployment suggest plenty of spare capacity. Inflation is only barely at the bottom of the central bank's range. Massive household debt levels will make it difficult for consumers to handle higher interest rates. Australian banks, although relatively healthy, are still enormously exposed to Australian housing and interest-only mortgages. House prices have nearly quadrupled since 2000 and exhibit the characteristics of a bubble. Still, it will likely take considerable monetary tightening before the bubble bursts. We do not think this will occur anytime soon. Maintain a neutral exposure to Australian government bonds, but enter into a 2-year/10-year Australian government bond yield curve flattener. Feature Chart 1Diverging Trends In##BR##The Australian Economy
Diverging Trends In The Australian Economy
Diverging Trends In The Australian Economy
Australia remains one of the more difficult bond markets on which to take a decisive investment stance at the moment. The recent Moody's downgrade of Australian banks has put the spotlight back on the housing boom Down Under. With home prices continuing to climb - despite the introduction of macro-prudential measures on mortgage lending and with household indebtedness reaching exorbitant levels - investors are becoming increasingly concerned over a potential housing crash that could have spillover effects on the Australian banking system (Chart 1). At the same time, the domestic economy continues to suffer a hangover from the end of the mining boom earlier this decade, with excess capacity keeping inflation pressures subdued. Naturally, this has put the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) in a difficult position. Interest rate cuts in response to low inflation would add further fuel to the housing bubble. On the other hand, any attempt to try and normalize the current accommodative monetary policy settings with rate hikes could trigger an unwanted surge in the Australian dollar and prompt a correction in house prices. The latter could lead to financial instability and raise recession risks with consumers already dealing with negative real wage growth, low savings and massive debt loads. In this Special Report, we examine Australia's monetary policy trajectory, analyze its concentrated banking sector and the potential risks from a downturn in house prices, and revisit our positioning on Australian government debt. Our conclusions still lead us to stick with a neutral duration stance and country allocation on Australian debt, but with a bias towards a flatter government bond yield curve. RBA On Hold... For Now Chart 2Aussie Bonds Caught##BR##In The Global Selloff
Aussie Bonds Caught In The Global Selloff
Aussie Bonds Caught In The Global Selloff
Earlier this month, the RBA decided to leave the cash rate unchanged at 1.5%. The central bank maintained its fairly neutral rhetoric, though they did cite that the "broad-based pick-up in the global economy is continuing." The central bank upgraded its economic forecasts, with real GDP growth now projected to reach slightly above 3% over the next two years. The minutes from that July 4 monetary policy meeting revealed that a discussion over the ideal level of the real cash rate took place.1 The conclusion was that equilibrium inflation-adjusted rate is now around 1%, meaning that the "neutral" nominal rate is 3.5% after adding an inflation expectation of 2.5% (the middle of the RBA inflation target band). That implies that the RBA has lots of catching up to do on interest rates once the next tightening cycle begins. The timing of that discussion on real rates came shortly after the rebound in global bond yields that began after policymakers in other countries, most notably the European Central Bank and the Bank of Canada, began hinting that a move to dial back the emergency monetary easings of 2015/16 was about to begin (Chart 2). With the RBA possibly sending a similar message, investors responded by raising interest rate expectations and bidding up the Australian dollar (AUD). 30bps of RBA hikes are now priced in over the next year, while our proxy for the market-implied pricing of the terminal (i.e. equilibrium) cash rate - the 5-year AUD overnight index swap rate, 5-years forward - shot up to just over 3%. We believe that this market repricing of potential RBA rate hikes is too optimistic. Australian monetary policy must remain highly accommodative for some time. Our more dovish case is based on our assessment of the RBA's policy mandates, which include full employment, price stability and the 'welfare of the Australian people'. Because of Australia's heavy economic exposure to iron ore prices, its largest export, we also include an outlook on the commodity to aid in our forecast of RBA policy. Employment: The latest readings on the Australian labor market have shown marked improvement so far in 2017 (Chart 3). The unemployment rate now sits at 5.6%. Employment growth is accelerating while the participation rate has edged higher in recent months. The National Australia Bank business confidence index is steadily improving, while job vacancies are at a five-year high. In the statement released after the June monetary policy meeting, RBA governor Philip Lowe stated that "forward-looking indicators point to continued growth in employment in the period ahead." Chart 3Labor Demand##BR##Picking Up...
Labor Demand Picking Up...
Labor Demand Picking Up...
Chart 4...But All Signs Point To Lots##BR##Of Spare Labor Capacity
...But All Signs Point To Lots Of Spare Labor Capacity
...But All Signs Point To Lots Of Spare Labor Capacity
While Governor Lowe also noted that the overall employment picture is 'mixed' in some aspects, we are far more pessimistic (Chart 4). The underemployment rate has been rising and now sits only slightly below its almost 50-year high of 8.8%.2 Part-time workers as a percentage of total employment has experienced a structural increase to nearly 33%, while hours worked have declined. Additionally, nominal wages have been flat and real wages are declining. This suggests that there is plenty of slack in labor markets and that Australia is still far from full employment, even with the headline jobless rate sitting slightly below the OECD's current NAIRU estimate of 5.9%.3 Inflation: Core inflation has been slowing since 2014 and only reached an anemic 1.45% in the first quarter of 2017 (Chart 5). Although headline inflation has rebounded over the past year, at 2.1% it remains only at the bottom of the RBA's 2-3% target range. Additionally, the downtrend in inflation expectations for 2017 appears to be intact. Chart 5Inflation Staying Within The RBA 2-3% Target
Inflation Staying Within The RBA 2-3% Target
Inflation Staying Within The RBA 2-3% Target
Chart 6Australian Consumer Spending Slowing
Australian Consumer Spending Slowing
Australian Consumer Spending Slowing
Weak productivity growth, leading to lackluster wage growth, is keeping overall inflation subdued. The trade-weighted currency has rallied since June, presenting an additional headwind for consumer prices. Even if the recovery in headline inflation persists and starts to pass through to core readings, policymakers will likely err on the side of caution. A higher realized inflation rate will be tolerated in the near term to ensure expectations stay well within the 2-3% target band - the RBA's definition of "price stability" - before any interest rate increases are considered. Consumer: Australian households face a challenging environment. Real wages are declining, with the wage cost index in a downtrend since 2011. Real retail spending growth has been slowing and is nearing negative territory, while consumer sentiment is quite pessimistic (Chart 6). As income growth is lacking, consumers have had to dip into savings to maintain consumption, with the savings rate collapsing from 10% to 5% over the last few years. Part of that decline is likely due to the rising cost of "essentials" spending, such as utilities, health care, education and transportation. The inflation rates for those sectors have been outpacing overall headline and core readings (Chart 7), suggesting that Australian households are saving less just to "make ends meet." Chart 7Spending More On The "Essentials"
Spending More On The "Essentials"
Spending More On The "Essentials"
Overall, Australian consumers remain incredibly indebted. The household debt-to-income ratio is nearing 200% - the fourth highest figure among the OECD countries.4 Households have been able to handle the massive debt loads (so far) due to record-low interest rates, which have allowed debt service ratios to fall in line with long-term averages. However, hiking interest rates against this backdrop of highly leveraged consumers - especially given the huge exposure of Australian household balance sheets to overvalued house prices - could severely test the 'economic prosperity and welfare of the Australian people' element of the RBA's mandates. In other words, the RBA would need to see decisive signs that the economy was pushing up against inflationary capacity constraints before embarking on a tightening cycle, for fear of the spillover effects of pricking the housing bubble too soon (as we discuss later in this report). Iron Ore: Historically, Australia's growth has been tightly linked to the performance of industrial commodities, in particular iron ore which represents nearly 20% of total Australian exports. Our commodity strategists are neutral on iron ore on a cyclical horizon and bearish on a strategic basis. Chinese iron ore import growth has recently ticked up, but should remain subdued as Chinese inventories are still high (Chart 8). Chinese property construction activity, which accounts for roughly 35% of total Chinese steel demand, remains depressed. Globally, iron ore supply is set to increase throughout the year as many mining projects will come on stream. On a longer-term basis, Chinese demand for metals will likely slow due to the ongoing structural economic shift away from excessive reliance on infrastructure investment and house-building to an economy based on consumption and services. Summing it all up, none of the RBA's policy mandates is being threatened in a way that should force policymakers to begin shifting to a less dovish stance. There is little evidence that Australia has reached full employment, inflation and inflation expectations remain within the RBA target band, growth momentum remains moderate and the housing bubble remains an existential risk to the future health of the economy. Additionally, Australian policymakers will want to keep rates as low as possible to ensure that a weaker currency helps prop up exports, support the economy in its transition away from the heavy reliance on mining investment. Real GDP growth fell below 2% and the output gap is still far in negative territory, suggesting plenty of slack (Chart 9). Our own Australian Central Bank Monitor has rolled over and is now barely in the "tight policy required" zone (bottom panel). Projected fiscal drag over the next few years will also dampen growth. RBA growth forecasts appear highly optimistic relative to median economist estimates. All of these factors point to a delay in rate hikes. Chart 8No Big Boost To Iron Ore Prices From China
No Big Boost To Iron Ore Prices From China
No Big Boost To Iron Ore Prices From China
Chart 9No Pressure On The RBA To Hike Rates
No Pressure On The RBA To Hike Rates
No Pressure On The RBA To Hike Rates
Bottom Line: Markets are overpricing the potential for RBA tightening. There is still spare capacity in labor markets, inflation is subdued and consumers cannot handle higher rates. Monitoring The Banks In June, Moody's downgraded all Australian banks, citing a "rise in household leverage and the rising prevalence of interest-only and investment loans" (Chart 10). The downgrade raised concern among investors, with banks being the largest component of the Australian equity market, and short positions have noticeably risen. Despite subdued income growth and enormous household debt levels, escalating house prices have supported consumption through the wealth effect, but this is clearly unsustainable. Political pressures are also building, as evidenced by the introduction of a bank levy in South Australia. Chart 10A Relentless Climb In Household Debt
A Relentless Climb In Household Debt
A Relentless Climb In Household Debt
The Chairman of the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), Wayne Byres, wants to make bank capital levels "unquestionably strong." His recent comments indicate that Australian banks will need to raise capital before 2020 to adhere to global standards, with some estimates reaching as high as $20bn (in USD). This process is crucial for instilling confidence in markets that banks can meet these targets through organic capital generation or dividend re-investment plans. As the increased capital required is relatively small - only 2% of the capital base of the Australian banks - it should not be difficult to raise that amount. The greatest risk to the financial system is still the exposure to Australian housing. For the four major banks, Australian housing loans make up slightly over 50% of their lending mix, far greater than for U.S. banks prior to the Great Financial Crisis of 2008 (Chart 11). Of those loans, approximately 40% are non-traditional (interest-only, sub-prime, reverse mortgages). Several macro-prudential measures have been implemented by Australian financial regulators to decrease risks within the banking sector. The regulations have been focused on interest-only loans, which are more vulnerable to rate rises. Such loans are riskier, typically shorter in maturity and requiring larger deposit amounts. Banks are tightening their lending standards for these loans and risk weights will likely be increased, thereby requiring more capital. Additionally, the standard variable rate on interest-only loans has increased by 30-35bps and APRA has imposed a 30% cap on interest-only loans as a percentage of new loans. This will cause a meaningful decline in the risk profile of banks' mortgage books, as consumers with interest-only loans will shift to less expensive principal-plus-interest loans. Another source of risk is the Australian banks' increasing reliance on offshore short-term wholesale funding. When credit growth outpaces deposit growth, which has been the case, banks need to balance the equation through increased wholesale funding. This raises the potential for a liquidity crunch, as capital may be unavailable during a crisis. Credit growth to the private sector is slowing, though, reducing the immediate need for this type of funding. Additionally, authorities are prompting banks to substitute away from the heavy reliance on short-term wholesale funding through the implementation of a net stable funding ratio. This is defined as the available amount of stable funding (i.e. core deposits, equity and long-term wholesale funding) over the required regulatory level of stable funding. Banks will have until 2018 to increase this ratio above 100%. As a result, long-term wholesale debt issuance rose sharply in 2016 and that amount is projected to be relatively similar for 2017. Overall, current metrics suggest that Australian banks are fairly healthy, even before the additional capital requirements. Tier 1 capital ratios have gradually increased since 2007 and are fairly strong, non-performing loans are subdued and net interest margins are rising (Chart 12). In fact, Tier 1 ratios are substantially higher in Australia than they were in the U.S. prior to the Global Financial Crisis. Return-on-assets and return-on-capital have bounced slightly, although increasing capital will certainly dampen the earnings prospects for the Australian banks. Chart 11Australian Banks Heavily Exposed##BR##To Risky Mortgage Lending
Australia: Stuck Between A Rock And A Hard Place
Australia: Stuck Between A Rock And A Hard Place
Chart 12Aussie Banks In##BR##Good Shape Right Now...
Aussie Banks In Good Shape Right Now...
Aussie Banks In Good Shape Right Now...
Since the Moody's downgrade, credit default swap spreads for Australian banks have actually declined to near the 2014 lows, suggesting markets are not concerned about the risk of future bank stresses. We remain concerned, however. Macro-prudential measures on mortgage loan sizes and higher capital requirements are certainly welcome and will reduce perceived risks within the banking sector. However, these measures have done little to curb the rise in Australian house prices. Given their huge exposure to Australian housing, the banks will likely not be able to withstand a meaningful decline in house values - the outlook for which depends critically on the RBA's future monetary policy path. Bottom Line: Australia bank metrics are fairly healthy but they will need to raise more capital. This should not be too problematic. However, the banks' massive exposure to Australian housing, elevated number of interest-only mortgage loans and heavy reliance on short-term wholesale funding present substantial risks. Even if the bank capital levels are 'unquestionably strong,' they will not be enough to withstand a meaningful downturn in house prices. When Will The Housing Bubble Burst? House prices in Australia have nearly quadrupled since 2000. With the exception of Perth, house prices in the other major cities have continued their massive run-up over the last year, suggesting macro-prudential measures have done little to cool the market (Chart 13). Price gains have been supported by robust demand, both domestic and foreign. However, the steady rise in debt-fueled speculation (i.e. loans for investment purposes), the magnitude of the price increases, and the lack of any correction in over 25 years, suggest Australian housing is indeed in the midst of a bubble. On the supply side, steadily rising completions over the past decade have not curbed price gains (Chart 14). While construction has slowed since its peak at the end of 2016 and building approvals have declined, we find the argument that there has been a shortage in supply to be fairly weak. In fact, the rate of dwelling completions has outpaced population growth since 2012 and dwelling completions per 1,000 people are much higher in Australia than its G7 counterparts. Chart 13...Just Don't Prick##BR##The Housing Bubble
...Just Don't Prick The Housing Bubble
...Just Don't Prick The Housing Bubble
Chart 14Supply Not Rising Enough To##BR##Slow House Price Growth
Supply Not Rising Enough To Slow House Price Growth
Supply Not Rising Enough To Slow House Price Growth
History teaches us that bubbles never deflate calmly. Nevertheless, we view the likelihood of a systemic crash over the next 6-12 months as highly unlikely. While growth estimates may not meet the RBA's lofty goals, Australia will also not experience its first recession in over 25 years, which would crimp housing demand. The two most likely candidates to act as a catalyst for a housing downturn are therefore: a slowdown in capital inflows from Chinese property buyers and/or a shift to restrictive monetary policy from the RBA. It will not require a complete halt in capital inflows from China, simply a considerable slowdown, for the Australian housing market to come under pressure. While there is always a possibility for Chinese authorities to clamp down on outflows, particularly if the RMB comes under pressure, we view this as fairly unlikely. Current capital outflows have eased a bit and a long-term goal is to deregulate the capital account. Continued capital liberalization in China will aid in maintaining capital flows into Australian housing. Additionally, the millionaire class in China is growing and the private sector wants to diversify its assets. While Australian house prices are expensive, prices are far more affordable than those metropolitan areas such as Hong Kong, indicating Chinese money will continue to drift into Australian real estate. Chart 15A Long Way From Restrictive Policy Rates
A Long Way From Restrictive Policy Rates
A Long Way From Restrictive Policy Rates
The more likely candidate for a bursting of the housing bubble is through the monetary policy channel. In the case of the U.S., multiple Fed rate hikes in the mid-2000s pushed monetary conditions into restrictive territory, prompting the housing crash. As we previously argued, the RBA will likely stay on hold for an extended period due to a lack of serious inflation pressures. Yet even if the RBA were to begin tightening sooner than we expect, it will take multiple rate hikes before monetary conditions become even close to restrictive. Using a simple measure of the equilibrium RBA cash rate, like a combination of Australian potential GDP growth and a five-year moving average of headline CPI inflation or the Taylor Rule formulation that we introduced in a recent Weekly Report, it is clear that the RBA is a long way from a restrictive policy stance (Chart 15).5 Bottom Line: Australian house prices have nearly quadrupled since 2000 and exhibit the characteristics of a bubble. Still, it will likely take considerable monetary tightening before the bubble bursts. We do not think this will occur anytime soon. Investment Implications We currently hold a neutral recommended stance on Australian government debt, both in terms of duration exposure and country allocation in global fixed income portfolios. Australian bond yields are above the lows seen in 2016 but have yet to break out of the structural downtrend with the benchmark 10-year now at 2.67% (Chart 16). We hesitate to go outright overweight on Australian debt in our model bond portfolio, however, even with our relatively dovish view on the RBA's future policy moves. Without any slowing in house prices, and with realized and expected inflation having clearly bottomed after last year's downturn, a big move lower in Australian bond yields is unlikely. At best, Australian yields will not rise by as much as we expect to see in the U.S. or Euro Area over the next 6-12 months. At the same time, if that view pans out, the Australian currency will likely underperform which will erode into the returns of an overweight Australian bond position (either through currency hedging costs or the outright losses on unhedged currency exposure). We do, however, see an opportunity to enter into an Australian 2-year/10-year yield curve flattening position (Chart 17). As previously mentioned, the short end of the curve will be anchored by an inactive central bank. The long end, however, faces multiple downward pressures. Macro-prudential measures and political pressures will continue to dampen credit growth. While we believe there is scope for realized inflation to grind a bit higher in the coming quarters, longer-term inflation expectations are likely to remain well-anchored. Additionally, the economic surprise index is elevated after several positive data releases and has plenty of scope for disappointment, which will limit any rise in longer-dated bond yields. Chart 16No Bear Market##BR##In Australian Bonds
No Bear Market In Australian Bonds
No Bear Market In Australian Bonds
Chart 17Enter A 2yr/10yr##BR##Australian Curve Flattener
Enter a 2yr/10yr Australian Curve Flattener
Enter a 2yr/10yr Australian Curve Flattener
The added benefit of entering a curve flattener is that the trade will likely work if our RBA view turns out to be wrong in a hawkish direction. If the RBA does indeed begin to hike rates sooner than we expect to deal with an improving economy or to begin deflating the housing bubble, this should put flattening pressure on the curve as the market prices in additional future rate increases. Only in the case of a breakout in longer-term inflation expectations that bear-steepens the curve, or a severe economic downturn that prompts RBA rate cuts and bull-steepens the curve, will a flattening trade underperform. Given our views on Australian growth and inflation, we see more likely scenarios where the curve flattens than steepens, particularly versus the only modest amount of flattening currently priced in the forwards. Bottom Line: Enter into a 2-year/10-year Australian government bond yield curve flattener. The short end of the curve will be anchored by an inactive central bank. On the long end, slowing credit growth, fiscal drag and an elevated economic surprise index will put downward pressure on yields. Patrick Trinh, Associate Editor Patrick@bcaresearch.com Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 http://www.rba.gov.au/monetary-policy/rba-board-minutes/2017/2017-07-04.html 2 The "underemployed" is defined as full-time workers on reduced hours for economic reasons and part-time workers who would like, and are available, to work more hours. 3 NAIRU = Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate Of Unemployment. 4 https://data.oecd.org/hha/household-debt.htm 5 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Dangerous Duration", dated July 11 2017. Available at gfis.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights The GOP's failure to repeal Obamacare could rev up the Republicans' motivation to move forward on tax cuts. Fed policymakers are taking financial stability seriously. Constructive conditions for consumer spending. Margin expansion continues in early Q2 earnings results. Feature Tax Cuts Still On The Table The Republicans' failure to pass their health care legislation is leading the markets to doubt the prospect for tax cuts. This may be premature but, contrary to conventional wisdom, it may actually increase the chances of tax cuts. Ironically, the inability to jettison Obamacare may turn out to be a blessing for President Trump and the Republican Party. According to the Congressional Budget Office, by 2026, 22 million fewer Americans would have health care if the legislation had been enacted compared with the status quo. The Senate bill also would have led to substantial cuts to Medicaid and deep reductions to insurance subsidies for poor and middle-class families, many of whom voted for Trump. The failure to repeal Obamacare could actually increase the motivation of Republicans to move forward on tax cuts anyway. The chances for broad tax reform have certainly diminished, since that will be just as difficult to get passed as healthcare reform. The GOP also wanted to use the roughly $200 billion in savings from healthcare reform to fund reduced tax rates. However, tax cuts are something that all Republicans can easily agree too, and they will need to show a legislative victory ahead of next year's mid-term elections. The difficulty will be how to pay for these cuts. We expect them to be "fully funded" in the sense that there will be offsetting spending cuts, but these will be back-loaded toward the end of the 10-year budget window, whereas the tax cuts will be front-loaded. This would generate a modest amount of fiscal stimulus over the next few years. Implications For The Fed Expansionary fiscal policy next year would generate difficulties for the FOMC. The June CPI report underscored that inflation is not a problem for now. Nonetheless, we highlighted in last week's report that pipeline inflationary pressures are gradually building. The unemployment rate is already below the Fed's estimate of the full employment level. Chart 1Inside The Fed's Forecasts...
Inside The Fed's Forecasts...
Inside The Fed's Forecasts...
Moreover, unemployment will continue to fall unless productivity picks up soon. We backed out the productivity growth rate implied by the Fed's latest Summary of Economic Projections, given its assumption that real GDP growth will be roughly 2% over the next couple of years and that the unemployment rate will stabilize near the current level. This combination implies that productivity growth will accelerate from the average rate observed so far in this expansion (0.7%) to about 1%, which is consistent with monthly payrolls of 135,000. If we instead assume that productivity does not accelerate (and real GDP growth is 2%), then payrolls must jump to 160,000 and the unemployment rate would fall below 4% next year (Chart 1). The implication is that, unless real GDP growth slows, the unemployment rate is soon likely to reach lows not seen since 2000. The FOMC hawks would become even more worried that the Fed is taking too large a risk with inflation and financial stability (see below). Fiscal stimulus in 2018 would place the FOMC even further behind the curve. Policymakers would be forced to tighten aggressively to bump up the unemployment rate. The Fed would hope for a soft landing, but the more likely result is a recession in 2019. That said, it is too early for investors to position for a recession.1 Bonds rallied and the dollar weakened anew following the collapse of the Senate's healthcare bill on the view that hopes for fiscal stimulus are all but dead. We still believe that bond yields and the dollar have more upside potential, even in the absence of fresh fiscal stimulus. Last week's report2 highlighted that a global monetary policy recalibration is under way because central bankers have decided that "emergency" levels of monetary accommodation are no longer required. Moreover, the maximum level of policy divergence has not yet been reached between the Fed and other major central banks, which means that the dollar will have one last leg higher. The U.S. stock market has weathered the fiscal disappointment, seemingly moving out of sync with dollar and bond market action in the past several months. The equity market appears to have been given a "free pass" because earnings have been very supportive. The combination of robust earnings growth, steady real GDP growth near 2%, and low bond yields, all have been bullish for stocks. It will be tougher sledding when profit growth peaks. Fortunately, the earnings backdrop is still constructive at the moment (see below). A Third Mandate? Financial stability has become a third mandate for the Fed, and is one of the reasons the hawks want to keep tightening despite the fact that the FOMC has not yet met the inflation target. The topic has been mentioned by either Fed staff or FOMC members in 27 of the 39 meetings since September 2012. Fed Chair Yellen has elevated financial stability during her tenure, leading discussions or staff briefings in 19 of the 27 meetings she has presided over. The topic merited only passing mention in Fed deliberations prior to 2012. At the June meeting, Fed staff characterized the "financial vulnerabilities of the U.S. financial system" as moderate on balance.3 This assessment has not changed since the Fed began to offer opinions on the health of the financial system at its September 2013 meeting. However, the Fed does not provide a financial stability grade at every meeting. In December 2013, Fed staff described financial conditions as moderate, but its next judgment (also moderate) was only in January 2016. Since then, Fed staff has provided an assessment of financial stability in half of the 12 subsequent meetings. Another indication that Fed policymakers are paying particular attention to financial market risk is that the issue has become a key part of the Monetary Policy Report (MPR).4 Before the onset of the GFC, financial stability warranted only a few paragraphs in the MPR, but since 2013 the report has included a special section on the topic. Chart 2FOMC Closely Monitoring Financial Stability
FOMC Closely Monitoring Financial Stability
FOMC Closely Monitoring Financial Stability
The four primary areas that the Fed monitors to assess financial stability are: Vulnerabilities stemming from maturity and liquidity transformation in the financial sector (Chart 2, panel 1); Valuation pressures across a range of assets, including Treasury securities, equities, corporate bonds and commercial real estate (panel 2); Leverage in the household and business sectors (panel 5); and Regulatory burden (not shown). Some FOMC members are worried that if rates are not normalized soon, then valuation will become even more stretched in bond and equity markets, which could potentially lead to financial stability issues. This is a reason why a few of the central bankers want to hike rates even though inflation is still too low. This group believes it is better to tighten slowly, rather than wait and raises rates sharply in the future when financial valuations may be even more stretched. Nonetheless, others at the Fed are concerned that higher rates may trigger an equity correction, which if significant enough, would spark a slowdown in the U.S. economy via the wealth channel. In this case, greater financial instability would push the Fed to pause its rate hike regime prematurely. We intend to return to this scenario in a future Weekly Report. The monetary authority is also concerned by negative term premiums in the bond market. We expect only minimal impact on Treasury bond yields linked to the reduction in the Fed's balance sheet.5 That said, a big sell-off in bond prices that leads to a sudden correction in equity prices or a widening of credit spreads would tighten financial conditions, impact the real economy and prompt the Fed to rethink its path for the fed funds rate and its balance sheet. Bottom Line: The conditions that foster financial stability matter to the central bank almost as much as maintaining low and stable inflation, and full employment. The doves want to see inflation rise closer to the 2% target before tightening even more. The hawks worry that the relationship could be non-linear, which means that a further undershoot of unemployment below estimates of full employment could suddenly generate a surge in inflation. At a minimum, an undershoot could boost risks to financial stability by promoting excess risk-taking in the financial markets. Conditions Still Favor The Consumer June's reading on retail sales released in mid-July was disappointing, but the conditions that cultivated increased consumer spending are still in place. Core retail sales dipped by 0.1% month-over-month in June, and both the 3-month and 12-month rates of change have been on a downward trajectory since the start of the year (Chart 3, panel 1). Moreover, auto sales have stagnated near all-time highs in recent months, adding to the market's consumer concerns (panel 2). The only positive is that consumer spending looks better in real terms because inflation has moderated (panel 3). Nominal retail sales have softened, but inflation-adjusted spending is what feeds into the construction of GDP. Even so, conditions are in place for a rebound in spending in the coming months. Consumer confidence readings are still near cycle peaks; home values are elevated and rising; household net worth is at an all-time high and expanding rapidly, financial conditions are easy, and accelerating income growth is supported by the tightening labor market. When these economic circumstances prevailed in the past, consumer spending almost always sped up (Chart 4). Chart 3Soft Patch In Retail Sales##BR##And Inflation Continues
Soft Patch In Retail Sales And Inflation Continues
Soft Patch In Retail Sales And Inflation Continues
Chart 4Conditions Conducive For##BR##Consumer Spending
Conditions Conducive For Consumer Spending
Conditions Conducive For Consumer Spending
Bottom Line: The soft patch in consumer spending is lingering longer than expected, which challenges our view that U.S. economic growth will be stronger in the second half of the year relative to the first half average. Nevertheless, we anticipate that GDP growth will permit economic output to hit the Fed's low target for the year and keep the monetary authority on track to tighten policy at a faster pace than is discounted in the bond market. The resulting bond sell-off will not derail the equity bull run as long as profits remain supportive. Q2 Earnings Update: Margin Expansion Continues Chart 5Positive Earnings Surprises Continue
Positive Earnings Surprises Continue
Positive Earnings Surprises Continue
The Q2 earnings reporting season is off to a strong start, with both EPS and sales running well ahead of consensus expectations as forecasted in our July 3 preview. Moreover, the counter trend rally in profit margins is still in place. Just under 20% of companies have reported results so far with 74% of companies beating consensus EPS projections, right at the long-term average of 70% (Chart 5). In addition, 74% have posted Q2 revenues that exceeded expectations. The surprise factor for Q2 stands at 5% for EPS and 1% for sales. We anticipate the secular mean-reversion of margins to re-assert itself in the S&P data, perhaps beginning early in 2018. Nonetheless, the initial results imply that Q2 will see another quarter of margin expansion. Average earnings growth (Q2 2017 versus Q2 2016) is strong at 9% with revenue growth at 5%. The BCA Earnings model predicts EPS growth to hit roughly 18% later this year on a 4-quarter moving total basis, before moderating in 2018 (Chart 6). Measured on this basis, S&P 500 EPS growth so far in Q2 is 18%, compared with 12% in Q1. The strength in earnings and revenue is broad based (Table 1). Earnings per share are up in Q2 2017 versus Q2 2016 in 10 of 11 sectors; the lone exception is the utilities sector. EPS results are particularly strong in energy, technology and financials. Energy revenues surged by 15% in Q2 versus a year ago. Sales gains in technology (7%), materials (6%), utilities (5%), and real estate (5%), are notable. The upward trajectory of EPS estimates for 2017 and 2018 (Chart 7) since the start of 2017 is encouraging. We will provide an update on the Q2 earnings season in the August 7 Weekly Report. Chart 6Strong EPS##BR##Growth Ahead
Strong EPS Growth Ahead
Strong EPS Growth Ahead
Table 1S&P 500:##BR##Q2 2017 Results*
The Fed's Third Mandate
The Fed's Third Mandate
Chart 7Estimates For '17 & '18 Have Moved##BR##Higher Since Start Of The Year
Estimates For '17 & '18 Have Moved Higher Since Start Of The Year
Estimates For '17 & '18 Have Moved Higher Since Start Of The Year
Bottom Line: EPS growth will continue to accelerate through the end of 2017 and into early 2018, aided by a period of margin expansion and decent top-line growth. The elevated level of ISM sets the stage for EPS growth to gather speed in the second half of 2017. Firm readings on ISM are an indication that our bullish profit story for 2017 is still intact. Stay overweight stocks versus bonds. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Waiting For The Turn", dated June 26, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Global Monetary Policy Recalibration", dated July 17, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 3 https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20170614.htm 4 https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/20170707_mprfullreport.pdf 5 Please see BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report "Two Challenges For U.S. Policymakers", dated May 23, 2017. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com.
Dear Client, I am visiting clients this week, and as such there will be no Weekly Report. Instead, we are sending you this Special Report written by my colleague Jonathan LaBerge. Jonathan argues that while the recent acceleration of the Canadian economy is genuine, the rise in Canadian household debt-to-income over the past 16 years has been so large that a credit-driven downturn in spending is now virtually unavoidable over the long run. I hope you will find this report both interesting and informative. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Strategist Global Investment Strategy Highlights The recent economic improvement in Canada is genuine. In isolation, this supports the Bank of Canada's decision to gradually raise interest rates. However, over the long run, the historical experience suggests that the substantial leverage of Canadian households will ultimately cause a serious credit-driven downturn. Several myths about Canada's housing market have obscured the true extent of its credit market imbalances, heightening the risk that policymakers will ultimately overplay their hand when tightening monetary conditions. There are multiple potential triggers that could eventually spark a credit-driven downturn in Canada, but none of them seem likely to have a major impact on the economy over the coming 6-12 months. Favor a pro-cyclical stance over the coming year, but look to shift to a bearish structural view at some point beyond the immediate investment horizon. Feature Several developments over the past few months have altered the outlook for the Canadian economy. However, these events have not had a consistent impact on the narrative for Canadian assets. Whereas a sharp rebound in real GDP growth and a hawkish pivot from the Bank of Canada have been signs of a strengthening economy, the crisis surrounding Home Capital Group (a Canadian non-bank mortgage lender) was an ominous sign for many investors concerned about the deeply imbalanced Canadian housing market.1 In this report we argue that the cyclical improvement in the Canadian economy is legitimate, and that the Bank of Canada is likely to move forward with gradual policy tightening following Wednesday's move. However, the rise in Canadian household debt-to-income over the past 16 years has been so large that a credit-driven downturn in spending is now virtually unavoidable over the long run, rather than a risk. We highlight how, in many ways, the imbalances in the Canadian housing market are even worse than the market narrative would suggest. We also provide a checklist of factors to monitor in order to judge when Canada's day of reckoning will arrive. For now, it does not appear to be imminent. From an investment standpoint, our conclusions imply that investors should pursue a "two-staged" approach when allocating to Canadian assets. Over the coming 6-12 months, a cyclical improvement in the economy means that Canadian risky asset prices and government bond yields are likely to rise, and we believe that this stage is worth playing. But over the secular horizon, the reverse is likely to unfold, meaning that a rally in Canadian assets over the coming year will create excellent "selling conditions" for investors looking to position for a bearish structural view. Economic Momentum Is Spurring Tighter Monetary Policy... The Bank of Canada is now back on a path towards tighter monetary policy, and a close examination of the Canadian economy, as well as our outlook for global oil inventories, supports the BoC's view: Real consumer spending picked up significantly in Q1, rising from 2.7% to 3.1% on a year-over-year basis. Chart 1 highlights that the rise in real spending has been supported by a rebound in employment growth and consumer confidence (the latter is at a 9-year high). On the employment side, Chart 1 also shows that the acceleration in job growth is not limited to provinces that are strongly associated with oil sands production. In fact, the chart shows that employment in Canada excluding Alberta and Saskatchewan has been in an uptrend since mid-2014, when fiscal and monetary policy began to respond to the shock from a collapse in the price of oil. All Canadian employment cylinders are now firing, given the job recovery in oil sands provinces. Real Canadian gross fixed capital formation turned positive in Q1 after a significant decline into negative territory, and a simple model based on business confidence, oil prices, and the Canadian dollar (stripped of its correlation with oil) suggests that it will continue to accelerate modestly over the coming year (Chart 2). Chart 1Genuine Signs Of A Stronger Economy
Genuine Signs Of A Stronger Economy
Genuine Signs Of A Stronger Economy
Chart 2Further Gains In Investment Likely
Further Gains In Investment Likely
Further Gains In Investment Likely
Chart 3 shows a model for oil prices, based on global industrial production, oil production, OECD oil inventories, and oil consumption in the major countries and China. If OPEC is successful in reducing inventories to their 5-year moving average, as BCA's commodity strategists expect, the model implies that oil prices will rise materially. This is likely to provide a tailwind for the Canadian economy, at least in nominal terms. While the pace of tightening is likely to be gradual because of the weakness in Canadian core inflation, Chart 4 suggests that the decline in inflation over the past few months may simply represent the correction towards more fundamentally-justified levels. The chart shows a model of core inflation based on lagged real core consumer spending and the Canadian dollar (as a proxy for imported inflation/deflation), and highlights that actual inflation has overshot the model value over the past three years. But the chart also shows that the fundamentally-justified level of core inflation remains in an uptrend, suggesting that recent weakness is likely temporary and is thus not an impediment to higher policy rates over the coming year. Chart 3Falling Inventories Will Be Bullish For Oil
Falling Inventories Will Be Bullish For Oil
Falling Inventories Will Be Bullish For Oil
Chart 4The Dip In Core Inflation Is Temporary
The Dip In Core Inflation Is Temporary
The Dip In Core Inflation Is Temporary
Bottom Line: The recent economic improvement in Canada is genuine and, in isolation, supports the Bank of Canada's decision to gradually raise interest rates. ...But It Will All Likely End In Tears Chart 5Higher Household Leverage Than In The U.S. Pre-Crisis
Higher Household Leverage Than In The U.S. Pre-Crisis
Higher Household Leverage Than In The U.S. Pre-Crisis
While we agree that the Bank of Canada is on a path to gradually raise interest rates over the coming year and that the economy is currently in good shape, the odds are good that tighter policy (and/or other factors) will eventually inflict considerable damage to the Canadian economy via the housing market and its impact on highly leveraged consumers. In this regard, the pickup in Canadian economic growth likely represents a happy moment in an otherwise sad story. Chart 5 compares Canada's mortgage debt-to-disposable income, total household debt-to-GDP, and the total household debt service ratio to that of the U.S. The chart neatly illustrates the fundamental basis for a bearish secular outlook for the Canadian economy, which is that household debt levels have risen enormously since 2000, to a level that is worse today than in the U.S. in 2007. "So what?" ask some investors. Household debt levels vary significantly across countries, meaning that an elevated level of household debt-to-income does not necessarily spell economic doom. Chart 6 counters this point by showing the relationship between the historical change in household debt-to-GDP (y-axis) versus the starting point for the ratio (x-axis) during episodes of significant household leveraging. The change in debt-to-GDP is shown as a 10-year average of the year-over-year change in the ratio, in order to compare Canada's recent debt binge with other long-term booms in credit. In terms of very significant increases in household credit-to-GDP from an already above-average level, Chart 6 shows that Canada's experience (an average yearly increase of 3.3%) has been among the most severe cases. The chart also shows that while there are a few exceptions, other observations in the neighborhood of Canada's have had a strong tendency to be associated with harsh economic consequences once the credit binge has come to an end. In particular, while the chart shows that the countries at the center of the euro area sovereign debt crisis saw a more rapid rise in household debt-to-GDP than observed in Canada, this occurred from a lower base. When measuring the total change in household debt-to-GDP, Canada has experienced almost the same magnitude rise from 2000 to today as what occurred in Spain and Portugal during the last economic cycle. In terms of a comparison with the U.S., Chart 7 presents a long-term perspective on the inverse relationship between household credit growth and real per capita consumption in the U.S. The chart highlights that 10-year upcycles in household debt-to-GDP correlate well, with a lag, to 10-year downcycles in real per capita spending. Periods where the relationship is less tight have tended to be associated with less severe increases in household debt-to-GDP, suggesting that investors can be more confident that debt growth will eventually negatively impact consumer spending the stronger the credit binge has been. Chart 6The Historical Experience Of Household Leveraging Does Not Paint A Pretty Picture For Canada
Canada: A (Probably) Happy Moment In An Otherwise Sad Story
Canada: A (Probably) Happy Moment In An Otherwise Sad Story
Chart 7Upcycles In Household Leveraging Correspond To Downcycles In Real Spending
Upcycles In Household Leveraging Correspond To Downcycles In Real Spending
Upcycles In Household Leveraging Correspond To Downcycles In Real Spending
As a final point, Chart 7 underscores a sobering fact: The U.S. has only seen two instances of a 3% or greater average annual rise in household debt-to-GDP over the course of a decade: the first was in the 1920s, and the second was from 1998 to 2007. Clearly, in both cases the rise in debt ended very poorly for the U.S. economy. This, along with the prevalence of serious debt crises following credit binges similar in magnitude to Canada's experience, makes it clear that a credit-driven downturn in spending is a highly probable event for the Canadian economy over the long run, rather than a risk. Bottom Line: The available historical evidence suggests that the substantial leveraging of Canadian households that has already occurred will ultimately cause a serious credit-driven downturn. Debunking Some Housing Market Myths: It's Worse Than You Think Chart 816 Years Of Too-Easy Money
16 Years Of Too-Easy Money
16 Years Of Too-Easy Money
The risk that the Bank of Canada will eventually "over-tighten" is magnified by the fact that there is still an ongoing debate within Canada about whether any housing market imbalances even exist. Many market participants still employ several arguments about the Canadian housing market that, at first blush, appear to mitigate the risk of serious long-term consequences of Canada's debt boom. But these arguments are flawed, and an in-depth review of these fallacies highlights the economic risk of higher interest rates. Myth #1 - Sustainable Demand And Affordability The first myth about Canada's housing market is that the rise in house prices and household debt is sustainable because of how long the boom has lasted without consequence. However, besides the ominous historical experience highlighted in Charts 6 and 7 above, Chart 8 makes it clear that the substantial build-up in Canadian household debt since 2000 has occurred primarily due to too-easy monetary policy, rather than legitimate housing market fundamentals. The chart presents Canadian household debt-to-GDP versus the Bank of Canada's target for the overnight rate. The dotted line in panel 2 is a Canadian version of the well-known Taylor rule of monetary policy, with panel 3 showing the difference between the actual policy rate and that prescribed by the rule. The chart shows that the rise in household debt-to-GDP began precisely when the policy rate fell below the Taylor rule, and that this gap has persisted for the past 16 years. We acknowledge that the Bank of Canada felt it was necessary to keep interest rates relatively low during the last economic cycle because of the persistent strength in the Canadian dollar (which acts to restrain exports). But whatever drag on growth that occurred from a strong currency was not large enough to prevent low interest rates from sparking an enormous rise in household leverage. Myth #2 - No Foreign Money Effect The second myth about the Canadian housing market is that there is no substantial effect on house prices from foreign money and that, by extension, foreign transaction taxes should be discouraged. To us, the issue is not the specific residency status of a particular buyer, but rather whether the housing market is being supported by an inflow of foreign capital. While data limitations make it difficult to prove with certainty that Canada has been struck with a tidal wave of capital from China (with Hong Kong acting as the conduit), Charts 9 and 10 show that the circumstantial evidence is overwhelming. The story that emerges from the charts is that the peak in Chinese real GDP growth in 2010 marked the beginning of significant capital outflow from the country, which appears to have moved through Hong Kong, and was perhaps accelerated by Xi Jinping's crackdown on cronyism that began in 2013. Panel 2 of Chart 9 shows that the average absolute value of Hong Kong's "net errors and omissions" line from the balance of payments spiked after mid-2010,2 as did Canada's "other investment liabilities" with a lag. Chart 10 shows that this period also saw a sharp rise in visitor arrivals to Canada from China and Hong Kong, a rise in the share of Canadian bank loans to nonresidents, and a meteoric rise in house prices in Vancouver and Toronto. Chart 11 presents data from Global Financial Integrity, a Washington-based think tank that tracks illicit financial flows globally. While the data is only available with a lag, the chart shows that GFI's estimate of illicit financial outflows from China has risen significantly following the global financial crisis, which is consistent with the narrative presented in Charts 9 and 10. Chart 9Very Strong Circumstantial Evidence...
Very Strong Circumstantial Evidence...
Very Strong Circumstantial Evidence...
Chart 10...Of Foreign Capital Inflows
...Of Foreign Capital Inflows
...Of Foreign Capital Inflows
Chart 11Clear Evidence Of Chinese Capital Flight
Clear Evidence Of Chinese Capital Flight
Clear Evidence Of Chinese Capital Flight
Myth #3 - Tight Supply The third myth concerning Canadian housing is the argument that housing supply is tight, which justifies the exponential move in house prices. First, it should be noted that while residential investment as a share of GDP was indeed low in the late-1990s, it rose back to its long-term average within the first three years of the housing boom, and has recently risen to a 27-year high (Chart 12). A similar trend can be observed in housing starts and the number of unsold housing inventories. As such, it seems difficult to make the case that the extraordinary rise in house prices and household debt that we have observed over the past 16 years is ultimately due to scarce housing supply. Chart 13 makes this point more saliently, by presenting a scatterplot of the median house price-to-income ratio versus the population density of several major global markets. Ultimately, in any true market economy, genuine housing supply constraints must be related to high density or else there would be ample room to build additional housing units. Two points are noteworthy: Chart 12There Is No Supply Problem
There Is No Supply Problem
There Is No Supply Problem
Chart 13'There's Nowhere To Build!': Yeah, Right!
Canada: A (Probably) Happy Moment In An Otherwise Sad Story
Canada: A (Probably) Happy Moment In An Otherwise Sad Story
The median house price-to-income ratio for Toronto and Vancouver deviate enormously from the level that would be implied by their density given the relationship across global housing markets. Based purely on this analysis of relative density, Toronto and Vancouver house prices are 80% and 140% overvalued, respectively. Around the globe, the housing markets that appear to be the most overvalued relative to population density appear to be the geographically closest to China (Vancouver, Australia, Hong Kong, and the West Coast of the U.S.), which echoes our conclusions about foreign capital inflow above. Myth #4 - A Healthier Canadian Household Debt Distribution The fourth myth concerning Canadian housing is the idea that the household debt binge that we have observed has been a "healthier" rise than what occurred in the U.S. during the last economic cycle. The argument is that the rise in debt in the U.S. from 2001 - 2007 predominantly occurred among "subprime" borrowers, and that this is not occurring in Canada. Comparing Canada to the U.S. last cycle is difficult due to the lack of data on the distribution of Canadian household debt-to-income ratios by income percentile. However, some inferences can be drawn from the OECD's wealth distribution database, and they suggest that Canadian household debt is, in fact, quite concentrated. Chart 14 presents the relationship between the number of households with debt and the median debt-to-income ratio of indebted households, from 2010 to 2012 (depending on the observation). The chart shows that while only about half of Canadian households are indebted (in line with the average of the countries shown and below that of the U.S.), among those with debt the median debt-to-income ratio is substantially higher than most other countries. This is also reflected in Chart 15, which shows that Canada has a high rank of significantly indebted households as a share of all indebted households,3 more so that the U.S. Investors should note that Canada's rank today is likely to be higher than that shown in Chart 15, given that several other highly indebted countries (such as the Netherlands and Portugal) have actually experienced household deleveraging since 2010. Chart 14High Concentration...
Canada: A (Probably) Happy Moment In An Otherwise Sad Story
Canada: A (Probably) Happy Moment In An Otherwise Sad Story
Chart 15...Of Household Indebtedness
Canada: A (Probably) Happy Moment In An Otherwise Sad Story
Canada: A (Probably) Happy Moment In An Otherwise Sad Story
Myth #5 - The "CMHC Backstop" The fifth and final myth concerning Canadian housing is the fact that the economy is not significantly exposed to a housing market downturn because of the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation's mortgage insurance coverage protects Canadian banks. It is true that the CMHC can act as a backstop for the economy by helping to mitigate mortgage default losses. But Chart 16 highlights that there have been some substantial changes over the past few years in the CMHC's footprint in the mortgage market that casts significant doubt on whether it would be able to materially blunt the losses that are likely to occur from systemic mortgage defaults. First, the chart shows that while half of mortgages in Canada had CMHC insurance coverage in 2010, this has fallen by 14 percentage points in just six years (to 36%). This means that almost 2/3rds of Canadian mortgages are not CMHC-insured. Second, while the CMHC has been aggressive in building equity over the past several years (perhaps in anticipation of a significant housing bust!), this equity buffer is still small relative to its total loans (9%) and is fractional as a share of total Canadian residential mortgage credit (1.5%). As such, while we agree that the CMHC is an effective backstop against idiosyncratic risk in the mortgage market, it is simply too small to act as a credible buffer against large-scale losses. Bottom Line: Several myths about Canada's housing market have obscured the true extent of its credit market imbalances, heightening the risk that policymakers will ultimately overplay their hand when tightening monetary conditions. When Will The Party Come To An End? From our perspective, the most likely catalysts for a credit-driven downturn in spending are a reversal of the factors that drove the rise in household debt in the first place. Chart 17 presents a three-phase view of the rise in household debt-to-income since 2000, and summarizes the major drivers of rising leverage in each phase given our analysis above: persistently easy monetary policy (phase I), fiscal and monetary easing (phase II), and foreign capital inflow (phase III). Given this, higher interest rates, fiscal drag, and/or a shock to foreign capital would appear to be the most likely triggers for a credit-driven downturn: Chart 16A Substantially Lower CMHC Footprint
A Substantially Lower CMHC Footprint
A Substantially Lower CMHC Footprint
Chart 17The Major Drivers Of Rising Household Leverage
The Major Drivers Of Rising Household Leverage
The Major Drivers Of Rising Household Leverage
Higher Interest Rates: Tighter monetary policy is an obvious (and most likely) trigger for a major reversal in the Canadian housing market. It is not yet clear how aggressively the Bank of Canada will raise interest rates over the coming 6-12 months, but Chart 18 highlights that the household debt service ratio will quickly rise to a new high even if the Bank of Canada hikes rates by 150 bps over a two-year period, owing to the relatively short maturity of Canadian mortgage contract terms. Still, the chart shows that this does not occur until mid-2019 at the earliest. Fiscal Drag: IMF forecasts for Canada's cyclically-adjusted primary balance suggest that government spending and investment will remain a positive contributor to growth into next year (Chart 19). But beginning in 2019, fiscal policy is forecast to become a persistent drag on growth, and it is even possible that the sharp deceleration in fiscal thrust set to occur next year could act as the proximate cause of serious problems in the Canadian housing market. Chart 18Not An Imminent Threat, But Watch Out
Not An Imminent Threat, But Watch Out
Not An Imminent Threat, But Watch Out
Chart 19Fiscal Drag Set To Begin In 2019
Fiscal Drag Set To Begin In 2019
Fiscal Drag Set To Begin In 2019
Chart 20Macroprudential Measures Didn't Kill The Vancouver Housing Market
Macroprudential Measures Didn't Kill The Vancouver Housing Market
Macroprudential Measures Didn't Kill The Vancouver Housing Market
A Domestically-Driven Shock To Foreign Capital Inflow: Some investors have pointed with concern to dramatic declines in the sales-to-listings ratios in Vancouver and Toronto following foreign taxation announcements in these markets. We agree that the impact of new or existing macroprudential measures may eventually cause a severe fallout in the housing market, but for now the experience of Vancouver suggests that such an event is not imminent. Chart 20 presents the 3- and 12-month rate of change in Vancouver house prices, with the vertical line denoting the announcement of the foreign transaction tax. While it is clear that the tax sharply slowed the rate of appreciation in Vancouver house prices, it did not cause an outright decline (the 3-month rate of change only briefly turned negative before returning to positive territory). Cyclically, we would become more concerned were we to observe a combination of additional restrictions on foreign capital inflow, higher minimum down payment thresholds for houses priced at or below median levels, and a significantly lower allowable gross/total debt service ratio. An Externally-Driven Shock To Foreign Capital Inflow: We noted earlier in the report that there is strong circumstantial evidence showing that Canada's property market is benefiting from large capital inflows from China, with Hong Kong acting as the conduit. Given this, the Canadian housing market could be subject to a shock from exogenous changes in the flow of this capital, perhaps triggered by cyclical changes in China's economy or, more likely, actions by Chinese policymakers to materially slow the pace of capital flight. While it is very difficult on a high frequency basis to track whether the impact of foreign capital on Canada's housing market is growing or weakening, the indicators shown in Charts 9 and 10 on page 9 form the basis of our monitoring effort. The list above has focused on potential triggers that are specific to the factors that led to the build-up in Canadian household debt. Clearly there are additional macro factors that could trigger the onset of a major debt payback period in Canada, and chief among these would be the next U.S. or global recession. For example, we recently noted how continued tightening from the Fed could set the stage for a U.S. recession in 2019, which could easily trigger either a prolonged period of stagnant Canadian growth or an active deleveraging event.4 Bottom Line: There are multiple potential triggers that could eventually spark a credit-driven downturn in Canada, but none of them seem likely to have a major impact on the economy over the coming 6-12 months. Investment Implications Canadian household leverage has risen enormously over the past 16 years, and a detailed analysis of Canada's housing market shows that an eventual credit-driven downturn in spending is a highly probable event for the Canadian economy over the long run (rather than a risk). However, among the most probable triggers for a serious housing market shock, only higher interest rates are set to occur over the coming year. Given that monetary tightening will be gradual in its pace, it does not seem probable that a major downturn in spending is imminent. From an investment standpoint, these conclusions imply the following stance towards Canadian dollar assets over the coming 6-12 months: Overweight the Canadian dollar: The cyclical improvement in the Canadian economy, along with our bullish view on oil prices, suggests that the Canadian dollar is set to appreciate over the coming year. We acknowledge that our constructive view on oil prices is contrarian and that, for now, we are ahead of the market. Continued weakness in oil prices remains the chief risk to a bullish stance on the CAD. But our detailed analysis of the global oil market strongly implies that the current level of oil inventories is too high and is set to draw materially over the coming months, which will be undoubtedly positive for oil prices barring the development of a major global demand shock. Maintain Canadian equities on upgrade watch: Canadian equities have materially underperformed their global peers over the past six years, due to fairly significant de-rating from overvalued levels as well as a downtrend in relative 12-month forward earnings (mostly vs the U.S.; Chart 21). Relative performance in common-currency terms has also been hurt by a declining Canadian dollar. Looking out over the next year, there are at least some tentative signs to be optimistic about Canadian stocks. First, Chart 22 highlights that Canadian stocks are now moderately cheap relative to their global peers based on a composite valuation indicator. Second, our expectation of an uptrend in oil prices would likely bolster relative forward earnings, and could act as a re-rating catalyst for the broad market. Chart 21Multiples And Earnings Have Worked Against Canadian Stocks
Multiples And Earnings Have Worked Against Canadian Stocks
Multiples And Earnings Have Worked Against Canadian Stocks
Chart 22No Longer Expensive
No Longer Expensive
No Longer Expensive
Underweight Canadian bonds within a hedged global fixed-income portfolio: Canadian government bonds have recently underperformed their global peers, and this trend is likely to continue in response to tighter monetary policy. Over the longer term, the likelihood of a major credit-driven downturn in spending means that the secular investment implications for Canada are precisely the opposite of that described above. This means that investors should pursue a "two-staged" approach to investing in Canadian assets. The fact that the Canadian economy is currently accelerating and a significant reversal in the Canadian housing market does not seem to be imminent means that there is an opportunity for Canadian assets to potentially outperform (or underperform in the case of government bonds) over the coming 6-12 months. Such a period of cyclical improvement would likely (temporarily) dampen investor concerns about a major housing market correction, creating much better "selling conditions" for Canadian risky assets than from current levels. We acknowledge that the "two-stage" nature of this strategy is nuanced, and we have provided a checklist of potential triggers for the housing market in this report so that investors can gauge the likelihood that a material payback period is about to begin. We will continue to monitor both the cyclical improvement in the Canadian economy and the magnitude of imbalances in the household sector, and will provide investors with regular updates as they develop. Stay tuned! Bottom Line: Investors should pursue a "two-staged" approach when allocating to Canadian assets. Favor a pro-cyclical stance over the coming 6-12 months, but look to shift to a bearish structural view at some point beyond the immediate investment horizon. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com Appendix A A Quick Recap Of Home Capital: Not A Systemic Issue In April, the share price of Home Capital Group (a Canadian non-bank mortgage lender) collapsed by 75% in response to a major liquidity crisis for the firm. The crisis ultimately stemmed from a set of mortgage loans with falsified income documentation, which to many outside observers was strongly reminiscent of the aberrant practices of U.S. subprime lending institutions during the last cycle that eventually spawned the global financial crisis. However, as highlighted below, Home Capital Group's problems were largely idiosyncratic (i.e., not systemic) in nature: Home Capital's business model involves lending to Canadians who lack a stable credit history, but who are generally otherwise creditworthy (commonly referred to as "near-prime" borrowers). Since these borrowers subsequently build a credit history by staying current on their mortgage loans with Home Capital, they often switch to a big-five bank after the term of the loan is complete. As such, Home Capital faces substantial client retention challenges, which is an idiosyncratic income statement problem rather than a balance sheet problem with systemic implications. To combat the tendency of its loan book to shrink, in 2014 Home Capital increased the size of its sales force by partnering with a set of established mortgage brokers. Some of the loans that had been originated by these brokers had falsified income documentation, which led to an internal investigation. Following the investigation, the company failed to disclose the results to investors during a period where the company's operating performance was impacted by the fraud. This eventually led to enforcement action from the Ontario Securities Commission. The disclosure of enforcement, along with several other events (such as the termination of its CEO in late-March) severely eroded investor confidence in the firm and essentially caused a bank run. From a macro perspective, there are two important takeaways from this series of events. First, it is important to note that Home Capital experienced a liquidity rather than a solvency crisis. While the former can, of course, lead to the latter, the run on Home Capital did not occur because of deteriorating loan performance, unlike what occurred in the U.S. with the subprime market. Indeed, Home Capital's first quarter results show that net impaired loans as a percent of gross loans have continued to trend lower over the past several quarters (Chart A1). Second, the fact that Home Capital's mortgage book tends to shrink underscores the underlying creditworthiness of at least some of its borrowers, because these households would probably not be able to shift their mortgages to the big-five banks if loan qualification was an issue. As a final point, Chart A2 presents some perspective about the apparent prevalence of mortgage fraud in Canada by showing the number of U.S. mortgage loan fraud suspicious activity reports (SARs) in the lead-up to the subprime financial crisis. The chart not only shows the sharp rise in the number of SARs from 2002-2003 to 2007-2008, but it also shows that the volume of reports numbered in the tens of thousands. By contrast, Canadian news stories reporting on a rise in the number of mortgage fraud complaints in Canada quote a trivially small number of cases. For example, a recent article from the Vancouver Sun stated that British Colombia's Financial Institutions Commission statistics "show complaints roughly doubled from 109 in 2013 to about 200 in 2016, and about a third of complaints allege loan application fraud."5 Chart A1No Deterioration In Loan Performance
Canada: A (Probably) Happy Moment In An Otherwise Sad Story
Canada: A (Probably) Happy Moment In An Otherwise Sad Story
Chart A2No Evidence That This Is Happening In Canada
Canada: A (Probably) Happy Moment In An Otherwise Sad Story
Canada: A (Probably) Happy Moment In An Otherwise Sad Story
While it is technically correct to state that this is a doubling in the rate of fraud cases, it is from what appears to be an extremely small base. Adjusting by a factor of 10 to account for the difference in population, Canada would need to see 3,000-to-6,000 cases of mortgage fraud per year in order to be comparable to what occurred in the U.S. in the latter half of the housing market bubble. There is simply no evidence that mortgage fraud on this scale of magnitude is occurring. 1 See Appendix A on page 19 for a review of the Home Capital debacle and why concerns of systemic mortgage fraud are quite likely overblown. 2 If Hong Kong has been a conduit for capital flight from China, the flow of capital would only temporarily show up in Hong Kong's balance of payments. For example, one quarter of significant capital inflow might be followed by a quarter of significant capital outflow as the money enters from China and exits towards the rest of the world. As such, we use the absolute value of Hong Kong's net errors and omissions line to see whether the magnitude of the flow has increased. 3 Defined as having a debt-to-income ratio in excess of 3. 4 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Timing Of The Next Recession," dated June 16, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Sam Cooper, "Regulator Tracks The Rise In Mortgage Fraud Complaints In B.C. As House Prices Jump," Vancouver Sun, June 19, 2017. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Highlights Rising equity prices, low and falling bond yields and stable credit spreads are all consistent with today's low growth and inflation backdrop, where the Fed can take its time raising rates. The FOMC is looking through the inflation shortfall for now and is sticking with its rate hike plan. Lower oil prices are the key driver of plunging market-based inflation expectations. We expect the Fed to begin to trim its balance sheet later this year, and be a modest negative for Treasury prices. The latest readings on the health of household balance sheet from the Fed's flow of funds accounts reinforce our view that the consumer sector will provide solid support for the U.S. economy through 2017; the student loan debt situation is not a source of financial systemic risk. Feature We first outlined our view that U.S. assets were in a policy sweet spot back in September 2016, noting that the monetary policy sweet spot won't end for risk assets until interest rates climb above the equilibrium rate. Nine months later, policy remains in the sweet spot, thanks to a beneficial combination of moderate economic growth, healthy corporate profit growth, stable margins and low inflation. Last week's CPI report was disconcerting, but did reinforce the notion that the Fed can take its time. Thus, when investors ask: "How can equity prices and bond prices both be moving higher?" Our answer is: "Because we are still in the sweet spot." Low And Slow Wins The Day Investors are wondering how the equity market can hold up given that the bond market and the dollar appear to be signaling sluggish economic growth. We look at it another way. Rising equity prices, low and falling bond yields and stable credit spreads are all consistent with today's low growth and inflation backdrop, where the Fed can take its time raising rates. The FOMC reaffirmed its intended path for rates at last week's meeting (see below). If the Fed's modest forecasts for growth and inflation are met, the central bank will raise rates gradually and begin to shrink its balance sheet. The implication for investors is that the recent outperformance of stocks over bonds accompanied by positive correlations between the two can persist for some time. Lessons from the 1950s and 1990s are helpful in illustrating this point. During the 1950s (Chart 1A, the Fed was gradually raising rates, but inflation and long rates remained low. Even as rates edged higher, stocks outperformed bonds, despite a booming economy that was near full employment. In the 1990s, long bond yields fell even as equity prices surged. Inflation was well contained for most of that decade (Chart 1B). Chart 1ABond Yields, Stocks, Inflation And The Fed In The 1950s...
Bond Yields, Stocks, Inflation And The Fed In The 1950s...
Bond Yields, Stocks, Inflation And The Fed In The 1950s...
Chart 1B...And In The 1990s
...And In The 1990s
...And In The 1990s
At what point will bond market become a problem for stocks? Charts 2 and 3 show that low inflation and low rates are both critical to keeping stock and bond yields positively correlated. The 4.25% level on the 10-year Treasury is a critical level to watch based on the historical relationship between Treasury yields and stock-bond correlations. However, the reason for rising bond yields is as important as the level of yields. An increase in long-dated Treasury yields associated with a pickup in real growth is less of a threat to equities than a rise in yields due to an uptick in inflation, because the latter invites a more aggressive Fed tightening cycle.
Chart 2
Chart 3
Chart 3 shows that core inflation around or below 2% supports a positive correlation between stock and bond yields. As inflation begins to move from 2 to 3%, the relationship fluctuates, and above 3% there are very few periods of positive correlation. All signs point to a depressed inflation environment over the next year, which is one of the keys to keeping bond yields and stock prices positively correlated. We expect core CPI to move back up to 2% in the medium term, and the Fed agrees. The central bank's latest forecast puts inflation at just 2% for the next two years and in the long run. Bottom Line: Stocks can handle rising bond yields as long as higher yields are driven by better growth and not inflation. With inflation low and bonds yields at 2.15%, we are a long way from where bond yields become a problem for the stock market. FOMC: Sticking With The Roadmap For Now It was a wild ride in the Treasury market last week as bonds first rallied hard on the heels of some data releases, before selling off after the FOMC failed to deliver a fully "dovish hike". May retail sales were decent below the surface. The "control group" measure that feeds into the GDP figures was flat in May, but was revised up to a 0.6% gain in April (Chart 4). The result was a solid 4.3% annualized gain over the past three months. This suggests that, although not booming, consumer spending growth is solid in the second quarter. U.S. household balance sheets are in solid shape, as we highlight below. The FOMC was probably not swayed by this report. The CPI report was another story (Chart 5). The energy component pulled down the headline rate as expected, but the softening of inflation is widespread in the index. The annualized 3-month rate of change in the core rate fell virtually to zero in May. Disinflation can be seen in areas that have little to do with the output gap, such as shelter and medical care. But it is also showing up in other services, a segment of the CPI that is most highly correlated with wage growth and labor market pressure. The sudden broad-based change in direction is difficult to explain and, at a minimum, presents a challenge to the view that the U.S. economy is approaching its non-inflationary limits. Chart 4Consumer Spending##BR##Remains Solid
Consumer Spending Remains Solid
Consumer Spending Remains Solid
Chart 5Disinflation In Core Services##BR##Is A Challenge To Fed's View
Disinflation In Core Services Is A Challenge to Fed's View
Disinflation In Core Services Is A Challenge to Fed's View
Bonds rallied heading into the FOMC meeting on the view that the Fed would deliver a rate hike as promised, but would revise down the "dot plot" or, at a minimum, would play up concerns about the inflation undershoot. In the event, the Fed did neither. Chart 6Labor Market Continues To Tighten
Labor Market Continues To Tighten
Labor Market Continues To Tighten
The statement acknowledged the disappointing inflation readings, but also revealed a determination to normalize interest rates in the face of a tight labor market. In the press conference, Chair Yellen downplayed the inflation shortfall, pointing to some one-off factors. She stressed that the FOMC makes policy for the "medium term," and should not over-react to short-term wiggles in the data. Given the tight labor market, the Fed Chair argued that the conditions are in place for inflation to move higher. Indeed, the median FOMC forecast for headline and core inflation was revised down for this year only; the outlook for 2018 and 2019 was left unchanged at 2%. Growth was revised up a little for 2017. We agree with the FOMC that the labor market is tight enough to gradually push up inflation. The underlying trend in wage growth has accelerated from 1.2% in 2010 to 2.4% today according to our wage tracker, in line with the narrowing of the unemployment gap over the period (Chart 6). The FOMC trimmed its estimate of the full-employment level of unemployment by 0.1 percentage points to 4.6%, but it revised down its forecast for the actual unemployment rate by a larger 0.3 percentage points over the next two years. This means that the projected amount of excess labor demand is now greater than in the March projection. By itself, this should make the FOMC more predisposed to tightening, especially since financial conditions have been easing. That said, the May CPI report was admittedly disconcerting due to the broad-based nature of the disinflationary pulse. This is contrary to Chair Yellen's assertion that the inflation disappointment reflects one-off factors. The May CPI report could be a head-fake, related to normal randomness in the data. But it is not clear why there would be a sudden and widespread moderation of inflation. Inflation Expectations Plunge A large portion of the decline in long-term Treasury yields since March reflected a decline in inflation expectations. The 10-year CPI swap rate has dropped by 35 basis points over the period. BCA's fixed-income strategists point out that the decline in long-term inflation expectations has been widespread across the major countries, irrespective of whether or not actual inflation is trending up or down.1 Given all these diverging signals within the national inflation data, it is odd that there has been such a uniform decline in inflation expectations across the major bond markets. That leads us to look to the oil price decline as the main driver. Weaker energy prices have been part of a broader move lower in commodity prices that is likely related to less reflationary monetary and fiscal policies out of the world's biggest commodity consumer, China. However, our commodity strategists have noted that export and import volumes in the emerging economies accelerated sharply in the first quarter of 2017. Given that there is a strong correlation between trade volumes and oil demand in the emerging markets, this bodes well for a rebound in global oil demand. Combined with the "OPEC 2.0" production cuts, the demand-supply balance in world oil markets is likely to turn positive in the months ahead, which will allow oil prices to return to a range close to $60/bbl by year-end. A move in oil prices back to that level would help arrest the downturn in overall commodity price indices, and stabilize goods CPI inflation in the developed economies in the latter half of 2017. This should also boost global inflation expectations and bond yields, especially since inflation expectations have fallen too far relative to underlying non-energy inflation pressures. This forecast also applies to the U.S. bond market, although one cannot blame the deceleration in inflation entirely on energy in this case. We expect inflation to move higher in line with the tight labor market, but we may have to change our view if service sector inflation continues to move lower in the next few of months. Balance Sheet News Chart 7Main Risk To Bond Yields Is To The Upside
Main Risk To Bond Yields Is To The Upside
Main Risk To Bond Yields Is To The Upside
The Fed also provided some details on plans to shrink the balance sheet in terms of the size of the monthly "run off". If the economy evolves as the Fed expects, the balance sheet will start to shrink later this year. Reducing the Fed's balance sheet will be negative for Treasury prices as we argued in the May 22, 2017 Weekly Report, but the impact of this adjustment on its own will be modest. As the FOMC dials back monetary stimulus it will be concerned with overall monetary conditions, including short-term rates, long-term rates and the dollar. If long-term rates and/or the dollar rise too quickly, policymakers will moderate the pace of rate hikes and use forward guidance to talk down the long end of the curve so as to avoid allowing financial conditions get too tight, too quickly (i.e. the term premium would rise, but would be partly offset by a lower expected path for the fed funds rate). Thus, the path of short-term rates is dependent on the dollar and the reaction of the long end of the curve. The bottom line is that the FOMC is looking-through the inflation shortfall for now and is sticking with its rate hike plan. The evolution of inflation in the coming months will obviously be key. Nonetheless, given that only one more rate hike is expected over the next year, inflation expectations are back to U.S. pre-election levels, and that the 10-year U.S. term premium is well below zero again, it appears that the main risk for bond yields is to the upside (Chart 7). The equity market should benefit in the short-term to the extent that market expectations for a flatter rate hike cycle are driven by lower inflation expectations, rather than a slower growth outlook. If we are correct that inflation expectations will bounce later this year, the associated bond sell-off may present a small headwind for stocks. Nonetheless, we do not believe this will derail the rally in risk assets until inflation has reached the Fed's 2% target, and bond yields and the dollar are significantly higher. The Consumer Comeback Continues The latest readings on the health of household balance sheet from the Fed's flow of funds accounts reinforce our view that the consumer sector will provide solid support for the U.S. economy through 2017 and beyond. Household net worth continues to rise and is well above average at this point in a long expansion (Chart 8). While the total wealth effect for consumer spending is lagging behind prior cycles, it remains supportive. Debt to income ratios are at multi-decade lows. The result of the ongoing balance sheet repair is that FICO scores have hit an all time high (Chart 8, panel 4). The most recent Fed Senior Loan Officer's Survey also suggests that the banking sector is willing to lend to households and that consumers themselves are open to borrowing, although household demand for loans has weakened in recent quarters (Chart 9). Chart 8Support For Consumer Remains In Place
Support For Consumer Remains In Place
Support For Consumer Remains In Place
Chart 9Senior Loan Officers Survey Still Supportive
Senior Loan Officers Survey Still Supportive
Senior Loan Officers Survey Still Supportive
Consumer spending intentions also remain in an uptrend, and while consumers do not always do what they say, the 10-year high readings on "plans to buy" a house and a car are telling. (Chart 10, panels 1 and 2). Overall measures of consumer confidence also remain at 16 year highs (Chart 10, panel 3). Chart 10Consumers Are In A Good Mood
Consumers Are in A Good Mood
Consumers Are in A Good Mood
The sturdy labor market, modest wage growth, and low inflation are all factors that support a solid pace of real income growth, adding another support to the spending backdrop (Chart 10, panel 4). Rising rates do not pose a threat to spending for two main reasons, at least in the early stages of the Fed tightening cycle. First, we expect Fed rate hikes to be gradual this year and next, putting only modest upward pressure on longer-dated Treasury yields that anchor consumer loan rates for mortgages, autos, and personal loans. Our colleagues in The Bank Credit Analyst concluded that household interest payment burdens will rise only modestly, and from a low level, in the next couple of years even if borrowing rates increase immediately by 100bps for today's levels. According to their analysis, it would require a much more significant shock, i.e. 300bps or greater, to move interest payments as a share of GDP back toward historical averages.2 We continue to receive many questions from clients on the risks posed by the rise in student debt levels. The Bank Credit Analyst publication covered the topic in a comprehensive report back in November 2016.3 The key takeaway from that report for investors was that student debt is a modest drag for economic growth, but is not a source of risk for U.S. government finances and does not represent the next subprime crisis. More than half a year later, our conclusions remain the same, though the concern among investors has not abated. A recent report4 by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York provides some data on student loans through Q1 2017. More specifically, the report noted that student debt levels continued to rise in Q4 2016 and Q1 2017, and that student loan delinquencies remain high by historical standards but moved sideways in recent years. We will continue to monitor the student loan and all other forms of consumer indebtedness as we assess the risks in the U.S. economy. However, the elevated level of student loan delinquencies does not change our overall assessment of the impact of student loans on the economy and the financial system. Student loans are only a mild economic headwind, and do not represent a source of financial systemic risk. Bottom Line: The consumer - a key driver of the U.S. economy and corporate earnings - will provide a solid backdrop for the economy through 2017 and beyond. This climate will allow the Fed to raise rates one more time this year and begin to pare its balance sheet. The solid underpinnings for the consumer will sustain corporate earnings growth and, ultimately, higher stock prices. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report "Alternative Facts In The Bond Market," dated June 13, 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report "Global Debt Titanic Collides With Fed Iceberg?," dated February 2017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report "Student Loan Blues: Can't Replay What I Borrowed," dated October 2016, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see "Quarterly Report On Household Debt And Credit", dated May 2017, available at https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/interactives/householdcredit/data/pdf/HHDC_2017Q1.pdf
Highlights Monetary Policy: The Fed will deliver two rate hikes between now and the end of the year and will also begin the process of winding down its balance sheet. The market is only priced for 36 bps of rate hikes this year. Maintain below-benchmark duration. Economy: Weakness in Q1 GDP was concentrated in consumer spending and inventories. Both of these components are likely to strengthen in the months ahead. Inflation: The Fed is content to rely on Phillips Curve inflation forecasts, and does not need to see actual inflation rise in order to lift rates. However, if inflation does not rebound as expected, the Fed will become increasingly concerned about falling inflation expectations and could adopt a more dovish reaction function later this summer. We think inflation will be strong enough to avoid this outcome. Financial Conditions: The Fed strongly believes that financial conditions lead economic growth. Absent any major changes in the economic data, the pace of rate hikes will be determined by the Fed's targeting of financial conditions. Feature The market-implied probability of a June rate hike jumped sharply during the past two weeks (Chart 1), and stood at 81% as of last Friday's close. In all likelihood the fourth rate hike of the cycle, and the third in the past six months, will occur at the next FOMC meeting on June 14. In our view, the Fed will deliver two 25 basis point rate hikes between now and the end of the year and will also begin the process of winding down its balance sheet (see Box). With the market only priced for 36 bps of rate hikes during that timeframe, we continue to advocate a below-benchmark duration stance. Chart 1Still On For June
Still On For June
Still On For June
The minutes from the May FOMC meeting, released last week, suggest that most Fed policymakers still maintain a forecast for two more hikes this year. The minutes also provide some useful insight about how FOMC participants think about the economy and what developments could cause their forecasts to change. This week we take a look at what the Fed believes, and consider whether those beliefs are well founded. Box Balance Sheet Strategy Revealed We wrote about the potential impact of the Fed’s balance sheet policy in last week’s report (please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Two Challenges For U.S. Policymakers”, dated May 23, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com), but provide a brief update this week because of new information gained from the May FOMC minutes. Previously, it was unknown whether the Fed would cease the reinvestment of its securities holdings all at once, or whether it would “taper” the reinvestment by gradually increasing the amount of securities it allowed to run off. We now know that “nearly all policymakers expressed a favorable view” of a tapering strategy where the Fed will set a series of gradually increasing caps on the total amount of securities it allows to run off its balance sheet. The plan calls for the caps to be raised every three months, according to a schedule that will be set in advance. The only reason for this plan to not function smoothly would be if market participants start to view the reinvestment caps as an additional policy tool that the Fed will vary according to economic conditions. This would risk taking the focus off the fed funds rate as the main policy tool, and would make it difficult for the market to interpret the overall stance of monetary policy. The minutes show that the Fed plans to avoid this messy outcome by setting a fixed schedule for changing the reinvestment caps. If the market believes that the Fed will stick to this schedule, then the plan should work fine. The May minutes also showed that “nearly all policymakers” thought that it would be appropriate to begin the reinvestment process this year, as long as economic conditions do not deteriorate. While we still lack some important details, such as the Fed’s target for the ultimate level of reserves in the banking system, we now think it is very likely that these details will emerge at either the June or September FOMC meeting and that balance sheet run off will begin following either the September or December meeting. What The Fed Believes: Weak Q1 Growth Is Transitory Although the incoming data showed that aggregate spending in the first quarter had been weaker than participants had expected, they viewed the slowing as likely to be transitory.1 Even after last week's slight upward revision, at 1.2%, first quarter GDP growth came in well below its post-crisis average (Chart 2). However, a quick look at the major components of GDP reveals that the weakness was concentrated in consumer spending and the change in private inventories (Chart 2, bottom two panels). Growth contributions from residential and non-residential investment were actually considerably above their post-crisis averages, and the contributions from net exports and government spending were in-line with theirs (Chart 3). Chart 2The Consumer Was A Drag In Q1
The Consumer Was A Drag In Q1
The Consumer Was A Drag In Q1
Chart 3Investment Is A Bright Spot
Investment Is A Bright Spot
Investment Is A Bright Spot
We know from history that large changes in inventories tend to mean-revert fairly quickly. In fact, we can model the inventory component of GDP growth based on the lagged change in inventories and the Backlog of Orders component of the ISM Manufacturing survey (Chart 4). Both of these factors suggest that inventories will bounce back strongly next quarter. In fact, the ISM survey shows the largest backlog of manufacturing orders since 2014. Likewise, weakness in consumer spending is unlikely to persist. The fundamental drivers of consumer spending all continue to paint a positive picture (Chart 5). Chart 4Big Backlog Of Orders
Big Backlog Of Orders
Big Backlog Of Orders
Chart 5Consumer Spending Drivers: Part I
Consumer Spending Drivers: Part I
Consumer Spending Drivers: Part I
Consumer confidence has hardly given back any of its post-election gains (Chart 5, panel 1). Personal income growth is already on the upswing, and income expectations point to further acceleration (Chart 5, panel 2). Employment is still growing at a reasonably robust pace, and the mild slowdown since early 2015 has been offset by stronger wage growth (Chart 5, bottom panel). Longer-run drivers of consumer spending are also solid. Households continue to accumulate wealth, and household leverage has returned to late 1990s levels. In other words, household balance sheets are the healthiest they have been since prior to the housing bubble (Chart 6). More broadly, indicators of overall GDP growth are also pointing toward an acceleration (Chart 7). The ISM Non-Manufacturing index increased to 57.5 in April from 55.2 in March, and the BCA Beige Book Monitor - an indicator based on the occurrence of certain keywords in the Fed's Beige Book2 - has gone vertical. It would be unusual for GDP growth to diverge from these two indicators for a prolonged period of time. Chart 6Consumer Spending Drivers: Part II
Consumer Spending Drivers: Part II
Consumer Spending Drivers: Part II
Chart 7Overall Growth Indicators
Overall Growth Indicators
Overall Growth Indicators
Bottom Line: Weakness in Q1 GDP was concentrated in consumer spending and inventories. Both of these components are likely to strengthen in the months ahead. The Fed is probably correct that weak Q1 growth will prove transitory. Recent Weak Inflation Readings Are Also Transitory Overall, most participants viewed the recent softer inflation data as primarily reflecting transitory factors, but a few expressed concern that progress toward the Committee's objective may have slowed.3 We dealt with the inflation outlook in last week's report,4 through the lens of our Phillips Curve inflation model. To recap, using our model we found it very difficult to craft a realistic set of economic assumptions that resulted in year-over-year core PCE inflation below 1.88% by the end of the year. In our base case economic scenario the model projects that core inflation will reach 2.11%. Because our model is based on one that Janet Yellen referred to in a 2015 speech,5 we assumed that the Fed would reach a similar conclusion with regards to the inflation outlook. Although it must be said that the May FOMC meeting occurred prior to the disappointing April CPI release, it is notable that the minutes from the May meeting say that only "one member view[ed] further progress of inflation toward the 2 percent objective as necessary before taking another step to remove policy accommodation." In other words, almost all Fed members are content to rely on Phillips Curve style inflation models, which suggest that inflation will rise in the near future, and are putting less weight on the current low level of actual inflation. Of course, that dynamic could change relatively quickly. Chart 8 shows the track record of our Phillips Curve model, and we can see that it is not unusual for large residuals - on the order of 0.5% - to persist for significant periods of time. This means that even if all of our forecasts of the independent variables in the model turn out to be correct, there is still a chance that actual inflation will not keep pace with the model. In light of current circumstances, one period in particular stands out. The period from late-1993 to mid-1994, denoted by the shaded region in Chart 8. Chart 8The Fed Still Believes In The Phillips Curve
The Fed Still Believes In The Phillips Curve
The Fed Still Believes In The Phillips Curve
In that episode the fair value from our model suggested that inflation should trend higher. Instead, inflation fell quite sharply. Eventually the model's fair value also moved lower, driven by a declining contribution from the model's lagged inflation term,6 and also by falling inflation expectations. In our view, this latter point is particularly important. In 1993-94, the failure of inflation to keep pace with Phillips Curve forecasts eventually caused market participants to lose faith and revise their inflation expectations lower. In a worst case scenario, a large decline in inflation expectations can feed on itself, leading to a deflationary spiral from which the Fed would have difficulty escaping. Chart 9Inflation Expectations Are ##br##Tough To Measure
Inflation Expectations Are Tough To Measure
Inflation Expectations Are Tough To Measure
The Fed is very worried about falling (or more specifically "un-anchored") inflation expectations. In her aforementioned 2015 speech,7 Chair Yellen cautioned that temporary fluctuations in import prices or resource utilization could lead to permanent changes in inflation if they also caused inflation expectations to shift. Also, the longer the Fed misses its inflation target, the more likely it is that inflation expectations will become un-tethered. This is a very real risk. For now, the FOMC continues to view inflation expectations as well anchored, although the May minutes showed that "some participants" expressed concern that "the public's longer-term inflation expectations may have fallen somewhat." One problem is that there is no perfect way to measure inflation expectations (Chart 9). Market-based measures of inflation compensation are well below levels that have been consistent with the Fed's 2% inflation target in the past (Chart 9, panel 1), but these measures are volatile and are often driven by market-specific factors unrelated to inflation expectations. Meantime, the inflation expectations of professional forecasters have been quite stable (Chart 9, panel 2), while the message from consumer inflation expectations is mixed (Chart 9, bottom panel). The University of Michigan consumer survey shows inflation expectations near an all-time low, but the New York Fed's survey shows them in an uptrend. In any event, the strong correlation between consumer inflation expectations and gasoline prices makes them questionable at best. Bottom Line: The Fed is content to rely on Phillips Curve inflation forecasts, and does not need to see actual inflation rise in order to lift rates. However, if inflation does not rebound as expected, the Fed will become increasingly concerned about falling inflation expectations and could adopt a more dovish reaction function later this summer. We think inflation will be strong enough to avoid this outcome and that the Fed is still on track for two more rate hikes this year. Financial Conditions Are Crucial [Some participants] noted variously that the decline in longer-term interest rates and the modest depreciation of the dollar over the intermeeting period would provide some stimulus to aggregate demand, that the Committee's recent policy actions had not resulted in a tightening of financial conditions, or that some of the decline in longer-term yields reflected investors' perceptions of diminished odds of significant fiscal stimulus and an increase in some geopolitical and foreign political risks.8 The above passage shows that the Fed believes that financial conditions lead growth, a result we have also shown in prior reports (Chart 10).9 In this context, the Fed would expect financial conditions to tighten as it lifts rates, eventually causing economic growth to moderate. If financial conditions fail to tighten it would suggest that monetary policy needs to become more restrictive, and vice-versa. Financial conditions tightened dramatically following the December 2015 rate hike (Chart 11) and the ensuing growth slowdown caused the Fed to postpone the next rate hike for 12 months. Then, financial conditions were relatively unchanged following the December 2016 rate hike, and this allowed the Fed to deliver another hike in March. The large easing in financial conditions since the March hike is telling the Fed that it needs to step up its pace. Chart 10The Fed Believes That Financial Conditions Lead Growth
The Fed Believes That Financial Conditions Lead Growth
The Fed Believes That Financial Conditions Lead Growth
Chart 11A Big Easing Since March
A Big Easing Since March
A Big Easing Since March
Ultimately, the Fed still needs inflation to increase. This means that it does not want financial conditions to tighten too much, and would likely prefer to keep the Chicago Fed's Adjusted Financial Conditions index below the zero line (Chart 11, top panel). A negative reading from the adjusted index signals that financial conditions are easy relative to the strength of the economy. That is, they should be sufficiently accommodative to allow the economic recovery to continue and cause inflation to rise. At the same time, levels that are deep in accommodative territory signal that the Fed can move more rapidly. Bottom Line: The Fed strongly believes that financial conditions lead economic growth. Absent any major changes in the economic data, the pace of rate hikes will be determined by the Fed's targeting of financial conditions. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee May 2-3, 2017. https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20170503.pdf 2 For further details on the BCA Beige Book Monitor please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Great Debate Continues", dated April 17, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com 3 Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee May 2-3, 2017. https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20170503.pdf 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Two Challenges For U.S. Policymakers", dated May 23, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150924a.htm 6 One of the independent variables in our model is a 12-month lag of the year-over-year change in core PCE inflation. The lagged inflation variable pressures the model's fair value toward the level of actual inflation. If no other variables change, then over time the lagged inflation variable will ensure that the model fair value converges toward actual inflation. 7 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150924a.htm 8 Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee May 2-3, 2017. https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20170503.pdf 9 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Buy The Back-Up In Junk Spreads", dated March 14, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights Politics will inject further volatility into risk assets, but stocks will outperform bonds and cash on a 6-12 month horizon. The health of the economy and earnings matter more than Trump's political woes for investors and the Fed. The consumer - a key driver of the U.S. economy and corporate earnings - will provide a solid backdrop for the economy through 2017 and beyond. The combination of balance sheet shrinkage and Fed rate hikes will lead to higher bond yields than are currently discounted in the market. It is a different story for the mortgage market, where spreads will be biased to widen during Fed runoff. Feature The Economy Matters More Than Politics The health of the economy and earnings matter more than Trump's political woes for investors and the Fed. When the economy and earnings backdrop was favorable during presidential scandals in the 1920s and the 1990s, the equity markets performed well. In the early 70s, amid soaring inflation and the worst recession since the Great Depression, there was a bear market in equities (Chart 1). Today, the backdrop for the economy and earnings - while not as robust as in the 1920s or late 1990s - provides support for higher stock prices, two more Fed rate hikes and higher Treasury bond yields. Trump's political woes may slow, but not completely halt the GOP's legislative agenda1. Support for Trump among his GOP base remains high at 85%, making impeachment a long shot until after the November 2018 mid-term elections (Chart 2). If the Democrats take the House, they are likely to impeach Trump in 2019. For the Trump and the Republicans in Congress, this means the impetus is even greater to make progress now on tax cuts, tax reform and infrastructure. However, the embattled White House will slow the process as the president's staff often acts as a coordinator among the various factions in Congress. With Trump's team preoccupied with political woes, they will not be effective in this role. Chart 1Economy Will Trump Politics ##br## For Financial Markets
Economy Will Trump Politics For Financial Markets
Economy Will Trump Politics For Financial Markets
Chart 2GOP Base Not Yet Willing To ##br## Impeach Trump
The Economy Trumps Politics
The Economy Trumps Politics
The Fed will look through the politics and focus on the health of the economy and will continue to raise rates gradually this year, with the next hike coming in June. Financial conditions have eased since the Fed's 25 basis point rate hike in December, and that alone should be enough to keep the Fed on track to tighten next month. As we have noted in recent reports, even without fiscal stimulus, the U.S. economy will still grow near its long-term potential, tighten the labor market and push up wages and inflation. The Fed has been reticent to include any impact from fiscal stimulus into their policy deliberations thus far. The minutes of the March FOMC meeting noted that "members continued to judge that there was significant uncertainty about the effects of possible changes in fiscal and other government policies". Bottom Line: The lack of progress on legislation may result in a pullback in U.S. equity prices, but absent a material weakening of the U.S. economy or profit picture, the pullback will not turn into a bear market. Checking In On The Consumer The consumer - a key driver of the U.S. economy and corporate earnings - will provide a solid backdrop for the economy through 2017 and beyond. This backdrop will allow the Fed to pursue two rate hikes this year. The weakness in several indicators has worried some investors that the economy may be on the verge of a slowdown or even a collapse. However, a firming economy should sustain corporate earnings growth and, ultimately, higher stock prices. Consumer spending's share of GDP is 68% and increasing (Chart 3). GDP growth excluding consumer spending is more volatile than overall GDP growth. The household sector has contributed 75% to growth since the end of the recession, which is the best performance of any sector. The key drivers of spending point to further gains in the sector, and the imbalances that were present ahead of prior downturns are not evident today. Chart 3Household Share Of GDP Is At An All Time High And Rising
Household Share Of GDP Is At An All Time High And Rising
Household Share Of GDP Is At An All Time High And Rising
Chart 4Consumer Spending Remains In An Uptrend
Consumer Spending Remains In An Uptrend
Consumer Spending Remains In An Uptrend
Household spending growth has softened but remains in an uptrend. Broad measures of consumer spending tend to peak two to four years prior to the start of a recession. The lead time is even longer in a long-cycle expansion.2 Investors should not dismiss the weakness altogether, but position portfolios for the late-cycle environment. Personal consumption expenditure growth peaked at 4% year-over-year in Q1 2015. Auto sales, a timelier measure of spending although not as comprehensive, peaked in December 2016 (Chart 4). Applying the 2 to 4 year lead time noted above - and making the assumption that spending has indeed peaked - this points to a recession commencing in the middle of 2019 at the earliest. Household net worth is at an all-time high, and the overall wealth effect on consumer spending has been positive for some time. Our forecast for financial markets and the housing market, though modest, imply that the positive wealth effect will continue. Debt-financed spending remains a viable option for consumers, which was not the case in late 2007 before the onset of the recession. Banks have not changed their lending standards for most consumer loans and demand for these loans will stay solid despite the Fed rate increases that we expect. The Bank Credit Analyst's March 2017 report showed that even a 100-basis point rate rise from the current levels would not lift the interest payments to burdensome levels by historical standards. Incomes will continue to climb and importantly, consumer income expectations have also hit new highs. With the economy at the Fed's assessment of full employment, wage growth is accelerating, albeit more modestly than in previous recoveries. Our recent report3 found that wages tend to rise about two years after the output gap has formed a bottom. A narrowing output gap leads to a tighter labor market and higher incomes. As measured by the quit rate, job security is at a fresh cycle high (not shown). Many consumer indicators are in better shape today than they were in 2007 or at similar points in the other long cycles4 (Charts 5 and 6). We define the long cycle economic expansions as those lasting 8-10 years. The two expansions that meet the definition are 1981-1990 and 1992-2001.5 Consumer spending is running in line with incomes, unlike in the mid-2000s. Chart 5Key Consumer Metrics ##br## Remain Favorable
Key Consumer Metrics Remain Favorable
Key Consumer Metrics Remain Favorable
Chart 6There Is Still Plenty Of Support ##br## For Solid Consumer Spending
There Is Still Plenty Of Support For Solid Consumer Spending
There Is Still Plenty Of Support For Solid Consumer Spending
Mortgage equity withdrawal, a crucial source of debt-fueled consumer spending prior to 2007, has been non-existent in this cycle. Spending on essentials are close to all-time lows. In 2007 they were at record highs and had moved up dramatically in the prior half-decade amid escalating debt levels, rising energy prices and consumer interest rates. We are concerned by the historically high percentage of household incomes (17%) dedicated to medical care. An aging population, ever rising healthcare costs and uncertainty surrounding the future of Obamacare may drive medical spending even higher. Household debt levels as a percentage of disposable income peaked in 2008 at over 120%, but are back under 100%, i.e. at the level that existed prior to the 2007-2009 recession. The level of household debt compares favorably to similar points in the long cycles of the 1980s and 1990s. Financial obligations are at multi-decade lows (Chart 6, bottom panel). Bottom Line: The fundamentals supporting consumer spending remain solid. A healthy consumer means the economy can meet the Fed's modest GDP forecast for 2017, keeping the central bank on track to tighten twice more in 2017. This outlook supports our view for stocks over bonds in the next 6-12 months. The Fed's Balance Sheet: It's Diet Time Chart 7Fed Set To Begin Tapering In Early 2018
Fed Set To Begin Tapering In Early 2018
Fed Set To Begin Tapering In Early 2018
The minutes from the March FOMC meeting indicated that a change in the Fed's reinvestment policy will likely be appropriate "later this year". The minutes suggested that the FOMC is split on whether to simply terminate all reinvestment for both Treasurys and MBS, or to "taper" reinvestment over time. Our base case is that the Fed will follow up a June rate hike with another one in September, at which point policymakers will provide some details on their plans for balance sheet runoff to begin in January of 2018. Investors are rightly concerned about the potential impact of the runoff, especially given that memories of the 2013 "taper tantrum" are still fresh. There is disagreement among academics about whether quantitative easing (QE) directly depressed bond yields by restricting the supply of high-quality fixed income assets, or whether the impact on yields was solely via the "signaling effect" (i.e. that QE implied that short-rates will be held at a low level for a very long time). Either way, balance sheet runoff will likely have some impact on bond yields. A good starting point is to employ an empirical estimate of the impact of QE. The IMF has modeled long-term Treasury yields based on a number of economic and financial variables, including inflation expectations, demographics, growth, current accounts and budget balances. The model also includes the stock of assets held by the Fed as a share of GDP. If the Fed were to begin running off its holdings of both Treasurys and MBS at the beginning of 2018 by terminating all reinvestment, then the amount of bank reserves held at the Fed would likely evaporate by 2021. This represents a fall of roughly 10 percentage points of GDP (Chart 7). Given the IMF interest rate model's coefficient of -0.9, it implies that long-term Treasury yields and mortgage rates would rise by 90 basis points from the "portfolio balance" effect alone. However, it is more complicated than that. The impact on yields is likely to be tempered by three factors: The Fed may opt to avoid going "cold turkey" on reinvestment, choosing instead to scale back gradually. Fed President William Dudley recently commented that the Fed wants balance sheet reduction to "run in the background", such that it is not a major event for markets. Some academic experts are recommending that the Fed maintain a fairly large balance sheet by historical standards because of the need in financial markets for short-term, risk-free assets that would diminish if there are fewer excess bank reserves available. Banks, for example, are required by regulators to hold more high-quality assets than they did in the pre-Lehman years. The implication is that the balance sheet may never fully revert to historic norms relative to GDP. As the FOMC dials back monetary stimulus it will be concerned with overall monetary conditions, including short-term rates, long-term rates and the dollar. If long-term rates and/or the dollar rise too quickly, policymakers will moderate the pace of rate hikes and use forward guidance to talk down the long end of the curve so as to avoid allowing financial conditions get too tight, too quickly (i.e. the term premium would rise, but would be partly offset by a lower expected path for the fed funds rate). Thus, the path of short-term rates is dependent on the dollar and the reaction of the long end of the curve. It is difficult to estimate how it will shake out, but a recent report from the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City estimated that a $675 billion reduction in the size of the Fed's balance sheet is equivalent to a 25 basis point increase in the fed funds rate (although the authors admit that the confidence band around this estimate is extremely wide).6 We expect that the impact of runoff alone will be much less than the 90 basis point estimate discussed above. Still, the combination of balance sheet shrinkage and Fed rate hikes will lead to higher bond yields than is currently discounted in the market. We could also see some upward pressure on global term premia when the ECB announces the next tapering of its QE purchase program, possibly this autumn. However, it will be years before the ECB will be in a position to reduce the size of its balance sheet. As for the Bank of Japan, we doubt that the central bank will ever shed its JGB holdings. What about the shape of the Treasury curve? Our fixed-income strategists believe that the shape of the curve will be determined by the normal cyclical dynamics we have seen in the past. We are still in a window in which the Treasury curve will steepen as yields rise. A little later in the Fed cycle, the curve will bear-flatten as the long-end begins to rise at a slower pace than the front end. We do not see balance sheet adjustment as changing these dynamics much. Similarly, with respect to credit spreads, the state of nonfinancial corporate sector balance sheets and the overall stance of monetary policy will continue to be the main drivers of the credit cycle. If unwinding the balance sheet leads to a premature tightening of financial conditions, then the Fed will proceed more slowly on rate hikes. The crucial indicator to watch is core PCE inflation. Credit spreads will remain fairly well contained until core PCE inflation reaches the Fed's 2% target. At that point, the pace of monetary normalization will ramp up, putting spreads at risk of widening. It is a different story for the mortgage market, where spreads will be biased to widen during Fed runoff. While spreads have already widened a bit, in our view they still do not adequately compensate for the additional MBS supply that will hit the market when the Fed takes a step back. Historically, there is a reasonably tight correlation between MBS spreads and the spread between mortgage rates and Treasury yields (Chart 8). Thus, it is reasonable to expect mortgage rates to rise by more than Treasury yields. Chart 8MBS Spreads Set To Widen As Fed Tapers
MBS Spreads Set To Widen As Fed Tapers
MBS Spreads Set To Widen As Fed Tapers
While the Fed's balance sheet reduction by itself may not have a big impact on the dollar, we still believe the currency has more upside because of the divergence in the overall monetary policy stance between the U.S. on one side and the ECB and Bank of Japan (BoJ) on the other. The BoJ will hold the 10-year JGB near to zero for quite some time. The ECB will also not be in a position to tighten for a long time, outside of removing negative short rates and tapering QE purchases a bit further in 2018. Meanwhile, we think the Fed will tighten by more than is currently discounted. Admittedly, the economic data have disappointed so far in 2017 and CPI inflation has softened which, at the margin, would cause some FOMC members to back away from rate hikes. Nonetheless, policymakers are focused more on the labor market than GDP to gauge the health of the expansion and the amount of economic slack. Despite the dismal Q1 GDP figures, following unimpressive growth in 2016, the unemployment rate has already fallen below what the FOMC expected the rate will be at the end of this year! A tightening labor market means that the economy is still growing above a trend pace. Unless there is a clear deceleration in wage growth as measured by the ECI or the Productivity and Cost report, the FOMC will likely hike rates by more than the 38 basis points currently discounted over the next 12 months. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com 1 See Geopolitical Strategy Report, "Break Glass In Case Of Impeachment," May 17, 2017. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com 2 See The Bank Credit Analyst, March 2017. Available at bca.bcaresearch.com 3 See U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Still Awaiting the Next Pullback", May 15, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com 4 See The Bank Credit Analyst, March 2017. Available at bca.bcaresearch.com 5 We did not include the 1960s in this analysis because the Fed waited too long to tighten and allowed inflation to get out of hand. 6 Forecasting the Stance of Monetary Policy Under Balance Sheet Adjustments. The Macro Bulletin, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. Troy Davig and A. Lee Smith. May 10, 2017.
Highlights Fed: The Fed is likely to lift rates in June, which could roil markets if economic data do not improve between now and then. Municipal Bonds: Weak state & local government revenue growth reflects the fall-out from the mid-2014 commodity price collapse. Now that energy sector capex has recovered, state & local government revenues will soon follow. Economy & Inflation: Consumer confidence remains elevated, and this should lead to a snapback in consumer spending in the second quarter. Stronger growth and a tight labor market should also cause core inflation to soon resume its uptrend, driven by accelerating wage growth. Feature How stubborn are Fed policymakers? This is an important question for markets at the moment. The Fed has clearly articulated that its base case economic outlook will result in two more rate hikes before the end of 2017, and even traditionally dovish Chicago Fed President Charles Evans said he "could be fine with two more rate hikes this year."1 Meanwhile, broad indexes of financial conditions suggest that markets can absorb another rate increase (Chart 1). Everything appears to be set up for the FOMC to lift rates by another 25 basis points when it meets next month, and this remains our expectation. The only problem is that the flow of economic data has turned decisively negative (Chart 2). Most recently, core CPI disappointed expectations by increasing only 0.1% in April, causing the year-over-year growth rate to fall to 1.9%. It was only three months ago that core CPI was growing 2.3% year-over-year. True to form, President Evans also noted last week that "downside risks [to inflation] still predominate". Chart 1Green Light From Financial Conditions
Green Light From Financial Conditions
Green Light From Financial Conditions
Chart 2Red Light From Data Surprises
Red Light From Data Surprises
Red Light From Data Surprises
The risk from a market point of view is that the Fed holds true to its promise and lifts rates in June, despite the fact that recent data have disappointed and inflation remains well below target. In that scenario, it is possible that markets come to the conclusion that the Fed is running an overly tight policy, resulting in a bear-flattening of the yield curve and a near-term sell-off in spread product. Chart 3Stay Positioned For Higher Yields
Stay Positioned For Higher Yields
Stay Positioned For Higher Yields
As we have highlighted numerous times in the context of our Fed Policy Loop,2 with inflation below target, the Fed will be quick to adopt a more dovish stance when faced with a sharp tightening of financial conditions. This will put a floor under risk assets. Further, as was discussed in last week's report,3 negative data surprises are not likely to persist for much longer. But until that turnaround occurs, there is a heightened risk of a near-term widening in credit spreads if the Fed sticks to its guns. Ultimately, the Fed will continue to support credit spreads, and we remain overweight spread product on a 6-12 month investment horizon. Our 6-12 month outlook for Treasury yields is also unchanged, even though recent yield movements reflect the "hawkish Fed" scenario described above. The nominal 10-year yield has risen in recent weeks, driven entirely by real yields that have moved higher alongside increasingly hawkish rate hike expectations (Chart 3). The compensation for inflation protection has actually declined, in reaction to disappointing inflation data and perceptions of a more hawkish Fed. Even in the event that financial conditions tighten and the Fed is forced to adopt a more dovish policy stance, we would expect the decline in real yields to be offset by an increase in the cost of inflation compensation, which still has considerable upside (see section titled "The Consumer Is Strong, But Where's The Inflation?" below). We therefore continue to recommend a below-benchmark duration stance. Finally, futures market positioning is now solidly net long, suggesting that yields are biased higher during the next three months (Chart 3, bottom panel). Bottom Line: Risk assets could sell off in the near-term if economic data do not turn around and the Fed proceeds with a June hike. However, Fed policy will ultimately encourage tighter credit spreads and a higher cost of inflation compensation on a 6-12 month horizon. Remain at below-benchmark duration and overweight spread product. Municipal Bonds: Not Just About Taxes The uncertain outlook for fiscal policy is the immediate concern in municipal bond markets. While we expect some sort of tax bill will make its way through Congress before the end of the year, as of now, we don't have much clarity on what that bill will include. Lower corporate and individual tax rates seem likely, and the administration has also expressed a desire to curb deductions. Unfortunately, for now that's about all we can say for certain. Lower tax rates would be negative from the perspective of municipal bond investors, but fewer deductions would increase demand for munis, assuming the municipal bond tax exemption is not scrapped altogether. We haven't even mentioned the potential replacement of Obamacare and a possible federal infrastructure bill! For now, the muni market seems content to shrug off this uncertainty. Muni / Treasury (M/T) yield ratios are approaching their post-crisis lows across the entire curve (Chart 4), though longer maturity yield ratios remain elevated compared to pre-crisis levels (Chart 5). We recently recommended that investors favor long over short maturities on the Aaa muni curve.4 Chart 4Yield Ratios At Post-Crisis Lows
Yield Ratios At Post-Crisis Lows
Yield Ratios At Post-Crisis Lows
Chart 5More Value In Long Maturities
More Value In Long Maturities
More Value In Long Maturities
As for tax reform, although nothing is known for certain, we do expect that the administration's desire for increased infrastructure investment will keep the muni tax exemption in place. We also anticipate lower corporate and individual tax rates. How much of an impact will lower tax rates have on M/T yield ratios? Even that is hard to pin down, although we note that historically there has only been a loose relationship between yield ratios and the top marginal income tax rate (Chart 6). Chart 6The Municipal Treasury Yield Ratio & Tax Rates
The Municipal Treasury Yield Ratio & Tax Rates
The Municipal Treasury Yield Ratio & Tax Rates
Further, elevated yield ratios since the financial crisis are much more driven by concerns about credit quality than changes in tax policy. With the potential for municipal bankruptcy more present than ever in investors' minds, as long as the muni tax exemption is not repealed, we think that trends in state & local government balance sheet health will continue to drive yield ratios. On that latter point, there is growing reason for optimism. Revenue Growth Ready To Rebound Periods of rising state & local government net savings have historically coincided with tightening M/T yield ratios, and vice-versa. Net savings increases when revenue growth exceeds expenditure growth. However, expenditure growth has been outpacing revenue growth since early 2015 and net savings have declined as a result (Chart 7). Unsurprisingly, state & local governments have reduced their pace of hiring in an effort to protect budgets (Chart 7, panel 3). Ratings downgrades have also spiked, but the message from our Municipal Health Monitor is that they will soon subside (Chart 7, bottom panel).5 We concur, and in fact believe that state & local government revenue growth has reached an inflection point and is poised to head higher. Breaking out the different sources of state & local government revenue we see that the recent deceleration has been concentrated in income tax and sales tax revenues (Chart 8). Property tax growth has been steady, if unspectacular. Transfers from the federal government have also decelerated since early 2015, but have been flat recently. Transfer revenue is at risk of falling if the federal government is able to pass a healthcare bill that includes the block-granting of Medicaid payments. But there is still a long road ahead before any proposed healthcare bill becomes law, and a lot can change in the interim. Chart 7A Setback In State & Local Savings
A Setback In State & Local Savings
A Setback In State & Local Savings
Chart 8State & Local Revenue By Source
State & Local Revenue By Source
State & Local Revenue By Source
What seems clear at the moment is that personal income growth is heading higher and consumer spending is firm (please see the following section of this report, titled "The Consumer Is Strong, But Where's The Inflation?", for a discussion of the outlook for income and consumer spending growth). Both suggest that income and sales tax revenue growth have bottomed for the time being. Chart 9State & Local Revenue By State
State & Local Revenue By State
State & Local Revenue By State
Using data from the Rockefeller Institute, we can also examine state & local government revenue by state. Then, if we split out the nine states that are most heavily dependent on the energy and mining sectors,6 we observe that commodity-dependent states have dragged overall state & local government revenue growth lower since commodity prices collapsed in mid-2014 (Chart 9). Further, we see that revenue growth in commodity-dependent states is heavily influenced by nonresidential investment in the energy and mining sectors (Chart 9, bottom panel). Now that commodity prices have recovered from the 2014 bust and energy sector investment is coming back on line, we would expect state & local revenue growth to follow with a lag. Investment Implications Although we expect state & local government revenue growth to accelerate from here, yield ratios already reflect quite a lot of good news. Also, heightened policy uncertainty means there is an increased risk that yield ratios will widen sharply in the coming months. For now, we recommend only a neutral allocation to Municipal bonds within U.S. fixed income portfolios. However, an interesting opportunity could lie in focusing municipal bond exposure on those aforementioned commodity-dependent states, where revenues are likely to grow more quickly as energy capex rebounds, and whose bonds might still trade at a discount because of lower current revenues. Looking at Charts 10 & 11, we notice that the General Obligation (GO) bonds of energy-dependent Texas offer a yield advantage of 15 bps versus the overall Aaa muni curve at the 10-year maturity point. This is close to the same yield advantage offered by Massachusetts GO bonds, even though Massachusetts is rated Aa1 and Texas carries a Aaa rating. Other Aaa-rated states (Virginia, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina and Tennessee) trade at much lower yields. Not only that, but Texas has also seen the strongest population growth during the past 12 months of all the states in our sample (Chart 11), and employment growth in Texas should continue to rebound alongside rising oil prices (Chart 12). Our Commodity & Energy Strategy service maintains a $60/bbl year-end oil price target.7 Chart 10Grab The Premium In Texas GOs Part I
Will The Fed Stick To Its Guns?
Will The Fed Stick To Its Guns?
Chart 11Grab The Premium In Texas GOs Part II
Will The Fed Stick To Its Guns?
Will The Fed Stick To Its Guns?
Chart 12Texas Bouncing Back
Texas Bouncing Back
Texas Bouncing Back
Bottom Line: Weak state & local government revenue growth reflects the fall-out from the mid-2014 commodity price collapse. Now that energy sector capex has recovered, state & local government revenues will soon follow. Commodity-dependent states should benefit disproportionately. Texas GOs in particular look attractive on a risk/reward basis. The Consumer Is Strong, But Where's The Inflation? Consumer Spending Chart 13Consumer Spending Looks Solid
Consumer Spending Looks Solid
Consumer Spending Looks Solid
The post-election surge in consumer confidence does not look as though it's about to reverse. At least not according to the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Survey, which was released last week. The expectations component of that survey, which closely tracks real consumer spending (Chart 13), rose from 87 in April to 88.1 in May, suggesting that weak first quarter consumer spending will prove to be nothing more than a blip. We like to think about consumer spending as a combination of income growth and the savings rate. On income growth, survey measures are also pointing to an imminent acceleration (Chart 13, panel 2). Meanwhile, the savings rate will likely remain elevated compared to pre-crisis levels, but is unlikely to move meaningfully higher from here. In our February 21 report,8 we noted that while tightening bank lending standards correlated with a higher savings rate prior to the financial crisis, that relationship has since completely broken down (Chart 13, panel 3). Since the housing bust, the supply of credit is no longer the chief constraint on consumer borrowing. Households are now much more concerned with maintaining the health of their own balance sheets. For this reason, we do not view the recent tightening of consumer lending standards as a meaningful impediment to consumer spending. Similarly, we do not think the recent decline in demand for consumer credit (according to the Fed's Senior Loan Officer Survey) will soon translate into much weaker consumer spending. In prior cycles, we see that loan demand tended to fall several years prior to the next recession, while the savings rate did not spike until the recession actually hit (Chart 13, bottom panel). Inflation & TIPS As was mentioned above, the Consumer Price Index for April was also released last week. Not only was the core CPI print disappointing, but the decline was broad based across the four major components of core CPI: shelter, core goods, core services excluding shelter, and medical care (Chart 14). The tick lower in shelter inflation is not surprising, and in fact should continue now that rental vacancies have put in a bottom. We would also expect core goods inflation to stay low, given that the U.S. dollar remains in a bull market. More worrisome is the large drop in core services inflation excluding shelter (Chart 14, panel 3). This component of core inflation correlates most closely with wage growth, and we would expect this component to drive core inflation higher as the labor market tightens and wage growth accelerates. It is worth noting that while wage growth has also weakened during the past few months, leading wage growth indicators are still trending up (Chart 15). Pipeline measures of inflationary pressures, such as the core Producer Price Index and the Supplier Deliveries and Prices Paid components of the ISM Manufacturing index, are the other bright spots in the inflation outlook (Chart 16). While the 10-year TIPS breakeven rate has fallen all the way to 1.85% from its post-election high of 2.08%, these pipeline measures suggest the decline will prove fleeting. Chart 14Core CPI By Major Component
Core CPI By Major Component
Core CPI By Major Component
Chart 15Wage Growth Will Recover
Wage Growth Will Recover
Wage Growth Will Recover
Chart 16Pipeline Measures Still Positive
Pipeline Measures Still Positive
Pipeline Measures Still Positive
We continue to expect that the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate will reach 2.4% to 2.5% by the time that core PCE inflation returns to the Fed's 2% target, sometime near the end of this year. Bottom Line: Consumer confidence remains elevated, and this should lead to a snapback in consumer spending in the second quarter. Stronger growth and a tight labor market should also cause core inflation to soon resume its uptrend, driven by accelerating wage growth. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-12/evans-says-risks-to-fed-inflation-outlook-still-on-the-downside 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Caught In A Loop", dated September 29, 2015, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Past Peak Pessimism", dated May 9, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary, "Reflation Window Still Open", dated April 4, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 For further details on our Municipal Health Monitor, please see: U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Trading The Municipal Credit Cycle", dated October 18, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 These states are: Alaska, Louisiana, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, West Virginia and Wyoming. 7 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Oil: Be Long, Or Be Wrong", dated May 11, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Odds Of March", dated February 21, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights Portfolio Strategy Any advance in Treasury yields should be gradual and more reflective of an improving global economy than it would be restrictive for equities. Book profits in homebuilders and downgrade to neutral. Rising lumber prices will do more harm than good. In contrast, home improvement retailers are in a sweet spot. We reiterate our high-conviction overweight stance. Recent Changes S&P Homebuilding - Downgrade to neutral. Table 1
Awaiting A Catalyst
Awaiting A Catalyst
Feature Equities marked time at the top end of their range last week. A catalyst may be required to sustain a breakout to new highs, as robust corporate profitability and forward guidance, coupled with tame monetary conditions, are battling against a spate of economic disappointments and soft commodity prices. Financial conditions remain sufficiently easy that economic growth should rebound in the back half of the year. The Fed is in no hurry to aggressively tighten monetary policy, owing to the lack of a serious inflation threat. If hard data begin to firm, then investors will gain confidence in the durability of the profit recovery, powering a further share price advance. While there may be some concern that stronger growth will simply embolden the Fed and push up Treasury yields, we doubt that the latter will become a roadblock just yet. Last week we highlighted that it typically takes a rise to at least one standard deviation above the mean in BCA's Treasury Bond Valuation Indicator to warn that the economy and stocks are at risk of a major downturn. That level would equate to 3.3% on the 10-year Treasury yield (Chart 1). Such large moves in Treasury yields do occur occasionally, (Nov/2010-Feb 2011, summer of 2013 and winter of 2016) and have sometimes preceded/caused economic slowdowns and/or financial accidents. The speed of the adjustment clearly plays a role, as short-term spikes are much harder to digest than gradual yield advances. Nominal GDP growth is comfortably above the 10-year Treasury yield, signaling that financial conditions will stay sufficiently easy for some time, barring a major bond selloff (second panel, Chart 2). Chart 1Yields Have Room To Rise##br## Before Becoming Restrictive
Yields Have Room To Rise Before Becoming Restrictive
Yields Have Room To Rise Before Becoming Restrictive
Chart 2Sales Will Support##br## The Overshoot
Sales Will Support The Overshoot
Sales Will Support The Overshoot
In other words, any advance in yields should be gradual and more reflective of a better global economy than restrictive, especially given the ongoing gentle softening in the U.S. dollar. The upshot is that the string of economic disappointments should begin to fade. In recent research, we have stressed the importance of a meaningful revival in corporate sector revenue growth in order to sustain sky-high valuations (top panel, Chart 2). Encouragingly, inflation expectations are recovering globally. A whiff of inflation is a positive omen for top line growth prospects. Inflation and economic growth expectations have firmed around the world. Chart 2 shows that euro area sales per share are on track to exit deflation after a multiyear slump, based on the message from the bond market. The same is true for emerging markets. If companies outside the U.S. finally enjoy renewed top-line growth, that would bode well for a continued recovery in U.S. business sales, especially if the U.S. dollar weakens. Chart 3 shows that both EM currencies and regional confidence surveys are heralding ongoing gains in U.S. profits sourced from overseas. Nevertheless, it is critical to keep the backdrop in a longer-term context. BCA's Equity Speculation Index (ESI) signals that the advance is at a very high risk stage (Chart 4). The ESI can stay in elevated territory for a prolonged period, as occurred in 2014/2015, before a correction unfolds. But, investors should maintain some non-cyclical exposure even if the market continues its advance in the short run. Chart 3Foreign-Sourced Profit Support
Foreign-Sourced Profit Support
Foreign-Sourced Profit Support
Chart 4The Rally Is Very High Risk
The Rally Is Very High Risk
The Rally Is Very High Risk
This week we are updating our overall view of the consumer discretionary sector and tweaking our housing-related equity positioning. Consumer Discretionary: On The Way To All-Time Highs Consumer discretionary stocks have been portfolio stalwarts in 2017 (outside of autos and select media), advancing by over 10% and besting the S&P 500 by about 400bps. The heavyweight media sub-group (ex-cable and satellite) has come under scrutiny recently, as fears that ad spending will endure a deep slump have resurfaced. However, most of our indicators suggest that ad spending, at least outside of autos, will not suffer a major downturn, given our upbeat outlook for consumption and profits. Cord-cutting is not a new phenomenon, and is already reflected in very washed out profit expectations, both on a cyclical and structural horizon (we will be covering media in more detail in an upcoming Report). Consequently, there are good odds that this impressive consumer discretionary showing will remain intact especially as last Friday's payrolls bounced smartly. Two key drivers have added fuel to this fiery performance: border adjustment tax fears have subsided and soft economic data have given the Fed enough breathing room to continue erring on the dovish side. Importantly, leading indicators of discretionary spending are heralding a solid recovery in consumer outlays. Interest rates remain near generationally low levels and oil price inflation has peaked. The economy is near full employment, signaling that wage inflation will quicken. According to BCA's Income Indicator1, consumer income growth is expected to reaccelerate imminently (bottom panel, Chart 5). While consumers have demonstrated a preference for saving vs. spending, several factors suggest that purse strings should soon loosen. Consumer confidence has soared, buoyed by income gains (third panel, Chart 5). Moreover, new highs in household net worth as a percent of disposable income signal that the upward pressure on the personal savings rate should diminish (second panel, Chart 5). The implication is that recent disappointing consumer spending data should prove transitory. While these factors could ultimately put upward pressure on interest rates, there may be a window where limited inflation pressures and weak credit growth permit only a gradual upshift in the Treasury curve. Regardless, there are other indicators pointing to additional outperformance. For instance, there is still a wide gap between forward earnings breadth and washed-out technical conditions. Roughly 75% of consumer discretionary sub-groups have rising 12-month forward profit estimates. This is sustainable as long as consumers have an incentive to spend. In contrast, the proportion of consumer discretionary sub-indexes with a positive 52-week rate of change and/or are trading above their 40-week moving average remains well below 50%. This divergence between fundamentals and technicals is an exploitable gap, which should narrow via a sustained rise in relative share prices (Chart 6). Chart 5Upbeat Consumption Outlook
Upbeat Consumption Outlook
Upbeat Consumption Outlook
Chart 6Exploitable Gap
Exploitable Gap
Exploitable Gap
Finally, consumer discretionary stocks are no longer expensive. On a relative forward P/E basis they trade below the historical mean and at a discount to the S&P 500. Consumer discretionary EV/EBITDA is also trailing the broad market, as well as its long-term average. If a recovery in consumer outlays pans out in the back half of the year, as we expect, then a re-rating phase is likely. However, not all sub-groups are created equal. This week we are tweaking our housing-related consumer discretionary exposure. Homebuilders' Pain... Homebuilding stocks have been moving sideways for the better part of the past four years in a narrow trading range. They are currently sitting near the top of this range. Is it time to book profits? The short answer is yes. The recent confirmation of U.S. tariffs on Canadian lumber imports represents a source of cost inflation that may embed a risk premium in share prices until a new trade deal can be worked out. Lumber prices have nearly doubled during the past sixteen months and remain the best performing commodity in 2017 (bottom panel, Chart 7). Lumber comprises anywhere between 10%-20% of the cost of a new home, underscoring that a 20% lumber tariff will add to the cost of building a new home, squeezing margins unless homebuilders can pass this cost on via increased house prices. However, we are skeptical that there is a lot of room for new house price increases given that it would make it more difficult to compete with existing house sales. While new homes have taken market share from existing homes since the residential housing market trough earlier in the decade (Chart 8), market share gains have come at the expense of profit margins. Homebuilders have been aggressively discounting properties in order to lure new buyers. Given the buildup in new home inventories, further market share gains are at risk, unless additional selling price concessions materialize. Chart 7Elevated Lumber Prices...
Elevated Lumber Prices...
Elevated Lumber Prices...
Chart 8...Spell Trouble For Homebuilding Margins
...Spell Trouble For Homebuilding Margins
...Spell Trouble For Homebuilding Margins
The implication is that builders would likely have to absorb any input cost inflation, to the detriment of margins. Indeed, homebuilder sales are already decelerating as a consequence of pricing pressure (second panel, Chart 7). A simple homebuilder profit margin proxy (comprising new house price inflation minus the residential construction wage bill) warns that operating margins will compress, irrespective of the path of lumber prices (bottom panel, Chart 8). Nevertheless, there are some positive offsets that prevent us from turning outright bearish on the niche S&P homebuilding index. These counterbalances are related to the stage of the housing recovery. Homebuilders' sales expectations have surged, nearing the previous cycle's peak, according to the NAHB survey (Chart 9). Similarly, overall housing market conditions are probing multi-year highs and buyer traffic has vaulted to the highest level since mid-2005. Homebuilders remain optimistic about new housing demand. Household formation is still running higher than housing starts, representing a bullish backdrop for future new home construction. Rising incomes and a firming job market also bode well for the prospects of residential real estate. In aggregate, house prices are still expanding according to the Case-Shiller indexes and there are pockets of frothiness in select markets. The thirty year fixed mortgage rate recently broke back below 4% (Chart 10) and banks are willing extenders of mortgage credit, allaying fears that the price of credit will undermine housing affordability. According to our updated estimates (not shown), even if mortgage rates spiked 200bps from current levels, neither affordability nor mortgage payments as a percent of median incomes would return to their respective long-term average. Chart 9Housing Market Remains Firm...
Housing Market Remains Firm...
Housing Market Remains Firm...
Chart 10...Warranting A Neutral Stance
...Warranting A Neutral Stance
...Warranting A Neutral Stance
Still, these positives are already reflected in expectations, as the sell side has aggressively upgraded homebuilding profit estimates. The net earnings revisions ratio has catapulted to a 12-year high (Chart 10). Given our more balanced outlook for homebuilding earnings, we are leaning against this exuberance. Bottom Line: Book profits of 3.4% in the S&P homebuilding index and downgrade to neutral. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: DHI, LEN, PHM. ...Is Home Improvement Retailers' Gain While our confidence in further homebuilding outperformance has ebbed, the opposite is true for the S&P home improvement retail (HIR) index. We put the S&P HIR index on our high-conviction overweight list at the beginning of the year, and so far, so good. HIR stocks have outperformed the broad market and the S&P consumer discretionary sector year-to-date. There are good odds that more gains lie ahead. Industry retail sales are running at a mid-single digit rate, surpassing lackluster overall retail sales (second panel, Chart 11). Importantly, household appliance and furniture selling prices have surged, reinforcing that demand is robust and signaling that HIR same-store sales growth will likely accelerate in the busy spring selling season, and beyond (middle panel, Chart 11). Unlike homebuilders, home improvement retailers benefit from rising lumber prices. HIR companies typically earn a set margin on lumber-related sales. Thus, any absolute increase in lumber prices boosts top line growth, and profit margins (bottom panel, Chart 11). The industry's disciplined approach to store additions in the aftermath of the GFC has set the stage for ongoing selling price gains. Chart 12 shows that while house prices have overtaken the 2006 highs, increasing the incentive for homeowners to remodel and invest in this key asset, building and supply store construction activity has remained depressed. Easier mortgage lending standards should ensure that total home sales activity remains elevated, to the benefit of home prices, and provide the necessary financing needed for large projects (Chart 12). Tight labor markets, rising wages and surging consumer confidence are signaling that consumers have an appetite to re-lever and space to take on more debt (Chart 12). With store capex budgets under tight control, same-store sales and cash flow growth are bound to sustain their solid advance as renovation activity accelerates. All of this is best encapsulated by our HIR model. The model has recently soared, driven by the drop in fixed mortgage rates and surge in lumber prices, signaling that the path of least resistance is higher for relative share prices (top panel, Chart 11). Indeed, relative profits have already soared to fresh highs, also signaling the same for relative share prices (top panel, Chart 13). Oddly, analysts are overly pessimistic about the industry's sales and earnings growth prospects. In fact, top line growth estimates are trailing those of the broad market, and the 12-month forward relative profit growth hurdle is set very low at 2% (middle panel, Chart 13). Chart 11All Signals Flashing Green
All Signals Flashing Green
All Signals Flashing Green
Chart 12Capacity Restraint Is Paying Dividends
Capacity Restraint Is Paying Dividends
Capacity Restraint Is Paying Dividends
Chart 13Earnings Led Advance
Earnings Led Advance
Earnings Led Advance
Given the positive message from leading indicators of remodeling activity we are far more optimistic, and expect both relative top and bottom line growth numbers to overwhelm. Bottom Line: The re-rating phase in the S&P home improvement retail index has room to run. We reiterate our high-conviction overweight stance. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: HD, LOW. 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat," dated March 31, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor small over large caps and stay neutral growth over value.
Highlights The headwinds against commodity currencies are still brewing, the selloff is not over. Global liquidity conditions are deteriorating and EM growth will disappoint. The valuation cushion in commodity currencies and EM plays is not large enough to compensate for the red flags emanating from financial markets. The euro is peaking. A capitulation by shorts is likely early next week. A move to 1.12 should be used to sell EUR/USD. Feature Commodity currencies have had a tough nine weeks, weakening by 5% in aggregate, helping boost our short commodity currency trade returns to 3.8%. At this juncture, the key questions on investors' minds is whether or not this trend will deepen and if this selloff will remain playable. We believe the answer to both questions is yes. A Less Friendly Global Backdrop When observed in aggregate, the past 12 months represented a fertile ground for commodity currencies to perform well as both global liquidity and growth conditions were on one of the most powerful upswings in the past two decades, lifting risk assets in the process (Chart I-1). Chart I-1The Zenith Is Passing
The Zenith Is Passing
The Zenith Is Passing
Global Liquidity Is Drying When we look at the global liquidity picture, the improvement seems to be over, especially as the Fed, the key anchor to the global cost of money, is more confidently embracing its switch toward a tighter monetary policy. It is true that U.S. Q1 data has been punky at best; however, like the Fed, we think this phenomenon will prove to be temporary. Recently, much ink has been spilled over the weakness in the auto sector. However, when cyclical spending is looked at in aggregate, the picture is not as dire and even encourages moderate optimism. Driven by both corporate and housing investment, cyclical sectors have been growing as a share of GDP (Chart I-2). This highlights that poor auto sales may have been a sector specific development and do not necessarily provide an accurate read on the state of household finances. Chart I-2Autos Do Not Paint The Full Picture For The U.S. Cyclical Spending Is Firm...
Autos Do Not Paint The Full Picture For The U.S. Cyclical Spending Is Firm...
Autos Do Not Paint The Full Picture For The U.S. Cyclical Spending Is Firm...
Moreover, the outlook for household income is still positive. Our indicator for aggregate household disposable income continues to point north (Chart I-3). As we have highlighted in recent publications, various employment surveys are suggesting that job growth should improve in the coming months.1 Also, this week's productivity and labor cost report showed that compensation is increasing at a nearly 4% annual pace. This healthy outlook for household income, combined with the consumer's healthy balance sheets - debt to disposable income stands near 14 year lows while debt-servicing ratios are still near 40 year lows - and elevated confidence suggests that house purchases can expand. With the inventory of vacant homes standing at 11 year lows, this positive backdrop, along with the improving household-formation rate, is likely to prompt additional housing starts, lifting residential investment (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Bright U.S. Household ##br##Income Prospects
Bright U.S. Household Income Prospects
Bright U.S. Household Income Prospects
Chart I-4As Households Get Formed,##br## Housing Starts To Pick up
As Households Get Formed, Housing Starts To Pick up
As Households Get Formed, Housing Starts To Pick up
For the corporate sector, the strength in survey data is also likely to result in growing capex (Chart I-5). Not only have "soft" data historically been a good leading indicator of "hard" data, but the outlook for profit growth has also improved substantially. Profit growth is the needed ingredient to realize the positive expectation of business leaders embedded in "soft" data. Profit itself is very often dictated by the trend in nominal revenue growth. The fall in profits in 2016 mostly reflected the fall in nominal GDP growth to 2.5%, which produced a level of revenue growth historically associated with recessions (Chart I-6). As such, the recent rebound in nominal GDP growth, suggests that through the power of operating leverage, profit should also continue to grow, supporting capex in the process. Chart I-5Business Confidence Points ##br##To Better Growth And Capex...
Business Confidence Points To Better Growth And Capex...
Business Confidence Points To Better Growth And Capex...
Chart I-6...Especially As A Key Profit##br## Driver Is Improving
...Especially As A Key Profit Driver Is Improving
...Especially As A Key Profit Driver Is Improving
With the most cyclical sector of the U.S. economy still on an upswing, the Fed will continue to increase rates, at least more aggressively than the 45 basis points of tightening priced into the OIS curve over the next 12 months. With liquidity being sucked into the U.S. economic machine, international dollar-based liquidity, which is already in a downtrend, is likely to deteriorate further (Chart I-7). Moreover, global yield curves, which were steepening until earlier this year, have begun flattening again, highlighting that the tightening in global liquidity conditions is biting (Chart I-8). This will represent a continuation of the expanding handicap against global growth, and EM growth in particular. Chart I-7Global Dollar Liquidity Is Already Poor
Global Dollar Liquidity Is Already Poor
Global Dollar Liquidity Is Already Poor
Chart I-8A Symptom Of The Tightening In Liquidity
A Symptom Of The Tightening In Liquidity
A Symptom Of The Tightening In Liquidity
Global Growth Conditions Are Also Past Their Best, Especially In EM Global growth conditions are already showing a few troubling signs, potentially exerted by the tightening in global liquidity. To begin with, while our global leading economic indicator is still pointing north, its own diffusion index - the number of nations with improving LEIs versus those with deteriorating ones - has already rolled over. Normally, this represents a reliable signal that growth will soon peak (Chart I-9). For commodity currencies, the key growth consideration is EM growth. Here too, the outlook looks precarious. The impulse to EM growth tends to emerge from China as Chinese imports have been the key fuel to boost exports, investments, and incomes across a wide swath of EM nations. Chinese developments suggest that Chinese growth, while not about to crater, may be slowing. Chinese monetary conditions have been tightening abruptly (Chart I-10, top panel). Moreover, this tightening seems to be already yielding some results. The issuance of bonds by smaller financial firms has been plunging, which tends to lead the growth in aggregate total social financing (Chart I-10, bottom panel). This is because the grease in the shadow banking system becomes scarcer as the cost of financing rises. Chart I-9Deteriorating Growth##br## Outlook
Deteriorating Growth Outlook
Deteriorating Growth Outlook
Chart I-10Chinese Monetary Conditions ##br##Are Tightening
Chinese Monetary Conditions Are Tightening
Chinese Monetary Conditions Are Tightening
This situation could continue. Some of the rise in Chinese interbank rates to two-year highs reflects the fact that easing capital outflows have meant that the PBoC can tighten monetary policy through other means. However, the recent focus by the Beijing and president Xi Jinping on financial stability and bubble prevention, suggests that there is a real will to see tighter policy implemented. This means that the decline in total credit growth in China should become more pronounced. As a result, this will weigh on the country's industrial activity, a risk already highlighted by the decline in Manufacturing PMIs (Chart I-11). Additionally, this decline in credit growth tends to be a harbinger of lower nominal GDP growth, and most importantly for EM and commodity producers, a foreboding warning for Chinese imports (Chart I-12). Chart I-11China Industrial ##br##Growth Worry
China Industrial Growth Worry
China Industrial Growth Worry
Chart I-12Slowing Chinese Credit Impulse ##br##Will Weigh On EM Growth
Slowing Chinese Credit Impulse Will Weigh On EM Growth
Slowing Chinese Credit Impulse Will Weigh On EM Growth
Financial markets are already flashing red signals. The Canadian Venture exchange and various coal plays have historically displayed a tight correlation with Chinese GDP growth.2 Today, they are breaking below key trend lines that have defined their bull markets since the February 2016 troughs (Chart I-13). This message is corroborated by the recent weakness in copper, iron ore, and oil prices. Additionally, the price of platinum relative to that of gold is also breaking down. While the VW scandal has a role to play, this breakdown is also a symptom of the pain on growth created by the tightening in global liquidity conditions. In the past, the message from this ratio have ultimately been heeded by EM stock prices, suggesting that the recent divergence is likely to be resolved with weaker EM asset prices (Chart I-14). Confirming this risk, the sectoral breadth of EM equities has also deteriorated, and is already at levels that in the past have marked the end of stock advances (Chart I-15). At the very least, the narrowing of the EM bull market should prompt investors in EM-related plays to pause and reflect. Chart I-13Two Worrisome Breakdowns##br## On Chinese Plays
Two Worrisome Breakdowns On Chinese Plays
Two Worrisome Breakdowns On Chinese Plays
Chart I-14Platinum's Dark##br## Omen For EM
Platinum's Dark Omen For EM
Platinum's Dark Omen For EM
Chart I-15The Falling Participation ##br##In The EM Rally
The Falling Participation In The EM Rally
The Falling Participation In The EM Rally
This moment of reflection seems especially warranted as EM assets do not have much cushion for unanticipated growth disappointment. The implied volatility on EM stocks is near cycle lows, so are EM sovereign CDS and corporate spreads (Chart I-16). This picture is mimicked by commodity currencies. Even after the recent bout of weakness, the aggregate risk-reversal in options points to a limited amount of concern, and therefore, a growing risk of negative surprises (Chart I-17). Chart I-16Little Cushion##br## In EM Assets
Little Cushion In EM Assets
Little Cushion In EM Assets
Chart I-17Commodity Currency Options##br## Turn Optimistic As Well
Commodity Currency Options Turn Optimistic As Well
Commodity Currency Options Turn Optimistic As Well
If commodity currencies have already depreciated in the face of a slightly soft dollar and perky EM asset prices, we worry that further weaknesses will emerge if the dollar strengthens again and EM assets self-off on the back of less liquidity and more EM growth disappointment. If the price of platinum relative to that of gold was a signal for EM assets, it is also a good indicator of additional stress in the commodity-currency space (Chart I-18). Chart I-18Platinum Raises Concerns ##br##For Commodity Currencies As Well
Platinum Raises Concerns For Commodity Currencies As Well
Platinum Raises Concerns For Commodity Currencies As Well
We remain committed to our trade of shorting a basket of commodity currencies. AUD is the most expensive and most exposed to the Chinese tightening of the group, but that doesn't mean much. The Canadian housing market seems to be under increased scrutiny thanks to the combined assault of rising taxes on non-residents and growing worries about mortgage fraud, which is deepening the underperformance of Canadian banks relative to their U.S. counterparts. If this two-front attack continues, the housing market, the engine of the domestic economy, may also prove to weaken faster than we anticipated. Finally, the New Zealand dollar too is expensive even if domestic economic developments suggest that its fair value may be understated by most PPP metrics. Bottom Line: The outlook for the U.S. economy remains good, but this will deepen the tightening in global liquidity. When combined with the tightening of monetary conditions in China, this suggests that global industrial activity and EM growth in particular could disappoint, especially as cracks in the financial system are beginning to appear. Moreover, EM assets and commodity currencies do not yet offer enough of a valuation cushion to fade this risk. Stay short commodity currencies. Macron In = Buy The Euro? The euro has rallied a 3.6% since early April, mostly on the back of Emmanuel Macron's electoral victories. Obviously, the last big hurdle is arriving this weekend with the second round. The En Marche! candidate still leads Marine Le Pen by a 20% margin. Wednesday's bellicose debate is unlikely to overturn this significant lead. The Front National candidate's lack of substance seems to have weighed against her in flash polls. If anything, her performance might have prompted some undecided Mélanchon voters to abstain or cast a "vote blanc" this weekend instead of picking her. This was her loss, not Macron's win. Does this mean that the euro has much upside? A quick rally toward 1.12 early next week still seems reasonable. New polls are beginning to show that En March! might perform much better than anticipated in the legislative election. Also, the center-right Les Républicains should also perform very well, resulting in the most right wing, pro-market Assemblée Nationale in nearly 50 years. While these polls are much too early to have any reliability, they may influence the interpretation by traders of Sunday's presidential election. However, we would remain inclined to fade any such rally. As we highlighted last week in a Special Report, our EUR/USD intermediate-term timing model shows that the euro is becoming expensive tactically, and that much good news is now in the euro's prices (Chart I-19).3 Additionally, investors have been excited by the rebound in core CPI in the euro area, a development interpreted as giving a carte-blanche to the ECB to hike rates sooner than was anticipated a few months ago. Indeed, currently, the first hike by the ECB is estimated to materialize in 27 months, versus the more than 60 months anticipated in July 2016. We doubt that market participants will bring the first rate hike closer to the present, a necessary development to prompt the euro to rally given our view on the Fed's tightening stance. We expect the rebound in the European core CPI to prove transient. Not only does European wage dynamics remain very poor outside of Germany, our country-based core CPI diffusion index has rolled over and points to a decelerating euro area core CPI (Chart I-20). Chart I-19EUR/USD: ##br##Good News In The Price
EUR/USD: Good News In The Price
EUR/USD: Good News In The Price
Chart I-20European Core CPI Rebound ##br##Should Prove Transient
European Core CPI Rebound Should Prove Transient
European Core CPI Rebound Should Prove Transient
Additionally, as we argued four weeks ago, tightening Chinese monetary conditions and EM growth shocks weigh more heavily on European growth than they do on the U.S.4 As such, our EM view implies that the euro area's positive economic surprises might soon deteriorate. Therefore, the favorable growth differential between Europe and the U.S. could be at its zenith. Shorting the euro today may prove dangerous, as a violent pop next week is very possible if the last euro shorts capitulate on a positive electoral outcome. Instead, we recommend investors sell EUR/USD if this pair hits 1.12 next week. Moreover, for risk management reasons, despite our view on the AUD, we are closing our long EUR/AUD position at a 6.9% gain this week. Bottom Line: Emmanuel Macron's likely victory this weekend could prompt a last wave of euro purchases. However, we are inclined to sell the euro as economic differentials between the common currency area and the U.S. are at their apex. Moreover, European core CPI is likely to weaken in the coming quarters, removing another excuse for investors to bid up the euro. Close long EUR/AUD. A Few Words On The Yen The yen has sold-off furiously in recent weeks. The tension with North Korea and the rise in the probability of a Fed hike in June to more than 90% have been poisons for the JPY. We are reluctant to close our yen longs just yet. Our anticipation that EM stresses will become particularly acute in the coming months should help the yen across the board. That being said, going forward, we recommend investors be more aggressive on shorting NZD/JPY than USD/JPY. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled “The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction”, dated April 21, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled "Healthcare Or Not, Risks Remain", dated March 24, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report titled "Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models", dated April 28, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled "ECB: All About China?", dated April 7, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1
USD Technicals 1
USD Technicals 1
Chart II-2USD Technicals 2
USD Technicals 2
USD Technicals 2
The Fed decided to keep the federal funds rate unchanged at the 0.75% - 1% range. The Committee highlighted the Q1 GDP weakness as transitory, as the labor market has tightened more since their last meeting, inflation is reaching its 2% target, and business investment is firming. Continuing and initial jobless claims both beat expectations; However, ISM Manufacturing PMI came in less than expected at 54.8; PCE continues to fluctuate around the 2% target, coming in at 1.8% from 2.1%; ISM Prices Paid came in at 68.5, beating expectations. Furthermore, the Committee expects that "near-term risks to the economic outlook appear roughly balanced", and that "economic activity will expand at a moderate pace". The market is now pricing in a 93.8% probability of a hike. We therefore expect the dollar to continue its appreciation after the French elections. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1
EUR Technicals 1
EUR Technicals 1
Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2
EUR Technicals 2
EUR Technicals 2
Macron's lead over Le Pen has risen after the heated debate between the two rival candidates. We believe these dynamics were a key bullish support for the euro in the run up to elections as the possibility of a Le Pen victory is being completely priced out. Adding to this optimism is a plethora of positive data from Europe. Business and consumer confidences have both pick up. German HICP came in at 2% yoy; Overall euro area headline CPI came in at 1.9%, and core at 1.2%. Nevertheless, labor market data in the peripheries, as well as the overall euro area, was disappointing. We believe this highlights substantial slack in the economy, and will keep the ECB from increasing rates any time soon. We expect the euro to climb in the short run, but the longer-run outlook remains bleak. Look to short EUR/USD at 1.12. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1
JPY Technicals 1
JPY Technicals 1
Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2
JPY Technicals 2
JPY Technicals 2
Economic data in Japan has been positive this past week: The unemployment rate went down to 2.8%, outperforming expectations. Retail trade annual growth came in 2.1%, also outperforming expectations. The jobs offer-to-applicants ratio came in at 1.45. This last number is significant, as this ratio has reached it 1990 peak, and it provides strong evidence that the Japanese labor market is very tight. Eventually, this tight labor market will exert pressures on wage inflation. In an environment like Japan, where nominal rates are capped, rising inflation would mean a collapse in real rates and consequently a collapse on the yen. Thus, we are maintaining our bearish view on the yen on a cyclical basis. On a tactical basis, we continue to be positive on the yen, given that a risk-off period in EM seems imminent. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1
GBP Technicals 1
GBP Technicals 1
Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2
GBP Technicals 2
GBP Technicals 2
In spite of the tougher rhetoric coming from Brussels recently, the pound has maintained resilient and has even gain against the U.S. dollar. Indeed, recent data from the U.K. has been positive: Markit Services PMI came in at 55.8, outperforming expectations. Meanwhile, Markit Manufacturing PMI came in at 57.3, crushing expectations. Additionally, both consumer credit and M4 money supply growth also outperformed. Overall we continue to be positive on the pound, particularly against the euro, as we believe that expectations on Britain are too pessimistic, while the ability for the ECB to turn hawkish limited given that peripheral economies are still too weak to sustain tighter monetary conditions. Against the U.S. dollar the pound will have limited upside from now, given that it has already appreciated substantially. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1
AUD Technicals 1
AUD Technicals 1
Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2
AUD Technicals 2
AUD Technicals 2
The RBA left its cash rate unchanged at 1.5%. The Bank also stated that its "forecasts for the Australian economy are little changed." It remains of the opinion that the low interest rate environment continues to support the outlook. This will also be a crucial ingredient to generate a positive outcome in the labor market in the foreseeable future. This past month has been very negative for the antipodean currency, with copper and iron ore prices displaying a similar behavior, losing almost 10% and 25% of their values since February, respectively. With China tightening monetary policy, and dissipating government spending soon to impact the Chinese economy, we remain bearish on AUD. In brighter news, the Bank's trimmed mean CPI measure increased by 1.9% on an annual basis, beating expectations of 1.8%. This is definitely a positive, but economic slack elsewhere could limit this development. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 AUD And CAD: Risky Business - March 10, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1
NZD Technicals 1
NZD Technicals 1
Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2
NZD Technicals 2
NZD Technicals 2
Data for New Zealand was very positive this week: The participation rate came in at 70.6%, outperforming expectations. Employment growth outperformed expectations substantially in the first quarter of 2017, coming in at 1.2%. The unemployment rate also outperformed coming in at 4.9% This recent data confirms our belief that inflationary pressures in New Zealand are stronger than what the RBNZ would lead you to believe. Indeed, non-tradable inflation, which measures domestically produced inflation is at its highest since 2014. Eventually, this will lead the RBNZ to abandon its neutral bias and embrace a more hawkish one, lifting the NZD in the process, particularly against the AUD. Against the U.S. dollar the kiwi dollar will likely have further downside, as the tightening in monetary conditions in China should weigh on commodity prices. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1
CAD Technicals 1
CAD Technicals 1
Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2
CAD Technicals 2
CAD Technicals 2
The oil-based currency has once again succumbed to fleeting oil prices, depreciating to a 1-year low. U.S. crude inventories have recently been declining by less than expected and production in Libya has been increasing. Moreover, headline inflation dropped 0.5% from its January high of 2.1%. The Bank of Canada acknowledged the weak core CPI data in its last monetary policy meeting, but instead chose to focus on stronger economic data to change their stance to neutral. As the weakness in oil prices proves temporary due to another likely OPEC cut, headline inflation should pick up again. However, labor market conditions and economic activity remain questionable based on the weakness of recent data: retail sales are contracting 0.6% on a monthly basis, and the raw materials price index dropped 1.6%. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 AUD And CAD: Risky Business - March 10, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1
CHF Technicals 1
CHF Technicals 1
Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2
CHF Technicals 2
CHF Technicals 2
Recent data in Switzerland has been mixed: Real retail sales growth came in at 2.1%, crushing expectations. However, Aprils PMI underperformed coming in at 57.4 against expectations of 58.3. Additionally, the KOF leading indicator came in at 106, al coming below expectations. EUR/CHF now stands at its highest level since late 2017 and while data has not been beating expectations it still very upbeat. We believe that conditions are slowly being put into place for the SNB to abandon its implied floor, given that core inflation is approaching its long term average. Therefore, once the French elections are over, EUR/CHF will become an attractive short, given that the euro will once again trade on economic fundamentals rather than political risks. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1
NOK Technicals 1
NOK Technicals 1
Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2
NOK Technicals 2
NOK Technicals 2
The krone continues to depreciate sharply. This comes as no surprise given that oil is now down 13% in 2017. Overall we expect that oil currencies will outperform metal currencies given that oil prices will have less sensitivity to EM liquidity and economic conditions. That being said, it is hard to be too bullish on oil if China slows anew, even if one believe that the OPEC deal will stay in place . This means that USD/NOK could have additional upside. On a longer term basis, there has been a slight improvement in Norwegian data, as nominal retail sales are growing at a staggering 10% pace, while real retail sales are growing at more than 2%, which are a 5-year and a 2-year high respectively. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1
SEK Technicals 1
SEK Technicals 1
Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2
SEK Technicals 2
SEK Technicals 2
The April Monetary Policy meeting delivered an unexpected decision, with members deciding to extend asset purchases till the end of the year, while delaying the forecast for a rate hike to mid-2018. Recent inflationary fluctuations and weak commodity prices support the Riksbank's actions. Forecasts for both inflation and the repo rate were lowered for 2018 and 2019. The Riksbank highlighted that "to support the upturn in inflation, monetary policy needs to be somewhat more expansionary", and is prepared to be more aggressive if need be. This increasingly dovish rhetoric by the Riksbank contrasts markedly with the FOMC's hawkish tilt, a dichotomy that will prove bearish for the krona relative to the greenback. Implications for EUR/SEK are a little more blurred, as the ECB will also remain dovish for the foreseeable future. However, Sweden's attentive and cautious stance on its currency's strength will cap any downside in EUR/SEK. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades