Developed Countries

Dear Client, As is custom every year, next Monday November 30 instead of our regular Strategy Report you will receive BCA’s flagship publication “The Bank Credit Analyst” detailing the house views and themes for next year. Our regular publishing schedule resumes on December 7 with our 2021 High-Conviction Calls Strategy Report. On December 14 we will host a Webcast to discuss our calls in more detail and answer questions. Happy Thanksgiving. Kind Regards, Anastasios Highlights Portfolio Strategy A firming demand backdrop for lodging services courtesy of the positive vaccine news, enticing industry operating metrics along with compelling valuations encourage us to take a punt on the niche S&P hotels, resorts & cruise line index. In marked contrast, we recommend investors avoid the high-flying S&P homebuilding index. Home-related survey data paint a rosy picture for homebuilding demand in the coming months underpinned by low mortgage rates and low housing supply. Nevertheless, most of the good news is baked in resurgent homebuilder stock prices and the prospects of rising interest rates, a looming profit margin squeeze and extremely high earnings expectations warn that the time is ripe to shed S&P homebuilding exposure.  Recent Changes Upgrade the S&P hotels, resorts & cruise lines index to overweight, today. Downgrade the S&P homebuilding index to underweight, today. Feature Similar to two Mondays ago, the SPX opened weekly trading with gusto courtesy of MRNA’s 94% efficacy vaccine news, but failed to breach previous all-time highs. The market has rallied roughly 10% this month, and while we remain cyclically and structurally bullish, a short-term consolidation period is likely in the cards. Extremely easy financial conditions along with a near halving in implied volatility – which have been key rally drivers since the March lows as we pointed out numerous times in our research – are nearly perfectly priced in the SPX. The implication is that were a meaningful rally to resume, further easing is required which is a tall order (top panel, Chart 1). Another factor underpinning the market’s recent advance is the drop in the CBOE’s implied correlation index (pair wise correlation of S&P500 constituents, shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 1). However, correlations have collapsed and are near levels that have marked prior temporary peaks in the SPX. Beyond near-term jitters, output is poised to recover smartly next year and most importantly so are SPX EPS. In a recent Special Report we lifted our EPS target to $168 for calendar 2021 and introduced an end-2021 SPX target of 4,000. The GS Current Activity Indicator corroborates our macro four-factor profit growth estimate and heralds a slingshot EPS recovery next year (Chart 2). Chart 1Good News Is Priced In Chart 2One More V-Shape Is Coming Turning over to capital spending, the latest GDP report was revealing. On the surface private sector capex made a splash with non-residential investment contributing 2.88% to real GDP growth, the highest since Q4/1983 when the economy was recovering from that severe double-dip recession. In absolute terms, the Q/Q annualized growth clocked in at over 20%, a growth rate last seen in the late-1990s (Chart 3). Drilling deeper into capex is instructive. Technology investment was on fire. Surprisingly, software took the back seat and investment in tech goods roared. In other words, this data confirms that businesses and consumers alike prepared to work from home and bought up tech gadgets en masse, and stole demand from the future (Chart 3). Looking ahead we expect a reversal of this trend with software retaking the reigns and the rest of the tech sector fading. As a reminder, while base effects really augmented this capex rebound, recovering animal spirits signal that a capex upcycle is in the offing. We have shown in the past that as profits grow, CEOs become more confident in the longevity of the cycle and choose to deploy long-term oriented capital, albeit with a one-year lag. Eventually, this creates a virtuous upcycle where rising profits lead to rising capital outlays that further boost sales and profits and sustain the positive feedback loop (Chart 4). Chart 3Exploring Investment Data Chart 4Lagging Capex Will Also Recover This week we make two sub-surface consumer discretionary sector changes further adding exposure to our back-to-work reopening laggards and shedding exposure to work-from-home winners. Open For Business While admittedly we were early in locking in gains in the S&P hotels, resorts & cruises index last spring by lifting exposure to neutral from underweight, today we are compelled to augment this niche leisure index to an overweight stance. Relative share prices have bounced at a level last seen during the GFC and not far off the level hit post the 9/11 accelerated recession that dealt a big blow to everything travel related (top panel, Chart 5). The recent positive vaccine news is a key reason we are warming up to this consumer discretionary sub group. While neither lodging nor cruise line vacationing will return to their previous peaks any time soon, both industries will survive and thus should no longer be priced for bankruptcy. Industry pricing power has plunged, but it is trying to trough at an extremely depressed level (middle panel, Chart 5). As a result, profit margins have gone haywire (bottom panel, Chart 5), but again most of the negative news is likely priced into this negative profits backdrop. Chart 5Fell Off A Cliff… One key industry demand determinant is confidence. Consumer sentiment has staged a W-shaped recovery and while still flimsy the brightening vaccine efficacy news should catapult it higher in the coming quarters. The implication is that the wide gulf between consumer confidence and relative share prices will narrow via a catch up phase in the latter (top panel, Chart 6). Closely linked to the budding recovery in confidence are discretionary versus non-discretionary retail sales. Thus, the latter have been tightly correlated with the oscillations in relative share prices, and the current message is positive (top panel, Chart 7). Chart 6...But There Are Signs Of Life Moreover, the ISM non-manufacturing survey is on a sling shot recovery following the depths of the spring readings. This rebound also suggests that the path of least resistance is higher for lodging stocks (middle panel, Chart 6). Chart 7Enticing Signals On the business side, capex intentions are slated to increase in the coming year – as we highlighted above on the back of recovering animal spirits – and by extension so will business-related travel (bottom panel, Chart 7). Our hotel demand indicator does an excellent job at encapsulating all these different forces and forecasts an enticing lodging services demand backdrop into 2021 (bottom panel, Chart 6). Already, consumer outlays on hotels are staging a comeback albeit from an extremely depressed level. The upshot is that an earnings-led rebound is in the cards (middle panel, Chart 7). With regards to industry operating metrics, industry executives have reined in expansion plans: construction spending on hotels has been contracting all year long. At the margin, such a supply restraint on the heels of a seven-year expansion phase is quite encouraging (middle panel, Chart 8) as it will aid in the industry’s efforts to lift beaten down occupancy rates. Another reassuring industry operating metric is the confirmation that hotel workers are returning to work. Not only has leisure and hospitality employment absorbed more than half the losses suffered since the spring carnage, but also industry hours worked have ticked higher of late (bottom panel, Chart 8). Finally, washed out technicals and extremely alluring valuations provide an attractive reward/risk tradeoff at the current juncture (Chart 9). Chart 8Receding Supply Is Good Chart 9Plenty Of Upside Netting it all out, a firming demand backdrop for lodging services courtesy of the positive vaccine news, enticing industry operating metrics along with compelling valuations encourage us to take a punt on the niche S&P hotels, resorts & cruise line index. Bottom Line: Upgrade the S&P hotels, resorts & cruise lines index to overweight, today. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HOTL – MAR, HLT, CCL, RCL, NCLH. Contrarian Housing Call Today we recommend a downgrade in the S&P homebuilding index to underweight. Since the March 23 SPX lows, consumer discretionary stocks are up 74%, besting the S&P 500 by 1500 basis points (bps). While single stock GICS4 sub-groups like household appliances (i.e. Whirlpool) have reached escape velocity rising over 200% over the same time frame, the S&P homebuilding index is also up a whopping 140%. While we were quick enough to close our underweight recommendation in March and cement impressive relative gains for the portfolio to the tune of 50%, we refrained from lifting exposure all the way to overweight and remained at benchmark. As a reminder, we opted instead to play a housing rebound via the sister home improvement retail index in mid-April that also added significant alpha to our portfolio. Residential real estate optimism abounds. The media’s bombardment is non-stop reminding consumers of runaway home prices, all-time lows in fixed mortgage rates (third panel, Chart 10) and nearly non-existent housing inventory (supply of homes shown inverted, middle panel, Chart 11), painting an urgency to stampede into home buying (top panel, Chart 11). Chart 10Positives Reflected In Prices Chart 11The Good… True, the COVID-19 recession has acted as an accelerant to the suburban housing boom and there is an element of at least a semi-permanent shift away from city centers and toward the suburbs as the work-from-home flexibility is not a fad. Tack on all-time highs on the overall NAHB housing sentiment survey and a number of sub-components like sales expectations (second panel, Chart 10) and no wonder mortgage applications to purchase a new home are also flirting with multi-year highs (bottom panel, Chart 10). Another survey, part of the Conference Board’s consumer confidence monthly survey, revealed that consumers’ plans to buy a new home are also probing all-time highs (second panel, Chart 10). Even the Fed’s October Senior Loan Officer survey highlighted that demand for residential mortgage loans is on the mend (bottom panel, Chart 11). However, we deem that most, if not all, of the good news is already priced in galloping homebuilders stock prices and exuberant expectations. While being contrarian is fraught with danger, as more often than not the herd is right, there is a key macro driver that gives us confidence to our going against the grain housing trade: interest rates. If our economic reopening thesis proves accurate next year, then the COVID-19 winners – homebuilders included – will take the back seat. Importantly, as the economy rebounds and is ready to stand on its own two feet, then the selloff in the bond market should gain significant steam. Using our 100-125bps rule of thumb to gauge how much monetary tightening the economy can withstand in a year’s time, then the 10-year US Treasury yield can hit 1.5% by next March. Historically, interest rates and relative share prices have been inversely correlated and a steep selloff in the bond market is bad news for homebuilding stocks (top panel, Chart 12). Chart 12...The Bad... Chart 13...And The Ugly Meanwhile on the operating housing front, some cracks are forming. New home sales, while brisk in absolute terms, are losing out to existing housing sales and homebuilders have resorted to price concessions in order to drive volumes (second, third & bottom panels, Chart 12). Profit margins are at the highest mark since the subprime crisis and are vulnerable to a squeeze not only from lower selling prices, but also from rising input costs. Framing lumber comprises roughly 15% of a new home’s commodity related costs and lumber prices have been expanding all year long (Chart 13). Finally, unfettered sell-side optimism reigns supreme. Net earnings revisions cannot go any higher as they hit a wall at the 100% ceiling. One year forward relative profit growth expectations are literally through the roof, and even five-year relative EPS growth estimates are up 1500bps since the 2019 nadir (Chart 14). All these metrics represent a high bar for homebuilders to surpass and we would lean against such extreme enthusiasm toward this niche early-cyclical group. However, there is a key risk to our bearish homebuilders call we are monitoring: cheap valuations. On relative forward P/E, trailing P/S and EV / EBITDA bases, home construction stocks offer compelling value (bottom panel, Chart 14). Whether this is a value opportunity or a trap, the jury is still out. For the time being we side with the latter. Chart 14Peak Sell-Side Euphoria In sum, home-related survey data paint a rosy picture for homebuilding demand in the coming months underpinned by low mortgage rates and low housing supply. Nevertheless, most of the good news is baked in resurgent homebuilder stock prices and the prospects of rising interest rates, a looming profit margin squeeze and extremely high earnings expectations warn that the time is ripe to shed S&P homebuilding exposure. Bottom Line: Trim the S&P homebuilding index to underweight, today. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HOME – LEN, PHM, DHI, NVR.     Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com   Current Recommendations Current Trades Strategic (10-Year) Trade Recommendations Size And Style Views October 26, 2020 Favor small over large caps July 27, 2020 Overweight cyclicals over defensives June 11, 2018 Long the BCA Millennial basket  The ticker symbols are: (AAPL, AMZN, UBER, HD, LEN, MSFT, NFLX, SPOT, TSLA, V). January 22, 2018 Favor value over growth

Today we update our Millennial Basket as TSLA and UBER have gone vertical this month rising 29% and 46%, respectively. Specifically, we rebalance the basket back to an equal weight with AAPL, UBER, LEN, and TSLA being rebalanced lower, and AMZN, HD, MSFT, NFLX, SPOT, and V higher. Our Millennial Basket is up 116% in absolute terms and 68% relative to the SPX since inception in our June 11, 2018 Special Report. In addition, we also recommended investors overweight our Millennial Basket on a secular ten year view basis, predicated upon our Millennials spending theme. While profit potential has not changed, recent news and price action in TSLA (eerily reminiscent of the YHOO inclusion in the SPX announcement 21 years ago on November 30th 1999!) compel us to rebalance this basket back to equal weight. We also add another layer of risk management in order to protect cyclical-only profits and institute a rather wide rolling 18% stop. Bottom Line: We reiterate our structural and cyclical overweight stance on our Millennial Basket, but today we recommend an 18% rolling stop in order to protect cyclical-only profits. The ticker symbols in the US Equity Strategy Millennials Basket are: AAPL, AMZN, UBER, HD, LEN, MSFT, NFLX, SPOT, TSLA, and V.  

Special Report

Highlights Iran is second only to China as a target for President Trump during his “lame duck” two months in office. There is plenty of spare capacity to absorb oil supply disruptions, however. President-Elect Biden will rejoin the 2015 Iranian nuclear deal, but the process will be rocky and we are far from a balance of power in the Middle East. The impact on oil supply is positive but the recovery of global demand will push oil prices up over time regardless. Now is not the right time to go long Middle Eastern equities as a reflation trade. We favor the Trans-Pacific Partnership countries. Israeli stocks can continue outperforming Middle East bourses as a whole, but the rotation from growth to value stocks will benefit other bourses. Prefer the UAE to Turkey, where a large political risk premium will persist. Feature Dear Client, With the US election largely complete, this week marks the return to our regular coverage of global market-relevant political risks. Over the past several months we have focused heavily on every aspect of the US election. The effort was worth it: our final forecast of Democratic White House and a Republican Senate came to pass and our trade recommendations generally performed as expected. Nevertheless it is time to refresh and expand our views on other markets and topics. Geopolitical Strategy has always been – necessarily – a global service offering global coverage. Recent events in China, Europe, Russia, Turkey, and the Middle East demand greater attention – and clients have told us as much. Moreover, with promising vaccine candidates on the horizon, major questions are emerging about what the post-pandemic world will bring. To this end we are returning to our roots with weekly offerings on the full range of global affairs. This week we give you a Special Report on the future of the Middle East by one of BCA’s up-and-coming strategists, Roukaya Ibrahim. We know you will find her post-Trump outlook on the region insightful. As always, we look forward to hearing from you about your research needs and what we can do to answer your geopolitical and investment questions in a timely and actionable manner. Sincerely, Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy The Middle East is about to become a major source of geopolitical risk again. First, President Trump remains in office for two months and is rushing to cement his legacy on the way out. Second, President-Elect Joe Biden will likely face gridlock at home and therefore concentrate the first two years of his presidency on foreign policy. Iran is a priority for both presidents. Biden will rejoin the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA), the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, which Trump pulled out of in 2018. The purpose of the JCPA was to wind down the US war in Iraq and then “pivot” to Asia, where the US has a much greater interest at stake in managing China’s rise (Chart 1). Chart 1Biden To Restore Obama's 'Pivot To Asia' Chart 2Squint To See Iran ... US Will Focus On China China poses a major challenge to the US while Iran poses a minor challenge (Chart 2). Biden’s aim will be to restore President Obama’s legacy. Given that the US president has unilateral authority on foreign policy, and that the 2015 deal was an executive deal without Senate approval, Biden has a good chance of success. But conditions are much less propitious than in 2015. He will not improve on the terms of the 2015 deal. Any return to a nuclear agreement and deeper understanding with Iran should ultimately reduce tensions in the Middle East. But the pathway to a new regional power equilibrium is rocky. So geopolitical risk is frontloaded and will be a near-term negative factor for Middle Eastern equities, which otherwise stand to benefit from global economic recovery. Restoring Iranian oil exports will increase global oil supply but geopolitical conflict will occasionally reduce supply. As always Iraq, wedged between Iran and US allies, is the central battleground for the power struggle in the Middle East (Map 1). Over a six-to-twelve month time frame, the global economy should recover and oil prices should trend upward. Map 1The Persian Gulf Is Filled With Black Swan Risks Biden Looks To Withdraw Like Obama And Trump Chart 3Biden May Regulate, But US Stays Energy-Independent The US’s ascent toward energy self-sufficiency and its geopolitical decline vis-à-vis China have forced Washington to revise its foreign policy over the past decade, resulting in a strategic divestment from the Middle East (Chart 3). The “Pivot to Asia” is a strategic reality evident in the shift in US military commitments – and Trump has ordered new drawdowns on his way out of office. China’s increasing geopolitical pressure on Australia and rising saber-rattling in the Taiwan Strait highlights the need for the energy-independent US to attend to allies elsewhere. The American public’s view of the Middle East as a strategic quagmire is now producing its third presidency. Obama, Trump, and Biden have all pledged to end the country’s “forever wars” in various ways. The risk to this trend, ironically, was Trump’s aggressive policy on Iran. He revoked Obama’s signature diplomatic achievement and tried to squash Iran’s regional role through “maximum pressure” sanctions and occasional military strikes. He also reinforced US allies Israel and Saudi Arabia, rather than trying to rein them in as Obama had done. Biden’s victory implies that the US will once again favor diplomacy and détente with Iran. Although Iran may make a show of resistance to Biden’s overtures and raise its price so as not to appear to have capitulated to the US, it ultimately has little choice. Its economy is on its last legs, it faces widespread popular unrest, and its sphere of influence is crumbling. Hence constraints on both sides point to a restored nuclear deal. The first obstacle is immediate. President Trump’s “lame duck” period through January 20 is a window of opportunity for Israel or Saudi Arabia to make strategic gains while still enjoying full American support. We highlight the allies because they have much more to fear from Iranian power than the US, and more to lose if the Biden administration appeases Iran. The Trump administration has allegedly reviewed options to launch strikes against Iran since the election, but he has also allegedly ruled against them (as in June 2019). While Trump could still take some kind of action, he would likely face obstruction from the Department of Defense if he tried to do anything that would trigger a full-fledged war in his final two months. It falls to the allies then – or Iran – if conflict is to erupt in the near term. Obama, Trump, and Biden have all pledged to end the country’s "forever wars" in various ways. Cyber-attacks on Iranian nuclear sites this summer are a case in point (Table 1). Suspicious explosions, including at the preeminent Natanz nuclear site, were rumored to be the work of Israel and the United States and raised the specter of a military escalation. However, Iran stuck to its policy of “strategic patience,” hoping for a Biden win. Table 1US And Israel Suspected Of Sabotaging Iran This Year It is possible that elements within the Iranian regime, such as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), could launch attacks to deter further sabotage against their infrastructure and capabilities. The IRGC is focused on rigging the 2021 presidential election and ensuring its ascendancy within the Iranian state ahead of the 82 year-old Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s succession, so it cannot be assumed to be quiet. The legacy of the outgoing President Rouhani – a relative moderate in Iran’s political scene – hinges on the success of the 2015 agreement, which he pledged would bring economic prosperity to Iran. The deal’s near-collapse has blighted this legacy and triggered a resurgence of hardliners in Iranian politics. This is clear from the February legislative elections in which hardliners won by a landslide (Chart 4). The hardening of the regime will continue, as Khamenei and the IRGC are increasingly focused on solidifying the regime’s security and authority prior to the succession. The next president will almost certainly be a hardliner reminiscent of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Oil price volatility should be expected, but over time the vaccine will secure the global economic recovery and oil prices will rise. Still, we assign low odds to Iran instigating a war or pulling out of the JCPA. The past two years have raised the specter of regime collapse. Khamenei is more likely to keep his eye on the prize: a diplomatic agreement with Biden that eases sanctions and thus enables the regime to live to fight another day. This would be his crowning achievement. The change in US leadership offers Tehran an excuse to renegotiate the 2015 deal and blame Trump as an idiosyncratic deviation from an agreement that lay in Iran’s interest. As long as Khamenei retains control of the IRGC this is our base case. Israel is limited in its ability to wage war against Iran alone, but it is not incapable of surgical strikes to set back the clock on the nuclear program, especially if the Trump administration is there to provide assistance in an exigency. The risk is not negligible. Trump’s former National Security Adviser H. R. McMaster has already warned that Israel could act on the “Begin Doctrine” of preemptive strikes against would-be nuclear powers in its neighborhood. While the near-term risk of conflict would remove oil supply, there is a simultaneous risk that cartel behavior would increase supply. Iran’s regional rivals have an interest in preventing a US-Iran deal, but they could not do so in 2015 and ultimately cannot do so today. Therefore they will seek to shore up their political strength in Iraq while undermining the Iranian economy. Saudi Arabia and other oil-producing GCC states benefit from the maximum pressure sanctions that have wiped out Iranian crude exports. The collapse in oil markets is weighing heavily on these economies. An Iranian deal would bring an additional 1mm b/d – 1.5 mm b/d of crude to global markets in short order. Arab petro-states will not cut back on their own production to make room for Iranian crude. They may try to grab greater oil market share ahead of any surge in Iranian exports. In the current oil market environment, Iran has more to lose from the status quo than do its Arab rivals. While ongoing conflict would add to the multiple crises facing Arab oil producers, the risk to oil production is less relevant today than it was at the top of the business cycle. OPEC 2.0 production is ostensibly capped at 36.42 mm b/d but there is plenty of spare capacity to make up for conflict-induced losses (Chart 5). Chart 4Hardliners Roaring Back To Power In Iran Chart 5Plenty Of Spare Oil Production Capacity Bottom Line: Biden’s election ensures that he will try to revive the Iranian nuclear deal and pivot to Asia. While this is positive for Middle Eastern stability over the medium term, it comes with near-term risks. A “lame duck” President Trump or Israel could strike out against Iran. The Gulf Arabs will do what they can to undermine Iran as well. Oil price volatility should be expected, but over the long run the main tendency will be for the global economy to recover and hence for oil prices to rise. Iraq: A Persistent Source Of Instability Iraq is the fulcrum of the US-Iran conflict, as witnessed in January with the US assassination of Quds Force commander Qassem Suleimani. Torn between Tehran and Riyadh, Baghdad remains in political crisis and is the chief battleground in the regional power struggle. Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi is still struggling to bring Iraq’s various militias, many backed by Iran, under the control of the state. The US embassy, military bases, and other interests have been under attack throughout the summer, prompting Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to threaten to withdraw the US embassy from Baghdad (Table 2). As in the past any escalation between Iran and the US will likely occur in Iraq. Table 2Iran Adopting Deterrence Strategy In Iraq Beyond Trump’s lame duck period, if Washington looks to normalize relations with Iran, then various Iraqi and Saudi forces will try to make sure that Iraq remains independent. Iraq is the critical strategic buffer zone for Saudi Arabia and it will use its leverage with Sunni forces inside Iraq to oppose Iranian domination and warn the US against giving too much to Iran. The problem for Iraq is that the US is divesting from the region and Biden will focus on the Iranian deal to the neglect of other issues. As a result the Saudis will escalate their influence campaign and Iraq will remain unstable. Bottom Line: Iraq is ground zero for the creation of a new regional power equilibrium. If the US manages to secure its allies, even while reviving the Iranian deal, then Iraq has a prospect of stabilization. But the insecurity of US allies will predominate so Iraq remains at risk of instability, militancy, and oil supply disruptions. A New Dawn? Unification to counter Iran is the chief motive behind the Abraham Peace Accords signed between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, and Sudan with the Trump administration’s mediation (Table 3). Table 3The Abraham Accords Unify Iran’s Regional Rivals Although Israel and the UAE had already been cooperating and sharing intelligence, the deal creates a formal diplomatic partnership against Iran that the countries will need even more as the US pivots to Asia. From Washington’s perspective, the deal enables it to reduce its direct management of the region and delegate authority to its ally and partners. While Saudi Arabia did not sign a deal with Israel, it has signaled a change in strategy. Bahrain is ultimately a Saudi proxy and would not have signed the agreement without Riyadh’s blessing. Moreover, the decision to open Saudi airspace to Israeli airplanes highlights closer cooperation. Additional motives that helped seal the deal: President Trump sought a foreign policy win ahead of the election. The deal reflects his promise to withdraw from the Middle East. Having won 48% of the popular vote, Trump’s approach will loom large over the Republican Party. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hoped the deal would secure him a political win amid unpopularity at home. Israel was not even forced to accede to the UAE’s demand to halt the annexation of the West Bank: Netanyahu merely announced that annexation was postponed. And on October 14, only a month after the accords were signed, Israel approved new settler homes in the occupied West Bank. For the UAE, the deal requires little effort but is economically and militarily beneficial. It improves its chances of purchasing long-sought F-35 fighter jets from the US. It is also consequential that the UAE was the first to sign the deal. Abu Dhabi is seeking to raise its stature as a regional power. It has engaged in various Middle Eastern conflicts including in Libya and Yemen and is the only Arab state to have committed troops to Afghanistan for security and humanitarian missions. The UAE has also expanded its influence by being the top source of capex investments in the region (Chart 6). It has emerged as a model Arab state and seeks to replicate that success in its geopolitical status (Chart 7). Chart 6UAE The Top Mideast Investor Ultimately the Abraham Accords reflect a shift in Middle Eastern politics to address the US’s withdrawal and changing landscape. The deal’s signatories seek to improve ties not only to face Iran but also to face Turkey, Russia, and even China. Chart 7UAE Leads The Pack Opinion polls suggest that young Arabs’ favorable perception of the US are linked to its involvement in the region. Their perception of the US as an ally, or somewhat of an ally, increased post-2018 when President Trump initiated his maximum pressure campaign on Iran (Chart 8). Chart 8US Image Has Bottomed Among Arab Youth The Abraham Accords are also significant in that they mark a departure from the Arab Peace Initiative. The Initiative conditions normalization of Arab relations with Israel on Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, and Lebanon. Until recently, this initiative was a hallmark of regional diplomacy. Palestinians of course have rejected the Abraham Accords and expressed dismay at what they perceive to be disloyalty. Their sidelining could result in an increase in radicalism and militant activity in Israel, though Biden’s election will now blunt that effect and put new demands on Israel. Similarly, Turkey and Qatar oppose the agreement. The rift will widen between the authoritarian states (the GCC and Egypt) and those in favor of political Islam (Turkey and Qatar). Unlike Israel’s previous peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, which did not result in any economic gains, bilateral economic cooperation is a cornerstone of the Abraham Accords (Table 4). Thus the agreement not only explicitly aligns geopolitical positions in the Middle East, it also weaves Israel into the region’s economies, generating gains for all sides and cementing the partnership. This is a positive example of Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy. Table 4The Abraham Accords By Sector Bottom Line: The Abraham Accords reflect long-developing structural changes in the Middle East. With the US reducing its direct management in the region, Israel and the Arab states are drawing together – particularly in opposition to Iran. If Biden restores the Iranian nuclear deal, there may be a semblance of balance in the region. But its durability will depend on the uncertain willingness of the US to keep the peace. Great Power Struggle Instability stemming from Washington’s shift away from the Middle East is being exacerbated by the competition by great powers and middle powers over filling the power vacuum. Russian and Turkish interference has had mixed results. Both are exerting their influence through greater military engagement in Syria and Libya, in which they have partially stabilized these countries. For instance, Moscow’s 2015 decision to send its air force and some ground troops to Syria reversed President Bashar al-Assad’s fate in Syria, giving him new life. Similarly, Ankara’s increased involvement in the Libyan crisis earlier this year helped the Tripoli-based government drive General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army back to its eastern enclave. Chart 9AChina Pivots To Middle East Yet Russia’s commitment is deliberately limited and likely to become more limited due to increasing domestic political risks. Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party has been in power for two decades, is showing economic and political weakness, and is overreaching in international conflicts. Therefore these countries’ interventions do not have a high degree of staying power or predictability. A more durable trend is China’s growing influence in the region. China’s approach emphasizes soft power rather than hard power, but the latter will gradually come into play. China’s main motive is to secure oil supplies. It has emerged as the top oil importer, 46% of which are sourced from the Middle East (Charts 9A and 9B). Chinese interest in the region is evident in its “Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships” (the highest of China’s diplomatic levels) with several key regional actors (Table 5).   Chart 9BChina’s Mideast Dependency Grows Rather than interfering in regional politics, China has favored economic cooperation. It has emerged as a top foreign investor in the Arab region (Chart 10 and see Chart 16 below). Table 5China Cultivates Mideast Relations Chart 10Awaiting Return Of Chinese Investment This approach has been well received by the Arab population, at least the younger generations. The Arab youth see China the most favorably among all the competing foreign actors (Chart 11). Chart 11Arab Youth Have Positive Views Of China However, China is also becoming more scrutinizing of its investments in the region. The Belt and Road Initiative is no longer just a blank check. Beijing’s investments are starting to pick up and will continue to revive as its economy recovers in the coming years, but Middle Eastern states will not be able to assume they have China’s unconditional support (Chart 12). Chart 12China's Investment Just Starting To Revive, At Best While China has improved relations with Saudi Arabia and the GCC during the Trump administration’s conflict with Iran, Biden raises the possibility of China reviving its interest in Iran, which is a key linchpin of its Belt and Road Initiative and other strategies of deepening economic relations across Eurasia. Gradually China will take a more obtrusive role. It built its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017. Moreover, the strategic pact with Iran it is negotiating, which is likely to be very large even if lower than the official price tag of $400 billion over 25 years, also includes military cooperation. If US-China tensions persist at today’s high levels, China will try to improve its supply security in the Middle East, which will eventually become another front in the new cold war. Bottom Line: The power vacuum left by the US’s reduced commitment to the region has not been filled by any of the major or middle powers. Russian, Chinese, and Turkish actions are unclear and in some cases contradictory. China has the potential to fill in some of the vacuum, but at the moment Chinese strategic involvement is nascent. Détente between the US and Iran clears the way for China to revive relations with Iran, a linchpin of its global, regional, and Eurasian strategy. Economic Progress … Interrupted While these cyclical and structural geopolitical shifts play out, Middle Eastern states also find themselves in a weak economic situation. The double whammy of pandemic and the collapse in oil prices is weighing on household, corporate, and government budgets. It is exposing long-standing vulnerabilities, unwinding recent progress, and introducing new challenges. Arab petro-states face a funding gap in the midst of economic contraction. With oil prices significantly below those needed to balance their budgets, they are re-prioritizing their spending (Chart 13). Chart 13Fiscal Squeeze Hits Arab Petro-States While this adjustment has come at the expense of strategic economic plans, in some cases it has also led to an acceleration of fiscal reforms. Oman and Saudi Arabia are cases in point. Oman has been implementing a 5% value-added tax (VAT) since April and plans to impose taxes on high-income earners beginning 2022. Similarly, Saudi Arabia tripled its VAT from 5% to 15%, eliminated a bonus cost-of-living allowance previously granted to public sector employees, and increased custom duties for several imported goods. The immediate aim of these measures is to offset some of the weakness in oil revenues (Chart 14). But over the long run they align with the strategic objective of transitioning from resource-dependent rentier states to economically diverse ones. While the economic shock has weighed on both household and government budgets, the GCC oil producers generally enjoy low debt-to-GDP ratios and comfortable government coffers. They are better positioned than their neighbors to survive the downturn without it morphing into a social, political, or economic crisis. Oil-importing Arab states, on the other hand, face limited fiscal space and have been forced to walk back recent structural reform progress while limiting their fiscal response to the recession (Chart 15). Egypt is highly dependent on tourism and remittances from Arab petro-states. The recession has reversed the improvement in its fiscal situation following austerity measures imposed as part of the three year IMF program. Chart 14Fiscal Reforms Underway Chart 15More Stimulus Needed That said, as long as nominal GDP outpaces interest on the debt, these countries will avoid a debt crisis. Although Egypt’s 10-year yield is 14.8%, its expected nominal GDP growth of 19.7% this year will ensure debt sustainability. By contrast, Tunisia is more at risk, as the yield on its 10-year government bond is near 10% yet nominal growth lags in the single digits. While policymakers across the region have implemented measures to ease burdens on households through various policies, Gulf Arab states have in some cases limited the benefits to nationals. For instance, the Qatari government announced on June 1 that it would reduce non-Qatari employee wage bills by 30%. While this protects the incomes of GCC nationals, it puts non-nationals at risk of income loss, raising the possibility that weakness among oil-producers will be transferred to non-oil producers. Chart 16Iran Teetering On Edge This is not to say that GCC nationals are completely immune to income or employment loss. In fact, the unemployment rate among Saudi nationals, which was already higher than the overall unemployment rate, jumped 2.5 pp in the second quarter to 15.5%. The Shia Crescent remains the most vulnerable neighborhood in the Middle East. Syria collapsed over the past decade, Lebanon is in the process of collapse, and Iran and Iraq are teetering (Chart 16). The IMF estimates that Iran needs oil prices at $521.2/bbl to balance its fiscal account! Weakness in Iran has spread across its sphere of influence — i.e. other predominantly Shia states and non-state actors who depend on Tehran for informal funding. Mass protests against poor economic conditions and corruption afflicted Iraq and Lebanon in the fall of 2019, forcing both governments to resign late last year. The political and economic situations have only deteriorated since. The August 4 blast at the Port of Beirut was the final straw for Lebanon which is now facing financial meltdown. Meanwhile, Iraq’s stability continues to be tested. The collapse in oil markets has weighed on government revenues as well as on the current account, which is projected to record a deficit worth 12.6% of GDP this year, following surpluses in the previous years. The good news is that the discovery of a COVID-19 vaccine points to a rebound in global economic activity over the coming 12 months. The bad news is that the virus is breaking out again and the distribution of the vaccine will take time. Eventually the combination of vaccines and additional monetary and fiscal stimulus in the developed world will alleviate some of the Middle East’s deepest strains, but it will be a rocky road. Social and political problems will escalate for some time even after the economy bottoms. Regarding the outlook for oil markets, BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategists see the confluence of steadily improving demand, a decline in US shale-oil production, and OPEC 2.0 production management pushing oil prices higher. They forecast Brent will average $63 per barrel next year, compared to $44 per barrel at current prices, and they make a good fundamental case for oil to average between $65 - $70 per barrel over the coming five years. The latest readings from global manufacturing PMIs send bullish signals, suggesting that Middle Eastern recovery is gradually underway (Chart 17). It is the near-term that is most treacherous. Chart 17Global Rebound Not A Moment Too Soon Chart 18New Lockdowns Pose Near-Term Risks On the demand-side, COVID-19 cases globally are trending upward with several European countries imposing partial lockdowns (Chart 18). While the lockdowns are unlikely to be as severe as earlier this year, they threaten to delay the recovery in oil markets. In response, the OPEC 2.0 coalition of producers, which was planning to reduce production cuts to 5.7 mm barrel per day in January (leading to higher output) may instead extend the current 7.7 mm barrel per day cuts when it meets again in December 2020. This means petro-states will need to contend with low prices and revenues for longer, while oil importers see shortfalls in remittances. Aside from risks to the oil market, the resurgence in COVID-19 cases adds further uncertainty to the expected recovery in global growth through knock-on effects on activity. Even though not all Middle Eastern countries are experiencing the second wave of the disease, governments have generally tightened stringency measures recently (Chart 19). Chart 19COVID-19 Restrictions Vary By Country Bottom Line: Middle Eastern economies have been hit hard by the double whammy of pandemic and oil price collapse. Policy responses have been measured to limit deviation from long-term goals. This is a positive for the long-term outlook. We expect improvements in the global economy and the recovery in oil markets over the coming 12 months to alleviate some of the pressure. However, risks are skewed to the downside and a protracted downturn could put to waste recent structural improvements. Countries that lie in the so-called “Shia Crescent” – Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon – are in dire need of resuscitation. Oil importers face the risk that the cyclical downturn unwinds recent economic improvements and uncovers structural vulnerabilities, weighing on the strategic outlook. Arab petro-states enjoy the most comfortable coffers. But even their economies are at risk, especially in the high-risk scenario in which oil markets do not recover anytime soon. Saudi Arabia and Oman are at a disadvantage versus Qatar in this sense given their outsized dependence on oil and higher fiscal breakeven oil price. Investment Implications Middle Eastern equity market capitalization is growing over time relative to the rest of the world (Chart 20). The region remains a reflation play, with a heavy sectoral focus on materials and financials as well as energy. Thus it stands to benefit over the long run as the global recovery gets underway. Chart 20Investors Gaining Interest In Mideast Over Time However, today is not an attractive entry point for the Middle East relative to other emerging markets. The rebalancing of oil markets, the current wave of COVID-19 before the vaccine rollout, and near-term geopolitical risks outlined above imply that the Middle East will face a period of heightened uncertainty and uninspiring equity performance. Protracted economic weakness will weigh on social stability. The oil-rich GCC is least vulnerable to popular unrest as it has the space to be generous to its citizens. But even these countries have had to cut some benefits. The pandemic will erode the social contract currently in place whereby monetary incentives are awarded to make up for the lack of political voice. The Shia Crescent is already in crisis as bouts of mass protests have been occurring in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon for the past year. And the pandemic has derailed the economic recovery of various states that had only recently gotten back on track after the Arab Spring. Another bout of economic weakness will push people back into the streets, threatening to topple governments again (Chart 21). Chart 21Unrest Will Rise Even After Economic Bottom A good entry point into Middle Eastern equities will emerge once the global economy gets onto a better footing as the US and Iran will likely achieve a precarious balance. Geopolitics and the recession are forcing Arab states to adopt greater pragmatism in their economic and foreign policies. Reform policies are creating more diverse economies, as in the case of the UAE (Chart 22), which, unlike Saudi Arabia, is decoupling its equity performance from oil prices. Chart 22UAE About Financials, Saudi About Oil The risk to Israel, aside from politics, is that it is a tech-heavy bourse that could start to underperform neighbors like the UAE amid the likely global rotation into value stocks and cyclicals. Chart 23Israel Outperforms, But Beware Rotation To Value Israel has been outperforming the broad Middle East basket, including the UAE, and that trend looks to continue. But it does not look attractive relative to emerging markets as a whole. The risk to Israel, aside from politics, is that it is a tech-heavy bourse that could start to underperform neighbors like the UAE amid the likely global rotation into value stocks and cyclicals. Israel equity performance relative to Turkey closely tracks global growth versus value stocks (Chart 23). However, we do not recommend playing this specific pair trade. For that we would also need to see an improvement in Turkish governance. Turkey may benefit from global macro developments but its country risk will remain extreme. The recent change of central bank leadership temporarily improved Turkey’s relative performance but does not mark a fundamentally positive turning point in policy, according to BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategist Arthur Budaghyan. President Recep Erdogan is unlikely to adopt orthodox monetary policy and austerity prior to the 2022 elections. The approach of the elections, and several simultaneous foreign adventures, will keep the Turkish political risk premium elevated. Therefore the UAE provides the better long end of a value play on the Middle East.     Roukaya Ibrahim Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com