Economy

Executive Summary Macroeconomic Backdrop Favors Defensive Consumer Staples Markets now expect five-to-six rate hikes in 2022  The rate of change in rates as opposed to their level has triggered the fast and furious repricing of long-duration assets.  However, rising rates are a temporary headwind to equities The repricing of the equity market came through the P/E as opposed to the “E” Demand is clearly shifting from goods to services. Supply disruptions are clearing Earnings were strong, but investors expected more We are upgrading Consumer Staples, which is a “deep” defensive sector that offers downside protection in an environment of heightened volatility and slowing economic growth   Bottom Line: While it is impossible to time the market, we believe that the worst is behind us. US equities are outright oversold, and valuations are much more reasonable. However, we recommend investors be cautious in sector selection: For now, stay away from Tech, and add to Consumer Staples to reduce portfolio volatility. Feature Performance Hit Undo 2021 January had a nasty shock in store for equity investors: At the lowest point, the S&P 500 was down 12% from its peak, and NASDAQ was down 20%, officially entering correction territory. January market moves were a partial reversal of the 2021 gains (Chart 1A), with some of the hottest investment themes, such as clean energy, fintech, and Cathie Wood's innovation ETFs hit the hardest (Chart 1B). Investors were rushing to monetize their super-charged gains before the Fed starts draining liquidity off the market. Chart 1APerformance: Sectors And Styles Chart 1BPerformance: Investment Themes Post-Mortem A post-mortem of the sell-off shows that the stocks that have pulled back most, were trading at extended valuations and had long duration, i.e., companies that are not very profitable now but expect to grow earnings at a robust pace far into the future. These companies are akin to lottery tickets – a small payment now may result in a low-probability event of a high gain in the future. Small-cap growth stocks are down 30% from their peak. Over time, the sell-off of small-cap growth has spread to other areas of the market and has hit all sectors but Energy, almost indiscriminately. Overall, the S&P 500's multiple has contracted by over 10% (Chart 1C). Chart 1CJanuary Correction Was Down To Multiple Contraction Valuations And Technicals Pullbacks are responsible for equity market hygiene, cleansing the market of overextended valuations, taking the froth off the names that got ahead of themselves, and offering a reset for a new leg of upward moves, fueled by inflows into oversold names and cash deployed by new market entrants. Forward multiples of the S&P 500 have come down from 21.7x to a more reasonable 19.5x (Chart 2A). Now, 8 out of the 11 sectors have a forward PE below 20x (Chart 2B). Chart 2AMultiples Have Come Down A lot From The Peak Chart 2BValuations Moderated Across All Sectors But Energy By many technical metrics, such as the bull/bear ratio (Chart 2C), market breadth, and RSI, the market appears oversold. Many investors may consider this a good entry point. Chart 2CRetail Investors Have Capitulated Macroeconomic Backdrop Six Is The New Four This correction was triggered by a market surprised by the grave tone of Fed officials, acknowledging their concern about the intransigent, as opposed to transient, inflation. While monetary tightening has been on the cards for a while now, what a difference a month makes! In December, the market was pricing in three rate hikes in 2022, while currently, the probability of five rate hikes stands at over 90%, and of six rate hikes at over 80% (Chart 3A). The 10-year Treasury yield moved from 1.5% at the end of December to 1.87% at its January peak. It is important to note that monetary policy is still easy and it was the rate of change in rates as opposed to their level that triggered the fast and furious repricing of long-duration assets. Chart 3AInvestors Expect Five-To-Six Hikes In 2022 Is Monetary Tightening A Death Knell For US Equities? Historically, equities wobbled two-to-three months prior to the first rate hike, and then took a breather for another couple of months for the dust to settle (Chart 3B). January and now February volatility and pullbacks are textbook behavior of equities at the cusp of a new monetary regime. However, in three of the four tightening cycles since 1990, the stock market was higher a year later. The same is true for long-term rates: In all but one of the episodes of a sharp rise in the 10-year Treasury yield since 1990, the stock market rose (Table 1). Chart 3BEquities Wobble Around The First Rate Hike Table 1Equity Performance Around Periods Of Rising Treasury Yields Economic Growth: Supply (Finally) Meets Demand Of course, the best antidote to higher rates is strong economic growth. So far, everything is in order on that front, with economists projecting solid 2022 nominal GDP growth of around 7.6%. Economic growth is slowing but off high levels. At last, global supply chains are gradually unclogging, and shipping bottlenecks are starting to clear. Even automakers are now saying that auto chips are becoming more readily available. However, part of the reason that supply and demand are getting closer to each other is that demand for goods is waning, dampened by both saturation and higher costs. The latest ISM PMI reading shows that both new orders and the backlog of orders are falling (Chart 4, top panel). Prices paid have also turned, heralding that the worst of price increases may be behind us (Chart 4, bottom panel). Will this contain inflation enough to appease the Fed? Possible, but not highly likely. Chart 4Demand Is Weakening Earnings: Good But Not Good Enough With economic growth slowing, earnings and sales growth are also rolling over (Chart 5A). As investors are trying to decipher the state of the American economy, they are increasingly focused on corporate guidance. So far 12 companies offered positive guidance vs 28 with negative guidance. The Negative/Positive ratio for Q4-2021 currently stands at 2.3, compared to 0.8 in the prior four quarters. Price action in response to projected lower growth has been brutal. And while 78% of companies have beaten earnings expectations, this is a smaller share than during the other pandemic recovery quarters. The magnitude of the earnings surprise has also fallen (Chart 5B). Chart 5AEarnings And Sales Growth Are Slowing Chart 5BThe Magnitude Of Earnings Surprises Has Fallen This earnings season has also seen some of the largest moves on the back of companies’ reports. Positive surprises by Google, Microsoft, and Amazon have soothed investors' fears and led to broad-based next-day rallies, while skimpy results from PayPal and Meta, not only have sent these companies down more than 20%, erasing billions in market capitalization, but also have dragged down their nearest competitors (Square, Snap, etc.). Also, many companies are complaining about rising input and labor costs cutting into their profitability. This is hardly a surprise. According to our analysis of the NIPA accounts, in the US labor costs constitute 55% of sales. With wages rising at the fastest pace in years, their effect on corporate profitability can be meaningful (Chart 6A). To make things worse, input costs are also soaring – the latest PPI reading is 9.7%. Chart 6AMargins Are Contracting As... However, companies are more and more constrained in their ability to pass on their cost increases to customers, although the elasticity of demand varies across industries. Many companies can no longer afford to raise prices without suppressing demand for their products. Corporate pricing power has turned decisively lower (Chart 6B). As a result, profit margins have contracted across all sectors, except Energy. Bottom-line – earnings are good so far, but they have failed to allay investor fears of waning profitability. Chart 6B...Corporate Pricing Power Is Declining Sector Positioning Revenge Of The Nerds – Be Granular While we believe that equities are poised for another leg up, as economic growth remains strong and corporate earnings are decent, we recommend that investors be granular in their sector selection: Avoid areas most adversely affected by a tighter monetary regime and slowing growth. Per our previous analysis, we recommend underweighting the Technology sector on a tactical basis, but within Tech, stay overweight more defensive Software and IT Services. We also like Banks and Insurers that benefit from rising rates and prefer Value and Small over Growth. We are also constructive on Industrials, which are the primary beneficiaries of the new Capex cycle and the US industrial renaissance. Consumer Services Are Finally Rebounding In the meantime, with Omicron finally receding, consumer spending is shifting from consumer goods to services (Chart 7A). Consumers are flush with cash, and still have $2.2 trillion in their coffers. We have been overweight the Travel complex (Hotels, Restaurants, Cruises) since October. However, performance was derailed in the late fall as many consumers chose to stay at home and wait for the variant to pass. Also, many of the industries in the Travel complex have been challenged by the sheer number of staff quarantining or on sick leave. We upgraded Airlines at the beginning of January and remain optimistic about the outperformance of the Consumer Services sector. Upgrading Consumer Staples We are also upgrading Consumer Staples, which is a “deep” defensive that offers downside protection in an environment of heightened volatility and slowing economic growth (Chart 7B). Moreover, consumer confidence is down as Americans are disheartened by prices in the supermarket and at the gas station. However, demand for consumer staples is inelastic and should be inflation-proof. The sector is trading at 21x forward multiples and is expected to grow earnings at 6% over the next 12 months, bettering the S&P 500. Chart 7AWaning Demand For Goods Is Replaced By Demand For Services Chart 7BMacroeconomic Backdrop Favors Defensive Consumer Staples Investment Implications The market correction is still running its course, and while it is impossible to time the market, we believe that the worst is behind us. US equities are outright oversold, and valuations are much more reasonable. Rising rates are a temporary headwind. However, we recommend investors be cautious in sector selection: For now, stay away from Tech, and add to Consumer Staples to reduce portfolio volatility.   Irene Tunkel Chief Strategist, US Equity Strategy irene.tunkel@bcaresearch.com     S&P 500  Chart 8Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 9Profitability Chart 10Valuations And Technicals Chart 11Uses Of Cash Communication Services Chart 12Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 13Profitability Chart 14Valuations And Technicals Chart 15Uses Of Cash Consumer Discretionary Chart 16Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 17Profitability Chart 18Valuations And Technicals Chart 19Uses Of Cash Consumer Staples Chart 20Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 21Profitability Chart 22Valuations And Technicals Chart 23Uses Of Cash Energy Chart 24Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 25Profitability Chart 26Valuations And Technicals Chart 27Uses Of Cash Financials Chart 28Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 29Profitability Chart 30Valuations And Technicals Chart 31Uses Of Cash Health Care Chart 32Sector vs Industry Groups Chart 33Profitability Chart 34Valuations And Technicals Chart 35Uses Of Cash Industrials Chart 36Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 37Profitability Chart 38Valuations And Technicals Chart 39Uses Of Cash Information Technology Chart 40Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 41Profitability Chart 42Valuations And Technicals Chart 43Uses Of Cash Materials Chart 44Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 45Profitability Chart 46Valuations And Technicals Chart 47Uses Of Cash Real Estate Chart 48Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 49Profitability Chart 50Valuations And Technicals Chart 51Uses Of Cash Utilities Chart 52Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 53Profitability Chart 54Valuations And Technicals Chart 55Uses Of Cash Recommended Allocation Footnotes

Executive Summary The European Central Bank (ECB) has engaged in a decisive pivot toward higher policy rates. Markets are pricing in a first interest-rate hike in July and three more increases thereafter in 2022. This is too much for one year. Limited domestic inflationary pressures, weakness in long-term inflation expectations, economic slack, and vulnerability in the periphery will limit the ECB to one hike in December. Nonetheless, the ECB will increase interest rates more than the market anticipates beyond 2022. The UK is setting up for a dangerous latter half of 2022. Too Much Now, Not Enough Later Bottom Line: Bet on a steepening of the euro short-term rate (€STR) curve. Current pricing for 2022 is too aggressive; however, it is too timid beyond the yearend. European financials will be the prime beneficiary of this tilt. Feature On Thursday, February 3, ECB President Christine Lagarde announced a decidedly hawkish pivot at the ECB press conference. The Frankfurt-based institution, worried by higher-than-anticipated inflation, no longer excludes rate hikes for 2022. In a context in which the BoE is resolutely hiking rates and the Fed is ready to initiate a sustained tightening campaign, investors are pricing in a 10bp ECB rate hike as early as July 2022. They also foresee three additional increases by the end of the year. We agree that the ECB will start lifting the deposit rate this year; however, we expect the tightening to begin in December. Nonetheless, we expect the ECB to lift policy rates more aggressively than the €STR prices in subsequent years. European Inflation Is Different Chart 1Surprise! The knee-jerk reaction of investors to price in a sudden, sustained campaign of ECB rate hikes this year similar to that of the Fed is natural in light of elevated Eurozone inflation and inflation surprises (Chart 1). However, we continue to view European inflation as distinct from US inflation. European inflation remains dominated by dynamics in the energy market. While headline inflation increased from 5% to 5.1% in January, the core Consumer Price Index (CPI) declined modestly to 2.3% from 2.6%. Crucially, the variance of headline CPI is still almost fully explained by the variance of its energy component (Chart 2, top panel). However, it is concerning that there is also evident pass-through from energy prices to core CPI taking place today (Chart 2, bottom panel). Naturally, natural gas prices play a particularly important role in this energy-driven inflation spike (Chart 3). Chart 2Energy Still Drives Inflation Chart 3Natural Gas Remains Key Imported inflation is another key driver of European inflation. Chart 4 highlights that there is a robust relationship between the level of headline Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) across EU nations and their import prices. This confirms that a large proportion of the European inflationary outburst has taken root outside of the continent’s borders. Chart 4Imported Inflation? Despite this energy-driven, imported inflation, domestic pressures are still much more muted than those in the US. VAT increases played an important role in pushing core CPI higher. Without this contribution, CPI excluding food and energy would be 50 bps lower (Chart 5). Meanwhile, rent inflation remains a modest 1.1%, which is significantly lower than that in the US (Chart 6, top panel), whereas used car CPI is not nearly as extreme as across the Atlantic (Chart 6, bottom panel). Chart 5Elevated Contribution From Taxes Chart 6Comparatively Muted Domestic Inflation Drivers Wage dynamics too are not yet as concerning in the Eurozone as they are in the US. Negotiated wages remain near a record low of 1.4%, and unit labor costs at 0.9% are still inconsistent with strong underlying inflationary pressures (Chart 7, top and second panel). The labor market is tightening and the Euro Area unemployment rate fell to a new low at 7%. However, the total hours worked have not yet reached their pre-pandemic levels (Chart 7, third panel), which suggests that it could take a few more months before the dislocation caused by the pandemic has been fully absorbed and wages become a risk. That being said, it is only a matter of time, as job vacancies are skyrocketing (Chart 7, bottom panel). Chart 8Plentiful Slack Chart 7The Labor Market Will Heat Up... Later The European output gap also limits a repetition of the wage-price spiral taking hold in the US. The OECD’s Weekly Tracker of GDP, a proxy for the overall Eurozone comprised of Germany, France, Italy, and Spain, reveals that, as of mid-January, aggregate output was still 4.9% below its pre-pandemic trend (Chart 8, top panel). Looking at the actual GDP of European countries individually, only France stands above its pre-pandemic trend, whereas Germany, Italy, and Spain still linger well below the average economic path that prevailed from 2012 to 2019 (Chart 8, bottom panels). Chart 9The Inflationary Role Of Bottlenecks Bottlenecks have also played an important role in relation to higher inflation. Goods inflation is much more elevated than services inflation (Chart 9, top panel), and industrial companies rank the ability to procure equipment and materials as their most important production constraint (Chart 9, second panel). However, production bottlenecks are dissipating. A recent Ifo survey highlights that the proportion of retailers with procurement issues declined from 82% in December 2021 to 57% in January 2022. Moreover, the supplier deliveries indexes of the PMIs are improving across the world. In fact, our simple Supply Disruption Index has begun to rollover, which points toward an imminent end to the wave of inflation surprises (Chart 9, bottom panel). European inflation expectations bear the imprint of those more modest domestic inflationary pressures, which explains the comparatively more limited wage-price spiral on the continent. The inflation expectations of Eurozone households are rising, but they are still within the norm of the past 20 years. In the US, they are breaking out. Moreover, our Index of Common Inflation Expectations, designed to mimic the New York Fed’s measure, remains well contained and is tentatively rolling over (Chart 10). Collectively, these forces explain the radically different inflation profiles of the Euro Area and the US. On the western shore of the Atlantic, the two-year annualized rate of change of the core CPI has completely shattered its highs of the past 20 years, indicating that more than simple base-effects are contributing to inflation (Chart 11, top panel). Meanwhile, the two-year annualized rate of change of the European core CPI is higher than the past deflationary eight years, but it is still low compared to the rates that prevailed prior to the European sovereign debt crisis (Chart 11, bottom panel). Chart 10Inflation Expectations: Unlike The US Chart 11Realized Inflation: Unlike The US Chart 12The Coming CPI Peak? Going forward, there remains a high likelihood that Eurozone inflation will soon peak. The impact of the German VAT increases will soon dissipate from the data, energy inflation will diminish as the annual rate of change of oil and natural gas prices peaks, and the growth in monetary aggregates has normalized sharply. Most importantly, in the absence of significant domestic inflationary pressures, the sharp decline in the ZEW Inflation Expectations components point toward a deceleration in headline HICP (Chart 12). Nonetheless, we cannot be too sanguine. The European output gap is likely to close this year and wages pressures will emerge before the end of 2022. As a result, inflation will not fall below 2% anytime soon. Moreover, as we wrote last week, any long-lasting crisis in Ukraine will prevent energy inflation from declining, and thus, there remains significant upside risk to our inflation view in the coming months.  Bottom Line: European inflation remains dominated by energy prices and imported price pressures. For now, domestic inflation dynamics are still mild, which explains why Europe’s inflation profile is much shallower than that of the US. Moreover, the near-term picture suggests that the imported inflation will peak, giving a respite to the HICP. Nonetheless, toward the yearend, domestic inflationary forces will pick up as wages gain traction. ECB Pricing: Too Much And Too Little ECB President Christine Lagarde delivered a message that was loud and clear: The ECB is abandoning its ultra-dovish stance. Despite this policy pivot, investors are pricing in too many hikes this year, whereas we only expect one rate increase toward yearend. True, if energy prices spike anew, risks to this forecast will be skewed to the upside. Nonetheless, we are inclined to fade the number of rate hikes priced in for 2022 and bet for more hikes in 2023 and 2024 (Chart 13). Chart 13Too Much Now, Not Enough Later Why does our base case only include one rate hike in December? First, we are considering the entirety of the inflation picture. As we argued above, inflationary dynamics in Europe are much tamer than those in the US, especially in terms of domestic inflation, which the ECB can influence. Moreover, the ECB is still reeling from its infamous 2011 policy mistake, which accentuated underlying deflationary pressures and caused the ECB to undershoot its mandate for eight years in a row (Chart 14). Inflation expectations also offer some leeway to the ECB. Predictions by professional forecasters continue to track below two percent for the medium term. Importantly, market-based inflation expectations remain consistent with a temporary inflation shock, and do not meet yet the ECB’s criteria of being above the 2% target durably. 10-year CPI swaps hover around 2%, driven by the jump in 2-year CPI swaps to 2.7%. Long-dated expectations approximated by the 5-year/5-year forward CPI swap remain below 2% and the inflation curve is its most inverted on record (Chart 15). Chart 15Inflation Swaps Don't Fit The ECB's Criteria Chart 14The Legacy Of The 2011 Mistake In the end, President Lagarde did mention in the press conference that inflation is finally moving toward its target after years of undershoot. In the context described above, it is likely that the ECB will continue to tolerate some higher inflation in the near term if it represses the deflationary mentality that had engulfed the Eurozone last decade and caused a progressive Japanification of the region. This is a small price to pay to exit at last the lower bound of interest rates on a durable basis. Second comes the sequencing of policy. President Lagarde reiterated the importance of the order of events. First, the ECB will have to bring asset purchases to a net zero before lifting rates. It has yet to curtail purchases. The March meeting will be of paramount importance, since it will feature the tapering schedule of the central bank. We continue to see a progressive pace of declining assets purchases that will likely end in September 2022. Moreover, the ECB will want to see how the European economy and markets will absorb the TLTRO cliff this June, when EUR1.3 trillion of facility expire. Chart 16The Italian Constraint Third, the ECB remains hamstrung by financial dynamics in the periphery. On Thursday, as Bund yields rose 10 basis points, BTP yields rose 21 basis points, bringing the Italian-German spread to 150bps, its highest level since September 2020 (Chart 16). Simply put, the periphery remains fragile because Italy and Spain sport some of the most negative output gaps in the region. Waiting for a stronger position out of those countries would let the ECB increase rates further down the road, allowing for a cleaner exit from negative policy rates in Europe. While these factors continue to favor a cautious posture by the ECB in 2022 and, therefore, support our base view of only one 10bps hike in December to be flagged when net purchases end in September, they will evolve and allow for many more hikes in 2023 and 2024. We expect the following developments to unfold: The output gaps across the region will close this year, which will put the economy in a position of strength and generate stronger domestic inflationary pressures down the road. Salaries will begin to accelerate meaningfully by the summer. This force will accentuate domestic inflationary pressures in late 2022 and 2023, and will contribute to higher household inflation expectations. The periphery will grow increasingly stronger as the Next Generation EU (NGEU) disbursements accelerate in 2022 and 2023. These disbursements are primarily geared toward infrastructure/capex spending (Chart 17) and will therefore sport elevated fiscal multipliers. The resulting strength will provide more resilience to the periphery and limit the tightening of financial conditions caused by higher interest rates. Chart 17The NGEU Will Matter… A Lot Chart 18Terminal Rates Are Too Low In the longer term, we also believe that markets still understate the ability of the ECB to lift rates. The market-derived terminal rate proxy for Europe is in the vicinity of the levels recorded in the wake of the European sovereign debt crisis last decade (Chart 18). Fiscal policy is more generous, however, and thus domestic demand is stronger. As a corollary, the accelerator model implies that capex will be more robust than it was last decade. Finally, the European Union is not as politically divided as it once was, which creates a stronger block. Together, these developments suggest that the r-star or the neutral rate of interest in the Euro Area is higher than last decade. Bottom Line: The €STR curve is pricing in the potential path of the ECB this year too aggressively. The ECB is likely to start raising rates in December, not in July. Domestic inflation and inflation expectations remain too modest, while the periphery remains fragile. Moreover, the ECB will stick to the previously decided sequence that calls for an end to net asset purchases ahead of hikes. Beyond 2022, we expect the ECB to increase rates more than what is priced into the €STR curve. Investment Implications The first implication of our view is that the European yield curve is likely to steepen further in the coming year. This is true in absolute terms but also relative to the US. We remain long European steepeners relative to US ones. Second, we continue to favor European financials. European banks are a direct equity play on higher yields and on a steeper yield curve (Chart 19). Moreover, European financials have upside relative to their US competitors. They are cheap, and they will benefit from the relative steepening in the European yield curve (Chart 20). Additionally, European monetary conditions will remain easier this year than US ones, whereas European growth will continue to catch up to the US. Chart 20Roll Over XLF Chart 19Banks Will Shine More Chart 21A Bit More Stress Third, the equity market correction might have a little more to run. In the near term, equities had become very oversold. This week’s bounce makes sense after the S&P 500’s RSI plunged below 30. However, hedge funds are not shorting the market as violently as they did in 2018, yet all the major global central banks (apart from the BoJ) are abandoning their pandemic-driven policy. As a result of the prospect of a global decline in liquidity, a retest of the 2018-lows in net exposure is likely as we approach the March Fed meeting, especially as credit spreads are still too low to cause a meaningful change in tone by the Fed (Chart 21). Thus, European stocks could experience another wave of selling in the coming weeks, especially when the risks surrounding Ukraine have yet to clear. Keep some protections in place. Finally, the euro has surged this week. With looming Ukrainian risk, the potential for a repricing downward of the near-term European policy rates and the risk of a last sell-off in equities, the euro could give up some of its recent gains and remain in a churning pattern, in place since December 2021. The uncertainty is therefore elevated for near-term traders. However, considering last week’s ECB pivot and the likelihood of an upward revision of the €STR curve for 2024 rates, long-term investors should use a pull back in the euro in the coming weeks to gain exposure to long EUR/USD. What About The BoE? Last week, the Bank of England increased rates by 25bps to 0.5%, which was a widely expected move. The BoE is naturally ahead of the ECB because inflation swaps stand at 4.3% and are even higher than those in the US. The BoE is forced to be more aggressive because inflation expectations are becoming unmoored, which raises the risk of a wage-price spiral north of the Channel. This is a legacy of years of higher inflation and of the labor-supply problems created by Brexit. Additionally, the UK is exiting Omicron lockdowns faster than the Euro Area, which accentuates its near-term economic strength. The UK is not, however, out of the woods. A perfect storm is brewing for the remainder of the year. Interest rates are set to rise sharply, energy price caps will disappear in two months, and the budget is anticipating a significant tightening in the coming quarters after taxes rise in April. This will hurt economic activity in the latter half of the year and will cause tensions in the domestic market. The tax hikes are not guaranteed and a reversal is still possible. PM Boris Johnson is currently embroiled in the so-called “Partygate” scandal and Rishi Sunak, Chancellor of the Exchequer, is seen as the most likely candidate within the Conservative Party to replace Johnson if he were to be pushed out of power by the 1922 Committee. As a colleague observed, it remains to be seen whether Sunak’s political ambitions will scuttle his fiscal rectitude. Nonetheless, the threats to UK small-cap stocks are increasing, warranting a cautious stance if the tax increases are not revoked in the coming weeks.   Mathieu Savary, Chief European Strategist Mathieu@bcaresearch.com Tactical Recommendations Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Trades

Executive Summary Inflation has broken out to 40-plus-year highs in the US and is rapidly becoming a pressing issue for major central banks around the world. Financial markets are vulnerable to upside inflation surprises, which could induce the Fed and its peers to pursue markedly less friendly monetary policy. Despite the ongoing surge in consumer and producer prices, longer-term inflation expectations remain firmly anchored at low levels. Surveys and market prices betray no concern about a lasting inflection. We have ticked a majority of the boxes on our inflation checklist, but we will remain constructive on risk assets as long as inflation expectations remain well-behaved. Long-Run Inflation Expectations Are Well Anchored Bottom Line: The Fed will only slam on the brakes if long-run inflation expectations break out, opening the door to a vicious circle in which inflation begets inflation. Risk assets will outperform this year unless expectations become unmoored. Feature We will be holding our quarterly webcasts next Monday, February 14, for clients in EMEA and the Americas and Tuesday, February 15, for Asia-Pacific clients in lieu of publishing a Weekly Report. Please join us with your questions to make it a fully interactive event. We will resume our regular publication schedule on the 21. Chart 1Inflation And The Fed Have Markets On Edge When we assembled our inflation checklist last May, the future path of consumer prices was still quite uncertain. At the time, the drivers of elevated inflation readings were concentrated in categories that had suffered the worst pandemic disruptions, like air fares, hotels, new cars, used cars, rental cars and auto insurance, and it was unclear how much upward price pressures would spread more broadly across the economy. Delta and Omicron had yet to worsen existing supply chain tangles. While inflation was sure to exceed its post-crisis levels for an extended period, it was not at all clear that it would do so by a significant margin. Now that inflation has broken out to Volcker-era highs, investors’ focus is squarely on the Fed’s response. Fears that inflation would prompt the Fed to tighten policy more and faster than previously expected underpinned the selling spasm that stretched across the last two full weeks of January (Chart 1). The equity market had moved on from the Fed outlook before Friday’s employment report pushed the 10-year yield to a new pandemic high, but it promises to be a recurring theme until the impending rate hike cycle is complete. Turning to our checklist, we contend that inflation expectations hold the key to the Fed’s reaction and that they continue to hold fast as a bulwark against the Fed adopting a war footing that would torpedo financial markets and the economy. Making A List (And Checking It Seven Times) It doesn’t take a certified market technician to confirm that inflation has broken out (Chart 2). It doesn’t take our checklist, either, though we’ve now checked seven of its twelve boxes (Table 1). Its purpose wasn’t to replace what investors could see with their own eyes but rather to augment it with a framework for assessing future inflation moves and their impact on monetary policy settings. We do not expect that the FOMC will bring the party to an abrupt end while investors, businesses and consumers remain untroubled about long-run inflation. Chart 2Breakout Table 1Inflation Checklist Though we think the Inflation Expectations boxes are the key, we make a full tour through the checklist to spotlight the data behind each line. We have ticked the Labor Supply/Utilization box, despite the still-low labor force participation rate (Chart 3, top panel) because the evidence suggests it is not going to return to its pre-pandemic level any time soon. The prime age employment-to-population ratio has made much more steady progress and is back within the range of the last three expansions, suggesting that the economy has returned to full employment with the exception of industries hit hardest by the pandemic1 (Chart 3, bottom panel). Chart 3The Economy Is Closing In On Full Employment ... Labor demand continues to soar, with nearly half of all respondents to the NFIB survey indicating that they have unfilled job openings and the Department of Labor’s job openings rate routinely setting new records (Chart 4). The combination of roaring demand and limited supply would seem to be a recipe for salary and wage growth, but it still hasn't come to pass. Though the main wage series have all picked up in nominal terms (Chart 5), the supply/demand imbalance has yet to produce compensation increases that can outpace inflation (Chart 6). Rampant concerns that wage gains will drag on corporate profit margins have yet to materialize and we leave the wage box unchecked. Chart 4... And Demand For Workers Is Still Exploding Chart 5Nominal Wage Gains Look Large, ...​​​​​​ Chart 6... But They're Lagging Inflation​​​​​​ The breakouts in the marquee core CPI (Chart 7, top panel) and PCE (Chart 7, bottom panel) indexes have captured a lot of attention, but their trimmed-mean measures have quietly overtopped their longstanding ranges as well. The trimmed-mean series, which throw out the outliers at both ends of the distribution, supported the transitory view last summer but are now confirming that the underlying pace of consumer price increases has materially quickened. Chart 7It's Not Just About The Outliers Anymore As for future inflation, our pipeline inflation indicator has eased over the last few months (Chart 8, top panel), but remains elevated and the preponderance of other cost pressure evidence keeps us from unchecking its box. Dollar strength has helped to guard against imported inflation pressures (Chart 8, bottom panel). They have been tame so far, but with inflation breaking out in Europe (Chart 9, top panel) and just about every major economy except China (Chart 9, bottom panel), rising import costs are likely to add some inflation momentum at the margin. Chart 8The Dollar's Tailwind Has Been An Inflation Headwind, ... Chart 9... But Inflation's Become A Problem Everywhere But China The Levees Are Holding Firm Although we checked six of the first eight boxes, we maintain a sanguine view about inflation’s impact on monetary policy and financial markets. Some of the boxes are more equal than others, and if we had to pick just one indicator to determine whether inflation will compel the Fed to take stern action, it would be the shape of the inflation expectations curve. Inflation begins to beget inflation when economic actors – workers, businesses, consumers and lenders – begin to expect it will linger into the future and change their behavior to align with their expectations. When inflation is expected to remain persistently high over the long term, individual workers or their unions insist on higher wages to maintain purchasing power, businesses at all points of the supply chain demand higher prices to protect their margins, consumers accelerate their big-ticket purchase decisions to get the most bang for their buck and lenders require higher nominal pro forma returns. The resulting feedback loops help inflation become entrenched in the same way that expectations of falling prices have paved the way for a deflationary mindset to grip Japan. Despite all the attention that rising prices have drawn, investors (Table 2) and households (Chart 10) continue to expect inflation to decelerate from the short term to the intermediate term, and again from the intermediate term to the long term. As long as economic actors are unconcerned about the longer-term picture, the Fed will be able to remove accommodation at a deliberate pace that will not pull the rug out from under financial markets. Table 2These Inverted Curves ... Chart 10... Are Good Omens To that end, the FOMC has heretofore limited itself to open mouth operations. Chair Powell may have talked tough at last month’s post-meeting press conference, but the committee passed on the chance to terminate the asset purchase program early. A rate hike is all but assured at the next meeting in mid-March and Powell indicated that investors should expect the Fed to move faster than the 25-basis-points(bps)-every-other-meeting pace of the last tightening cycle, but our US Bond Strategy team is inclined to bet the under on the money market’s 125-bps full-year expectation. We have checked the commentary box but are not going to check the dots box ahead of the March meeting’s update. It is further possible that the Fed’s expressed concerns about inflation will reduce the need for it to take action to combat it. We have previously cited our Global Fixed Income Strategy colleagues’ view that investors need only worry about inflation when central banks don't. One-year inflation expectations have come down considerably and intermediate- and long-term expectations have eased since late November (Chart 11), when Omicron’s emergence and the Fed’s hawkish pivot stirred concern. Omicron caused less supply-side disruption than initially feared and markets have relaxed a little now that the inflation cop is once again walking the beat. Chart 11Long-Term Expectations Stay Put, No Matter What Happens At The Short End Investment Implications Ever since the year began, we have stressed the point that tighter policy is not necessarily tight policy. Economic and market inflection points are conditioned upon the level of the fed funds rate, not its direction. Restrictive monetary policy settings are not yet in sight and we doubt that they will emerge in time to shadow risk assets’ 2022 prospects. We like the tighter-does-not-equal-tight formulation, but it obscures an important nuance. Strictly speaking, the Fed is not tightening monetary policy when it tapers its monthly asset purchases – it’s merely dialing down the level of monetary accommodation. Similarly, raising the target fed funds rate from an emergency range of 0 to ¼% two years after COVID reached the US and several months after it ceased to be an acute threat merely reduces the level of monetary stimulus. Even if the FOMC does deliver 125 bps of hikes by year end, lifting the funds rate to 1⅜%, it will still be egging on the economy because no one believes the neutral rate is 1⅜% or lower. Removing accommodation is more like easing up on the gas than squeezing the brakes. As long as inflation doesn’t scare economic participants, causing their longer-run inflation expectations to become unmoored, the Fed will be able to reduce monetary stimulus in an incremental fashion akin to applying less pressure to the gas pedal. That does not mean investors can forget about the Fed; we expect policy scares will roil financial markets off and on throughout the rest of the year. Ultimately, though, we think the elevated volatility will prove unfounded as our base case is that the Fed will not have to slam on the brakes. The steeply downward sloping inflation expectations curve suggests that it will take a lot for expectations to reset but we will be keeping an eye on it nonetheless, because uncomfortably high inflation, and the Fed’s eagerness to counter it, remains the biggest risk to our view.   Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      Per the January Employment Situation Report, Leisure and Hospitality now accounts for nearly 60% of nonfarm payroll and 97% of private sector service employment losses since February 2020.

Special Report

BCA Research is proud to announce a new feature to help clients get the most out of our research: an Executive Summary cover page on each of the BCA Research Reports. We created these summaries to help you quickly capture the main points of each report through an at-a-glance read of key insights, chart of the day, investment recommendations and a bottom line. For a deeper analysis, you may refer to the full BCA Research Report. Executive Summary China’s Property Bust To Dwarf Japan’s China’s confluence of internal and external risks will continue to weigh on markets in 2022. Internally China’s property sector turmoil is one important indication of a challenging economic transition. The Xi administration will clinch another term but sociopolitical risks are underrated. Externally China faces economic and strategic pressure from the US and its allies. The US is distracted with other issues in 2022 but US-China confrontation will revive beyond that. China will strengthen relations with Russia and Iran, though it will not encourage belligerence. It needs their help to execute its Eurasian strategy to bypass US naval dominance and improve its supply security over the long run. China will ease monetary and fiscal policies in 2022 but it has no interest in a massive stimulus. Policy easing will be frontloaded in the first half of the year. Featured Trade: Strategically stay short the renminbi versus an equal-weighted basket of the dollar and the euro. Stay short TWD-USD as well. Recommendation INCEPTION Date Return SHORT TWD / USD 2020-06-11 0.5% SHORT CNY / EQUAL-WEIGHTED BASKET OF EURO AND USD 2021-06-21 -3.9% Bottom Line: Beijing is easing policy to secure the post-pandemic recovery, which is positive for global growth and cyclical financial assets. But structural headwinds will still weigh on Chinese assets in 2022. China’s Historic Confluence Of Risks Global investors continue to clash over China’s outlook. Ray Dalio, founder of Bridgewater Associates, recently praised China’s “Common Prosperity” plan and argued that the US and “a lot of other countries” need to launch similar campaigns of wealth redistribution. He warned about the US’s 2024 elections and dismissed accusations of human rights abuses by saying that China’s government is a “strict parent.”1 By contrast George Soros, founder of the Open Society Foundations, recently warned against investing in China’s autocratic government and troubled property market. He predicted that General Secretary Xi Jinping would fail to secure another ten years in power in the Communist Party’s upcoming political reshuffle.2 Geopolitics can bring perspective to the debate: China is experiencing a historic confluence of internal (political) and external (geopolitical) risk, unlike anything since its reform era began in 1979. At home it is struggling with the Covid-19 pandemic and a difficult economic transition that began with the Great Recession of 2008-09. Abroad it faces rising supply insecurity and an increase in strategic pressure from the United States and its allies. The implication is that the 2020s will be an even rockier decade than the 2010s. In the face of these risks the Chinese Communist Party is using the power of the state to increase support for the economy and then repress any other sources of instability. Strict “zero Covid” policies will be maintained for political reasons as much as public health reasons. Arbitrary punitive measures will put pressure on the business elite and foreigners. The geopolitical outlook is negative over the long run but it will not worsen dramatically in 2022 given America’s preoccupation with Russia, Iran, and midterm elections. Bottom Line: Global investor sentiment toward China will remain pessimistic for most of the year – but it will turn more optimistic toward foreign markets, especially emerging markets, that sell into China. China’s Internal Risks Chart 1China's Demographic Cliff By the end of 2021, China accounted for 17.7% of global economic output and 12.1% of global imports. However, the secular slowdown in economic growth threatens to generate opposition to the single-party regime, forcing the Communist Party to seek a new base of political legitimacy. Most countries saw a drop in fertility rates in the third quarter of the twentieth century but China’s “one child policy” created a demographic cliff (Chart 1). At first this generated savings needed for national development. But now it leaves China with excess capacity and insufficient household demand. Across the region, falling fertility rates have led to falling potential growth and falling rates of inflation. Excess savings increased production relative to consumption and drove down the rate of interest. The shift toward debt monetization in the US and Japan, in the post-pandemic context, is now threatening this trend with a spike in inflation. China is also monetizing debt after a decade of deflationary fears. But it remains to be seen whether inflation is sustainable when fertility remains below the replacement rate over the long run, as is projected for China as well as its neighbors (Chart 2). China’s domestic situation is fundamentally deflationary as a result of chronic over-investment over the past 40 years. China’s gross fixed capital formation stands at 43% of GDP, well above the historic trend of other major countries for the past 30 years (Chart 3). Chart 2Will Inflation Decouple From Falling Fertility?​​​​​​ Chart 3Over-Investment Is Deflationary, Not Inflationary Like other countries, China financed this buildup of fixed capital by means of debt, especially state-owned corporate debt. While building a vast infrastructure network and property sector, it also built a vast speculative bubble as investors lacked investment options outside of real estate. The growth in property prices has tracked the growth in private non-financial sector debt. The downside is that if property prices fall, debt holders will begin a long and painful process of deleveraging, just like Japan in the 1990s and 2000s. Japan only managed to reverse the drop in corporate investment in the 2010s via debt monetization (Chart 4). Chart 4Japan’s Property Bust Coincided With Debt Deleveraging ​​​​​​ Chart 5China's Debt Growth Halts Looking at the different measures of Chinese debt, it is likely that deleveraging has begun. Total debt, public and private, peaked and rolled over in 2020 at 290% of GDP. Corporate debt has peaked twice, in 2015 and again in 2020 at around 160% of GDP. Even households are taking on less debt, having gone on a binge over the past decade (Chart 5). In short China is following the Japanese and East Asian growth model: the stark drop in fertility and rise in savings created a huge manufacturing workshop and a highly valued property sector, albeit at the cost of enormous private and considerable public debt. If the private sector’s psychology continues to shift in favor of deleveraging, then the government will be forced to take on greater expenses and fund them through public borrowing to sustain aggregate demand, maximum employment, and social stability. The central bank will be forced to keep rates low to prevent interest rates from rising and stunting growth. China’s policymakers are stuck between a rock and a hard place. New regulations aimed at controlling the property bubble (the “three red lines”) precipitated distress across the sector, emblematized by the failure of the world’s most indebted property developer, Evergrande. Other property developers are looking to raise cash and stay solvent. Property prices peaked in 2015-16 and are now dropping, with third-tier cities on the verge of deflation (Chart 6). Chart 6China's Property Crisis Weighs On Construction As the property bubble tops out, Chinese policymakers are looking for new sources of productivity and growth. Chart 7Productivity In Decline​​​​​​ Productivity growth is subsiding after the export and property boom earlier in the decade, in keeping with that of other Asian economies. And sporadic initiatives to improve governance, market pricing, science, and technology have not succeeded in lifting total factor productivity (Chart 7). The initial goal of the Xi administration’s reforms, to rebalance the economy away from manufacturing toward services, has stumbled and will continue to face headwinds from the financial and real estate sectors that powered much of the recent growth in services (Chart 8). Chart 8China’s Structural Transition Falters Indeed the Communist Party is rediscovering the value of export-manufacturing in the wake of the pandemic, which led to a surge in durable goods orders as global consumers cut back on services and businesses initiated a new cycle of capital expenditures (Chart 9). The party encouraged the workforce to shift out of manufacturing over the past decade but is now rethinking that strategy in the face of the politically disruptive consequences of deindustrialization in the US and UK – such that the state can be expected to recommit to supporting manufacturing going forward (Chart 10). Policymakers are emphasizing economic self-sufficiency and “dual circulation” (import substitution) as solutions to the latent socioeconomic and political threat posed by disillusioned former manufacturing workers. Chart 9China Turns Back To Exports​​​​​​ Chart 10De-Industrialization Will Be Halted Even beyond ex-manufacturing workers, the country’s economic transition risks generating social instability. The middle class, defined as those who consume from $10 to $50 per day in purchasing power parity terms, now stands at 55% of total population, comparable to where it stood when populist and anti-populist political transformations occurred in Turkey, Thailand, and Brazil (Chart 11). China’s middle class may not be willing or able to intervene into the political process, but the government is still concerned about the long-term potential for discontent. Otherwise it would not have launched anti-corruption, anti-pollution, and anti-industrial measures in recent years. These measures vary in effectiveness but they all share the intention to boost the government’s legitimacy through social improvements and thus fall in line with the new mantra of “common prosperity.” For decades the ruling party claimed that the “principle contradiction” in society arose from a failure to meet the people’s “material needs,” but beginning in 2021 it emphasized that the principle contradiction is the people’s need for a “better life.” Real wages continue to grow but the pace of growth has downshifted from previous decades. The bigger problem is the stark rise in inequality, here proxied by skyrocketing housing prices. Hong Kong’s inequality erupted into social unrest in recent years even though it has a much higher level of GDP per capita than mainland China (Chart 12). In major cities on the mainland, housing prices have outpaced disposable income over the past two decades. Youth unemployment also concerns the authorities. Chart 11Social Instability A Genuine Risk Bottom Line: The Chinese regime faces historic social and political challenges as a result of a difficult structural economic transition. The ongoing emphasis on “common prosperity” reveals the regime’s fear of social instability. The underlying tendency is deflationary, though Beijing’s use of debt monetization introduces a long-term inflationary risk that should be monitored. Chart 12Causes Of Hong Kong Unrest Also Present In China​​​​​​ China’s External Risks Geopolitically speaking, China’s greatest challenge throughout history has been maintaining domestic stability. Because China is hemmed in by islands that superior foreign powers have often used as naval bases, it is isolated as if it is a landlocked state. A stark north-south division within its internal geography and society creates inherent political tension, while buffer regions are difficult to control. Hence foreign powers can meddle with internal affairs, undermine unity and territorial integrity, and exploit China’s large labor force and market. However, in the twenty-first century China has the potential to project power outward – as long as it can maintain internal stability. Power projection is increasingly necessary because China’s economy increasingly depends on imports of energy, leaving it vulnerable to western maritime powers (Chart 13). Beijing’s conversion of economic into military might has also created frictions with neighbors and aroused the antagonism of the United States, which increasingly seeks to maintain the strategic anchor in the western Pacific that it won in World War II. Chart 13Import Dependency A Strategic Security Threat As China’s influence expands into East Asia and the rest of Asia, conflicts with the US and its allies are increasingly likely, especially over critical sea lines of communication, including the Taiwan Strait. China’s reinforcement of its manufacturing prowess will also provoke the United States, while the US’s erratic attempts to retain its strategic position in Asia Pacific will threaten to contain China. Yet the US cannot concentrate exclusively on countering China – it is distracted by internal politics and confrontations with Russia and Iran, especially in 2022. China will strengthen relations with Russia and Iran. As an energy importer, China would prefer that neither Russia nor Iran take belligerent actions that cause a global energy shock. But both Moscow and Tehran are essential to China’s Eurasian strategy of bypassing American naval dominance to reduce its supply insecurity. And yet, in 2022 specifically, the US and China are both concerned about maintaining positive domestic political dynamics due to the midterm elections and twentieth national party congress. This includes a desire to reduce inflation. Hence both would prefer diplomacy over trade war, with regard to each other, and over real war, with regard to Ukraine and Iran. So there is a temporary overlap in interests that will discourage immediate confrontation. China might offer limited cooperation on Iranian or North Korean nuclear and missile talks. But the same domestic political dynamics prevent a significant improvement in US-China relations, as neither side will grant trade concessions in 2022, and the underlying strategic tensions will revive over the medium and long run. Bottom Line: China faces historic external risks stemming from import dependency and conflict with the United States. In the short run, the US conflicts with Russia and Iran might lead to energy shocks that harm China’s economy. Japan never recovered its rapid growth rates after the 1973 Arab oil embargo. In the long run, while Washington has little interest in fighting a war with China, its strategic competition will focus on galvanizing allies to penalize China’s economy and to substitute away from China, in favor of India and ASEAN. China’s Macro Policy In 2022: Going “All In” For Stability In last year’s China Geopolitical Outlook, we maintained our underweight position on Chinese equities and warned that Beijing’s policy tightening posed a significant risk to global cyclical assets – and yet we concluded that policymakers would avoid overtightening policy to the extent of spoiling the global recovery. This view prevailed over the course of 2021. Policymakers tightened monetary and fiscal policy in the first half of the year, then started loosening up in the summer. Chinese equities crashed but global equities powered through the year. In December 2020, at the Central Economic Work Conference, policymakers stated that China would “maintain necessary policy support for economic recovery and avoid sharp turns in policy” in 2021. In the event they did the minimal necessary, though they did avoid sharp turns. For 2022, the key word is “stability.” At the Central Economic Work Conference last month, the final communique mentioned “stability” or “stabilize” 25 times (Table 1). Hence the main objective of Chinese policymakers this year is to prioritize both economic and social stability ahead of the twentieth national party congress. Authorities will avoid last year’s tight policies. Table 1Key Chinese Policy Guidance 2021-22 China’s quarterly GDP growth slipped to just 4% in Q4 2021, from rapid recovery growth of 18.3% in Q1 2021. Considering the low base effect of 2020, the average growth of 2020 and 2021 ranged from 5-5.5% (Chart 14). This growth rate is in line with the pre-pandemic trajectory of 2015-2019. In Jan 2022, the IMF cut China’s 2022 growth forecast to 4.8%, while the World Bank lowered its forecasts to 5.1%. Considering the two-year average growth and government’s goal of “all in for stability,” we see an implicit GDP target of 5-5.5%. Chart 14Breakdown Of China’s GDP Growth Does this target matter? Although China stopped announcing explicit GDP growth targets, understanding the implicit target helps investors predict the turning point in macro policy. Due to robust global demand, net exports are now making a sizable contribution to GDP growth. However, due to the high base effect of 2021, there is limited room for exports to grow in 2022. Hence economic growth has to rely on final consumption expenditure and gross capital formation. Yet as a result of policy tightening, gross capital formation’s contribution to GDP has decreased significantly, from positive in H1 2021 to a rare negative contribution to GDP in the second half. At the same time, the contribution from final consumption expenditure also slipped over the course of 2021, due to worsening Covid conditions, one of the three pressures stated by the government. What does that mean? It means that loosening up macro policies is the pre-condition for stabilizing growth and the economy. Just like the officials said (see Table 1), the Chinese economy is “facing triple pressure from demand contraction, supply shocks, and weakening expectations,” so that “all sides need to take the initiative and launch policies conducive to economic stability.” Bottom Line: It is reasonable to expect accommodative fiscal and monetary policies in 2022, at least until the party congress ends. In fact, authorities have already started to make these adjustments since Q4 2021. China Avoids Monetary Overtightening Credit growth can be seen as an indicator for gross capital formation. In the second half of 2021, China’s total social financing (total private credit) growth plunged below 12% (Chart 15), the threshold we identified for determining whether authorities overtightened policy. Correspondingly, gross capital formation’s contribution to GDP dropped into the negative zone (see Chart 14 above). However, money growth did not dip below the threshold, and authorities are now trying to boost credit growth. Starting from December 2021, the market has seen marginally positive news out of the People’s Bank of China: December 15, 2021: The PBOC conducted its second reserve requirement ratio (RRR) cut in 2021. The 50 bps cut was expected to release $188 billion in liquidity to support the real economy. December 20, 2021: The PBOC conducted its first interest rate cut since April 2020 by cutting 1-Year LPR by 5 bps on December 20 (Chart 16). Chart 15China's Money And Credit Growth Hits Pain Threshold​​​​​​ Chart 16China Monetary Policy Easing​​​​​​ January 17, 2022: The PBOC cut the interest rate on medium-term lending facility (MLF) loans and 7-day reverse repurchase (repos) rate both by 10 bps. January 20, 2022: The PBOC further lowered the 1-year LPR by 10 basis points and cut the 5-year LPR by 5 basis points, the first cut since April 2020. Chart 17China Policy Easing Will Boost Import Volumes The timing and size of the last two rate cuts came as a surprise to the market, signaling more comprehensive easing than was expected (confirming our expectations).3 The market saw a clear turning point: Chinese authorities are now fully aware of the need to loosen up monetary policy to counter intensifying downward pressure on the economy. Incidentally, the fine-tuning of the different lending facilities suggests the government aims to lower borrowing costs and stimulate the market without over-heating the property sector again. PBOC officials claim there is still some space for further cuts, though narrower now, when asked about if there is any room to further cut the RRR and interest rates in Q1. They added that the PBOC should “stay ahead of the market curve” and “not procrastinate.”4 Recent movements have validated this point. Going forward, M2 growth should stay above 8%. Total social financing growth should move up above our “too tight” threshold, although weak sentiment among private borrowers could force authorities to ease further to ensure that credit growth picks up. If the government is still committed to fighting housing speculation, as before, then we could see a smaller adjustment to the 5-Year LPR in the future. Otherwise the government is taking its foot off the brake for stability reasons, at least temporarily. Bottom Line: China will keep easing monetary policy in 2022, at least in the first half. This will result in an improvement in Chinese import volumes and ultimately emerging market corporate earnings, albeit with a six-to-12-month lag (Chart 17). China Avoids Fiscal Overtightening China will also avoid over-tightening fiscal policy in 2022. In December the government stressed the need to “maintain the intensity of fiscal spending, accelerate the pace, and moderately advance infrastructure investment.” In 2021, local government bond issuance did not pick up until the second half of the year. Considering the time lag of construction projects, it was too late for local government investment to stimulate the economy. By Q3 2021, local government bond issuance had just completed roughly 70% of the annual quota. By comparison, in 2018-2020, local governments all completed more than 95% of the annual quota by the end of September each year (Chart 18A). Chart 18AChina: No Pause In Local Bond Issuance In H1 2022​​​​​ Chart 18BChina: No Pause In Local Bond Issuance In H1 2022​​​​​​ There are several reasons behind the slow pace last year. The central government refused to pre-approve and pre-authorize the quota for bond issuance at the beginning of the year in 2021, in order to restore discipline after the massive 2020 stimulus measures. The quota was not released until after the Two Sessions in March, which means local government bond issuance did not pick up until April 2021, causing a 3-month vacuum in local government fiscal support (see Chart 18B). In contrast, for 2019 and 2020, the central government pre-authorized the bond issuance quota ahead of time to try to provide fiscal support evenly throughout the year. Starting from 2020, the central government strengthened supervision and evaluation of local government investment projects, again to instill discipline. Previously local governments could easily issue general-purpose bonds and the funds were theirs to spend. But now local governments are required to increase the transparency of their investment projects and mainly finance these projects via special-purpose bonds, i.e. targeted money for authorized projects (Table 2). In 2021 local governments were less willing to issue bonds. At the April 2021 Politburo meeting, the central government vowed to “establish a disposal mechanism that will hold local government officials accountable for fiscal and financial risks.” This triggered risk-aversion. Beijing wanted to prevent a growth “splurge” in the wake of its emergency stimulus, like what happened in 2008-11. The fiscal turning point came in the second half of the year. The central government called for accelerating local government bond issuance several times from July to October. The pace significantly picked up in the second half of 2021 and Q4 accounted for a significant portion of annual issuance (Chart 18). As a result, fixed asset investment and fiscal impulse should pick up in Q1 2022. Thus, unlike last year, authorities are trying to avoid a sharp drop in the fiscal impulse. The Ministry of Finance has already frontloaded 1.46 trillion yuan ($229 billion) from the 2022 special purpose bonds quota. This amount is part of the 2022 annual local government bond issuance quota, with the rest to be released at the Two Sessions in March. Pulling these funds forward indicates the rising pressure to stabilize economic growth in Q1 this year. That being said, investors should differentiate easing up fiscal policy and “flood-like” stimulus in the past. The government still claims it will “contain increases in implicit local government debts.” In fact, pilot programs to clean up implicit debts have already started in Shanghai and Guangdong. This means, China will not reverse past efforts on curbing hidden debts. Hence fiscal support will be more tightly controlled in future, like water taps in the hands of the central government. The risk of fiscal tightening is backloaded in 2022. The tremendous amount of local government bonds issued in Q4 2021 will start to kick in early 2022. These will combine with the frontloaded special purposed bonds. Fiscal impulse should tick up in Q1. However, fiscal impulse might decelerate in the second half. A total of $2.7 trillion yuan worth of local government bonds will reach maturity this year, with $2.2 trillion yuan reaching maturity after June 2022 (Table 3). This means that in the second half, local governments will need to issue more re-financing bonds to prevent insolvency risk, thus undermining fiscal support for the economy. And this last point underscores the threat of economic and financial instability that China faces over the long run. Table 2Breakdown Of China Local Government Bond Issuance Bottom Line: Stability is the top priority in 2022. China will continue to easy up monetary and fiscal policy in H1, to combat the economic downward pressure ahead of the twentieth national party congress (Chart 19). Policy tightening risk is backloaded. Structural reforms will likely subside for now until the Xi administration re-consolidates power for the next ten years. Table 3China: Local Government Debt Maturity Schedule​​​​​​ Chart 19Policy Support Expected For 20th Party Congress Note: An error in an earlier version of this report has been corrected. Chinese fixed asset investment in Chart 19 is growing at 0.1%, not 57.6% as originally shown. The chart has been adjusted. Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Yushu Ma Research Associate yushu.ma@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      See Bei Hu and Bloomberg, “Ray Dalio thinks the U.S. needs more of China’s common prosperity drive to create a ‘fairer system,’” Fortune, January 10, 2022, fortune.com. 2     See George Soros, “China’s Challenges,” Project Syndicate, January 31, 2022, project-syndicate.org. 3     The 5-year LPR had remained unchanged after the December 2021 cut. At that time, only the 1-Year LPR was cut by 5bps. Furthermore, the different magnitudes of the January 20 LPR cut also have some implications. The 1-Year LPR mostly affects new and outstanding loans, short-term liquidity loans of firms, and consumer loans of households. In comparison, the 5-Year LPR has a larger impact, affecting the borrowing costs of total social financing, including mortgage loans, medium- to long-term investment loans, etc. The MLF rate was cut by 10 basis points on January 17; in theory the LPR should also be cut by the same size. However, the 5-Year LPR adjustments was very cautious and was only cut by 5 bps, smaller than the MLF cut and the 1-Year LPR cut. The 5-year LPR serves as the benchmark lending rate for mortgage loans. 4     To combat the negative shock caused by the initial outburst of COVID-19, altogether China lowered the MLF and 1-year LPR by 30 bps and 5-year LPR by 15 bps in H1 2020. This also suggests that there is still room for future interest rate cuts or RRR cuts in the coming months. Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)