Diplomacy/Foreign Relations

Special Report

Highlights Chinese equities have rallied enthusiastically since the COVID-19 outbreak and are now exposed to underlying political and geopolitical risks. Xi Jinping’s intention is to push forward reform and restructuring, creating a significant risk of policy overtightening over the coming two years. In the first half of 2021, the lingering pandemic and fragile global environment suggest that overtightening will be avoided. But the risk will persist throughout the year. Beijing’s fourteenth five-year plan and new focus on import substitution will exacerbate growing distrust with the US. We still doubt that the Biden administration will reduce tensions substantially or for very long. Chinese equities are vulnerable to a near-term correction. The renminbi is at fair value. Go long Chinese government bonds on the basis that political and geopolitical risks are now underrated again. Feature The financial community tends to view China’s political leadership as nearly infallible, handling each new crisis with aplomb. In 2013-15 Chinese leaders avoided a hard landing amid financial turmoil, in 2018-20 they blocked former President Trump’s trade war, and in 2020 they contained the COVID-19 pandemic faster than other countries. COVID was especially extraordinary because it first emerged in China and yet China recovered faster than others – even expanding its global export market share as the world ordered more medical supplies and electronic gadgets (Chart 1). COVID-19 cases are spiking as we go to press but there is little doubt that China will use drastic measures to curb the virus’s spread. It produced two vaccines, even if less effective than its western counterparts (Chart 2). Monetary and fiscal policy will be utilized to prevent any disruptions to the Chinese New Year from pulling the rug out from under the economic recovery. Chart 1China Grew Global Market Share, Despite COVID Chart 2China Has A Vaccine, Albeit Less Effective In short, China is seen as a geopolitical juggernaut that poses no major risk to the global bull market in equities, corporate bonds, and commodities – the sole backstop for global growth during times of crisis (Chart 3). The problem with this view is that it is priced into markets already, the crisis era is fading (despite lingering near-term risks), and Beijing’s various risks are piling up. Chart 3China Backstopped Global Growth Again First, as potential GDP growth slows, China faces greater difficulty managing the various socioeconomic imbalances and excesses created by its success – namely the tug of war between growth and reform. The crisis shattered China’s attempt to ensure a smooth transition to lower growth rates, leaving it with higher unemployment and industrial restructuring that will produce long-term challenges (Chart 4). Chart 4China's Unemployment Problem The shock also forced China to engage in another blowout credit surge, worsening the problem of excessive leverage and reversing the progress that was made on corporate deleveraging in previous years. Second, foreign strategic opposition and trade protectionism are rising. China’s global image suffered across the world in 2020 as a result of COVID, despite the fact that President Trump’s antics largely distracted from China. Going forward there will be recriminations from Beijing’s handling of the pandemic and its power grab in Hong Kong yet Trump will not be there to deflect. By contrast, the Biden administration holds out a much greater prospect of aligning liberal democracies against China in a coalition that could ultimately prove effective in constraining its international behavior. China’s turn inward, toward import substitution and self-sufficiency, will reinforce this conflict. In the current global rebound, in which China will likely be able to secure its economic recovery while the US is supercharging its own, readers should expect global equity markets and China/EM stocks to perform well on a 12-month time frame. We would not deny all the positive news that has occurred. But Chinese equities have largely priced in the positives, meaning that Chinese politics and geopolitics are underrated again and will be a source of negative surprises going forward. The Centennial Of 1921 The Communist Party will hold a general conference to celebrate its 100th birthday on July 1, just as it did in 1981, 1991, 2001, and 2011. These meetings are ceremonial and have no impact on economic policy. We examined nominal growth, bank loans, fixed asset investment, industrial output, and inflation and observed no reliable pattern as an outcome of these once-per-decade celebrations. In 2011, for example, General Secretary Hu Jintao gave a speech about the party’s triumphs since 1921, reiterated the goals of the twelfth five-year plan launched in March 2011, and reminded his audience of the two centennial goals of becoming a “moderately prosperous society” by 2021 and a “modern socialist country” by 2049 (the hundredth anniversary of the People’s Republic). China is now transitioning from the 2021 goals to the 2049 goals and the policy consequences will be determined by the Xi Jinping administration. Xi will give a speech on July 1 recapitulating the fourteenth five-year plan’s goals and his vision for 2035 and 2049, which will be formalized in March at the National People’s Congress, China’s rubber-stamp parliament. As such any truly new announcements relating to the economy should come over the next couple of months, though the broad outlines are already set. There would need to be another major shock to the system, comparable to the US trade war and COVID-19, to produce a significant change in the economic policy outlook from where it stands today. Hence the Communist Party’s 100th birthday is not a driver of policy – and certainly not a reason for authorities to inject another dose of massive monetary and credit stimulus following the country’s massive 12% of GDP credit-and-fiscal impulse from trough to peak since 2018 (Chart 5). The overarching goal is stability around this event, which means policy will largely be held steady. Chart 5China's Big Stimulus Already Occurred Far more important than the centenary of the Communist Party is the political leadership rotation that will begin on the local level in early 2022, culminating in the twentieth National Party Congress in the fall of 2022.1 This was supposed to be the date of Xi’s stepping down, according to the old schedule, but he will instead further consolidate power – and may even name himself Chairman Xi, as the next logical step in his Maoist propaganda campaign. This important political rotation will enable Xi to elevate his followers to higher positions and cement his influence over the so-called seventh generation of Chinese leaders, pushing his policy agenda far into the future. Ahead of these events, Beijing has been mounting a new battle against systemic risks, as it did in late 2016 and throughout 2017 ahead of the nineteenth National Party Congress. The purpose is to prevent the economic and financial excesses of the latest stimulus from destabilizing the country, to make progress on Xi’s policy agenda, and to expose and punish any adversaries. This new effort will face limitations based on the pandemic and fragile economy but it will nevertheless constitute the default setting for the next two years – and it is a drag on growth rather than a boost. The importance of the centenary and the twentieth party congress will not prevent various risks from exploding between now and the fall of 2022. Some political scandals will likely emerge as foreign or domestic opposition attempts to undermine Xi’s power consolidation – and at least one high-level official will inevitably fall from grace as Xi demonstrates his supremacy and puts his followers in place for higher office. But any market reaction to these kinds of events will be fleeting compared to the reaction to Xi’s economic management. The economic risk boils down to the implementation of Xi’s structural reform agenda and his threshold for suffering political pain in pursuit of this agenda. For now the risk is fairly well contained, as the pandemic is still somewhat relevant, but going forward the tension between growth and reform will grow. Bottom Line: The hundredth birthday of the Communist Party is overrated but the twentieth National Party Congress in 2022 is of critical importance to the governance of China over the next ten years. These events will not prompt a major new dose of stimulus and they will not prevent a major reform push or crackdown on financial excesses. But as always in China there will still be an overriding emphasis on economic and social stability above all. For now, this is supportive of the new global business cycle, commodity prices, and emerging market equities. The Fourteenth Five-Year Plan (2021-25) The draft proposal of China’s fourteenth five-year plan (2021-25) will be ratified at the annual “two sessions” in March (Table 1). The key themes are familiar from previous five-year plans, which focused on China’s economic transition from “quantity” to “quality” in economic development. Table 1China’s 14th Five Year Plan China is seen as having entered the “high quality” phase of development – and the word quality is used 40 times in the draft. As with the past five years, the Xi administration is highlighting “supply-side structural reform” as a means of achieving this economic upgrade and promoting innovation. But Xi has shifted his rhetoric to highlight a new concept, “dual circulation,” which will now take center stage. Dual circulation marks a dramatic shift in Chinese policy: away from the “opening up and reform” of the liberal 1980s-2000s and toward a new era of import substitution and revanchism that will dominate the 2020s. Xi Jinping first brought it up in May 2020 and re-emphasized it at the July Politburo meeting and other meetings thereafter. It is essentially a “China First” policy that describes a development path in which the main economic activity occurs within the domestic market. Foreign trade and investment are there to improve this primary domestic activity. Dual circulation is better understood as a way of promoting import substitution, or self-reliance – themes that emerged after the Great Recession but became more explicit during the trade war with the US from 2018-20. The gist is to strengthen domestic demand and private consumption, improve domestic rather than foreign supply options, attract foreign investment, and build more infrastructure to remove internal bottlenecks and improve cross-regional activity (e.g. the Sichuan-Tibet railway, the national power grid, the navigation satellite system). China has greatly reduced its reliance on global trade already, though it is still fairly reliant when Hong Kong is included (Chart 6). The goals of the fourteenth five-year plan are also consistent with the “Made in China 2025” plan that aroused so much controversy with the Trump administration, leading China to de-emphasize it in official communications. Just like dual circulation, the 2025 plan was supposed to reduce China’s dependency on foreign technology and catapult China into the lead in areas like medical devices, supercomputers, robotics, electric vehicles, semiconductors, new materials, and other emerging technologies. This plan was only one of several state-led initiatives to boost indigenous innovation and domestic high-tech production. The response to American pressure was to drop the name but maintain the focus. Some of the initiatives will fall under new innovation and technology guidelines while others will fall under the category of “new types of infrastructure,” such as 5G networks, electric vehicles, big data centers, artificial intelligence operations, and ultra-high voltage electricity grids. With innovation and technology as the overarching goals, China is highly likely to increase research and development spending and aim for an overall level of above 3% of GDP (Chart 7). In previous five-year plans the government did not set a specific target. Nor did it set targets for the share of basic research spending within research and development, which is around 6% but is believed to need to be around 15%-20% to compete with the most innovative countries. While Beijing is already a leader in producing new patents, it will attempt to double its output while trying to lift the overall contribution of technology advancement to the economy. Chart 6China Seeks To Reduce Foreign Dependency Dual circulation will become a major priority affecting other areas of policy. Reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), for example, will take place under this rubric. The Xi administration has dabbled in SOE reform all along, for instance by injecting private capital to create mixed ownership, but progress has been debatable. Chart 7China Will Surge R&D Spending The new five-year plan will incorporate elements of an existing three-year action plan approved last June. The intention is to raise the competitiveness of China’s notoriously bloated SOEs, making them “market entities” that play a role in leading innovation and strengthening domestic supply chains. However, there is no question that SOEs will still be expected to serve an extra-economic function of supporting employment and social stability. So the reform is not really a broad liberalization and SOEs will continue to be a large sector dominated by the state and directed by the state, with difficulties relating to efficiency and competitiveness. Notwithstanding the focus on quality, China still aims to have GDP per capita reach $12,500 by 2025, implying 5%-5.5% annual growth from 2021-25, which is consistent with estimates of the International Monetary Fund (Chart 8). This kind of goal will require policy support at any given time to ensure that there is no major shortfall due to economic shocks like COVID-19. Thus any attempts at reform will be contained within the traditional context of a policy “floor” beneath growth rates – which itself is one of the biggest hindrances to deep reform. Chart 8China's Growth Target Through 2025 Chart 9Stimulus Correlates With Carbon Emissions As the economy’s potential growth slows the Communist Party has been shifting its focus to improving the quality of life, as opposed to the previous decades-long priority of meeting the basic material needs of the society. The new five-year plan aims to increase disposable income per capita as part of the transition to a domestic consumption-driven economy. The implied target will be 5%-5.5% growth per year, down from 6.5%+ previously, but the official commitment will be put in vague qualitative terms to allow for disappointments in the slower growing environment. The point is to expand the middle-income population and redistribute wealth more effectively, especially in the face of stark rural disparity. In addition the government aims to increase education levels, expand pension coverage, and, in the midst of the pandemic, increase public health investment and the number of doctors and hospital beds relative to the population. Beijing seems increasingly wary of too rapid of a shift away from manufacturing – which makes sense in light of the steep drop in the manufacturing share of employment amid China’s shift away from export-dependency. In the thirteenth five-year plan, Beijing aimed to increase the service sector share of GDP from 50.5% to 56%. But in the latest draft plan it sets no target for growing services. Any implicit goal of 60% would be soft rather than hard. Given that manufacturing and services combined make up 93% of the economy, there is not much room to grow services further unless policymakers want to allow even faster de-industrialization. But the social and political risks of rapid de-industrialization are well known – both from the liquidation of the SOEs in the late 1990s and from the populist eruptions in the UK and US more recently. Beijing is likely to want to take a pause in shifting away from manufacturing. But this means that China’s exporting of deflation and large market share will persist and hence foreign protectionist sentiment will continue to grow. The fourteenth five-year plan ostensibly maintains the same ambitious targets for environmental improvement as in its predecessor, in terms of water and energy consumption, carbon emissions, pollution levels, renewable energy quotas, and quotas for arable land and forest coverage. But in reality some of these targets are likely to be set higher as Beijing has intensified its green policy agenda and is now aiming to hit peak carbon emissions by 2030. China aims to be a “net zero” carbon country by 2060. Doubling down on the shift away from fossil fuels will require an extraordinary policy push, given that China is still a heavily industrial economy and predominantly reliant on coal power. So environmental policy will be a critical area to watch when the final five-year plan is approved in March, as well as in future plans for the 2026-30 period. As was witnessed in recent years, ambitious environmental goals will be suspended when the economy slumps, which means that achieving carbon emissions goals will not be straightforward (Chart 9), but it is nevertheless a powerful economic policy theme and investment theme. Xi Jinping’s Vision: 2035 On The Way To 2049 At the nineteenth National Party Congress, the critical leadership rotation in 2017, Xi Jinping made it clear that he would stay in power beyond 2022 – eschewing the nascent attempt of his predecessors to set up a ten-year term limit – and establish 2035 as a midway point leading to the 2049 anniversary of the People’s Republic. There are strategic and political goals relevant to this 2035 vision – including speculation that it could be Xi’s target for succession or for reunification with Taiwan – but the most explicit goals are, as usual, economic. Chart 10Xi Jinping’s 2035 Goals Officially China is committing to descriptive rather than numerical targets. GDP per capita is to reach the level of “moderately developed countries.” However, in a separate explanation statement, Xi Jinping declares, “it is completely possible for China to double its total economy or per capita income by 2035.” In other words, China’s GDP is supposed to reach 200 trillion renminbi, while GDP per capita should surpass $20,000 by 2035, implying an annual growth rate of at least 4.73% (Chart 10). There is little reason to believe that Beijing will succeed as much in meeting future targets as it has in the past. In the past China faced steady final demand from the United States and the West and its task was to bring a known quantity of basic factors of production into operation, after lying underutilized for decades, which made for high growth rates and fairly predictable outcomes. In the future the sources of demand are not as reliable and China’s ability to grow will be more dependent on productivity enhancements and innovation that cannot be as easily created or predicted. The fourteenth five-year plan and Xi’s 2035 vision will attempt to tackle this productivity challenge head on. But restructuring and reform will advance intermittently, as Xi is unquestionably maintaining his predecessors’ commitment to stability above all. Outlook 2021: Back To The Tug Of War Of Stimulus And Reform The tug of war between economic stimulus and reform is on full display already in 2021 and will become by far the most important investment theme this year. If China tightens monetary and fiscal policy excessively in 2021, in the name of reform, it will undermine its own and the global economic recovery, dealing a huge negative surprise to the consensus in global financial markets that 2021 will be a year of strong growth, rebounding trade, a falling US dollar, and ebullient commodity prices. Our view is that Chinese policy tightening is a significant risk this year – it is not overrated – but that the government will ultimately ease policy as necessary and avoid what would be a colossal policy mistake of undercutting the economic recovery. We articulated this view late last year and have already seen it confirmed both in the Politburo’s conclusions at the annual economic meeting in December, and in the reemergence of COVID-19, which will delay further policy tightening for the time being. The pattern of the Xi administration thus far is to push forward domestic reforms until they run up against the limits of economic stability, and then to moderate and ease policy for the sake of recovery, before reinitiating the attack. Two key developments initially encouraged Xi to push forward with a new “assault phase of reform” in 2021: First, a new global business cycle is beginning, fueled by massive monetary and fiscal stimulus across the world (not only in China), which enables Xi to take actions that would drag on growth. Second, Xi Jinping has emerged from the US trade war stronger than ever at home. President Trump lost the election, giving warning to any future US president who would confront China with a frontal assault. The Biden administration’s priority is economic recovery, for the sake of the Democratic Party’s future as well as for the nation, and this limits Biden’s ability to escalate the confrontation with China, even though he will not revoke most of Trump’s actions. Biden’s predicament gives Beijing a window to pursue difficult domestic initiatives before the Biden administration is capable of turning its full attention to the strategic confrontation with China. The fact that Biden seeks to build a coalition of states first, and thus must spend a great deal of time on diplomacy with Europe and other allies, is another advantageous circumstance. China is courting and strengthening relations with Europe and those very allies so as to delay the formation of any effective coalition (Chart 11). Chart 11China Courts EU As Substitute For US Thus, prior to the latest COVID-19 spike, Beijing was clearly moving to tighten monetary and fiscal policy and avoid a longer stimulus overshoot that would heighten the country’s long-term financial risks and debt woes. This policy preference will continue to be a risk in 2021: Central government spending down: Emergency fiscal spending to deal with the pandemic will be reduced from 2020 levels and the budget deficit will be reined in. The Politburo’s chief economic planning event, the Central Economic Work Conference in December, resulted in a decision to maintain fiscal support but to a lesser degree. Fiscal policy will be “effective and sustainable,” i.e. still proactive but lower in magnitude (Chart 12). Local government spending down: The central government will try to tighten control of local government bond issuance. The issuance of new bonds will fall closer to 2019 levels after a 55% increase in 2020. New bonds provide funds for infrastructure and investment projects meant to soak up idle labor and boost aggregate demand. A cut back in these projects and new bonds will drag on the economy relative to last year (Chart 13). Chart 12China Pares Government Spending On The Margin Chart 13China Pares Local Government Spending Too Monetary policy tightening up: The People’s Bank of China aims to maintain a “prudent monetary policy” that is stable and targeted in 2021. The intention is to avoid any sharp change in policy. However, PBoC Governor Yi Gang admits that there will be some “reasonable adjustments” to monetary policy so that the growth of broad money (M2) and total social financing (total private credit) do not wildly exceed nominal GDP growth (which should be around 8%-10% in 2021). The risk is that excessive easiness in the current context will create asset bubbles. The implication is that credit growth will slow to 11%-12%. This is not slamming on the brakes but it is a tightening of credit policy. Macro-prudential regulation up: The People’s Bank is reasserting its intention to implement the new Macro-Prudential Assessment (MPA) framework designed to tackle systemic financial risk. The rollout of this reform paused last year due to the pandemic. A detailed plan of how the country’s various major financial institutions will adopt this new mechanism is expected in March. The implication is that Beijing is turning its attention back to mitigating systemic financial risks. This includes closer supervision of bank capital adequacy ratios and cross-border financing flows. New macro-prudential tools are also targeting real estate investment and potentially other areas. Larger established banks will have a greater allowance for property loans than smaller, riskier banks. At the same time, it is equally clear that Beijing will try to avoid over-tightening policy: The COVID outbreak discourages tightening: This outbreak has already been mentioned and will pressure leaders to pause further policy tightening at least until they have greater confidence in containment. The vaccine rollout process also discourages economic activity at first since nobody wants to go out and contract the disease when a cure is in sight. Local government financial support is still robust: Local governments will still need to issue refinancing bonds to deal with the mountain of debt coming into maturity and reduce the risk of widespread insolvency. In 2020, they issued more than 1.8 trillion yuan of refinancing bonds to cover about 88% of the 2 trillion in bonds coming due. In 2021, they will have to issue about 2.2 trillion of refinancing bonds to maintain the same refinancing rate for a larger 2.6 trillion yuan in bonds coming due (Table 2). Thus while Beijing is paring back its issuance of new bonds to fund new investment projects, it will maintain a high level of refinancing bonds to prevent insolvency from cascading and undermining the recovery. Table 2Local Government Debt Maturity Schedule Monetary policy will not be too tight: The People’s Bank’s open market operations in January so far suggest that it is starting to fine-tune its policies but that it is doing so in an exceedingly measured way so as not to create a liquidity squeeze around the traditionally tight-money period of Chinese New Year. The seven-day repo rate, the de facto policy interest rate, has already rolled over from last year’s peak. The takeaway is that while Beijing clearly intended to cut back on emergency monetary and fiscal support this year – and while Xi Jinping is clearly willing to impose greater discipline on the economy and financial system prior to the big political events of 2021-22 – nevertheless the lingering pandemic and fragile global environment will ensure a relatively accommodative policy for the first half of 2021 in order to secure the economic recovery. The underlying risk of policy tightening is still significant, especially in the second half of 2021 and in 2022, due to the underlying policy setting. Investment Takeaways The CNY-USD has experienced a tremendous rally in the wake of the US-China phase one trade deal last year and Beijing’s rapid bounce-back from the pandemic. The trade weighted renminbi is now trading just about at fair value (Chart 14). We closed our CNY-USD short recommendation and would stand aside for now. China’s current account surplus is still robust, real reform requires a fairly strong yuan, and the Biden administration will also expect China not to depreciate the currency competitively. Thus while we anticipate the CNY-USD to suffer a surprise setback when the market realizes that the US and China will continue to clash despite the end of the Trump administration, nevertheless we are no longer outright short the currency. Chinese investable stocks have rallied furiously on the stimulus last year as well as robust foreign portfolio inflows. The rally is likely overstretched at the moment as the COVID outbreak and policy uncertainties come to the fore. This is also true for Chinese stocks other than the high-flying technology, media, and telecom stocks (Chart 15). Domestic A-shares have rallied on the back of Alibaba executive Jack Ma’s reappearance even though the clear implication is that in the new era, the Communist Party will crack down on entrepreneurs – and companies like fintech firm Ant Group – that accumulate too much power (Chart 16). Chart 14Renminbi Fairly Valued Chart 15China: Investable Stocks Overbought Chart 16Communist Party, Jack Ma's Boss Chart 17Go Long Chinese Government Bonds Chinese government bond yields are back near their pre-COVID highs (though not their pre-trade war highs). Given the negative near-term backdrop – and the longer term challenges of restructuring and geopolitical risks over Taiwan and other issues that we expect to revive – these bonds present an attractive investment (Chart 17). Housekeeping: In addition to going long Chinese 10-year government bonds on a strategic time frame, we are closing our long Mexican industrials versus EM trade for a loss of 9.1%. We are still bullish on the Mexican peso and macro/policy backdrop but this trade was premature. We are also closing our long S&P health care tactical hedge for a loss of 1.8%. Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Yushu Ma Research Associate yushu.ma@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Indeed the 2022 political reshuffle has already begun with several recent appointments of provincial Communist Party secretaries.

Highlights Markets largely ignored the uproar at the US Capitol on January 6 because the transfer of power was not in question. Democratic control over the Senate, after two upsets in the Georgia runoff, is the bigger signal. US fiscal policy will become more expansive yet the Federal Reserve will not start hiking rates anytime soon. This is a powerful tailwind for risk assets over the short and medium run. Politics and geopolitics affect markets through the policy setting, rather than through discrete events, which tend to have fleeting market impacts. The current setting, in the US and abroad, is negative for the US dollar. The implication is positive for emerging market stocks and value plays. Go long global stocks ex-US, long emerging markets over developed markets, and long value over growth. Cut losses on short CNY-USD. Feature Chart 1Market's Muted Response To US Turmoil Scenes of mayhem unfolded in the US Capitol on January 6 as protesters and rioters flooded the building and temporarily interrupted the joint session of Congress convened to count the Electoral College votes. Congress reconvened later and finished the tally. President-elect Joe Biden will take office at noon on January 20. Financial markets were unperturbed, with stocks up and volatility down, though safe havens did perk up a bit (Chart 1). The incident supports our thesis that the US election cycle of 2020 was a sort of “Civil War Lite” and that the country is witnessing “Peak Polarization,” with polarization likely to fall over the coming five years. The incident was the culmination of the past year of pandemic-fueled unrest and President Trump’s refusal to concede to the Electoral College verdict. Trump made a show of force by rallying his supporters, and apparently refrained from cracking down on those that overran Congress, but then he backed down and promised an orderly transfer of power. The immediate political result was to isolate him. Fewer Republicans than expected contested the electoral votes in the ensuing joint session; one Republican is openly calling for Trump to be forced into resignation via the 25th amendment procedure for those unfit to serve. The electoral votes were promptly certified. Vice President Mike Pence and other actors performed their constitutional duties. Pence reportedly gave the order to bring out the National Guard to restore order – hence it is possible that Pence and Trump’s cabinet could activate the 25th amendment, but that is unlikely unless Trump foments rebellion going forward. Vandals and criminals will be prosecuted and there could also be legal ramifications for Trump and some government officials. Do Politics And Geopolitics Affect Markets? The market’s lack of concern raises the question of whether investors need trouble themselves with politics at all. Philosopher and market guru Nassim Nicholas Taleb tweeted the following: If someone, a year ago, described January 6, 2021 (and events attending it) & asked you to guess the stock market behavior, admit you would have gotten it wrong. Just so you understand that news do not help you understand markets.1 This is a valid point. Investors should not (and do not) invest based on the daily news. Of course, many observers foresaw social unrest surrounding the 2020 election, including Professor Peter Turchin.2 Social instability was rising in the data, as we have long shown. When you combined this likelihood with the Fed’s pause on rate hikes, and a measurable rise in geopolitical tensions between the US and other countries, the implication was that gold would appreciate. So if someone had told you a year ago that the US would have a pandemic, that governments would unleash a 10.2% of global GDP fiscal stimulus, that the Fed would start average inflation targeting, that a vaccine would be produced, and that the US would have a contested election on top of it all, would you have expected gold to rise? Absolutely – and it has done so, both in keeping with the fall in real interest rates plus some safe-haven bonus, which is observable (Chart 2). Chart 2Gold Price In Excess Of Fall In Real Rates Implies Geopolitical Risk The takeaway is that policy matters for markets while politics may only matter briefly at best. Which brings us back to the implications of the Trump rebellion. What Will Be The Impact Of The Trump Rebellion? We have highlighted that this election was a controversial rather than contested election – meaning that the outcome was not in question after late November when the court cases, vote counts, and recounts were certified. This was doubly true after the Electoral College voted on December 14. The protests and riots yesterday never seriously called this result into question. Whatever Trump’s intentions, there was no military coup or imposition of martial law, as some observers feared. In fact the scandal arose from the President’s hesitation to call out the National Guard rather than his use of security forces to prevent the transfer of power, as occurs during a coup. This partially explains why the market traded on the contested election in December 2000 but not in 2020 – the result was largely settled. The Biden administration now has more political capital than otherwise, which is market-positive because it implies more proactive fiscal policy to support the economic recovery. Trump’s refusal to concede gave Democrats both seats in the Georgia Senate runoffs, yielding control of Congress. Household and business sentiment will revive with the vaccine distribution and economic recovery, while the passage of larger fiscal stimulus is highly probable. US fiscal policy will almost certainly avoid the mistake of tightening fiscal policy too soon. Taken with the Fed’s aversion to raising rates, greater fiscal stimulus will create a powerful tailwind for risk assets over the next 12 months. The primary consequence of combined fiscal and monetary dovishness is a falling dollar. The greenback is a counter-cyclical and momentum-driven currency that broadly responds inversely to global growth trends. But policy decisions are clearly legible in the global growth path and the dollar’s path over the past two decades. Japanese and European QE, Chinese devaluation, the global oil crash, Trump’s tax cuts, the US-China trade war, and COVID-19 lockdowns all drove the dollar to fresh highs – all policy decisions (Chart 3). Policy decisions also ensured the euro’s survival, marking the dollar’s bottom against the euro in 2011, and ensuring that the euro could take over from the dollar once the dollar became overbought. Today, the US’s stimulus response to COVID-19 – combined with the Fed’s strategic review and the Democratic sweep of government – marked the peak and continued drop-off in the dollar. Chart 3Euro Survival, US Peak Polarization, Set Stage For Rotation From USD To EUR Chart 4China's Yuan Says Geopolitics Matters The Chinese renminbi is heavily manipulated by the People’s Bank and is not freely exchangeable. The massive stimulus cycle that began in 2015, in reaction to financial turmoil, combined with the central bank’s decision to defend the currency marked a bottom in the yuan’s path. China’s draconian response to the pandemic this year, and massive stimulus, made China the only major country to contribute positively to global growth in 2020 and ensured a surge in the currency. The combination of US and Chinese policy decisions has clearly favored the renminbi more than would be the case from the general economic backdrop (Chart 4). Getting the policy setting right is necessary for investors. This is true even though discrete political events – including major political and geopolitical crises – have fleeting impacts on markets. What About Biden’s Trade Policy? Trump was never going to control monetary or fiscal policy – that was up to the Fed and Congress. His impact lay mostly in trade and foreign policy. Specifically his defeat reduces the risk of sweeping unilateral tariffs. It makes sense that global economic policy uncertainty has plummeted, especially relative to the United States (Chart 5). If US policy facilitates a global economic and trade recovery, then it also makes sense that global equities would rise faster than American equities, which benefited from the previous period of a strong dollar and erratic or aggressive US fiscal and trade policy. Trump’s last 14 days could see a few executive orders that rattle stocks. There is a very near-term downside risk to European and especially Chinese stocks from punitive measures, or to Emirati stocks in the event of another military exchange with Iran (Chart 6). But Trump will be disobeyed if he orders any highly disruptive actions, especially if they contravene national interests. Beyond Trump’s term we are constructive on all these bourses, though we expect politics and geopolitics to remain a headwind for Chinese equities. Chart 5Big Drop In Global Policy Uncertainty US tensions with China will escalate again soon – and in a way that negatively impacts US and Chinese companies exposed to each other. Chart 6Geopolitical Implications Of Biden's Election The cold war between these two is an unavoidable geopolitical trend as China threatens to surpass the US in economic size and improves its technological prowess. Presidents Xi and Trump were merely catalysts. But there are two policy trends that will override this rivalry for at least the first half of the year. First, global trade is recovering– as shown here by the Shanghai freight index and South Korean exports and equity prices (Chart 7). The global recovery will boost Korean stocks but geopolitical tensions will continue to brood over more expensive Taiwanese stocks due to the US-China conflict. This has motivated our longstanding long Korea / short Taiwan recommendation. Chart 7Global Economy Speaks Louder Than North Korea Chart 8China Wary Of Over-Tightening Policy Chart 9Global Stock-Bond Ratio Registers Good News Second, China’s 2020 stimulus will have lingering effects and it is wary of over-tightening monetary and fiscal policy, lest it undo its domestic economic recovery. The tenor of China’s Central Economic Work Conference in December has reinforced this view. Chart 8 illustrates the expectations of our China Investment Strategy regarding China’s credit growth and local government bond issuance. They suggest that there will not be a sharp withdrawal of fiscal or quasi-fiscal support in 2021. Stability is especially important in the lead up to the critical leadership rotation in 2022.3 This policy backdrop will be positive for global/EM equities despite the political crackdown on General Secretary Xi Jinping’s opponents will occur despite this supportive policy backdrop. The global stock-to-bond ratio has surged in clear recognition of these positive policy trends (Chart 9). Government bonds were deeply overbought and it will take several years before central banks begin tightening policy. What About Biden’s Foreign Policy? Chart 10OPEC 2.0 Cartel Continues (For Now) Iran poses a genuine geopolitical risk this year – first in the form of an oil supply risk, should conflict emerge in the Persian Gulf, Iraq, or elsewhere in the region. This would inject a risk premium into the oil price. Later the risk is the opposite as a deal with the Biden administration would create the prospect for Iran to attract foreign investment and begin pumping oil, while putting pressure on the OPEC 2.0 coalition to abandon its current, tentative, production discipline in pursuit of market share (Chart 10). Biden has the executive authority to restore the 2015 nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action). He is in favor of doing so in order to (1) prevent the Middle East from generating a crisis that consumes his foreign policy; (2) execute an American grand strategy of reviving its Asia Pacific influence; (3) cement the Obama administration’s legacy. The Iranian President Hassan Rouhani also has a clear interest in returning to the deal before the country’s presidential election in June. This would salvage his legacy and support his “reformist” faction. The Supreme Leader also has a chance to pin the negative aspects of the deal on a lame duck president while benefiting from it economically as he prepares for his all-important succession. The problem is that extreme levels of distrust will require some brinkmanship early in Biden’s term. Iran is building up leverage ahead of negotiations, which will mean higher levels of uranium enrichment and demonstrating the range of its regional capabilities, including the Strait of Hormuz, and its ability to impose economic pain via oil prices. Biden will need to establish a credible threat if Iran misbehaves. Hence the geopolitical setting is positive for oil prices at the moment. Beyond Iran, there is a clear basis for policy uncertainty to decline for Europe and the UK while it remains elevated for China and Russia (Chart 11). Chart 11Relative Policy Uncertainty Favors Europe and UK Over Russia And China The US international image has suffered from the Trump era and the Biden administration’s main priorities will lie in solidifying alliances and partnerships and stabilizing the US role in the world, rather than pursuing showdown and confrontation. However, it will not be long before scrutiny returns to the authoritarian states, which have been able to focus on domestic recovery and expanding their spheres of influence amid the US’s tumultuous election year. Chart 12GeoRisk Indicators Say Risks Underrated For These Bourses The US will not seek a “diplomatic reset” with Russia, aside from renegotiating the New START treaty. The Democrats will seek to retaliate for Russia’s extensive cyberattack in 2021 as well as for election interference and psychological warfare in the United States. And while there probably will be a reset with China, it will be short-lived, as outlined above. This situation contrasts with that of the Atlantic sphere. The Biden administration is a crystal clear positive, relative to a second Trump term, for the European Union. The EU and the UK have just agreed to a trade deal, as expected, to conclude the Brexit process, which means that the US-UK “special relationship” will not be marred by disagreements over Ireland. European solidarity has also strengthened as a result of the pandemic, which highlighted the need for collective policy responses, including fiscal. Thus the geopolitical risks of the new administration are most relevant for China/Taiwan and Russia. Comparing our GeoRisk Indicators, which are market-based, with the relative equity performance of these bourses, Taiwanese stocks are the most vulnerable because markets are increasingly pricing the geopolitical risk yet the relative stock performance is toppy (Chart 12). The limited recovery in Russian equities is also at risk for the same reason. Only in China’s case has the market priced lower geopolitical risk, not least because of the positive change in US administration. We expect Biden and Xi Jinping to be friendly at first but for strategic distrust to reemerge by the second half of the year. This will be a rude awakening for Chinese stocks – or China-exposed US stocks, especially in the tech sector. Investment Takeaways Chart 13Global Policy Shifts Drive Big Investment Reversals The US is politically divided. Civil unrest and aftershocks of the controversial election will persist but markets will ignore it unless it has a systemic impact. The policy consequence is a more proactive fiscal policy, resulting in virtual fiscal-monetary coordination that is positive both for global demand and risk assets, while negative for the US dollar. The Biden administration will succeed in partially repealing the Trump tax cuts, but the impact on corporate profit margins will be discounted fairly mechanically and quickly by market participants, while the impact on economic growth will be more than offset by huge new spending. Sentiment will improve after the pandemic – and Biden has not yet shown an inclination to take an anti-business tone. The past decade has been marked by a dollar bull market and the outperformance of developed markets over emerging markets and growth stocks like technology over value stocks like financials. Cyclical sectors have traded in a range. Going forward, a secular rise in geopolitical Great Power competition is likely to persist but the macro backdrop has shifted with the decline of the dollar. Cyclical sectors are now poised to outperform while a bottom is forming in value stocks and emerging markets (Chart 13). We recommend investors go strategically long emerging markets relative to developed. We are also going long global value over growth stocks. We are not yet ready to close our gold trade given that the two supports, populist fiscal turn and great power struggle, will continue to be priced by markets in the near term. We are throwing in the towel on our short CNY-USD trade after the latest upleg in the renminbi, though our view continues to be that geopolitical fundamentals will catch yuan investors by surprise when they reassert themselves. We also recommend preferring global equities to US equities, given the above-mentioned global trends plus looming tax hikes.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 January 6, 2020, twitter.com. 2 See Turchin and Andrey Korotayev, "The 2010 Structural-Demographic Forecast for the 2010-2020 Decade: A Retrospective Assessment," PLoS ONE 15:8 (2020), journals.plos.org. 3 Not to mention that 2021 is the Communist Party’s 100th anniversary – not a time to make an unforced policy error with an already wobbly economy.

Highlights With a vaccine already rolling out in the UK and soon in the US, investors have reason to be optimistic about next year. Government bond yields are rising, cyclical equities are outperforming defensives, international stocks hinting at outperforming American, and value stocks are starting to beat growth stocks (Chart 1). Feature President Trump’s defeat in the US election also reduces the risk of a global trade war, or a real war with Iran. European, Chinese, and Emirati stocks have rallied since the election, at least partly due to the reduction in these risks (Chart 2). However, geopolitical risk and global policy uncertainty have been rising on a secular, not just cyclical, basis (Chart 3). Geopolitical tensions have escalated with each crisis since the financial meltdown of 2008. Chart 1A New Global Business Cycle Chart 2Biden: No Trade War Or War With Iran? Chart 3Geopolitical Risk And Global Policy Uncertainty Chart 4The Decline Of The Liberal Democracies? Trump was a symptom, not a cause, of what ails the world. The cause is the relative decline of the liberal democracies in political, economic, and military strength relative to that of other global players (Chart 4). This relative decline has emboldened Chinese and Russian challenges to the US-led global order, as well as aggressive and unpredictable moves by middle and small powers. Moreover the aftershocks of the pandemic and recession will create social and political instability in various parts of the world, particularly emerging markets (Chart 5). Chart 5EM Troubles Await Chart 6Global Arms Build-Up Continues   We are bullish on risk assets next year, but our view is driven largely from the birth of a new economic cycle, not from geopolitics. Geopolitical risk is rapidly becoming underrated, judging by the steep drop-off in measured risk. There is no going back to a pre-Trump, pre-Xi Jinping, pre-2008, pre-Putin, pre-9/11, pre-historical golden age in which nations were enlightened, benign, and focused exclusively on peace and prosperity. Hard data, such as military spending, show the world moving in the opposite direction (Chart 6). So while stock markets will grind higher next year, investors should not expect that Biden and the vaccine truly portend a “return to normalcy.” Key View #1: China’s Communist Party Turns 100, With Rising Headwinds Investors should ignore the hype about the Chinese Communist Party’s one hundredth birthday in 2021. Since 1997, the Chinese leadership has laid great emphasis on this “first centenary” as an occasion by which China should become a moderately prosperous society. This has been achieved. China is deep into a structural economic transition that holds out a much more difficult economic, social, and political future. Chart 7China: Less Money, More Problems The big day, July 1, will be celebrated with a speech by General Secretary Xi Jinping in which he reiterates the development goals of the five-year plan. This plan – which doubles down on import substitution and the aggressive tech acquisition campaign – will be finalized in March, along with Xi’s yet-to-be released vision for 2035, which marks the halfway point to the “second centenary,” 2049, the hundredth birthday of the regime. Xi’s 2035 goals may contain some surprises but the Communist Party’s policy frameworks should be seen as “best laid plans” that are likely to be overturned by economic and geopolitical realities. It was easier for the country to meet its political development targets during the period of rapid industrialization from 1979-2008. Now China is deep into a structural economic transition that holds out a much more difficult economic, social, and political future. Potential growth is slowing with the graying of society and the country is making a frantic dash, primarily through technology acquisition, to boost productivity and keep from falling into the “middle income trap” (Chart 7). Total debt levels have surged as Beijing attempts to make this transition smoothly, without upsetting social stability. Households and the government are taking on a greater debt load to maintain aggregate demand while the government tries to force the corporate sector to deleverage in fits and starts (Chart 8). The deleveraging process is painful and coincides with a structural transition away from export-led manufacturing. Beijing likely believes it has already led de-industrialization proceed too quickly, given the huge long-term political risks of this process, as witnessed in the US and UK. The fourteenth five-year plan hints that the authorities will give manufacturing a reprieve from structural reform efforts (Chart 9). Chart 8China Struggles To Dismount Debt Bubble Chart 9China Will Slow De-Industrialization, Stoking Protectionism Chart 10China Already Reining In Stimulus A premature resumption of deleveraging heightens domestic economic risks. The trade war and then the pandemic forced the Xi administration to abandon its structural reform plans temporarily and drastically ease monetary, fiscal, and credit policy to prevent a recession. Almost immediately the danger of asset bubbles reared its head again. Because the regime is focused on containing systemic financial risk, it has already begun tightening monetary policy as the nation heads into 2021 – even though the rest of the world has not fully recovered from the pandemic (Chart 10). The risk of over-tightening is likely to be contained, since Beijing has no interest in undermining its own recovery. But the risk is understated in financial markets at the moment and, combined with American fiscal risks due to gridlock, this familiar Chinese policy tug-of-war poses a clear risk to the global recovery and emerging market assets next year. Far more important than the first centenary, or even General Secretary Xi’s 2035 vision, is the impending leadership rotation in 2022. Xi was originally supposed to step down at this time – instead he is likely to take on the title of party chairman, like Mao, and aims to stay in power till 2035 or thereabouts. He will consolidate power once again through a range of crackdowns – on political rivals and corruption, on high-flying tech and financial companies, on outdated high-polluting industries, and on ideological dissenters. Beijing must have a stable economy going into its five-year national party congresses, and 2022 is no different. But that goal has largely been achieved through this year’s massive stimulus and the discovery of a global vaccine. In a risk-on environment, the need for economic stability poses a downside risk for financial assets since it implies macro-prudential actions to curb bubbles. The 2017 party congress revealed that Xi sees policy tightening as a key part of his policy agenda and power consolidation. In short, the critical twentieth congress in 2022 offers no promise of plentiful monetary and credit stimulus (Chart 11). All investors can count on is the minimum required for stability. This is positive for emerging markets at the moment, but less so as the lagged effects of this year’s stimulus dissipate. Chart 11No Promise Of Major New Stimulus For Party Congress 2022 Not only will Chinese domestic policy uncertainty remain underestimated, but geopolitical risk will also do so. Superficially, Beijing had a banner year in 2020. It handled the coronavirus better than other countries, especially the US, thus advertising Xi Jinping’s centralized and statist governance model. President Trump lost the election. Regardless of why Trump lost, his trade war precipitated a manufacturing slowdown that hit the Rust Belt in 2019, before the virus, and his loss will warn future presidents against assaulting China’s economy head-on, at least in their first term. All of this is worth gold in Chinese domestic politics. Chart 12China’s Image Suffered In Spite Of Trump Internationally, however, China’s image has collapsed – and this is in spite of Trump’s erratic and belligerent behavior, which alienated most of the world and the US’s allies (Chart 12). Moreover, despite being the origin of COVID-19, China’s is one of the few economies that thrived this year. Its global manufacturing share rose. While delaying and denying transparency regarding the virus, China accused other countries of originating the virus, and unleashed a virulent “wolf warrior” diplomacy, a military standoff with India, and a trade war with Australia. The rest of Asia will be increasingly willing to take calculated risks to counterbalance China’s growing regional clout, and international protectionist headwinds will persist. The United States will play a leading part in this process. Sino-American strategic tensions have grown relentlessly for more than a decade, especially since Xi Jinping rose to power, as is evident from Chinese treasury holdings (Chart 13). The Biden administration will naturally seek a diplomatic “reset” and a new strategic and economic dialogue with China. But Biden has already indicated that he intends to insist on China’s commitments under Trump’s “phase one” trade deal. He says he will keep Trump’s sweeping Section 301 tariffs in place, presumably until China demonstrates improvement on the intellectual property and tech transfer practices that provided the rationale for the tariffs. Biden’s victory in the Rust Belt ensures that he cannot revert to the pre-Trump status quo. Indeed Biden amplifies the US strategic challenge to China’s rise because he is much more likely to assemble a “grand alliance” or “coalition of the willing” focused on constraining China’s illiberal and mercantilist policies. Even the combined economic might of a western coalition is not enough to force China to abandon its statist development model, but it would make negotiations more likely to be successful on the West’s more limited and transactional demands (Chart 14). Chart 13The US-China Divorce Pre-Dates And Post-Dates Trump Chart 14Biden's Grand Alliance A Danger To China The Taiwan Strait is ground zero for US-China geopolitical tensions. The US is reviving its right to arm Taiwan for the sake of its self-defense, but the US commitment is questionable at best – and it is this very uncertainty that makes a miscalculation more likely and hence conflict a major tail risk (Chart 15). True, Beijing has enormous economic leverage over Taiwan, and it is fresh off a triumph of imposing its will over Hong Kong, which vindicates playing the long game rather than taking any preemptive military actions that could prove disastrous. Nevertheless, Xi Jinping’s reassertion of Beijing and communism is driving Taiwanese popular opinion away from the mainland, resulting in a polarizing dynamic that will be extremely difficult to bridge (Chart 16). If China comes to believe that the Biden administration is pursuing a technological blockade just as rapidly and resolutely as the Trump administration, then it could conclude that Taiwan should be brought to heel sooner rather than later. Chart 15US Boosts Arms Sales To Taiwan Chart 16Taiwan Strait Risk Will Explode If Biden Seeks Tech Blockade Bottom Line: On a secular basis, China faces rising domestic economic risks and rising geopolitical risk. Given the rally in Chinese currency and equities in 2021, the downside risk is greater than the upside risk of any fleeting “diplomatic reset” with the United States. Emerging markets will benefit from China’s stimulus this year but will suffer from its policy tightening over time. Key View #2: The US “Pivot To Asia” Is Back On … And Runs Through Iran Most likely President-elect Biden will face gridlock at home. His domestic agenda largely frustrated, he will focus on foreign policy. Given his old age, he may also be a one-term president, which reinforces the need to focus on the achievable. He will aim to restore the Obama administration’s foreign policy, the chief features of which were the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran and the “Pivot to Asia.” The US is limited by the need to pivot to Asia, while Iran is limited by the risk of regime failure. A deal should be agreed. The purpose of the Iranian deal was to limit Iran’s nuclear and regional ambitions, stabilize Iraq, create a semblance of regional balance, and thus enable American military withdrawal. The US could have simply abandoned the region, but Iran’s ensuing supremacy would have destabilized the region and quickly sucked the US back in. The newly energy independent US needed a durable deal. Then it could turn its attention to Asia Pacific, where it needed to rebuild its strategic influence in the face of a challenger that made Iran look like a joke (Chart 17). Chart 17The "Pivot To Asia" In A Nutshell It is possible for Biden to revive the Iranian deal, given that the other five members of the agreement have kept it afloat during the Trump years. Moreover, since it was always an executive deal that lacked Senate approval, Biden can rejoin unilaterally. However, the deal largely expires in 2025 – and the Trump administration accurately criticized the deal’s failure to contain Iran’s missile development and regional ambitions. Therefore Biden is proposing a renegotiation. This could lead to an even greater US-Iran engagement, but it is not clear that a robust new deal is feasible. Iran can also recommit to the old deal, having taken only incremental steps to violate the deal after the US’s departure – manifestly as leverage for future negotiations. Of course, the Iranians are not likely to give up their nuclear program in the long run, as nuclear weapons are the golden ticket to regime survival. Libya gave up its nuclear program and was toppled by NATO; North Korea developed its program into deliverable nuclear weapons and saw an increase in stature. Iran will continue to maintain a nuclear program that someday could be weaponized. Nevertheless, Tehran will be inclined to deal with Biden. President Hassan Rouhani is a lame duck, his legacy in tatters due to Trump, but his final act in office could be to salvage his legacy (and his faction’s hopes) by overseeing a return to the agreement prior to Iran’s presidential election in June. From Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s point of view, this would be beneficial. He also needs to secure his legacy, but as he tries to lay the groundwork for his power succession, Iran faces economic collapse, widespread social unrest, and a potentially explosive division between the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and the more pragmatic political faction hoping for economic opening and reform. Iran needs a reprieve from US maximum pressure, so Khamenei will ultimately rejoin a limited nuclear agreement if it enables the regime to live to fight another day. In short, the US is limited by the need to pivot to Asia, while Iran is limited by the risk of regime failure. A deal should be agreed. But this is precisely why conflict could erupt in 2021. First, either in Trump’s final days in office or in the early days of the Biden administration, Israel could take military action – as it has likely done several times this year already – to set back the Iranian nuclear program and try to reinforce its own long-term security. Second, the Biden administration could decide to utilize the immense leverage that President Trump has bequeathed, resulting in a surprisingly confrontational stance that would push Iran to the brink. This is unlikely but it may be necessary due to the following point. Third, China and Russia could refuse to cooperate with the US, eliminating the prospect of a robust renegotiation of the deal, and forcing Biden to choose between accepting the shabby old deal or adopting something similar to Trump’s maximum pressure. China will probably cooperate; Russia is far less certain. Beijing knows that the US intention in Iran is to free up strategic resources to revive the US position in Asia, but it has offered limited cooperation on Iran and North Korea because it does not have an interest in their acquiring nuclear weapons and it needs to mitigate US hostility. Biden has a much stronger political mandate to confront China than he does to confront Iran. Assuming that the Israelis and Saudis can no more prevent Biden’s détente with Iran than they could Obama’s, the next question will be whether Biden effectively shifts from a restored Iranian deal to shoring up these allies and partners. He can possibly build on the Abraham Accords negotiated by the Trump administration smooth Israeli ties with the Arab world. The Middle East could conceivably see a semblance of balance. But not in 2021. The coming year will be the rocky transition phase in which the US-Iran détente succeeds or fails. Chart 18Oil Market Share War Preceded The Last US-Iran Deal Chart 19Still, Base Case Is For Rising Oil Prices Chart 20Biden Needs A Credible Threat The lead-up to the 2015 Iranian deal saw a huge collapse in global oil prices due to a market share war with Saudi Arabia, Russia, and the US triggered by US shale production and Iranian sanctions relief (Chart 18). This was despite rising global demand and the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq. In 2021, global demand will also be reviving and Iraq, though not in the midst of full-scale war, is still unstable. OPEC 2.0 could buckle once again, though Moscow and Riyadh already confirmed this year that they understand the devastating consequences of not cooperating on production discipline. Our Commodity and Energy Strategy projects that the cartel will continue to operate, thus drawing down inventories (Chart 19). The US and/or Israel will have to establish a credible military threat to ensure that Iran is in check, and that will create fireworks and geopolitical risks first before it produces any Middle Eastern balance (Chart 20). Bottom Line: The US and Iran are both driven to revive the 2015 nuclear deal by strategic needs. Whether a better deal can be negotiated is less likely. The return to US-Iran détente is a source of geopolitical risk in 2021 though it should ultimately succeed. The lower risk of full-scale war is negative for global oil prices but OPEC 2.0 cartel behavior will be the key determiner. The cartel flirted with disaster in 2020 and will most likely hang together in 2021 for the sake of its members’ domestic stability. Key View #3: Europe Wins The US Election Chart 21Europe Won The US Election The European Union has not seen as monumental of a challenge from anti-establishment politicians over the past decade as have Britain and America. The establishment has doubled down on integration and solidarity. Now Europe is the big winner of the US election. Brussels and Berlin no longer face a tariff onslaught from Trump, a US-instigated global trade war, or as high of a risk of a major war in the Middle East. Biden’s first order of business will be reviving the trans-Atlantic alliance. Financial markets recognize that Europe is the winner and the euro has finally taken off against the dollar over the past year. European industrials and small caps outperformed during the trade war as well as COVID-19, a bullish signal (Chart 21). Reinforcing this trend is the fact that China is looking to court Europe and reduce momentum for an anti-China coalition. The center of gravity in Europe is Germany and 2021 faces a major transition in German politics. Chancellor Angela Merkel will step down at long last. Her Christian Democratic Union is favored to retain power after receiving a much-needed boost for its handling of this year’s crisis (Chart 22), although the risk of an upset and change of ruling party is much greater than consensus holds. Chart 22German Election Poses Political Risk, Not Investment Risk However, from an investment point of view, an upset in the German election is not very concerning. A left-wing coalition would take power that would merely reinforce the shift toward more dovish fiscal policy and European solidarity. Either way Germany will affirm what France affirmed in 2017, and what France is on track to reaffirm in 2022: that the European project is intact, despite Brexit, and evolving to address various challenges. The European project is intact, despite Brexit, and evolving to address various challenges. This is not to say that European elections pose no risk. In fact, there will be upsets as a result of this year’s crisis and the troubled aftermath. The countries with upcoming elections – or likely snap elections in the not-too-distant future, like Spain and Italy – show various levels of vulnerability to opposition parties (Chart 23). Chart 23Post-COVID EU Elections Will Not Be A Cakewalk Chart 24Immigration Tailwind For Populism Subsided The chief risks to Europe stem from fiscal normalization and instability abroad. Regime failures in the Middle East and Africa could send new waves of immigration, and high levels of immigration have fueled anti-establishment politics over the past decade. Yet this is not a problem at the moment (Chart 24). And even more so than the US, the EU has tightened border enforcement and control over immigration (Chart 25). This has enabled the political establishment to save itself from populist discontent. The other danger for Europe is posed by Russian instability. In general, Moscow is focusing on maintaining domestic stability amid the pandemic and ongoing economic austerity, as well as eventual succession concerns. However, Vladimir Putin’s low approval rating has often served as a warning that Russia might take an external action to achieve some limited national objective and instigate opposition from the West, which increases government support at home (Chart 26). Chart 25Europe Tough On Immigration Like US Chart 26Warning Sign That Russia May Lash Out Chart 27Russian Geopolitical Risk Premium Rising The US Democratic Party is also losing faith in engagement with Russia, so while it will need to negotiate on Iran and arms reduction, it will also seek to use sanctions and democracy promotion to undermine Putin’s regime and his leverage over Europe. The Russian geopolitical risk premium will rise, upsetting an otherwise fairly attractive opportunity relative to other emerging markets (Chart 27). Bottom Line: The European democracies have passed a major “stress test” over the past decade. The dollar will fall relative to the euro, in keeping with macro fundamentals, though it will not be supplanted as the leading reserve currency. Europe and the euro will benefit from the change of power in Washington, and a rise in European political risks will still be minor from a global point of view. Russia and the ruble will suffer from a persistent risk premium. Investment Takeaways As the “Year of the Rat” draws to a close, geopolitical risk and global policy uncertainty have come off the boil and safe haven assets have sold off. Yet geopolitical risk will remain elevated in 2021. The secular drivers of the dramatic rise in this risk since 2008 have not been resolved. To play the above themes and views, we are initiating the following strategic investment recommendations: Long developed market equities ex-US – US outperformance over DM has reached extreme levels and the global economic cycle and post-pandemic revival will favor DM-ex-US. Long emerging market equities ex-China – Emerging markets will benefit from a falling dollar and commodity recovery. China has seen the good news but now faces the headwinds outlined above. Long European industrials relative to global – European equities stand to benefit from the change of power in Washington, US-China decoupling, and the global recovery. Long Mexican industrials versus emerging markets – Mexico witnessed the rise of an American protectionist and a landslide election in favor of a populist left-winger. Now it has a new trade deal with the US and the US is diversifying from China, while its ruling party faces a check on its power via midterm elections, and, regardless, has maintained orthodox economic policy. Long Indian equities versus Chinese – Prime Minister Narendra Modi has a single party majority, four years on his political clock, and has recommitted to pro-productivity structural reforms. The nation is taking more concerted action in pursuit of economic development since strategic objectives in South Asia cannot be met without greater dynamism. The US, Japan, Australia, and other countries are looking to develop relations as they diversify from China.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com

Highlights The vaccine promises an eventual return to “normal” life – just as Americans voted to “return to normalcy.” Markets are cheering and hinting at an eventual rotation into value stocks. The contested US election can still cause volatility even though Trump is highly unlikely to change the result. The fiscal stimulus cliff is still a risk to the normalcy rally in the short run. But gridlock is the best political outcome over the coming 12-24 months. Stay strategically long global stocks over bonds. Tactically maintain safe-haven positions, add risk gradually, and stay short China/Taiwan. Feature The news of Pfizer’s success in developing a COVID-19 vaccine galvanized financial markets this week. America’s leading public health official Anthony Fauci also predicted that Moderna’s vaccine candidate would be similarly effective. It will take time to distribute these vaccines but the world can look toward economic recovery next year. Stocks rallied, bonds sold off, and value outperformed growth on the back of the news (Charts 1A and 1B). Chart 1ABiden: Return To Normalcy Chart 1BVaccine: Return To Normalcy The vaccine announcement super-charged the “return to normalcy” rally that followed the US election. The election’s likeliest policy outcome is that President Elect Joe Biden will not raise sweeping tariffs while Republican senators will not raise taxes next year, the best-case scenario for markets. This is genuinely positive news. The benefits are very clear over the next 12 months. But the risks are also very clear over the next three months: the virus will remain a problem until the vaccine is widely distributed, the US is in the midst of a contested election that could still cause negative surprises, the Republican senators are less likely to agree to fiscal relief, and President Trump will take aggressive actions to cement his legacy during the “lame duck” period of his last 68 days in office. The takeaway is that the US dollar will see a near-term, counter-trend rally and developed markets will outperform emerging markets for a while longer. We are only gradually adding risk to our strategic portfolio as we keep dry powder and maintain tactical safe-haven trades. Is The Election Over Or Not? Yes, most likely the election is over. But our definitive guide to contested US elections will teach any reader to be sensitive to the tail risks. The counting of ballots is not finished and the Electoral College does not vote until December 14. First, it is still possible that President Trump could pull off a victory in Georgia, which will now recount ballots by hand. Biden’s margin of victory of 14,045 votes is not so large there as to make it impossible that Trump would come back with a win (though history suggests recounts only change hundreds, not thousands, of votes). Trump is also narrowing the gap in Arizona, where counting continues, though the latest reports suggest he is still falling short of the roughly 60% share of late ballots that he needs to close the 11,635 vote gap and win the state. Second, there is a 50/50 chance that the Supreme Court will rule that Pennsylvania must stick to the statutory November 3 deadline, i.e. not accept mail-in ballots that arrived in the three days after that date. While the high court would prefer to let Pennsylvania settle its own affairs, this case is of the sort that the court could feel compelled to weigh in. The constitution is crystal clear that legislatures, not courts, decide how a state’s electors are chosen. Such a ruling probably would not reverse Biden’s projected victory in Pennsylvania. Trump is currently trailing Biden by 53,980 votes in this state. State officials say that the ballots that arrived late amount to only 7,800 and would not be able to change the outcome.1 This may be understating the risk but it is probably accurate in the main. Table 1 shows the share of mail-in votes that arrived late in this year’s primary elections. The share was 1.07% in Pennsylvania and up to 3% in other states. Applying the high water mark of 3% to the November 3 general election mail-in ballots, it is possible that 77,187 votes arrived late and would be excluded by a Supreme Court ruling. However, 85% of those ballots would have to have gone to Biden in order for Trump to come out the winner. This is far-fetched. Table 1Share Of Ballots Arriving Late In Primary Election Extrapolated To General Election It is also unlikely that Republican legislatures will take matters into their own hands and defy the election boards of their state by nominating their own slate of Republican electors – a scenario we entertained in our definitive guide. If Biden leads the statewide vote, then a state legislature would be politically suicidal to appoint the state’s electors to vote for Trump. It would invite a popular backlash. In the case of Pennsylvania, Republican leaders of the lower and upper chambers have explicitly denied any willingness or ability to choose electors other than those entailed by the popular vote. Thus the 1876 “Stolen Election” scenario is extremely unlikely in this critical state. It is just as unlikely in Arizona, Nevada, or Georgia.2 Nevertheless, if President Trump wins in Georgia or gets a favorable Supreme Court verdict, investors will have to increase the probability that the election result will be overturned, which currently stands at 16% (Chart 2). This will cause a bout of volatility even if it changes nothing in the end. If somehow Trump pulls off a Rutherford B. Hayes and overturn the result, markets should sell off. Yes, Trump is an exclusively commercial and reflationary president, but his election on a constitutional technicality would create nearly unprecedented social and political instability in the United States and it would presage major instability globally. Chinese, European, and Canadian assets would be hardest hit (Chart 3). Chart 2Trump’s Tiny Chance Of Reversing Election Otherwise Trump and the Republicans are trying to do four things with their litigation: (1) probing for weaknesses that can delay or change the Electoral College math (2) conducting due diligence in case fraud really did tip over one of the states (3) saving face for President Trump and his allies, who otherwise would be exposed as failures (4) keeping their base motivated for the showdown in Georgia on January 5, which will determine control of the Senate. Chart 3Trump's Loss Favors Euro, Renminbi, Loonie In Georgia, opinion polls show Republican David Perdue slightly leading Democrat Jon Ossoff, in keeping with his superior showing on November 3. However, Republican Kelly Loeffler is trailing Democrat Raphael Warnock (Charts 4A and 4B). Last week we argued that the odds of Democrats winning both races stood around 20%. If anything this view is generous – given that Perdue already beat Ossoff, and Warnock will continue to suffer attacks for associating with Fidel Castro – but it is in line with online betting markets (Chart 5). Chart 4AVoters Split On Georgia Senate Runoffs Chart 4BVoters Split On Georgia Senate Runoffs Chart 5Democrats Have ~20% Chance To Win Senate Investors should plan on the US government being gridlocked unless something occurs that fundamentally changes the Georgia race. Gridlock is positive, so if Trump’s election disputes keep the Republican political base spirited for the Georgia runoffs, then Trump’s activities have an ironic upside for markets. That is, as long as he doesn’t succeed in overturning the election result and the flames of discontent do not break out into a significant violent incident. Other fears about the transition period are less concerning. Several clients have asked us what should happen if President Elect Biden came down with COVID-19 or were otherwise incapacitated. The answer is that Vice President Elect Kamala Harris would take his place, as she now has popular consent to do exactly that. Prior to the Electoral College voting on December 14, the Democratic National Committee would have to nominate a candidate to replace Biden, almost certainly Harris. After December 14, the regular succession would apply under the twentieth amendment and Harris would automatically fill Biden’s shoes. Harris is only slightly more negative for equities than Biden: her regulatory pen would be more anti-business, but like Biden her main policies depend entirely on control of the senate. Bottom Line: It ain’t over till it’s over. The big picture is positive for risk assets but a surprise from ongoing election disputes or the unusually rocky transition of power would trigger a new bout of volatility. Stay long Japanese yen and health stocks on a tactical time frame. Trump’s Lame Duck Risk An investor in the Wild West has often criticized us for arguing that Trump would become a “war president” as he became a political lame duck at home. This war president view did pay off with Iran in January 2020, but otherwise the criticism is valid (see Trump’s Abraham Accords). Now Trump is almost certainly a lame duck so we will find out what he intends to do when unshackled from election concerns. Stay long Japanese yen and health stocks on a tactical time frame.  Since losing the election, Trump has fired Defense Secretary Mark Esper, several defense officials have resigned, and CIA Director Gina Haspel is rumored to be next on the chopping block. Most of the officials to depart had broken with the president over the course of the election year, so he may just be dishing out punishment now that the campaign is over. But it is possible that Trump is planning a series of final actions to cement his legacy and that these officials were removed because they got in the way. Chart 6Trump's Lame Duck Risk To China And Taiwan Strait First, there is no doubt that Trump is already tightening sanctions on China and Iran. China was the origin of the coronavirus pandemic and Trump has called for reparations, which could mean more tariff hikes. His outstanding legacy in US history will be his insistence that the US confront China. We are fully prepared for this outcome and remain short the renminbi and Taiwanese equities, despite their strong performance year-to-date (Chart 6). Trump could also raise tariffs on Europe. However, investors should be used to tariffs and sanctions by now. The impact would be fleeting and the next administration could reverse it. In the case of the renminbi, or any tariffs that weigh on the euro, investors should buy on the dips. By contrast, there are some conceivable actions – we are speculating – that would be extremely destabilizing and possibly irreversible. These would include: Extending diplomatic recognition to Taiwan, potentially provoking a war with China. Sending aircraft carriers into the Taiwan Strait, like Bill Clinton did during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, to shore up US deterrence. Launching surgical strikes against Iran’s ballistic missile and nuclear facilities or critical infrastructure. A prominent official has already denied that Trump intends anything of the sort. Launching surgical strikes against North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear facilities. No sign of this, but Kim Jong Un did enhance his capabilities after his meetings with Trump, thus embarrassing the president on a major foreign policy initiative ahead of the election. Providing intelligence and assistance to US allies like Israel who may seek to sabotage or attack Iran now or in future to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons. Withdrawing US troops from Germany or South Korea – which is much more consequential than hasty withdrawals from Afghanistan or Syria, which Trump clearly intends. War actions are largely infeasible. The bureaucracy would refuse to implement them. Assuming the Department of Defense would slow-walk any attempts to reduce troops in important regions like Germany or Korea, it would almost certainly avoid instigating a war. Withdrawing troops from Afghanistan or Syria is manageable, and fitting with Trump’s legacy, but it would not be disruptive for financial markets. A diplomatic upgrade or a show of force to demonstrate the American commitment to defend Taiwan is possible and highly disruptive for global financial markets. The critical risk may come from US allies or partners that are threatened by the impending Biden administration and have a window of opportunity to act with full American support while Trump still inhabits the Oval Office. The likeliest candidate would be Israel and Saudi Arabia on the Iranian nuclear program. Trump’s onetime national security advisor, H. R. McMaster, has already warned that Israel could act on the “Begin Doctrine,” which calls for targeted preventive strikes against hostile nuclear capabilities.3 Even here, Israel is unlikely to jeopardize its critical security relationship with the United States, so any actions would be limited, but they could still bring a major increase in regional tensions. Saudi Arabia can do little on its own but President Trump could willingly or unwilling encourage provocative actions. Chart 7Big Tech Is Not Priced For Surprises Any number of incidents or provocations could occur in this risky interregnum between Trump and Biden. Some suggest Trump will release a treasure trove of documents to discredit Washington and the Deep State. If that is all that occurs, then investors will be able to give a sigh of relief, as revelations of government intrigue would have to be truly consequential for future events in order to cause a notable market impact. Last-minute executive orders on regulating domestic industries are just as likely to shock markets as any international moves. We speculate that Big Tech is in Trump’s sights for censoring his comments during the election. In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Department of Homeland Security versus Regents of the University of California, the Trump administration is positively incentivized to issue a flurry of executive orders and write them in a way that makes them hard for the Biden administration to rescind them.4 Tech is priced for perfection, despite ruffles due to the vaccine this week, and investors expect Biden-Harris to maintain Obama’s alliance with Silicon Valley, not least because Biden has named executives from Facebook and Apple to his transition team and is considering putting former Google chief Eric Schmidt in charge of a Big Tech task force (Chart 7).5 Ultimately we have no idea what the Trump administration will do in its final two months. A lot of Trump’s attention will be focused on contesting the election. Drastic or reckless decisions will likely be obstructed by the bureaucracy. But the president still retains immense powers and there are executive orders that are legitimate and would benefit the US’s long-term interests even if disruptive for financial markets – and these would be harder for officials to disobey. Trump is an anti-establishment player who intends to shake up Washington, stay involved in politics, and cement his legacy. There is a reason for investors to take political risk seriously rather than to assume that the transition to a more market-friendly administration will be smooth. Bottom Line: Stay long gold on geopolitical risk, despite the potential for a counter-trend rise in the US dollar. We are neutral tech: polarization and fiscal risks are positive for tech shares but reopening and Trump lame duck risks are negative. Biden’s Cabinet Picks This “lame duck Trump” risk explains why we are not overly concerned about Biden’s cabinet picks. Insofar as Biden’s choices affect the market at all, they will confirm the “return to normalcy” theme and hence will be market-friendly. Take for example Biden’s just-announced chief of staff, Ronald Klain, who was chief of staff when Biden served as vice president from 2009- 16. The current transition is obstructed by election disputes, as occurred in November-December of 2000, but the cabinet picks are not likely to bring negative surprises. Already Biden has announced a coronavirus advisory board, a bipartisan transition team, and is pondering other picks, some of which will be known by Thanksgiving. None of the choices are in the least disruptive or radical – and most are acceptable to Wall Street. Biden will pick experts and technocrats who are known from his political career, the Obama administration, the Clinton administration, the Democratic Party, and academia. The market will invariably approve of establishment nominations after four years of anti-establishment picks and spontaneous firings. Since the Senate will remain in Republican hands, the cabinet members will have to be centrist enough to be confirmed. While Biden will inevitably nominate a few progressives, they will either fail in the Senate or take up marginal posts. Stay long gold on Trump “lame duck” geopolitical risks. Biden may have the opportunity to appoint three or even four members to the Federal Reserve’s board of governors. The Trump administration failed to fill two seats, while Fed Chair Jerome Powell’s term will expire in February 2022 (Diagram 1). If Biden appoints Lael Brainard to another post, such as Treasury Secretary, he will have a fourth space to fill. Diagram 1Biden Could Have Three-To-Four Fed Picks Chart 8Facing Gridlock, Biden Will Re-Regulate The implication will be a further entrenchment of dovish policy, with greater attention to new concerns that fall outside of traditional monetary policy such as climate change and racial inequality. The Fed has already committed to pursuing “maximum employment,” refraining from rate hikes till the end of 2023, and targeting average inflation – all a major boon to the Biden administration as it attempts to revive the economy. What is negative for markets is that Biden will re-regulate the economy – after Trump’s deregulatory shock – and that this will bring about political risks for small business and key industries like health, financials, and energy (Chart 8). Biden has little other option given that his legislative agenda will be largely stymied. Nevertheless, the sectors most likely to be heavily impacted are attractively valued and stand to benefit from economic normalization if not from Biden’s version of normalcy. Bottom Line: Stay long health and energy. Yes, Gridlock Is Best For Markets Some clients have asked us about our view that gridlocked government is truly the best for financial markets. Wouldn’t Democrats winning control of the Senate in Georgia be better, as it would usher in greater political certainty and larger fiscal spending? We have addressed this issue in previous reports so we will be brief. First, yes, gridlock has higher returns than single-party sweep governments on average over the past 120 years (Chart 9). Clearly the normalcy rally can go higher, but it is equally clear that it will get caught by surprise when the political reality hits home.  Second, however, the stock market’s annual returns are roughly average under single-party sweeps during this period (Chart 10). Chart 9Gridlock Best For Markets Chart 10Single-Party Sweeps Generate Average Annual Returns So while investors can cheer gridlock, it is not as if they should sell everything if Democrats do win control of the Senate on January 5. Chart 11Sweeps As Good As Gridlock Over 70 Years Indeed, looking at the period after World War II, sweep governments have witnessed average annual returns that are the same or slightly better than under gridlock (Chart 11). Whereas limiting the study to the post-Reagan era, gridlocks are clearly favored. If greater fiscal resources are needed then gridlock will quickly become a market risk rather than an opportunity. It is notable that over the past 120 years, there is not an example of a Democratic president presiding over a Republican senate and a Democratic House. There was only one case of the inverse – a Republican President, a Democratic senate, and a Republican House – which occurred in 2001-02 and coincided with a bear market. In fact, this episode should be classified as a Republican sweep, as in Table 2, since a sweep was the result of the 2000 election and the context of the key market-relevant legislation in 2001.6 Table 2Average Annual Equity Returns And Gridlock Government Chart 12Market Predicted Gridlock In 2020 In 2020 the stock market clearly anticipated a gridlocked outcome – the market’s performance matches with the historical profile of divided government (Chart 12). We argued that this was the best case for the market because it meant neither right-wing populism nor left-wing socialism. But we also highlighted that any relief rally on election results (reduced uncertainty) would be cut short by the major near-term implication of gridlock: a delay of fiscal support for the economy in the near term. This was the only deflationary scenario on offer in this election. Hence bad news in winter 2020-21 would precede the good news over the entire 2020-22 period. This is still largely our view, but we admit that the vaccine announcement erodes near-term risk aversion even further. There is little substance to the discussion of whether Americans will take the vaccine or not. Evidence shows that Americans are no less likely to take vaccines than other developed country citizens – assuming they are demonstrated to be safe and effective (Chart 13). Chart 13Yes, Americans Take Vaccines So gridlock looks even better now than it did previously. Yet we still think the near-term fiscal risks will hit markets sometime soon. Senate Republicans have been emboldened by the fact that their relative hawkishness paid off in the election on November 3. If they would not capitulate to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi prior to the election, they are even less likely to do so after gaining seats in the House, retaining the Senate, and crying foul over the presidential election. McConnell could agree to a $500 billion deal before Christmas – or not. There is no clear basis for optimism. A government shutdown is even possible if the continuing resolution expires on December 12. If the economic data turns sour and/or markets sell off dramatically then the Republicans will be forced to agree to a bigger deal, but as things stand they are not forced to do anything. And that presents a downside risk to the normalcy rally. Investment Takeaways Today’s post-election environment is comparable to the period after 2010, when a new business cycle was beginning and a new President Barack Obama had to face down Republican fiscal hawks in the House of Representatives. Today’s GOP senators may prove somewhat more cooperative with President Elect Biden, but that remains to be seen. Given how tight the election was, Republicans have an incentive to obstruct, slow down the economic recovery, and contest the 2022 midterms and 2024 election on the back of another slow-burn recovery. It worked last time. The debt ceiling crises of 2011 and 2012-13 were different than the fiscal stimulus cliff that Washington faces today but the market implications are similar. At the climax of brinkmanship between the president and the senate, treasuries will rally, the dollar will rally, stocks will fall, and emerging markets will underperform (Charts 14A and 14B). Today there is a greater limit on how far the dollar will rise and how far treasury yields will fall, but a fiscal impasse will still drive flows into these assets. Chart 14AObama’s Debt Ceiling Crises… Chart 14B… Presage Biden’s Fiscal Cliffs ​​​​​​​This is what we expect over the next three months. The fact that President Trump could bring negative surprises only enhances this expectation. Therefore we are only gradually adding risk to our strategic portfolio and maintaining tactically defensive positions. Clearly the normalcy rally can go higher, but it is equally clear to us that it will get caught by surprise when the political reality hits home. Since this could be anytime over the next two months, we are only gradually adding new risk. We would not deny that the outlook is brighter over the 12-24-month periods due to the vaccine and election results.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 See Chris Matthews, "Alleging fraud, GOP seeks to overturn election results in Michigan, Pennsylvania," MarketWatch, November 10, 2020, marketwatch.com. 2 See Senator Jake Corman and Representative Kerry Benninghoff, "Pennsylvania lawmakers have no role to play in deciding the presidential election," Centre Daily, October 19, 2020, centredailly.com. As for the 1876 “Stolen Election,” the initial election results suggested that Democrat Samuel Tilden had won 184 electoral votes while Republican Rutherford B. Hayes had won 165. The amount needed for a majority in the Electoral College at the time was 185, so Tilden fell one vote short while Hayes fell 20 votes short. After partisan litigation, actions by state legislatures, an intervention by the US House of Representatives, and a grand political compromise, Hayes won with 185 votes. 3 See Charles Creitz, "McMaster warns Biden on Iran deal: Don't resurrect 'political disaster masquerading as a diplomatic triumph,’" Fox News, November 12, 2020, foxnews.com. 4 In this ruling, which was decided on a 5-4 split with Chief Justice John Roberts siding with liberal justices, the Supreme Court denied the Trump administration’s effort to overturn the Obama administration’s policy known as Deferred Action on Childhood Arrivals (DACA), which stopped the US from deporting illegal immigrants who came to the US as children. The majority opinion argued that the Trump administration had merely asserted, not demonstrated, that the Obama administration’s executive orders were unconstitutional. In doing so, it established a precedent by which the court can determine whether one president’s executive orders should overrule another’s. While future administrations may follow better procedures in attempting to revoke their predecessors’ orders, this decision likely incentivizes the Trump administration to try to issue decrees that will be difficult to revoke. See John Yoo, "How the Supreme Court’s DACA decision harms the Constitution, the presidency, Congress, and the country," American Enterprise Institute, June 22, 2020, aei.org. 5 See Kiran Stacey, “What can Silicon Valley expect from Joe Biden?” Financial Times, November 8, 2020, ft.com. 6 The election produced a Republican sweep, with a 50-50 balance in the Senate, that led to the Bush tax cuts in May 2001. The business cycle was ending, however. In June, Democrats took the senate majority when Republican Senator Jim Jeffords of Vermont became an independent and began caucusing with Democrats. In September terrorists attacked the World Trade Center causing a market collapse.

Highlights Biden’s chances of winning the US election are rising, but it is still unsettled and could bring negative surprises to financial markets. The fiscal cliff will not subside immediately as the Senate Republicans have been vindicated for their fiscally hawkish approach. We doubt Democrats will win both Senate seats in Georgia to restore the lost “Democratic Sweep” scenario that offered maximum policy reflation. President Trump’s lame duck period, if he loses, lasts for three months and could bring negative surprises on China, the Taiwan Strait, Big Tech, Iran, or North Korea. The US remains at “peak polarization,” though we expect a growing national consensus over the long haul. Go long a basket of Trans-Pacific Partnership countries on a strategic time horizon to capitalize on what we believe will be Biden’s pro-trade-ex-China policy. Feature Chart 1Market Response To US Election The US presidential election remains undecided despite former Vice President Joe Biden’s increasing likelihood of victory. Votes will be recounted in several states while one potential tipping-point state, Pennsylvania, could easily swing on a Supreme Court decision. The Senate is likely to remain in Republican hands, though there is still a ~20% chance that it will flip if Democrats win both of the likely Georgia runoff elections on January 5. Thus our base case is the same as in our final forecast: Biden plus a Republican Senate. Financial markets first rallied and have now paused (Chart 1). The pause makes sense to us. Ultimately the best-case scenario of this election was always Biden plus a Republican Senate – neither tariffs nor taxes would increase. But this same scenario also always posed the highest risk of near-term fiscal tightening that would undermine the US recovery and global reflation trade. GOP Senators will insist on a smaller fiscal relief bill and may wait too long to enact it. Below we discuss these dynamics and why we maintain a tactically defensive position amid this contested election. We will not go full risk-on until the critical short-run risks subside: the contested election, the fiscal impasse, Trump’s “lame duck” executive orders, and the international response. Biden Not Yet President-Elect Biden is leading the vote tally in Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin as we go to press. To all appearances he has reclaimed the “Blue Wall” (MI, PA, WI) and made inroads in the Sun Belt (AZ, GA). We will not go full risk-on until the critical short-run risks subside. Map 1 shows tentative election results. Unsettled states are colored lightly while settled states are solid red or blue. This map points to a Biden victory even if Georgia and Pennsylvania slip back to Trump. The President would need to reclaim the latter two and one other state to reach 270 Electoral College votes. Map 1US 2020 Election Results (Tentative) Chart 2 shows the final prediction of our quantitative model. While our model predicted a Trump victory at 51% odds, we subjectively capped Trump’s odds at 45% because we disagreed that Trump would win Michigan.1 We did not do the same for our Senate model as the results matched with our subjective judgment that Republicans would keep control. Chart 2Our Presidential Quant Model Versus Actual Results Investors cannot yet conclude that the contested election risks have abated. If Biden wins only AZ, NV, MI, and WI, then he will end up with 270 Electoral College votes. This is the minimal vote needed for a victory. It is legitimate, but it means that a net of one faithless elector, or a disqualified elector, could throw the nation into a historic and nearly unprecedented crisis. If the Electoral College becomes indecisive for any reason, the House of Representatives will decide the election. Each state will get one vote. The results of the election suggest Republicans have four-to-ten seat majority of state delegations in the House (Table 1). Trump would win. Polarization and unrest would explode. Not for nothing did we brand this election cycle “Civil War Lite.” Table 1State Delegations In US House Of Representatives The greater the margin of victory in the Electoral College, the less vulnerable the nation is to indecision in the college, or to a result decided in the courts. The Republicans have a strong case in Pennsylvania that votes that arrived after November 3 should not be counted. It is not clear if the Supreme Court will revisit the case, having left it unresolved prior to the election. If Pennsylvania’s 20 electoral votes become the fulcrum of the election, and the Supreme Court rules to exclude votes received after November 3, and if Trump thereby wins the count, a national crisis will erupt. This is not high probability at the moment because Biden can afford to lose Pennsylvania if he wins Nevada or Georgia. But the history of contested elections teaches that investors should not rush to conclusions. Senate Gridlock Will Survive Georgia Runoffs The most likely balance of power is a Democratic president with a Republican Senate and Democratic House, i.e. gridlock. Chart 3 shows the likely balance of power in Congress. Democrats would need to win both runoff elections in Georgia to win 50 seats, which would give them a de facto majority if Biden wins, since Vice President Kamala Harris would become President of the Senate and break any tie votes there. They are unlikely to do so. Chart 3AGridlock In US Government Chart 3BGridlock In US Government Why do we doubt that Democrats will win both Georgia seats, given that Trump is now falling short in the statewide presidential vote? First, Republicans tend to do well in runoffs as Georgia is a conservative-leaning state (Chart 4). Second, the Republican vote was greater than the Democratic vote in both Senate elections, though falling short of 50%. Third, exit polls show that voters leaned Republican in the suburbs and were mostly concerned about the economy, not the coronavirus. Fourth, also clear from exit polls, Republican voters will be more motivated to retain control of the Senate with Trump out, while Democratic voters will be less motivated with Biden in (Chart 5). Voter turnout will drop in the special election as usual. Neither Trump nor the presidency will be on the ballot on January 5. Still, it is possible for Democrats to win both seats and hence de facto control of the Senate. We would say the odds are roughly 20% (0.5 x 0.4 = 0.2). Chart 4GOP Does Well In Georgia Runoffs Chart 5Georgia 2020 Election Results (So Far) If Democrats pulled off two victories in Georgia, the “Blue Sweep” scenario would be reaffirmed and several legislative proposals that had a 0% chance of passage in a Republican Senate would become at least possible. Certainly taxes would go up – the Democrats would be able to use the reconciliation process to push through reforms to the health care system paid for by partially repealing the Trump Tax Cut and Jobs Act. They would also be able to pass legislation that is popular with moderate Democrats who would then hold the balance in the Senate. The Green New Deal would become possible, if highly improbable. There would be a small chance of removing the filibuster in an exigency, but a vanishingly small chance of other radical structural changes, like creating new seats on the Supreme Court or granting statehood to Washington DC and Puerto Rico. A 50-50 count in the Senate, with Harris breaking the tie, would produce a larger increase in the budget deficit than otherwise. Stocks would have to discount the tax hike but they would recover quickly on the prospect of combined monetary and fiscal ultra-dovishness. Fiscal Impasse Prolonged Biden plus a Republican Senate is positive for the US corporate earnings outlook over the 24 months between now and the 2022 midterm election. It is also positive for the global earnings outlook over the four-year period due to the drastically reduced odds of a global trade war. But it is negative in the near term because it will result in a smaller and delayed fiscal relief package – and sooner than later the market will need a signal that the government will not pull the rug out from under the recovery. Biden plus a GOP Senate is negative in the near term due to fiscal risks but positive beyond that. True, the US economy continues to bounce back rapidly, which is why the Republicans performed so well in this election despite a recession, a pandemic, and a failure to pass another round of stimulus beforehand. In October the unemployment rate fell to 6.9%. Yet previous rounds of fiscal support are drying up. The job market is showing some signs of underlying weakness and these will worsen as long as benefits run out and COVID-19 cases discourage economic activity (Chart 6). Personal income has dropped off from its peak when the first round of stimulus was passed in March. Without the dole it will relapse (Chart 7). Chart 6US Job Market Weakening Sans Stimulus Chart 7US Personal Income Will Drop Sans Stimulus Will Senate Republicans agree to a fiscal deal in the “lame duck” session before the new Congress sits on January 3? We have no basis for a high-conviction view. They might agree to a deal in the range of $500 billion to $1 trillion, but only if the Democrats come down to these levels in the talks. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell is one of the big winners of the election. He held his seat and likely maintained Republican control of the Senate without capitulating to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s demands of a $3 trillion-plus relief bill. He wagered that Republicans would do better with voters if they concentrated on reopening the economy (and confirming Amy Coney Barrett to the Supreme Court) while limiting any fiscal bill to targeted COVID response measures. He drew a hawkish line against broad-based social spending and bailouts for state and local governments. The gambit appears to have worked. House Democrats, far from gaining seats, lost five. We would not be surprised if Pelosi were replaced as speaker in 2021. Her plan backfired so badly that if Trump had stayed on message in his campaign, he might even have won. The implication is that unless Pelosi comes down to McConnell’s number, the fiscal impasse will extend into January and February. The American public approves of fiscal relief, but that did not force McConnell’s hand earlier, as the economy was recovering regardless (Table 2). Unless the economy slumps or financial markets selloff drastically, he will likely insist on a skinny deal that includes liability protections for businesses while minimizing bailouts for indebted blue states. Table 2Americans Support Fiscal Stimulus Package Hence investors are likely to get bad news before good news on the US fiscal front. And if other bad news arises, the absence of fiscal support will be sorely felt. This motivates our tactically defensive posture until the fiscal impasse is resolved. Peak Polarization Polarization is at peak levels in the US and the election result suggests it will remain elevated. Whichever party wins will win with a narrow margin. There is simply no commanding mandate for either party, as has been the case this century, so the struggle will continue (Chart 8). Chart 8Polarization Will Continue With Narrow Margins Of Victory Of course, polarization may subside temporarily, assuming Trump loses. At least under Biden the Electoral College vote will coincide with the popular vote, improving popular consent. Biden will have a lower disapproval rating, probably throughout his term. High disapproval tends to coincide with crises in modern US history, but in 2021, after the dust clears from this election, the country may catch its breath (Chart 9). Chart 9Presidential Disapproval Will Fall Much will depend on whether the presumed Biden administration is willing to sideline the left-wing of the Democratic Party to court the median voter. Exit polling in the swing states strongly suggests that the Biden administration won the election (if indeed it did) by improving Democratic support among the majority white population, non-college educated voters, and senior citizens, all groups that delivered Trump the victory in 2016. The Democrats had mixed results among ethnic minorities and suburban voters. Their biggest liability was their focus on issues other than the economy (Chart 10). Chart 10Exit Polls Say Focus On Bread And Butter Over the coming decade we think the combination of (1) cold war with China and (2) generational change on fiscal policy will produce a new national consensus. But we are not there yet. The contested election is not guaranteed to end amicably. If Trump wins on a technicality, the country will erupt into mass protests; if he loses and keeps crying stolen election, isolated domestic terrorist incidents are entirely possible. Moreover the battle over the 2020 census and redistricting process will be fierce. Democrats will be hungry to take the Senate in 2022, failing Georgia in January, to achieve major legislative objectives while Biden is in office. And the 2024 election will be vulnerable to the fact that Biden may have to bow out due to old age, depriving the Democrats of an incumbent advantage. The bottom line is that Republicans outperformed and will not be inclined to help the Biden administration start off on strong footing. The implication is the fiscal battle will extend into the New Year unless a stock market selloff forces Republicans to compromise. Fiscal cliffs will be a recurring theme until at least the 2022 election. A deflationary tail risk will persist. Obama’s Legacy Secured? The sole significance of a gridlocked Biden presidency will lie in regulatory affairs, foreign policy, and trade policy. These are the policy areas where presidents have unilateral authority and Biden can act without the Senate’s approval. In this context, Biden’s sole focus will be to consolidate the legacy of the Barack Obama administration, in which he served. 1. Obamacare (ACA): Republicans failed to repeal and replace this bill despite a red sweep in 2016. Biden’s election ensures that Obamacare will be implemented, if not expanded, as he will have the power to enforce the law at the executive level. The risk is that the conservative-leaning Supreme Court could strike it down. Based on past experience, the health care sector will benefit from the drop in uncertainty once the court’s decision is known (Chart 11). For investors the lesson of the past four election cycles is that Obamacare is here to stay, but Americans will not adopt a single-payer system until 2025 at the earliest conceivable date. We are long health equipment and see this outcome as beneficial to the health sector in general, particularly health insurance companies. Big Pharma, however, will suffer from bipartisan populist pressures to cap prices. 2. Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPA): Biden will seek to restore Obama’s signature foreign policy accomplishment, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, i.e. the Iran nuclear deal of 2015. The purpose of the deal was to establish a modus vivendi in the Middle East so that the US could “pivot to Asia” and focus its energy on the existential strategic challenge posed by China. Biden will stick with this plan. The Iranians also want to restore the deal but will play hard to get at first. Israel and Saudi Arabia could act to thwart Iran and tie Biden’s hands in the final three months of Trump’s presidency while they have unmitigated American backing. Chart 11Obamacare Preserved The implication is that Iranian oil production will return to oil markets (Chart 12), but that conflict could cause production outages, and Saudi Arabia could increase production to seize market share. Hence price volatility is the outcome, which makes sense amid fiscal risks and COVID risks to demand as well. 3. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP): Biden claims he will “renegotiate” the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which was the Obama administration’s key trade initiative. The idea was to group like-minded Pacific Rim countries into an advanced trade deal that addressed services, the digital economy, labor and environmental standards, and pointedly excluded China. Trump withdrew from the deal out of pique despite the fact that it served the purpose of diversifying the American supply chain away from China. The impact of rejoining is miniscule from an economic point of view (Chart 13), but it will be a boon for small emerging markets like Mexico, Chile, Vietnam, and Malaysia. Chart 12Restoring The Iran Nuclear Deal Chart 13Rejoining The Trans-Pacific Partnership The bigger takeaway is that Biden will continue the US grand strategic shift toward confronting China, which will be a headwind toward Chinese manufacturing and a tailwind for India, Latin America, Southeast Asia. The US will cultivate relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a more coherent economic bloc and a manufacturing counterweight to China (Chart 14). A lame duck Trump will  attempt to cement his legacy by targeting China/Taiwan, Iran, North Korea, or Big Tech. When it comes to on-shoring, Biden’s focus will be reducing dependency on China and improving the US’s supply security in sensitive areas like health and defense. Trade and strategic tensions with China will persist, but a global trade war is not in the cards. Manufacturing economies ex-China stand to benefit. 4. The Paris Climate Accord: Biden will not be able to pass his own version of the Green New Deal without the Senate, so investor excitement over a government-backed surge in green investment will subside for the time being (Chart 15). He will also moderate his stance on the energy sector after his pledge to phase out oil and gas nearly cost him the election. He was never likely to ban fracking comprehensively anyway. Chart 14ASEAN's Moment Biden will be able to rejoin the international Paris Agreement and reverse President Trump’s deregulation of the energy sector. He will re-regulate the economy to lift clean air, water, environment, and sustainability standards. This is a headwind for the energy sector, but stocks are already heavily discounted and congressional gridlock is a positive surprise. Chart 15Returning To The Paris Climate Accord There may be some room for compromise with Senate Republicans when it comes to renewables in a likely infrastructure package next year. Post-Trump Republicans may also be interested in Biden’s idea of a “carbon adjustment fee” on imports, which is another way of saying tariffs on Chinese-made goods. Like the health care sector, the election is tentatively positive for US energy stocks – especially once fiscal risks are surmounted. Investment Takeaways Chart 16Lame Duck Trump Risk: Taiwan Strait Three near-term risks prevent us from taking a tactically risk-on investment stance. First, the contested election, which could still throw up surprises. Second, the fiscal stimulus impasse, which could persist into January or February and will reduce the market’s margin of safety in the event of other negative surprises. Third, a lame duck Trump will attempt to cement his legacy via executive orders. He could target China/Taiwan, Iran, North Korea, or even Big Tech. On China, Trump is already tightening export controls on China and selling a large arms package to Taiwan (Chart 16). The lame duck period of any presidency is a useful time for the US to advance strategic objectives. Trump will also blame China and the coronavirus for his defeat. He could seek reparations for the virus, restrictions on Chinese manufacturing and immigration to the US, export controls or sanctions on tech companies, secondary sanctions over Iran or North Korea, delisting of Chinese companies listed in the US, sanctions over human rights violations in China’s autonomous regions, or travel bans on Communist Party members. During these three months, Big Tech will face crosswinds – risks from Trump, but opportunities from gridlock. Polarization has helped support US equity and tech outperformance over the past decade. Frequent hold-ups over the budget in Congress weigh on growth and inflation expectations, thus favoring growth stocks and tech. Internal divisions have prompted the US to lash out abroad, increasing risks to international stocks and driving safe-haven demand into the dollar and tech. More broadly the second wave of the pandemic is a boon for tech earnings and Biden will restore the Obama administration’s alliance with Silicon Valley. But tech is already priced for perfection and this favorable trend will be cut short when COVID restrictions ease and Biden works out a compromise with the Senate GOP over stimulus and the budget (Chart 17). Beyond these near-term risks, we have a constructive outlook for risk assets over the next 12 months. Chart 17Biden, Peak Polarization, And Big Tech Chart 18Global Stocks, Cyclicals Benefit When US Fiscal Impasse Resolved Insofar as Biden seeks to restore US commitment to global free trade, and more stable and cooperative relations with allies and partners ex-China, global policy uncertainty should fall relative to the United States. Once near-term fiscal hurdles are cleared, the dollar’s strength can subside and global stocks and global cyclicals can start to outperform (Chart 18). Chart 19Trump An Exclusively Commercial President We also favor stocks over bonds on a strategic horizon. Trump was an exclusively commercial president whose approval rating had a tight correlation with the stock-to-bond ratio (Chart 19). A surge in stocks would help power Trump’s approval. This relationship is not standard across presidents. But it does make sense during periods of policy change that affect earnings. Trump’s tax cuts are the best example. Equities outpaced bonds in anticipation of tax cuts in 2017. Trump’s approval rating recovered once the bill was passed. President Obama’s approval rating also correlated somewhat with the stock-to-bond ratio during the critical fiscal cliff negotiations under gridlock from 2010-12. Once Biden works out a compromise with GOP Senators, bond yields will rise and stocks will power upward. The takeaway from these points is that volatility can remain elevated over the next 0-3 months (Chart 20). We would not expect it to go as high as in 2000, when the dotcom bubble burst, but Trump’s lame duck maneuvers against China could generate a massive selloff. But this cannot be ruled out. Indeed, Trump’s constraints have almost entirely fallen away regardless of whether he loses or wins. Investors should take a phased and conservative approach to adding risk in the near term. The outlook will brighten up when the president is known, a fiscal deal is reached, and President Trump’s legacy as the Man Who Confronted China is complete. Chart 20Volatility Will Stay Elevated In Short Run Chart 21Go Long Trans-Pacific Partnership Given our view that Biden will be hawkish on China, especially amid gridlock at home, we are maintaining our short CNY-USD trade. We also recommend buying a basket of Trans-Pacific Partnership bourses, weighted by global stock market capitalization, on a strategic time-frame to capture what we expect will be Biden’s pro-trade-ex-China policy (Chart 21). Finally, to capture the views expressed above regarding Biden’s likely market impacts, over the short and long run, we will go long US health care relative to the broad market on a tactical basis and long US energy on a strategic basis.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 As things stand, the model overrated the Republicans in Arizona and Georgia as well, though really Georgia looks to be the only state Democrats won that the model gave high odds of staying Republican. If we had used the level rather than the range of Trump’s approval rating – or if we had neglected opinion polling altogether – the model would have called a Biden win.

Highlights Our base case of a Biden win with a GOP Senate may come to pass. But the US election is not over yet. Trump still has a chance of victory by winning Pennsylvania and one other state. If the vote count does not settle the outcome clearly this week, a full-fledged contested election will emerge that may not be settled until just before December 14 (or even January). Risk-off sentiment will prevail in the interim, given the importance of the executive-legislative configuration for the pandemic response and the fiscal policy outlook. What we know is that Republicans kept the Senate, in line with our final forecast last week. This means gridlock is assured – which is positive for US stocks beyond near-term fiscal risks. Stay long JPY-USD, short CNY-USD, long stocks over bonds, long health care equipment, and long infrastructure plays. Keep dry powder for the presidential outcome, as global trade hangs in the balance. Feature The US presidential election is unsettled as we go to press, but we know that Republicans will keep control of the Senate and hence that American government will be divided or “gridlocked” for the next two years. As things stand, Democrats picked up two senate seats, Arizona and Colorado, but fell short everywhere else. They may even have lost a seat in Michigan. This leaves the balance of power at ~52-48 in favor of Republicans – which is one seat better than our final 51-49 forecast in their favor (Chart 1).1 Chart 1Our Senate Election Model Correctly Predicted Republican Control Table 1Gridlock Is Inevitable Regardless Of Presidential Outcome Gridlock is the inevitable consequence. If President Trump pulls off a victory in any two of the upper Midwestern states (Michigan, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin), then he will still face a Democrat-controlled House of Representatives. If former Vice President Joe Biden pulls off a victory in two of these states, then he will face a Republican controlled Senate (Table 1). Chart 2Gridlock More Favorable Than Sweep For Wall Street, But Fiscal Risks Abound In Short Run Historically gridlock offers more upside for the S&P 500 than a single-party sweep (Chart 2), and we agree with this expectation when it comes to the long-run impact of this election. However, we have also warned against the fiscal risks of a Biden win with a Republican Senate in the short run. The status quo Trump gridlock is reflationary at first but later problematic due to trade war. The Biden gridlock is deflationary at first but the best outcome for investors over the long run. Consider the following: Trump with Senate Republicans: Trump is a spendthrift and he and his party joined the House Democrats in blowing out the budget deficit from 2018-20. Trump’s victory will force House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to concede to a Republican-drafted ~$1-$1.5 trillion new COVID-19 fiscal relief bill right away. For the second term, Trump will push an infrastructure bill, border security, and make his tax cuts permanent. The fiscal thrust in 2021 will be flat-to-up. The budget deficit will probably end up somewhere between the Republican “high spending” scenario and the Democratic “low spending” scenario in our budget deficit projections (Chart 3). This is positive for US growth and especially corporate earnings, but it comes with a catch: Trump will be emboldened in his trade wars, which could expand beyond China to Europe or others. Tariffs and currency depreciation will weigh on global growth. Still, Trump’s second term will occur in the early stages of the business cycle and the Fed is committed not to hike rates until 2023, so the overall picture is reflationary.   Chart 3Trump Gridlock Reflationary, Biden Gridlock Deflationary Over Short Run Biden with Senate Republicans: Since Senate Republicans did not capitulate to large Democratic spending demands prior to the election, when their seats were at risk, they will have less incentive to do so afterwards when the president hails from the opposing party. The only way they will agree to a new fiscal stimulus in the “lame duck” session (November-December) is if the Democrats concede to their skinny proposals for the time being. But Democrats will probably insist on their demands having made electoral gains. In this case, either financial markets will sell off, forcing Republicans to capitulate, or investors will have to wait until early 2021 to receive a new fiscal bill that is uncertain in size and timing. The first battle of Biden’s presidency will be with the GOP Senate. The Republican “low spending” scenario in Chart 3 is most likely. It is not realistic that Congress will allow the baseline scenario, in which the budget deficit contracts by ~7.4% of GDP. Republican senators today are not the Tea Party House Republicans of 2010, who were rabid fiscal hawks. Still, uncertainty will weigh heavily and markets will have to fall before GOP senators wake up to the underlying risk to the economic recovery. The consolation is that beyond this 3-6 month period of negative sentiment and deflationary fiscal risk, the outlook will be fairly positive. Biden will not use broad-based unilateral tariffs the way Trump did, with the possible exception of China later in his term. And the Republican Senate will not agree to tax hikes at any point, making taxes a concern for 2023 or thereafter. This is the best of both worlds for US business sentiment and the corporate earnings outlook over the two-year period. Risk-off sentiment will prevail until the election is decided. This could be in a couple of days if the vote count is clear in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. Or it could extend until just before December 14, when the Electoral College votes, if the litigation and court rulings in these critical states drag on, which we discuss below. The reason risk-off sentiment will prevail is that the US economy is burning through its remaining stimulus funds rapidly, the fiscal trajectory is unclear until the presidency is decided, Europe is going into partial lockdowns over the pandemic, and a Biden victory would imply more US lockdowns. Diagram 1 outlines the macro and market implications as we see them, depending on the presidential outcome. We never took the view that a Democratic sweep of White House and Senate would be the best outcome for the overall investment outlook, though we conceded that it was the most reflationary and bullish in the short term. But now this point is moot. Investors will have to wait another two years at minimum for the full smorgasbord of Democratic spending proposals to have a chance at passage. Diagram 1Gridlock Rules Out Massive Fiscal Boost Bottom Line: The presidency is indeterminate as we go to press. What is clear is that Republicans retained the Senate. Therefore gridlock will prevail. This is generally market positive, though a Biden win would weigh on risk assets in the near term until financial markets force Republican senators to capitulate to a new fiscal bill. A Controversial Election Or A Contested Election? The critical battleground states are undecided as we go to press. Trump needs to win any two of Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin to retain the White House. The vote count will last through Wednesday and possibly beyond. The Republican and Democratic legal teams are preparing for trench warfare. Major legal challenges are highly likely and will delay the final outcome into December or even January. The first thing is to finish counting the absentee and mail-in ballots. Georgia, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Arizona are not accepting ballots after election day, so they will finish counting soon. Then all that remains is to see if any legal disputes arise that prevent the Electoral College members from being settled in these states, which is still possible. For example, Wisconsin is within a percentage point. Nevada will accept ballots by November 10 and North Carolina by November 12 as long as they are postmarked by election day. It is likely but not certain that Democrats will keep Nevada (~75% counted) while Republicans will keep North Carolina (~100% counted). Thus Pennsylvania poses the biggest risk of a contested result – and this was anticipated. The deadline to receive mailed ballots is Friday, November 6, but a legal dispute is already underway as to whether the original November 3 deadline should be reinstated.2 We will not pretend to predict the final court verdict on Pennsylvania, but it would not be surprising at all if the Supreme Court ruled that ballots received after election day cannot be accepted. The constitution grants state legislatures the sole power of choosing a state’s electors. Each state passes its own election laws. The Pennsylvania state legislature clearly stated that ballots must be returned by election day. It was a court decision that extended the deadline. The Supreme Court could easily determine that a lower court does not have the power to change the deadline. But nobody will know until the court rules. The fact that Trump appointed several of the judges has little bearing on their decisions because they serve lifetime appointments. Once election disputes rise above state vote-counting to the federal level, Trump gets a lifeline. First, the two-seat conservative leaning on the Supreme Court should produce strict readings of the law that could favor his bid. Second, the GOP’s victory in the Senate means that Democrats cannot unilaterally settle disputed electoral votes in their own favor at the joint session of Congress on January 6, which they could have done with a united Congress. Third, the Republicans are likely to have maintained a one or two-state majority of state delegations in the House of Representatives (based on results as we go to press), which means that Trump would win if the candidates failed to reach a 270-vote majority on the Electoral College or tied at 269. Note that an Electoral College tie is a distinct possibility in this election. Right now, if Trump loses in Michigan and Wisconsin, but wins Pennsylvania, and nothing else changes, then an Electoral College tie could result at 269-269 electoral votes.3 Polls … And Exit Polls Before condemning the entire profession of opinion pollsters to death it will be important to receive the verified results of the election and compare them with the final polling averages. It is clear that Trump was widely underrated yet again, but it is not yet clear that this was primarily or exclusively the fault of pollsters. Right now Trump is down by 1.8% in the nationwide popular vote, whereas he lagged by 7.2% in the average of the national polls and 2.3% in the battleground average on election day. This is a big 5.4% gap in the national poll, but in the battleground poll it is a minor 0.5% polling gap and as such merely confirms what many observers knew, that the battleground polls were the ones that really mattered due to the Electoral College. Trump’s battleground support average was 46.6% and his approval rating was 45.9% on election day, which respectively is 1.8% and 2.5% below his tentative share of the national vote at 48.4%. These gaps are within the average 3% margin of error – and normally sitting presidents outperform their polling by around 1%. State opinion polling had huge errors like the national poll. Charts 4 and 4B shows the final election polling in the critical swing states along with a “T” or “B” to mark Trump’s and Biden’s tentative vote share as we go to press. Swing state polls showed Trump staging a major rally in the final weeks of the campaign, which is what prompted us to upgrade his odds to 45%. Neither major pundits nor the mainstream media paid enough attention to this shift. Several prominent outlets denied that there was any real tightening in the polls even in late October. Chart 4APundits Overlooked Trump’s Rally In Swing State Polls In Final Weeks Chart 4BPundits Overlooked Trump’s Rally In Swing State Polls In Final Weeks What this demonstrates to us is the power of momentum in opinion polling, especially in the final week before an election when people’s attitudes harden and they bare more of their true opinions. It does not tell us that opinion polling is dead. What about the exit polls? Biden cut into Trump’s lead in key demographic groups just as the Democratic Party machinery anticipated, but it is not clear if it was enough to win the election. Trump lost ground and Democrats gained ground, relative to 2016, with white voters, old folks, and non-college-educated voters. But Trump improved his support among blacks and Hispanics, a signal point that gives the lie to much of this year’s media hype (Charts 5A and 5B). Chart 5ADemocrats Gained Ground With White, Elderly, And Non-College-Educated Voters; GOP Gained Among Blacks And Hispanics Chart 5BDemocrats Gained Ground With White, Elderly, And Non-College-Educated Voters; GOP Gained Among Blacks And Hispanics By far voters cared most about the issues, not personalities, and the biggest issue was the economy (35% of voters versus 20% on racial inequality and 17% on the coronavirus, which was apparently overrated as an issue by Democrats). The economic focus is the only explanation for Trump’s outperformance – the law and order narrative was less popular. Trump’s vote share may end up exactly equal to the number of respondents who said the economy was “good” or “excellent” (48%). Otherwise Trump’s base is well known: it consists predominantly of white people, rural people, those in the Midwest and South, those who have been fairly successful in income, and those who think America needs a “strong leader” more than a unifier with good judgment who seems to care about the average person. If Trump is defeated, the clear implication is that he failed to expand his base. If he wins, the clear implication is that Democrats suffered in the key regions for their aggressive approach to COVID lockdowns, their condoning of lawlessness, and their divisive handling of racial inequality and police brutality. With such a close vote for the White House, sweeping narratives are questionable. It is not clear yet whether liberalism or nationalism won, and at any rate the margin was thin. What is clear is that Democrats substantially disappointed in the Senate and they might even have failed to gain the White House. Given that this year witnessed a recession, pandemic, and widespread social unrest – well-attested historical signs that point to the failure of the incumbent party and recession – Democrats apparently failed to capitalize. National exit polls suggest the fault lay in their relative neglect of bread and butter in favor of the coronavirus or left-wing social theory. This is true not so much in the House of Representatives but in the presidential and senate races. If Trump wins – especially through a contested election – then US political polarization will rise due to the continued divergence of popular opinion and the constitutional system. “Peak polarization” will last another four years at least. But if Trump loses, given that Republicans held the Senate, there is room for compromise that would reduce polarization. But it is too early to say. Investment Takeaways Trade and foreign policy hinge on the presidency. Trump is favored in several of the key states at the moment and he is especially favored in a contested election process, but it is too soon to make investment recommendations on the executive branch other than that US equity outperformance is likely to continue on both of the scenarios at hand. Table 2Earnings Shock From Partial Repeal Of Trump Tax Cuts Has Been Averted For now we recommend investors stay long JPY-USD, short CNY-USD, long health care equipment, and overweight stocks relative to bonds. On the Senate, the key takeaway is that Biden and the Democrats will not be able to raise taxes. This is a big benefit to the sectors that faced the greatest earnings shock from a partial repeal of Trump’s Tax Cuts and Jobs Act – namely real estate, tech, health care, utilities, consumer discretionary, and financials (Table 2). A simple play on these sectoral benefits courtesy of Anastasios Avgeriou, our US equity strategist, would be to go long small caps versus large caps, i.e. S&P 600 relative to the S&P 500, but wait till the fiscal hurdle is cleared. The BCA infrastructure basket should benefit regardless, as infrastructure is one of the few areas of bipartisan agreement, especially amid a large output gap.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 We upgraded the Republicans to favored status last week based on our quantitative Senate election model, which showed a 51% chance that Republicans would maintain control, with 51-49 votes. Our presidential model also showed Trump winning with a 51% chance, but we subjectively capped his odds at 45% due to our doubts about his ability to win Michigan given Biden’s 4% lead in head-to-head public opinion polls there. 2 It is possible that Nevada’s November 10 deadline or North Carolina’s November 12 deadline could become relevant, but we doubt it. 3 Precise Electoral College outcomes cannot be predicted due to faithless electors, i.e. electoral college members who vote differently than required based on their state’s popular vote. In 2016 there were seven faithless electors and in 2020 there could be several and they could make the difference. Material punishments may not prevent an elector from making a conscientious decision to stray from his or her state’s results in an election viewed as having historic importance.

Special Report

Highlights The Beirut blast calls attention to instability in the Shia Crescent. A turbulent push for political change will now ensue in Lebanon. Hezbollah’s and Iran’s political capital in Lebanon will suffer significantly. Lebanon is a red herring, but Iraq is a Black Swan. It is at risk of social unrest contagion. Iran’s financial troubles are weighing on its ability to maintain its sphere of influence. It is adopting a strategy of measured sabotage and deterrence against US interests in Iraq. The double whammy of low oil prices and pandemic is weighing on Saudi Arabia’s finances. Nevertheless it is prioritizing a cooperative relationship with Iraq. Iran could stage a major attack or President Trump’s poor election prospects could force him to “wag the dog.” Massive excess oil capacity will mute the oil market impact of a supply shortfall in Iraq. However, the risk becomes more relevant as demand recovers and markets rebalance in the second half of the year. Stay long Brent crude oil and gold. Feature The August 4 explosion at the Port of Beirut was devastating. It killed more than 220, wounded over 6000, left 300,000 homeless, and damaged buildings as far away as 9km from the site of the explosion. The blast added insult to injury to the country’s already troubled finances. Estimates for the cost of repair range anywhere between $5 billion and $15 billion. Global investors can largely write off the incident as an idiosyncratic shock. Even though emigration is likely to pick up, Lebanon’s population is only a third of Syria’s prior to its civil war. Assuming that a third of Lebanese become displaced abroad – a generous assumption more suitable to Syrian-style civil war than Lebanon’s situation – about 2 million Lebanese will be displaced, half of which will make their way to Europe or elsewhere outside the Middle East. As long as an antagonistic Turkey upholds its agreement with the EU, a mass exodus from Lebanon does not risk an unmanageable migrant crisis for Europe (Chart 1). Political tensions will rise and potentially lead to a populist backlash, given Europe’s battered economy. But Lebanon alone is not enough. The risk is broader Middle Eastern instability, which is a credible risk. Chart 1Middle Eastern Instability Could Fuel European Populism Thus Lebanon in itself is a red herring, but it is a bellwether for further unrest in the Middle East in countries that are not red herrings (Map 1). Map 1Lebanon Is A Red Herring; Iraq And Saudi Arabia Are Relevant A major conflict in Iraq is an underrated risk to global oil supply. The catastrophe calls attention to instability the Shia Crescent – a region in a tug of war between rival sectarian and geopolitical interests. Whereas the 2008 crisis led to the largely Sunni Arab states in the so-called Arab Spring, the 2020 crisis is piling pressure onto already unstable Shia states and regions: Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and possibly eastern Saudi Arabia. Of particular significance is the fate of Iraq. Popular grievances are eerily similar to Lebanon’s. Baghdad is on shaky ground, yet the ramp up in US-Iran tensions going into the November US elections makes the threat of instability in Iraq more acute. As OPEC’s second ranked oil producer, a major conflict in Iraq poses an underrated risk to global oil supply. Supply losses are a tailwind to oil prices when market conditions are tight. However OPEC 2.0’s 8.3mm b/d of voluntary cuts means massive spare capacity is available globally to offset potential losses in Iraq, reducing the potential upside to oil prices. Nevertheless, this risk becomes more relevant as markets tighten on the back of a demand-side recovery, i.e. as balance is restored to the oil market and as excess spare capacity is eliminated. With oil markets likely rebalancing in 3Q20, unrest in Iraq poses an upside risk to our Commodity & Energy Strategy service’s expectation that 2H20 Brent prices will average $44/bbl and 2021 prices will average $65/bbl (Chart 2). Even though gold has already rallied 30% since mid-March, geopolitical risks including US-Iran tensions suggest any near-term selloff is a buying opportunity (Chart 3). The bullish gold narrative – geopolitical risks, falling dollar, and low real interest rates for the foreseeable future – remain intact even as the downturn gives way to a cyclical recovery. We continue to recommend gold on a strategic time horizon. Chart 2Oil Price Rally Remains Intact Chart 3Gold Is Due For A Breather Lebanon’s economic collapse highlights risks to other regional economies tied to the oil dependent Arab economies of the Persian Gulf. As the latter grapple with record low oil prices, production cuts, and the pandemic-induced recession, second-order effects will reverberate throughout the region, hitting economies such as Egypt and Jordan whose economic as well as political structures are intimately intertwined with Gulf Cooperation Council finances and policies. Lebanon’s Collapse Was Inevitable Lebanon was already going through an economic and financial meltdown before the explosion (Chart 4). Aside from the humanitarian loss, the economic impact is also profound. The country – highly dependent on imports of basic goods and suffering from food insecurity – must now contend with the loss of its main port and most of its grain reserves, destroyed in the explosion. As the dust settles, grief is morphing into anger on the streets. Regardless of whether the blast was due to happenstance or malice, the immediate cause was 2,750 tons of ammonium nitrate in storage for six years. The government was warned about the risks of the explosive chemicals at least four times this year – with the latest being on the day of the blast. Chart 4Beirut Port Explosion Accelerated Lebanon’s Collapse Mass protests are already taking place, calling on the government to be held accountable for criminal negligence. A controversial petition to return Lebanon to French mandate has gained more than 60,000 signatures. Prime Minister Hassan Diab’s seven-month-old cabinet has resigned. (It was put in place last year amid an earlier bout of unrest.) Official incompetence and neglect are in fact the best-case explanations for the explosion. Many questions remain unanswered. For instance, what triggered the fire? Israel swiftly denied any connection and offered humanitarian aid, while Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah claimed to know more about the Port of Haifa than about Beirut Port. Early parliamentary elections and the cabinet’s resignation will not appease the protesters. Photos of Nasrallah, President Aoun, Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, and former Prime Minister Saad Hariri were among those hung by protesters in gallows in Martyrs’ Square over the weekend. Berri and Gebran Bassil are known to be the source of the cabinet’s decision-making power.1 They have veto over all decisions, large and small. During the mass protests in October 2019, Nasrallah stated that Hezbollah has two red lines:     Aoun must finish his term, which expires in 2022;     No early elections will be held, i.e. the speaker of the house will not be changed. While early elections have now been promised, these red lines highlight that corruption runs deep in Lebanon and opposition groups face an uphill battle against the establishment. A turbulent push for political change will now ensue. Hezbollah’s and Iran’s political capital in Lebanon will suffer significantly. Another Israeli confrontation with Hezbollah is not the base case but it could occur. Bottom Line: Lebanon is a failed state. As with the Arab Spring, the question is whether popular anger will prove contagious and spread to more market-relevant neighboring countries. The rally in the Israeli shekel in trade weighted terms since mid-March has already started to fizzle and may be tested further as turmoil in Lebanon raises the risk of confrontation. Contagion? In order for a geopolitical event in the Middle East to warrant investors’ attention, it must affect at least two of the following factors : (1) global oil supply, (2) geography of existential significance to a regional power, or (3) sectarian conflict which could lead to contagion. In this context, Lebanon is a red herring, but Iraq is not – therefore investors should watch to see if anything causes destabilization in Iraq. A decline in Iranian funds will weaken Tehran’s sphere of influence. Like Lebanon, Iraq is dominated by a highly corrupt sectarian system that has been plundering the wealth; people are suffering from rising rates of unemployment; and the regime is in the crosshairs of competing foreign agendas (Chart 5). Chart 5Iraqis And Lebanese Suffer Similar Grievances Iraq is in Iran’s sights because it aspires to establish a land bridge to the Mediterranean through a friendly “Shia Crescent” (Map 2). Iran’s modus operandi is to establish a presence in its neighbors’ domestic politics through Iran-backed factions. Map 2Iraq Essential To Iran’s Aspirational ‘Land Bridge’ To The Mediterranean Given the current state of Iran’s economy, it is not far-fetched to envision a significant drop in the funding of its foreign proxies (Chart 6). Historically these funds have followed the ebbs and flows of oil prices. For instance, in 2009, when faced with declining oil prices and US sanctions Iran’s funds to Hezbollah were estimated to have fallen by 40%. This happened again in 2014-16 and is not too different from today. Thus Iraq is at risk of contagion. Iran’s financial troubles are weighing on its ability to maintain its sphere of influence. Syrian fighters have reported paychecks being slashed, Iranian projects in Syria have stalled, and Hezbollah employees report to have missed paychecks and lost other benefits. Tehran’s finances are essential for Hezbollah’s survival.2 Iran’s proxies in Iraq are facing a similar fate.3 Chart 6Iran Suffering Under "Maximum Pressure" Bottom Line: Iraq faces an uptick in social unrest due to the poor living conditions and possible contagion from Lebanon. Meanwhile, Iran-backed groups there face a decline in funds from Tehran, which will send them searching for replacement funds. If Lebanon falters the world can usually ignore it but if Iraq falters the world will have to take notice. Saudi Arabia Prioritizes Revenue Over Growth Beirut’s foreign policy stances in recent years have been seen as appeasing Iran at the expense of Gulf Arab states.4 This trend coincides with a decline in Gulf Cooperation Council financing to Lebanon. Now the collapse in oil prices and pandemic have weighed on Saudi Arabia’s budget, which still depends on the energy sector for most of its revenues despite efforts to diversify. State revenues were down 49% year-on-year in Q2 pulling the budget deficit down to $29 billion (Chart 7). Riyadh is reassessing its priorities. Opting for revenue at the expense of growth, Riyadh has tightened the screws on its citizens. The government has had to pare back some of the benefits Saudis have long been accustomed to. The value-added-tax rate tripled from 5% to 15%, and a bonus cost-of-living allowance of $266 for public sector employees ended. The kingdom also announced plans to reduce spending on major projects by $26 billion – including some of those associated with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s reform agenda, Vision 2030. Chart 7Saudi Arabia Under Pressure From Double Whammy Severe economic turmoil poses a risk to the Saudi social contract in which citizens pledge allegiance to the ruling class in exchange for financial and social guarantees. The risk now is that the fiscal challenges dent Saudi citizens’ pocketbooks and thus impact social and political stability. However, oil prices are recovering to levels consistent with the kingdom’s fiscal breakeven oil price next year. The global economic recovery will begin to support the kingdom’s economy in the second half of this year (Chart 8). This will ease pressure on the budget and hence households. Moreover the slowdown is likely to hit foreign workers hardest and thus hasten the Saudization process. Foreign workers are the lowest hanging fruit and will be the first to find themselves jobless. In that sense the crisis is expediting some of Riyadh’s long-term reform targets. That said, there is still some risk of internal instability or even a palace coup. Tehran could incite sectarian tensions in the kingdom’s Eastern Province where an estimated 30-50% of the population is believed to be Shia. This is relevant given that nearly all Saudi oil production is located there. Chart 8KSA Benefits From EM GDP Growth ... Regarding the possibility of a palace coup, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has spent this year cracking down on potential dissidents. Former Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef and King Salman’s only surviving full-brother Prince Ahmed bin Abdulaziz – both influential and well-liked – were among those detained in March. The kingdom’s contradictory policies – reform through repression – may eventually culminate in an overt political crisis. Though such a crisis may not occur until the time of royal succession. These economic and political challenges may force Saudi Arabia to adopt an inward stance. Its foreign interventions to date have been costly and come with little benefit – judging by the war in Yemen. It is also possible that Saudi Arabia, which is already the third largest defense spender globally, will try to strengthen its position vis-à-vis Iran. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has already stated that the kingdom will pursue a nuclear program if Iran develops a nuclear bomb. This is relevant in today’s context with Iran no longer complying with restrictions to its nuclear program (Table 1). Saudi Arabia, like Iran, claims its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes – in order to generate nuclear power as part of efforts to diversify its economy.5 Table 1Iran No Longer Complying With 2015 Nuclear Deal Still, low oil prices tend to discourage petro states from engaging in conflict (Chart 9). Arab petro states may show restraint, at least until oil markets recover. Chart 9Low Oil Prices Discourage Petro States From Engaging In Conflict Overall weakness in oil-producing economies will hurt various countries that rely on remittances (Chart 10). The downturn will also hurt countries dependent on remittances from petro states in the region such as Egypt and Jordan. Bottom Line: The collapse in oil prices is forcing Saudi Arabia to reconsider its priorities and is expediting some long-term reforms. For now, it is adopting a pro-revenue rather than a pro-growth stance. This is likely to result in a focus inward for the kingdom. The implication is that countries that are leveraged to the petro-economies of the Gulf for remittances, bilateral aid, and capital flows will take a hit. These include Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan. Chart 10Egypt And Jordan Also Vulnerable To Petro State Weakness Iraq Is The Prize Not unlike Lebanon, Iraq’s political class has been suffering a legitimacy crisis since protests erupted there last October resulting in the resignation of then-Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi. However unlike Lebanon, Iraq is a significant geography for global investors. It is a major OPEC producer – second only to Saudi Arabia – accounting for 16% of the cartel’s production last year. The Iraqi oil minister’s first foreign trip was to the Saudi capital. This is not surprising. Iraq not only seeks Saudi leniency in OPEC 2.0 cuts, but also needs financial assistance to develop a natural gas field that will allow it to reduce dependence on Iran. Saudi Arabia also hopes to reduce Iraq’s dependence on Iranian natural gas and coax it into its sphere of influence. When it comes to crude oil, the additional 1mm b/d of voluntary cuts in June announced unilaterally by Saudi Arabia beyond its agreed OPEC 2.0 commitments are also a sign of Saudi willingness to accommodate Iraq and its non-compliance  (Chart 11).6 Saudi Arabia does not want to see Iraq’s newly elected government failing on the back of budgetary strain. In fact, al-Kadhimi is an opportunity for the Saudis. Formerly the director the National Intelligence Service with warm ties to the US, he is a champion of Iraqi sovereignty. Even though Iraq is being forced to compensate for past overproduction of oil in August and September, it was cajoled by the promise of a $500 million “bridging” loan from Saudi Arabia, to be repaid when oil markets recover. While financial assistance shows the kingdom’s commitment to Iraq, more significantly it reflects Riyadh’s desperation to revive oil markets and bring prices closer to its fiscal breakeven oil price amid the still uncertain demand outlook. Chart 11Saudi Arabia Willing To Accommodate Iraq Neither Saudi Arabia’s nor al-Kadhimi’s efforts are guaranteed to succeed in pulling Iraq out of Iran’s sphere. The prime minister received a rude awakening upon his arrest of 14 Kata’ib Hezbollah fighters in June on grounds of a plan to launch a rocket attack on US interest in Baghdad. They were swiftly released, and the case against them dropped. It is hard to curb Iranian influence. For its part, Iran stood behind al-Kadhimi’s nomination despite him being perceived as pro-Western. Tehran needed to avoid an anti-Iranian backlash on the streets of Baghdad if it had stood against him. Instead, Iran’s calculus was that it is in its best interest to swallow the pill and work with the new government at a time when Iraqi anger was targeted against US involvement rather than at Iranian interference. Prior to the US assassination of Qassem al-Suleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis on Iraqi soil, Iraqis were rebelling against Iran’s influence. That being said, Iran will maintain pressure on Iraq through continued attacks on US interests there (Table A1 in Appendix). This is also reflected in the July assassination of top Iraqi security expert Hisham al-Hashimi, who had previously advised the government on how to curb Iranian control. Iran was looking to make it to the US election in November without an escalation in tensions, hoping the US elections will result in a more dovish Democratic Party leadership averse to conflict with Iran. However, recent cyber-attacks on key Iranian infrastructure raise the likelihood that tensions will escalate ahead of the elections. The US is also threatening to maintain maximum sanctions even if the United Nations Security Council disagrees. As always, Iraq will find itself in the crossfire of any deterioration in relations. Bottom Line: Maintaining a cooperative relationship with Iraq aligns with both of Saudi Arabia’s interests there: limiting Iranian interference and supporting global oil markets through supply-side discipline. Iran will maintain pressure on Iraq’s new government through continued attacks on US interests. However, these attacks are supposed to fall short of killing US citizens and giving President Trump a reason to launch air strikes that could give him a patriotic boost in opinion polls. Nevertheless, tensions in the Gulf could escalate if Iran stages a major attack or if President Trump’s poor election prospects force him to “wag the dog.” In that case Iraqi oil supply would be disrupted. Investment Implications The Shia Crescent remains at heightened risk of instability on the back of Iran’s economic deterioration. Massive excess oil capacity will mute the oil market impact of a supply shortfall in Iraq. However, the risk becomes more relevant as demand recovers and markets rebalance in the second half of the year. Given that the Saudi loan will ensure Iraq’s commitment to compensatory production cuts in August and September, supply-side risks are a tailwind to oil prices in H2. The elevated risk of an escalation in US-Iran tensions also favors holding gold. President Trump’s polling has bottomed, yet he remains the underdog in the election – we maintain his odds of winning reelection are 35%. This raises the risk that he adopts a “war president” posture. Iran could become a target as the financial price of confronting Iran is negligible for Trump, whereas a major China confrontation could sink the stock market. The collapse in oil prices and pandemic have weighed on Saudi Arabia’s budget. It has adopted a revenue over growth posture. While this could be a risk to domestic stability, our base case is that it accelerates the kingdom’s long-term reforms. The oil market rout and economic downturn will hurt other countries in the region that are leveraged to Arab petro states – chiefly Egypt and Jordan. Investors should monitor risks to state stability in the coming years. Lebanon’s crisis will incentivize emigration, but given the relatively small size of its population, the major risk to Europe comes from any broader state failures and Middle Eastern instability rather than from Lebanon’s failure alone. If the Democratic Party wins the US election, as expected, then the US-Iran strategic détente will resume and Iran will get a lifeline. But the immediate transition will still be rocky given the Israeli and Saudi desire to exploit Iran’s extreme vulnerability and build leverage with Washington. The COVID-19 crisis heralds another round of Middle Eastern crisis, much as the 2008 crisis led to the Arab Spring. Stay strategically long Brent crude oil and gold. Also, in the wake of yesterday’s 15% pullback in silver, go strategically long silver (XAGUSD), which will continue benefiting from the same structural trends favoring gold but also outperform gold as the global economy recovers, given its greater industrial utility.     Roukaya Ibrahim Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com       Appendix Table A1Iran Adopting Deterrence Strategy In Iraq   Footnotes 1     Berri is of the Hezbollah-allied Amal Movement and has been parliamentary speaker since 1992, while Bassil is President Aoun’s son-in-law and president of the Free Patriotic Movement, which has the most seats in parliament. 2     Hezbollah gains legitimacy at home through its charity work that plugs the gap in services normally provided for by the government. 3    According to a commander of an Iran-backed paramilitary group in Iraq, Iran slashed its monthly funding to the top four militias by nearly half this year. Please see “Coronavirus and sanctions hit Iran’s support of proxies in Iraq,” Reuters, July 2, 2020. 4    Hezbollah has gained control over the foreign policy and Lebanon has recently taken stances that are seen as bowing to Iranian pressure. Lebanon did not attend a March 22, 2018 extraordinary Arab League meeting discussing violations committed by Iran. Prior to that, Beirut did not condemn Iranian attacks on a Saudi diplomatic mission in Tehran. 5    However an undisclosed facility for processing uranium ore in the northeast of the kingdom has recently appeared. 6    This is not unlike the US’s decision to extend sanction waivers by four months, allowing Baghdad to import Iranian energy in order to ensure that the new government of Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi can stand on its own and is not overly dependent on Iran.

Special Report

Highlights The epicenter of the new Middle East crisis is the Shia Crescent, which threatens global oil supply. However, the escalation of conflict in the Mediterranean is also relevant to global investors. The crises in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean are escalating as President Erdogan makes a last attempt to benefit from his relationship with Trump before US elections in November. A breakup between Turkey and NATO is not our base case, but European sanctions against Turkey are likely. Turkish risk will rise. A revival in Libyan oil production would not be a meaningful risk to the recovery in oil markets. Stay strategically long Brent crude oil. Libya could become a “Black Swan” for market participants exposed to southern Europe, Turkey, and North Africa. We remain short our EM Strongman Currency Basket versus other emerging market currencies. Feature Dear Clients, This week we present to you a special report on Turkey by my colleague Roukaya Ibrahim, Editor, Geopolitical Strategy. Roukaya argues that President Erdogan is at a crossroads in which he will confront major military and economic constraints to his foreign policy adventurism. On Monday, July 27 you will receive a special report that I co-wrote with Anastasios Avgeriou, chief strategist of our US Equity Strategy. In this report we continue our analysis of the equity sector implications of the upcoming US election. Anastasios also provides analysis of two cyclical sectors that you may find of interest. On Friday, July 31 we will send you our regular monthly GeoRisk Update, which surveys our proprietary, market-based geopolitical risk indicators and what they imply for your portfolio. We trust you will enjoy these reports and look forward to your feedback. All very best, Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Chart 1Shia Crescent' Flailing Under Maximum Pressure And COVID-19 The Middle East is suffering a wave of instability after the COVID-19 crisis just as it did in the years after the 2008 financial crisis. The crises in Libya, Syria, and Yemen were never resolved and now new crises are emerging from Egypt and Turkey to Iran and Iraq. By contrast with the “Arab Spring” of 2011, the epicenter of the political earthquake this time around is likely to be the “Shia Crescent,” i.e. Iran, Iraq, eastern Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Lebanon. The US policy of maximum pressure on Iran, which is intensifying in the lead-up to the US election, has weakened Iran and its sphere of influence (Chart 1). Chart 2Dominant Arab States Also Face Struggles Meanwhile the pandemic and collapse in oil prices have destabilized the predominantly Arab states (Chart 2). Authoritarian regimes like Egypt and Saudi Arabia that consolidated power after the Arab Spring are more stable than they were but still vulnerable to external and internal forces. These cyclical developments are occurring against the backdrop of structural changes like the US’s energy independence and strategic pivot to Asia, which have created a power vacuum in the Middle East. The pivot to Asia is rooted in US grand strategy and has proceeded across partisan administrations, so it will continue. Indeed US-China tensions are escalating rapidly in 2020 despite the financial market’s lack of interest. Turkey and Russia are scrambling to take advantage of the US’s withdrawal and gain greater influence through regional proxy wars. This year has seen a marked escalation of their involvement in Libya, where the war is re-escalating and drawing in Egypt, Europe, and Gulf Arabs. At minimum a Mediterranean conflict could affect oil prices as well as Turkish, Russian, and other regional financial assets. At maximum it could affect European assets, which are exposed to geopolitical risk in Turkey and North Africa. The Shia Crescent is the crisis’s epicenter, but Libya is also investment relevant. Bottom Line: The epicenter of the new Middle East crisis is the Shia Crescent, which threatens global oil supply. However, the escalation of conflict in the Mediterranean is also relevant to global investors, primarily through its potential to impact European assets. Re-Escalation In Libya The Libyan crisis has been escalating since the beginning of the year and is on the verge of turning into a major multilateral conflict. The risk now is that Egypt, another regional power, will intervene in Libya against Turkey in a battle for North African hegemony (Map 1). Map 1Libya Could Become A "Black Swan" Event Several incidents since we outlined Egypt’s red lines on the Libyan conflict suggest that Cairo and Ankara will clash in Libya (Table 1). Table 1Egypt And Turkey Up The Ante In Libya While Egypt has declared Sirte and al-Jufra as red lines, threatening military intervention if crossed, Turkey is calling for the Libyan National Army’s (LNA) withdrawal from these regions as a precondition for a ceasefire (Map 2). Egypt is allied with General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army, which is based in Benghazi and holds parliament in Tobruk. Map 2Libya’s Battlefront Is Closing In On The Oil Crescent The next move is now in Turkey’s hands. The escalation depends on whether it insists on moving forward toward Egypt’s red line. Turkey’s recent movements do not suggest it is backing down. True on July 21, and again on July 22, top officials from Turkey’s foreign ministry referred to a political solution as being the only solution in Libya. However, these statements were made while Turkey held diplomatic meetings with Niger and Malta that could be aimed at establishing airbases there.1 At its core, the conflict in Libya is a clash between the two dominant geopolitical forces in the Middle East. On the one hand, Turkey and Qatar are independent economic forces to Saudi Arabia and supporters of political Islam. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt form an economic bloc and support Saudi religious authority and political authoritarianism. Bottom Line: The crisis in Libya is heading toward an Egypt-Turkey confrontation. Be ready for an escalation. Egypt Has More To Lose Than Turkey In Libya Both Egypt and Turkey are nearing a point of no return in Libya. A last-minute change of heart from either side would be increasingly more humiliating, both domestically and regionally. Chart 3Defeat In Libya Would Accelerate Erdogan’s Decline While Egypt’s geographic proximity to Libya makes it more interested in what goes on there and will give it a home advantage in any military confrontation, Egypt’s military may be overstretched as it is also at risk of conflict with Ethiopia over water resources.2 For Egypt, a victory would resuscitate its position as a regional power, bringing about a new era of greater Egyptian regional leadership. It would silence domestic skeptics who argue Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s rule is based on the illegitimate ousting of Egypt’s only democratically elected leader. It would squash any prospect of a revival of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and validate authoritarian rulers in the region. It could also annul the recent Libya-Turkey maritime demarcation agreement – a positive for Egypt’s natural gas ambitions. A loss would be a wake-up call for Egypt’s military, which has been spending scarce funds on costly equipment. It may also result in a change in leadership in Egypt or at the very least weaken al-Sisi’s domestic power and Egypt’s regional clout. The regime would persist over the short and medium term, but it would suffer a loss of legitimacy and the underground domestic opposition would intensify, creating a long-term threat. A complete defeat of LNA forces would pose a major security risk. Haftar’s LNA acts as a buffer between Egypt and unfriendly militias in Western Libya. Turkey does not have a vital national strategic interest in Libya and therefore the constraint pushing against on a protracted conflict is stronger than it is for Egypt. Given that Turkey is a democracy, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has more to lose in the case of a military defeat. It would accelerate the decline in his popular support and that of his Justice and Development Party (AKP) (Chart 3). A conflict with Egypt is therefore a gratuitous gamble. However, victory would vindicate Erdogan’s efforts to create a strongman regime and revive memories of the great Ottoman empire.3 Such an accomplishment could mark a major turning point for Erdogan. His domestic blunders would be forgiven and he would be able to claim that he is one of the great leaders of Turkey. Given that Turkey lacks strategic necessity in Libya, and a defeat could dislodge Erdogan in 2023, one should expect Turkey not to cross Egypt’s red lines. However, Erdogan’s rule has been characterized by hubris, nationalism, and foreign assertiveness to distract from domestic economic mismanagement. Therefore we cannot have a high conviction that Turkey will bow to its political and military constraints. The risk of a large conflict is underrated. Bottom Line: Egypt has greater national interests at stake in Libya than Turkey. The implication is that Turkey should recognize Egyptian red lines. However, Turkey’s decision to intervene in Libya suggests that Erdogan could overreach. Libya could become a “Black Swan” for market participants exposed to southern Europe, Turkey, and North Africa. Will Turkey Break With NATO? Since signing the maritime and military cooperation agreements with Libya on November 27, Turkey has raised its stakes in Libya. Ankara has sent more armed drones, surface-to-air missile defense systems, naval frigates, a hundred officers, and up to 3,800 Syrian fighters. It has rolled back all of the strategic gains that the Libyan National Army made in 2019. The timing of the recent escalation is significant. The US election cycle offers Erdogan a chance to increase Turkey’s foreign assertiveness with minimal US retaliation. US-Turkish relations have been icy for years. Turkey is an ascendant regional power that is pursuing an increasingly independent national policy, while the US is no longer as dominant of a global hegemonic power capable of enforcing discipline among minor allies. The US alliance with the Kurds in Syria and Iraq has alienated Turkey. The 2016 Turkish coup attempt also increased the level of distrust between the two states. However, President Trump’s personal and political affinity for President Erdogan has resulted in a permissive policy toward Turkey. Trump seeks to distance the US from conflicts in Syria and Libya inherited from his predecessor. He has little commitment to the Kurds. More broadly he has embraced geopolitical multipolarity and avoided telling Erdogan what to do. The Trump administration has not retaliated against Turkey for purchasing Russia’s S400 missile defense system or for pursuing expansive maritime-territorial claims near Cyprus. Even though the Turkish arms purchase makes it eligible for sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), the Trump administration has yet to impose sanctions. Senator Lindsey Graham, who is close to the Trump administration, suggested in July 2019 that sanctions could be avoided if Turkey did not activate the system.4 Turkey, for its part, has yet to activate the system three months after the April target date for activation. Turkey blames the delay on COVID-19. With regard to Libya, the Trump administration has remained largely on the sidelines. It has promised to reduce American commitment to overseas conflicts and has criticized the Obama administration’s intervention in Libya in 2011 to bail out the European allies. Officially the US is aligned with Fayez al-Sarraj’s UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA), but so far its role has been minimal, refraining from providing any military support. Moreover, Washington’s key allies in the region – Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, even France – support the Libyan National Army. Libya could become a “Black Swan” event. It is Haftar’s other main backer – Russia – that would present an incentive for greater American involvement. The US African Command reports that two thousand Russian mercenaries from the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group have fought in Libya. The US also reported in June that at least 14 MiG29 and Su-24 Russian warplanes were sent to Libya via Syria, believed to be located in the al-Jufra airbase. Moreover, the US State Department has accused Russia of printing billions of fake Libyan dinars to fund Haftar’s forces.5 The Trump administration has been permissive toward Russia as well as Turkey, letting them work out deals with each other, but US electoral politics could prompt Trump to make shows of strength against Russia to fend off criticism. Thus the months in the lead up to the US elections offer the Turkish leader what may be a closing opportunity to increase the country’s foreign assertiveness with minimal US retribution. If Trump loses, Erdogan may face a less sympathetic Washington. By contrast France, also a NATO ally, has taken a stronger position against Ankara over its involvement in Libya. Relations with other eastern Mediterranean countries have also been rocky due to Turkey’s exclusion from gas deals in the region and drilling in disputed waters near Cyprus and Greece. France has a commercial interest in Libya’s oil industry and backs Haftar’s Libyan National Army to some extent.6 Citing aggressive behavior by Turkish warships after an encounter in the Mediterranean, France suspended its involvement in NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian on July 1.7 France has also demanded EU sanctions against Turkey – both for its drilling activities around Cyprus as well as for its role in Libya.8 Still, Europeans have little appetite for direct intervention in Libya. The leaders of France, Italy and Germany have threatened sanctions against foreign states that violate the arms embargo in Libya. This warning comes after EU foreign ministers agreed to discuss the possibility of another set of sanctions against Turkey in their August meeting if Turkey persists in converting the Hagia Sophia from a museum to a mosque. Despite the fracturing within NATO, the alliance will not break up. Turkey’s geographic proximity to Russia, large number of troops, and military strength make it an essential member of the defense treaty (Chart 4). Chart 4NATO Will Not Break With Turkey Instead, the Europeans will retaliate against Erdogan’s foreign adventurism through sanctions, while maintaining the NATO alliance. This acts as a cyclical rebuke without damaging the secular relationship. Europe will use sanctions to retaliate against Turkey’s provocations. The Europeans will be particularly rattled if Turkey succeeds in its North African endeavor and amasses significant regional power as a result. Victory in Libya would make Turkey the gatekeeper to two major migrant entry points to the European continent, providing Ankara with leverage in its negotiations with Europe (Chart 5). It would also increase the likelihood that Turkey increases its assertive behavior in the Eastern Mediterranean, where Israel, Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, and Italy are seeking to develop a natural gas hub. Chart 5Turkish Victory In Libya Would Rattle Europe Although Erdogan shows no signs of backing down, constraints suggest that Erdogan may pull back from being perceived as overly provocative. The Turkish economy is highly dependent on Europe in trade and capital flows (Chart 6). Thus unlike American sanctions, which have little bearing on the Turkish economy short of radical financial measures, European sanctions suppress any chance of an economic recovery. Chart 6European Sanctions Would Reverse Turkey's Recovery Chart 7Erdogan Risks Popularity By Overstepping In Libya And East Med Turkey’s frail economy and crackdown on opposition parties could weigh on Erdogan’s approval, which is losing its COVID-induced bounce (Chart 7). Thus, as in the case of Egypt, Erdogan should recognize these constraints and reduce his foreign assertiveness. If he does not, then he will hit up against material constraints that will harm the Turkish economy. Bottom Line: The Libyan crisis is escalating as Erdogan makes a last attempt to benefit from his relationship with Trump before US elections in November. Washington’s detached stance in Libya highlights that its foreign policy priorities lie elsewhere – in Asia and Iran. Meanwhile, Europe is divided over Libya. A breakup between Turkey and NATO is not our base case, but new European sanctions against Turkey are not unlikely. A Turkish victory in Libya would lead to a significant escalation in tensions between Turkey and the West. Investment Implications Turkish geopolitical risk is set to rise in the lead up to the November US elections as Turkey becomes increasingly embroiled in foreign conflicts – in Libya, Syria, Iraq, and most recently in the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict (Chart 8). Ankara’s more provocative stances raise the risk of sanctions from the US and more significantly from the EU. This would hurt Turkish risk assets at a time of already heightened vulnerability. If Turkey manages to secure a victory in Libya, it would benefit economically from construction and energy contracts there. However, it would also result in a significant uptick in geopolitical tensions in the Middle East as the West and the West’s regional allies will be disturbed by Ankara’s expanding influence. Stay short our EM Strongman Currency Basket composed of the Turkish lira, Philippine peso, and Brazilian real versus other emerging market currencies. Even though the lira is already cheap against the US dollar, it faces more downside due to the risks highlighted in this report and the massive growth in money supply in Turkey. Similarly, the prospect of a military confrontation will raise the equity risk premium priced in Egyptian stocks. Egypt will continue underperforming emerging markets as long as it remains invested in an unsettled conflict in Libya (Chart 9). Chart 8Turkish Risk Will Rise Libyan oil exports are unlikely to stage a major revival anytime soon (Chart 10). Although the Libyan National Oil Company lifted force majeure on July 10, Haftar’s Libyan National Army reintroduced the blockade a day later. Clashes are also occurring near oil facilities in the Brega region where Syrian, Sudanese, and Russian Wagner Group mercenaries currently have a presence. Chart 9Egyptian Risk Assets Will Underperform Chart 10Libyan Oil Handicapped By Haftar’s Blockade Chart 11Stay Bullish Euro Over The Long Run Even in the best-case scenario, in which force majeure is promptly lifted, the blockade damaged both the reservoirs and oil and gas infrastructure, preventing a resurgence of exports to pre-January levels. The Libyan National Oil Company warned that unless oil production restarts immediately, output will average 650,000 barrels per day in 2022. This is significantly less than the over 1 million barrels per day just prior to the blockade, and the 2.1 million barrels per day Libya had planned to produce by 2024. In any case these figures pale in comparison to the production curtailments currently in place by OPEC 2.0, which are set to decrease to 8.3 million barrels per day beginning in August from 9.6 million barrels per day now. Given OPEC 2.0’s demonstrated commitment to production discipline, a revival in Libyan oil production is not a meaningful risk to the recovery in oil markets. We remain strategically long Brent crude oil, which is up 78% since inception in March. This trade could experience near-term volatility due to any hiccups in global economic stimulus or risk-off events from geopolitical risks. But over a 12-month time frame we expect oil prices to rise higher. BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy strategists expect Brent prices to average $44/bbl in 2H2020, and $65/bbl in 2021. The recent rise in the euro is rooted in global macro and structural factors but a major Mediterranean crisis and/or other geopolitical risks we have highlighted surrounding the US election cycle could create headwinds in the short term. Over the long run we are bullish euro (Chart 11).   Roukaya Ibrahim Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 In Niger, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu met with his Nigerien counterpart and stated the two states’ willingness to boost bilateral relations in agriculture, mining, energy, industry, and trade. A day earlier, Turkey and Qatar’s defense ministers met with Libya’s minister of interior in Ankara to discuss the situation in Libya. And on July 20, a trilateral meeting was held between Turkey’s defense minister, Libya’s interior minister, and Malta’s minister of home affairs and national security. The inclusion of Malta – located just north of Libya in the Mediterranean – is perplexing. The three discussed defense cooperation and efforts toward regional stability and peace. These recent meetings could suggest that Turkey is negotiating agreements to fortify its strategic approaches to Libya. This could involve greenlighting airbases in Niger and Malta in exchange for economic support and Qatari funding. 2 The latest developments suggest that the Egypt-Ethiopia conflict is de-escalating. On July 21, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed tweeted that Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan had reached a “common understanding on continuing technical discussions on filling.” But Ethiopia will have an opportunity if Egypt becomes embroiled in Libya. 3 The Turks ruled Tripolitania from the mid-1500s until Italy’s 1912 victory in the Italo-Turkish War. Surveys conducted by Metropoll reveal that the share of Turks with a positive perception of Turkey’s active role in Libya shot up to 58% in June from 35% in January. 4 Senate Majority Whip John Thune has even proposed using the US Army’s missile procurement account to buy the Russian missiles from Turkey, thus reducing tensions between the two NATO allies. This is unlikely to occur because it would look politically weak in the US, while Turkey would face Russian pressure. The US suspended Turkey from the F35 Joint Strike Fighter program, banning it from purchasing F35s, and removing it from the aircraft’s production program. US Secretary of Defense Mark Esper stated that the US would only consider allowing Turkey back into the F35 Joint Strike Program if the Russian defense system were moved out of the country. The Turkish purchase of the Russian defense system was partly driven by the need to work with Russia and partly driven by Erdogan’s desire to reduce the risk of another coup attempt. Ankara was indefensible against the Turkish Air Force’s F-16s during the 2016 coup attempt since its military relies heavily on US built missile defense. 5 Moscow has denied all allegations of involvement in Libya. 6 US-made javelin missiles purchased by France were found at the pro-Haftar base in Gharyan in June last year, raising suspicion that France was backing Haftar’s offensives. 7 On June 10, French frigate Courbet approached a Tanzanian-flagged ship heading to Libya in suspicion that it was violating the UN arms embargo. France accused three Turkish vessels that were escorting the Tanzanian vessel of harassment by targeting the Courbet’s fire control radars. Turkey denied harassing the Courbet and maintains that the Tanzanian vessel was transporting humanitarian aid to Libya. A NATO investigation into the incident was inconclusive. 8 The EU agreed to impose sanctions on two Turkish oil company officials in February in protest against Turkish drilling activity in the Eastern Mediterranean. However these sanctions are mostly just political symbolism.

Special Report

Highlights Theoretically the US could employ a “Reverse Kissinger” strategy – befriend Russia to isolate China or at least prevent the budding Russo-Chinese alliance.  But Trump has made no headway in relations with Russia. Meanwhile Democrats now see engagement with Putin as a failure and will pursue a more aggressive policy. Competition in Europe’s natural gas market underscores the broader Russo-American geopolitical confrontation. Russia will likely succeed in preserving its share in the European natural gas market in the medium term, but not in the long run. We remain overweight Russian equities and bonds relative to EM benchmarks, but will downgrade if Biden’s election becomes a foregone conclusion. Feature Investors do not need to wait for the US election verdict to assess the general trajectory of US-Russia relations. Some points are clear regardless of whether President Trump or former Vice President Joe Biden prevails: US-Russia engagement had mostly but not entirely failed between the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and President Trump’s election in 2016.   President Trump could not break free of the constraints of office and his administration has remained adversarial toward Russia despite his preference for deeper engagement. Whether Democrats or Republicans take the White House in 2021, the result will be confrontation with Russia over the four-year term and likely beyond. The geopolitical risk premium in the Russian ruble will rise relative to its current level. A Trump victory would reduce this risk, but only temporarily.   The Failure Of Engagement Russia’s rise from the ashes of the Soviet Union can be illustrated by our Geopolitical Power Index – it shows Russia’s rise relative to the US in terms of demographic, economic, technological, commercial, and military variables that make a nation strong (Chart 1). Chart 1Russia Rose From Soviet Ashes, But Still Lags US Russia is a shadow of its Soviet self and lags far behind the US in raw capability. But its recovery from the chaos of the 1998 financial crisis, fueled by a global commodity bull market, has consisted of a systematic removal of domestic political constraints. It is politically unified under the personal rule of Putin, has reformed its economy and modernized its military, and has successfully pushed back against the US and the West in its sphere of influence. Russia punches above its economic weight in the world by means of its military, which it has wielded opportunistically in Georgia, Ukraine, Syria, and Libya (Chart 2). Neither the US nor any other power was willing to fill the power vacuum in these locations. A Trump victory only temporarily reduces the rise in Russian geopolitical risk. The US and Russia have a fundamentally antagonistic relationship over influence in Europe and occasionally the Far East. They have little need to trade with each other. They are both large, independent commodity exporters and advanced weapon-makers separated by vast distances. Russia is threatened by the US’s military and technological superiority, its economic strength and newfound status as an energy exporter (see energy section), and its ability to undermine Russian legitimacy in the former Soviet sphere by promoting democracy.  Russia’s advantage is that the US is internally divided by political factions. Putin’s popular approval has benefited from his restoration of domestic order and Russia’s standing as a great power. Successive American presidents have floundered under domestic partisanship and polarization (Chart 3).   Chart 2Russia’s Military Punches Above Its Economic Weight Chart 3Russia Is Politically Unified, The US is Internally Divided   Attempts to “reset” relations have failed.1 The Barack Obama administration’s 2009-11 Reset, announced by Biden, saw several concrete compromises, including the New START treaty and Russia’s joining the WTO. But the Bolotnaya Square protests in 2011-12, at the height of the Arab Spring, rekindled Moscow’s fear that the US aimed to foment “color revolutions” not only in Russia’s periphery but even in Russia itself. Faced with losing its control over Ukraine’s geopolitical orientation, Russia invaded parts of Ukraine and seized Crimea, the first military annexation of territory in Europe since World War II. The US and Europe applied extensive sanctions that last to this day and drag on Russian growth.2  True, Moscow cooperated on the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran. Russia does not want Iran to get nuclear weapons. Yet this is not imminent. And Russia gained global oil market share when the US walked away from the deal and restarted sanctions (Chart 4). Either way, Iran survives as a Russian ally capable of exerting influence across the Middle East.   President Trump launched another attempt at engagement with Russia. If there is a strategic basis for this policy – i.e. if it is not just based in Trump’s personal proclivities – then it is the idea of a “Reverse Kissinger” maneuver. During the Cold War, the US befriended Maoist China in order to isolate the Soviet Union. Today, with China posing the clear threat to US hegemony, the US could try to befriend Russia to isolate China or at least prevent the budding Russo-Chinese alliance.  The difference is that in 1972, American and Chinese interests were complementary. China wished to stabilize its borders and the US offered geopolitical relief as well as technology and knowhow. Today American and Russian interests are not complementary other than the political convenience of demonizing each other (Chart 5). The US offers Russia limited investment capital; Russia does not offer cheap labor or a vast consumer market. Chart 4Russia’s Oil Market Share Benefitted From Iran Sanctions Chart 5US-Russo Interests Are Not Complementary   The Trump administration’s attempt to engage Putin has failed. Putin’s declaration of a global oil market share war this year drove American shale oil companies into bankruptcy during an election year. Barring an “October surprise” engineered by Putin to get Trump reelected, their “alliance” is at best rhetorical and at worst a mirage. Putin might favor Trump because he sharpens US internal divisions, or because he has an isolationist foreign policy preference, but Putin’s actions so far in 2020 suggest a deeper strategic reality: Russia seeks to foment political turmoil in the US, not solidify either of the parties in power, as the latter could backfire against Russia. What Comes After Engagement? Russia lacks the power to create a new world order, but it will continue to leverage its relative power to exercise a veto over affairs in the current global order, in which US influence is weakening. It can hasten the West’s decline by sowing divisions within the West. Chart 6COVID-19 Dented Support For Trump And Putin What happens when US polarization falls and a new political consensus takes shape? This would pose a major threat to Putin’s strategic options. Thus it is relevant if Joe Biden wins the 2020 election with a strong majority and a full Democratic sweep of government. Presidents Trump and Putin, and their political parties, are among the worst performers amid the COVID-19 pandemic and recession (Chart 6). The implication is that Trump will lose the election and Putin will resort to time-tried techniques of confrontation with the West to restore his domestic support. Democrats will pursue a more aggressive policy toward Russia. The Democrats harbor a deep vendetta against Russia over its interference in the 2016 election and will go on the offensive to prevent Russia from trying to undermine their grip on power again. They will also seek to deter Russia from further undermining American strategic interests. Biden will try to revive NATO, expand US troop presence in eastern Europe, and promote democracy and human rights in Russia’s periphery, using the Internet to launch a disinformation campaign against Putin’s regime. Cyber warfare will escalate.  A “Reverse Kissinger” is not achievable until Russia feels threatened by China. The silver lining for Russia is economic: Biden’s policies will help to weaken the dollar and cultivate a global growth recovery. Biden will be less inclined to start disruptive Trump-style trade war with China that could permanently damage China’s potential growth or global growth. Chinese imports are essential to propping up Russia’s sluggish economy. In enabling commodity prices to recover, and reducing global policy uncertainty, Biden would inadvertently aid Russian recovery (Chart 7). Chart 7The Silver Lining Of A Biden Presidency For Russia Is A Weaker Dollar Ultimately Russia is insecure because the US threatens to undermine its economy and political legitimacy both at home and in its strategic buffers. Putin has re-centralized control while shutting out foreign influence. This approach is not changing anytime soon given the recent constitutional changes to prolong Putin’s rule till 2036. Preliminary reports claim that, with 65% of the public voting, these changes were ratified by 76% of the population.3  What changed is that the US is no longer as optimistic about engaging Russia. If anything, its internal divisions will encourage it to go on the offensive. Sanctions may well be expanded before they are eased, the Ukraine conflict could revive rather than simmer down, and new fronts in the conflict could widen, particularly in cyberspace. This is particularly the case if Biden wins the White House in November. The structural, geopolitical risk premium of US-Russia conflict is priced into Russian assets, but there is room for a cyclical increase if Biden is elected. Our market-based Russian geopolitical risk indicators – which define geopolitical risk as excessive ruble weakness relative to its macro context – show that Russian risk is elevated because of COVID-19, but dropping. The US election should reverse this trend, unless Trump wins (Chart 8). Chart 8Russian Geopolitical Risk Set To Increase Even If Trump Re-Elected Alternative measures of political risk that utilize non-market variables support our qualitative assessment, such as the indicator provided by GeoQuant. The implication is that Russian political risk is higher than the market is pricing (Chart 9). Chart 9Market Is Underpricing Russian Political Risk Kissinger Reversed? Not Yet. If Trump wins, could he not engineer a major détente with Russia? In 2018 the US shifted its national defense strategy to emphasize that “the central challenge to US prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition,” arguing specifically that “it is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model.4”  Yet US geopolitical power has declined such that taking an offensive approach to Russia and China simultaneously is not practicable.  If the US pursues the Reverse Kissinger strategy, then it will have to make major concessions to Putin’s Russia. It would need to provide substantial sanctions relief, accept the Crimean annexation, allow a high degree of Russian influence in Donbass (Ukraine), abandon hopes of retribution for the 2016 election interference, ask for a return to the 2015 nuclear deal on Iran at best, and settle for arms control agreements that do not cover new technologies. It is not clear that President Trump would concede this much in a second term, though in most cases he would have the power to do so. Yet Moscow cannot downgrade its cooperation with Beijing by much, since US-Russia détente never lasts long and China weighs more heavily in its economic calculus than the West’s sanctions. Chart 10US-Russo Struggle Is Subordinate To US-Sino Conflict The Democrats, by contrast, are not prepared to make these concessions, particularly on 2016. They are more willing to pursue a gradualist approach in dealing with China, which they believe is less urgent due to shared economic interests.5  If the US confronts Russia, then Russia will draw closer to China. The informal alliance between these two powers is well advanced. A closer association provides China with a better position in waging its long-term geopolitical competition with the United States.  Ultimately US grand strategy and public opinion will drive American presidents to take a harder line on China because it rivals the US in economic resilience and technology over the long run (Chart 10). The conflict with Moscow will eventually be subordinate to the US-China struggle. But a “Reverse Kissinger” is not achievable until Russia feels threatened by China, either through its own weakness or Chinese strength. A much stronger trans-Atlantic alliance, or much greater Chinese influence over East Asia and/or the Middle East, could trigger a shift in Russian strategy. We are not there yet. Russia’s cooperation with China will deepen, strengthening China’s hand and making it all the more imperative for the United States to solidify the trans-Atlantic alliance with Europe. Otherwise the risk of a precipitous decline in American power will threaten global stability.  Bottom Line: US-Russian antagonism will continue for the foreseeable future. Russian geopolitical risk is underpriced, particularly if Biden wins the election. A Trump victory would offer only a temporary reprieve.  Direct Competition In Energy Russia can offer low cost natural gas alongside an existing and projected (under construction) network of pipelines into Europe. This capability will help it to sustain and marginally increase its market share in Europe relative to the US in the medium term. In turn, this will help Russia secure vital revenues for its macro stability.  Natural gas exports to Europe represent 2.5% of GDP or 9% of total exports. A Biden presidency is negative for Russian assets, but Russia has room to ease policy. In the long run, however, US LNG will challenge Russia’s share in the European natural gas market. On the whole, the US sees Russia as an economic competitor in the European natural gas market and it will continue to disrupt Russian natural gas exports to Europe through sanctions and/or by other means. A resulting market share war between the US and Russia will lead to low natural gas prices benefitting the consumer, Europe. Competition in Europe’s natural gas market underscores the broader geopolitical confrontation between the US and Russia. The following factors will shape heightened competition: Escalating Competition For European Natural Gas Market Europe will remain a major market for natural gas. The combination of falling domestic production, steady consumption growth and the ongoing structural shift to cleaner sources of energy will require greater imports of natural gas (Chart 11). Critically, Europe’s natural gas consumption might rise faster than its GDP making this market attractive to energy producers. According to the IEA, Europe’s consumption of natural gas will continue to grow at a steady rate over the next 5 years. In a nutshell, European policymakers are promoting cleaner energy such as natural gas over coal and nuclear energy. This push will facilitate rising demand for natural gas.  Yet, European natural gas production is expected to drop by 40%, driven by field closures in the Netherlands and the UK.  As such, the diverging gap between falling production and steady consumption opens up a space for both Russian and US natural gas exports into the continent. Russia Natural Gas Strategy: Russia and its largest natural gas producer, Gazprom, are aiming to increase their share in the European market from their current 36% to 40% (Chart 12). Chart 11Europe's Nat Gas Imports Will Continue Growing... Chart 12...Allowing Russia To Grab Market Share   Table 1Russia’s Pipeline Export Capacity More specifically, Russia’s latest 2035 strategy (known as ES-2035) reaffirms its two-pronged strategy: (i) continue to provide low-cost natural gas to Europe and Asia through pipelines and (ii) developing LNG export capacity for exports to the Far East. Pipelines: Russia’s export capacity to Europe is set to increase to 190 Bcm/y by 2022 excluding existing transit routes passing through Ukraine (Table 1). Two new sources of pipeline routes will be the Nord Stream2, coming online by the end of this year, and Turk Stream, expected to come online by 2022. These pipelines will have an export capacity of 55 Bcm/y and 31.5/y Bcm, respectively (Map 1).   Map 1Russia’s Latest Pipelines Bypass Ukraine Chart 13Russian Natural Gas Exports To Non-CIS Countries Meanwhile, pipeline capacity through Ukraine will remain 140 Bcm/y. Ultimately, Russia has been determined to diversify its natural gas transit routes despite pressures from the US.6 In addition, Gazprom natural gas production for transport via pipeline is expected to increase by 35% to 983 Bcm in the next 15 years. The European market is essential to Russia’s export revenues, as it currently represents 56% of Russia’s total gas export volumes compared with 83% total export to non-CIS countries (Chart 13). Lastly, regarding natural gas pricing, Gazprom will continue to move away from oil-indexed long-term contracts to shorter-term spot market contracts. This change of tack will cause deflation in Gazprom’s export prices to Europe but will preserve Russia’s market share in its strategic European market.   LNG: Russia will continue to be one the top four LNG producers alongside Qatar, Australia and the US. According to the latest estimates by the IEA, Russian exports of LNG, currently at 39 Bcm, are set to expand by 20% by 2025. The development of the Yamal peninsula into a major natural gas and LNG hub will allow Russia to produce close to 110 Bcm of LNG by 2035, which will constitute 16% of its overall current gas production. This will lead to continued LNG exports to various markets, particularly Europe, which consumes 50% of Russia’s LNG exports. Imported technology from Europe and external financing from China have allowed Novatek, Russia’s second largest natural gas producer, to become the leader in production and exports of LNG. Russia is also investing heavily in liquefaction. It is now fifth globally in liquefaction capacity. There are currently $21 billion in pre-final investment decision (FID) from the LNG Artic 2 in the Yamal that will increase its liquefaction capacity by over 200% by 2026.  Lastly, it is estimated that 70-80% of total commodity exporters’ costs are sourced locally and are in rubles due to the import substitution policy adopted by Moscow in 2015. This will alleviate cost pressures arising from a potentially weaker ruble in exploiting the Yamal reserves. US Needs To Find A Market For Its LNG: US produces 920 bcm/y of natural gas but consumes only 830 bcm/y. The rest is available for export. The need to export rising excess of natural gas output puts the US in direct competition with other natural gas exporters such as Russia. Chart 14US LNG Exports To Europe To Rise In the medium term, an oversupplied market alongside the COVID-19-induced demand shock in Europe will reduce European natural gas demand, hurting both the US and Russia. US LNG might lose market share in the European market to Russia due to falling production arising from capex cuts and bankruptcies in the US natural gas sector.7 Yet, in the long run, Europe’s geopolitical ties with the US and strategic interest in diversifying away from Russia make US LNG an obvious area of cooperation. The Trump-Juncker agreement in July 2018 led to a 300% increase in US LNG exports to Europe before the COVID-19 pandemic (Chart 14). Since coming into effect, the agreement also resulted in a doubling of EU utilization of LNG regasification capacity, from 30% to close to 60% in early 2020 and is expected to continue expanding in the years to come. Bottom Line: Russia will likely succeed in at least preserving its share in the European natural gas market in the medium term, but will be challenged by US LNG in the long run. Macro And Financial Market Implications For Russia Chart 15Russia: Low Public Debt Burden Heightened confrontation with the US and new sanctions on Russia will materialize if Biden wins the presidency. All else constant, this is unfavourable for Russian asset prices. It should be noted, however, that years of fiscal conservativism, tight monetary policy, a prudent and pro-active bank regulatory stance as well as some success in import substitution have given Russia the capacity to offset negative external shocks by easing macro policy: Russia has one of the lowest public debt-to-GDP ratios among the largest countries in the world. Its total public debt stands at 13.5% of GDP (Chart 15). Its external public debt is at a mere 4% of GDP. As in many other countries, Russia’s fiscal deficit is widening sharply due to the pandemic and low oil prices. However, we expect the primary and overall fiscal deficits will be only 4.25% and 5% of GDP in 2020, respectively. So far, at 3.5% of GDP, the announced fiscal stimulus in response to the pandemic has been small by global standards. Russia has room to boost fiscal expenditure substantially this year and in the coming years to offset negative external shocks. The Central Bank still has room to reduce interest rates further. The real policy rate is 2.5% compared with 1% for EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan (Chart 16, top panel). Russia’s local currency government bond yields offer value: their real yield is 2.5% compared with the EM GBI benchmark real yield of 1.5% (Chart 16, bottom panel). The Central Bank of the Russian Federation will refrain from QE-type policies (i.e., public debt monetization). This is a plus for the ruble relative to other EM currencies where central banks are engaged in QEs. Bank lending rates remain extremely elevated in Russia and local currency credit penetration is reasonably low (Chart 17). Companies and banks’ external indebtedness has declined from $1,200 bn in 2014 to $900 bn currently. Chart 16Russian Real Rates Offer Value Chart 17Russia: Real Lending Rates Are Too Elevated!   Authorities have cleaned up the banking system. The number of banks has dropped from 1000 in 2010 to 430. Banks have written down and provisioned for a large amount of loans. All of these reduce Russia’s vulnerability to negative shocks. Finally, pressured by US and EU sanctions, Russia has been moderately successful in import substitution as we discussed in a previous report. The nation has expanded its productive capacity, especially in agriculture and some other industries. As a result, it now has more room to deploy fiscal and monetary stimulus to boost demand that will be satisfied by domestic rather than foreign output. In short, fiscal and monetary stimulus will not cause the currency to plunge. On the negative side, the outlook for productivity growth remains lukewarm. Russia’s long-term economic outlook will be characterized by relative stability but low growth, as has been the case in recent years. Combining our geopolitical and macro analysis, two conclusions stand out. First, we remain overweight Russian equities as well as both local currency and US dollar bonds relative to their EM benchmarks. If Trump stages a comeback over the next four months, which is not impossible, then the geopolitical risk premium will continue to fall. Trump would offer a reprieve in tensions for a year or two.  Second, the US election threatens this view because Joe Biden is currently heavily favoured to beat Trump and if he does, he is likely to impose fresh sanctions on Russia, possibly as early as 2021. Therefore, if Biden’s election becomes a foregone conclusion, we will downgrade Russian assets. Matt Gertken  Vice President Geopolitical Strategist  mattg@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic Associate Editor andrijav@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1  Michael McFaul, From Cold War To Hot Peace: The Inside Story of Russia and America (London: Penguin, 2018). 2  International Monetary Fund, “Russian Federation: 2019 Article IV Consultation,” IMF Country Report 19/260 (August 2019). 3  Ann M. Simmons and Georgi Kantchev, “Russians Vote for Overhaul That Could Keep Putin in Power Until 2036,” Wall Street Journal, July 1, 2020.  4  “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening The American Military’s Competitive Edge,” Department of Defense, 2018. 5  Victoria Nuland, “Pinning Down Putin: How A Confident America Should Deal With Russia,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2020. 6  The US has tried to stop Russia’s expansion of pipelines into Europe in the past. Evidenced from both Kennedy and Reagan administration policies directed towards the building of the Friendship oil pipeline in the 1960s and the Brotherhood gas pipeline in the 1980s, respectively. In response, Russia began developing its own technological capacity through import substitution, hurting western firms in the process. 7  "U.S. natural gas giant Chesapeake Energy goes bankrupt,” CBC, June 29, 2020.

Special Report

Highlights The economic and health crises since Q1 2020 have accelerated the breakdown in the US-China relationship. Although the US is in a much weaker economic position this year than in 2019, President Trump may have fewer political constraints to an escalation in the trade war. President Xi Jinping is fueling provocations with the US, adding instability and unpredictability to the geopolitical equation. The Phase One trade deal may be collapsing. We recommend a defensive stance on Chinese risk assets and the RMB during the summer. Feature The outbreak of COVID-19 this year has sparked the worst economic contraction in China and the US in decades. Economic calamities and social unrest should have tied the hands of leaders in both countries. However, as our Geopolitical Strategist Matt Gertken reminds us, this is an atypical election year in the US and some constraints that previously deterred both sides from taking aggressive actions may be diminishing.1 We agree that the economic and health crises have likely accelerated the possibility of a breakdown in the relationship between the US and China. The risk will likely reach a new height in the summer, when pressure on Trump’s election campaign intensifies leading up to the vote in November. While there is a growing bipartisan hawkish view on China in Washington, China is also playing a part in fanning the flames. The USD/CNY exchange rate will be extremely volatile during this episode of heightened geopolitical turbulence. We continue to hold a long USD-CNH position, with the expectation that the RMB will likely weaken further in the summer. Trump Facing Fewer Constraints Whether Trump’s chances of reelection increase through a strong recovery in the US stock market and economy, or decrease through an economic recession and/or weak public support, either scenario could remove constraints preventing Trump from confronting China.     Trump’s current priority may be to secure a recovery in the equity market and improve his polling, which will require economic improvement. Ironically, the US stock market has been on fire despite the battered real economy. The S&P 500 Index has gone up by 44% since its trough on March 23, nearly erasing its losses for the year. The higher the market rises, the more Trump may believe that the market can sustain a shock even if he resorts to imposing tariffs on Chinese export goods - particularly if his approval rating does not rise along with the market. The market’s reaction in 2018 and 2019 provides a good example of how the US financial markets shrugged off any negative impact from a trade war between the US and China (Chart 1). If the pandemic prevents the US economy from fully reopening and/or recovering in the summer, then an equity market correction could send a negative signal about Trump’s reelection prospects. In this case, Trump may not be as enslaved by financial constraints as he would have been if the economy was in an expansionary state.  A falling approval rating, coupled with domestic social unrest, would make Trump a “lame duck” President (Chart 2).  Therefore, he may try to divert attention away from the economy and adopt an aggressive foreign and trade policy. China is already perceived negatively by a majority of American voters and certain political communities, thus there could be a political upside for Trump to escalate his confrontation with China. Chart 1US Stocks Kept Reaching New Highs In 2019 Despite An Ongoing Trade War Chart 2Trump’s Polling Drops Below Average All bets are off if Trump’s approval rating continues to trend downwards, regardless of whether the US equity market continues to rally and/or if the US economy is mired in recession. Our Geopolitical Strategy illustrates the scenarios as follows (Diagram 1). If Trump’s approval rating is high and the market is up, then Trump is “winning” and the only risk of a tariff hike would come from overconfidence or Chinese provocation. If his approval is up but the market falls, then he may become more inclined to use tariffs. If his approval rating is low but the market is up, then he has ammunition to get tougher on China. If his approval and the market are collapsing, then he is a “lame duck president” and all bets are off. Combined, these scenarios imply there is a 59% probability that Trump refrains from large tariffs, and a 41% chance that he reverts to large tariffs. Diagram 1Odds President Trump Will Hike Tariffs On China Before US Election Bottom Line: All bets are off if Trump’s approval rating continues to trend downwards, regardless of whether the US equity market continues to rally and/or if the US economy is mired in recession. Both scenarios would remove financial and economic constraints that Trump faced in 2019. If Trump's polling is weak, he may spend financial ammunition to shore up his “America First” credentials.      Adding China To The Geopolitical Instability Equation China itself may be an independent source of geopolitical instability and unpredictability. While President Xi Jinping does not have any electoral constraints, he needs to restore the confidence of Chinese people in the wake of the worst public health crisis and economic performance in decades. Like Trump, the pandemic gives President Xi an incentive to distract his populace from domestic crises by adopting hawkish foreign policies.  This hawkish approach was demonstrated when a new Hong Kong SAR national security law was proposed and approved at this year’s National People’s Congress (NPC). The new law would give Beijing greater direct control over Hong Kong, in contravention of its promise of 50 years of substantial autonomy enshrined in the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984.  China’s foreign policy tone recently shifted to a more combative one. This “wolf warrior diplomacy" has gained popularity among Chinese diplomats.2 During a news conference at this year’s NPC, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi defended the “wolf warrior diplomacy” by stating that the country will stand firm in defending its national interest and combating “smears.”  Chart 3Chinese Imports Of American Goods Are Falling Far Short Of The Target Set By The Trade Deal The response from the Trump administration has been lukewarm. While Secretary of State Mike Pompeo will strip Hong Kong of its autonomous status, President Trump is taking limited sanctions on mainland China and eschewing more drastic punitive measures. China may see the timid response as a sign that Trump is reluctant to take action on China and tip the bilateral relationship into an outright confrontation. This perception is, in itself, a risk that may lead to more provocation on both sides. Lastly, the Phase One trade deal is tenuous. US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer last week stated that "China has done a pretty good job" at meeting its trade-deal quotas,3 but we have long argued China was never going to honor the commitment to its full extent.4 The latest data shows that Chinese purchases of American exports in the first four months of 2020, from manufacturing goods to agricultural produce and energy, have fallen far short of the huge expansion agreed in the deal (Chart 3). The recent depreciation in the RMB may be another sign that China is abandoning the Phase One trade deal.5 Weakness in economic fundamentals and renewed tensions between the US and China may have contributed to the RMB’s recent depreciation. However, the decline was reinforced by the PBoC’s move to set the CNY/USD fixing rate to its lowest point since 2008 (Chart 4). Given that the RMB has become an anchor for emerging market currencies, a rapid drop in the RMB would lead to selloffs in emerging Asian and Latin American currencies and, in turn, would strengthen the USD (Chart 5). The Trump administration may see a swift RMB depreciation as China is deliberately violating the Phase One trade deal, which will prompt Trump to seek retaliatory actions against China. Chinese purchases of American goods in the first four months of 2020 have fallen far short of the Phase One trade agreement. Chart 4Is The PBoC Sending A Warning Signal To Trump? Chart 5The RMB Has Been The Anchor Currency In EM Bottom Line: While China is prioritizing its own economic recovery, its foreign policy stance has decisively swung to a more combative one. Additionally, the Phase One trade deal is on the verge of collapsing.  Investment Conclusions The USD/CNY exchange rate will likely be extremely volatile in the next quarter amid heightened geopolitical turbulence, with more downside risks to the RMB. As such, we continue to recommend that investors hedge their RMB exposure in Chinese stocks by holding a long USD-CNH position. We remain neutral on Chinese stocks in relative terms in view of the non-trivial, near-term vulnerability of risk assets. As in 2019, investable stocks are particularly exposed to an escalation in the US-China conflict (Chart 6). Chart 6Large Divergence In Onshore Versus Offshore Stock Performance During The Trade War Chart 7Stocks In Some Domestic Demand-Oriented Sectors Are Still Relatively Safe Bets Price corrections in both China’s onshore and offshore aggregate equity markets are likely to occur during the summer. Nevertheless, cyclical plays that closely track Chinese stimulus are relatively safe bets, especially for China’s domestic investors and in absolute terms (Chart 7).   Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report "Spheres Of Influence (GeoRisk Update)," dated May 29, 2020, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 2South China Morning Post, “Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi defends ‘wolf warrior’ diplomats for standing up to ‘smears’”, May 24, 2020 3Bloomberg, “Lighthizer Says He Feels ‘Very Good’ About Phase One China Deal”, June 4, 2020 4Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Managing Expectations," dated January 22, 2020, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 5The Phase One trade deal prohibits both the US and China from manipulating exchange rates to devalue their currencies for competitive purposes. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations