Economy

Highlights Our top five “black swan” risks for 2022: Social unrest in China; Russian invasion of all of Ukraine; unilateral Israeli strikes on Iran; a cyber attack that goes kinetic; and a failure of OPEC 2.0. Too early to buy the dip on Russian assets: President Biden says Putin will probably “move in” and re-invade Ukraine, Russian embassy staff have been evacuating Ukraine, the US and UK have been providing more arms to Ukraine, and the US is warning of a semiconductor embargo against Russia. Talks resume in Geneva on Friday. Tactically investors should take some risk off the table, especially if linked to Russia and Europe.  Stay short the Russian ruble and EM Europe; stay short the Chinese renminbi and Taiwanese dollar; stay long cyber security stocks; and be prepared for oil volatility. Convert tactical long equity trades to relative trades: long large caps versus small caps, long defensives versus cyclicals, and long Japanese industrials versus German industrials. Feature Chart 1Recession Probability And Yield Curve The 2/10-year yield curve is flattening and now stands at 79 bps, while the implied probability of a recession over the next 12 months troughed at 5.9% in April 2021, and as of December 2021 stood at 7.7% (Chart 1). Apparently stagflation and recession are too high of a probability to constitute a “black swan” risk for this year. Black swans are not only high impact but also low probability. In this year’s annual “Five Black Swan” report, the last of our 2022 outlook series, we concentrate on impactful but unlikely events. These black swans emerge directly from the existing themes and trends in our research – they are not plucked at random. The key regions are highlighted in Map 1. Black Swan #1: Major Social Unrest Erupts In China China’s financial problems are front and center risks for investors this year. They qualify as a “Gray Rhino” rather than “Black Swan” risk.1 It is entirely probable that China’s financial and property sector distress will negatively impact Chinese and global financial markets in 2022. What investors are not expecting is an eruption of social unrest in China that fouls up the twentieth national party congress this fall and calls into question the Communist Party’s official narrative that it is handling the pandemic and the underlying economic transition smoothly. Social unrest is a major risk around the world in the face of the new bout of inflation. Most of the democracies have already changed governments since the pandemic began, recapitalizing their political systems, but major emerging markets – Russia, India, Turkey, Brazil – have not done so. They have seen steep losses of popular support for both political leaders and ruling parties. There is little opinion polling from China and people who are surveyed cannot speak openly. It is possible that the government’s support has risen given its minimization of deaths from the pandemic. But it is also possible that it has not. Beijing’s policies over the past few years have had a negative impact on the country’s business elite and foreign relations. There are disgruntled factions within China, though the current administration has a tight grip over the main organs of power. Since President Xi is trying to clinch his personal rule this fall, sending China down a path of autocracy that proved disastrous under Chairman Mao Zedong, it is possible he will face surprise resistance. China’s economic growth is decelerating, clocking in at a 4.0% quarter-on-quarter growth rate at the end of last year. While authorities are easing policy to secure the recovery, there is a danger of insufficient support. Private sentiment will remain gloomy, as reflected by weak money velocity and a low propensity to spend among both businesses and households (Chart 2). The government will continue to be repressive in the lead up to the political reshuffle. At least for the first half of the year the economy will remain troubled. Structurally China is ripe for social unrest. It suffers from high income inequality and low social mobility, comparable to the US and Brazil, which are both struggling with political upheaval (Chart 3). Chart 2China's Private Sector Still Depressed​​​​​ ​​​​​​ In addition China is keeping a stranglehold over Covid-19. This “Zero Covid” policy minimizes deaths but suppresses economic activity. Strict policy has also left the population with a very low level of natural immunity and the new Omicron variant is even more contagious than other variants. Hence the regime is highly likely to double down to prevent an explosive outbreak. The service side of the economy will continue to suffer if strict lockdowns are maintained, exacerbating household and business financial difficulties (Chart 4). Yet in other countries around the world, government decisions to return to lockdowns have sparked unrest. Chart 4Zero Covid Policy: Not Sustainable Beyond 2022 China’s “Misery Index” (unemployment plus inflation) is rising sharply. While misery is ostensibly lower than that of other emerging markets, China’s unemployment data is widely known to be unreliable. If we take a worst-case scenario, looking at youth unemployment and fuel prices, misery is a lot higher (Chart 5). The youth, who are having the hardest time finding jobs, are also the most likely to protest if conditions become intolerable (Chart 6). Of course, if social unrest is limited to students, it will lack support among the wider populace. But it is inflation, not youth activism, that is the reason for China’s authorities to be concerned, as inflation is a generalized problem that affects workers as well as students. Chart 5China's Misery Index Is Higher Than It Looks​​​​​ Chart 6China's Troubled Youth Why would protesters stick their necks out knowing that the Communist Party will react ferociously to any sign of instability during President Xi Jinping’s political reshuffle? True, mainland Chinese do not have the propensity to political activism that flared up in protests in Hong Kong in recent years. Also the police state will move rapidly to repress any unrest. Yet the entire focus of Xi Jinping’s administration, since 2012, has been the restoration of political legitimacy and prevention of popular discontent. Xi has cracked down on corruption, pollution, housing prices, education prices, and has announced his “Common Prosperity” agenda to placate the low and middle classes.2 The regime has also cracked down on the media, social media, civil society, and ideological dissent to prevent political opposition from taking root. If the government were not concerned about social instability, it would not have been adopting these policies. Disease, often accompanied by famines or riots, has played a role in the downfall of six out of ten dynasties, so Beijing will not be taking risks for granted (Table 1). Table 1Disease And Downfall Of Chinese Dynasties Social instability would have a major impact as it would affect China’s stability and global investor sentiment toward China. Western democracies would penalize China for violations of human rights, leaving China even more isolated. Bottom Line: Investors should stay short the renminbi and neutral Chinese equities. Foreign investors should steer clear of Chinese bonds in the event of US sanctions. After the party congress this fall there will be an opportunity to reassess whether Xi Jinping will “let a hundred flowers bloom,” thus improving the internal and external political and investment environment, but this is not at all clear today. Black Swan #2: Russia Invades All (Not Just Part) Of Ukraine US-Russia relations are on the verge of total collapse and Russian equities have sold off, in line with our bearish recommendations in reports over the past two years. Russia’s threat of re-invading Ukraine is credible. Western nations are still wishy-washy about the counter-threat of economic sanctions, judging by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s latest comments, and none are claiming they will go to war to defend Ukraine.3 Russia is looking to remove the threat of Ukraine integrating militarily and economically with the West. The US and UK are providing Ukraine with defense weaponry even as Russia specifically demands that they cease to do so. President Putin may choose short-term economic pain for long-term security gain. The consensus view is that if Russia does invade, it will undertake a limited invasion. But what if Russia invades all of Ukraine? To be clear, a full invasion is unlikely because it would be far more difficult and costly for Russia. It would go against Putin’s strategy of calculated risk and limited conflict. Table 2 compares Russia and Ukraine in size and strength, alongside a comparison of the US and Iraq in 2002. This is not a bad comparison given that Ukraine’s and Iraq’s land area and active military personnel are comparable. Table 2Russia-Ukraine Balance Of Power 2022 Compared To US-Iraq 2002 Russia would be biting off a much bigger challenge than the US did. Ukraine’s prime age population is 2.5 times larger than Iraq’s in 2002, and its military expenditure is three times bigger. The US GDP and military spending were 150 and 250 times bigger than Iraq’s, while Russia’s GDP and military spending are about ten times bigger than Ukraine’s today. Iraq was not vital to American national security, whereas Ukraine is vital to Russia; Russia has more at stake and is willing to take greater risks. But Ukraine is in better shape to resist Russian occupation than Iraq was to resist American. The point is that the US invasion went smoothly at first, then got bogged down in insurgency, and ultimately backfired both in political and geopolitical terms. Russia would be undertaking a massive expense of blood and treasure that seems out of proportion with its goal, which is to neutralize Ukraine’s potential to become a western defense ally and host of “military infrastructure.” However, there are drawbacks to partial invasion. The remainder of the Ukrainian state would be unified and mobilized, capable of integrating with the western world, and willing to support a permanent insurgency against Russian troops in eastern Ukraine. Russia has forces in Belarus, Crimea, and the Black Sea, as well as on Ukraine’s eastern border, giving rise to fears that Russia could attempt a three-pronged invasion of the whole country. In short, it is conceivable that Russian leaders could make the Soviet mistake of overreaching in the military aims, or that a war in eastern Ukraine could inadvertently expand into the west. If Russia tries to conquer all of Ukraine, the global impact will be massive. A war of this size on the European continent for the first time since World War II would shake governments and populations to their bones. The borders with Poland, Romania, the Baltic states, Slovakia, Hungary, Finland and the Black Sea area would become militarized (Map 2). NATO actions to secure its members and fortify their borders would exacerbate tensions with Russia and fan fears of a wider war. Trade flows would become subject to commerce destruction, affecting even neutral nations, including in the Black Sea. Energy supplies would tighten further, sending Russia and probably Europe into recession. The disruption to business and travel across eastern Europe would be deep and lasting, not only due to sanctions but also due to a deep risk-aversion that would affect foreign investors in the former Soviet Union and former Warsaw Pact. Germany would be forced to quit sitting on the fence, as it would be pressured by the US and the rest of Europe to stand shoulder to shoulder in the face of such aggression. Finland and Sweden would be much more likely to join NATO, exacerbating Russia’s security fears. Russia would suffer a drastic loss of trade, resulting in recession, and its currency collapse would feed inflation (Chart 7). Chart 7Inflation Poses Long-Term Threat To Putin Regime Ultimately the consequences would be negative for the Putin regime and Russia as a result of recession and international isolation. But in the short run the Russian people would rally around the flag and support a war designed to prevent NATO from stationing missiles on their doorstep. And their isolation would not be total, as they would strengthen ties with China and conduct trade via proxy states in the former Soviet Union. Bottom Line: A full-scale invasion of all of Ukraine is highly unlikely because it would be so costly for Russia in military, economic, and political terms. But the probability is not zero, especially because a partial re-invasion could lead to a larger war. While global investors would react in a moderate risk-off matter to a limited war in eastern Ukraine, a full-scale war would trigger a massive global flight to safety as it would call into question the entire post-WWII peace regime in Europe. Black Swan #3: Israel Attacks Iran The “bull market in Iran tensions” continues as there is not yet a replacement for the 2015 nuclear deal that the US abrogated. Our 2022 forecast that the UAE would get caught in the crossfire was confirmed on January 17 when Iran-backed Houthi rebels expanded their range of operations and struck Abu Dhabi (Map 3). The secret war is escalating and US-led diplomacy is faltering. Iran is not going to give up its nuclear program. North Korea achieved nuclear arms and greater military security and is now developing first and second strike capabilities. Meanwhile Ukraine, which faces another Russian invasion, exemplifies what happens to regimes that give up nuclear arms (as do Libya and Iraq). Iran appears to be choosing the North Korean route. While we cannot rule out a minor agreement between President Biden and Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, we can rule out a substantial deal that halts Iran’s nuclear and missile progress. Here’s why: Any day now Iran could reach nuclear “breakout capacity,” with enough highly enriched uranium to construct a nuclear device (Table 3).4 Table 3Iran’s Violations Of 2015 Nuclear Deal Since US Exit Within Iran’s government, the foreign policy doves have been humiliated and kicked out of office while the hawks are fully in control. No meaningful agreement can be reached before 2024 because of the risk that the US will change ruling parties again and renege on any promises. Iran is highly incentivized to make rapid progress on its nuclear program now. The US will not be able to lead the P5+1 coalition to force Iran to halt its program because of its ongoing struggles with Russia and China. China is striking long-term cooperation deals with Iran. Israel has a well-established record of taking unilateral action, specifically against regional nuclear programs, known as the “Begin Doctrine.”5 Israel’s threats are credible on this front, although Iran is a much greater operational challenge than Iraq or Syria. Iran’s timeline from nuclear breakout to deliverable nuclear weapon is 12-24 months.6 Iran’s missile program is advanced. Missile programs cannot be monitored as easily as nuclear activity, so foreign powers base the threshold on nuclear capability rather than missile capability. Iran had a strong incentive to move slowly on its nuclear and missile programs in earlier years, to prevent US and Israeli military interference. But as it approaches breakout capacity it has an incentive to accelerate its tempo to a mad dash to achieve nuclear weaponization before the US or Israel can stop it. Now that time may have come. The Biden administration is afraid of higher oil prices and Israeli domestic politics are more divided and risk-averse than before. And yet Iran’s window might close in 2025, as the US could turn aggressive again depending on the outcome of the 2024 election. Hence Iran has an incentive to make its dash now. The US and Israel will restate their red lines against Iranian nuclear weaponization and brandish their military options this year. But the Biden administration will be risk-averse since it does not want to instigate an oil shock in an election year. Israel is more likely than the US to react quickly and forcefully since it is in greatest danger if Iran surprises the world with rapid weaponization. Here are the known constraints on unilateral Israeli military action: Limited Israeli military capability: Israel would have to commit a large number of aircraft, leaving its home front exposed, and even with US “bunker buster” bombs it may not penetrate the underground Fordow nuclear facility.7 Limited Israeli domestic support: The Israeli public is divided on whether to attack Iran. The post-Netanyahu government recently came around to endorsing the US’s attempt to renegotiate the nuclear deal. Limited US support: Washington opposes Israeli unilateralism that could entangle the US into a war. Israel cannot afford to alienate the US, which is its primary security guarantor. Iranian instability: The Iranian regime is under economic distress due to “maximum pressure” sanctions. It is vulnerable to social unrest, not least because of its large youth population. These constraints have been vitiated in various ways, which is why we raise this Israeli unilateralism as a black swan risk: Where there’s a will, there’s a way: If Israel believes its existence will be threatened, it will be willing to take much greater operational risks. It has already shown some ability to set back Iran's centrifuge program beyond the expected.8 Israeli opinion will harden if Iran breaks out: If Iran reaches nuclear breakout or tests a nuclear device, Israeli opinion will harden in favor of military strikes. Prime Minister Naftali Bennett has an incentive to take hawkish actions before he hands the reins of government over to a partner in his ruling coalition as part of a power-sharing agreement. The ruling coalition is so weak that a collapse cannot be ruled out. US opposition could weaken: Biden will have to explore military options if talks fail and Iran reaches nuclear breakout capacity. Once the midterms are over, Israel may have even more freedom to act, while a gridlocked Biden may be looking to shift his focus to foreign policy. Iranian stability: Iran’s social instability has not resulted in massive unrest or regime fracture despite years of western sanctions and a global recession/pandemic. Yet now energy prices are rising and Iran has less reason to believe sanction regimes will be watertight. From Israeli’s point of view, even regime change in Iran would not remove the nuclear threat once nuclear weapons are obtained. Finally, while Israel cannot guarantee that military strikes would successfully cripple Iran’s nuclear program and prevent weaponization, Israel cannot afford not to try. It would be a worse outcome to stand idly by while Iran gets a nuclear weapon than to attack and fail to set that program back. Hence the likeliest outcome over the long run is that Iran pursues a nuclear weapon and Israel attacks to try to stop it, even if that attack is likely to fail (Diagram 1). Diagram 1Game Theory: Will Israel Attack Iran? Bottom Line: A unilateral Israeli strike is unlikely but would have a massive impact, as 21% of global oil and 26% of natural gas flows through the Strait of Hormuz, and conflict could disrupt regional energy production and/or block passage through the strait itself. Black Swan #4: Cyber Attacks Spill Into Real World Investors are very aware of cyber security risks – it holds a respectable though not commanding position in the ranks of likely crisis events (Table 4). Our concern is that a cyber attack could spill over into the real world, impairing critical infrastructure, supply chains, and/or prompting military retaliation. Table 4Cyber Events Underrated In Consensus View Of Global Risks Russian attacks on US critical infrastructure by means of ransomware gangs disrupted a US fuel pipeline, meat-packing plant, and other critical infrastructure in 2021. Since then the two countries have engaged in negotiations over cyber security. The Russian Federal Security Bureau has cracked down on one of the most prominent gangs, REvil, in a sign that the US and Russia are still negotiating despite the showdown over Ukraine.9 Yet a re-invasion of Ukraine would shatter any hope of cooperation in the cyber realm or elsewhere. Russia is already using cyberattacks against Ukraine and these activities could expand to Ukraine’s partners if the military conflict expands. Should the US and EU impose sweeping sanctions that damage Russia’s economy, Russia could retaliate, not only by tightening energy supply but also by cyber attacks. Any NATO partners or allies would be vulnerable, though some states will be more reactive than others. Interference in the French election, for example, would be incendiary. The key question is: if Russia strikes NATO states with damaging cyber attacks, at what point would it trigger Article V, the mutual defense clause? There are no established codes of conduct or red lines in cyber space, so the world will have to learn each nation’s limits via confrontation and retaliation. Similar cyber risks could emerge from other conflicts. China is probably not ready to invade Taiwan but it has an interest in imposing economic costs on the island ahead of this fall’s midterm elections. Taiwan’s critical role in the semiconductor supply chain means that disruptions to production would have a global impact. Israel and the US have already used cyber capabilities to attack Iran and set back its nuclear program. These capabilities will be necessary as Iran approaches breakout capacity. Yet Iran could retaliate in a way that disrupts oil supplies. North Korea began a new cycle of provocations last September, accelerated missile tests over the past four months, and is dissatisfied with the unfinished diplomatic business of the Trump administration. In the wake of the last global crisis, 2010, it staged multiple military attacks against South Korea. South Korea may be vulnerable due to its presidential elections in May. The semiconductor or electronics supply chain could be interrupted here as well as in Taiwan. Bottom Line: There is no code of conduct in cyber space. As geopolitical tensions rise, and nations test the limits of their cyber capabilities, there is potential for critical infrastructure to be impaired. This could exacerbate supply chain kinks or provoke kinetic responses from victim nations. Black Swan #5: OPEC 2.0 Falls Apart The basis of the OPEC 2.0 cartel is Russian cooperation with Saudi Arabia to control oil supply and manage the forward price curve. Backwardation, when short-term prices are higher than long-term, is ideal for these countries since they fear that long-term prices will fall. In a world where Moscow and Riyadh both face competition from US shale producers as well as the green energy revolution, cooperation makes sense. Yet the two sides do not trust each other. Cooperation broke down both in 2014 and 2020, sending oil prices plunging. Falling global demand ignited a scramble for market share. Interestingly, Russian military invasions have signaled peak oil price in 1979, 2008, and 2014. Russia, like other petro-states, has greater room for maneuver when oil revenues are pouring in. But high prices also incentivize production, disincentivize cartel discipline, and trigger reductions in global demand (Chart 8). Chart 8Russian Invasions And Oil Price Crashes Broadly speaking, Saudi oil production rose modestly during times of Russian military adventures, while overall OPEC production was flat or down, and Russian/Soviet production went up (Chart 9). Chart 9Saudi And OPEC Oil Production During Russian Military Adventures Since 2020, we have held that OPEC 2.0 would continue operating but that the biggest risk would come in the form of a renewed US-Iran nuclear deal that freed up Iranian oil exports. In 2014, the Saudis increased production in the face of the US shale threat as well as the Iranian threat. This scenario is still possible in 2022 but it has become a low-probability outcome. Even aside from the Iran dynamic, there is some probability that Russo-Saudi cooperation breaks down as global growth decelerates and new oil supply comes online. Bottom Line: The world’s inflation expectations are elevated and closely linked to oil prices. Yet oil prices hinge on an uneasy political agreement between Russia and Saudi Arabia that has fallen apart twice before. If Russia invades Ukraine, or if US withdraws sanctions on Iran, for example, then Saudi Arabia could make a bid to expand its market share and trigger price declines in the process. Two Bonus Black Swans: Turkey And Venezuela Turkey lashes out: Our Turkish Political Capital Index shows deterioration for President Recep Erdogan’s political capital across a range of variables (Table 5). With geopolitical pressures increasing, and domestic politics heating up ahead of the 2023 elections, Erdogan’s behavior will become even more erratic. His foreign policy could become aggressive, keeping the lira under pressure and/or weighing on European assets. Table 5Turkey: Erdogan’s Political Capital Wearing Thin Venezuela’s Maduro falls from power: Venezuelan regime changes often follow from military coups. These coups do not only happen when oil prices collapse – sometimes the army officers wait to be sure prices have recovered. Coup-throwers want strong oil revenues to support their new rule. An unexpected change of regimes would affect the oil market due to this country’s giant reserves. Bottom Line: Turkey’s political instability could result in foreign aggression, while Venezuela’s regime could collapse despite the oil price recovery. Investment Takeaways We are booking profits on our tactical long trades on large caps and defensive sectors. We will convert these to relative trades: long large caps over small caps, and long defensives over cyclicals. We also recommend converting our tactical long Japan trade into long Japanese industrials / short German industrials equities. If US-Russia diplomacy averts a war we will reconsider.     Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      “Gray Rhino” is a term coined by author Michele Wucker to describe large and probable risks that people neglect or avoid. For more, see thegrayrhino.com. 2     Xi Jinping recently characterized the “common prosperity” agenda as follows: “China has made it clear that we strive for more visible and substantive progress in the well-rounded development of individuals and the common prosperity of the entire population. We are working hard on all fronts to deliver this goal. The common prosperity we desire is not egalitarianism. To use an analogy, we will first make the pie bigger, and then divide it properly through reasonable institutional arrangements. As a rising tide lifts all boats, everyone will get a fair share from development, and development gains will benefit all our people in a more substantial and equitable way.” See World Economic Forum, “President Xi Jinping’s message to The Davos Agenda in full,” January 17, 2022, weforum.org. 3     Chancellor Scholz, when asked whether Germany would avoid using the Nord Stream II pipeline if Russia re-invaded Ukraine, said, "it is clear that there will be a high cost and that all this will have to be discussed if there is a military intervention against Ukraine.” He was speaking with NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg. See Hans Von Der Burchard, “Scholz: Germany will discuss Nord Stream 2 penalties if Russia attacks Ukraine,” Politico, January 18, 2022, politico.eu. 4     For the Begin Doctrine, see Meir Y. Soloveichik, “The Miracle of Osirak,” Commentary, April 2021, commentary.org. 5     The estimate of 12-24 months to mount a nuclear warhead on a missile has been cited by various credible sources, including David Albright and Sarah Burkhard, “Highlights of Iran’s Perilous Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons,” Institute for Science and International Security, August 24, 2021, isis-online.org, and Eric Brewer and Nicholas L. Miller, “A Redline for Iran?” Foreign Affairs, December 23, 2021, foreignaffairs.com. 6     See Edieal J. Pinker, Joseph Szmerekovsky, and Vera Tilson, “Technical Note – Managing a Secret Project,” Operations Research, February 5, 2013, pubsonline.informs.org, as well as “What Can Game Theory Tell Us About Iran’s Nuclear Intentions?” Yale Insights, March 17, 2015, insights.som.yale.edu.  7     See Josef Joffe, “Increasingly Isolated, Israel Must Rely On Nuclear Deterrence,” Strategika 35 (September 2016), Hoover Institution, hoover.org. 8     The sabotage of the Iran Centrifuge Assembly Center at the Natanz nuclear facility in July 2020 “set back Iran’s centrifuge program significantly and continues to do so,” according to David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, and John Hannah, “Iran’s Natanz Tunnel Complex: Deeper, Larger Than Expected,” Institute for Science and International Security, January 13, 2022, isis-online.org. For a recent positive case regarding Israel’s capabilities, see Mitchell Bard, “Military Options Against Iran,” Jewish Virtual Library, American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, January 2022, jewishvirtuallibrary.org.  9     For the FSB and REvil, see Chris Galford, “Russian FSB arrests members of REvil ransomware gang following attacks on U.S. infrastructure,” Homeland Preparedness News, January 18, 2022, homelandprepnews.com. For the Colonial Pipeline and JBS attacks, and other ransomware attacks, see Jonathan W. Welburn and Quentin E. Hodgson, “How the United States Can Deter Ransomware Attacks,” RAND Blog, August 9, 2021, rand.org. Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)

Highlights The bond market assumes that when recent inflation has been high, it will be higher than average for the next ten years. Yet the reality is the exact opposite. High inflation is followed by lower than average inflation. This means that the ex-post real yield delivered by 10-year T-bonds will turn out to be much higher than the negative ex-ante real yield that 10-year Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) are now offering. Long-term investors should overweight 10-year T-bonds versus 10-year TIPS. Underweight (or outright short) US TIPS. Underweight commodities, and especially underweight those commodities that have not yet corrected. Fractal trading watchlist: the US dollar, alternative energy, biotech, nickel versus silver, and an update on semiconductors. Feature Chart of the WeekThe Real Yield Turns Out To Be Higher Than Expected Real interest rates are negative. Or are they? Given that real interest rates form the foundation of most asset prices, getting this question right is of paramount importance. Over the short term, yes, real interest rates are negative. Policy interest rates in the major developed economies are unlikely to rise quickly from their current near-zero levels. So, they will remain below the rate of inflation. But what about over the longer term, say ten years – are long-term real interest rates truly negative? The Real Bond Yield Is The Mirror Image Of Backward-Looking Inflation The negative US real 10-year bond yield of -0.7 percent comprises the nominal yield of 1.8 percent minus an expected inflation rate of 2.5 percent. This means that the negativity of the real bond yield hinges on the expectation for inflation over the next ten years. Therein lies the big problem. Many people believe that the bond market’s expected 10-year inflation rate is an independent and forward-looking assessment of how inflation will evolve. Yet nothing could be further from the truth. The bond market’s expected inflation is just the result of an algorithm that uses historic inflation. And at that, an extremely short period of historic inflation, just six months.1  The bond market’s expected inflation is just the result of an algorithm that uses historic inflation. Specifically, in the pandemic era, the bond market has derived its expected 10-year inflation rate from the historic six month (annualized) inflation rate, which it assumes will gradually converge to a long-term rate of just below 2 percent during the first four years, then stay there for the remaining six years2 (Figure I-1). We recommend that readers replicate this simple calculation for themselves to shatter any illusion that there is anything forward-looking about the bond market’s inflation expectation! (Chart I-2). Chart I-2Expected 10-Year Inflation Is Just Based On The Last 6 Months Of Inflation! The upshot is that when the backward-looking six month inflation rate is low, like it was in the depths of the global financial crisis in late 2008 or the pandemic recession in early 2020, the market assumes that the forward-looking ten year inflation rate will be low. And when the backward-looking six-month inflation rate is high, like now or in early-2008, the bond market assumes that the forward-looking ten year inflation rate will be high. In other words, the bond market extrapolates the last six months of inflation into the next ten years. This observation leads to an immediate investment conclusion. The US six-month inflation rate has already peaked. As it cools, it will also cool the expected 10-year inflation rate, thereby putting upward pressure on the mirror image Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) real yield. It follows that investors should underweight (or outright short) US 10-year TIPS (Chart I-3). Chart I-3As Inflation Cools, TIPS Will Underperform The Real Bond Yield Is Based On A False Expectation There is a more fundamental issue at stake. The market assumes that when recent inflation has been low, it will be lower than average for the next ten years. And when recent inflation has been high, it will be higher than average for the next ten years. Yet the reality is the exact opposite. Low inflation is followed by higher than average inflation, and high inflation is followed by lower than average inflation. The price level is lower than the 2012 expectation of where it would stand in 2022! Another way of putting this is that the market assumes that any breakout of the consumer price index (CPI) will be amplified over the following ten years (Chart I-4). Yet the reality is that any breakout of the price level tends to trend-revert over the following ten years. This means that after the CPI’s decline in late 2008, the market massively underestimated where the price level would be ten years later. But earlier in 2008, when the CPI had surged, the market massively overestimated where the price level would be ten years later. Chart I-4The Market Exaggerates Any Deviations In The CPI Into The Distant Future Today in 2022, the price level seems to be uncomfortably high. But the remarkable thing is that it is still lower than the 2012 expectation of where it would stand in 2022! (Chart I-5). Chart I-5The Market Overestimates Where The Price Level Will Stand 10 Years Ahead The crucial point is that after surges in the price level, realised 10-year inflation turns out to be at least 1 percent lower than the bond market’s expectation (Chart I-6). This means that the ex-post real yield delivered by 10-year T-bonds turns out to be at least 1 percent higher than the ex-ante real yield that 10-year TIPS offered at the start of the ten year period (Chart of the Week). Chart I-6Actual Inflation Turns Out To Be Lower Than Expected It follows that after the current surge in the price level, the (actual) real yield that will be delivered by 10-year T-bonds over the next ten years will not be the -0.7 percent indicated by the TIPS 10-year real yield. Instead, if history is any guide, it will be at least +0.3 percent. Therefore, in answer to our original question, the real long-term interest rate is almost certainly not negative. Of course, the obvious comeback is that ‘this time is different’. But we really wouldn’t bet the farm on it. Many people thought this time is different during the price level surge in early 2008 as well as the lows in late 2008 and early 2020. But those times were not different. And our bet is that this time isn’t any different either. This means that the real yield on T-bonds will turn out to be much higher than that on TIPS. Long-term investors should overweight T-bonds versus TIPS. Commodities Are Vulnerable A final important observation relates to commodities. Commodity prices have been tightly tracking the 6-month inflation rate, but which way does the causality run in this tight relationship? At first glance, it might seem that the causality runs from commodity prices to the inflation rate. Yet on further consideration, this cannot be right. It is not the commodity price level that drives the overall inflation rate, it is the commodity inflation rate that drives the overall inflation rate. And in the past year, overall inflation has decoupled (upwards) from commodity inflation (Chart I-7 and Chart I-8). Chart I-7Inflation Is Tracking ##br##Commodity Prices... Chart I-8...But Inflation Should Be Tracking Commodity Inflation Therefore, the causality in the tight relationship between the 6-month inflation rate and commodity prices must run from backward-looking inflation to commodity prices. And the likely explanation is that investors are bidding up commodity prices as a hedge against the backward-looking inflation which they are incorrectly extrapolating into the future. Low inflation is followed by higher than average inflation, and high inflation is followed by lower than average inflation. It follows that as 6-month inflation cools, so will commodity prices. The investment conclusion is to underweight commodities, and especially to underweight those commodities that have not yet corrected. Fractal Trading Watchlist This week’s observations relate to the US dollar, alternative energy, biotech, nickel versus silver, and an update on semiconductors. The US dollar reached a point of fragility in early December, from which it experienced a classic short-term countertrend sell-off. As such, the countertrend sell-off is mostly done. Alternative energy versus old energy is approaching a major buying point. Biotech versus the market is very close to a major buying point. Nickel versus silver is very close to a major selling point. Semiconductors versus technology was on our sell watchlist last week, and has now hit its point of maximum fragility (Chart I-9). Therefore, the recommended trade is to short semiconductors versus broad technology, setting a profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 6 percent. Chart 9Semiconductors Are Due A Reversal Fractal Trading Watchlist Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The expected 10-year inflation rate = (deviation of 6-month annualized inflation from 1.6)*0.2 + 1.6. 2 Inflation is based on the PCE deflator. Fractal Trading System Fractal Trades 6-Month Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - ##br##Euro Area Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - ##br##Europe Ex Euro Area Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - ##br##Asia Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - ##br##Other Developed   Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

Highlights On US inflation and the Fed: If the Fed adheres to its mandate, it has no choice but to hike rates until core inflation drops toward 2% (from its current level above 4%). Yet, share prices will sell off before inflation converges toward the Fed’s target. On US TIPS yields: Rising TIPS yields will depress share prices in the richly valued equity markets like the US, support the greenback, and curtail portfolio flows into EM for a period of time. On China: Despite stimulus, China’s business cycle will continue disappointing over the near-term. Besides, a bottom in money/credit indicators does not always herald an imminent and sustainable equity rally. On financial market divergences: Major selloffs evolve in phases resembling domino effect-like patterns. In contrast, corrections are abrupt, and the majority of markets drop concurrently. Hence, the nature of current market dynamics is more consistent with a major selloff than a short-term correction. On regional allocation within a global equity portfolio: Overweight the euro area and Japan, underweight the US and EM. Feature Ms. Mea is a long-time BCA client and an avid follower of the Emerging Markets Strategy (EMS) service. Since 2017, I have been meeting with her twice a year to exchange thoughts on the global macro environment, to discuss the nuances of our views and to elaborate on investment strategy. We always publish our conversations for the benefit of all EMS clients. This virtual meeting took place earlier this week. Chart 1A Technical Breakout Is In US Bond Yields Ms. Mea: It has been two years since we last met in person. I did not imagine that world travel would stay so depressed for so long when the pandemic began two years ago. I have also been surprised by the recent behavior of financial markets. There have been divergences that I cannot reconcile, such as the woes in China’s real estate sector and resilient commodity prices, the diverging performance of the S&P 500, US small caps and a significant portion of NASDAQ-listed stocks. I will ask you about these later. But let’s start with your main macro themes. Since early last year, you have been advocating two macro themes: (1) China’s slowdown; and (2) rising and non-transitory US inflation. They were controversial a year ago but have now become widely accepted in the investment community. Financial markets have moved a great deal to reflect these macro themes. Don’t you think financial markets have already fully priced in these macro trends? Answer: You are right that these narratives have become well known and financial markets have been moving to price in these developments. However, our bias is that these themes are not yet fully priced in and these macro forces will continue to impact financial markets over the near term. Let’s first discuss US inflation and interest rate moves. Chart 1 illustrates that US government bond yields have broken above major resistance levels. Such a breakout technically entails higher yields. Odds are that US long-term bond yields will move up by another 50 basis points in the months ahead before they pause or reverse. The fundamental justification for higher US bond yields is as follows: The inflation genie is out of the bottle in the US. If the Fed adheres to its inflation mandate, it has no choice but to hike rates until core inflation drops toward 2%. In December, trimmed-mean CPI and median CPI printed 4.8% and 3.8% respectively, well above the Fed’s preferred range of 2-2.25% for core inflation (Chart 2). Critically, these inflation measures are not impacted by volatile components. These measures strip out outliers like used and new car prices, auto parts, as well as energy and food. The core CPI and PCE inflation measures will drop this year but super core inflation will remain north of 3%, well above the Fed’s preferred range. Importantly, a wage inflation spiral is already underway in the US. Employees have experienced substantial negative wage growth in real terms in the past 12 months. Labor shortages are prevalent, and the employee quit rate is very high. Employees are demanding very high wage growth and employers will have little choice but to meet these demands (Chart 3). Chart 2US Super Core Inflation Suggests Broad-Based Inflationary Pressures Chart 3US Wages Will Be Accelerating Chart 4Rising TIPS Yields = Equity Multiples Comparison As a result, the only way to bring down core inflation toward its preferred target range is for the Fed to slow the economy down and curb employment and wage gains. Yet before core inflation converges to the Fed’s target, risk assets will sell off first. Practically, the Fed will talk hawkish and hike until something breaks. The breaking point will be a major selloff in US share prices. US equities have been priced to perfection on the assumption that US interest rates will remain low for many years. As interest rate expectations rise further, US equity multiples are under pressure (Chart 4). Ms. Mea: The recent rise in US bond yields has been largely driven by the real component (TIPS yields), not inflation breakevens. That would usually imply improving US growth prospects. Yet US stocks have corrected as TIPS yields rose. How do you explain this and what should investors expect going forward? Answer: Indeed, the latest rise in US bonds yields is primarily driven by increasing TIPS yields, not inflation breakevens (Chart 5) TIPS yields have not been driven by economic growth expectations in the past couple of years. TIPS yields are breaking out and more upside is likely for reasons unrelated to US economic growth: The Fed’s rhetoric and guidance. TIPS yields typically move with 5-year/5-year forward yields, i.e., expectations for US interest rates in the long run (Chart 6). One of reasons why forward interest rates and TIPS yields have been low is the Fed’s commitment to keep interest rates extremely depressed for so long. As the Fed’s rhetoric has recently changed, so are interest rate expectations and TIPS yields. Given that core inflation will not drop to the Fed’s target range any time soon, the Fed will likely escalate its hawkish rhetoric. Hence, TIPS yields will keep rising, until something breaks. Chart 5US Tips Yields Have Broken Out After A Base Formation Chart 6US TIPS Yields More With Long-Term Interest Rate Expectations TIPS demand/supply and momentum. The TIPS market is relatively small, and it has been rigged by the Fed in the past two years or so. As a part of its QE program, the Fed has been buying a large share of TIPS, and it now owns 22% of this market. As a result, TIPS yields have fallen irrespective of economic growth dynamics. As the QE program ends, the Fed will stop purchasing TIPS. There has also been a rush into TIPS by institutional investors. In a quest for inflation protection when the Fed was complacent about inflation, investors have been opting for TIPS. This has also depressed TIPS yields. As the US central bank sounds more hawkish, investors’ demand for inflation protection will likely diminish. In addition, TIPS prices have recently plunged dramatically. Large losses could prompt further liquidation by investors pushing TIPS yields much higher. All of the above and the fact that TIPS yields remain negative suggest that they will continue rising in the coming months. Chart 7Rising TIPS Yields Warrant A Stronger US Dollar Ms. Mea: Your point that TIPS yields will continue rising in the months ahead irrespective of US inflation and growth dynamics is interesting. So, what are the implications of rising US bond yields, especially TIPS yields, on various financial markets? Answer: Falling/low TIPS yields have benefited long duration plays like US stocks, and especially US growth stocks. Declining TIPS yields were a drag on the US dollar (Chart 7). Finally, they also prompted portfolio capital flows to EM. Consistently, rising TIPS yields will depress share prices in the richly valued equity markets like the US (Chart 4, above) support the greenback, and curtail portfolio flows into EM for a period of time. Ms. Mea: But aren’t US share prices positively correlated with US interest rates? Answer: Not always. Chart 8 illustrates that the correlation between the S&P 500 and US Treasury yields varied over time. Prior to the mid-1960s, it was positive. From 1966 until 1997, US equity prices were negatively correlated with US Treasury yields. Since 1997, US share prices have been positively correlated with US government bond yields (Chart 8, top panel). Chart 8US Stock-Bond Correlation: A Paradigm Shift In 2022? Chart 9Early 2020s = Late 1960s? We believe US markets are now undergoing a major paradigm shift in the stock prices-bond yields correlation. The latter is about to turn negative like it did in the second half of the 1960s. In the mid-1960s, the reason why the stock-to-bond yields correlation turned negative was because US core inflation surged well above 2% in 1966 (Chart 8, bottom panel). This marked a paradigm shift in the relationship between equity prices and US Treasury yields. The same is happening now. As we wrote a year ago in our Special Report titled A Paradigm Shift In The Stock-Bond Relationship, the proper roadmap for the US stock-to-bond correlation is not the last 10 or 20 years, but the second half of the 1960s. After US core CPI surged substantially above 2%, the S&P 500 became negatively correlated with US Treasury yields (Chart 9). Ms. Mea: Let’s now turn to emerging markets. How will EM financial markets perform amid rising US bonds yields? Also, which US yields matter most for EM financial markets, US Treasury yields or TIPS? Answer: Neither US Treasury yields nor TIPS yields have a stable correlation with EM stock prices. Correlations between US nominal bond yields, EM currencies and EM domestic bond yields vary over time. However, US TIPS yields exhibit a reasonably strong positive correlation with mainstream EM local bond yields and the US dollar's exchange rate versus EM currencies (Chart 10). Mainstream EM includes 16 markets but excludes China, Korea and Taiwan. Hence, as US TIPS yields move up, it is reasonable to expect the US dollar to strengthen against mainstream EM currencies and their local bond yields to rise (Chart 10). Currency depreciation and rising domestic bond yields will prove to be toxic for the share prices of these mainstream emerging markets. To sum up, rising US TIPS yields will jeopardize the performance of EM equities, currencies, local rates and credit markets. Ms. Mea: Aren’t many EMs better prepared for rising US nominal/real yields than they were in 2013? Answer: Yes, they are: many EM countries that were running large current account deficits in 2013 now have current account surpluses or small deficits (Chart 11, top panel). Besides, mainstream EMs ramped up their foreign currency debt in the years preceding 2013 while their foreign debt has changed little in the past 6-7 years (Chart 11, bottom panel). Chart 10Rising TIPS Yields Are A Risk To EM Domestic Bonds Chart 11Mainstream EM: Less Vulnerable To The Fed Now Than in 2013 Table 1Current Account Balances In Individual EM Countries Table 1 illustrates the current account balance in individual developing countries. Further, the share of foreign investor holdings in EM local currency bonds has declined a great deal in the past 2 years (Table 2). Finally, many mainstream EM central banks have hiked rates aggressively and their local bond yields have already risen considerably in the past 12 months. These also provide some protection against fixed-income portfolio capital outflows. All in all, vulnerability from foreign portfolio capital outflows in EM is much lower than it was in 2013. Nevertheless, EM financial markets will not remain unscathed if US rates march higher, the US dollar rallies and US stocks wobble. Based on the parameters displayed in Tables 1 and 2, the most vulnerable countries among mainstream EMs are Peru, Colombia, Chile and Egypt. Table 2Foreign Ownership Of Domestic Bonds: January 2022 Versus October 2019 Chart 12China"s Construction Cycle In Perspective Ms. Mea: Let’s now move to your second theme - China’s slowdown. This is well known and arguably priced in financial markets. Importantly, policymakers have been ratcheting up stimulus. Don’t you think now is the time to upgrade the stance on Chinese stocks and China-related plays? Answer: Despite the new round of stimulus, China’s business cycle will continue disappointing over the near-term. As we wrote in last week’s report titled Chinese Equities: Valuations and Profits, Chinese corporate earnings are set to contract in the next 6 months. This means that the risk-reward profile of Chinese stocks in absolute terms is not yet attractive. Importantly, even though property market woes are well known and housing sales and starts have collapsed, housing construction activity has remained resilient (Chart 12). The bottom panel of Chart 12 demonstrates rising completions, which is one of reasons why raw materials prices have been resilient. However, new funding for property developers has dried up and they will be forced to scale back completions/construction activity. Historically, EM non-TMT share prices lagged the turning points in China’s money/credit impulses by several months (Chart 13). Even though the money/credit cycle is now bottoming, a buying opportunity in stocks will likely transpire in a few months. In brief, a tentative bottom in money/credit indicators does not always herald an imminent and sustainable equity rally. Chart 13China"s Credit Cycle And EM Non-TMT Stocks Ms. Mea: Another topic I wanted to discuss today is divergences in global financial markets. Some equity markets have already fallen significantly, while the S&P 500 index as well as a couple of individual EM equity bourses (India, Taiwan and Mexico) have been firm. There have been massive divergences within the US equity market in general and the NASDAQ index in particular. Besides, EM high-yield corporate spreads have widened but EM investment grade corporate spreads remain tight. Finally, commodity prices have remained firm despite both China’s slowdown and US dollar strength. How should investors interpret these divergences? Answer: Such divergences in financial markets often occur during major selloffs. Notable financial market downturns evolve in phases resembling domino effect-like patterns, where some markets lead while others lag. In contrast, corrections are abrupt, and the majority of markets drop concurrently. For example, the EM crises in 1997-98 did not occur simultaneously across all EM countries. It began in July 1997 with Thailand, then spread to Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia, and finally to the rest of Asia. By August 1998, Russian financial markets had collapsed, triggering the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) debacle. The last leg of the crisis appeared in Brazil and culminated in the real's devaluation in January 1999. Chart 14Domino Effect In 2007-08 Similarly, the US financial/credit crisis in 2007-08 commenced with the selloff in sub-prime securities in March 2007. Corporate spreads began widening, and bank share prices rolled over in June 2007. Next, the S&P 500 and EM stocks peaked in October 2007 (Chart 14). Despite these developments, commodity prices and EM currencies continued to rally until the summer of 2008 when they finally collapsed in the second half of that year (Chart 14, bottom panel). There was a domino effect in financial markets in both the 2015 and 2018 turbulences. Initially, the selloffs started in the weakest links while other parts were holding up. Then, the selloff spread to all without exception. For example, in 2018, US share prices and high-yield credit spreads were doing quite well until October 2018. Then, a broad-based selloff transpired in the fourth quarter of 2018.  Just as chains break at their weakest links, financial market selloffs begin in the most susceptible sectors. Overpriced US stocks with little or no profits and currencies with zero or negative interest rates have been most vulnerable to rising US interest rates. That is why these segments have sold off first in response to rising US nominal and real rates. Our hunch is that the selloff in global markets due to rising US interest rates will broaden in the coming months. This does not mean that global stocks on the verge of a major bear market, but a double-digit drop in global share prices is likely. The last asset class standing will be commodity prices. These will likely be the last affected by rising US interest rates because many investors buy commodities as an inflation hedge. Besides, oil prices have also been supported by the geopolitical tensions around Ukraine and Iran. It might take investor concerns about the US economy and a slowdown in global manufacturing to trigger a relapse in commodity prices. Chart 15Rising TIPS Yields = European Equities Outperforming US Ones Ms. Mea: What investment strategy do you recommend in the coming months? Answer: As US interest rates continue rising and China’s recovery fails to transpire immediately, EM financial markets remain at risk. Therefore, we recommend a defensive stance for absolute return investors in EM equity and fixed income. We are also continuing to short a basket of EM currencies versus the US dollar. As for global equity regional allocation, the outlook for EM performance is less certain than it was in the past 12 months. Clearly, rising US/DM interest rates herald US equity underperformance versus other DM markets, like the euro area and Japan (Chart 15). The basis is that non-US equities are not as expensive as US ones and, hence, are less vulnerable to rising interest rates. Chart 16EM Relative Equity Performance Is Correlated With The USD, Not US Bond Yields Whether EM outperforms or not is mainly contingent on the US dollar, rather than US bond yields. The top panel of Chart 16 demonstrates that EM relative equity performance against DM has a low correlation with US bond yields. Yet, EM equities will underperform their DM peers if the USD strengthens (the greenback is shown inverted on the bottom panel of Chart 16). However, if the greenback depreciates, EM will certainly outperform the US in both equity and the fixed income space. Putting it all together, asset allocators should overweight the euro area and Japan, and underweight the US and EM in a global equity portfolio. Ms. Mea: What about EM local bonds and EM credit markets? Answer: EM credit spreads will widen, and EM local yields will not drop as US bond yields head higher and EM exchange rates depreciate. We continue to recommend investors underweight EM credit versus US corporate credit, quality adjusted. As for local rates, we largely remain on the sidelines of this asset class. Our current recommendations are as follows: receiving 10-year rates in China and Malaysia, paying Czech 10-year rates and betting on 10/1-year yield curve inversions in Mexico and Russia. For a detailed list of our country recommendations for equities, credit, domestic bonds and currencies, please refer to Open Position Tables below. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com

Highlights US Vs. Europe: Growth and inflation momentum remains stronger in the US versus Europe. The latter is taking the bigger economic hit from more severe Omicron economic restrictions and a greater exposure to slowing Chinese demand. European inflation has accelerated, but remains slower and less broad-based than elevated US inflation. The backdrop remains more negative for US fixed income compared to Europe. UST-Bund Spread: With markets already priced for multiple Fed rate hikes in 2022, it is now harder to earn significant returns shorting US Treasuries outright compared to 2021. We prefer positioning for higher US bond yields through less-volatile US Treasury-German Bund spread widening positions, with the ECB unlikely to deliver even the single discounted 2022 rate hike. We recommend the position both as a structural allocation in bond portfolios (underweight the US versus Germany) and as a tactical trade (selling US Treasury futures versus Bund futures). Feature Chart of the WeekUS Bond Yields & Bond Volatility Are Both Rising Global fixed income markets are off to a volatile start in 2022, on the back of significant repricing of US interest rate expectations. The 10-year US Treasury yield now sits at 1.85%, up +34bps so far in January and is up +72bps from the August 4/2021 intraday low of 1.13%. The 2-year US yield, which is even more sensitive to changes in Fed expectations, is 1.04%, up +31bps so far this month and up +87bps since early August 2021. Yields are rising in other countries as well, with the 10-year benchmark government bond yield up year-to-date in the UK (+24bps), Canada (+45bps) and even Germany (+18bps) where the Bund yield is threatening to return to positive territory. US Treasuries are selling off as markets have heeded the hawkish shift in the Fed’s interest rate guidance. The US overnight index swap (OIS) curve now discounting 89bps of Fed rate hikes in 2022. Bond volatility further out the Treasury curve has increased as yields have moved higher, with the realized volatility of the Bloomberg 7-10 US Treasury index now at an 19-month high (Chart of the Week). We continue to recommend a defensive strategic posture towards direct US Treasuries with below-benchmark exposure on both duration and country allocations in global bond portfolios. However, we prefer a more efficient way to position for the same theme of rising US yields – betting on a wider 10-year US Treasury-German Bund spread. US Growth & Inflation Fundamentals Support A More Hawkish Fed The rise in global bond yields seen in recent weeks has inflicted damage on risk assets, but not in a consistent fashion. Equity markets have taken the brunt of the hit, with the S&P 500 down around -3% so far in January with the tech-heavy NASDAQ down -6%. Yet the MSCI emerging market equity index is up around +1%, European equities are flat and global high-yield corporate bond spreads are essentially unchanged so far this month. While higher bond yields are reflecting expectations of more global monetary tightening over the next year, medium-term interest rate expectations remain subdued. Our proxy for the market pricing of terminal interest rate expectations – 5-year OIS rates, 5-years forward – remains at or below pre-pandemic levels in the US, the UK, Canada and the euro area (Chart 2). Risk assets are performing relatively well in the face of higher bond yields because markets still do not believe that a major increase in interest rates will be needed in the current global tightening cycle. We see this – the likelihood that interest rates will have to rise much more than markets expect - as the biggest vulnerability for global bond markets over the next couple of years. The US remains the “poster child” for this view. In the US, core CPI inflation accelerated to an 31-year high of 5.5% in December. The pickup in US inflation continues to be broad-based, with the Cleveland Fed median CPI and trimmed mean CPI inflation measures reaching 3.8% and 4.8%, respectively (Chart 3). This massive run-up in US inflation has filtered through to medium-term household inflation expectations; the preliminary University of Michigan consumer survey for January showed that inflation 5-10 years out is expected to be 3.1% - the highest level in 13 years. Chart 2Rising Yields Are Not A Threat To Risk Assets ... Yet​​​​​ Chart 3The Fed Cannot Ignore Elevated Inflation Expectations​​​​​​ Chart 4US Demand Steadily Normalizing From The Pandemic Shock While much of the run-up in US inflation over the past year has been fueled by supply chain disruption and high energy prices, there is still a robust demand component to the high inflation. Consumer spending on goods remains elevated versus its pre-pandemic trend, while services spending is steadily returning back to the pre-pandemic pace (Chart 4). The overall US unemployment rate is now down to 3.9%, the lowest level since February 2020, with broad-based strength in the US labor market across most industries (bottom panel). The rise in consumer inflation expectations has to be most worrisome to Fed officials. Yes, market-based inflation expectations have already seen a significant run-up since the mid-2020 lows, and have even drifted down a bit of late on the back of the more hawkish rhetoric from the Fed. However, survey-based measures of inflation expectations tend to be less volatile than market-based measures, and typically follow trends in realized inflation, which is not slowing down in the US. In other words, rising household inflation expectations are a more reliable indication that an inflationary mindset is becoming entrenched in consumer behavior. US inflation dynamics are transitioning away from supply-driven goods inflation toward more lasting domestically driven forces like tight labor markets, faster wage growth and rising housing costs (Chart 5). Measures of supply chain disruption like global shipping costs are showing signs of peaking (top panel), while commodity price momentum has clearly rolled over – both should eventually feed into slower goods inflation this year. At the same time, tight labor markets will continue to boost US employment costs, which historically have been strongly correlated to US services inflation (middle panel). Chart 5US Inflation Pressures Remain Intense Meanwhile, shelter costs, which represents 32% of the US CPI index, were up 4.2% on a year-over-year basis in December and are likely to continue accelerating given a dearth of housing supply versus demand that is pushing up both house prices and rents (bottom panel). Tying it all together, there are good reasons why the Fed has ramped up the hawkish rhetoric over the past couple of months. However, with the US OIS curve now discounting between 3-4 rate hikes in 2022, it will be harder to generate a second consecutive year of negative returns in the US Treasury market this year. Dating back to the early 1970s, there have only been five calendar years where the Bloomberg US Treasury index delivered an outright negative total return: 1994, 1999, 2009, 2013 and 2021 (Chart 6). None of the four cases prior to last year saw negative returns in the following year, as Treasury yields fell in 1995, 2000, 2010, 2014. Yet even the episodes that saw consecutive years of US yield increases – 1974-75, 1977-81, 1987-88, 2005-06 and 2015-16 – did not see outright negative returns from the Bloomberg US Treasury index. Chart 6Negative Return Years For US Treasuries Are Rare Given the starting point of deeply negative real US bond yields, and interest rate expectations that remain too low beyond 2022, we still see value in staying below-benchmark on US duration exposure on a medium-term basis. However, we see a more efficient way to play for higher Treasury yields this year by positioning US Treasury underweights/shorts versus overweights/longs in government bonds in a region where discounted rate hikes will not happen – Europe. The ECB Is In No Hurry To Hike Rates The same supply driven factors that have pushed up US inflation over the past year have also lifted inflation in the euro area. Headline HICP inflation reached an 30-year high of 5.0% in December, while core HICP inflation hit an all-time high of 2.6%. The European Central Bank (ECB), however, is unlikely to deliver any rate hikes in 2022 even with the high inflation, for several reasons (Chart 7): Growth momentum entering 2022 was soft, thanks to Omicron related economic restrictions at the end of 2021 and also weak demand for European exports from China. It will take time for both of those factors to reverse, thus reducing any growth related pressure to tighten monetary policy. Inflation expectations are not exceeding the ECB 2% inflation target, with the 5-year/5-year forward EUR CPI swap now at 1.9% even with headline inflation of 5.0%. The surge in European energy prices will eventually subside in the first half of 2022, which will reduce inflationary pressure on the ECB to tighten. The ECB is ending its pandemic emergency bond buying program (PEPP) in March, and is only partially replacing that buying activity by upsizing its existing pre-pandemic asset purchase program (APP). The ECB will not want to compound the effect of this “tapering” of bond buying by also hiking interest rates, which would surely tighten financial conditions further through higher Italian government bond yields, rising corporate bond yields and a firmer euro. There is little evidence to date showing any pass-through of higher energy-fueled inflation into more domestically-driven inflation. Euro area wage growth was only 1.3% as of the latest available data in Q3/2021 (which is still well after realized inflation had started to accelerate), highlighting the lack of visible “second round” effects on euro area inflation from high energy prices that would prompt the ECB to consider rate hikes (Chart 8). Chart 7An ECB Rate Hike In 2022 Is Unlikely​​​​​​ Chart 8Limited 'Second Round' Effects From Energy-Driven European Inflation​​​​​​ The EUR OIS curve is discounting 7bps of rate hikes by year-end. Even that modest amount will not be delivered, which will limit how much further European government bond yields will rise this year. A Better Mousetrap: Playing UST Bearishness Through UST-Bund Spread Widening Trades Combining our view of an increasingly hawkish Fed and a still-dovish ECB produces our highest conviction investment recommendation for 2022: positioning for a wider 10-year US Treasury/Germany Bund spread. This can be done by underweighting the US versus core Europe in global bond portfolios, or shorting US Treasury futures versus German Bund futures as we are already recommending in our Tactical Trade Overlay (see page 15). A Treasury-Bund spread widening view is a more efficient way to play for a more hawkish Fed and higher US Treasury yields, for several reasons: There are many examples over past 30 years where the Treasury-Bund spread widened in consecutive years (Chart 9). This is in contrast to the fewer occurrences of consecutive years of rising Treasury yields shown earlier in this report. Thus, there are better odds that last year’s Treasury-Bund spread widening can be repeated in 2022. Chart 9Consecutive Years Of A Rising UST-Bund Spread Happen Often The realized volatility of Treasury-Bund spread trades is almost always lower than that of an outright short position in US Treasuries, but the direction of returns of the two trades is similar (Chart 10). This shows that there is directionality in the Treasury-Bund spread (i.e. it is driven far more by the movements of US yields), but that is a welcome feature given our more bearish view on US Treasuries. The Treasury-Bund spread remains well below fair value on our fundamental valuation model, with fair value increasing due to widening US-European inflation differentials (Chart 11). Tighter relative monetary policies this year (more tapering and rate hikes from the Fed compared to the ECB) also favor a wider fair value spread on our model. Chart 10UST-Bund Wideners Have Lower Volatility Than Outright UST Shorts​​​​​ Chart 11The UST-Bund Spread Looks Very Cheap On Our Model​​​​​​ The gap between our 24-month discounters, which measure the change in policy interest rates over the next two years discounted in OIS curves, for the US and euro area is a reliable leading indicator of the 10-year Treasury-Bund spread (Chart 12, bottom panel). The “discounter spread” is currently calling for the Treasury-Bund spread to widen by more than the current path discounted in US Treasury and German Bund forward rates. Chart 12Position For More UST-Bund Spread Widening In 2022​​​​​​ Chart 13UST-Bund Spread Is Not Technically Stretched​​​​​ The Treasury-Bund spread is not stretched from a technical perspective (Chart 13). The spread is sitting right at its 200-day moving average and the 26-week change in the spread (a measure of price momentum) is rising but remains well below previous peak levels that have capped past spread increases. Summing it all up, the case is strong for including US-Germany spread widening positions as core holdings in investor portfolios in 2022. The current spread is 185bps and we have a year-end target of 225bps. Bottom Line: With markets already priced for multiple Fed rate hikes in 2022, it is now harder to earn significant returns shorting US Treasuries outright compared to 2021. We prefer positioning for higher US bond yields through less-volatile US Treasury-German Bund spread widening positions, with the ECB unlikely to deliver even the single discounted 2022 rate hike. We recommend the position both as a structural allocation in bond portfolios (underweight the US versus Germany) and as a tactical trade (selling US Treasury futures versus Bund futures).   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com   Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning     Active Duration Contribution: GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. Custom Performance Benchmark The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index