Developed Countries

Your feedback is important to us. Please take our client survey today. Highlights The long-term outlook for the dollar is bearish, but fresh shorts could be offside over the next one to three months. An uptick in US political uncertainty adds to our bullish dollar view over the next month. Stay short USD/JPY as a core holding for now. Beyond the near term, the Scandinavian currencies are best positioned for outperformance over the next 12 months. Silver is selling off relative to gold. Being long silver is a long-term bet that will pay handsome returns, but stand aside for now. Feature November is seasonally a good month for the dollar, and this year could well prove no exception (Chart I-1). Just a few days ago, the market consensus was that the dollar would decline irrespective of who sits in the Oval Office next year. A few days later and the market woke up to the realization that such a “heads I win, tails I win” bet rarely pans out smoothly. We have been very sympathetic to a dollar-bearish view over the long term, but as we highlighted last week, a few indicators have not passed our smell test, setting up the potential for a knee-jerk dollar rally. To add to this thesis, the rise in the greenback this week (and bloodbath in financial markets) has eerie historical echoes with the recent past. Remarkably, since the 2009 global financial crisis and the ensuing 2011 dollar bull market, the greenback has tended to stage its most powerful rallies into year-end. Chart I-2 shows that even after adjusting for the dollar uptrend over the last decade, November to January have proven to be very good months for dollar-long positions. This was particularly notable in 2009, 2011, 2014 and 2017 (Chart I-3). Chart I-1The Dollar Loves November Chart I-2The Dollar Since GFC Chart I-3The Dollar Is Oversold We are no technical experts, but could this time be different, especially given so many uncertainties clouding the investment outlook? And if so, what are other catalysts for a dollar bounce, other than those penned in report last week? What Could Be Different? Chart I-4The Dollar Rally Occurs In Two Phases Crises are rarely solved with one silver bullet. Historians can try to justify this over the last several centuries, but for the dollar call, it is instructive to simply re-examine the significant events we have lived through since the Great Financial Crisis. Enter 2008. The dollar rally occurred in two phases. The first phase prompted the US authorities to act by dropping interest rates, which dampened the rally and stimulated reflation. When the crisis proved bigger than the authorities expected, indiscriminate liquidation by financial market participants eventually prompted more action (Chart I-4). To be specific, the US first introduced swap lines with a select few central banks in December 2007 in response to the dollar crisis following the collapse of the housing market. These swap lines allowed foreign central banks to draw on dollar liquidity directly from the Federal Reserve and use this to provide credit to domestic concerns. However, from March to October 2008, the dollar soared by about 25%, since the swap lines did not include emerging markets. This prompted the Fed to expand its swap lines to include more developed-market participants and some emerging market countries. When the crisis proved bigger than the authorities expected, indiscriminate liquidation by financial market participants eventually prompted more action.  If we consider the situation today, we can all agree that the nature of the crisis is quite different from 2008, but the severity is as important, if not greater. However, similar to 2008, the Fed only has swap lines with 14 central banks. Moreover, the six-month original window is expiring. Granted, cross-currency basis swaps do not suggest any imminent danger (Chart I-5). Nevertheless, emerging market countries like South Africa, Turkey, India, Indonesia, and Russia do not have direct access to dollar liquidity from the Fed and are at risk to torpedo the dollar decline. Chart I-5No Funding Stresses For Now In short, many emerging market central banks do not have swap agreements with the US. These are countries with huge dollar liabilities that could continue to see their currencies fall, pushing up the aggregate dollar index. Developed market commodity currencies tend to be highly correlated with emerging market currencies, so this dynamic is very important for the US dollar call (Chart I-6). Meanwhile, there is a huge pool within the financial architecture unable to access funding through central bank swap lines. To be exact, around 60% of outstanding foreign exchange swaps/forwards are among non-bank financial and other institutions. Hedge funds are included in this group, and they entail a lot more credit risk than any central bank would be willing to bear. Then there is the Fed’s FIMA facility. This is a temporary repo facility for foreign and international monetary authorities (FIMA) that allows account holders to temporarily exchange their Treasury securities held with the Fed for US dollars. However, the pool of Treasury securities available to swap for US dollars has shrunk significantly. This has been on the back of slowing global trade and conscious diversification of reserves by offshore concerns (Chart I-7). Chart I-6EM And DM Currencies Chart I-7A Smaller Pool Of Treasurys To Sell The bottom line is that there is a window between a crisis and action by the Fed that could exacerbate the knee-jerk rally in the US dollar, as we have been highlighting in recent weeks. For now, there remains ample room for foreign central banks to draw on dollar liquidity (Chart I-8). As such, the dollar bounce will be an opportunity to establish fresh short positions rather than signal a renewed bull market. Chart I-8Ample Swap Liquidity Currency Positions US Dollar: A temporary dip in inflation expectations in the US will boost real rates and encourage flows back into US fixed-income assets. The drop in oil prices, which has been moving neck in neck with US inflation expectations, corroborates this view (Chart I-9). The DXY could easily touch 96 before consolidating gains. Chart I-9US Inflation Expectations Could Drop Euro: It remains unclear the disbursement of the funds from the pandemic emergency purchase program (PEPP). In the meantime, the European Central Bank stood pat today, confirming the narrative that Europe might be out of monetary bullets and fiscal policy is needed to revive animal spirits. This could cause air pocket for EUR/USD, which could touch 1.15 before rebounding. Yen: The yen is a perfect “heads I win, tails I don’t lose much bet.” Japan is one of the few countries offering positive real rates (Chart I-10). Switzerland also falls in that category. In a world that can temporarily dip into deflation, one might prefer to be in US dollars, but the yen and Swiss franc will also hold up nicely. Chart I-10Only In Japan And Switzerland Loonie: Our colleagues at the Daily Insights summarized the Bank Of Canada’s actions this week as technical and not fundamental (Chart I-11). With no real change in monetary policy, Canadian asset prices will remain dominated by global trends. The CAD has cyclical upside versus the USD, as we wrote about, but the current period of market tumult should push the loonie lower in the coming month or two. Chart I-11Canada Versus US Scandinavian currencies: The NOK and SEK have borne the brunt of the dollar decline so far and will bounce the most once reflation is back in play. We have a limit buy order on Nordic currencies should they decline further (Chart I-12). Chart I-12Dollar Seasonality Relative Value: Focus on relative value at the crosses rather than outright dollar bets. We are short the NZD/CAD, CAD/NOK and EUR/GBP as plays on relative fundamentals. EUR/GBP remains at risk of a significant selloff if we get a Brexit deal. Oil currencies: Remain long petrocurrencies versus the euro, but we are looking to use the tactical bounce in the dollar to shift to USD shorts. Silver: Short-term investors should stand aside on silver for now. The bullish thesis remains intact but volatility will rise in the short term.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data from the US have been positive: GDP recovered by 33.1% quarter-on-quarter on an annualized basis in Q3. The Markit Manufacturing PMI marginally increased from 53.2 to 53.3 in October. The services PMI also increased, from 54.6 to 56. The Chicago Fed National Activity Index declined from 1.11 to 0.27 in September. Initial jobless claims increased by 751K for the week ending on October 23rd. The DXY index increased by 1% this week alongside the equity market correction, impacted by the looming US elections and increasing number of COVID-19 cases. Our Geopolitical strategists have upgraded Trump’s odds of winning from 35% to 45%, though major opinion polls still favor a Biden victory. Our bias is that a Biden win will likely increase fiscal stimulus and decrease economic and trade policy uncertainties, which is bearish for the US dollar. Report Links: A Few Market Observations - October 23, 2020 Does The US Save Too Much Or Too Little? - October 16, 2020 Tail Risks In FX Markets - October 2, 2020 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data from the euro area have been mixed: The Markit Manufacturing PMI increased from 53.7 to 54.4 in October. However, the Services PMI declined from 48 to 46.2.  M3 money supply surged by 10.4% year-on-year in September. The Economic Sentiment Indicator was unchanged at 90.9 in October. The euro plunged by 1.4% against the US dollar this week. On Thursday, the ECB held its key interest rate unchanged at -0.5% despite re-imposed lockdown measures against surging COVID cases in Europe. However, it also hinted that there could be additional policy action and more stimulus in December should conditions worsen. Report Links: Addressing Client Questions - September 4, 2020 On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data from Japan have been positive: The Jibun Manufacturing PMI increased from 47.7 to 48 in October. The Coincident Index rose from 78.3 to 79.2 in August. The Leading Economic Index also ticked up from 86.7 to 88.4. Retail trade fell by 8.7% year-on-year in September.  The Japanese yen depreciated by 0.3% against the US dollar this week amid market volatilities. With relatively higher real interest rates, a current account surplus and cheaper valuation, the Japanese yen is our favorite safe-haven currency. We continue to recommend holding the Japanese yen as a portfolio hedge for surfing election and COVID waves. On a separate note, the BoJ kept its interest rate on hold this Thursday. The Bank also weakened its economic forecast for this year but upgraded the economic recovery outlook. Report Links: The Near-Term Bull Case For The Dollar - February 28, 2020 Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 Currency Market Signals From Gold, Equities And Flows - January 31, 2020 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data from the UK have been mixed: Retail sales increased by 4.7% year-on-year in September. The Markit Manufacturing PMI declined from 54.1 to 53.3 in October. The services PMI fell from 56.1 to 52.3 in October. The British pound plunged by 1.5% against the US dollar this week amid broad USD strength. The latest PMI releases saw a steeper decline in the services industry. As UK’s services account for more than half of total economic output, it suggests that the pound is more exposed to second infection risks than other manufacturing-oriented economies. Report Links: Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data from Australia have been positive: Imports fell by 1% month-on-month in September. Exports, however, increased by 3% month-on-month. The trade surplus widened from A$2.6 billion to A$5.1 billion. Headline CPI increased by 0.7% year-on-year in Q3, up from -0.3% the previous quarter. The Australian dollar fell by 1.5% against the US dollar this week. The pickup in inflation eased the RBA’s pressure to further ease monetary policy further. The expansion in the trade account surplus also bodes well for the Australian dollar in a reflationary environment. Report Links: An Update On The Australian Dollar - September 18, 2020 On AUD And CNY - January 17, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data from New Zealand have been negative:  Exports fell from NZ$4.4 billion to NZ$4 billion in September while imports expanded from NZ$4.7 billion to NZ$5 billion. The trade deficit therefore widened from NZ$282 million to NZ$1,013 million. The ANZ Business Confidence Index rose to -15.7 from -28.5 in October. The New Zealand dollar fell by 1.2% against the US dollar this week. The ANZ Activity Outlook Report said that “there was a mix of ups and downs” in recent developments and warned against higher economic and unemployment risks once the cushioning impact of the wage subsidy fades. Report Links: Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data from Canada have been positive: Building permits increased by 17% month-on-month in September. The Canadian dollar plunged by 1.7% against the US dollar this week. Crude oil prices dropped by 12% this week amid worries about the second infection wave and prolonged travel restrictions, which represent a headwind for the Canadian dollar. On Wednesday, the Bank of Canada announced that it would keep interest rates on hold at 0.25% and maintain such low policy rates until the inflation objective is achieved. Moreover, the Bank is recalibrating the QE program to shift purchases towards longer-term bonds, which have a more direct influence on the borrowing rates for household and businesses. Report Links: Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 More On Competitive Devaluations, The CAD And The SEK - May 1, 2020 A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data from Switzerland have been negative: The ZEW Expectations Index plunged from 26.2 to 2.3 in October. Total sight deposits increased from CHF 705.1 billion to CHF 706.9 billion for the week ending on October 23rd. While the Swiss franc depreciated by 1% against the US dollar this week, it increased by 0.5% against the euro, which brings it close to our limit buy price of 1.06. An expensive currency is likely to impede growth for a small open economy like Switzerland, suggesting the SNB will step up its currency intervention. Prepare to go long EUR/CHF.  Report Links: On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Currency Market Signals From Gold, Equities And Flows - January 31, 2020 Portfolio Tweaks Before The Chinese New Year - January 24, 2020 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data from Norway have been positive: Retail sales increased by 0.3% month-on-month in September. The Norwegian krone plunged by 3.4% against the US dollar this week, making it the worst performing G10 currency. Despite recent market volatilities, we continue to favor the Norwegian krone in the long run based on its cheap valuation and a brighter energy outlook in the post-vaccine world. We are looking to rebuy the Nordic currencies on weakness. Report Links: Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data from Sweden have been positive: The trade balance shifted from a deficit of SEK 2.1 billion to a surplus of SEK 2.6 billion in September. Consumer confidence increased from 88.4 to 90 in October. Retail sales increased by 3.9% year-on-year in September. PPI fell by 4.2% year-on-year in September. The Swedish krona decreased by 1.9% against the US dollar this week. While COVID cases have been resurging in Sweden, Sweden’s services is lower, as a % of GDP, than other major euro area countries and therefore less exposed to the risk of a second wave. We continue to recommend the Swedish krona from a cyclical perspective. Kelly Zhong Research Analyst Report Links: Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades

Highlights A Biden victory with a Republican Senate (28% odds) poses the greatest risk to the global reflation trade. The US is the most susceptible to social unrest of all the developed markets. Europe is stable relative to the US, but political risks are rising as new lockdowns go into effect. Emerging markets are also susceptible to social unrest – even those that look best on paper. Chile and Thailand have more downside due to politics, despite underlying advantages. Turkey and Nigeria are among those at risk of major unrest in a post-COVID world. Book gains on EUR-GBP volatility, Indian pharma, and rare earths. Cut losses. Feature This week saw a long-awaited risk-off move in global financial markets. A new wave of COVID lockdowns plus the US failure to pass a fiscal package finally registered with investors. Over the past two months we have argued that rising COVID cases without stimulus would produce a pre-election selloff that would drive the final nail in President Trump’s re-election bid. That should still be the case (Chart 1).  While we are sticking with our view that Biden will win, we have upgraded Trump’s odds from 35% to 45%. We are focused on Trump’s momentum – not alleged polling errors – in Florida and Pennsylvania, and Biden’s loss of altitude in Arizona, as these trends open a clear Electoral College path to another Trump victory (Chart 2). Nevertheless Biden is tied with Trump among men and leads by 17 percentage points among women. He is also in a statistical tie among the elderly.  Chart 1COVID Rising + Stimulus Falling = Red Ink Chart 2Trump's Momentum In Swing States   Even assuming Trump’s comeback proves too little, too late, it could produce a contested election in which Trump has constitutional advantages, or a Republican Senate. Either of these two scenarios would extend the election season volatility for one-to-three months. Our updated US election probabilities are shown in Table 1 alongside the odds from the popular online betting site PredictIt.org. Table 1There Is A 72% Chance The Post-Election Policy Setting Will Favor Reflation A Biden victory with a Republican Senate (28% odds) is the only deflationary scenario in the near term, since fiscal stimulus will be reduced in size and uncertain in timing. However, assuming financial market pressure forces senators to agree, this is actually the best outcome over the full two-year Senate election period, since neither tariffs nor corporate taxes would rise. Notably Treasury yields have risen regardless of election scenario, but there is little doubt that this scenario poses the greatest risk to the global reflation trade (Chart 3). Why does this election matter? Trump’s re-election would prolong US political polarization and “maximum pressure” foreign and trade policy. Trump must win through the constitutional system, not the popular vote, so a win would push polarization up. Polarization at home, including Democratic opposition in the House of Representatives, would drive him abroad. By contrast, a Biden win would include a popular majority and might include a united Democratic Congress, which would result in a clear popular mandate and would concentrate Biden's administration on an ambitious domestic agenda.   A Biden victory with a Republican Senate (28% odds) poses the greatest risk to the global reflation trade. Hence Trump’s election would bolster the USD and US equity outperformance, along with global policy uncertainty relative to the United States (Chart 4). Whereas Biden’s election, if it also brings a Democratic Senate, would bolster global equity outperformance, cyclical equities, and US policy uncertainty relative to global. Chart 3Republican Senate Less Reflationary Chart 4Trump Would Boost US Equity Outperformance   The election will have a geopolitical fallout. First, Trump is still president through January 20 regardless of outcome and could take aggressive actions to seal his legacy and lock the Biden administration into conflict with China or Iran. Second, a contested election would create a power vacuum in which other nations could seek to take advantage of American distraction. Third, a Trump victory spells strategic conflict with Iran and China, and either could try to seize the advantage by acting first. Fourth, a Biden win spells confrontation with Russia and ultimately China, and both countries would test his resolve early in his administration. Diagram 1 summarizes these key market takeaways of the US election scenarios. This week we provide our monthly GeoRisk Update with a special focus on our COVID-19 Social Unrest Index and implications for select developed, emerging, and frontier markets. Diagram 1Scenarios For US Election Outcomes And Market Impacts The United States The market can get hit by negative surprises after the US election just as easily as before.1 The US is a powder keg of social and political angst, ranking the worst among developed markets in our COVID-19 Social Unrest Index (Table 2). The lower a country ranks on the list, the less stable it is and the more susceptible to unrest. Social unrest becomes market-relevant if it weighs on consumer or business sentiment, or if it causes a major change in government or policy. Table 2The US Is The Developed Market Most Susceptible To Social Unrest The first US risk is a contested election. By rallying in the swing states in the final weeks of the election, Trump has increased the likelihood of a disputed outcome. Armies of lawyers will descend upon the swing state election boards. The Supreme Court’s intervention in Florida in 2000 has incentivized political parties to seek a judicial intervention, especially if they think they are losing the popular vote narrowly. Mail-in counts, recounts, and other disputes could push up against the December 14 Electoral College voting date. Worse, if the Electoral College is hung, the House of Representatives would have to decide the outcome in January. Volatility and risk-off sentiment would predominate. Emerging markets are showing the first signs of upheaval in the wake of this year’s crisis. The second risk is resistance to the election results. If Trump wins on a constitutional technicality, the country faces widespread unrest. This would be relevant to investors if it paralyzes major cities, exacerbates the COVID outbreak, or snowballs into something big enough to suppress consumer confidence. If Biden wins on a technicality, the country faces not widespread unrest but isolated pockets of potentially armed resistance or domestic terrorist attacks. The FBI, DHS, and recent news events have confirmed the presence of armed or violent extremist groups of various ideological stripes that pose a rising threat in the current climate of pandemic, unemployment, and polarization.2 They could strike any time after the election.     Europe And Brexit Chart 5European Lockdowns Push Up Political Risk Europe and Canada have reinstated lockdowns in response to their rise in COVID-19 cases. The surge in political risk is evident from our GeoRisk Indicators (Chart 5). These lockdowns will not be as draconian as earlier this year as the death rate has been found to be lower than once feared. While most governments have time on the political clock to take a hardline approach today, at the start of what could be a nasty winter season, they do not have so much leeway in 2021. Greece, Spain, Italy, the UK, and France are next in line for social unrest, after the US, in our index, Table 2 above. These countries are also vulnerable because fiscal support is not as robust as elsewhere, as can be seen by our global fiscal stimulus tracker (Chart 6). France is in better shape than the others and marks the dividing line – the 2017 election was a turning point in which the political establishment unified to defeat a right-wing populist challenge. President Emmanuel Macron’s popularity is holding up decently and it will now be buttressed by his tough stance against a spate of radical Islamist terrorist attacks. Extremist incidents will continue to be a problem, given the lockdowns and economic slump. Macron will focus on economic reflation in 2021 leading up to an election for which he is clearly favored in spring of 2022. Anything that derails his political trajectory before that time is of great importance for Europe’s political future, since Macron will be the de facto leader once Angela Merkel steps down in October 2022. Italy and Spain will be ongoing sources of political risk. Italy was the first major European hotspot of the pandemic, and euroskeptic attitudes are quietly ticking back up, but the ruling coalition and especially Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte have received popular backing for their handling of the crisis. Spain, on the other hand, has seen Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez lose support, while conservative parties tick up in popular opinion. These two countries are candidates for early elections when the hens come home to roost for the pandemic and recession (Chart 7). Chart 6More Stimulus Needed In Europe Chart 7Europe’s Leaders Fare Better Than Others   The other major countries with looming elections in 2021-22 are seeing relatively positive outcomes in popular opinion (e.g. the Netherlands, Germany). The exception is the UK, which is on the lower end of the social unrest index and is in the midst of internal disruption due to Brexit. Our assessment remains that Prime Minister Boris Johnson and the Tories will have to accept a trade deal with the EU over the next month (Chart 8). They can afford to leave on paper, but the economy would suffer and Scotland’s nationalists would be empowered to attempt secession. Our European Strategist Dhaval Joshi believes a Biden win in the US will hasten Johnson’s capitulation. We don’t expect much more upside in our GBP-EUR volatility trade after the US election result is known (Chart 9).  Chart 8Go Long Sterling Chart 9Close EUR-GBP Volatility Trade Chart 10Trump Would Weigh On Euro Trump’s re-election would be negative for the European Union’s economic and political stability (Chart 10). It would portend a greater trade war, Middle Eastern instability and refugees, Russian aggression, or European populism. By contrast, Biden will not use sweeping tariffs to resolve trade tensions, will seek to restore the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, will suppress anti-establishment politics, will seek a multilateral approach to China trade tensions, and will only substantially aggravate the Europeans by being too aggressive on Russia. EM: Chile And Thailand Emerging markets are showing the first inevitable signs of upheaval in the wake of this year’s global crisis. What is critical to note about our Social Unrest Index for EM is that even if a country ranks high on the list overall, it could still face significant sociopolitical upheaval. This is manifest in the top-ranked countries of our list – Chile, Malaysia, Thailand, Russia, Indonesia – all of which have already seen some degree of social and/or political unrest in this crisis year (Table 3).  Table 3Even Emerging Markets That Look Good On Paper Are Susceptible To Unrest The best example is Chile, which is top-ranked in the index but ranks ninth in the “Household Grievances” column, which measures inequality, inflation, and unemployment. The latter measure helps explain how Chile erupted last fall and again this fall in mass protests. Chart 11Political Risk Weighs On Chile Over the past week Chileans voted overwhelmingly in a referendum to revise their constitution with a constitutional convention that will be elected, i.e. not overdetermined by current members of the National Congress. The constitutional revision process is ultimately a positive way for a country with good governance to assuage its household grievances. But the process will continue through a revision process in April 2021, the November 2021 general election, and a final referendum in 2022, ensuring that political risk persists. Chilean assets have fallen short of their expected performance based on global copper prices, suggesting that they have upside in the near term (Chart 11). Positive news is driven by macro fundamentals, including Chinese stimulus, but political risk will periodically put a cap on rallies by highlighting Chile’s transition to expansive social spending, higher debts, and hence future currency risk. Thailand’s case is different, as it is not household grievances per se but rather the ongoing governance problem that is triggering mass protests. The governance problem stems from regional disparities in wealth and representative government. Modern society and pro-growth populism have repeatedly clashed with the royalist political establishment and its military backers over the past 20 years and that process is set to continue. Chart 12Thailand Not Fully Pricing New Instability Cycle The newest round of the crisis will build for some years and ultimately culminate in some degree of bloodshed before a new political settlement is achieved. Typically, over the past 20 years, Thai political unrest creates a buying opportunity for investors. But the previous major wave of unrest, from 2006-14, occurred during the lead-up to the all-important royal succession. Now the succession is “over” and it is not clear that the new king, Vajiralongkorn, will live up to his father’s legacy as a successful arbiter of society’s conflicts. It is possible that he will overreact to domestic opposition and abuse his powers. Our Emerging Markets Strategy has downgraded Thailand in its portfolio, showing that the economy is suffering from insufficient stimulus as a negative credit impulse offsets public spending during the crisis. Thai equities do not offer relative value within the emerging market space at present (Chart 12). Most likely Thai political troubles will continue to provide a buying opportunity, but at the moment the risks are not sufficiently priced. If Chile, Malaysia, and Thailand are already experiencing significant political risk despite their high rankings on our index, then Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, and the Philippines face even greater challenges going forward. We have written about Brazil recently – we continue to see a rising political risk premium there (Chart 13). We will update our views on South Africa and the Philippines in forthcoming special reports. For now we turn to Turkey. Turkey: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back Turkey scores near the bottom of our Social Unrest Index. The regime of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been in power for nearly two decades, is suffering cracks in public support, is continuing to suffer the inflationary consequences of populist monetary and fiscal policy, and is embroiled in a range of international adventures and conflicts, now including Nagorno-Karabakh. After a brief pause of tensions in September, we argued that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s retreat would be temporary and that geopolitical tensions would re-escalate. They have done so even sooner than we thought. The lira is collapsing, as registered by our GeoRisk Indicator, which is once again on the rise (Chart 14). Chart 13Brazilian Political Risk Nearing 2018 Levels Chart 14Turkish Political Risk Spikes Anew   Relations with Europe have worsened significantly. Aggressive rhetoric between Erdogan and Macron in response to France’s treatment of French Muslims and handling of recent terrorist incidents has led to a diplomatic crisis: Paris recalled its ambassador. The episode highlights both Erdogan’s increased assertiveness vis-à-vis the EU as well as his Neo-Ottoman bid to become the leader of the Muslim world. Erdogan has called for a boycott of French goods (alongside similar popular calls in various Muslim countries). The European Commission warned Turkey could face punitive action at its December summit.   The feud in the eastern Mediterranean is also escalating. Turkey’s Oruc Reis seismic research vessel was once again sent out on an exploratory mission in contested waters on October 12. The mission’s duration was extended multiple times.    The EU may impose sanctions as early as December. Brussels' response to Turkish provocations may include targeted anti-dumping measures, likely on steel and fish. There have also been calls to suspend the customs union, but this would require the conflict to rise above rhetoric as it would harm EU investments in Turkey. Turkey is growing even more assertive in its neighborhood with its support for Azerbaijan in the conflict with Armenia. Tensions with Russia are rising yet again. Erdogan is already overextended in Syria and Libya, and recently threatened to launch a new military operation in northern Syria if Kurdish militants do not relocate from along Turkey’s border. The warning follows a Russian airstrike on Turkey-backed Syrian rebels in Idlib earlier this week – the deadliest strike in Idlib since March. Provoking the United States, Turkey also tested its newly purchased Russian S400 missile defense system on October 16. This was swiftly followed by US warnings that Turkey faces US sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act if it operationalizes the system. The risk of punitive action would rise under a Biden presidency as he is more likely to adopt a tougher stance on Erdogan than President Trump. Chart 15More Downside For Turkish Lira These developments all point to a continuation in geopolitical tensions, as Erdogan flouts various risks and constraints. Turkey’s relationship with NATO allies is continuing to deteriorate meaningfully. The lira’s collapse is also in response to economic developments. After a surprise 200 basis points rate hike in September, the CBRT disappointed markets by keeping the benchmark 1 week repo rate on hold at its October 22 meeting. Investors had hoped that the September hike marked a reversal of Erdogan’s unorthodox policies. However, the October decision disconfirms this hope, as the central bank is instead opting for stealth measures to raise the cost of funding (e.g. limiting funding at the benchmark rate and thus forcing banks to borrow at higher costs; widening the interest rate corridor to give itself more room to raise the weighted average cost of funding). These decisions come amid rising inflation, debt monetization, a loss in foreign interest in Turkish equities and bonds, and deteriorating budget and current account balances. All point to further lira weakness (Chart 15). Bottom Line: The TRY faces downside pressure from the deteriorating geopolitical and economic backdrop. Although the EU has so far shown restraint in penalizing Ankara, its stance has not dissuaded Erdogan from adopting a provocative foreign policy stance. Moreover tensions with the US are at risk of escalating due to the possibility of a Biden presidency. Economic factors also point to continued weakness as monetary policy is too loose and the CBRT has not abandoned Erdoganomics. Nigeria: No Political Change Waves of protests have erupted across Nigeria in recent weeks, largely driven by the country’s youth. Protests center on calls to end the special anti-robbery squad (SARS), an arm of the national police service, which has long been accused of extrajudicial killings, torture, extortion, and corruption. Most recently, dozens of soldiers and police officers approached the scene of a major protest site in Lekki, a large district in Lagos, and opened fire, killing 12 people. The violence fueled outrage toward the government and security forces. To quell unrest, the government announced that SARS would be disbanded and promised a host of reforms. Demonstrators are skeptical of government promises without clearly specified timeframes. After all, previous incumbents have suggested police reform would be expedited. This has yet to happen, so we do not expect national policy to meet public demand. Moreover, President Buhari is a former military dictator who has maintained a hard line on security matters. He is in his final term in office and not legally required to step down until 2023. While discontent grows toward the government for social injustices, the Nigerian economy remains vulnerable and imbalanced. The local currency is facing considerable risk of major devaluation stemming from strains on its balance of payments, as BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy pointed out in a recent report. Low oil prices and weak FDI inflows will foster various imbalances impeding the nation’s structural adjustments and its potential growth rate. The US election will act as a positive catalyst for markets in the short run as long as it produces a clear result and resolves the US fiscal stalemate. Nigeria’s current account excluding oil has been structurally wide, a sign of weak domestic productivity and an uncompetitive currency (Chart 16). Foreign currency reserves stand at $36bn, barely above foreign debt obligations at $28bn. FDI inflows have reached their second lowest point over the past decade, weighing on productivity growth, which is near 0%. A positive for Nigeria’s macro fundamentals is that public debt is low, at 23% of GDP, decreasing the likelihood of a sovereign default in the near term. Government officials refrained from large COVID fiscal relief, keeping spending in check. Coupled with low debt servicing costs, of which the foreign share only represents 2% of government revenues, a currency depreciation to improve competitiveness would not make public debt dynamics a concern. Nominal GDP is above short-term rates (Chart 17). Hence there is room for the currency to fall and government spending to pick up into next year to support the economy.  Chart 16Nigeria Struggles With Economic Rebalance Chart 17Nigeria Has Fiscal Firepower   In the post-dictatorship era, oil revenues knit the country’s predominantly Muslim north with its oil-rich and predominantly Christian south. The country has struggled to rebalance the economy in the wake of the 2014 oil shock. Crude production has fallen from over 2 million barrels per day to around 1.6 million bpd since 2010, and Nigeria struggles to meet its modest OPEC quotas. The current global crisis could have a negative long-term impact as rig counts have fallen again. We expect global oil demand to be supported in 2021, as lockdowns will be less stringent the second time and global fiscal stimulus will keep coming. And while Buhari’s age and poor health make him vulnerable, he is not without reserves of political strength. He is seen as someone who has kept up a good fight against the Islamist militant group Boko Haram. Considering that he is a northerner and a Muslim by faith, this strategy has helped ease sectarian tensions across the country, strengthening his grip. The problem is that the size of the global crisis could upset even the most stable of petro-states. Like most of sub-Saharan Africa, the youth population is large – the median age is around 18. If global oil demand relapses amid the second wave of the pandemic and a lack of domestic and global stimulus, the country will suffer yet another wave of unemployment. And if policy remains hawkish, sociopolitical troubles will be amplified.  Nigeria’s impact on global oil prices is limited – it only provides 2% of global oil supply – but it could become a contributor to rising unplanned outages if instability gets out of hand. Bottom Line: The SARS protests are not likely to threaten overall government stability, but mounting economic pressures could exacerbate social unrest, and the negative feedback with security forces. This could deliver a significant blow to the aging Buhari’s government if he does not enact expansionary fiscal policy to smooth out the external shocks. Investment Takeaways Chart 18Biden Good For Global Trade Rebound The US election will act as a positive catalyst for markets in the short run as long as it produces a clear result and resolves the US fiscal stalemate. But a contested election is not unlikely and a deflationary risk arises in the 28% chance that Biden wins while Republicans retain the Senate. Stimulus would still be agreed but its size and timing would be uncertain, prolonging the selloff. Therefore we are updating our portfolio to book some gains and cut some losses. We are booking gains on our EUR-GBP volatility trade for a return of 13%. We are closing our long Indian pharmaceuticals trade for a gain of 12%. We are throwing in the towel on our long defense and aerospace trade for a loss of 21%. And we are closing our rare earths basket trade for a gain of 5%. We are closing two pair trades and re-initiating them as absolute longs: long China Play Index relative to MSCI global stocks (0.1% return) and long ISE Cyber Security Index relative to the NASDAQ (-6.8%). Chinese reflation and global cyber-attacks will remain relevant themes.  The inverse of Trump, Biden is positive for the euro, negative for the dollar, and supportive of global trade. However, a range of higher taxes and levies on corporations suggests that his administration will ultimately weigh on S&P global stocks relative to those at home. And while Biden appears softer on China, we consider this a mispricing, as he has largely coopted Trump’s and Sanders’s trade agenda (Chart 18). Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Roukaya Ibrahim Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Guy Russell Research Analyst GuyR@bcaresearch.com Chart 19China: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 20Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 21UK: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 22Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 23France: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 24Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 25Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 26Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 27Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 28Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 29Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 30Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator   Geopolitical Calendar Footnotes 1  There have been strange warnings in recent days – an unidentified aircraft intercepted over a Trump rally in Arizona, a Saudi warning of a potential Houthi attack on Americans, and a Chinese warning of a potential US drone attack against Chinese assets in the South China Sea. None of these have amounted to anything, and the idea of a US drone attack on China is absurd, but investors should be cautious nonetheless, particularly because a range of state and non-state actors will have an incentive to take actions once the US outcome is known. 2  Please see FBI Director Christopher Wray, “Statement Before The House Homeland Security Committee,” Washington DC, September 17, 2020, fbi.gov; Department of Homeland Security, “Homeland Threat Assessment,” October 2020, dhs.gov; Tresa Baldas and Paul Egan, “More details emerge in plot to kidnap Michigan Gov. Whitmer as suspects appear in court,” USA Today, October 13, 2020, usatoday.com.   

The Fed remains a key player enabling the transition from Washington to fiscally loose Buenos Aires consensus as we outlined in this Monday’s Weekly Report. As fiscal valves open and debt piles rise, the bond market will be the only regulatory mechanism. The implication is that the interplay between future fed funds rate (FFR) expectations and the 10-year US Treasury yield becomes a key variable to monitor. The most recent, and similar to today, period was during the GFC, when the Fed held the FFR near zero from December 2008 until December 2015. In this seven-year period, the interplay between the FFR change expectations and the 10-year US Treasury yield reveals that the sensitivity of interest rates to FFR change expectations stood near 2-to-1; i.e. a 50bps increase in the FFR change expectations would push the 10-year yield 100bps higher and vice versa. Year-to-date, the 10-year US Treasury yield’s sensitivity to FFR change expectations has ranged between 1-to-1 and 2-to-1. Looking ahead post the election, the odds are rising of a mammoth fiscal package, especially if there is a “Blue Sweep” but also potentially in a renewed Trump administration. Under such a backdrop the 10-year US Treasury yield would spike and so will FFR hike expectations. Bottom Line: Any selloff in the bond market will serve as a catalyst for a rotation out of fully valued tech stocks and into deeply undervalued financials (see chart).  ​​​​​​​