Developed Countries

Highlights We remain bearish on the US dollar over the next 12 months. The best vehicle to express this view continues to be the Scandinavian currencies (NOK and SEK). Precious metals remain a buy so long as the dollar faces downside. However, we remain more bullish on silver than gold. Go short the gold/silver ratio (GSR) again at 75. At the crosses, our favorite trade is short NZD against other cyclical currency pairs. These include the CAD, AUD, and SEK. Sterling is selling off as we anticipated, but our timing was offside. That said, the pound is cheap. We will go long cable if it falls below 1.25. Short EUR/GBP at current levels. The Swiss franc will continue to appreciate versus the USD, but will lag behind the euro. EUR/CHF will touch 1.15. We prefer the JPY to the CHF as a currency portfolio hedge. We argued last week that Prime Minster Shinzo Abe’s resignation does not change the yen’s outlook. Feature Our trade basket this year has been centered on a dollar-bearish theme. Since the top in the DXY index on March 19th, we have been expressing this view via various vehicles, most of which have been very profitable. Our favorites have been the Scandinavian currencies, silver, and the AUD, either at the crosses or against the US dollar. So far, these are among the best-performing trades in the G10 currency world (Chart I-1). Chart I-1A Currency Report Card Going into the final leg of 2020, the key question is which currency pairs will provide the most upside. In this report, we revisit the rationale behind our high-conviction trades. The Case For Scandinavian Currencies A review of Q2 GDP across the G10 reveals which countries have been doing relatively better during the pandemic. Norway emerges as the economy that had the best quarter-on-quarter annualized growth (Chart I-2). Swedish growth held up very well in Q1 and even the drop in Q2 still puts it well ahead of the US, the euro area, and the UK. As small, open economies which are very sensitive to global growth conditions, this is a very impressive feat for Sweden and Norway. Part of the reason for this is that over the years, the drop in their currencies, both against the US dollar and euro, has made them very competitive. Chart I-2A Currency Report Card Norway benefited from a few things during the pandemic. First, as a major oil exporter, the sharp fall in the NOK helped cushion the domestic economy against the crash in crude prices. Second, the handling of the pandemic was swift and rigorous, and this has almost completely purged the number of new infections in Norway. Third, aggressive monetary and fiscal stimulus (zero rates, quantitative easing, and the first budget deficit in 40 years) has set the economy on a recovery path. As a result, consumption is rebounding smartly and the Norges Bank expects mainland GDP to touch pre-crisis levels by 2023. Already, real retail sales have exploded higher (Chart I-3). Should global growth continue to rebound, a reversal in pessimism towards energy stocks (and value stocks in general) could see investors reprice the Norwegian stock market (and krone) sharply higher (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Norwegian Consumption Has##br##Recovered Chart I-4A Bounce In Oil & Gas Stocks Will Help The Krone In the case of Sweden, the sharp rebound in the manufacturing PMI also suggests the industrial base is recovering. This will also coincide with a solid bounce in exports, cementing Sweden’s rise in relative competitiveness and its exit from the pandemic-induced recession (Chart I-5). The Riksbank’s resource utilization indicator has stabilized, suggesting deflationary pressures are abating. Meanwhile, home prices are on the cusp of a recovery, which should help boost consumer confidence and support consumption. With our models showing the Swedish krona as undervalued by 19% versus the USD, there is much room for currency appreciation before financial conditions tighten significantly. Should global growth continue to rebound, a reversal in pessimism towards energy stocks could see investors reprice the Norwegian stock market (and krone) sharply higher. The bottom line is that both Norway and Sweden are well poised to benefit from a global economic recovery, with much undervalued currencies that will bolster their basic balances. We expect both the SEK and NOK to be the best performers versus the USD in the coming year (Chart I-6).  Chart I-5The Swedish Economy Is On The Mend Chart I-6The Scandinavian Currencies Remain Cheap Stay Long Precious Metals, Especially Silver In a world of ample liquidity and a falling US dollar, gold and precious metals are bound to benefit. This is especially the case on the back of a central bank that is trying to asymmetrically generate inflation. Gold has a long-standing relationship with negative interest rates, though the correlation has shifted over time. The intuition behind falling real rates and rising gold prices is that low rates reduce the opportunity cost of holding non-income-generating assets such as gold. But more importantly, the correlation is between the rise in gold prices and the level of real interest rates, meaning as long as the latter stays negative, it is sufficient to sustain the gold bull market (Chart I-7). Gold tends to be a “Giffen good,” meaning demand increases as prices rise. This can be seen in the tight correlation between our financial demand indicator (proxied by open futures interest on the Comex and ETF holdings, Chart I-8) and gold prices. The conclusion is that, just like the US dollar, gold tends to be a momentum asset, where higher prices beget more demand – at least until the catalyst of easy money and negative rates vanishes Chart I-7Gold Prices And Real Yields Chart I-8Gold Is A Giffen Good There is reason to believe that the bull market in gold might be sustained for longer this time around. The reason is that central banks have become important (and price-insensitive) buyers. Foreign central banks have been amassing almost all of the gold annual output in recent years. It is remarkable that for most of the dollar bull market this past decade, the world’s major central banks (and biggest holders of US Treasurys) have seen rather stable exchange rates relative to the gold price (Chart I-9). This suggests that gold price risks could be asymmetric to the upside. A fall in prices encourages accumulation by EM central banks as a way to diversify out of their dollar reserves, while a rise in prices encourages financial demand and boosts the value of gold foreign exchange reserves. While we like gold, more value can be found in silver (and even platinum) prices, which have lagged the run up in gold. While we like gold, more value can be found in silver (and even platinum) prices, which have lagged the run up in gold. During precious metals bull markets, prices tend to move in sequence, starting with gold, then silver. Meanwhile, the gold/silver ratio (GSR) tends to track the US dollar (Chart I-10), since silver tends to rise and fall more explosively than gold. Part of the reason is that the silver market is thinner and more volatile. Silver’s rising industrial use has also led to competition with investment demand in recent years. Chart I-9Central Banks Will Put A Floor Under Gold Prices Chart I-10Silver Should Outperform Gold As The Dollar Falls The next important technical level for silver will be the 2012 highs near $35/oz. After this, silver could take out its 2011 highs that were close to $50/oz, just as gold did. Globally, the world produces much more gold than silver, with a supply ratio that is 7:1. Meanwhile, the price ratio between gold and silver is near 70:1. Back in the 1800s, Isaac Newton concluded that the appropriate ratio was 15.5:1. We initially shorted the GSR at 100 and eventually took 25% profits when our rolling stop was triggered. We recommend putting a limit sell at 75. More speculative investors can buy silver outright. Stay Short NZD At The Crosses, Especially Versus The CAD Chart I-11Stay Long CAD/NZD In our currency portfolio, trades at the crosses are equally important as versus the USD in terms of adding alpha. Over the past year, we have successfully been playing the short side of the kiwi trade. We closed our long SEK/NZD trade for a profit of 7.8% on March 20, and our long AUD/NZD trade for a profit of 5.2% on June 26. Today, we remain bullish on the CAD/NZD as an exploitable trading opportunity. First, the New Zealand stock market is the most defensive in the G10, while Canadian bourses are heavy in cyclical stocks. Should value start to outperform growth, this will favor the CAD/NZD cross. Second, immigration was an important source of labor for New Zealand, and COVID-19 has eaten into this dividend for the economy. As such, the neutral rate of interest is bound to head lower. And finally, in the commodity space, our bias is that energy will fare better than agriculture, boosting Canada’s relative terms of trade. At the Bank of Canada’s meeting this past Wednesday, the tone was slightly optimistic as it kept rates on hold. Recent data has been rather strong in Canada, especially in housing and goods consumption. This allows for the possibility of the BoC tapering asset purchases faster than the market expects, as argued by my colleague Mathieu Savary. This arbitrage is already being reflected in real interest rates, where they offer a premium of 180 basis points in Canada relative to New Zealand (Chart I-11). What To Do About Sterling? Trade negotiations between the UK and EU are once again hitting a brick wall. The key issue is around Northern Ireland. Ireland wants to remain bound to the EU’s customs and trade regime. The UK is seeking an amendment to be able to intervene, if there is “inconsistency or incompatibility with international or domestic law.” In short, it allows for UK discretion in the movement of goods to and from Northern Ireland, as well as state aid to Northern Ireland. The EU argues this is a clear breach of the treaty agreed to last year.    We remain bullish on the CAD/NZD as an exploitable trading opportunity. As negotiations go on, our base case is that a deal will eventually be reached. This is because neither side wants the worst-case scenario, namely, a no-deal Brexit. Should no deal be reached, the sharp rise in the trade-weighted euro will be exacerbated by a drop in the pound. This is deflationary for the euro area. And while the drop in the pound could be beneficial to the UK in the longer term, it will be very destabilizing since the UK is highly dependent on capital flows. Our roadmap for sterling is as follows: Historically, odds of a “hard” Brexit have usually been associated with cable near 1.20. This occurred after the UK referendum in 2016 and after Prime Minister Boris Johnson was elected with a mandate to take the UK out of the EU (Chart I-12). Intuitively, this suggests that maximum pessimism on the pound, driven by Brexit fears, pins cable at around 1.20. A “weak” deal cobbled together at the eleventh hour will still benefit cable. Depending on the details, 1.35-1.40 for cable will be within striking distance. In the case where both the UK and EU come to a “perfect” agreement, the pound could be 20%-25% higher. The real effective exchange rate for the pound is now lower than where it was after the UK exited the ERM in 1992, with a drawdown that has been similar in size. A good deal should cause the pound to overshoot the mid-point of its historical real effective exchange rate range (Chart I-13). Chart I-12GBP Has Historically Bottomed At 1.20 Chart I-13The Pound Is Cheap The pound is also cheap versus the euro, and we expect the EUR/GBP to start facing significant headwinds near 0.92. It is remarkable that UK data continues to outperform both the US and euro area (Chart I-14). As such, cable should be bought on weakness. Tactically, we would be buyers of the pound in the 1.24-1.25 zone, and our limit sell on EUR/GBP was triggered yesterday at 0.92.   Chart I-14The UK Economy Is Improving Thoughts On The ECB The main takeaways from the European Central Bank (ECB) conference were threefold. First, data in the euro area was better than the ECB expected. Second, the ECB did not give any hints on its policy review or extend forward guidance. Keeping policy easy until inflation is up to, but still below, 2% appears more hawkish than the Federal Reserve, which is now trying to asymmetrically generate inflation. And finally, the ECB said they are monitoring the exchange rate, but fell short of providing any hints that they will actively lean against the currency. The euro took off, both against the dollar and other European currencies. We outlined in last week’s report why we do not believe the euro can fall much from current levels. These include the common currency being cheap and having a large share of exports in the eurozone. A Few Words On The CHF Finally, a few clients have asked what happens to the Swiss franc in an environment where the euro is rising (and the dollar is falling). Our bias is that the Swiss National Bank lets a rising EUR/CHF ease financial conditions in Switzerland, and even leans into it. The Swiss National Bank has been stepping up its pace of intervention since EUR/CHF touched 1.05 this year and will continue to do so (Chart I-15). Unfortunately, there is not much it can do about a falling USD/CHF. This suggests the franc will fall against the euro, but not so much against the dollar. In a world where global yields eventually converge to zero, holding the Swiss franc is an attractive hedge. Chart I-15USD Weakness Will Be A Headache For The SNB   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data from the US have been positive: On the labor market front, nonfarm payrolls fell to 1371K from 1734K in August. The average hourly earnings increased by 4.7% year-on-year. The unemployment rate declined from 10.2% to 8.4%. Initial jobless claims increased by 884K for the week ending on September 4th.  Finally, the NFIB business optimism index increased from 98.8 to 100.2 in August. The DXY index initially rose to a 4-week high of 93.6 earlier this week with positive data releases, then fell back to 93. Our bias is that while the dollar has been rebounding since the beginning of the month, the rally could prove to be a healthy counter-trend move in the long-term dollar bear market. Report Links: Addressing Client Questions - September 4, 2020 A Simple Framework For Currencies - July 17, 2020 DXY: False Breakdown Or Cyclical Bear Market? - June 5, 2020 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data from the euro area have been mixed: The Sentix investor confidence increased from -13.4 to -8 in September. GDP plunged by 11.8% quarter-on-quarter in Q1, or 14.7% year-on-year.  The euro declined by 0.5% against the US dollar this week. The ECB decided to keep its interest rate and PEPP program unchanged on this Thursday. President Christine Lagarde sounded quite hawkish in the press conference, saying that incoming data since the last monetary policy meeting suggest “a strong rebound in activity broadly in line with previous expectations.” We continue to favor the euro against the US dollar. Report Links: Addressing Client Questions - September 4, 2020 On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data from Japan have been mixed: The coincident index increased from 74.4 to 76.2 in July. The leading economic index also climbed up from 83.8 to 86.9 in July. The current account balance widened from ¥167 billion to ¥1,468 billion in July. GDP plunged by 7.9% quarter-on-quarter in Q2, or 28.1% on an annualized basis. Preliminary machine tool orders continued to fall by 23.3% year-on-year in August. Overall household spending contracted by 7.6% year-on-year in July. The Japanese yen appreciated by 0.2% against the US dollar this week. The expansion in Japan’s current account balance is mainly driven by the decline in domestic demand. Exports fell by 19.2% year-on-year in July while imports slumped at a faster pace by 22.3%. This suggests that deflationary forces are returning to Japan, which will boost real rates and buffet the yen. Report Links: The Near-Term Bull Case For The Dollar - February 28, 2020 Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 Currency Market Signals From Gold, Equities And Flows - January 31, 2020 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data from the UK have been mostly positive: Retail sales continued to increase, rising by 4.7% year-on-year in August, following a 4.3% increase the previous month. Halifax house prices increased by 5.2% year-on-year for the 3 months to August. The Markit construction PMI declined from 58.1 to 54.6 in August. The British pound extended its sell-off this week, depreciating by 2.5% against the US dollar, making it the worst-performing G10 currency. Under ongoing trade negotiations, the possibility of a no-deal Brexit is now putting more downward pressure on the pound after the summer rally. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? - Sept. 20, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data from Australia have been mixed: The AiG services performance index fell from 44 to 42.5 in August. The NAB business confidence increased from -14 to -8 in August while the business conditions index fell from 0 to -6. The Australian dollar appreciated by 0.4% against the US dollar this week. Spending fell sharply during the pandemic, pushing Australia’s savings rate to 19.8% from 6%. Until consumer spending returns in earnest, the RBA is unlikely to raise rates, which puts a cap on how far the AUD can rise. The good news is that household balance sheets are being mended, which reduces macroeconomic risk. Report Links: On AUD And CNY - January 17, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data from New Zealand have been mixed: Manufacturing sales plunged by 12.2% quarter-on-quarter in Q2. The preliminary ANZ business confidence index increased from -41.8% to -26% in September. The ANZ activity outlook index also ticked up from -17.5% to -9.9%. The New Zealand dollar fell initially against the US dollar, then recovered, returning flat this week. The ANZ New Zealand Business Outlook shows that most activity indicators have increased to the highest levels since the beginning of the pandemic but are still well below pre-COVID-19 levels. We like the New Zealand dollar against the US dollar but believe that it will underperform against other pro-cyclical currencies including the Australian dollar and the Canadian dollar. Report Links: Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data from Canada have been positive: On the labor market front, the unemployment rate declined from 10.9% to 10.2% in August. The participation rate increased from 64.3% to 64.6%. Average hourly wages surged by 6% year-on-year in August. Housing starts increased by 6.9% month-on-month to 262.4K in August, the highest reading since 2007. The Canadian dollar depreciated by 0.3% against the US dollar this week. The Bank of Canada maintained its target rate at 0.25% on Wednesday. It is also continuing large-scale asset purchases of at least C$5 billion per week of government bonds. Moreover, the Bank suggested that the bounce-back in activity in Q3 was better than expected, which bodes well for the loonie. Report Links: Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 More On Competitive Devaluations, The CAD And The SEK - May 1, 2020 A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data from Switzerland have been mixed: FX reserves continued to increase from CHF 847 billion to CHF 848 billion in August. The unemployment rate remained unchanged at 3.4% in August. The Swiss franc appreciated by 1% against the US dollar this week. The SNB Chairman Thomas Jordan said that “stronger currency market interventions relieve over-valuation pressure on the Swiss franc and protect the Swiss economy”. Recent dollar weakness could be another headache for the SNB, accelerating SNB’s currency intervention. While we like the franc as a safe-haven hedge with high real rates, the upside potential is likely to be more gradual as the SNB leans against it. Report Links: On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Currency Market Signals From Gold, Equities And Flows - January 31, 2020 Portfolio Tweaks Before The Chinese New Year - January 24, 2020 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data from Norway have been positive: Manufacturing output increased by 1.8% month-on-month in July. Headline consumer price inflation ticked up from 1.3% to 1.7% year-on-year in August. Core inflation continued rising to 3.7% year-on-year from 3.5% the previous month. The Norwegian krone depreciated by 0.5% against the US dollar this week. The increase in headline inflation was mainly driven by furnishings and household equipment (10%), communications (4.9%) and food (3.7%). However, the Norwegian krone is still tremendously undervalued against the US dollar according to our models. Report Links: A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 On Oil, Growth And The Dollar - January 10, 2020 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data from Sweden have been mostly positive: The current account surplus fell to SEK 63.2 billion in Q2 from SEK 75.5 billion in Q1. However, this compares favorably to a surplus of SEK 34.7 billion the same quarter last year. Manufacturing new orders continued to fall by 6.4% year-on-year in July. This is an improvement compared to the 13.1% contraction the previous month. Headline consumer prices inflation increased from 0.5% to 0.8% year-on-year in August. Core inflation also climbed up from 0.5% to 0.7% year-on-year. The Swedish krona appreciated by 0.5% against the US dollar this week. We continue to favor the Swedish krona amid global economy recovery. Moreover, our PPP model shows that the krona is still undervalued by 19% against the US dollar. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades

This week we introduced a structurally constructive US equity view with an SPX 7000 target for the year 2028 on the back of peak cycle EPS of $310 and peak cycle P/E multiple of 23. The Fed’s explicit acceptance that it is ready to incur inflation risk, cementing the fed funds rate near the zero-lower bound for as long as the eye can see, underpins this bullish view. Since the late-1920s, EPS have grown by 7.5%/annum on average, effectively doubling every decade. More recently, using I/B/E/S data, there have been four distinct EPS growth periods over the past four decades with different durations. From trough-to-peak, EPS have enjoyed an average CAGR of over 10%. The current trough in forward EPS stands just shy of $140. Applying the average CAGR until 2028 results in a $310 EPS figure. Assigning the current forward multiple equates to an SPX terminal value of over 7000. Bottom Line: Our new structurally bullish view calls for SPX 7000 by the year 2028. For more reasons underpinning this view, please refer to our most recent Weekly Report.

Highlights Stocks face near-term downside risks from further delays in passing a new US fiscal stimulus package, a potentially slower-than-expected rollout of a Covid-19 vaccine, and the unwinding of speculative call option positions in large-cap US tech companies. Nevertheless, we continue to favor equities over bonds over a 12-month horizon. One key reason is that the global equity risk premium – proxied by the difference between the stock market earnings yield and the real government bond yield – remains quite large. Many observers argue that the bond yield component of the equity risk premium is distorted by central bank manipulation. They also contend that low bond yields reflect poor economic prospects and that structurally low borrowing costs could lead to malinvestment down the road. In this report, we push back against these views. We argue that today’s low bond yields do, in fact, provide a reliable estimate of the risk-free component of the discount rate; that the drop in yields over the past year mainly reflects higher private-sector savings and easier monetary policy rather than pessimism about growth and earnings; and that instead of leading to overinvestment, the main effect of falling interest rates, at least so far, has been to inflate the rents earned by companies with monopoly power. All of this means that lower interest rates really do justify higher market valuations. The Correction Is Not Over, But We Are Sticking With Our Bullish 12-Month View On Stocks Chart 1Tech Stocks At Greatest Risk Of A Pullback After recouping some of their losses on Wednesday, stocks stumbled again on Thursday. Since reaching new highs last week, global equities have dropped by 5.3%. US equities have taken the brunt of the beating. They are down 7% from last week’s top, compared to 3% for non-US stocks (Chart 1). The tech-heavy Nasdaq remains 9.4% off its record high. We continue to see near-term downside risks to global stocks, particularly US equities. It has now been six weeks since emergency US federal unemployment benefits lapsed. The US economy is set to rebound at a brisk pace in the third quarter – the Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow model projects that output will grow 30% at an annualized pace – but GDP is rising from a very low base. In the absence of a new fiscal package, US growth could slow sharply in the fourth quarter and beyond, causing more workers to become permanently unemployed. Concern over the safety of the vaccines being developed to fight Covid-19 could also unsettle investors. On Wednesday, AstraZeneca announced that it had temporarily paused the Phase 3 trial of its vaccine co-developed with the University of Oxford after a patient suffered a severe reaction. Such delays are normal in the conduct of vaccine testing, but they do raise memories of the 1976 debacle with the Swine flu vaccine, which caused 450 Americans to come down with Guillain-Barré syndrome, a life-threatening neurological disorder.1 Chart 2Nasdaq Volatility Declined Even As Share Prices Tumbled These worries come on the heels of a six-month rally in tech stocks – one that was dangerously amplified by speculative call option purchases by retail investors. The preference among retail investors for short-dated calls allowed them to gain control of large swathes of shares at relatively little cost. Market makers and other counterparties who sold the calls were forced to buy the underlying stock to hedge their exposure. This created a self-reinforcing feedback loop where rising call option prices generated more purchases of the underlying stock, leading to even higher call prices. Starting last week, the process began to go in reverse. It is noteworthy that Nasdaq implied volatility actually fell on both Monday and Wednesday as tech stocks imploded, a possible sign that nervous investors were liquidating their call positions (Chart 2). It is difficult to know how much further this process has to run, but our guess is that a capitulation point has not yet been reached. This suggests that the correction is not yet over.   TINA’s Siren Song Despite our near-term concerns, we expect global equities to be higher in 12 months’ time. At least one of the nine vaccine candidates currently in Phase 3 trials is likely to produce a viable formula. Policymakers are also liable to heed the will of voters and maintain generous fiscal stimulus measures. All this should allow global growth to pick up. Stocks usually do well when global growth is accelerating (Chart 3). And then there is TINA. TINA — There Is No Alternative — has become a popular adage on Wall Street. As the argument goes, no matter how expensive stocks seem to get, bonds and cash are even less attractive. There is some logic to this view. Today, the dividend yield on the S&P 500 stands at 1.6%. While this dividend yield is well below its historic average of 4.3%, it is still higher than the 0.68% yield on the 10-year Treasury note (Chart 4). Chart 3Stocks Usually Do Well When Global Growth Is Accelerating Chart 4Bond Yields Have Fallen Below Dividend Yields Imagine an investor having to decide whether to place their money in an S&P 500 index fund or a 10-year Treasury note. Dividends-per-share paid by S&P 500 companies have almost always increased over time. However, even if we make the pessimistic assumption that dividends-per-share remain unchanged for the next ten years, the value of the S&P 500 would still have to fall by 9% over the next decade to equal the return on the 10-year note. Assuming that inflation averages 2% over this period, the real value of the S&P 500 would need to drop by 25%. The picture is even more dramatic outside the US. In the euro area, the index would have to fall by over 30% in real terms for investors to make more money in bonds than stocks. In the UK, it would need to fall by over 50%. Elevated Equity Risk Premia Granted, stocks are riskier than bonds. However, based on a comparison of dividend yields with bond yields, stocks today are significantly cheaper than usual (Chart 5). Chart 5AStocks Would Need To Fall A Lot For Equities To Underperform Bonds Chart 5BStocks Would Need To Fall A Lot For Equities To Underperform Bonds The relative attractiveness of stocks can also be inferred by subtracting the real bond yield from the cyclically-adjusted earnings yield on stocks in order to get an implied equity risk premium (ERP)2 (Chart 6). Outside the US, the ERP is high both because earnings yields are elevated and because real bond yields are depressed. In the US, which accounts for 56% of global stock market capitalization, the earnings yield is below its long-term average. Nevertheless, the US ERP is still quite high because real bond yields reside deep in negative territory. In fact, the US ERP has barely fallen since March because the decline in real yields has largely offset the rise in stock prices (Chart 7). Chart 6Equity Risk Premia Are Elevated Chart 7The Decline In US Real Yields Since March Has Largely Offset The Rise In Stock Prices   Are Bond Yields Fake News? Stock market bears will argue that the ERP is overstated by the abnormally low level of bond yields. Their argument typically centers on three points: Quantitative easing, forward guidance, NIRP and ZIRP have distorted bond yields to such an extent that we can no longer use them as a reliable measure of the risk-free component of the discount rate. Even if one accepts the premise that current bond yields are a valid proxy for the risk-free rate, the fact that yields are so low is hardly a cause for celebration. This is because today’s low yields reflect dismal economic prospects, which justifies a higher-than-normal equity risk premium. Low bond yields are incentivizing all sorts of malinvestment. With time, this will depress the rate of return on capital, leading to lower stock prices. Let’s examine all three arguments in turn. Are Bond Yields Being Manipulated? The term financial repression gets bandied around quite often these days. There is no doubt that central banks would like to keep yields low, but how much higher would yields be in the absence of any unorthodox monetary measures? Our guess is not much higher. The simplest test of whether bond yields are above or below their equilibrium level is to look at whether growth is above or below trend. The recovery following the financial crisis was anemic, suggesting that monetary policy was only modestly accommodative. If anything, one can argue that in much of the world, bond yields would be even lower today were it not for the fact that nominal interest rates cannot go much below zero. Do Low Bond Yields Reflect Bad News? Bond yields can decline for many reasons. Some of these reasons are positive for equity investors, while others are negative. If yields fall on the expectation of weaker economic growth, that is clearly bad for stocks. On the flipside, if yields drop because monetary policy has turned more dovish, that is good for stocks. The impact on equities from other factors influencing bond yields can be ambiguous. For example, consider the case of an increase in private-sector savings. All things equal, higher savings will lead to less spending. A decline in spending is likely to result in lower output and diminished corporate profits. That is bad for stocks. However, if governments absorb the excess private-sector savings by running larger budget deficits, there may end up being no net loss in aggregate demand. In that case, stock prices may not fall. Indeed, one can very easily envision a scenario where an adverse shock to private-sector spending leads to an increase in equity valuations. To see this point, consider a standard dividend discount model. Suppose something happens that leads the private sector to spend less at any given interest rate. Let us also suppose that the central bank reacts to this shock by cutting interest rates all the way down to zero, at which point governments, taking advantage of cheaper borrowing costs, step in and increase fiscal stimulus. The upshot could be a lower interest rate but at the same level of aggregate spending (See Box 1 for a formal economic discussion of how this process works). If aggregate demand – and by extension, corporate earnings and dividends — drop temporarily, while interest rates fall permanently (or at least semi-permanently), the present value of cash flows will rise. As far-fetched as this scenario may seem, something along these lines appears to have happened over the past six months. Chart 8 shows that analysts expect global profits to contract by 19% in 2020, but then rebound by 29% in 2021 and rise a further 16% the following year, leaving 2022 profits 21% above 2019 levels. Like everywhere else, analysts expect US profits to return to their long-term trend over the next few years. Meanwhile, the 30-year TIPS yield – a proxy for the risk-free component of the discount rate – has fallen by 94 basis points since the start of the year. Even if one assumes, contrary to the optimistic forecasts of analysts, that the level of US EPS does not return to its pre-pandemic trend until 2030, this would still leave the fair value of the S&P 500 17.5% higher than it was at the start of the year (Chart 9). Chart 8Analysts Expect Global Profits To Contract This Year Before Rebounding Chart 9The Present Value Of Earnings: A Scenario Analysis Will Low Interest Rates Lead To Malinvestment? A drop in interest rates may seem like a free lunch for shareholders: It increases the present value of future cash flows without reducing the cash flows themselves. In fact, one could argue that lower rates actually increase future cash flows by shrinking net interest payments on outstanding debt. That might be all fine and dandy, but what about the effect of low interest rates on future investment decisions? To the extent that lower rates increase the market value of a firm’s capital stock relative to its replacement cost – the so-called Tobin’s Q ratio – lower rates could spur more investment. Higher investment, in turn, could drive down the rate of return on capital, leading to lower profits (Box 2 illustrates this point with a simple example featuring a lemonade stand). While there is some truth to this logic, it is less compelling than it once was. This is because much of the capital stock of listed companies today takes the form of intangible capital – which is often difficult to reproduce – rather than physical capital. Such intangible capital may include patents and trademarks as well as monopoly power. In particular, internet companies have gained significant monopoly power from network effects: The more people use their service, the more valuable their service becomes. This is a key reason why falling interest rates have helped the tech giants more than other companies. The Path Ahead The section above argued that today’s low bond yields do, in fact, provide a reliable estimate of the risk-free component of the discount rate; that the drop in yields over the past year mainly reflects higher private-sector savings and easier monetary policy rather than pessimism about growth and earnings; and that instead of leading to overinvestment, the main effect of falling interest rates, at least so far, has been to inflate the rents earned by companies with monopoly power. All this means that lower interest rates really do justify higher market valuations. Looking out, while bond yields are unlikely to rise significantly over the next two years in the absence of any meaningful inflationary pressures, yields are unlikely to fall either given how low they already are. This is not necessarily bad news for stocks. As mentioned above, the equity risk premium is quite high, which means that stocks can rise even if bond yields do edge somewhat higher. The more interesting action is likely to occur beneath the broad indices. If bond yields stabilize, this will remove a major headwind to bank shares (Chart 10). On the flipside, the reopening of economies will benefit companies that were crushed by lockdown measures. Money will shift from “pandemic plays” to “recovery plays.” Chart 10Stabilization In Bond Yields Would Remove A Major Headwind To Bank Shares Chart 11US Stocks Are More Expensive   As we predicted three weeks ago in a report titled “The Return Of Nasdog,” tech and health care stocks will go from leaders to laggards. The US has a higher concentration of tech and health care stocks than most other regions. US stocks are also quite expensive based on standard valuation measures, including the Tobin's Q ratio discussed above (Chart 11). The bottom line is that investors should remain overweight global equities over a 12-month horizon, while pivoting towards value stocks and non-US markets.   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Box 1The Role Of Monetary And Fiscal Policy Following Savings Shocks Box 2Fancy Some Lemonade? An Example Of Tobin’s Q Footnotes 1 Rick Perlstein, “Gerald Ford Rushed Out a Vaccine. It Was a Fiasco,” The New York Times, September 2, 2020. 2 It is necessary to subtract the real bond yield, rather than the nominal bond yield, from the earnings yield because the earnings yield provides an estimate of the real total expected return to shareholders. For further discussion on this, please see Appendix A of the Global Investment Strategy Special Report, “TINA To The Rescue?” dated August 23, 2019.   Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Current MacroQuant Model Scores

Special Report

Feature Investors are increasingly concerned that the US presidential election this year will fail to produce a legitimate result, leading to an escalation in political instability and uncertainty. In this report we hold a Q&A session that we hope will serve as your concise and definitive guide to a contested US election – by which we mean an election that is not decided by the popular vote or Electoral College but requires the intervention of the US Congress or Supreme Court to determine the final outcome. As always, this report draws on the best academic work on the subject, but is not limited to academic conclusions. We apply our geopolitical method and macroeconomic perspective to determine the likeliest scenarios and financial market impacts.  The takeaway? Most likely the election result will be decisive, as incumbent presidents tend to lose amid recessions. However, with President Trump staging a comeback, a contested election is possible and investors would be wise to prepare for volatility over the next two-to-four months at minimum.         Chart 1Trump At Disadvantage In Popular Opinion A good rule of thumb: Trump is at a disadvantage in raw popular opinion (Chart 1), so anything that directs the election decision away from the popular vote and toward constitutional procedures should be seen as a lifeline for Trump, and hence a recipe for a bigger trade war and prolonged US equity outperformance. How Is The US President Elected? The US elects presidents by means of electors, private citizens appointed by each of the 50 states to vote on their population’s behalf, i.e. the Electoral College. The popular vote, or canvass, has been the prevailing method of choosing each state’s electors since the 1840s. The vote is held and tallied by the election authorities of the states on the first Tuesday after the first Monday of November (e.g. November 3, 2020). Each state has different laws on how to hold elections and appoint a slate of electors loyal to the winning candidate in the state. The constitution grants state legislatures the power to appoint the electors. This could become a source of controversy in a contested election.1 Generally the state’s secretary of state approves the popular tally which then determines which slate of electors is appointed. The state governor certifies the names of the electors and the numbers of votes received, signs the letter and applies the state seal, and then sends multiple copies to various authorities for surety.2  If disputes arise over a state’s election results, the state will ideally resolve them by December 8 (Table 1), six days before the electors meet to fill out their ballots for the president and vice-president. Electors meet in the state capital on the first Monday after the second Wednesday of December (e.g. Monday, December 14, 2020) and cast their vote. They send certificates of their vote to the President of the United States Senate in Washington, DC, who is also the nation’s vice president, currently Mike Pence.  Table 1Calendar Of US Election 2020 On January 6 of the New Year (2021), the President of the Senate presides over a special joint session of the new Congress, which itself convenes on January 3. He presents the states’ electoral votes to Congress alphabetically. The votes are counted, with Congress employing official tellers to record the sums.3  If any disputes are raised against any state’s electoral votes, the two houses of Congress must agree in order to disqualify those votes. If the two houses disagree, the votes will be counted. The Senate President, as the constitutional keeper of the electoral returns and presiding officer of the joint session, has some influence, which is another potential source of controversy. When the count is done, the tellers hand their results to the Senate President, who reads them off. Usually the leading candidate captures an absolute majority of the Electoral College (270/538 votes), so the next president is crystal clear and the whole ceremony is finished in half an hour. Alas, not always. What Electoral Results Can Be Ruled Out In 2020? Before getting into contested elections, it is important to address what is highly unlikely to occur in 2020. First, President Trump will not win the popular vote. Chart 2Trump Highly Unlikely To Win Popular Vote Trump won 46% of the popular vote in 2016, trailing Hillary Clinton by 2.9 million votes. Since 2017, Trump’s national approval rating has never risen above 50% in the average of polls. His disapproval rating is almost always higher than his approval (Chart 2). Thus if Trump wins the election it will be through his Electoral College strategy, as in 2016 – or through a contested election. The US has split the popular and Electoral College vote on five occasions, yielding a historical probability of 9%. The fifth time was President Trump’s victory in 2016; he would be the first president to do so twice. This is possible because the regional and demographic factors behind Trump’s win four years ago are still largely intact. Currently our quantitative election model gives Trump a 45% chance of winning the election (Chart 3). This is in line with the consensus view, as online betting markets put Trump’s odds at 43%. However, online gamblers put the odds of the next president losing the popular vote in a range of 27%-31%, which implies that his odds are lower given his low popularity (Chart 4). Chart 3Our Quant Election Model Gives Trump 45% Chance Of Victory Chart 4Trump Odds Weighed Down By Low Chance Of Popular Win Subjectively, we are sticking with our 35% chance of Trump winning, which falls in the middle of this range. What is clear is that Trump has a much greater chance than the historical 9% probability of winning without the popular vote.  There is nothing illegitimate about an Electoral College victory – far from it, it is the constitutional way in which the presidency is won. Nevertheless a victory without a popular mandate deprives the new administration of political capital. A second-term Trump is likely to be stymied at home and more inclined to act unilaterally abroad, a downside risk to global equity markets. Second, Republicans will not reclaim a majority of the House of Representatives. Chart 5Republicans Highly Unlikely To Win House Of Representatives To do so, the GOP would have to retain all Republican-leaning seats (yielding 186) plus all “toss up” seats (totaling 214) and then four additional Democratic-leaning seats. Yet there are only two Democratic-leaning seats that do not benefit from the incumbent advantage (Chart 5).4 The re-election rate in the House and Senate is around 85-95%. Neither the state of the economy nor Trump’s approval rating suggest that Republicans are capable of such a big victory in the House (Chart 6). Chart 6Trump An Albatross For House Republicans Third, Democrats are unlikely to win a majority of the state delegations in the House of Representatives. Currently, Republicans have a majority on 26 of the 50 delegations of lawmakers that the states send to the US House of Representatives. Democrats control 23 state delegations, while Pennsylvania is neutral. If the presidential election is close, then the balance of power among the state delegations will most likely stay the same. Republicans are likely to retain 25 state delegations, whereas Democrats would have to win all five toss-up delegations plus Florida merely to tie the Republicans with 25 delegations (Table 2). This is a tall order. Table 2Democrats Unlikely To Win Majority Of State Delegations In House Of Representatives The Republicans’ state-by-state House majority would prove critical in a contested election, as we will see. Otherwise it doesn’t matter much. What Is A Contested Election? Chart 7Extreme Political Polarization Means Election Disputes Will Rage The 2020 election will inevitably see legal challenges, vote recounts, and procedural problems. Partisanship is at extreme levels, meaning that the two parties will do anything to win (Chart 7). The unprecedented large-scale adoption of mail-in voting due to the COVID-19 pandemic also ensures that recounts and legal disputes will abound.5 Neither candidate is likely to concede defeat quickly or easily. While President Trump is explicit about his reluctance to concede, there is zero chance that Joe Biden will bow out quietly like Al Gore did in the 2000 dispute.   However, investors should distinguish a contested election, in which the resolution of disputes will determine the final outcome, from a controversial election, in which the final outcome is known but the defeated candidate refuses to concede. Either could be market-relevant, but the first scenario is the primary concern as it yields the powers of the presidency. The rest is aftermath. The bedrock principle of US presidential succession is as follows: Constitutionally, if the Electoral College vote falls short of a clear majority (270 out of 538), the House of Representatives chooses the president on a majority vote, with each state receiving only one vote. Similarly, the Senate chooses the vice president.6 President Trump is favored to win in this scenario. As mentioned, Republicans may well hold 26 of the 50 state delegations in the House. A clear majority on either side removes any risk of indecision: the next president will be chosen on a party-line vote of the states. For Democrats to choose the president in the House, they need a landslide victory. This is possible, but then it would imply that President Trump has been soundly beaten in the presidential race. A contested election presupposes a close national race that is likely to result in the status quo balance of power among the states in Congress, and hence an advantage for Trump if the House chooses the president. Map 1 illustrates the fundamental shift in American political power if the House of Representatives votes on a state-by-state basis to resolve a contested election. It alters the geography of each state according to the voting age population, the Electoral College representation from 2016, and an equal weighting in which each state gets the same number of votes, as in the House’s contested election procedure. The Electoral College is not nearly as distortive of the popular will as is often made out. However, the red states greatly increase their prominence in an equal weighting (just as in the US Senate). Map 1Trump Disfavored In Popular Vote, But Favored If Contested Election Decided In House Of Representatives The fundamental takeaway is that President Trump is disfavored when it comes to the popular vote in the states, but if the election is contested and shifts to the House of Representatives, he has a lifeline. Yet if Democrats win the Senate in the election, this lifeline will be cut off. Moreover, the Supreme Court is a wild card, as discussed below.  What Can We Learn From Past Contested Elections? Chart 8US Contested Elections Often Coincide With Deflationary Economy The US has witnessed four contested elections under our definition. Most of them occurred amid deflationary economic trends, which would fit with today’s environment (Chart 8). Each episode can be described as a “stolen election,” depending on one’s point of view.  The key lessons for today are as follows: 1800 – “The Revolution” – Vice President Thomas Jefferson, as Senate President, chose to count the electoral votes from Georgia even though they lacked the governor’s signature and failed to meet federal requirements. This gave him a majority of the electoral votes, which ultimately led to his election.7 If he had rejected these votes, the outgoing House of Representatives would have chosen his rival candidate, John Adams, as president. Takeaway: The vice president has the constitutional authority to present the electoral votes for counting and to oversee the joint session of Congress. If Congress is divided, and the vice president has a decision as to whether to present a certain set of electoral votes, then the vice president could tip the election in his own party’s favor. Also noteworthy: the presence or absence of a governor’s signature on a state’s electoral votes is not definitive. 1824 – “The Corrupt Bargain” – Andrew Jackson lost the election despite winning both the popular vote and the Electoral College vote. With a hung vote in the college, the House of Representatives decided the election among the top three candidates. The Speaker of the House threw his weight behind John Quincy Adams, who then nominated the speaker as the secretary of state in his new administration. Takeaway: Washington insiders can determine the outcome arbitrarily if they control the House of Representatives. A hung Electoral College, or tie, throws the election to the House and thus favors Trump. 1876 – “The Stolen Election” – Democrat Samuel Tilden won the popular vote and the most electoral votes, at 184, while Republican Rutherford Hayes won 165 electoral votes. Tilden was one vote shy of an Electoral College majority (185), while Hayes fell 20 votes shy. Republican control of four states led to an alternative set of Republican electoral votes being sent to Washington. Congress then had to choose between the rival electoral slates. To resolve the dispute, Congress created a special bipartisan committee. The tiebreaking member of the committee was disqualified by a fluke, leading to a replacement who voted on party lines, awarding all 20 disputed electoral votes to Hayes, who thus won the presidency. Simultaneously lawmakers negotiated a grand compromise to ensure Congress would not filibuster the committee’s decision: Hayes would withdraw federal troops from the South, which had been occupied since the Civil War. Takeaway: A party can use control of states to send an alternate set of electoral returns to Washington, muddying the electoral counting process and throwing the election into Congress’s hands. Also, Congress is supreme and can create special mechanisms to resolve electoral disputes. Political solutions are essential when constitutional mechanisms fail.   2000 – Bush versus Gore – Contested election results in Florida led Democrat Al Gore to withdraw his concession to Republican George W. Bush. The Gore legal team convinced the Florida Supreme Court to allow several recounts, including a statewide recount. The Florida legislature, along with Florida Governor Jeb Bush, prepared to certify Jeb’s brother’s victory and send electoral votes to Washington. The US Supreme Court intervened, halting a statewide recount, on the basis of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and in rejection of the Florida court’s novel recount scheme. Takeaway: The Supreme Court can and will intervene in a state election dispute if it is becoming a legal morass. Previously the states settled disputes themselves, or the US Congress settled disputes in Washington. Though the Supreme Court claimed that its ruling did not set a precedent, the clear precedent is that the Supreme Court will intervene if there is a power vacuum. Each of these contested elections sparked extreme partisan controversy.8 In two of them, both the popular and electoral results were thrown out the window. The lesson is that the House of Representatives is definitive. Unless, of course, the Supreme Court preempts it. Since both the Constitution and statutory history point to Congress, not the Supreme Court, as the arbiter of presidential elections, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would overrule the House if the House makes its decision first. But it is still possible, and this is a major source of uncertainty for 2020 or future elections. To fix the various problems that have arisen over the years, Washington has passed several laws, such as the twelfth amendment (1804) and the Electoral Count Act (1887). But fundamental disagreements can still emerge: namely over the constitutional power of the state legislatures to appoint electors, the value of the governor’s signature on his or her state’s electoral votes, and whether the President of the Senate has a substantive or merely ceremonial role. Any of these factors could result in confusion and controversy in 2020-21. How Will States Settle Disputes? On the state level, prior to the joint session of Congress to count the electoral votes on January 6, a range of shenanigans could occur, and the states may never actually settle their disputes. States are supposed to settle any internal recounts or disputes by December 8, 2020 for “safe harbor” status. This status urges, but does not require, the US Congress to accept the state’s final determination of its own electoral votes. If a state fails of this status, Congress may still count its votes, but it has a freer hand to do as it pleases. Thus each party will attempt through judicial or legislative actions to rush and achieve safe harbor status if it believes it won the popular vote count, and will attempt to delay and deprive the state of that status if not. If the legislature and governor agree, then this will be no problem. If they do not agree, the risk emerges that a state battle could escalate all the way to Washington. States with Republican governors, and a Republican or at least a divided legislature, could ensure that Republican electoral votes are sent to Washington in the event of a dispute. This is particularly important in the case of Arizona and Florida, but it also applies to Georgia, Iowa, Ohio, and Texas in 2020. The same goes for Democrats, although there are fewer swing states that fit this description (e.g. Minnesota), as Table 3 shows. Table 3Swing States: Balance Of Legislative And Executive Power The reason for this is that the Electoral Count Act of 1887 instructs Congress to favor the electoral votes with the governor’s signature if there is any dispute about which results to accept when the US Congress holds the final count. If the governor is not opposed by his own legislature, then his certified results will be the ones that go to Congress.    However, states with a unified legislature, either Republican or Democratic, could conceivably send electoral votes of their choice regardless of what the state governor does – and this is relevant for several of the most important swing states in 2020, specifically Republican legislatures under Democratic governors in Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan, and North Carolina, and Democratic legislatures under Republican governors, as in New Hampshire. The constitution endows state legislatures with the power to appoint electors, so legislatures could attempt to override their governors – or even their state supreme courts. Indeed, Florida’s legislature and governor were prepared to send Republican electoral votes to Washington regardless of the Florida high court’s actions in the year 2000. How Will Congress Count The Votes? Republicans will not have unified control of the federal legislature and executive, as noted above. Hence Republican congressmen and senators will not be able to pick and choose which electoral votes to accept at their discretion when the votes are counted on January 6, 2021. House Democrats would prevent them from rejecting any state’s electoral votes for arbitrary reasons.  On the other hand, the Democrats are quite likely to pick up the Senate, and a united Democratic Congress would have the power to pick and choose electoral votes at its discretion. The Democrats could disqualify the electoral votes of a state that voted for Trump in the event of a dispute, tipping the scales in Biden’s favor, during the electoral counting process. For example, say President Trump wins 270 electoral votes and Biden wins 268 – a likely scenario if Trump wins all the 2016 states but loses Pennsylvania and Michigan. Ostensibly President Trump would be re-elected. But the Democratic House and Senate could disqualify the 10 electoral votes of Wisconsin due to any disputes in that state over its popular vote or electors. Trump’s votes would fall to 260 while Biden would retain his original 268. A unified Congress could simultaneously decide to disqualify Wisconsin’s electors from the 538 total of appointed electors, saying the electors were not legally appointed, bringing the total denominator of electors to 528, thus giving Biden a three-vote margin of victory (majority: 265/528). Biden would become the president. If Congress is divided then this kind of manipulation is not possible. Either a bipartisan agreement would determine whether to count a state’s votes – which would be credible and legitimate – or a bipartisan disagreement would lead to the disputed electoral votes being counted. Chart 9Democrats Likely To Win Senate, Hence Congress – Huge Perk In Electoral Count Hence the makeup of the Senate on January 3, which may not be wholly complete at that time, is of great consequence. Democrats are structurally favored to win the Senate this year. They have 12 seats up for re-election versus 23 for Republicans, and only two of their seats are at risk whereas 10 are at risk for Republicans (Chart 9). We expect Democrats to take the Senate, but in a close presidential race the Senate could tie at 50-50. If Republicans retain the Senate, then Vice President Mike Pence could take on a substantive role in counting the Electoral College votes, rather than a merely ceremonial role of presenting the electoral returns to the joint session. If a state sends questionable electoral returns, or more than one set of returns, Pence could conceivably choose which results to present to Congress. A unified Congress could override him but a divided Congress might not. There is precedent for a vice president making a decision on electoral counting that affects the outcome in his own favor, as noted above. While modern scholars tend to highlight the conflict of interest here, the constitution could be read as giving the vice president this advantage so as to more speedily settle any disputes.9 The Electoral Count Act of 1887 says that when in doubt, Congress should accept the electoral votes certified by a state’s governor. But this position was controversial at the time and may not be constitutional. The vice president could assert his own authority to present the legitimate votes to Congress to be counted. It is not clear that a conservative-leaning Supreme Court would contradict him, since neither the constitution nor the Electoral Count Act envisions the court as arbitrating these kinds of disputes. Thus it is conceivable that a situation could arise in which a critical swing state sends two sets of returns and Vice President Pence chooses the electors in favor of himself and President Trump, with a Republican Senate preventing the Democratic House from doing anything about it. A strict constructionist Supreme Court would likely defer to whatever happens in Congress. However, the court could be activist, given that Chief Justice John Roberts is a well-known swing player. It could interpose in a way that precludes any actions deemed entirely arbitrary or lacking a plausible basis in the facts of the state’s election results and laws. As we saw, the court will be inclined to fill a power vacuum. The takeaway is that a unified Congress could count the electoral votes in such a way as to secure a Biden win, while a divided Congress could count the electoral votes in such a way as to give President Trump a lifeline in a disputed election. The Supreme Court is a wild card. What About An Electoral College Tie Or Faithless Electors? A contested election, using the narrow definition, would occur due to an Electoral College tie at 269-269 or any other anomalies that prevent either candidate from reaching a 270-vote majority. Again, the House of Representatives would decide on a state-by-state basis, likely favoring Trump. For example, some electoral votes could be disqualified, a third party candidate could split the vote, or “faithless electors” could vote contrary to their state’s popular choice.10  An electoral tie is not a negligible risk in 2020 – there are 68 possible combinations, and many of them are plausible.11 In 2016, 11 states had a margin of victory less than 5%. Take two equally realistic examples. If Trump lost Pennsylvania and Michigan (likely) as well as Nebraska’s second district (Omaha/suburbs, which President Obama won) then he would tie Biden at 269. Or, if Trump lost Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Arizona (which leaned Democratic in 2018), yet gained Minnesota (the epicenter of the crisis over race and law enforcement), a tie would occur. In a near-tie, a few wayward electors could deprive either candidate of a win. This is far more likely to happen to Trump than Biden. Table 4Range Of Electoral College Votes, 2020 The current combinations of truly competitive states suggest that the Democrats have a lock on 268-319 electoral votes while Republicans only have a lock on 169-219 electoral votes (Table 4). Trump is widely expected to lose both Pennsylvania and Michigan, which alone cut him down to 270 votes; the loss of a single vote from there would deprive him of a majority. By contrast, Biden would hit 278 votes at minimum by picking off a single Republican state in addition to Pennsylvania and Michigan. It is more likely that Trump would lose one or two faithless electors than that Biden would lose nine or ten. So it is more likely that faithless electors would deprive Trump of a win than Biden. But then the House of Representatives would have to resolve the impasse, and would likely favor Trump. What Is The Line Of Succession If The House Fails To Choose A President? What happens if a contested election goes to the House but the state delegations tie at 25-25? Then the House must continue voting over and over until one of the presidential candidates gets the majority. A single lawmaker in a critical state could swing the balance. That lawmaker could be swayed by conscience, bribes, or chance. In 1824, a critical lawmaker from New York changed his vote at the last minute because he found a ballot with John Q. Adams’s name on it and believed it was a sign from God. In 1876, the tiebreaking Supreme Court judge in the congressional commission delegated to work out a compromise solution was disqualified after it was found he had won a simultaneous race for a seat in the Senate.12 The House would eventually decide, but if the state delegations are evenly split, the voting could continue through January 20, Inauguration Day. The vice president would take over at that time. The vice president is chosen by a majority vote of the Senate. If Democrats take the Senate, they would choose California Senator Kamala Harris as the vice president, and she would act as president until the House made its choice. If the Senate vote also split at 50-50 on the new vice president, then the Speaker of the House, who is likely still to be California Representative Nancy Pelosi, would serve as acting president under the statutory line of presidential succession (Table 5). Table 5US Line Of Succession If Presidency Vacant Obviously both the House and the Senate would be under immense pressure to make a decision, so the power vacuum would not last more than a couple of months at most. The US would not be without a leader. However, its leader would be an interim leader with limited ability to make major policy changes or act proactively at home or abroad. It might be a good time for China to stage a surprise attack on Taiwan, or for other revisionist powers like Russia, Iran, or Turkey to make aggressive moves, while the global policeman is asleep at the wheel.13  What Is The “Blue Shift” And Does It Matter? The scholar Edward Foley has called attention to the phenomenon of the “Blue Shift” as a possible pretext for President Trump to contest the election result. The blue shift is the emerging tendency for US election tallies to change significantly after election day as a result of absentee and mail-in ballots that arrive after in-person ballots are counted.14  In 2018, the Arizona senate election went from Republican, as of the tally on November 6 to Democratic as of November 12 as a result of the blue shift. This produced whiplash for Republican supporters who thought they had won (Table 6).  Table 6“ Blue Shift” Means Vote Count Leans Democratic As Late Votes Arrive Will COVID-19 exacerbate the blue shift in 2020? While Republicans are less fearful of the virus and Democrats more enthusiastic about mail-in voting, the pandemic’s effect will be for more people in general to vote by mail, which should reduce the Democratic skew relative to previous elections. Still, there will be some Democratic skew which opens the possibility that an election that looks like a Republican win in the wee hours of November 4 could later fall to the Democrats. Foley entertains a scenario in which President Trump disputes the election on the basis of this apparent, but not real, shift in the election results. However, a blue shift would not prevent state-level election boards from correctly tallying and certifying the result. Trump can always cry foul, but only a small group of Republican supporters will believe him if the results are duly and transparently verified by a bipartisan consensus among the branches of state government. This scenario is thus governed by the points made above regarding the role of state legislatures: if a swing state’s legislature genuinely disagrees with the state’s election board or governor, then it could send its own set of electoral votes to Washington. If Republicans control the Senate, then this alternate set of electoral votes could be accepted. What Happens After A Contested Election? The constitutional power to count the Electoral College votes, and to determine the election if the college is indecisive, lies with Congress (and/or the Supreme Court). The rest is just the wailing and gnashing of teeth.  This wailing and gnashing could still prove market-relevant, however. If the defeated candidate has enough popular support, he would reduce the effectiveness of the new administration. If President Trump is re-elected on any of the technicalities above, he will face an unprecedented popular opposition and social unrest, likely fanned by Biden and a unified Democratic Party. Trump’s administration would be weak at home and would only have influence abroad, creating downside for global risk assets. Polarization is extreme – the two parties will do anything to win the White House. Chart 10Republicans Will Drop Trump Like Nixon If He Loses By contrast, if President Trump loses and refuses to concede, then he will actually reduce policy uncertainty in the United States. Trump’s support among Republicans is premised on his ability to win and drive through their favored policies; his support will plummet if he loses, just as Richard Nixon’s plummeted after the Watergate tapes were revealed (Chart 10). Trump could create an alt-right social media empire and serve as a gadfly, or he could lead a “rump” of the Republican Party to break away. Either way, he would divide and weaken the Republicans relative to the now-ruling Democrats, which would eventually lead to greater policy certainty. Without steady opposition, Democrats would achieve more of their agenda. This would increase risks for certain equity sectors (health care, energy), but would actually reduce polarization as the Democratic majority would more easily cooperate with moderate Republicans.  The latter scenario would be hugely important. Trump could hobble the Republicans for years. This would pave the way for a Democratic ascendancy. Such an ascendancy is already possible based on trends in age, demographics, and ideology, but a serious split in the Republican Party would ensure that it comes to pass. The negative side-effect is that the populist fringe would be more likely to become disaffected or radicalized. Implications For The Long Run The advanced democracies have seen a period of relative peace and prosperity since World War II that kept their electoral disputes limited. They have sought to use multilateral institutions to promote free and fair elections across the rest of the world. But globalization has disrupted their internal political balances, particularly in the United States, making them vulnerable to governance and electoral failures usually associated with emerging and frontier markets (Table 7). Table 7Worldwide Contested Elections Rarely End Peacefully Even prior to COVID-19 the US had reached historic levels of political polarization. The downward spiral of partisanship began when the Soviet Union collapsed and the country no longer faced a common external enemy. The Democrats and Republicans rapidly descended into a fratricidal battle over what they thought would be world supremacy. Today polarization is exploding into open power struggle, with President Trump preemptively casting doubt on the legitimacy of the election and his challenger suggesting that the US military will have to remove him from office if he defies the election result (with prominent generals explicitly contemplating “collective action” to remove Trump).15 Social unrest is morphing into ideological and political violence in the streets. There is ample fuel for unrest and violence to intensify. The party that comes out on top of the 2020 election will have significant influence over the future, including taxing and spending, trade and foreign policy, Supreme Court picks, redistricting after the 2020 census, the fate of the Senate filibuster, and the debate over statehood for Washington, DC. If President Trump wins, it will either be narrowly, through the Electoral College, or through a contested election settled in the House of Representatives. It will prevent a new consensus forming on fiscal policy and the redistribution of wealth. The same goes for a Biden win with Republicans keeping the Senate. As such, polarization will increase for a few more years, before the next generation’s leftward political shift overtakes the Republicans.  Nevertheless, while domestic policy will swing on the Senate, the next president will mostly be important in shaping US policy toward the rest of the world. In this respect, it is notable that Biden and Trump are both competing to see who is more mercantilist and protectionist. The US’s secular competition with China is likely to help cultivate national consensus on a range of policies in the coming decade. And if the Democrats win with a clean sweep – which we still see as the most likely outcome – the painful process of forming a new consensus on taxing and spending will begin in 2021. The US will have witnessed a sea change in fiscal policy as well as trade policy. Partisanship will remain high, but a strong Democratic majority on taxing and spending, combined with Democrats flagrantly coopting Trump’s stance on trade and China, looks to us like the seeds of a new national policy consensus that will reduce US political polarization over the long run. A Trump victory on a technicality will lead to a weak government and trade war. A Biden victory will have popular support and lead to higher taxes. Chart 11Stock Market Will Sell Off Amid Contested Election, As In Past Unfortunately, this year and the next few years will still see polarization at extremes.  It goes without saying that the US election cycle in 2020-21 will bring surprises and likely induce financial market volatility, beyond what has been seen. Judging by history, a full-fledged contested election will likely lead to a substantial equity pullback (Chart 11) – especially in a recessionary context, as in the case of the 1876 “Stolen Election.”   Beyond that, Trump’s re-election would pose a major trade war risk for global assets, a boon for continued US equity outperformance relative to the world. Biden would reduce global risks, while hiking domestic risks due to higher taxes and regulation, thus encouraging the opposite effect.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1    See Article II, Section I of the US Constitution.  2   See “Electoral College Instructions To State Officials,” National Archives and Records Administration, Office of the Federal Register, available at archives.gov. 3   See Article II, i and Amendment XII of the Constitution. There is some disagreement about what the constitution says regarding who does the counting. But a miscounting of the results, if the results are clear, is not credible. The vice president cannot deliberately miscount the vote, nor could Congress. However, if the results are not clear, disagreements could emerge in which the vice president could have a decisive impact. See Stephen A. Siegel, “The Conscientious Congressman’s Guide To The Electoral Count Act of 1887,” Florida Law Review 56 (2004), floridalawreview.com. Throughout this report we are highly indebted to Siegel’s authoritative study. 4   See Cook Political Report, “2020 House Race Ratings,” August 21, 2020, cookpolitical.com.  5   See for example Anna Baringer et al, “Voting by Mail and Ballot Rejection: Lessons from Florida for Elections in the Age of the Coronavirus,” University of Florida Election Science Group, August 20, 2020, electionscience.clas.ufl.edu. 6   See Amendment XII of the Constitution. 7   See Siegel, “The Conscientious Congressman’s Guide.” For the historical details in this section, see Paul F. Boller, Jr., Presidential Campaigns: From George Washington To George W. Bush (Oxford: OUP, 1984 [2004]). The House had to vote between Jefferson and his vice presidential candidate, Aaron Burr, who had the same number of electoral votes. At that time the president and vice president were not treated separately. Jefferson ultimately won when a handful of state delegations in the House abstained after several rounds of voting. Subsequently the twelfth amendment to the constitution was passed so that presidents and vice presidents were chosen separately, avoiding an Electoral College tie between two members of the same party ticket. 8   In 1800, Thomas Jefferson warned of civil war. In 1824, Andrew Jackson fumed that the will of the people had been cheated and plotted revenge, which he got in 1828. In 1876, Washington sent federal troops to monitor state election boards and some southern states threatened to rise up again. In 2000, a debatable court intervention fueled a left-wing backlash and a vicious spiral of polarization that continues to this day. 9   Here and elsewhere in this report we are indebted to Edward B. Foley, “Preparing for a Disputed Presidential Election: An Exercise in Election Risk Assessment and Management,” Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 51:2 (2019), lawecommons.luc.edu. 10  Regarding “faithless electors,” the Supreme Court this year unanimously upheld the ability of states to punish electors who break their pledge. But faithless electors are still possible, and could conceivably deprive an Electoral College winner of his victory. The 2016 election saw seven electors deviate from their party (out of 10 who tried), abnormally high. The extreme political environment is likely to produce defectors. See “Supreme Court Clarifies Rules for Electoral College: States May Restrict Faithless Electors,” Congressional Research Service, July 10, 2020, crsreports.congress.gov. 11   See “Electoral College Tie Finder,” 270 To Win, www.270towin.com. 12  See Boller, Presidential Campaigns. 13  See Admiral James A. Winnefeld and Michael J. Morell, "The War That Never Was?" US Naval Institute Proceedings 146: 8 (August 2020), usni.org. 14  See Foley, “Preparing for a Disputed Presidential Election.” This trend began with electoral reforms that made absentee balloting easier in 2002, but it is also a broader trend. Republicans tend to vote in person; those who vote through mail skew Democratic. Therefore the initial results favor Republicans, while the final results bring in a rush of ballots favoring Democrats. 15  See Brittany Bernstein, “Mattis Told Then-DNI Coats They May Be Forced to Take ‘Collective Action’ against ‘Unfit’ Trump, According to New Woodward Book,” National Review Online, September 9, 2020, nationalreview.com.

In July we first highlighted the monstrous contribution of the top five stocks to the S&P 500’s return and cautioned that such a high concentration of returns in a handful of tech titans was not sustainable. More recently, we warned again about the danger of concentrated returns, and currently the same stocks that were pushing the market higher are the ones pulling it down. In other words the pendulum is swinging the opposite way, as concentration of returns cuts both ways. Table 1 shows MAGAF stocks losses in index points since the September 2nd peak and highlights that they are responsible for 46% of total SPX losses despite having “only” a 25% market cap weight in the index. Bottom Line: A healthy rotation out of overvalued tech titans and into beaten down cyclical stocks is likely getting underway. As a reminder, in the most recent  Weekly Report we went long a basket of bombed out “back to work” stocks at the expense of a “Covid-19 winners” basket. Table 1