Developed Countries

Highlights Rate Hikes Are Coming – O/W Banks And Small Caps: Rampant inflation is changing investor expectations on the timing and speed of rate hikes. At present, the market is pricing in three rate hikes in 2022. Overweight sectors that outperform in a rising rates environment. Shortages Of Goods – O/W Semis: Overweight industries which are upstream in the supply chain, such as semiconductor manufacturers. They enjoy strong pent-up demand and significant pricing power. Transportation Bottlenecks – O/W Airfreight, Road And Rail: While skyrocketing transportation costs are a boost for most, they are a boon for ocean shipping lines, and US transport companies, such as truck lines and railways. Pent-Up Demand For Services – O/W Travel Complex: The ISM PMI Non-Manufacturing composite reading indicates that demand for services still exceeds demand for goods. Stay overweight Hotels, Restaurants, Entertainment and Professional Business Services. Underweight Airlines for now. US Consumers Are Feeling Poorer – This Will Weight On Profits: Real wages are not keeping up with prices, erasing American consumer purchasing power, thus putting a lid on corporate pricing power. This will hurt profits in the Consumer Discretionary sector, in addition to causing broad-based margin compression. Fundamentals Are Strong For Now: Companies delivered blockbuster Q3 2021 earnings results and peak margins. However, an unusually high percentage of companies (52.6%) were guiding lower. Rising labor costs, reduced productivity, and loss of corporate pricing power will lead to margin compression as early as 2022. Strong Equity Inflows Into Year-End: Late-in-year catchup pension contributions translate into strong inflows into US equities after the early fall hiatus. Buying on dips still offers downward protection from a major market pullback. Buybacks vs Dividends: Share buybacks are on the rise, seemingly displacing dividends as a means of returning cash to shareholders. For cash yield, focus on sectors known for using buybacks to disburse cash to shareholders: Technology and Financials. Reiterating Investment Positioning Overarching Macroeconomic Themes Rate Hikes Are Coming Taper Tantrum 2.0 rotation is running its course: Sectors and styles most adversely affected by rising rates, such as Consumer Staples, Communications, Services and Health Care have underperformed in October (Chart 1), while cyclicals, geared to rising rates, have outperformed. Growth/Technology has benefited from recent rate stabilization. Chart 2Market Is Pricing In Three Rate Hikes in 2022 Market now expects three rate hikes by the end of 2022: Rampant inflation is changing investor expectations on the timing and the speed of rate hikes. A month ago, the probability of two rate hikes in 2022 stood at around 55%. Now, the probability of three rate hikes is roughly 64% (Chart 2). The BCA house view is that the Fed will raise rates once in December 2022 – an outlook much more temperate than the market’s. Investment Implication: Banks, Small Caps and Cyclicals outperform in a rising rates environment (Table 1). Table 1Recent Performance Of Sectors In A Rising Rates Regime Shortages Of Goods   Shortages are ubiquitous. How do we make money from this theme? We choose industries that are positioned upstream in the supply chain; for example, we prefer Semis to Durable Goods (Chart 3). Manufacturers of chips face strong demand and significant pricing power, while durable goods manufacturers face shortages and have to pass higher input costs on to their customers, which constrains demand and sales growth. Of course, there is also another aspect contributing to the underperformance of durables: Purchases of goods have exceeded the pre-pandemic trend and turned. Over the past three months, semis outperformed the S&P 500 by nearly 5%, while durables underperformed by 12%. Investment Implication: Stay overweight Semiconductors and Semiconductor Equipment, underweight Durable Goods (Table 2). Chart 3Demand for Chips Is BoomingTable 2Sectors Affected By Shortage: Recent Performance Pent-Up Demand for Services The ISM Non-Manufacturing PMI for October has come in at a record 66.7 (62 expected) (Chart 4A), and new orders are soaring at 70. These readings exceed the ISM Manufacturing PMI (60.8), suggesting that demand for services still exceeds demand for goods. Furthermore, spending on services is still below pre-pandemic levels, and the rebound is running its course (Chart 4B). We conclude that our “pent-up demand for services” investment theme still has legs. Chart 4AISM Services Is Soaring Chart 4BStill Strong Pent-up Demand For Services Investment Implication: Stay overweight Hotels, Restaurants, Entertainment and Professional Business Services (Table 3). Stay away from Airlines for now. Table 3Travel Complex: Recent Performance Transportation Bottlenecks Shipping costs continue their ascent (Chart 5). Over 100 ships are currently anchored in LA/Long Beach ports compared to almost immediate unloading before the pandemic. While rising transportation costs are denting the profit margins of a wide range of companies, from retailers to manufacturers, they are a boon for ocean shipping lines, and US transport companies, such as truck lines and railways. Case in point: A.P. Moller-Maersk, the world’s largest boxship operator, delivered $5.44B in quarterly profits last week – doubling its entire 2020 income, on the heels of the unprofitable years of 2018 and 2019.1 Profits of other freight operators are also surging. Investors take notice: After a stretch of underperformance, the S&P 500 Transportation Index outperformed the S&P 500 by 6.55% in October. Chart 5Shipping Costs Still Exorbitant Investment Implication: Continue overweight of Transportation Services, specifically Air Freight and Logistics, and Road and Rail (Table 4). Table 4Transportation: Recent Performance US Consumers Are Feeling Poorer Consumers are right to worry about inflation: Nominal wages increased by 4.5% Year-on-Year in October, the highest reading over the past 40 years. However, real wage growth is negative, i.e. it is not keeping up with prices, erasing American consumers’ buying power (Chart 6). According to a Gallup survey, upticks in citations of the deficit and inflation are largely responsible for an increase in mentions of any economic issue – from 16% in September to 24% in October.2 According to the Conference Board survey, consumers expect prices to rise by 7% over the next 12 months. Loss of purchasing power is bound to dampen consumer demand, as we have seen with demand for Consumer Durables and Autos which has collapsed due to shortages and sky-high prices. Corporate pricing power is waning: As a result of pressures on consumer purchasing power, US producers are reporting that they find it harder to raise prices. Looking ahead, companies will have to absorb price increases (Chart 7). Chart 6Wage Increases Are Not Keeping Up With Inflation Chart 7Corporate Pricing Power Is Waning Investment Implication: Erosion of consumer pricing power will eventually harm the Consumer Discretionary sector and will lead to a broad-based margin compression. Fundamentals Peak margins are here: The confluence of rising wages, falling productivity, and reduced ability to raise prices translates into an impending margin squeeze. We forecast that the year-over-year margin change will be negative in 2022 (Chart 8). The Q3 2021 earnings season delivered blockbuster results so far with roughly two-thirds of the companies reporting, and results are striking. 83% of companies have beaten the street expectations with the average earnings surprise standing at 11% (Chart 9). Sales beats are only marginally worse: 77% of the companies have exceeded expectations with an average sales surprise of 3%. Quarter-on-quarter earnings growth is 0.25%, exceeding an expected 6% contraction. Compared to Q3 2019, EPS CAGR is 12%. These results indicate that street expectations were a low bar to clear. Forward guidance is concerning: Most companies commented that supply chain bottlenecks and soaring shipping costs are the major headwinds. Most companies have navigated a challenging economic environment swimmingly so far. However, looking ahead, waning pricing power, falling productivity, and rising costs will weigh on profitability. These factors are the ubiquitous reasons for negative guidance: 52.6% of companies are guiding lower for Q4 2021 (compare that to 32.7% in the previous quarter). Investment Implication: It is likely that the Q4 2021 earnings season disappoints. Sentiment Strong inflows into US equities after early fall hiatus. This can be explained by FOMO (fear of missing out), and lots of cash sitting on the sidelines, which many retail investors aim to park in US equities (Chart 10). Furthermore, historically, November and December have been characterized by robust equity inflows: Retail investors wait until the end of the year to reach clarity on their financial situation and to allocate funds to 401Ks, IRAs, and 529s. Investment Implication: Buying on dips still offers downward protection from a major market pullback. Chart 10Strong Inflows Into US Equities: Buying On Dip Is Still En Vogue Uses Of Cash Buybacks Replace Dividends: Share buybacks are on the rise again (Chart 11, Panel 1), seemingly displacing dividends as a means of returning cash to shareholders: The dividend payout ratio is flagging (Chart 11, Panel 2). From a corporate standpoint, dividends require a long-term commitment, while buybacks can be a “one-off,” lending more flexibility to corporate treasurers. Corporations also prefer buybacks as they reduce their share count and inflate earnings per share. Investment Implication: For cash yield, focus on sectors known for using buybacks to disburse cash to shareholders: Technology and Financials. Chart 11Buybacks Are Replacing Dividends   Irene Tunkel Chief Strategist, US Equity Strategy irene.tunkel@bcaresearch.com   S&P 500 Chart 12Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 13Profitability Chart 14Valuations And Technicals Chart 15Uses Of Cash Cyclicals Vs Defensives Chart 16Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 17Profitability Chart 18Valuation And Technicals Chart 19Uses Of Cash Growth Vs Value Chart 20Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 21Profitability Chart 22Valuations And Technicals     Small Vs Large Chart 23Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 24Profitability   Chart 25Valuations and Technicals Chart 26Uses Of Cash       Footnotes 1     WSJ, Supply-Chain Pain Is Maersk’s Gain as $5.44 Billion Profit Dwarfs Amazon, UPS, November 2, 2021. 2     Job Market Ratings Set Record, but Economic Confidence Slides (gallup.com), October 27, 2021.   Recommended Allocation

We will be holding our quarterly webcasts next Monday, November 15th at 10:00 a.m. Eastern time and Tuesday, November 16th at 8:00 a.m. Hong Kong time in lieu of publishing a Weekly Report. Please join us with your questions to make it a fully interactive event. We will resume our regular publication schedule on the 22nd. Highlights Economy – Wages could be on the rise if workers are able to exploit the considerable leverage they now enjoy: The labor market currently has no slack. Workers’ ability to derive a lasting advantage from today’s shortages will determine if the extended decline in labor’s share of income will reverse. Markets – Lengthy agreements in labor’s favor could give inflation an additional impetus: Investors are not prepared for a shift in the balance of power from management to labor and a range of assets will have to reprice if workers can achieve some durable victories. Strategy – Keep an eye on labor agreements, which could hasten a shift to more defensive positioning: The current economic backdrop, along with accommodative monetary and fiscal policy, support risk-friendly portfolio positioning, but a labor revival could prompt the Fed to engage in a disruptive tightening cycle that would halt the bull markets in equities and credit and possibly also short-circuit the expansion. Feature At the end of 2019, tiring of the market debates du jour, we began haunting the New York Public Library, reading all we could about US labor relations history. Several books and rolls of microfilm later, we published a three-part Special Report on workers’ past, present and future. While we concluded that organized labor would not regain the influence it wielded in the fifties, sixties and seventies, we thought that investors were underestimating the potential for workers to reverse the grinding decline in their fortunes that began in the early eighties. Public opinion seemed to be shifting in workers’ favor, especially among the young; the coming election held promise for the Democrats; and the pendulum had swung so far, for so long, that there was little scope for management to gain any more ground. We looked forward to countering the view that organized labor was as dead as a doornail, only to have COVID-19 render the topic irrelevant. Nearly two years later, however, dislocations caused by the pandemic have pushed negotiations over wages and labor conditions to the fore. Amidst a recent flurry of strikes against S&P 500 constituents, clients have been asking what the labor future holds. We refresh the themes we identified in our initial analysis, noting how conditions have shifted since early 2020. The investment takeaway is that increasing labor muscle could stoke inflation and push long-run inflation expectations higher, forcing the Fed to tighten monetary policy more abruptly than markets expect. The 2020 Election Went Labor’s Way A review of the historical record makes it crystal clear that employees cannot gain ground if government sides with employers. The 2020 election, which delivered both the White House and the Senate to Democrats, put some unexpected wind in labor’s sails. They did not mark a revival of the New Deal, however, as Democrats’ legislative majorities are precariously thin and unlikely to survive the 2022 midterms, their control of the presidency may not extend beyond 2024, and the federal judiciary will be inclined to see things management’s way for some time thanks to past conservative appointments. At the state level, the executive and legislative branches remain firmly in Republican control. A friendly executive branch can do a lot to reset the scales nonetheless. The Biden Department of Labor, National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and Department of Justice are certain to enforce existing worker protection laws more vigorously than their recent predecessors, while more actively challenging business combinations. Joe Biden began his election campaign at a Pittsburgh union hall and returned to the Steel City to end it, promising to be “the most pro-union president you’ve ever seen.” Labor leaders have generally given him high marks since taking office for supporting legislation to make it easier for workers to organize and he publicly offered moral support to John Deere’s UAW workers when they went on strike last month, saying, “My message is they have a right to strike and they have a right to demand higher wages.” Public Opinion Has Continued To Shift Toward Labor We noted two years ago that young Democratic voters overwhelmingly favored Bernie Sanders’ and Elizabeth Warren’s candidacies, suggesting that solidarity with workers might be on the rise. It is no surprise that students would be the most avid supporters of progressive campaigns, but Millennials, born between 1981 and 1996, and Generation Z might be viewed as the Inequality Generations, having entered the workforce after China’s admittance to the WTO, which coincided with a peak in labor’s share of income (Chart 1). Their lives have spanned the September 11th attacks, the financial crisis, a once-in-a-century pandemic and three equity market crashes, and many of them started adulthood with onerous student debt burdens and dim earnings prospects. They might find the notion of a union buffer from market forces especially alluring and therefore view unions favorably. The 2019 Gallup poll found that public approval for unions had reached nearly 20-year highs; two years on, it’s up to levels last reached over 50 years ago (Chart 2). Chart 1Workers' Share Of The Pie Shrank For 15 Years Chart 2Extreme Makeover Public opinion is crucially important to the outcome of labor negotiations because for-profit employers will seek the most favorable terms they can get, to the extent that they are socially acceptable. In our schematic of the 1980s vicious circle that initiated unions’ 40-year decline, public opinion made it possible for the Reagan administration to take a hard line against the air traffic controllers’ union and emboldened private employers to take more aggressive measures as well (Figure 1). Beyond the private sector, elected officials reliably deliver what their constituents want, and the courts do, too, albeit with a longer lag. The median voter theory advanced by our geopolitical strategists doesn’t just predict future outcomes, it directly influences them. Striketober Another key takeaway from our original study was that successful strikes beget strikes. Strikes are the most potent weapon in workers’ arsenal – withholding their labor threatens to reduce their employer’s output and may halt it altogether – but they are fraught with risk for individual employees. Striking workers don’t get paid beyond the partial support that may be provided by their union strike fund and may find themselves entirely out of work if the strike fails. Workers should only strike when they have a good chance of winning or when their situation has become so intolerable that they have little to lose. Strikes (and lockouts) occur when labor and management cannot reach a mutually acceptable settlement, often because at least one side overestimates its bargaining power. It is easy to agree when labor and management hold similar views about each side’s relative position, as when both perceive that one of them is considerably stronger. In that case, a settlement favoring the stronger side can be reached quickly, especially if the stronger side exercises some restraint and does not seek to impose terms that the weaker side can scarcely abide. Restraint is rational in repeated games like employer-employee bargaining, and when both parties recognize that relative bargaining positions are fluid, they are likely to exercise it. Viewing labor negotiations through a game theory lens, we posit a simple framework in which each side can hold any of five perceptions of its bargaining power, resulting in a total of 25 possible joint perceptions. Labor (L) can believe it is way stronger than Management (M), L >> M; stronger than Management, L > M; roughly equal, L ≈ M; weaker than Management, L < M; or way weaker than Management, L << M. Management also holds one of these five perceptions, and the interaction of the two sides’ perceptions establishes the path negotiations will follow. Limiting our focus to today’s prevailing conditions, Figure 2 displays only the outcomes consistent with labor’s belief that it has the upper hand. For completeness, the exhibit lists all of management’s potential perceptions, but we deem the three away from the extremes to be most likely. Record job openings and job quits rates (Chart 3) should disabuse even the most rabidly anti-union managements from thinking they hold all the cards. On the other hand, four consecutive decades of victories will make it hard for all but the most objective management negotiators to believe that the tables have completely turned and that labor is fully in control. Chart 3It's A Labor Seller's Market ... Strike outcomes turn on which side has overestimated its leverage. The broad factors we use to assess leverage are overall labor market slack; economic concentration; regulatory and legal trends; and the sustainability of either side’s accumulated advantage, which we describe as the labor-management rubber band. Other factors that matter on a case-by-case basis, but are beyond the scope of our analysis, include industry-level slack, a labor input’s susceptibility to automation, and the degree of labor specialization/skill involved in that input. For these micro-level factors, a given group of workers’ leverage is inversely related to the availability of substitutes for their input. Labor Market Slack Though we hold the view that labor force participation is likely to revive in coming months because inequality and a comparatively thin social safety net will compel many lower-income workers to return to the work force, no one knows for sure where the workers have gone or when they will return, if at all. It is abundantly clear from accelerating wage gains (Chart 4), the openings and quits rates, and small businesses’ historic inability to fill job openings (Chart 5) that the labor market is extremely tight right now. A difference of opinion about whether and how long the worker shortages will persist could make finding common ground in contract negotiations a challenge. Chart 4... As Rising Wages ... Chart 5... And Frantic Employers Confirm Economic Concentration We previously noted that the trend toward economic concentration has strengthened management’s hand in labor negotiations as it has made an increasing share of local labor markets tend toward monopsony. A monopsony is a market with a single buyer, the mirror image of a monopoly, which is a market with a single seller. Unfortunately for labor, monopsonies restrain prices just as monopolies inflate them. The trend toward economic concentration is well established and we think the probability that it will reverse is low – Congress may shake its fist at Big Tech and the Biden Justice Department will more vigorously contest mergers on anti-trust grounds, but there is an ocean of liquidity available to support acquisitions and robust CEO confidence suggests it will be deployed. Regulatory And Legal Trends Over the last four decades, unions have endured a near-constant drubbing from statehouses, federal agencies and the courts, as union and labor protections have been under siege from all sides. But the regulatory and legal tide has been such a huge benefit for employers since the beginning of the Reagan administration that it simply cannot continue to maintain its pace. Furthermore, as our Global Investment Strategy colleagues have observed, the Republican party’s lurch toward populism may leave Big Business without a champion in Washington, DC. The regulatory and legal winds are shifting and management teams that have spent their entire careers in an environment in which labor has perpetually been on the back foot may be the last to know, leading to an uptick in the number and contentiousness of labor disputes. A change in Fed policy, as unveiled in the August 2020 revision to the FOMC’s statement on longer-run monetary policy goals, has also tilted the playing field in workers’ favor. The Fed has sworn off preemptively tightening monetary policy when the labor market appears to be getting tight. The new direction contrasts with 40-plus years of Fed policy that were predicated on taking away the punch bowl before upward wage pressures could build momentum. The tacit pledge in the revised statement on monetary policy implies that the Fed will prioritize its full employment mandate over its price stability mandate in the near term. That’s not an unalloyed positive for workers, who will only be better off if their nominal wage gains outpace inflation, but it will help give them more of a head start than they would have gotten if the FOMC had stuck with the proposition that tight labor markets stoke inflation. The Labor-Management Rubber Band Employees and employers have a deeply symbiotic relationship, and we like to think of labor and management as being linked by an elastic tether with a finite range. Since neither side can indefinitely thrive if the other is suffering, the tether pulls the two sides closer together when the gap between them threatens to become too wide. When labor does too well for too long at management’s expense, profit margins shrink and the company’s viability as a going concern is threatened. When management does too well, deteriorating living standards drive the best employees away, undermining productivity and profitability. One does not have to be a card-carrying socialist to believe that the band is near its limit and that some sort of mean reversion is inevitable, given how badly real hourly wages have lagged gains in hourly output over the last 50 years (Chart 6). Chart 6Testing How Far The Labor-Management Rubber Band Can Stretch What Comes Next Steady concentration across industries and a persistently hospitable legal and regulatory climate has given management the upper hand for four decades. Going forward, however, labor should see its fortunes improve as the legal and regulatory climate cannot get materially better for employers, and the labor-management rubber band becomes less stretched in management’s favor (Figure 3). The major uncertainty pertains to the ongoing level of slack in the labor market and how employment agreements should account for it. All parties recognize there is no slack right now and employers are duly offering generous inducements to attract workers. Sign-on bonuses for new employees in unskilled services positions are ubiquitous and negotiations with unionized employees include ratification bonuses for signing new contract packages. Because wages are sticky on the downside – it’s difficult to get employees to swallow outright pay cuts – employers prefer making one-time concessions like bonuses to increasing wage rates across the board, which is tantamount to locking in higher long-term input costs. The duration of concessions appears to be a sticking point in the negotiations to settle the current strikes. Over the last two decades, several large companies with unionized workforces have instituted a two-tier employment track distinguishing legacy employees from new hires. The legacy employees remain on their existing salary path and retain their retirement and health insurance benefits, while new employees are subject to a lower salary scale and are entitled to fewer benefits, if any. The result has been to bend the human resources cost curve lower in the future as natural attrition shrinks the share of employees on the more costly legacy path. The two-tier employment classification has proven to be an effective way for employers to bend the cost curve to their liking, as it protects the interests of a considerable majority of employee voters at the expense of a largely hypothetical future employee constituency. It is presumably difficult to empathize with workers who aren’t yet coming to the plant every day and legacy employees haven’t dwelled on their plight when participating in contract ratification votes. An interesting feature of the ongoing John Deere strike is that the UAW rejected what appeared to be a strikingly generous package partially in the interest of defending current and future employees who have no path to reach legacy employees’ all-in compensation level. The recent strikes against S&P 500 constituents have been concentrated in industries that faced demand spikes during the pandemic. The bakery worker’s union (BCTGM) representing Kellogg’s workers struck against Frito-Lay (owned by Pepsi) for three weeks in July and Nabisco (a unit of Mondelez) for five weeks in August and September. A significant motivation for the BCTGM workers’ actions seemed to be frustration over intense pandemic workloads. Their plants ramped up capacity to fill kitchen cabinets while consumers were cooped up at home and they are now seeking redress for the emergency hours they were asked to work. (All of the bakery workers who struck, as well as the John Deere workers, were considered essential workers.) Management, on the other hand, might take the view that their employees’ sacrifices are in the past, and are not likely to be repeated if product demand settles back into its pre-pandemic trend. Viewing ongoing negotiations from our game theory perspective, there is ample room for divergent perceptions of relative negotiating strength, based on differing opinions about the persistence of pandemic trends. The divergence might make for increasingly contentious labor negotiations going forward, with strikes exacerbating supply bottlenecks and ramping up near-term inflation pressures. If ongoing rounds of labor negotiations result in workers achieving longer-term victories, it will pressure corporate profit margins. Labor gains will also potentially feed into inflation if capacity is not poised to meet the ensuing increase in aggregate demand. We will keep close tabs on labor negotiations as the economy works its way back to a post-pandemic steady state.   Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com  

Special Report

Highlights We introduce our rotation graphs to assess the evolution of the relative trend and momentum of various assets. US equities remain on firm footing, but their weakening relative momentum suggests that investors may soon begin to rotate away from this market in favor of the Eurozone and EM. Cyclicals continue to dominate defensives, globally and in Europe. European value stocks are experiencing improving momentum, which suggests that a rotation out of growth equities is afoot. While European small-cap equities sport attractive fundamentals, rotational dynamics indicate it is still too early to overweight them aggressively. The energy crisis is a dominant driver of the relative sector performance in Europe and resulted in a massive shift in leadership from industrials to energy. As long as oil and natural gas act as a drag, industrials will lag. Financials are well supported. Swedish stocks have borne the brunt of the energy price spike, while Norwegian equities have been its main beneficiaries. The improvement in momentum of German stocks suggests that their relative underperformance will soon end. Spanish shares look attractive from a tactical perspective. Swiss industrials will need a recovery in EUR/CHF to outperform other European industrials. UK industrials will continue to outperform their continental competitors, while Spanish industrials have a window through which to shine. A rotation into UK financials may soon begin as their momentum improves. The darkest days for German financials are ending, while Spanish, Italian, and Swedish financials may soon witness a wave of underperformance. Spanish consumer discretionary equities are becoming more attractive compared to their European counterparts. While Dutch names continue to outperform other European tech equities, their softening momentum suggests investors are beginning to rotate out of this country. Spanish and German tech names offer an attractive diversification opportunity within the industry. Feature Methodology The combination of excess liquidity, large pools of fast money, elevated valuations across most securities, and the existence of the near-term momentum reversal effect encourage investors to rotate from one asset to the next in the hope of rapid profits. Measures to assess where each market stands in this rotational pattern can be useful for investors to catch these swings. In this optic, we introduce our rotation screener focused on equities. It is a simple tool that looks at whether a sector or a country is strengthening relative to its benchmark and whether this strength is happening at a faster or slower momentum. To measure each dimension, we use proprietary indicators of relative strength and momentum. Once each asset’s relative strength and relative momentum are established, we can position them in quadrants. We follow traditional terminology. The upper right quadrant denotes “Leading” assets, or securities that are outperforming their benchmark with strengthening momentum. The bottom right quadrant denotes “Weakening” assets, or securities that are outperforming their benchmark but with a deteriorating momentum. The bottom left quadrant denotes “Lagging” assets, or securities that are underperforming with decreasing momentum. Finally, the top left quadrant indicates “Improving” assets, or securities that are underperforming but with increasing momentum. Investors should move to overweight assets that are in the Improving quadrants and to underweight assets that are inching toward the “Lagging” from the “Weakening” quadrants. This method is very flexible and can be applied to sectors, countries, styles, and so on, as long as a benchmark is available to generate comparisons. In this report, we will analyze the following from a rotational perspective: global national markets, global cyclicals vs global defensive’s, European cyclicals vs European defensives, European sectors, European national markets, European financials, European consumer discretionaries, and European tech stocks. Global National Markets US equities have moved from the Leading quadrant to the Weakening one as they continue to outperform the global benchmark but with a decelerating momentum (Chart 1). This locates the US market in a risky position that could herald a period of underperformance, especially if global economic surprises accelerate. From a rotational perspective, US stocks could still experience another wave of outperformance over the coming weeks, as momentum has been firming over the past four weeks.   The Euro Area benchmark has fully moved from the Weakening quadrant in August to the Lagging one today. Investors should monitor Europe’s relative momentum closely, because a pick-up from here would push the Eurozone into Improving territory, a warning of an imminent trend change in European relative stock prices. Emerging markets have exited the Lagging zone and moved into the Improving quadrant. The move is far from decisive and remains at risk with Chinese credit growth still decelerating. The recent decline in steel prices in China suggests that construction activity in that economy continues to slow. Thus, as long as Chinese credit flows deteriorate, EM stocks will have trouble moving into the Leading quadrant. Cyclicals Vs Defensives Global defensive equities tried to move into the Leading quadrant at the end of the summer, but, ultimately, they plunged back into Lagging territory as global stocks recovered in October (Chart 2). Meanwhile, global cyclicals moved in the opposite trajectory, shifting from the Lagging quadrant to the Leading one over the past three months. Cyclicals continue to benefit from the general uptrend in the market. Even the recent decline in yields is doing little to boost the performance of defensive equities. The biggest risk to these stocks remains the Chinese economic slowdown. For now, this deterioration has not been large enough to compensate for the general vigour in profits and consumption in advanced economies. However, if inflation worries do not abate, then the Chinese slowdown will become more problematic for global cyclicals as it will raise the spectre of stagflation.  The rotational pattern for European cyclicals vs defensive stocks mimics that of global equities (Chart 3). However, European cyclicals are somewhat softer than their global equivalents, hurt by Europe’s greater exposure to the Chinese business cycle compared to the US’s exposure. European Investment Styles Over the past three months, European investment styles have begun a major shift. Value has moved from the Lagging quadrant to the Improving one, which suggests that flows could push value into the Leading quadrant (Chart 4). Moreover, growth has moved from the Leading quadrant to the weakening one, which created a similar dynamic as the decline in performance of the quality factor. This confirms that the rise in yields is beginning to favour a shift in style from growth to value. Meanwhile, small-cap stocks have tumbled into the Lagging quarter. We do expect attractive returns for European small-cap names over an 18- to 24-month investment horizon. However, we have not moved yet to overweight this sector of the market and rotational patterns confirm it is too early to do so safely. European Sectors Sectors have begun to make some important shifts in European markets (Chart 5). Tech has moved from the Leading quadrant to the weakening one. While the sector continues to outperform, it is doing so with a declining momentum, and it could soon move to the Lagging quadrant. This deteriorating price action must be monitored closely. Consumer discretionary names, which were strong performers that have become increasingly weak, have moved from the Weakening quadrant to the lagging one. However, their momentum is not deteriorating as much as it did nine weeks ago, which suggests a move to the Improving quadrant could soon be in the offing. Financials have greatly enjoyed the uptick in global yields. After a short passage through the Lagging quadrant, they have shifted into the Leading one. This suggests that the winds remain behind this sector, which we continue to overweight. Industrials and energy have become mirror images of one another, highlighting the negative impact on European economic activity and profitability of the recent surge in energy prices. The industrials have moved from the Leading quadrant to the lagging one, as the energy sector experienced the opposite direction of travel. This suggests that industrials will only recover their shine once the energy crisis abates, which will also hurt energy stocks. European National Markets The rotational pattern exhibited by European national markets bears their respective sectoral footprints (Chart 6). The tech-heavy Dutch market has moved from the Leading quadrant to the Weakening one, the industrials-focused Swedish market has fallen into the Lagging quadrant from the Weakening one and the Norwegian market has leapt out of Lagging into Leading territory. Hence, if the rotation out of tech deepens, The Netherlands will tumble directly into the Lagging zone, while an easing in energy prices will force Norway and Sweden to switch places on the back of a rotation out of energy into industrials. Germany is of particular interest. It is a well-diversified market that has become oversold. Moreover, as we wrote in September, its relative performance exhibits a significant discount to relative earnings. From a rotational perspective, Germany is moving to leave the Lagging quadrant; a durable shift into the Improving quadrant will sufficiently assuage traders into buying this market. This process will support our overweight position in German equities. Spain is another market we like on a tactical basis. Over the course of the past three months, it moved out of Lagging territory into the Improving zone. This price action supports our thesis that the large country-discount embedded across Spanish equity sectors is excessive and should soon dissipate. The main risk to this view would be another down leg in bond yields, which would hurt financials—a major weight in this market. Italy, too, is in the process of executing a full rotation, having exited the Weakening quadrant and moved into the Lagging one. Italian stocks have tried to punch their way into the Improving zone but have failed to do so. They will require higher yields to move out into the Improving zone durably because of the heavy financials weighting of Italian stocks. European Industrials Within European industrials, a rotational pattern is also evident (Chart 7). Swiss industrials have moved out of the Leading quadrant into the Lagging one as the Swiss franc continues to appreciate against the euro. The rising CHF imparts deflationary pressures into Switzerland and the SNB continues to build up its reserves. As a result, EUR/CHF will appreciate once EUR/USD finds a firmer footing. Thus, while it is too early to overweight Swiss industrials relative to those of the Eurozone, their oversold nature suggests that a rotation in favour of Swiss manufacturing businesses will soon take place. At the current juncture, Spanish industrials look appealing. They have moved out of the Lagging quadrant into the Improving one as the momentum of their relative performance improves. Additionally, they are close to moving into the leading territory. This picture is consistent with a narrowing of the discount embedded in all Spanish sectors since the pandemic broke out. Swedish industrials are also trying to exit the Lagging territory; their elevated RoE, and heavy sensitivity to the DM capex cycle indicate that they should move into the Leading quadrant in the coming weeks. UK industrials have remained in the Leading zone for the past three months, but their relative momentum is softening, which risks them being placed in the Weakening zone. The recent deterioration in GBP/EUR could provide a breath of fresh air, as it will improve the competitiveness of UK industrials compared to continental firms. Even then, for now, rotational dynamics do not flag an imminent problem for UK industrials. European Financials The clearest rotational pattern within European financials may be found in Sweden and the UK (Chart 8). Over the past three months, Swedish financials have fallen out of the Leading quadrant into the Weakening one, and they are inching closer toward the Lagging zone. This suggests that they could soon begin to underperform. Meanwhile, UK financials offer a mirror image as they exited the Lagging quadrant and moved into the improving one. They have yet to enter Leading territory, but seem close to doing so. The pessimism toward the UK is overdone right now. BCA’s Global Fixed-Income Strategy team expects the UK yield curve to steepen anew. UK financials would be prime beneficiaries of this dynamic. Italian and Spanish financials are also exhibiting some concerning moves lately. Both were in the Leading quadrant, but they have since shifted to the lagging one as peripheral spreads widened. Meanwhile, money seems to be moving into German financials, which have advanced from the Lagging quadrant to the Improving quadrant. While they are not as close to the Leading quadrant as their UK competitors, this shift warrants monitoring. European Consumer Discretionary Within the consumer discretionary space, most European countries have remained in their quadrant (Chart 9). Nonetheless, Spanish CD stocks have moved out of the Lagging zone into the Leading quadrant, while their Italian counterparts have recently entered the Weakening quadrant where they have joined French CDs. While both these countries’ consumer discretionary firms are witnessing weakening momentum, they remain in an upward trend against their European competitors. It is therefore too early to sell these countries within this industry. German Consumer discretionary equities are still in the Lagging quadrant, but they are trying to move into the Improving one, where UK CD names have remained for the past three months. European Tech The European tech sector is very much a story about The Netherlands versus the rest, due to the large size of the Dutch tech sector (Chart 10). For now, rotational patterns remain in favour of Dutch names; they have exited the Leading quadrant, but, while their momentum is weakening somewhat, they remain in a pronounced relative uptrend. A few small markets offer some promise. Over the past three months, both Spanish and German tech names have shifted from the Lagging quadrant into the Improving one. Their elevated momentum measures suggest that a shift into the Leading quadrant is imminent. As such, investors should consider switching some of their tech holdings into these two countries to diversify away from the Dutch behemoth.   Mathieu Savary, Chief European Strategist Mathieu@bcaresearch.com

Special Report

Highlights Japan’s long-term weaknesses – a shrinking population, low productivity growth, excess indebtedness – are very well known. However, it still punches above its weight in the realm of geopolitics. Abenomics – sorry, Kishidanomics – can still deliver some positive surprises every now and then. As the global pandemic wanes, and China faces a historic confluence of internal and external risks, investors should begin buying the yen on weakness. Japanese industrials also are an attractive play in a global portfolio. While the yen will likely fare better than the dollar over the next 6-9 months, it will lag other procyclical currencies. Feature Japan has always been an “earthquake society,”  in which things seem never to change until suddenly everything changes at once. The good news for investors is that that change occurred in 2011 and the latest political events reinforce policy continuity. Why “Abenomics” Remains The Playbook Over ten years have passed since Japan suffered a triple crisis of earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear meltdown. In fact, the Fukushima nuclear crisis merely punctuated a long accumulation of national malaise: the country had suffered two “Lost Decades” and was in the thrall of the Great Recession, a rare period of domestic political change, and a rise in national security fears over a newly assertive China. The nuclear meltdown marked the nadir. The result of all these crises was a miniature policy revolution in 2012 – Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) returned to power and initiated a range of bolder policies to whip the country’s deflationary mindset and reboot its foreign and trade relations. The new economic program, “Abenomics,” consisted of easy money, soft budgets, and pro-growth reforms. It succeeded in changing Japan. Both private debt and inflation, which had fallen during the lost decades, bottomed after the 2011 crisis and began to rise under Abe (Chart 1). By the 2019 House of Councillors election, however,  Abe was running out of steam. Consumption tax hikes, the US-China trade war, and COVID-19 thwarted his plans of national revival. In particular, Abe hoped to capitalize on excitement over the 2020 Tokyo Olympics to hold a popular referendum on revising the constitution. Constitutional revision is necessary to legitimize the Self-Defense Forces and thus make Japan a “normal” nation again, i.e. one that can maintain armed forces. But the global pandemic interrupted. Until the next heavyweight prime minister comes along, Japan will relapse into its old pattern of a “revolving door” of prime ministers who come and go quickly. For example, the only purpose of Abe’s immediate successor, Yoshihide Suga, was to tie off loose ends and oversee the Olympics before passing the baton (Chart 2). Chart 1Abenomics Was Making Progress The next few Japanese prime ministers will almost inevitably lack Abe’s twin supermajority in parliament, which was exceptional in modern history (Chart 3). It will be hard for the LDP to expand its regional grip given that it holds a majority in all 11 of the regional blocks in which the political parties contend for seats based on their proportion of the popular vote (Table 1). Table 1LDP+ Komeito Regional Performance Short-lived, traditional prime ministers will not be able to create a superior vision for Japan and will largely follow in Abe’s footsteps.   In September Prime Minister Fumio Kishida replaced Suga – a badly needed facelift for the ruling Liberal Democrats ahead of the October 31 election. The LDP retained its single-party majority in the Diet, so Kishida is off to a tolerable start (Chart 4). But he is far from charismatic and will not last long if he fumbles in the upper house elections in July 2022. This gives him a little more than half a year to make a mark. Kishida will oversee a roughly 30-40 trillion yen stimulus package, or supplemental budget, by the end of this year. Japanese stimulus packages are almost always over-promised and under-delivered. However, given the electoral calendar, he will put together a large package that will not disappoint financial markets. His other goal will be to build on recent American efforts to cobble together a coalition of democracies to counter China and Russia. Japan’s Grand Strategy In Brief Chart 5Japan Exposed To China Trade Japan’s grand strategy over centuries consists of maintaining its independence from foreign powers, controlling its strategic geographic approaches to prevent invasion, and stopping any single power from dominating the eastern side of the Eurasian landmass. Originally the hardest part of this grand strategy was that it required establishing unitary political control over the far-flung Japanese archipelago. However, since the Meiji Restoration, Tokyo has maintained centralized government. Since then Japan has focused on controlling its strategic approaches and maintaining a balance among the Asian powers. During the imperialist period it tried to achieve these objectives on its own. After World War II, the United States became critical to Japan’s grand strategy. Through its broad alliance with Washington, Tokyo can maintain independence, make sure critical territories are not hostile (e.g. Taiwan and South Korea), and deter neighboring threats (North Korea, China, Russia). It can at least try to maintain a balance of power in Eurasia. Yet these constant national interests underscore Japan’s growing vulnerabilities today: China’s economy is now two-times larger than Japan’s and Japan is more dependent on China’s trade than vice versa (Chart 5). Under Xi Jinping, Beijing is actively converting its wealth into military and strategic capabilities that threaten Japan’s security. Rising tensions across the Taiwan Strait are fueling nationalism and re-armament in Japan.  Russia’s post-Soviet resurgence entails an ever-closer Russo-Chinese partnership. It also entails Russian conflicts with the US that periodically upset any attempts at Russo-Japanese détente. North Korea’s asymmetric war capabilities and nuclearization pose another security threat. South Korea’s attempts to engage with the North and China, and compete with Japan, are unhelpful.    All of these realities drive Japan closer to the United States. Even the US is increasingly unpredictable, though not yet to the point of causing serious doubts about the alliance. If the US were fundamentally weakened, or abandoned the alliance, Japan would either have to adopt nuclear weapons or accommodate itself to Chinese hegemony to meet its grand strategy. Nuclearization would be the more likely avenue. The stability of Asia depends greatly on American arbitration. Japan’s Strategy Since 1990 Beneath this grand strategy Japan’s ruling elites must pursue a more particular strategy suited to its immediate time and place. Ever since Japan’s working population and property bubble peaked in the early 1990s, the country’s relative economic heft has declined. To maintain stability and security, the central government in Tokyo has had to take on a very active role in the economy and society. The first step was to stabilize the domestic economy despite collapsing potential growth. This has been achieved through a public debt supercycle (Chart 6). Unorthodox monetary and fiscal policy largely stabilized demand, at the cost of the world’s highest net debt-to-GDP ratio. The economic adjustment was spread out over a long period of time so as to prevent a massive social and political backlash. Unemployment peaked in 2009 at 5.5% and never rose above this level. The ruling elite and the Liberal Democrats maintained control of institutions and government. The second step was to ensure continued alliance with the United States. Japan could deal with its economic problems – and the rise of China – if it maintained access to US consumers and protection from the US military. To maintain the alliance required making investments in the American economy, in US-led global institutions, and cooperating with the US on various initiatives, including controversial foreign policies. As in the 1950s-60s, Japan would bulk up its Self-Defense Forces to share the burden of global security with the United States, despite the US-written constitution’s prohibition on keeping armed forces. The third step was to invest abroad and put Japan’s excess savings to work, developing materials and export markets abroad while employing foreign workers and factories to become Japan’s new industrial base in lieu of the shrinking Japanese workforce (Chart 7).  Chart 6Japan's Public Debt Supercycle Japan’s post-1990 strategy has staying power because of the massive pressures on Japan listed above: China’s rise, Russo-Chinese partnership, North Korean threats, and American distractions. Investors tend to underrate the impact of these trends on Japan. Unless they fundamentally change, Japan’s strategy will remain intact regardless of prime minister or even ruling party. Russia’s role is less clear and could serve as a harbinger of any future change. President Vladimir Putin and Abe had the best chance in modern memory to resolve the two countries’ territorial disputes, build on mutual interests, and maybe even sign a peace treaty. But Russia’s clash with the West  proved an insurmountable obstacle. New opportunities could emerge at some later juncture, as Japan’s interest in preventing China from dominating Eurasia gives it a strong reason to normalize ties with Russia. Russia will at some point worry about overdependency on China. But this change is not on the immediate horizon.  Japan’s Tactics Since 2011 Japan is nearly a one-party state. Brief spells of opposition rule, in 1993 and 2009-11, are exceptions that prove the rule. The Liberal Democrats did not fall from power so much as suffer a short “time out” to reflect on their mistakes before voters put them right back into power. However, these timeouts have been important in forcing the ruling party to adjust its tactics for changing times, as with Abenomics. Kishida will not have enough political capital to change direction. The emphasis will still be on defeating deflation and rekindling animal spirits and corporate borrowing (as opposed to relying exclusively on public debt). Kishida has talked about a new type of capitalism and a more active redistribution of wealth, in keeping with the current zeitgeist among the global elite. However, Japan lacks the impetus for dramatic change. Wealth inequality is not extreme and political polarization is non-existent (Chart 8). The LDP is wary of losing votes to the populist Japan Innovation Party, or other regional movements, but populism does not have as fertile ground in countries with low inequality.  The desire to boost wages was a central plank of Abenomics (Chart 9) and an area of success. It will come through in Kishida’s policies as well. But the ultimate outcome will depend on how tight the labor market gets in the upcoming economic cycle. Similarly Kishida can be expected to encourage, or at least not roll back, women’s participation in the labor force, as labor markets tighten (Chart 10). As the pandemic wanes it is also likely that he will reignite Abe’s loose immigration policy, which saw the number of foreign workers triple between 2010 and 2020. This inflow is perhaps the surest sign of any that insular and xenophobic Japan is changing with the times to meet its economic needs.  Chart 9Kishidanomics To Build On Abe's Wage Growth Chart 10Women Off To Work But Fertility ##br##Relapsed The only substantial difference between Kishidanomics and Abenomics is that Abe compromised his reflationary fiscal efforts by insisting on going forward with periodic hikes to the consumption tax. Kishida is under no such expectation. Instead he is operating in a global political and geopolitical context in which ambitious public investments are positively encouraged even at the expense of larger budget deficits (Chart 11). Yet interest rates are still low enough to make such investments cheaply. The stage is set for fiscal largesse. Chart 11Fiscal Largesse To Continue Kishida can be expected to promote large new investments in supply-chain resilience, renewable energy, and military rearmament. The US and EU may exempt climate policies from traditional budget accounting – Japan may do the same. Even more so than China and Europe, Japan has a national interest in renewable energy since it is almost entirely dependent on foreign imports for its fossil fuels. The green transition in Japan is lagging that of Germany but the Japanese shift away from nuclear power has gone even faster, creating an import dependency that needs to be addressed for strategic reasons (Chart 12). Monetary-fiscal coordination began under Abe and can increase under Kishida. What is clear is that public investment is the top priority while fiscal consolidation is not. Military spending is finally starting to edge up as a share of GDP, as noted above. For many years Japanese leaders talked about military spending but it remained steady at 1% of GDP. Now, at the onset of the US-China cold war, the Japanese are spending more and say the ratio will rise to 2% of GDP (Chart 13). Tensions with China, especially over Taiwan, will continue to drive this shift, though North Korea’s weapons progress is not negligible. The Biden administration is prioritizing US allies and the competition with China, which makes the Japanese alliance top of mind. Tokyo’s various attempts to talk with Beijing in recent years have amounted to nothing, with the exception of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which is far from ratification and implementation. Japan’s relations with China are driven by interests, not passing attitudes and emotions. If Biden proves too dovish toward China – a big “if” – then it will be Japan pushing the US to take a more hawkish line rather than vice versa. Japan will take various strategic, economic, technological, and military actions to defend itself from the range of external threats it faces. These actions will intimidate and provoke China and other neighbors, which will help to entrench the “security dilemma” between the US and China and their allies. For example, Japan will eagerly participate in US efforts to upgrade its military and its regional alliances and partnerships, including via the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with India and Australia. The Biden administration might force Japan to play nice with South Korea and patch up their trade war. But that is a price Japan can pay since American involvement also precludes any shift by South Korea fully into China’s camp. If China should invade Taiwan – which we cannot rule out over the long run – Japan’s vital supply lines and national security would fall under permanent jeopardy. Japan would have an interest in defending Taiwan but its willingness to war with China may depend on the US response. However, both Japan and the US would have to draw a stark line in defense of Japanese territory, not least Okinawa, where US troops are based. Both powers would mobilize and seek to impose a strategic containment policy around China at that point. Until The Next Earthquake … For Japan to abandon its post-1990 strategy, it would need to see a series of shocks to domestic and international politics. If China’s economy collapsed, Korea unified, or the US abandoned the Asia Pacific region, then Tokyo would have to reassess its strategy. Until then the status quo will prevail. At home Japan would need to see a split within the Liberal Democrats, or a permanent break between the LDP and their junior partner Komeito, combined with a single, consolidated, and electorally viable opposition party and a charismatic opposition leader. This kind of change would follow from major exogenous shocks. Today it is nowhere in sight – the last two shocks, in 2011 and 2020, reinforced the LDP regime. Theoretically some future Japanese government could adopt a socialist platform that relies entirely on public debt rather than trying to reboot private debt. It could openly embrace debt monetization and modern monetary theory  rather than trying to raise taxes periodically to maintain the appearance of fiscal rectitude. But if it tried to distance itself from the United States and improve relations with Russia and China, such a strategy would not go very far. It would jeopardize Japan’s grand strategy. For the foreseeable future, Japan’s economic security and national security lie in maintaining the American alliance and continuing an outward investment strategy focused on emerging markets other than China. Macroeconomic Developments The key message from an economic context is that fiscal stimulus is likely to be larger in Japan than the market currently expects. The IMF is penciling in a fiscal deficit of around 2% of potential GDP next year, which will be a drag on growth (Chart 14). More likely, Kishida will cobble together a slightly larger package to implement most of the initiatives he has proposed on the campaign trail. Meanwhile, a large share of JGBs are about to mature over the next couple of years, providing room for more issuance, which the BoJ will be happy to assimilate (Chart 15). Chart 14More Fiscal Stimulus In Japan Likely Chart 15Lots Of JGBs Mature In The Next Few Years Real numbers on the size of the fiscal package have been scarce, but it should be around 30-40 trillion yen, spread over a few years. With Japan’s net interest expense at record lows (Chart 16), and a lot of the spending slated for worthwhile productivity-enhancing projects such as supply chains, green energy, education and some boost to the financial sector in the form of digital innovation and consolidation, we expect fiscal policy in Japan will remain moderately loose, with the BoJ staying accommodative. The timing of more fiscal stimulus is appropriate as Japan has managed to finally put the pandemic behind it. The number of new Covid-19 cases is at the lowest recorded level per capita, and Japan now  has more of its population vaccinated than the US. As a result, the manufacturing and services PMIs, which have been the lowest in the developed world, could stage a coiled-spring rebound. This will be a welcome fillip for Japanese assets (Chart 17). Chart 16Little Cost To Issuing More Debt Chart 17The Japanese Recovery Has Lagged Consumption could also surprise to the upside in Japan. With the consumption tax hike of 2019 and the 2020 pandemic now behind us, pent-up demand could finally be unleashed in the coming quarters. Rising wages and high savings underscore that Japan could see a vigorous rebound in consumption, as was witnessed in other developed economies. This will be particularly the case as inflation stays low. The big risk for Japan from a macro perspective is an external slowdown, driven by China. A boom in foreign demand has been a much welcome cushion for Japanese growth, especially amidst weak domestic demand. The risk is that this tailwind becomes a headwind as Chinese growth slows, especially as a big share of Japanese exports go to China. Our view has been that policy makers in China will be able to ring-fire the property crisis, preventing a “Lehman” moment. As such, while China’s slowdown is a reality and downside risks warrant monitoring, we also expect China to avoid a hard landing. Meanwhile, Japanese exports are also diversified, with other developed and emerging markets accounting for the lion’s share of total exports. For example, exports to the US account for 19% of sales while EU exports account for 9%. Both exports and foreign machinery orders remain quite robust, suggesting that the slowdown in China will not crush all external demand (globally, export growth remains very strong).  It is noteworthy that many countries now have “carte blanche” to boost infrastructure spending, especially in areas like renewable energy and supply chain resiliency. Japan continues to remain a big supplier of capital goods globally. This will ensure that an economic recovery around the world will buffer foreign machinery orders. Market Implications Japanese equities have underperformed the US over the last decade, and Kishidanomics is unlikely to change this trend. But to the extent that more fiscal stimulus helps lift aggregate demand, a few sectors could begin to see short-term outperformance. More importantly, the underperformance of certain Japanese equity sectors have not been fully justified by the improving earnings picture (Chart 18). This suggests some room for catch-up. Banks in particular could benefit from a steeper yield curve in Japan, rising global yields and proposed reform in the sector (Chart 19). We will view this as a tactical opportunity however, than a strategic call. Our colleagues in the Global Asset Allocation service have clearly outlined key reasons against overweighting Japan, and are currently neutral.  More importantly, industrials also look poised to see some pickup in relative EPS growth, as global industrial demand stays robust. An improvement in domestic demand should also favor small caps over large caps. Chart 18ADismal Earnings Explain Some Underperformance Of Japanese Equities Chart 18BDismal Earnings Explain Some Underperformance Of Japanese Equities Chart 19Japanese Banks Will Benefit From A Steeper Yield Curve Foreigners have huge sway over the performance of Japanese assets, especially equities. Foreign holders account for nearly 30% of the Japanese equity float. This is important not only for the equity call but for currency performance as well since portfolio flows dominate currency movements. Historically, the yen and the Japanese equity market have been negatively correlated. This was due to positive profit translation effects from a lower currency. However, it is possible that Japanese domestic profits are no longer driven only by translation effects, but rather by underlying productivity gains. This could result in less yen hedging by foreign equity investors, which would restore a positive relationship between the relative share price performance and the currency. As for the yen, the best environment for any currency is when the economy can generate non-inflationary growth. Japan may well be entering this paradigm. Historically, now has been the exact environment where the yen tends to do well, as the economy exits deflation and enters non-inflationary growth (Chart 20). Chart 20The Yen And Japanese Growth Markets have been wrongly focusing on nominal rather than real yields in Japan and the implication for the yen. Therefore the risk to a long yen view is that the Bank of Japan keeps rates low as global yields are rising. However, in an environment where global inflationary pressures normalize (say in the next 6-9 months) and temper the increase in global yields, this could provide room for short covering on the yen. In our view, the yen is already the most underappreciated currency in the G10, as rising global yields have led to a massive accumulation of short positions. Finally, from a valuation standpoint, the yen is the cheapest G10 currency according to our PPP models, and is also quite cheap according to our intermediate-term timing model (Chart 21). With the yen being a risk-off currency, it also tends to rise versus the dollar not only during recessions, but also during most episodes of broad-based dollar weakness. This low-beta nature of the currency makes it a good portfolio hedge in an uncertain world. Chart 21The Yen Is Undervalued Given the historic return of geopolitical risk to Japan’s neighborhood, as the US and Japan engage in active great power competition with China, the yen is an underrated hedge. Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Chester Ntonifor Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy chestern@bcaresearch.com