Currencies

Dear client, There will be no weekly bulletin next week. Instead, I will be hosting a webcast, with my colleague, Matt Gertken, titled “Currencies And Geopolitics: A Discussion.” I hope you will tune in so that we can have an interactive session. Also, we will be revamping the traditional backsections that FX has been publishing and will send a mockup in the coming weeks. Feedback on the new format will be greatly appreciated. Finally, I hosted a webcast this week with Japanese clients titled “A Guide To Currency Management For Japanese Corporates.” For those who are interested but were unable to attend, I encourage you to consult your sales representative for a replay. Kind regards, Chester Highlights The Fed will taper asset purchases this year, but it could be a non-event for the US dollar. The reason is that the Fed is lagging other G10 central banks in tapering asset purchases. Many will end QE even before the Fed begins tapering. The two big exceptions are the ECB and the BoJ. But while dovish monetary policy is well priced into both the interest rate curve and their currencies, upside surprises are not. Most global central banks will remain data dependent. So the key to gauging the move in currencies is to observe (and forecast) economic data. On that front, the current evidence is that US growth is robust, but is losing momentum to other developed markets. Volatility in currencies will be on the rise. We went long CHF/NZD on this basis last week and maintain long yen positions. But our bias is that any rally in the DXY will fizzle out at the 94-95 level. Feature This week was a busy one for central bankers. We kicked off with the Riksbank on Tuesday, the Bank of Japan and the Federal Reserve on Wednesday, and concluded with the Swiss National Bank, the Bank of England, and the Norges bank on Thursday. The highlight was the Fed, but the general message from most central banks is that less monetary accommodation will be forthcoming, as economic activity picks up. Most central bankers also admitted that inflation was proving a bit more sticky than initially anticipated. The key question therefore for currency strategists is whether the Federal Reserve will be more or less orthodox with monetary policy, compared to other developed market central banks, and what that means for the dollar. Our bias is that while the Fed was slightly more hawkish this week, it will continue to lag other G10 central banks in curtailing monetary accommodation. The Message From The FOMC Chart I-1The Market Has Priced Fed Hawkishness The Market Has Priced Fed Hawkishness The Market Has Priced Fed Hawkishness The key development from the Fed meeting this week was an upgrade to the dot plot. Half of the committee now expects at least one interest rate hike in 2022, with perhaps 7-8 hikes by the end of 2024. This is a more aggressive path of interest rate increases compared to the June FOMC meeting. The Fed also suggested tapering could begin at the next policy meeting and end towards the middle of next year, in time for rate increases. The immediate market response to the FOMC meeting did certainly suggest a hawkish undertone. The two-year US Treasury yield rose by 4 bps, which boosted the DXY index from a low of 93 to a high of 93.5 (intraday). Stocks rose and the 10-year Treasury yield edged mildly lower. The 30/2-year Treasury slope flattened by almost 10 bps. In our view, this was a rather muted response. For one, most of these moves are fading as we go to press. More importantly, going into the meeting, the market was already priced for a liftoff in 2022. This will suggest that the market was well positioned for Fed tapering at a minimum, and possibly an upgrade to the dots (Chart I-1). The Message From Other Central Banks While the Fed is still considering tapering asset purchases (and would very likely do so) by year-end, other central banks are well ahead in exiting emergency monetary settings. Just this week: The Norges bank hiked interest rates by 25 bps. We are particularly bullish on the krone, as highlighted in our Norwegian Method report; The Riskbank will end asset purchases this year. Its balance sheet is slated to be flat for 2022. It also closed all lending facilities launched during the pandemic. The offer for USD loans via the Fed’s swap facility will expire this month; The Bank of England kept monetary policy unchanged, but has already purchased £852bn of its £895bn target for government and corporate bonds. In fact, two of its members voted this week to reduce this target by £35bn, which would have effectively ended QE on a majority vote; The Swiss National Bank said in its introductory statement that it is fighting against an expensive franc, but modestly upgraded its inflation forecasts for 2022; The sole dovish central bank (aside from the SNB) was the Bank of Japan, but with elections on the horizon, and the possibility (or not) of a big fiscal package, their policy stance made sense.  Chart I-2Central Bank Holdings Of Government Bonds Central Bank Holdings Of Government Bonds Central Bank Holdings Of Government Bonds Elsewhere, the Bank of Canada has already cut its asset purchases in half, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand has ended QE, and the Reserve Bank of Australia has already been tapering asset purchases. In a nutshell, a Fed tapering at this point is well behind the actions of other G10 central banks. This is one key reason why the DXY index has failed to punch above the 94-95 level, and is relapsing as we go to press. From a bird’s eye view, many G10 central banks already have bloated balance sheets and a strong incentive to curtail asset purchases as growth recovers. Within the G10, the US central bank has the smallest holdings of outstanding bonds (Chart I-2). This not only means that, ceteris paribus, the incentive to taper asset purchases is bigger for other central banks, but the scope for the Federal Reserve to ease monetary policy is quite substantial should another shock occur. This might explain why there is unease among other central bankers, to exit emergency settings. Admittedly, this week, traditionally dovish central banks such as the Bank of Japan and the Swiss National Bank kept policy on hold and telegraphed a message that they will keep doing so for the foreseeable future. With a slightly more hawkish Federal Reserve, this should be a negative for these currencies. The same will apply to the ECB (Chart I-3). However, it is important to note that relatively dovish policy settings are well priced into both interest rate curves and their currencies, while upside surprises are not. The market does not expect any interest rate increases in the euro area or Japan before 2024, while it is priced for an aggressive pace of Fed rate hikes (Chart I-4). The starting point for any currency investor is an extremely dovish ECB and BoJ, relative to the Fed. Chart I-3A Pickup In US Yields Has Boosted The Dollar A Pickup In US Yields Has Boosted The Dollar A Pickup In US Yields Has Boosted The Dollar Chart I-4Markets Expect A More Aggressive Fed Markets Expect A More Aggressive Fed Markets Expect A More Aggressive Fed What Could Change? Global central banks are clearly focused on two goals – the outlook for growth and what that means for their maximum employment objective, and the long-run rate of inflation. These two objectives are interlinked. On the growth front, central bankers are justifiably admitting that the outlook remains clouded due to the Delta variant of COVID-19 and supply disruptions that are muddling the manufacturing outlook. However, it is important to remember that this is a global phenomenon. On a relative basis, there has been a growth rotation from the US to other economies that has historically supported the performance of DM currencies (Chart I-5). The primary reason is that many economies outside the US were in various forms of a lockdown over the last several months. As these economies reopen, so will economic activity. Chart I-5ARelative Growth And Currencies Relative Growth And Currencies Relative Growth And Currencies Chart I-5BRelative Growth And Currencies Relative Growth And Currencies Relative Growth And Currencies On the inflation front, the most acute problem has been tied to supply bottlenecks and this is not a US-centric problem. Inflation in the euro area, Sweden, the UK, Canada, or New Zealand are all above central bank targets (Table I-1). While all these central banks view the current overshoot as temporary, most have already pared back emergency monetary settings, as we highlighted above. Table I-1Inflation In The G10 A Misconception About Fed Tapering And The Dollar A Misconception About Fed Tapering And The Dollar The key takeaway is that most central banks view inflation risks as symmetric, while the Fed has telegraphed it is willing to tolerate an inflation overshoot following downturns (Chart I-6). During the Fed’s last two meetings, it has been clear that there is a limit to how much of an overshoot they will tolerate. However, it still suggests that the Fed remains well behind the inflation curve, with one of the most negative 2-year rates in the G10 (Chart I-7). Chart I-6The Fed And Inflation Overshoots A Misconception About Fed Tapering And The Dollar A Misconception About Fed Tapering And The Dollar Chart I-7Real Yields In The US Are Very Low A Misconception About Fed Tapering And The Dollar A Misconception About Fed Tapering And The Dollar In a nutshell, if our bias turns out to be correct that growth does recover more earnestly outside the US, and other central banks remain more orthodox than the Fed, this will be a headwind for a stronger US dollar. A Final Note On Canada Canada re-elected a Liberal minority government on September 20. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s bet on a majority government, given an astute handling of the pandemic, and massive fiscal stimulus, failed. The implication is a continuation of the status quo in Canada. The good news is that the status quo is actually bullish for the loonie. As we highlighted in our recent report, minority governments tend to be positive for the loonie, while majority governments generally nudge the CAD lower post election (Chart I-8). The rationale is that fiscal policy is slated to stay easy, but not overly so, providing gentle room for the BoC to hike interest rates. Easy fiscal but tighter monetary policy is usually bullish for a currency. Chart I-8Historically, The CAD Likes A Minority Government Historically, The CAD Likes A Minority Government Historically, The CAD Likes A Minority Government Given our view on the US dollar, we expect the CAD/USD to punch above the recent 82-cent high, towards 85 and eventually 90 cents. While this view might take time to play out, both rising relative interest rates in Canada (our base case) and high oil prices will be the key catalysts. Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary A Misconception About Fed Tapering And The Dollar A Misconception About Fed Tapering And The Dollar Strategtic View A Misconception About Fed Tapering And The Dollar A Misconception About Fed Tapering And The Dollar Cyclical Holdings (6-18 months) Tactical Holdings (0-6 months) Limit Orders Closed Trades

Highlights We cannot predict how China will manage Evergrande precisely but we have a high conviction that it will do whatever it takes to prevent contagion across the property sector. However, China’s stimulus tools are losing their effectiveness over time. The country is due for a prolonged struggle with financial and economic instability regardless of whether Evergrande defaults. A messy default would obviously exacerbate the problem. China’s regulatory crackdowns target private companies and will continue to weigh on animal spirits in the private sector. The government will be forced to use fiscal policy to compensate. The US’s and China’s switch from engagement to confrontation poses a persistent headwind for investor sentiment toward China. The new consensus that investors should buy into China’s “strategic sectors” to avoid arbitrary regulatory crackdowns is vulnerable to its own logic and to sanctions by the US and its allies. Feature China poses a unique confluence of domestic and foreign political risks and global markets are now pricing them. Property giant Evergrande could default on $120 million in onshore and offshore interest payments as early as September 23, or next month, prompting investors to run for cover. Is this crisis fleeting or part of a larger systemic failure? It is a larger systemic failure. We expect a slow-motion, Japanese-style crisis over the coming decade, marked with periodic bailouts and stimulus packages. We recommend investors stay the course: steer clear of China and stay short the renminbi and Taiwanese dollar. Tactically, stick with large caps, defensive sectors, and developed markets within the global equity universe. Strategically, prefer emerging markets that benefit from forthcoming Chinese (and American) stimulus. 1. A “Minsky Moment” Cannot Be Ruled Out The chief fear is whether the approaching default of Evergrande marks China’s “Minsky Moment.” Hyman Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis held that long periods of stable revenues lead to risky financial deals and large accumulations of systemic risk that are underpriced. When revenues cannot cover interest payments, a crash ensues followed by deleveraging. Minsky’s hypothesis speaks to debt crises in an entire economy, yet nobody knows for sure whether China’s economy has reached such a breaking point. China’s national savings rate stands at 45.7% of GDP and nominal growth exceeds the long-term government bond yield. However, a sharp drop in asset prices, especially in the property sector, could change everything, as it could lead to balance sheet recession among corporates and a fall in national income. Evergrande is supposed to make an $84 million interest payment on offshore debt and a $36 million payment on onshore debt this week, and after 30 days it would default. It owes $37 billion in debt payments over the next 12 months but only has $13 billion cash on hand (as of June 30, 2021). Authorities can opt for a full bailout or a partial bailout, in which the company defaults on offshore bonds but not onshore. They could even let the company fail categorically, though that would produce exactly the kind of precipitous drop in property asset prices that would lead to wider financial contagion. State intervention to smooth the crisis is more likely – and the government can easily pressure other companies into acquiring Evergrande’s assets and business divisions. Chart 1Yes, This Could Be China's Minsky Moment Yes, This Could Be China's Minsky Moment Yes, This Could Be China's Minsky Moment Chart 1 shows that China’s corporate debt-to-GDP ratio stands head and shoulders above other countries that experienced financial crises in recent decades, courtesy of our Emerging Markets Strategy. While China can undoubtedly bear large debts due to its savings, the implication is that China has large enough financial imbalances to suffer a full-fledged financial crisis, even if the timing is hard to predict. Household credit is also elevated at 61.7% of GDP, and the household debt-to-disposable-income ratio is now higher than in the United States. About two-thirds of China’s corporate debt is held by state-owned or state-controlled entities, prompting some investors to dismiss the gravity of the risk. However, financial crises often involve the transfer of debt from the state to private sector or vice versa. 59% of bond defaults in H1 2021 have involved state companies. Total debt is the main concern. Don’t take our word for it: China’s Communist Party has warned for the past decade about the danger of “implicit guarantees” and “moral hazard” that encourage financial excesses in the corporate sector. The Xi Jinping administration has tried to induce a deleveraging process since it came to power in 2012-13. Xi’s “three red lines” for the property sector precipitated the current turmoil. Even if Evergrande’s troubles are managed, China’s systemic risks will continue to boil over as its potential growth rate slows and the government continues trying to wring out financial excesses. Chart 2Policy Uncertainty, Financial Stress Can Rise Higher Policy Uncertainty, Financial Stress Can Rise Higher Policy Uncertainty, Financial Stress Can Rise Higher More broadly China is experiencing an unprecedented overlap of economic and political crises: The population is aging and labor force is shrinking; The economic model since 2009 has been changing from export-manufacturing to domestic-oriented, investment-driven growth; Indebtedness is spreading from corporates to households and ultimately the government; The governance model is shifting from “single-party rule” to “single-person rule” or autocracy; The population is reaching middle class status and demanding better quality of life; The international trade environment is turning from hyper-globalization to hypo-globalization; The geopolitical backdrop is darkening with the US and its allies attempting to contain China’s ambitions of regional supremacy. Almost all of these changes bring more risks than opportunities to China over the long haul. The need for rapid policy shifts provides the ostensible reasoning for President Xi Jinping’s decision not to step down but to remain president for the foreseeable future. He will clinch this position at the twentieth national party congress in fall 2022. The implication is that policy uncertainty will continue climbing up to at least 2019 peaks while offshore equity markets will continue to trend lower, as they have done since the onset of the US trade war (Chart 2). Credit default swap rates have so far been subdued but they are showing signs of life. A sharp rise in policy uncertainty and property sector stress would pull them up. Domestic equities (A-shares) have rallied since 2019 but we would expect them to fall back given China’s historic confluence of structural and cyclical challenges, which will create further negative surprises (Chart 2, bottom panel). 2. Beijing Will Provide Bailouts And Stimulus Ad Nauseum Evergrande’s future may be in doubt but Beijing will throw all its power at stopping nationwide financial contagion. True, a policy miscalculation is possible. A tardy or failed intervention cannot be ruled out. However, investors should remember that a clear pattern of bailouts and stimulus has emerged over the course of the Xi Jinping administration whenever a “hard landing” or financial collapse loomed. The government tightens controls on bloated sectors until the financial fallout threatens to undermine general economic and social stability, at which point the government eases policy. It is often forced to stimulate the economy aggressively. Chart 3 shows these cycles in two ways: China’s control of credit through the state-controlled banks, and the frequency of news stories mentioning important terms associated with financial and economic distress: defaults, layoffs, and bankruptcies. These three terms used to be unheard of among China watchers. Under the Xi administration, a higher tolerance of creative destruction has served as the way to push forward reform. The current rise in distress is not extended, suggesting that more bad news is coming, but it also shows that the government has repeatedly been forced to provide stimulus even under the Xi administration. Chart 3Xi Jinping Has Bailed Out System Three Times Already Xi Jinping Has Bailed Out System Three Times Already Xi Jinping Has Bailed Out System Three Times Already Could this time be different? Not likely. The American experience and the pandemic will also force China’s government to ease policy: China learns from US mistakes. The US lurched from Lehman’s failure into a financial crisis, an impaired credit channel, a sluggish economic recovery, a spike in polarization, policy paralysis, a near-default on the national debt, a surge in right- and left-wing populism, the tumultuous Trump presidency, widespread social unrest, a contested leadership succession, and a mob storming the nation’s capitol (Chart 4). This is obviously the nightmare of any Chinese leader and a trajectory that the Xi administration will avoid at any cost. Chart 4Lehman Brothers A Powerful Disincentive For China To Let Evergrande Fail Lehman Brothers A Powerful Disincentive For China To Let Evergrande Fail Lehman Brothers A Powerful Disincentive For China To Let Evergrande Fail Chinese households store their wealth in the property sector, so any attempt at policy restraint or austerity faces a massive constraint. Only a few countries are comparable to China with respect to the share of non-financial household wealth (property and land) within total household wealth. All of them are hosts of property sector bubbles, including the bubbles in Spain and Ireland back in 2007 (Chart 5). A property collapse would destroy the savings of the Chinese people over four decades of prosperity. Chart 5Property Is The Bedrock Of Chinese Households Five Points On China’s Crisis Five Points On China’s Crisis Social instability is already flaring up. Almost all China experts agree that “social stability” is the Communist Party’s bottom line. But note that the Evergrande saga has already led to protests, not only at the company’s headquarters in Shenzhen but also in other cities such as Shenyang, Guangzhou, Chongqing. Protests were filmed and shown on social media (posts have been censored). Protesters demanded repayment for wealth management products gone sour and properties they are owed that have not been built. This is only a taste of the cross-regional protests that would emerge if the broader property sector suffered. The lingering COVID-19 pandemic is still relevant. Investors should not underrate the potential threat that the pandemic poses to the regime. Severe epidemics have occurred about 11% of the time over the course of China’s history and they often have major ramifications. Disease has played a role in the downfall of six out of ten dynasties – and in four cases it played a major role. It would be suicidal for any regime to add self-inflicted economic collapse to a lingering pandemic (Table 1). Table 1Disease Threatens Chinese Dynasties – Not A Time To Self-Inflict A Recession Five Points On China’s Crisis Five Points On China’s Crisis Easing policy does not necessarily mean bringing out the “bazooka” and splurging on money and credit growth, though that is increasingly likely as the crisis intensifies. Notably the July Politburo statement specifically removed language that said China would “avoid sharp turns in policy.” In other words, sharp turns might be necessary. That can only mean sharp reflationary turns, as there is very little chance of doubling down on policy tightening. A counterargument holds that the Chinese government is now exclusively focused on power consolidation to the neglect of financial and economic stability. Perhaps the leadership is misinformed, overconfident, or thinks a financial collapse will better purge its enemies – along the lines of the various political purges under Chairman Mao Zedong. Wealthy tech magnates and property owners could conceivably challenge the return of autocracy. After all, the US political establishment almost “fell” to a rich property baron – why couldn’t China’s Communist Party? Political purges should certainly be expected ahead of next year’s party congress. But not to the point of killing the economy. The government would not be trying to balance policy tightening and loosening so carefully if it sought to induce chaos. It must be admitted, however, that the change to autocracy means that the odds of irrational or idiosyncratic policy have gone up substantially and permanently. Of course, the high likelihood that Beijing will provide bailouts and stimulus should not be read as a bullish investment thesis, even though it would create a pop in oversold assets. The Chinese system is saturated with money and credit, which have been losing their effectiveness in driving growth. Financial imbalances get worse, not better, with each wave of credit stimulus. Beijing is caught between a rock and a hard place. Hence stimulus comes only reluctantly and reactively. But it does come in the end because a financial crash would threaten the life of the regime and preclude all other policy priorities, domestic and foreign. 3. Yes, China’s Regulatory Crackdown Targets The Private Sector Global growth and other emerging economies will get most of the benefit once China stimulates, since China’s own firms will still face a negative domestic political backdrop. Bullish investors argue that the government’s regulatory tightening is misunderstood and overblown. The claim is that China is not targeting the private sector generally but only isolated sectors causing social problems. Costs need to be reduced in property, education, and health to improve quality of life. China shares the US’s and EU’s desire to rein in tech giants that monopolize their markets, abuse consumer data and privacy, and benefit from distorted tax systems. Most of these arguments are misleading. China does not have a strong record on data privacy, equality, social safety nets, rule of law, or “sustainable” growth (as opposed to “unsustainable,” high-debt, high-polluting growth). China actively encourages state champions that monopolize key sectors. Many developed markets have better records in these areas, notably in Europe, yet China is eschewing these regulatory models in preference for an approach that is arbitrary and absolutist, i.e. negative for governance. As for the private sector, animal spirits have been in a long decline throughout the past decade. This is true whether judging by money velocity – i.e. the pace of economic activity relative to the increase in money supply – or by households’ and businesses’ marginal propensity to save (Chart 6). The 2015-16 period shows that even periodic bouts of government stimulus have not reversed the general trend. Regulatory whack-a-mole and financial turmoil will not improve the situation. Chart 6Private Sector Animal Spirits Depressed Throughout Xi Era Private Sector Animal Spirits Depressed Throughout Xi Era Private Sector Animal Spirits Depressed Throughout Xi Era Chart 7Even Official Data Shows Consumer Confidence Flagging Even Official Data Shows Consumer Confidence Flagging Even Official Data Shows Consumer Confidence Flagging Surveys of sentiment confirm that the latest developments will have a negative effect (Chart 7). Cumulatively, the changes in China’s domestic and international policy context are being interpreted as negative for business, entrepreneurship, and economic freedom – notwithstanding the government’s claims to expand opportunity in its “common prosperity” plan. 4. The Withdrawal Of US Friendship Is A Headwind For China Chart 8Other Asians Sought US Friendship, Not Conflict, When Export Models Expired Other Asians Sought US Friendship, Not Conflict, When Export Models Expired Other Asians Sought US Friendship, Not Conflict, When Export Models Expired All of the successful Asian economies – including China for most of the past forty years of prosperity – have tried to stay on the good side of the United States. By contrast, China and the US today are shifting from engagement to confrontation and breaking up their economic ties (Chart 8). This is a problem for China because the US and to some extent its allies will seek to undermine China’s economy and its autocratic model as part of this great power competition. The rise in geopolitical risk is underscored by the Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) agreement, by which the US will provide Australia with nuclear submarines over the next decade. This was a clear demonstration of the US’s “pivot to Asia” and the fact that the US and China are preparing for war – if only to deter it. China’s return to autocracy and clash with the US and Asian neighbors is also leading to a deterioration of its global image, particularly over issues of transparency and information sharing. The dispute over the origins of COVID-19 is a major source of division with the US and other countries. Transparency is important for investors. The World Bank has discontinued its “Ease of Doing Business” rankings after a scandal was revealed in which China’s ranking was artificially bumped up. The last-published trend is still downward (Chart 9). Most recently China has stepped up censorship of its financial news media amid the current market turmoil, which makes it harder for investors to assess the full extent of property and financial risks.1 The US political factions agree on China-bashing if nothing else. The Biden administration has little political impetus to eschew tariffs and export controls. One important penalty will come from the Securities and Exchange Commission, which is likely to ban Chinese firms from US stock exchanges unless they conform to common accounting standards. Hence the dramatic fall in the share prices of Chinese companies listed via American Depository Receipts (ADRs), in both absolute and relative terms (Chart 10, top panel). This threat prompted China’s recent crackdown on its own firms that were attempting to hold initial public offerings on US exchanges. Chart 9US Conflict Exposes China’s Global Influence Campaign Five Points On China’s Crisis Five Points On China’s Crisis The Quadrilateral Forum – the US, Japan, Australia, and India – has agreed to link the semiconductor supply chain to human rights standards, foreclosing China’s participation in that supply chain. US semiconductor firms are among the most exposed to China but they have not suffered over the course of the US-China tech war, suggesting that US vulnerabilities are limited (Chart 10, bottom panel). Chart 10US Regulators Will Kick Chinese Firms While They Are Down US Regulators Will Kick Chinese Firms While They Are Down US Regulators Will Kick Chinese Firms While They Are Down The point is not to exaggerate the strength of the US and its allies but rather the costs to China of actively opposing them. The US has a difficult enough time cobbling together a coalition of states to impose sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program, not to mention forming any coalition that would totally exclude and isolate China. China is far more important to US allies than Iran – it is irreplaceable in the global economy (Chart 11). The EU and China’s Asian neighbors will typically restrain the US’s more aggressive impulses so as not to upset the global recovery or end up on the front lines of a war.2 Chart 11No Substitute For China In Global Economy Five Points On China’s Crisis Five Points On China’s Crisis This diplomatic constraint on the US is probably positive for global growth but not for China per se. American allies are still able to increase the costs on China for pursuing its own state-backed development path and geopolitical sphere of influence. Japan, Australia, and others are likely to veto China’s application to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), while the UK and eventually the US are likely to join it. Investors should view US-China ties as a headwind at least until the two powers manage to negotiate a diplomatic thaw, i.e. substantial de-escalation of tensions. A thaw is unlikely in the lead-up to Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power and the US midterm elections in fall 2022. Presidents Biden and Xi are still working on a bilateral summit, not to mention a more substantial improvement in ties. We doubt a diplomatic thaw would be durable anyway but the important point is that until it happens China will face periodic bouts of negative sentiment from the emerging cold war. Other Asian economies thrived under US auspices – China is sailing in uncharted waters. 5. Global Investors Cannot Separate Civilian From State And Military Investments The word on Wall Street is that investors should align their strategies with those of China’s leaders so as not to run afoul of arbitrary and draconian regulators. For example, instead of “soft tech” or consumer-oriented companies – like those that give people rides, deliver food, or make creative video games – investors should invest in “hard tech” or strategic companies like those that make computer chips, renewable energy, biotechnologies, pharmaceuticals, and capital equipment. There is no question that the trend in China – and elsewhere – is for governments to become more active in picking winners and losers. Industrial policy is back. Investors have no choice but to include policy analysis in their toolbox. However, for global investors, an investment strategy of buying whatever the government says is far from convincing. The most basic investment strategy in keeping with the Xi administration’s goals would be to invest in state-owned enterprises in domestic equity markets. So SOEs should have outperformed the market, right? Wrong. They were in a downtrend prior to the 2015 bubble, the burst of which caused a further downtrend (Chart 12, top panel). Similarly, the preference for “hard tech” over “soft tech” is promising in theory but complicated in practice: hard tech is flat-to-down over the decade and down since COVID-19 (Chart 12, middle panel). It has underperformed its global peers (Chart 12, bottom panel). China’s policy disposition should be beneficial for industrials, health care, and renewable energy. First, China is doubling down on its manufacturing economy. Second, the population is aging and health care is a critical part of the common prosperity plan. Third, green energy is a way of diversifying from dependency on imported oil and natural gas. However, the profile of these sectors relative to their global counterparts is only unambiguously attractive in the case of industrials, which began to outperform even during the trade war (Chart 13). Chart 12State Approved' Trades Still Bring Risks State Approved' Trades Still Bring Risks State Approved' Trades Still Bring Risks Chart 13Beware 'State Approved' Trades Beware 'State Approved' Trades Beware 'State Approved' Trades In Table 2 we outline the valuations and political risks of onshore equity sectors. Valuations are not cheap. Domestic and foreign risks are not fully priced. Table 2China Onshore Equities, Valuations, And (Geo)Political Risks Five Points On China’s Crisis Five Points On China’s Crisis There is a bigger problem for global investors, especially Americans: investing in China’s strategic sectors directly implicates investors in the Communist Party’s domestic human rights practices, state-owned enterprises, and national security goals. “Civil-military fusion” is a well-established doctrine that calls for the People’s Liberation Army to have access to the cutting-edge technology developed by civilians and vice versa. These investments will eventually be subject to punitive measures since the US policy establishment believes it can no longer afford to let US wealth buttress China’s military and technological rise. Investment Takeaways China may or may not work out a partial bailout for Evergrande but it will definitely provide state assistance and fiscal stimulus to try to prevent contagion across the property sector and financial system. Bad news in the coming weeks and months will be replaced by good news in this sense. However, the fact that China will eventually be forced to undertake traditional stimulus yet again will increase its systemic financial risks, in a well-established pattern. The best equity opportunities will lie outside of China, where companies will benefit from global recovery yet avoid suffering from China’s unique confluence of domestic and foreign political risks. We prefer developed markets and select emerging markets in Latin America and Asia-ex-China. Chinese households and businesses are downbeat. This behavior cannot be separated from the historic changes in the economy, domestic politics, and foreign policy. It is hard to see an improvement until the government boosts growth and the 2022 political reshuffle is over. American opposition is a bigger problem for China than global investors realize. Not only are the two economies divorcing but other democracies will distance themselves from China as well – not because of US demands but because their own manufacturing, national security, and ideological space is threatened by China’s reversion to autocracy and assertive foreign policy. Investing in China’s “hard tech” and strategic sectors with government approval is not a simple solution. This approach will directly funnel capital into China’s state-owned enterprises, domestic security forces, and military. As such the US and West will eventually impose controls. Investments may not be liquid since China would suffer if capital ever fled these kinds of projects. Both American and Chinese stimulus is looming this winter but the short run will see more volatility. We are closing our long JPY-KRW tactical trade for a gain of 4.4%   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 We have often noted in these pages over the past decade that multilateral organizations overrated improvements in China’s governance based on policy pronouncements rather than structural changes. 2 Still, tensions among the allies should not be overrated since they share a fundamental concern over China’s increasing challenge to the current global order. The EU is pursuing trade talks with Taiwan, and there are ways that the US can compensate France over the nullification of its submarine sales to Australia (most of which are detrimental to China’s security).