Developed Countries

Highlights Treasuries: Bond yields held steady in September, even as the stock market sold off sharply. This leads us to conclude that long-maturity Treasury yields have room to fall in the near-term if progress towards a fiscal stimulus package moves too slowly. We continue to recommend keeping portfolio duration close to benchmark on a 6-12 month horizon. Corporates: Corporate spreads widened significantly in September, but they still embed a relatively optimistic default outlook. While corporate leverage has peaked, some labor market indicators have stalled. This makes us question whether defaults can improve enough to meet lofty market expectations. Continue to overweight investment grade corporates and Ba-rated junk on a 6-12 month horizon, while avoiding junk bonds rated B and lower. A Fed-Driven Sell-Off? Chart 1Treasuries A Poor Hedge In September It might seem odd to think of this month’s market weakness as a reaction to an overly hawkish Fed. With the funds rate pinned at its effective lower bound and no rate hikes expected until 2024 (at least), monetary conditions have never been more accommodative. However, the relative performance of different asset classes in September leads us to only one conclusion. Financial markets had been priced for even more central bank dovishness this month, and came away disappointed. Equity Sectors Responded To Monetary Tightness, Not Weaker Growth First, consider the simple observation that risk assets (equities and credit) have sold off sharply since September 2nd but the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury Index actually underperformed a position in cash (Chart 1). Investors have seen none of the usual hedging benefits from bonds. Some of this can be chalked up to the relative performance of different equity sectors (Table 1). Tech stock underperformance was responsible for the bulk of September’s market weakness, particularly early in the month. Meanwhile, the most cyclical (or growth-sensitive) sectors – Industrials, Energy and Materials – performed only slightly worse than traditionally defensive sectors. Typically, cyclical sectors perform worst when the stock market is responding to a negative re-rating of economic growth expectations. The fact that cyclicals weren’t the worst performers this month suggests that the sell-off had a different catalyst. Table 1Equity & Treasury Returns: September 2nd To September 25th The sector composition of the sell-off has important implications for bond yields because the relative performance between cyclical and defensive equity sectors explains more of the variation in the 10-year Treasury yield than the overall performance of the stock market (Chart 2). Chart 2Relative Sector Performance Matters For Bond Yields Commodities Suggest A Hawkish Policy Surprise … Table 2Commodities & Bond Yields: September 2nd To September 25th Second, consider the performance of industrial commodities and gold (Table 2). Growth-sensitive industrial commodities held up pretty well this month, but gold fared poorly. The relatively strong performance of industrial commodities suggests that markets were not pricing-in a significant shock to global growth expectations. Weakness in gold suggests that investors started to price-in less long-run inflation risk. This is the exact sort of performance you would expect if the central bank delivered an unexpected dose of monetary tightening. Along with the relative performance of equity sectors, the relative performance between industrial commodities and gold also helps explain why Treasury yields remained stable. The ratio between the CRB Raw Industrials Index and gold is tightly correlated with the 10-year Treasury yield (Chart 3). Chart 3Bond Yields Track The CRB/Gold Ratio … As Do Inflation-Linked Bonds Third, we can look at relative movements in nominal yields, real yields and inflation breakevens. Recall that we like to think of nominal yields as being driven by fed funds rate expectations and of inflation breakevens as being driven by inflation expectations. Real yields have no independent driver, but can be calculated using the Fisher Equation:1 Real Yield = Nominal Yield – Inflation Expectations With that in mind, look at how yields have moved since the stock market’s September 2nd peak (Table 2). The 10-year TIPS breakevens rate is down sharply but the 10-year nominal yield is unchanged. This suggests that the market moved to price-in less long-run inflation risk alongside an unchanged path for the policy rate. The result of the interaction between those two drivers is a sharp move up in the 10-year real yield. Credit Performance Also Looks Policy Driven Table 3Corporate Bond Excess Returns*: September 2nd To September 25th Finally, we can look at the relative performance of different corporate bond credit tiers (Table 3). In a typical risk-off market driven by greater pessimism about the outlook for economic growth, we would expect to see the bulk of underperformance concentrated in the lowest credit tiers where bonds are most likely to default. However, since September 2nd, Ba-rated issuers have underperformed all lower-rated credit tiers, even distressed Ca/C-rated issuers. One possible explanation is that Ba-rated and higher corporate bonds generally benefit from the Fed’s emergency lending facilities while B-rated and lower credits are mostly locked out. It could be that September’s market moves reflect some increased pessimism about the Fed’s ability or willingness to stick with its emergency facilities. Or more likely, there had been some hopes that the Fed would somehow expand its current emergency lending facilities. Hopes that were dashed when Chair Powell testified to Congress last week and seemed to suggest that the Fed has already done all it can in this regard. Investment Implications For us, this is the main takeaway from September’s strange market moves: Fed policy is certainly in no rush to tighten, but equally, the Fed can’t deliver any further easing on its own. All it can do is continue to support credit markets with its current emergency facilities and refrain from lifting rates even if inflation starts to rise. Those looking for an additional dose of economic adrenaline should look to fiscal policymakers, not the Fed. With regards to markets, since September’s moves don’t appear to reflect expectations for weaker economic growth, we fret that such a shock could still emerge. The most likely near-term catalyst would be the failure of Congress to pass a new stimulus package. We have previously written that consumer spending will not be able to sustain a decent growth rate without additional income support from Congress.2 If it looks like a deal is not forthcoming or we see some negative consumer spending data, there is room for cyclical equity sectors and bond yields to move lower. We view this as a material near-term risk. September’s junk bond weakness was unusual in that higher-rated credits performed worse than lower-rated ones. Beyond the near-term, on a 6-12 month horizon, we continue to believe that the economic recovery will continue. Congress will ultimately deliver sufficient stimulus, though it may not come in time to prevent a near-term market reaction. The conflict between these near-term and medium-term views leads us to maintain our cautious cyclical investment stance. We recommend keeping portfolio duration close to benchmark while holding duration-neutral yield curve steepeners that are designed to profit from higher yields on a 6-12 month horizon.3 More specifically, we advise medium- and long-run investors who are already exposed to curve steepeners to stay the course. But if you aren’t yet exposed, it is a good idea to wait until a follow-up stimulus bill is announced before moving in. An Update On Corporate Sector Health And The Default Rate As noted above, September’s junk bond weakness was unusual in that higher-rated credits performed worse than lower-rated ones. As with our Treasury call, the fact that markets appeared to react to a policy shock and not a growth shock makes us nervous that a near-term growth shock is still not in the price. We see low-rated junk bonds as looking particularly complacent, especially when you consider that spreads continue to embed a relatively optimistic default outlook. Calculating The Spread-Implied Default Rate Our workhorse valuation tool for junk bonds is the Default-Adjusted Spread. This is the average index option-adjusted spread less default losses observed over the subsequent 12-month period. For example, the Default-Adjusted Spread came in at -301 basis points for the 12-month period ending August 2020. This is equal to the August 2019 index spread of 393 bps less realized default losses of 694 bps that occurred between August 2019 and August 2020. Over time, we have found that the Default-Adjusted Spread does a good job of explaining excess junk returns and that, typically, a Default-Adjusted Spread of at least 150 bps is required for high-yield to outperform duration-matched Treasuries on a 12-month investment horizon (Chart 4).4 Chart 4Calculating The Spread-Implied Default Rate With that knowledge, we can set a target Default-Adjusted Spread of 150 bps and calculate the default rate that would have to occur during the next 12 months to hit that target. We call this the Spread-Implied Default Rate, and it is presented in the bottom panel of Chart 4. As of today, the Spread-Implied Default Rate is 5.1%. This means that if the speculative grade default rate comes in below 5.1% during the next 12 months, then our Default-Adjusted Spread will be above 150 bps and junk bonds will likely outperform Treasuries. If the default rate turns out to be above 5.1%, then the prospects for junk bond outperformance look dimmer. Can The Default Rate Fall To 5%? The logical question then becomes whether it’s possible for the default rate to fall to 5% during the next 12 months. This would certainly be a rapid improvement from its current level of 8.7%, but not one that is without historical precedent. In fact, the default rate tends to fall very quickly when the economy is coming out of recession and, already, August saw only six default events. This is down from above 20 in May, June and July (Chart 5). Chart 5Only Six Defaults In August Obviously, whether August’s gains can be maintained depends on the speed of economic recovery. In particular, we focus on nonfinancial corporate sector gross leverage – the ratio between total debt and pre-tax profits – and job cut announcements (Chart 6). Chart 6Default Rate Drivers Looking first at leverage, corporate profits plunged in the second quarter but that will probably represent the cyclical trough (Chart 7, top panel). Already, we see that analysts are revising up their earnings expectations (Chart 7, panel 2). Typically, positive net earnings revisions coincide with positive profit growth. On the debt side, firms issued massive amounts of debt in the first and second quarters (Chart 7, panel 3), but that process is also over. We note that the Financing Gap – the difference between capital expenditures and retained earnings – dipped into negative territory in Q2 (Chart 7, bottom panel). This means that firms retained more earnings than they needed to cover capital expenditures and suggests that further debt issuance is not necessary. When the Financing Gap moved below zero in 2009, it ushered in a lengthy period of corporate deleveraging. Chart 7Firms Have Enough Retained Earnings To Cover Capex It is therefore quite likely that both corporate sector leverage and the default rate have already peaked. The question is whether both can fall quickly enough to meet market expectations. Of this, we are less certain. When the Financing Gap moved below zero in 2009, it ushered in a lengthy period of corporate deleveraging. Job Cut Announcements – another predictor of corporate defaults – have also improved markedly since April, but they remain well above pre-COVID levels (Chart 8). Further, an array of other employment indicators suggest that labor market improvement has stalled during the past few weeks. Initial unemployment claims have flattened off and remain well above pre-COVID levels (Chart 8, panel 2). What’s more, high frequency data from scheduling firm Homebase show that the total number of employees working for companies using the Homebase software is no longer rising and is far below its pre-COVID level (Chart 8, bottom panel). It’s important to note that the Homebase data are biased toward small businesses, mostly in the restaurant, food & beverage, retail and services sectors. Those sectors have obviously been hit the hardest by COVID, but those are also the sectors where we are likely to see the bulk of corporate defaults. Chart 8Labor Market Indicators Investment Conclusions We are confident that the default rate has peaked, but we aren’t yet confident enough to recommend owning B-rated and below junk bonds. To make that recommendation we would need to have confidence that the default rate will move to 5% or lower during the next 12 months. The default rate was already 4.5% in the 12 months prior to COVID, and it now appears that most labor market data are stalling at worse than pre-COVID levels. An array of employment indicators suggest that labor market improvement has stalled during the past few weeks. We reiterate our recommendation to overweight investment grade and Ba-rated corporate bonds, while avoiding high-yield bonds rated B and lower. We will consider adding exposure to low-rated junk bonds if spreads rise to more attractive levels in the near-term and/or if Congress announces a significant stimulus package that looks poised to boost the economic recovery and labor market. Appendix A: Buy What The Fed Is Buying The Fed rolled out a number of aggressive lending facilities on March 23. These facilities focused on different specific sectors of the US bond market. The fact that the Fed has decided to support some parts of the market and not others has caused some traditional bond market correlations to break down. It has also led us to adopt of a strategy of “Buy What The Fed Is Buying”. That is, we favor those sectors that offer attractive spreads and that benefit from Fed support. The below Table tracks the performance of different bond sectors since the March 23 announcement. We will use this to monitor bond market correlations and evaluate our strategy’s success. Table 4Performance Since March 23 Announcement Of Emergency Fed Facilities   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 For more details on this forecasting framework please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Negative Oil, The Zero Lower Bound And The Fisher Equation”, dated April 28, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “More Stimulus Needed”, dated September 15, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 For more details on our yield curve recommendations please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Positioning For Reflation And Avoiding Deflation”, dated August 11, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 To calculate the Spread-Implied Default Rate we also need to estimate the 12-month recovery rate. We assume a recovery rate of 25%, slightly better than the 20% recovery rate seen during the past 12 months. Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights Portfolio Strategy We recommend investors participate in the equity market rotation during the ongoing correction and position portfolios for next year’s bull market resumption by preferring unloved and undervalued deep cyclical laggards. Ultra-loose Chinese fiscal policy, rising global demand and firming domestic operating conditions, all signal that the S&P machinery recovery has legs.    Vibrant emerging markets and a recuperating China, a softening US dollar rekindling the commodity complex, the nascent recovery in domestic conditions and washed out technicals, all suggest that a significant re-rating looms for severely neglected industrials equities.    Recent Changes Our trailing stop got triggered and we downgraded the S&P internet retail index to neutral for a gain of 20% since the mid-April inception. This move also pushed our S&P consumer discretionary sector weighting to a benchmark allocation for a gain of 15% since inception. Table 1 Feature The S&P 500 broke below the important 50-day moving average last week, but managed to bounce off the early-June 3233 level – also a level where the SPX started the year – that could serve as temporary support (Chart 1). We first highlighted that investors were turning a blind eye to (geo)political risks on June 8, and failure to pass a new fiscal package before the election will continue to weigh on the economy and on stocks risking a further 10% drawdown near the SPX 3000 level. Chart 1Critical Support Levels The Fed is now “out of the loop” i.e. a bystander on the sidelines, gently moving the foot off the accelerator as we illustrated last week. The FOMC’s, at the margin, less dovish monetary policy setting exerts enormous pressure on fiscal authorities to act as fiscal policy takes center stage. Our sense is that we have entered a Fiscal Policy Loop (FPL) where stalemate in Congress will cause a classic BCA riot point that in turn will force politicians’ hand to act in order to avoid a meltdown, and set in motion the next stage of the FPL (Figure 1). Keep in mind that the 2020s have ignited a paradigm shift from the Washington Consensus to the Buenos Aires Consensus1 and this is episode one of the FPL, more are sure to follow.    Figure 1The Fiscal Policy Loop It is no surprise that the Citi economic surprise index took off when the IRS started making direct payments to households in mid-April and leveled off toward the end of July when the stimulus money coffers ran dry (Chart 2). Chart 2In Dire Need Of Fiscal Stimulus If Congress fails to pass a new fiscal package by October 16, the latest now that the Ruth Bader Ginsburg SCOTUS replacement seems to have become the number one priority, we doubt a fiscal package can pass during a contested election. Thus, realistically a fresh stimulus bill is likely only after the new president’s inauguration. Under such a backdrop, the economy will suffer a relapse despite households drawing down their replenished savings (middle panel, Chart 3). This is eerily reminiscent of the October 2008 and October 2018 fiscal policy and monetary policy mistakes, respectively, that resulted in a market riot. Similar to today, markets were down 10% and on a precipice and the policy errors pushed them off the cliff leading to another 10% gap down in a heartbeat. With regard to equity market specifics during the current FPL iteration, banks are most at risk as they are levered to the economic recovery, and commercial real estate ails remain a big headache. Absent a fiscal package bank executives will have to further provision for loan losses when they kick off Q3 earnings season in late-October as CEOs will err on the side of caution. Tack on the recent news on laundering money – including by US banks – and the Fed’s new stringent stress tests, and the risk/reward tradeoff remains poor for the banking sector (bottom panel, Chart 3).  Odds are high that volatility will remain elevated heading into the election, therefore this phase represents an opportunity for investors to reshuffle portfolios and prepare for an eventual resumption of the bull market in early-2021. We continue to recommend investors avoid our “COVID-19 winners” basket and prefer our “back-to work” equity basket that we initiated on September 8. Similarly, this pullback is serving as a catalyst to shift some capital out of the fully valued tech titans and into other beaten down parts of the deep cyclical universe. Chart 3Show Me The Money We doubt this correction is over as positioning in the NASDAQ 100 derivative markets is still lopsided; stale bulls are caught net long as NQ futures are deflating, thus a flush out looms (Chart 4).  Chart 4Flush Out The easy money has likely been made in the tech titans that near the peak on September 2, AAPL, MSFT and AMZN each commanded an almost $2tn market capitalization. Thus, booking some of these tech gains and redeploying capital in other unloved deep cyclical sectors would go a long way, especially if our thesis that the economic recovery will gain steam into 2021 pans out.  Using a concrete rebalancing example to illustrate such a rotation is instructive.2 The tech titans’ (top 5 stocks) market cap weight in the SPX is 22%. Were an investor to take 10% of this weight or 220bps and redeploy it to the materials sector, which commands a 2.7% market cap weight in the SPX, would effectively double the exposure on this deep cyclical sector. The same would apply to the energy sector that comprises a mere 2.2% of the SPX, while industrials with an 8.4% market cap weight would get a sizable 26% lift (Chart 5). As a reminder our portfolio has an above benchmark allocation in all three deep cyclical sectors, and this week we reiterate our overweight stance on both the industrials sector and on a key subgroup. Chart 5Rotation Rotation Rotation Buy The Machinery Breakout Were we not already overweight the S&P machinery index, would we upgrade today? The short answer is yes. Aggressive loosening in Chinese financial conditions have underpinned the economic recovery (second & third panels, Chart 6). Infrastructure projects are making a comeback and absorbing the slack in machinery demand caused by COVID-19. As a result, Chinese excavator sales have soared in the past quarter which bodes well for US machinery profit prospects (bottom panel, Chart 6). Beyond China, emerging markets demand for machinery equipment is robust as the commodity complex is recovering smartly (second panel Chart 7). The US dollar bear market is also bolstering global trade growth, despite the greenback’s recent technical bounce, and should continue to underpin machinery net export growth and therefore profit growth for US machinery manufacturers (third & bottom panels, Chart 7).   Chart 6Enticing Chinese Backdrop Chart 7Dollar The Great Reflator The domestic machinery demand backdrop is also conducive to a renormalization of top line growth to a higher run-rate. The ISM manufacturing new orders sub-component is shooting the lights out, heralding a jump in machinery orders in the coming months (second panel, Chart 8). Simultaneously, a quick inventory check is revealing: both in the manufacturing and wholesale channels cupboards are bare which means that the risk of a liquidation phase in non-existent (third panel, Chart 8). Encouragingly, an inventory buildup phase is looming in order to satisfy firming demand. The tick up in machinery industrial production growth, the V-shaped recovery in the utilization rate and newly expanding backlog orders, all suggest that domestic demand conditions are on the mend (Chart 9). Tack on still prudent payrolls management that is keeping the machinery industry’s wage bill at bay (bottom panel, Chart 8), and a profit margin expansion phase is a high probability outcome. Chart 8What’s Not… Chart 9…To Like Our resurgent S&P machinery revenue growth model and climbing profit growth model do an excellent job in encapsulating all the industry’s moving parts and suggest that the path of least resistance is higher for relative share prices in the New Year (Chart 10). Finally, relative valuations have also recovered from the depth of the recession, but are only back to the neutral zone leaving enough room for a multiple expansion phase (Chart 11). Chart 10Models Say Buy Chart 11Compelling Entry Point In sum, ultra-loose Chinese fiscal policy, rising global demand and firming domestic operating conditions, all signal that the S&P machinery recovery has legs.    Bottom Line: Stay overweight the S&P machinery index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG S5MACH– CAT, DE, PH, ITW, IR, CMI, PCAR, FTV, OTIS, SWK, DOV, XYL, WAB, IEX, SNA, PNR, FLS. Industrials Are Jumpstarting Their Engines We have been offside on the S&P industrials sector, but now is not the time to throw in the towel. In contrast we are doubling down on our overweight stance as the ongoing rotation should see some tech sector outflows find their way to under-owned capital goods producers. Industrials equities have been on the selling block and suffered a wholesale liquidation during the dark days of the COVID-19 pandemic, and have yet to regain their footing (top panel, Chart 12). The GE and Boeing sagas have dealt a big blow to this deep cyclical sector, but now this market cap weighted sector has filtered these stocks out as neither of these “fallen angels” is occupying a spot in the top 5 weight ranks. Relative valuations are washed out, and relative technicals are still deep in oversold territory (second & third panels Chart 12). Sell-side analysts are the most pessimistic they have been on record with regard to the long-term EPS growth rate that is penciled in to trail the broad market by almost 800bps (bottom panel, Chart 12)! All this bearishness is contrarily positive as a little bit of good news can go a long way. Already, relative EPS breadth is stealthily coming back, and net earnings revisions are rocketing higher (Chart 13).  Chart 12Liquidation Phase… Chart 13…Is Over One reason behind this optimism rests with the domestic recovery. Capex intentions are firming and CEO confidence is upbeat for the coming six months. The ISM manufacturing new orders-to-inventories ratio is corroborating the budding recovery in the soft data. Green shoots are also evident in hard data releases. Durable goods orders are on the verge of expanding anew (Chart 14). Emerging markets (EM) and China represent another source of industrials sector buoyancy. The EM manufacturing PMI clocking in at 52.5 hit an all-time high. China’s PMIs are also on a similar trajectory, and the Chinese Citi economic surprise index has swung a whopping 300 points from -240 to above +60 over the past six months. The upshot is that US industrials stocks should outperform when China and the EM are vibrant (Chart 15). Chart 14Domestic And … Chart 15… EM Green Shoots Are Bullish Peering over to the currency market, the debasing of the US dollar should also underpin industrials stocks via the export relief valve (third panel, Chart 16). A depreciating greenback also lifts the commodity complex and hence industrials equities that are levered to the extraction of commodities and other derivative activities (top panel, Chart 16). Historically, an appreciating USD has been synonymous with a multiple contraction phase and vice versa. Looking ahead, the industrials sector relative 12-month forward P/E multiple should continue to expand smartly (bottom panel, Chart 16). The US Equity Strategy’s macro based EPS growth model captures all the different earnings drivers and signals that an earnings-led recovery is in the offing (Chart 17). Chart 16The Greenback Holds The Key Chart 17Models Flashing Green Adding it all up, vibrant emerging markets and a recuperating China, a softening US dollar rekindling the commodity complex, the nascent recovery in domestic conditions and washed out technicals, all suggest that a significant re-rating looms for severely neglected industrials equities.   Bottom Line: We continue to recommend an above benchmark allocation in the S&P industrials sector.   Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     The Washington Consensus – a catchall term for fiscal prudence, laissez-faire economics, free trade, and unfettered capital flows – is being replaced by economic populism, by a Buenos Aires Consensus. Buenos Aires Consensus is our catchall term for everything that is opposite of the Washington Consensus: less globalization, fiscal stimulus as far as the eyes can see, erosion of central bank independence, and a dirigiste (as opposed to laissez-faire) approach to economics that seeks to protect “state champions,” stifles innovation, and ultimately curbs productivity growth. 2     Our example assumes benchmark allocation in all sectors for illustrative purposes.   Current Recommendations Current Trades Strategic (10-Year) Trade Recommendations Size And Style Views July 27, 2020 Overweight cyclicals over defensives April 28, 2020  Stay neutral large over small caps June 11, 2018 Long the BCA Millennial basket  The ticker symbols are: (AAPL, AMZN, UBER, HD, LEN, MSFT, NFLX, SPOT, TSLA, V). January 22, 2018 Favor value over growth

Highlights An uptick in COVID-19 infections and squabbling on Capitol Hill are making investors newly uneasy, … : A rising 7-day moving average of new virus infections and falling probability of new fiscal aid weighed heavily on equities last week. … turning their focus back to the economy and equities’ seeming disconnection from it, … : Multiple retail, hospitality and entertainment concerns are under extreme pressure but the overall economy has held up far better than most commentators acknowledge. Households’ massive pile of new savings will help support consumption and credit performance well into next year even if Congress fails to provide a new round of stimulus. … and causing them to re-assess their comfort with dot-com-era valuations: We may not like the S&P 500 at 23 times forward four-quarter earnings, but the current valuation climate is a given and we have to figure a practical way to navigate through it. We are not abandoning equities yet. Feature COVID-19 appears to be making a comeback, in the US and around the globe, and its revival has investors reconsidering the sustainability of the spectacularly potent rally. How much longer can we go without a vaccine? How long before the economy succumbs without a new round of fiscal aid? How long can equities diverge from the economy? How long can equity multiples stay so high? COVID-19 infections have made another leg up and the 7-day average of new US cases is up over 25% since the second-wave bottom on September 12th (Chart 1). Even with most colleges and universities limiting in-person attendance and on-campus residence, the siren song of alcohol, fellowship and potential romance has turned many college towns into pandemic hot spots. The nation’s elementary and secondary schools could become another source of infections as children, teachers and staff return to classrooms, and the approach of cooler weather across most of the country brings no small measure of trepidation. The disease seems not to spread nearly as easily outside, but case counts threaten to pick up as activity moves indoors in fall and winter. Chart 1Daily New US COVID-19 Infections A much-slowed mortality rate mitigates the gravity of the rise in infections. Improved treatment protocols and heightened efforts to keep the most vulnerable out of harm’s way have pushed fatalities well below their April peak and considerably shy of their late July-early August levels, when new cases peaked (Chart 2). Indeed, one benefit of outbreaks on university campuses is that young adults are apparently much less likely to succumb to the virus. Unfortunately, the likelihood that invincible 18-to-22-year-olds won’t suffer too terribly if they contract COVID-19 may encourage them to disregard social distancing measures, contributing to its spread across the entire population. Chart 2Daily US COVID-19 Deaths Bottom Line: There is no reason to expect the virus to disappear when it is gaining new footholds in college towns across the country and a large measure of activity is headed back indoors. How Much Does The Economy Have Left? The good news about the reduced mortality rate is that it would seem to lessen the likelihood that state and local officials would feel the need to impose lockdowns as severe as the ones in early spring. The bad news, as our European Investment Strategy colleagues have stressed, is that lockdowns have less bearing on activity than economic actors’ personal perceptions of safety. If people are as unconcerned about contracting COVID-19 as many undergraduates appear to be, they’ll gather around the keg as closely as if they were riding the Tokyo subway at rush hour no matter how often they’re reminded that it’s unsafe. If they become fearful of getting sick, they’ll shun common carriers, offices, stores and gyms regardless of official rules giving them the green light to return. Last week’s release of European flash September PMIs may have illustrated the way personal concerns can override official rules. The divergence between solidly rising manufacturing PMIs, which comfortably topped expectations, and sharply and surprisingly weaker services PMIs, which crossed below the 50 expansion/contraction threshold, was stark (Chart 3). Modern manufacturing can be carried out in controlled environments by a comparatively modest number of workers whereas services demand is much more tied to public confidence, which appears to be fraying in Europe. Chart 3Europe's Demand For Services Has Slipped Developed economies employ considerably more people in services than manufacturing. If progress in reducing unemployment stalls upon upticks in COVID-19 cases, and mass manufacturing and distribution of an effective vaccine is still at least six months away, economies will require more fiscal support than initially envisioned in the spring. In the United States, the need for additional support places attention squarely on the off-again, on-again negotiations to extend key CARES Act provisions. Although we would expect households to have more difficulty keeping up with their obligations now that CARES Act flows have ceased, the data don't yet reveal any signs of strain. With the federal unemployment benefit supplement having expired at the end of July, households with laid-off wage earners are clearly at risk and they could light the fuse to spark a chain reaction of defaults. Despite the withdrawal of some federal support, however, the apartment rent collection and consumer delinquency data we’ve been following continue to indicate that households are managing to stay current on their obligations. The wobble in apartment rent collections through the week ended September 6th was apparently a function of the late Labor Day, as they have returned to the 2-percentage-points-below-2019 level they've occupied since the CARES Act took effect (Table 1). TransUnion’s latest monthly consumer credit update showed that consumers didn’t skip a beat in August, maintaining their streak of reducing month-over-month delinquency rates and shrinking them relative to their year-ago levels (Table 2). Table 1US Households Are Still Paying Their Rent ... Table 2... And They're Still Servicing Their Debt The forward-looking question is how long they can keep it going in the absence of additional help. A simple analysis of the data in the monthly Personal Income release suggests that households stored up over $1 trillion of excess savings in the five months through July, possibly enough to tide them over through the rest of the year (Box 1). Our estimate in last week’s report1 that households will need at least $800 billion of direct aid to bolster consumption into the second half of next year did not address the possibility of deploying some of the new savings and may thus be a little high. Although we continue to believe a bill will be passed ahead of the election despite increasing worries that Congress will not be able to reach an agreement, the near-term impact may not be as severe as feared. Box 1: What About All The New Savings? The upward explosion in the savings rate (Chart 4, top panel) and the associated plunge in consumption (Chart 4, bottom panel) illustrate that households squirreled away a record share of income while they were under lockdown and CARES Act measures were in force. This analysis attempts to determine the size of the savings windfall and households’ capacity to deploy it to support consumption and debt service until the economy can return to operating at its pre-pandemic capacity. Chart 4Two Sides Of The Same Coin Table 3 illustrates the steps we followed to estimate the quantity of pandemic-driven excess savings. The top two rows in the top panel show actual disposable income and outlays for each month from February through July and sum the five post-pandemic months in the Mar-Jul column. Savings are equal to the difference, and the savings rate is simply savings divided by disposable income. Table 3Household Savings, With And Without The Pandemic The bottom panel of the table models the outcome that might have occurred had there been no pandemic, assuming disposable income grew each month at a 4% annualized nominal rate, in line with the US economy’s real trend growth rate of ~2% plus ~2% inflation. We held the savings rate constant at February’s 8.3% to solve for baseline monthly outlays and savings. We aggregated our annualized monthly savings estimates ($7 trillion) and subtracted them from actual annualized savings ($19.6 trillion) to get $12.6 trillion annualized excess savings, or slightly more than $1 trillion, de-annualized (all four savings figures circled in the table). Table 4 quantifies the monthly consumption shortfalls that may occur in the absence of a new round of fiscal aid, projecting the path of the six broad disposable income categories for the rest of the year. We assume that employee compensation, proprietors’ income and taxes maintain July’s modest month-over-month growth rate in August and September and are then flat for the rest of the year. Rental income and interest and dividends are assumed to be unchanged from their July levels, as are transfer receipts, which incorporate only the share of July transfers that resulted from automatic stabilizers. (Though we tried to err to the side of conservatism, there is a meaningful possibility that virus-driven pessimism could produce a consumption double dip, causing income to fall short of our estimates.) Table 4Excess Savings Could Cover Projected Consumption Shortfalls We assume that the savings rate declines to 16.5% in August (twice February’s pre-pandemic rate) but remains there the rest of the year as households continue to exercise caution. Using our assumed savings rate and modeled disposable income, we calculate monthly outlays and compare them to the outlays that would meet economists’ consensus third and fourth quarter growth projections. That comparison yields around $300 billion of consumption shortfalls through the end of the year, a modest sum relative to the $1 trillion of excess savings that were accumulated from March through July. Investors interpreting our simple analysis should recognize that the possible range of actual results is quite wide and projecting how animal spirits will drive household consumption decisions is inherently uncertain. It is clear to us, however, that the direct aid households received from the CARES Act is not yet exhausted. The massive savings that households built up from March through July will allow the second quarter’s fiscal thrust to act something like a time-release medication, especially when it comes to consumer credit performance. The surprisingly low delinquency rates reported so far do not appear to have been a fluke when viewed against a $1 trillion cache of unanticipated savings. How Long Can Equities Float Free Of The Economy? One would expect that a once-in-a-century shock like a deadly pandemic would induce a brutal recession. In terms of the unemployment rate and GDP contraction, COVID-19 has not disappointed, delivering the worst numbers this side of the Depression. Movie theaters, concert venues, pro sports franchises, airlines, car rental companies, retailers, gyms, restaurants and bars face significant losses and potential extinction. For all the disruption in select individual businesses and industries, however, there has not yet been significant systemwide damage. We don't think the economy is doing as badly as the majority ofcommentators believe, ... Fiscal transfers and monetary accommodation have forestalled the unchecked wave of defaults that might otherwise have occurred, shielding the banking system from stress and preventing a negatively self-reinforcing cycle of illiquidity and reduced credit availability from taking hold. Away from businesses that depend on physical crowds and their landlords and lenders, the economy is not doing too badly. Disposable household income grew at a record rate in the second quarter, four standard deviations above its seven-decade mean (Chart 5); corporations issued record amounts of bonds at low rates that will reduce their long-run funding costs; and private equity funds and other entities with visions of the post-GFC recovery dancing in their heads are itching to deploy the ample capital they’ve raised to buy businesses at deep discounts. There will be many pandemic business casualties, but at the level of the overall economy, we expect a reasonably orderly transfer of viable assets from weak hands to amply funded strong ones. Chart 5Despite The Recession, Fiscal Shock And Awe Made Households Flush The bottom line is that we don’t think the economy is suffering all that badly, and that it won’t going forward provided that fiscal and monetary policy makers continue to pursue the measures that have successfully suppressed defaults and bankruptcies so far. Austrian School devotees may suffer severe emotional distress and deficit hawks will rant and rave, but investors should come out of it all okay. Equities quickly sized that up and the reversal of their steep losses can be viewed as a rational response to Congress’ and the Fed’s shock-and-awe measures. In our view, financial markets are not disconnected from the economic backdrop per se; they’re disconnected from the economic backdrop that would have unfolded were it not for policy makers’ extraordinary measures. Commentators with a more pessimistic bent seem to be focusing more on the scenario that didn’t occur than the one that actually did. And About Those Valuations? We frankly confess to discomfort with an S&P 500 valuation of 23 times forward four-quarter earnings. In forward estimates’ 41-year history, the index has only ever traded at a multiple of 23 or more at the 1999-2000 height of the dot-com mania (Chart 6). It is not a level that bodes well on its face for the index’s intermediate- and long-term prospects. By collectively bidding up the forward multiple to the 97th percentile as of the end of August, investors would seem to have pulled future returns into the present. ... because it seems that they've been focusing on the worst-case scenario that didn't occur, rather than the much milder one that policy makers have so far been able to engineer. Chart 6Back To The Future When asked if we can justify current equity valuations and if they can be sustained, we tread carefully, replying that we can make our peace with them for short stretches of time. We are not trying to dodge the tough questions, we are simply seeking practical ways for professional investors, judged on a relative performance basis, to navigate through a tricky backdrop. For a professional manager to align his/her portfolios with a view that today’s valuations are unsupportable, s/he would have to possess two things: extremely high conviction in that view and clients willing to stick with him/her despite tracking error that would make a pension consultant faint dead away and may well involve extended underperformance. Table 5How Expensive Is Too Expensive? Alpha is only earned by swimming against the tide but resisting a move like the rally from the March bottom is akin to an all-in bet, and all-in bets should be made sparingly if at all. Forward multiples have exceeded the dot-com heyday’s 20 level every month-end since April. Assuming the forward multiple series is normally distributed, there was only a 6% chance that the multiple would exceed its April level and the probabilities have shrunk every succeeding month as the multiple itself has climbed (Table 5). Based on valuation, a manager could have begun leaning against the rally in April and may have resisted participating in it at the end of March, given that the forward multiple never signaled that stocks were cheap. The dot-com mania, when the S&P traded two standard deviations above its forward multiple’s mean for fifteen straight months before peaking, presents an even starker example. Five quarters of sizable underperformance would have tested a manager’s commitment, not to mention his/her clients’. The bottom line is that valuations are a notoriously poor timing indicator. We tend to pay close attention to them only at extremes, but we never view them as decisive on their own – two standard deviations can become two-and-a-half or three before surges or plunges fully play out. The catalyst that might provoke mean reversion in the S&P 500’s forward multiple is still unclear, and we prefer to maintain a benchmark equity exposure until the potential catalyst(s) and the timetable over which it/they might emerge becomes clearer. If this really is a mania, there will be plenty of money to be made from betting against it over the last three quarters of its unwind; there’s no need to rush to be the first to call a top, which can prove to be a costly pursuit. For now, we are content to continue to watch and wait.   Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see the September 21, 2020 US Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fundamental Theorem Of Macroeconomics," available at usis.bcaresearch.com.