Developed Countries

Special Report

Highlights We expect limited upside to gas prices from current levels as the comeback of US Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) exports will add to an already oversupplied market. In the short term, prices will remain below full-cycle costs. This will limit investment in LNG and the infrastructure required to get it to market in future. European storage will peak below maximum capacity. Gas forwards are pricing a rapid drawdown over the winter. Whether this occurs depends critically on winter demand in the northern hemisphere and a continued recovery in world economic activity. In the US, declining production in the prolific natural-gas shales and rising LNG exports will help balance its domestic gas markets: Rig counts in the Appalachian basin are at multiyear lows, which is weighing on output. Collapsing oil production in major shale-oil basins is dramatically reducing associated gas output, which represents more than 16% of total gas production. Still, a second wave of COVID-19 that results in another round of widespread lockdowns could send natgas prices back below $2/MMBtu as storage fills. Over the next few months, the balance of risk in natgas markets – especially in the US – remains to the downside, though highly uncertain. We are staying on the sidelines for now.  Over the medium term, global demand for LNG will catch up with supply by 2024, supported by additional coal-to-gas switching and slower supply growth. Feature The mounting probability inventories will fill up to maximum capacity before this coming winter’s heating season has pushed major European and Asian benchmarks below US LNG’s variable costs. Global natural gas markets have been severely hit by the COVID-19 pandemic. Natgas prices in Asia, Europe, and the US were amongst the worst performing commodities during the crisis (Chart 1). This reflects weak fundamentals – i.e. a significant global supply surplus – which gas markets faced even before the exogenous shock. The mounting probability inventories will fill up to maximum capacity before this coming winter’s heating season has pushed major European and Asian benchmarks below US LNG’s variable costs. This development renders shipments of US gas overseas uneconomical. The cancellation of US cargoes is acting as the primary balancing factor and will allow inventories to stay below full capacity – assuming global economic activity continues to accelerate in 2H20. Henry Hub prices surged by 34% since the beginning of the month on the back of higher gas demand – from warmer-than-normal weather and rebounding global economic activity – depressed US LNG exports, and prolonged maintenance at Australia’s Gorgon plant. Chart 1Global Gas Benchmarks Collapsed In 1H20 Chart 2Relative Prices Will Favor Additional US LNG Exports As storage-related fears abate, LNG economics is turning favorable for cargoes to be delivered in 4Q20 and 1Q21. This will allow exports of US gas to Europe and Asia to resume as regional demand rises. This improvement is already apparent in relative futures curves (Chart 2). Still, we expect only limited price gains from current levels, especially in the US. The resurgence in US LNG exports will add to the global supply surplus and cap the upside. Relative prices will remain below LNG offtakers' (exporters) full-cycle costs, limiting additional investments in LNG projects over the medium term. We expect demand to catch up to supply by 2024. Gas Fundamentals Worsened In 2019 Global gas demand increased by 2% y/y in 2019, led by growth in the US and China as coal-to-gas switching intensified amid the low-price environment (Chart 3). However, this rate of growth is a marked slowdown relative to the average 3.5% y/y growth from 2016-2018. It was also slower than the strong global supply growth – up 3.4% y/y – and LNG export growth – up 12.7% y/y. Chart 3US, China Supported Gas Demand Growth In 2019 The US was the largest contributor to both new gas and LNG supply, accounting for 65% of the world’s incremental gas production (Chart 4). The liquefaction capacity addition from the first wave of investments – i.e. projects that received a final investment decision (FID) before 2017 – is now mostly operational. Chart 4US Dominated Natgas Supply And LNG Growth In 2019 US LNG capacity stands at ~10 Bcf/d and serves as a needed pressure valve to its oversupplied domestic market – a consequence of rapid shale production growth – forcing the excess gas to Europe and Asia. However, the economic slowdown in Asia in 2H19 meant the region could no longer adequately absorb these new volumes. As a result, global gas markets moved to a supply-surplus. Relative gas price spreads began trending downward and moved in favor of exports to Europe over Asia.1 Europe plays a growing role as a market of last resort for global natural gas – particularly US LNG – due to its well-developed storage infrastructure, regasification units, and pipeline networks. Around 80% of LNG exports from newly added terminals were absorbed by European markets, and most of that went into storage. Around 40% of the global natural gas supply increase last year ended up in storage, according to the IEA (Chart 5). Moreover, milder-than-expected weather last year exacerbated these trends and forced global prices to converge closer to Henry Hub. Chart 5European Storage Absorbed ~ 40% Of Global Gas Supply Growth By the end of 2019, gas storage in Europe was drastically higher than its 5-year average for that period (Chart 6). Chart 6Elevated US And Europe Gas Storage European Storage Will Stay Below Capacity-Testing Levels Cargo cancellations for September have been markedly lower, a sign of improving – though still oversupplied – fundamentals. Global gas markets confronted the COVID-19 pandemic from a fragile starting point. The shock reinforced the imbalances that began in 2019 and completely erased US LNG’s competitiveness in European and Asian markets. As demand fell in response to lockdowns – down 2.8% in the US and 7% in Europe y/y in Jan-May by IEA’s reckoning – storage in Europe was projected to reach full capacity by end-August.2 Consequently, in June, natural gas prices plunged to a more than two-decade low to incentivize supply and demand adjustments. Around 100 LNG cargoes from the US were cancelled for delivery in June and July, based on EIA estimates (Chart 7). US LNG supply is now the main balancing factor in global gas markets: It is a high-cost source of supply when delivered to Europe or Asia and is contracted under more flexible agreements facilitating cargo cancellations. Over the short term, the number of vessels cancelled each month is an important indicator of storage availability in Europe. The decision to cancel a cargo is complex but mainly depends on whether the spreads between US Henry Hub (HH) and Dutch Title Transfer Facility (TTF) or Japan Korea Marker (JKM) prices cover the exporter's variable costs. Based on a Cheniere-type contract,3 this implies the spread must be higher than 115% of Henry Hub prices plus shipping and regasification costs (Chart 2). Chart 7US LNG Vessel Cancellations Balance Global Gas Markets The spread failed to cover variable costs for most of 2020 and even moved to a premium – i.e. HH above TTF – in July. Moreover, because most contracts have a 40-day to 70-day notice period for cancellation, the supply of US LNG only reacted to the rapid drop in demand with a lag, aggravating the supply surplus and flooding European inventories. The resulting supply adjustments, combined with stronger-than-expected demand in Europe, have slowed the storage injections rates in August and pushed prices higher.4 Cancellations for September have been markedly lower, a sign of improving – though still oversupplied – fundamentals. Forward curve behavior suggests market participants expect US LNG shut-ins, combined with robust demand recovery in Asia and Europe, to move price spreads above variable costs by November this year (Chart 8). This is mostly a consequence of rising Asian LNG prices. We expect this will incentivize added exports of US LNG over the coming months which will move Henry Hub prices slightly higher over the winter. Chart 8Relative Price Spreads Cover LNG Variable Costs, But Not Total Costs In fact, some cargoes are reportedly already selling their gas in forward Asian markets and taking longer routes or reducing their travel speed to remain at sea for longer and profit from these higher deferred prices.5 Still, the increase in US prices will be limited given that relative prices need to remain wide enough to cover LNG variable costs. While global prices will move up gradually over the winter, we believe their upside is bounded by the supply surplus, especially as US exports normalize. At current storage levels, a resurgence of lockdowns in the US or Europe would have drastic consequences, sending prices back below $2/MMBtu. On the demand side, low prices will favor additional coal-to-gas switching as economies recover in 2H20 (Chart 9). Current forward TTF prices are signaling deep drawdowns in European storage this winter as demand in the region increases (Chart 10). Chart 9Cheap Gas Favors Coal-To-Gas Switching Chart 10TTF Forwards Signaling Strong Inventory Draws This Winter In Chart 11, we simulated the remaining of the filling season based on previous monthly seasonal injection rates for Europe. This suggests storage remains at risk of being maxed out by October. However, we believe – in agreement with current forward curves – that the pickup in demand from recovering economic activity, coal-to-gas switching, and lower US exports will further diminish injection rates in Aug-Sep-Oct relative to historical rates (Chart 12). This will allow inventory to reach its seasonal peak slightly below capacity-testing levels. Chart 11Euopean Storage Remains A Significant Downside Risk Chart 12Low US LNG Exports, Warmer Weather Drastically Reduced Injections In July Moreover, flows from Europe to Ukraine should continue freeing up capacity in core EU storage facilities (Chart 13).6 Chart 13Filling Ukrainian Storage Acts As A Safety Valve Chart 14Lower US Gas Supply Slows Inventory Builds In the US, the multi-year-low active gas rigs in the Appalachian basin are starting to weigh on production. Moreover, collapsing oil production in major shale-oil basins is bringing associated gas – which is now more than 16% of total gas production – down rapidly (Chart 14). This contributes to the slowdown in domestic storage injection and to the recent Henry Hub price gains. Still, at current storage levels, a resurgence of lockdowns in the US or Europe would have drastic consequences, sending prices back below $2/MMBtu (Chart 15). Consequently, we believe short-term downside risks from lockdowns are too elevated to try to profit from the limited price increase expected this winter. Chart 15Renewed Lockdowns In Europe Would Push Storage to Capacity   Rising US-Russia Competition Keeps Prices Lower For Longer Global gas markets will stay oversupplied over the medium term. This will keep relative prices between the US and Europe/Asia below LNG exports’ full-cycle costs. In 2019, a record volume of liquefaction capacity reached FID globally (Chart 16). By 2025, global LNG capacity is expected to reach ~73Bcf/d, a ~ 15Bcf/d increase from current levels. Despite the COVID-19 shock, most projects under construction in the US remain on track to be completed as previously scheduled in 2020.7 Global gas markets will stay oversupplied over the medium term. This will keep relative prices between the US and Europe/Asia below LNG exports’ full-cycle costs – i.e. below variable costs plus a fixed contracted liquefaction capacity fee estimated at ~$3/MMBtu. Chart 16Record FID Risks Keeping Markets Oversupplied Mounting competition – especially from Russia – in both Europe and Asia will hold down prices over the coming years. In Europe, the completion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline would add 5.3Bcf/d of cheap Russian gas supply and could keep prices ~ $1/MMBtu lower than otherwise.8 These new volumes would be absorbed by higher European consumption – fueled by low prices – and lower US LNG exports – from weak relative prices. Geopolitics is a major factor driving Russian behavior and hence oversupply: The US and Russia will vie with each other for market share in Europe. As gas markets further liberalize globally, Europe will be increasingly essential for US LNG as its destination of last resort in times of low demand elsewhere. If Russia floods this market with gas, it reduces Europe’s ability to absorb US gas, which will lead to lower Henry Hub prices. It will shut in US supply in times of low demand, making investments there riskier. While US administrations of either party almost always attempt to engage Russia at the beginning of a four-year term, the US foreign policy establishment no longer believes that engagement with Russia is beneficial (Chart 17). This is apparent under the Russia-friendly Trump administration but will be especially relevant if the Democratic Party wins the White House in November. Democrats blame Russia for undermining and ultimately reversing the Obama administration’s policies by betraying the US-Russia diplomatic “reset” and interfering in the 2016 election. Chart 17Russian Geopolitical Risk Set To Increase Even If Trump Re-Elected Hence the US will continue to impose sanctions on Russia and probably on a range of companies involved in Nord Stream 2 and Turkstream. If both pipelines are completed, then Washington will ask Europe to compensate for its Russia dealings in other ways. Meanwhile Russia will use a combination of commercial and strategic measures to woo Germany and the Europeans so that they do not commit to preferential bilateral deals with the United States. Because the US and Russia are engaged in a great power struggle – rather than healthy trade competition – they will attempt to achieve their aims through means other than price and volume. Punitive measures will create volatility by occasionally removing supplies but probably cannot change the backdrop of oversupply. The gist is that US-Russia relations will remain antagonistic and Europe will benefit from the oversupply except during times of surprise sanctions and strategic blows. In China, we expect imports of US LNG to increase. However, rising Russian LNG and pipeline supplies, increasing domestic gas output, and a persistent global oversupply of gas will limit the incentives for Chinese buyers to sign long-term agreements with US exporters at a price above full-cycle costs – i.e. ~ $7/MMBtu.9 The ongoing US-China trade conflict will encourage China to use US LNG imports as a negotiating lever. This has large implications for the US gas market, as LNG capacity represents ~ 11% of its domestic supply – based on 1H20 production levels. Low demand growth for its gas in Europe or Asia will keep Henry Hub prices low to limit supply growth from shale gas and limit investment in additional liquefaction capacity. Here too geopolitics will undermine Henry Hub prices: China is strengthening economic ties with its strategic partner, Russia, and the ongoing US-China trade conflict will encourage China to use US LNG imports as a negotiating lever. A Biden administration would approach China differently from the Trump administration but it would still have to face fundamental trade tensions due to China’s mercantilism and the US attempt to contain China’s technological rise. China is crucial for global LNG demand growth, but trade tensions will reignite even under Biden and spill over into China’s demand for US commodities. China has substitutes for American LNG. If trade tensions affect China’s imports of US LNG then they will lead to lower Henry Hub prices and possibly to vessel cancellations, especially if European storage once again proves unable to absorb these exports during the injection season. The Biden administration will not ultimately be China-friendly, looking beyond any diplomatic “reset” in its first year, and thus the risk of China diversifying away from US LNG is real. Global natgas prices are moving up, ahead of this winter, but gains will be limited by the persistent oversupply. There are currently more than 6Bcf/d of approved, not yet FID, projects in the US. We do not expect much of this capacity to move forward until LNG economics turn favorable and buyers’ willingness to sign long-term contracts comes back. Large projects expected to start closer to 2025 – e.g. Shell’s LNG Canada and Total’s Mozambique LNG – could be delayed to the second half of the decade. On the demand side, persistent low prices will reinforce two ongoing trends. First, this will favor additional coal-to-gas switching in most regions, helping demand to catch up to supply by 2024 and eventually forcing European and Asian prices significantly higher in anticipation of tighter fundamentals. Second, low spot LNG prices in Asia and the availability of flexible supply will accelerate the shift to a merchant/trading market.10 The movement toward shorter and non-indexed-oil contracts continued in 2019, with spot and short term contracts reaching 34% of total LNG flows in 2019, up 32% vs. 2018 (Chart 18). The COVID-19 shock augmented the incentive to switch to non-oil-indexed contracts given the steep discount it created in LNG spot market prices versus oil-indexed contracts. Based on our Brent price forecasts, we expect this divergence to persist in 2021 (Chart 19). Chart 18Shorter, Gas-On-Gas Contracts Will Increase In Asia Chart 19Spot Prices Will Decouple From Oil-Indexed Again In 2021 The convergence in regional prices that began in 2019 is disrupting the standard LNG model based on significant regional price spreads. Low and uniform prices reduce the arbitrage of moving gas overseas. Companies will need to start using sophisticated financial instruments and will increasingly resort to spot and futures markets, like in oil markets.11 Crucially, our expectation that demand will catch up to supply assumes government policies aimed at reducing carbon emissions continue being implemented in major consuming countries. Future gas consumption is a function of economic – i.e. price incentives – and policy variables. A reversal in China’s environmental policies could drastically slow gas demand growth and remains a risk to our view. At present China’s policy setting aims for growth recovery at all costs, but the driver of Xi Jinping’s green policy is the middle class demand for healthier air and environment (Chart 20). Hence the slog to diversify away from coal will resume over the medium and long run. Bottom Line: The large collapse in prices will remain bearish for US LNG over the short term as global gas markets remain firmly oversupplied and storage levels hew dangerously close to maximum capacity. Global natgas prices are moving up, ahead of this winter, but gains will be limited by the persistent oversupply. Relative prices will be capped close to variable costs. These unfavorable conditions for additional investments in LNG projects could create a supply deficit later in the decade. Chart 20China"s Green Policy Is Driven By Its Growing Middle Class   Hugo Bélanger Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com         Footnotes 1     These destination adjustments in response to price incentives are possible because of the flexibility in US long-term LNG agreements. These contracts, for the most part, have no predetermined destination clause. 2     For instance see "NWE gas storage sites could be 'almost' full by end-August: Platts Analytics" published by S&P Global Platts on May 21, 2020. 3    There exists two main types of LNG contracts in the US: (1) Tolling agreements in which the LNG exporter needs to secure the feedgas, transport the gas to the liquefaction facility, and ship it to the buyer. In this model, the LNG operator charges a fixed fee – usually in the range of $2.25 to $3.5/MMBtu, paid regardless of whether they use their contracted LNG space to liquefy the gas. The ownership of the gas remains in the hand of the offtaker. (2) Chienere-type agreements – or a hybrid merchant-tolling structure – in which the LNG operator secures the feedgas and transports it to its liquefaction facilities. It takes ownership of the gas until it is liquefied and sold to the exporter responsible for shipping the gas to the final buyer – the pricing scheme is usually ~115% of Henry Hub gas prices + a fixed liquefaction fee. In the US, the Cove Point, Freeport, Cameron, and Elba terminals mostly use the tolling model, while all of Cheniere’s installations – i.e. Sabine Pass and Corpus Christi – are operating under Cheniere-type models. In our analysis we use the Cheniere-type as it is slightly more flexible and seems more vulnerable to cargo cancellations – subject to a penalty, or fixed fee, to ensure a reliable cash flow to Cheniere. Moreover, it is difficult to estimate how much of the shipping cost are truly variable, some offtakers have long-term shipping contracts to diminish total variable costs. Please see “Steady as She Goes, Part 5 - How Global Prices Drive U.S. LNG Cargo Destinations,” published by RBN Energy on August 1, 2020 for a detailed discussion of LNG exporters’ costs. 4    Maintenance delays at Australia’s Gorgon LNG plant also contributed to the price increase, especially in Asia. Please see "Chevron says expects to restart Train 2 of Gorgon LNG plant in early September" published by reuters.com on July 28, 2020 for more details. 5    Please see "Buyers of U.S. LNG cancel September cargoes but pace slows, sources say," published by reuters.com on July 21, 2020. 6    Since May this year, the Ukrainian storage and gas pipeline managing company UkrTransGaz started offering discounts on transportation fees and other arrangements to incentivize European traders to storage gas at their facilities. Natgas stored by non-resident in customs warehouses with UkrTransGaz are more than four times higher than last year. Please see “European gas storage: backhaul helps open the Ukrainian safety valve,” published by Oxford Institute For Energy Studies in May 2020. 7     A few projects reported lockdown-related delays of up to 4 months. 8    Please see "Nord Stream 2 and the battle for gas market share in Europe" published by Wood Mackenzie on July 24, 2020. 9    Please see “No Upside: The U.S. LNG Buildout Faces Price Resistance From China,” published by The Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA), July 2020. 10   We highlighted in our October 4, 2018 report titled "US Set To Disrupt Global LNG Market" that the large LNG supply expansion in the US would incentivize consumers to shorten the tenor of oil-indexed contracts, replacing them with hedgeable futures-based contracts. 11    Please see “Covid-19 And The Energy Transition,” published by Oxford Institute For Energy Studies in July 2020. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 2020 Q2 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2020 Summary of Closed Trades

Our recent bump of the S&P materials sector to overweight on July 27th pushed our cyclicals vs defensives positioning to the overweight column. Since then, this bent has netted our portfolio roughly 6% of returns. Similar to any rate of change series that is mean reverting by construction, the cyclicals/defensives ratio is the ultimate mean reverting pairing of S&P 500 sectors.  Importantly, taking a cue from the ISM’s new orders-to-inventories (NOI) ratio, another consistent mean reverting macro pair, is in order. The chart shows that cyclicals/defensives relative share prices move in lockstep with the NOI ratio, and the current message is to expect a definitive breakout in the former. This is especially true as the economy is reopening and the “work from home” stock darlings pass the baton to the “back to business as usual” laggard stocks. Bottom Line: We reiterate our recent cyclicals versus defensives preference. For additional details please refer to our August 3, Special Report “Top 10 Reasons To Start Nibbling On Cyclicals At The Expense Of Defensives”.     

Special Report

Feature Feature ChartThe Sales Of Makeup And Perfumes Collapsed, But The Sales Of Hair Care And Skin Care Grew The pandemic era is diminishing our close quarters intimacy with people, which raises a fascinating question. In a world of social and physical distancing, widespread use of face coverings, and virtual meetings on Zoom or Skype, is it still important to look good? Is it important to smell good? And perhaps the most fascinating question of all: is it important to feel good? The so-called ‘lipstick effect’ is a putative counter-cyclical phenomenon during recessions in which the demand for small treats and pick-me-ups increases while other spending is shrinking. One theory is that it is based on the basic human desire to feel good, even during hard times. When budgets are squeezed, people simply cut out large extravagances and substitute them with small luxuries, epitomised by lipstick. The lipstick effect was first recorded during the Great Depression. Between 1930 and 1933, unemployment in Germany surged to six million. But thanks to the booming demand for its cosmetics, the German firm Beiersdorf could boast that it did not have to lay off a single worker. Across the Atlantic, the same was true. When US economic output shrank by a third, cosmetics were one of the few products whose sales grew. The lipstick effect was also observed during the Great Recession. Between September 2008 and January 2009 when US consumer spending shrank, the sales of cosmetics bucked the downtrend, and grew (Chart I-2).  Chart I-2Cosmetics Sales Grew In The 2008 Recession... The Lipstick Effect Is Working In An Evolved Form Fast forward to 2020, and the pandemic-induced economic slump is the one recession in which we would expect not to observe the lipstick effect. After all, if you are in lockdown, or must maintain physical distancing with other people, or must wear a face covering when near other people, what is the point of wearing makeup or perfume? The sales of cosmetics and fragrances collapsed in the 2020 recession… Just as we would expect, between February and April this year, the US sales of cosmetics and fragrances collapsed by 18 percent, exactly in line with the plunge in US consumer spending. On the face of it, the lipstick effect does not work under a facemask (Chart I-3). Chart I-3...But Shrank In The 2020 Recession Yet on closer examination, the lipstick effect is working, albeit in an evolved form. While the sales of makeup and perfumes have collapsed in 2020, the sales of skincare and haircare products are growing (Chart I-1). As the pandemic took hold and forced hair and beauty salons to shutter, people replaced salon visits with at-home care routines. And interestingly, even in the Great Recession of 2008-09, the US sales of haircare and non-cosmetic personal products outperformed the sales of cosmetics (Chart I-4-Chart I-7). Chart I-4Hair Care And Skin Care Sales Grew In The 2008 Recession... Chart I-5...And Grew In The 2020 ##br##Recession Chart I-6Total Personal Products Sales Grew In The 2008 Recession... Chart I-7...And Have Held Up Well In The 2020 Recession In fact, 60 percent of the total beauty market comprises skincare and haircare products compared with 30 percent for makeup and perfumes (Chart I-8). It turns out that the cosmetics and personal products firms that have a diversified exposure to all segments of the beauty market are the ones that outperform in hard times as well as good. And it turns out that these companies are European. Chart I-8Skin Care And Hair Care Dominates The Beauty Market The European Cosmetics Sector Is Outperforming In hard times, the European cosmetics sector, led by L’Oréal, has consistently outperformed the US cosmetics sector, led by Estee Lauder, and the Japanese cosmetics sector, led by Shiseido. In hard times, the European cosmetics sector, led by L’Oréal, has consistently outperformed. Specifically, the 12-month forward earnings for the European cosmetics sector barely declined in the 2008-09 recession and have barely declined in the 2020 recession. In contrast, the forward earnings for the US and Japanese cosmetics sectors collapsed both then and now (Chart I-9). Chart I-9The European Cosmetics Sector Has Been Recession-Proof Furthermore, the latest quarterly reports show that while operating profits for L’Oréal are down by around 20 percent from a year ago, the operating profits for Estee Lauder and Shiseido have slumped by more than 80 percent.1 As a result, the L’Oréal share price took a much smaller hit than those of Estee Lauder and Shiseido in both the 2008 and the 2020 stock market crashes (Chart I-10 and Chart I-11). Chart I-10L’Oréal Took A Smaller Hit Than Estee Lauder And Shiseido In 2008… Chart I-11…And In ##br##2020 An important reason for L’Oréal’s consistent outperformance is its diversified product range. L’Oréal acknowledges that for both its consumer products and luxury divisions “the health crisis triggered a sharp deceleration in the makeup market”. But the hit to makeup was counterbalanced by continued strong growth in skin care thanks, for example, to the launch of serums in its Revitalift range. Additionally, its hair care products grew thanks to Fructis Hair Food plus very strong performance in the “highly dynamic home-use hair colour market”.  Estee Lauder confirms that “Covid-19 and its various impacts have influenced consumer preferences due to the closures of offices, retail stores and other businesses and the significant decline in social gatherings”. While the demand for makeup and fragrance has slumped, the demand for skin care and hair care products has been more resilient. The trouble is that hair care accounts for less than 4 percent of Estee Lauder’s total sales. Meanwhile, the collapse in makeup sales has forced goodwill asset impairments to several of its makeup brands causing the 80 percent collapse in its overall profits. Likewise, Shiseido blames the 83 percent slump in its operating profits largely on “a product mix deterioration” which outweighed prompt cost-saving measures in response to the rapid deterioration of the market environment. Another vulnerability is that Shiseido’s sales are highly concentrated in Asia. By comparison, L’Oréal benefits from geographical diversification, with sales almost equally split between Europe, the Americas, and Asia (Table I-1). Table I-1L’Oréal Benefits From Geographical Diversification The European Personal Products Sector Is Also Outperforming Turning to the general personal products sector, the leading companies are Unilever and Beiersdorf in Europe, Procter & Gamble, Colgate-Palmolive, and Kimberly Clark in the US, and Kao in Japan. In the personal products sector too, Europe has consistently outperformed the US and Japan. In the personal products sector too, Europe has consistently outperformed the US and Japan. Indeed, while the European sector’s profits have steadily grown through the past decade, the US sector’s profits have been going nowhere since the mid-2010s (Chart 1-12). Chart I-12The European Personal Products Sector’s Profits Have Grown Through The Past Decade   One reason for the European personal products sector’s reliable growth is that both Unilever and Beiersdorf are highly exposed to the beauty sector – in fact, Unilever has an even larger market share than Estee Lauder (Chart I-13). And as we have just seen, a diversified exposure to all segments of the beauty sector – makeup, fragrances, skin care, and hair care – should produce resilient growth in all economic backdrops. Pre-pandemic, and potentially once the pandemic is over, makeup and fragrances were/will be the growth drivers. Whereas during the pandemic, skin care and hair care are the drivers. Chart I-13Unilever Is A Big Player In Beauty A final point is that despite the superior and safer growth prospects of the European cosmetics and personal products companies, they are not generally more richly valued than their peers in the US and Japan (Table I-2 and Table I-3). Table I-2The European Cosmetics Sector Is Not More Expensive Table I-3The European Personal Products Sector Is Not More Expensive To sum up, for the pandemic era and beyond, the European cosmetics and personal products sector is well set for diversified growth via product mix, price points, and regional exposures. And it is relatively well valued versus its peers elsewhere in the world. As such, the sector – dominated by L’Oréal, Unilever, and Beiersdorf – should remain a core holding in an investment portfolio.   Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com   Mohamed El Shennawy Research Associate mohamede@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The most recent quarterly report for Estee Lauder is due on August 20. But at the time of writing the latest quarterly report was to the end of June 2020 for L’Oréal and to the end of March 2020 for Estee Lauder and Shiseido.

Overweight Our S&P home improvement retail overweight continues posting healthy gains: the position is up 23%, in relative terms, since the mid-April inception. Such handsome returns compel us to move our trailing stop from 10% to the 15% relative return mark in order to protect gains. Nevertheless, we still expect to harvest more gains – a view that HD’s earnings release reiterated yesterday. Remote working has created an opportunity for homeowners to undertake remodeling projects that drove extra traffic to home improvement retail stores. Specifically, HD comparable-store sales grew by 25% year-over-year, which translated into a sizable EPS beat. The bottom panel of the chart corroborates that HIR sales are on fire. Bottom Line: We remain overweight the S&P home improvement retail index, but today we move our trailing stop from 10% to 15%. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HOMI – HD, LOW.