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Mexican equities have steadily underperformed their US counterparts since early 2013, when a large wave of peso depreciation began. Mexican stocks have also underperformed EM equities significantly this year. Could Mexican assets and the peso catch a break in…
The Bank of Canada’s Autumn Business Outlook Survey was released earlier this week. While the headline conclusion was that business sentiment remains weak, firms’ investment intentions imply a positive surprise to gross fixed capital formation relative to…
The various inflation indicators for the UK in September were a mixed bag. While Core CPI inflation hit expectations of 1.3% annually, the monthly headline CPI print hit 0.4%, below expectations of 0.5%. The most positive element came from the PPI release.…
Special Report Highlights Under the newly released deleveraging policies, Chinese real estate developers have no choice but to deleverage. Over the next six months, the most likely scenario will be moderate growth in property sales, starts and completions, but a drop in land purchases. We expect Chinese onshore and offshore property stocks to continue underperforming their respective benchmarks. However, we recommend buying Chinese property developers’ offshore corporate bonds. Feature The country’s real estate sector has exhibited clear signs of improvement. As both commodity buildings’ floor space starts and sales showed four consecutive months of year-on-year growth, Chinese real estate investment has returned to its pre-pandemic annual rate of acceleration (Chart 1). In addition, our broad measures of Chinese real estate construction activity – the “building construction” floor area starts and completions – have also rebounded sharply (Chart 2). Chart 1Chinese Property Market: A Sustainable Recovery Ahead? Chart 2Sharp Rebound In Post-Pandemic Construction Activity One driving force behind the real estate sector’s recovery was that China loosened up its monetary policy and implemented fiscal stimulus earlier this year. However, since July, the government has implemented a flurry of restrictive policies to clamp down on flows of capital into the real estate sector, and has repeatedly stressed the mantra: “Houses are for living in, not for speculation.” Most importantly, in late August the government released a framework mandating Chinese property developers to deleverage. As Chinese homebuilders have no choice but to reduce their debt load, will the property market recovery continue? Chart 3Constrained Financing May Lead To A Drop In Land Sales Going Forward Over the next six months, we expect a 4-6% year-on-year growth in property sales. The government-set deleveraging mandate will likely result in considerable property sales promotion by real estate developers. In the meantime, faced with constrained financing, homebuilders may prioritize completion of already sold but unfinished buildings over land investment (Chart 3). This may result in a moderate pickup in construction activity, but a drop in profit margins and land sales. Beyond the next six months, property sales in China will likely struggle to grow, as price discounts may not be enough to outweigh demand headwinds. In turn, construction activity may falter, as the government-led deleveraging mandate and weakening sales will curtail the cash flow to homebuilders.  Mandated Deleveraging Chart 4Property Developers Will Have No Choice But To Deleverage The Chinese real estate sector is highly indebted. According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, the sector’s total liability-to-asset ratio rose to 80%, and its debt-to-equity ratio was at 4.1 by the end of last year (Chart 4). Policymakers in Beijing well recognize that excesses in the property market in general, and leverage among property developers in particular, constitute a major risk to financial stability. As part of the strategy to establish a long-term, sustainable mechanism for the real estate sector, the Chinese central bank and the housing ministry issued a framework – essentially a deleveraging mandate for Chinese property developers. This framework includes Three Red Lines and Four Tiers. Three Red Lines There will be a 70% ceiling on liabilities to assets, excluding advanced payments from presold houses; The net debt-to-equity ratio needs to be less than 100%; Short-term borrowings cannot exceed cash reserves. Four Tiers Companies that exceed all three red lines are placed into the red tier, while those passing any two of the three red lines are in the orange tier and enterprises that cross one of the three lines are in the yellow tier. Firms with financials within the three red lines are classified in the green tier. The government is using these debt tiers to control which firms will have access to new financing and how much new financing they can apply for. Failing to meet all three “red lines” (i.e., the red tier) may result in them being cut off from access to new loans from banks. If a firm passes all three red lines (i.e., the green tier), it can increase its debt up to a maximum of 15% in the next year. If it is in the yellow or orange tier, it can increase its debt up to a maximum of 10% and 5% in the following year, respectively (Table 1). Table 1The Mandated Deleveraging Framework: Three Red Lines And Four Tiers Enterprises that break all three red lines are required to submit a report on their debt-reduction plan, listing their planned deleveraging measures to reduce the number of red-line breaches within one year, as well as the planned measures to reach the green tier within three years. Based on the 2020 mid-year data released by 100 major public-traded property-developing companies listed as either A-shares or H-shares, 86% of them are breaking at least one of the red lines, 22% of them are breaching all three red lines and only 14% of them are in the green tier. Bottom Line: Chinese home developers are set to embark on the deleveraging path due to the new regulation. This will limit their access to financing and has implications for their activity and, thereby, the overall economy. What Does This Mean? Property development is an asset-heavy and capital-intensive business, and this industry typically relies a lot on debt. Chart 5Chinese Real Estate Investment: A Breakdown Of Funding Source There are several ways for homebuilders to finance themselves. Chart 5 shows the breakdown of the source of Chinese real estate investment funding, with 15.5% of the total funding from domestic and foreign loans, 32% from a self-raising fund through issuances of bonds or equity, 33.2% from deposits and advanced payments, and 16.2% from homebuyers’ mortgages.  With limited financing from the loan and bond markets, the country’s real estate developers will have to seek more financing from deposits and advanced payments, homebuyers’ mortgages and equity issuances. Chart 6Property Developers Need To Boost Their Sales To Raise More Cash As equity issuance dilutes existing shareholders' profits and drives down share prices, developers often opt for presales to raise financing, i.e., they pre-sell more properties to increase their revenue from deposits and advanced payment, as well as mortgages (Chart 6).  Hence, in the short term, i.e., over the next six months, many property developers may need to cut home prices to boost their sales and shore up cash for their operations. For example, the country’s biggest real estate developer – Evergrande – falls short on all three metrics and lies in the red tier. The company announced in early September that it would do aggressive sales of properties by lowering the selling prices for all types of properties by 30% across the country during the period of September 7 to October 8. Indeed, the company’s sales reached a record high for this period. The aggressive sales promotion of properties will encourage demand. We expect the year-on-year growth of floor space sales to reach 4-6% over the next six months – an acceleration from 1.3% during the pre-pandemic period of 2H2019, but a moderation from the 6.4% growth in the post-pandemic months (Chart 7). Beyond the next six months, home sales may struggle to grow as the impact from price discounts diminishes and demand will face the following headwinds:  The authorities continued to show their determination to crack down on speculative housing demand. Stricter policies, including tighter restrictions on both first and second home purchases and mortgage applications, as well as raising the down payment ratio, have been implemented recently in cities experiencing a rapid rise in property prices, such as Shenzhen, Hangzhou, Tangshan, Zhengzhou and many other cities. The government also set new bank lending regulations to the real estate sector; new bank loans issued to the real estate sector, measured as a share of total new bank loans, should be kept under 30% of total banks’ loans (Chart 8). The ratio has declined to the current 25% from 30-50% in the past four years. We believe the ratio will remain below 30% over the next six to twelve months. Chart 7Chinese Property Sales, Starts And Completions Will Grow Moderately In Coming Months Chart 8Constrained Lending To Chinese Real Estate Sector From Banks Lending to the real estate sector includes housing mortgages and loans for real estate development. The capped bank loans to the property sector suggests that tighter lending standards will be applied to mortgage loans as well as property development loans. This will likely curb demand for housing. The authorities stopped the Pledged Supplementary Lending (PSL) program in 2020. The PSL was a driving force behind property demand in China during 2015-2018, but this time the government has refrained from PSL injections. The government-subsidized shantytown renovation program (e.g., adding elevators, building parking spots, painting interior and exterior walls, paving roads, etc.) will reduce demand for new properties. With improved living conditions, some households may not need to buy new properties. The government’s renovation project covers 7 million houses this year, of which 76.4% (5.4 million) were completed during the first eight months of this year. Moreover, a renovation project of a similar scale will be implemented next year.   The government’s active promotion of rental housing will also reduce the demand for new housing. Rental prices have been falling due to the pandemic, and that may delay home buyers from purchasing residential properties.    Chart 9Chinese Property Demand Faces Structural Headwinds The Chinese property market also faces strong structural headwinds. For example, property demand in China has already entered a saturation phase, and the working-age population (15-64 years of age) is shrinking (Chart 9). What about the outlook of property starts and completions? Constrained net borrowing will weigh on floor space starts and floor space completions. As such, we only expect moderate growth (i.e., smaller than 5%) in both property starts and completions over the next six months (Chart 7 on page 6). With constrained financing, homebuilders may have to allocate an increasing amount of funding to complete their unfinished projects instead of purchasing new land (Chart 3 on page 2). The pace of property completion has to catch up with both sales and starts. Property developers are currently under increased pressure to deliver units that were pre-sold about two years ago (Chart 10). Rising property sales will provide more financing for the developers to complete these projects under construction. The moderate growth in floor space starts and completions will lift construction activity slightly in the commodity buildings market (Chart 11). Chart 10Homebuilders Need To Deliver Their Unfinished Projects Chart 11Construction Activity In China: Moderate Increase Ahead That said, construction activity may relapse beyond the next six months. Both the enduring government-led deleveraging mandate and weakening sales will lead to funding shortages for Chinese homebuilders to carry on new construction projects. Bottom Line: Floor space sales, starts and completions will expand moderately despite the mandated deleveraging of developers in the next six months.  Investment Implications First, it is reasonable to expect a moderate pickup in real estate construction activity in China over the next six months. This will be marginally positive for construction-related commodities demand.  Chart 12Commodity Prices: Hold A Neutral Stance For Now However, commodity prices have already rebounded sharply since April, and China's infrastructure-related construction activities usually peak in October. Therefore, a marginal increase in commodity demand from the real estate sector is not a catalyst for further price increases in commodities such as steel, cement, and glass. For now, we prefer to hold a neutral stance on these commodities (Chart 12).  Beyond six months, the possibility of negative growth in home sales, starts and construction is rising, raising warning signs for construction-related commodities demand. Second, property developers may cut their land purchases in order to allocate more funds to completing unfinished homes. This heralds that a drop in the local government’s revenue may lie ahead. This will have ramifications for their spending in 2H2021. Third, regarding property stocks, they have been moving sideways in absolute terms this year, having significantly underperformed the benchmark (Charts 13 and 14). This reflects their poor profit growth prospects and weak financial fundamentals. We expect the Chinese property stocks to continue to underperform their benchmark, as the aggressive selling strategy will reduce companies’ profit margins. Chart 13Chinese Property Stocks: A Tapering Wedge In Absolute Terms, And… Chart 14…Continuing Underperformances Relative To Their Respective Benchmarks Lastly, we recommend buying Chinese offshore real estate bonds, as moderate growth recovery in the country’s real estate sector and deleveraging will lead to a narrowing of the sector’s corporate spread. In addition, the ongoing global search for yields will intensify the demand for high-yield bonds.   Ellen JingYuan He Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Investor concerns about the potential for inflation have increased significantly over the past several months, in response to large increases in government debt-to-GDP ratios in countries around the world. In addition, the very sharp rise in M2 growth in the…
The housing recovery remains a key locomotive of the US economy. While the September housing starts fell short of expectations of 1.47 million units, they nonetheless grew 1.9% on a monthly basis. Moreover, the leading building permits series rose to 1.55…
Special Report Highlights US Election & Duration: We estimate that there is an 80% probability of a US election result that will give a lift to US Treasury yields via increased fiscal stimulus. Those are strong enough odds to justify a move to a below-benchmark cyclical US duration stance on a 6-12 month horizon. US Treasuries: We anticipate a moderate bear market in US Treasuries to unfold during the next 6-12 months. In addition to below-benchmark portfolio duration, investors should overweight TIPS versus nominal Treasuries, hold nominal and real yield curve steepeners, and hold inflation curve flatteners. Non-US Country Allocation: Within global government bond portfolios, downgrade the US to underweight. Favor countries that have lower sensitivity to rising US Treasury yields with central banks that are likely to be more dovish than the Fed in the next few years. That means increasing allocations to core Europe and Japan, while reducing exposure to Canada and Australia. Stay neutral on the UK given the near-term uncertainties over the final Brexit outcome. Feature With the US presidential election just two weeks away, public opinion polls continue to show that Joe Biden is the favorite to win the White House. However, the odds of a “Blue Sweep” - combining a Biden victory with the Democratic Party winning control of both the US Senate and House of Representatives - have increased since the end of September according to online prediction markets. US Treasury yields have also moved higher over that same period (Chart 1), which we interpret as the bond market becoming more sensitive to the likelihood of a major increase in US government spending under single-party Democratic control. Chart 1A Blue Sweep Is Bond Bearish According to a recent analysis done by the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, President Trump’s formal policy proposals would increase US federal debt by $4.95 trillion between 2021 and 2030, while Biden’s plan would increase the debt by $5.60 trillion (Table 1).1 While those are both massive fiscal stimulus plans, there is a stark difference in the policy mix of their proposals that matters for the future path of US bond yields. Table 1A Comparison Of The Candidates' Budget Proposals Under Biden, spending is projected to increase by a cumulative $11.1 trillion, partially offset by $5.8 trillion in revenue increases and savings with the former vice-president calling for tax hikes on corporations and high-income earners. On the other hand, Trump’s plan includes $5.45 trillion of spending increases and tax cuts over the next decade, offset by $0.75 trillion in savings. Conclusion: Biden would increase spending by over twice that of a re-elected Trump, with much of that spending expected to be front-loaded in the early part of his first term. Outright spending is more reflationary than tax cuts because it puts more money in the pockets of consumers (spenders) relative to producers (savers). The Biden plan would be more stimulating for overall activity even if the increase in debt is about the same. Another analysis of the Biden and Trump platforms was conducted by Moody’s in September, based on estimates of how much of each candidate’s promises could be successfully implemented under different combinations of White House and Congressional control.2 The stimulus figures were run through the Moody’s US economic model, which is similar to the budget scoring model of the US Congressional Budget Office, to produce a year-by-year path for the US economy over the next decade (Chart 2). Chart 2The Biden Platform Is Highly Stimulative Moody’s concluded that the US economy would return to full employment in the second half of 2022 under a President Biden – especially if the Democrats win the Senate - compared to the first half of 2024 under a re-elected President Trump. Such a rapid closing of the deep US output gap that opened up because of the COVID-19 recession would likely trigger a reassessment of the Fed’s current highly dovish policy stance. The US output gap would close more rapidly under a President Biden, likely triggering a reassessment of the Fed’s current highly dovish policy stance.  At the moment, the US overnight index swap (OIS) curve discounts one full 25bp Fed hike by late 2023/early 2024, and two full hikes by late 2024/early 2025 (Chart 3). This pricing of the future path of interest rates has occurred even with the Fed promising to keep the funds rate anchored near 0% until at least the end of 2023. The likelihood of some form of increased fiscal spending after the election will cause the bond market to challenge the Fed’s current forward guidance even more, putting upward pressure on Treasury yields. Chart 3US Fiscal Stimulus Will Pull Forward Fed Liftoff Our colleagues at BCA Geopolitical Strategy see a Blue Sweep as the most likely outcome of the US election, although their forecasting models suggest that the race for control of the Senate will be much closer than the Biden vs Trump battle (there is little chance that control of the House of Representatives would switch back to the Republicans).3 Their scenarios for each of the White House/Senate combinations, along with their own estimated probability for each, are the following: Biden wins in a Democratic sweep: BCA probability = 45%. The US economy will benefit from higher odds of unfettered fiscal stimulus in 2021, although financial markets will simultaneously have to adjust for the negative shock to US corporate earnings from higher taxes and regulation. Government bond yields should rise on the generally reflationary agenda. Trump wins with a Republican Senate: BCA probability = 30%. In this status quo scenario, a re-elected President Trump would still face opposition from House Democrats on most domestic economic issues, forcing him to tilt towards more protectionist foreign and trade policies in his second term. Fiscal stimulus would be easy to agree, though not as large as under a Democratic sweep. US Treasury yields would rise, but would later prove volatile due to the risk to the cyclical recovery from a global trade war, as Trump’s tariffs will not be limited to China and could even affect the European Union. Biden wins with the Senate staying Republican: BCA probability = 20%. This is ultimately the most positive outcome for financial markets - reduced odds of a full-blown trade war with China, combined with no new tax hikes. Bond yields would drift upward over time, but not during the occasional fiscal battles that would ensue between the Democratic president and Republican senators. The first such battle would start right after the election. Treasuries would remain well bid until financial market pressures forced a Senate compromise with the new president sometime in H1 2021. Trump wins with a Democratic Senate: BCA probability = 5%. This is the least likely scenario but one that could produce a big positive fiscal impulse. Trump is a big spender and will veto tax hikes, but will approve populist spending on areas where he agrees. The Democratic Senate would not resist Trump’s tough stance on China, however, thus keeping the risk of US-China trade skirmishes elevated. This is neutral-to-bearish for US Treasuries, depending on the size of any bipartisan stimulus measures and Trump’s trade actions. The key takeaway is that the combined probability of scenarios that will put upward pressure on US Treasury yields is 80%, versus a 20% probability of a more bond-neutral outcome. That is a bond-bearish skew worth positioning for by reducing US duration exposure now, ahead of the November 3 election. Of this 80%, 35 percentage points come from scenarios in which President Trump would remain in power. Hence his trade wars would eventually undercut his reflationary fiscal policy. This would become the key risk to the short duration view after the initial market response. Bottom Line: The most likely scenarios for the US election will give a cyclical lift to US Treasury yields via increased fiscal stimulus. This justifies a move to a below-benchmark US duration stance on a 6-12 month horizon. If Trump is re-elected, the timing of Trump’s likely return to using broad-based tariffs will have to be monitored closely. A Moderate Bear Market Chart 4Less Election-Day Upside Than In 2016 While our anticipated Blue Sweep election outcome will lead to a large amount of fiscal spending in 2021 and beyond, we anticipate only a modest increase in bond yields during the next 6-12 months. In terms of strategy, our recommended reduction in portfolio duration reflects the fact that fiscal largesse meaningfully reduces the risk of another significant downleg in bond yields and strengthens our conviction in a moderate bear market scenario for bonds. This does raise the question of how large an increase in US Treasury yields we expect during the next 6-12 months. We turn to this question now. Not Like 2016 First, we do not expect a massive election night bond rout like we saw in 2016 (Chart 4). For one thing, the Fed was much more eager to tighten policy in 2016 than it is today, and it did deliver a rate hike one month after the Republicans won the House, Senate and White House (Chart 4, bottom panel). This time around, the Fed has made it clear that it will wait until inflation is running above its 2% target before lifting rates off the zero bound and will not respond directly to expectations for greater fiscal stimulus. A complete re-convergence to long-run fed funds rate estimates would impart 80 – 100 bps of upward pressure to the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield. Second, 2016’s election result was mostly unanticipated. This led to a dramatic adjustment in market prices once the results came in. The PredictIt betting market odds of a “Red Sweep” by the Republicans in 2016 were only 16% the night before the election. As of today, the betting markets are priced for a 58% chance of a Blue Sweep in 2020. Unlike in 2016, bonds are presumably already partially priced for the most bond-bearish election outcome. A Slow Return To Equilibrium To more directly answer the question of how high bond yields can rise, survey estimates of the long-run (or equilibrium) federal funds rate provide a useful starting point. In a world where the economy is growing at an above-trend pace and inflation is expected to move towards the Fed’s target, it is logical for long-maturity Treasury yields to settle near estimates of the long-run fed funds rate. Indeed, this theory is borne out empirically. During the last two periods of robust global economic growth (2017/18 & 2013/14), the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield peaked around levels consistent with long-run fed funds rate estimates (Chart 5). As of today, the median estimates of the long-run fed funds rate from the New York Fed’s Survey of Market Participants and Survey of Primary Dealers are 2% and 2.25%, respectively. In other words, a complete re-convergence to these equilibrium levels would impart 80 – 100 bps of upward pressure to the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield. We expect this re-convergence to play out eventually, but probably not within the next 6-12 months. In both prior periods when the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield reached these equilibrium levels, the Fed’s reaction function was much more hawkish. The Fed was hiking rates throughout 2017 & 2018 (Chart 5, panel 4), and the market moved quickly to price in rate hikes in 2013 (Chart 5, bottom panel). The Fed’s new dovish messaging will ensure that the market reacts less quickly this time around. Also, continued curve steepening will mean that the 5-year/5-year forward yield’s 80 – 100 bps of upside will translate into significantly less upside for the benchmark 10-year yield. The 10-year yield and 5-year/5-year forward yield peaked at similar levels in 2017/18 when the Fed was lifting rates and the yield curve was flat (Chart 6). But, the 10-year peaked far below the 5-year/5-year yield in 2013/14 when the Fed stayed on hold and the curve steepened. Chart 5How High For Treasury Yields? Chart 6Less Upside In 10yr Than In 5y5y The next bear move in bonds will look much more like 2013/14. The Fed will keep a firm grip over the front-end of the curve, leading to curve steepening and less upside in the 10-year Treasury yield than in the 5-year/5-year forward. In addition to shifting to a below-benchmark duration stance, investors should maintain exposure to nominal yield curve steepeners. Specifically, we recommend buying the 5-year note versus a duration-matched barbell consisting of the 2-year and 10-year notes (Chart 6, bottom panel).4 TIPS Versus Nominals We have seen that a full re-convergence to “equilibrium” implies 80 – 100 bps of upside in the 5-year/5-year forward nominal Treasury yield. Bringing TIPS into the equation, we have also observed that long-maturity (5-year/5-year forward and 10-year) TIPS breakeven inflation rates tend to settle into a range of 2.3 – 2.5 percent when inflation is well-anchored and close to the Fed’s target (Chart 7). The additional fiscal stimulus that will follow a Blue Sweep election makes it much more likely that the economic recovery will stay on course, leading to an eventual return of inflation to target and of long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates to a 2.3 – 2.5 percent range. However, as with nominal yields, this re-convergence will be a long process whose pace will be dictated by the actual inflation data. To underscore that point, consider that our Adaptive Expectations Model of the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate – a model that is driven by trends in the actual inflation data – has the 10-year breakeven rate as close to fair value (Chart 8).5 This fair value will rise only slowly over time, alongside increases in actual inflation. Chart 7Overweight TIPS Versus Nominals Chart 8Real Yields Have Likely Bottomed All in all, we continue to recommend an overweight allocation to TIPS versus nominal Treasuries. TIPS breakeven inflation rates will move higher during the next 6-12 months, but are unlikely to reach our 2.3 – 2.5 percent target range within that timeframe. TIPS In Absolute Terms As stated above, we expect nominal yields to increase more than real yields during the next 6-12 months, but what about the absolute direction of real (aka TIPS) yields? Here, our sense is that real yields have also bottomed. If we consider the extreme scenario where the 5-year/5-year forward nominal yield returns to its equilibrium level and where long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates return to our target range, it implies about 80 bps of upside in the nominal yield and 40 bps of upside in the breakeven. This means that the 5-year/5-year real yield has about 40 bps of upside in a complete “return to equilibrium” scenario. While we don’t expect this “return to equilibrium” to be completed within the next 6-12 months, the process is probably underway. The only way for real yields to keep falling in this reflationary world is for the Fed to become increasingly dovish, even as growth improves and inflation rises. After its recent shift to an average inflation target, our best guess is that Fed rate guidance won’t get any more dovish from here. Real yields fell sharply this year as the market priced in this change in the Fed’s reaction function, but the late-August announcement of the Fed’s new framework will probably mark the bottom in real yields (Chart 8, bottom panel).6 Two More Curve Trades Chart 9Own Inflation Curve Flatteners And Real Curve Steepeners In addition to moving to below-benchmark duration, maintaining nominal yield curve steepeners and staying overweight TIPS versus nominal Treasuries, there are two additional trades that investors should consider in order to profit from the reflationary economic environment. The first is inflation curve flatteners. The cost of short-maturity inflation protection is below the cost of long-maturity inflation protection, meaning that it has further to run as inflation returns to the Fed’s target (Chart 9). In addition, if the Fed eventually succeeds in achieving a temporary overshoot of its inflation target, then we should expect the inflation curve to invert. Real yield curve steepeners are in some ways the mirror image of inflation curve flatteners. Assuming no change in nominal yields, the real yield curve will steepen as the inflation curve flattens. But what makes real yield curve steepeners look even more attractive is that increases in nominal yields during the next 6-12 months will be concentrated in long-maturities. This will impart even more steepening pressure to the real yield curve. Investors should continue to hold inflation curve flatteners and real yield curve steepeners. Bottom Line: We anticipate a moderate bear market in US Treasuries to unfold during the next 6-12 months. In addition to below-benchmark portfolio duration, investors should overweight TIPS versus nominal Treasuries, hold nominal and real yield curve steepeners, and hold inflation curve flatteners. Non-US Government Bonds: Reduce Exposure To US Treasuries The mildly bearish case for US Treasuries that we have laid out above not only matters for our recommended duration stance, but also for our suggested country allocation within global government bond portfolios. Simply put, the risk of rising bond yields is much higher in the US than elsewhere, both for the immediate post-election period but also over the medium-term. Thus, the immediate obvious portfolio decision is to downgrade US Treasuries to underweight. The move higher in US Treasury yields that we expect is strictly related to spillovers from likely US fiscal stimulus. While other countries in the developed world are contemplating the need for additional fiscal measures, particularly in Europe where there is a renewed surge in coronavirus infections and growing economic restrictions, no country is facing as sharp a policy choice as the US with its upcoming election. The Fed has purchased 57% of all US Treasuries issued since late February of this year, in sharp contrast to the ECB and Bank of Japan that have purchased over 70% of euro area government bonds and JGBs issued. We can say with a fair degree of certainty that the US will have a relatively more stimulative fiscal policy stance than other developed economies over at least the next couple of years. This implies a higher relative growth trajectory for the US that hurts Treasuries more on the margin than non-US government debt. Chart 10The Fed Will Gladly Trade Less QE For More Fiscal Stimulus In addition, the likely path of relative monetary policy responses are more bearish for US Treasuries. As described above, the scope of the US stimulus will cause bond investors to further question the Fed’s commitment to keeping the funds rate unchanged for the next few years. That also applies to the Fed’s other policy tools, like asset purchases. The Fed is far less likely to continue buying US Treasuries at the same aggressive pace it has for the past eight months if there is less need for monetary stimulus because of more fiscal stimulus. According to the IMF, the Fed has purchased 57% of all US Treasuries issued since late February of this year, in sharp contrast to the ECB and Bank of Japan that have purchased over 70% of euro area government bonds and JGBs issued (Chart 10). If US Treasury yields are rising because of improving US growth expectations, fueled by fiscal stimulus, the Fed will likely tolerate such a move and buy an even lower share of Treasuries issued – particularly if the higher bond yields do not cause a selloff in US equity markets that can tighten financial conditions and threaten the growth outlook. The fact that US equities have ignored the rise in Treasury yields seen since the end of September may be a sign that both bond and stock investors are starting to focus on a faster trajectory for US growth. In terms of country allocation, beyond downgrading US Treasuries to underweight, we recommend upgrading exposure to countries that are less sensitive to changes in US Treasury yields (i.e. countries with a lower yield beta to changes in US yields). In Chart 11, we show the rolling beta of changes in 10-year government bond yields outside the US to changes in 10-year US Treasury yields. This is a variation of the “global yield beta” concept that we have discussed in the BCA Research bond publications in recent years. Here, we modify the idea to look at which countries are more or less correlated to US yields, specifically. A few points stand out from the chart: Chart 11Reduce Exposure To Bond Markets More Correlated To UST Yields All countries have a “US yield beta” of less than 1, suggesting that Treasuries are a consistent outperformer when US yields fall and vice versa. This suggests moving to underweight the US when US yields are rising is typically a winning strategy in a portfolio context. The list of higher beta countries includes Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the UK and Germany; although Canada stands out as having the highest yield beta in this group. The list of lower beta countries includes France, Italy, Spain, and Japan. In Chart 12, we show what we call the “upside yield beta” that is estimated only using data for periods when Treasury yields are rising. This gives a sense of which countries are more likely to outperform or underperform during a period of rising Treasury yields, as we expect to unfold after the election. From this perspective, the “safer” lower US upside yield beta group includes the UK, France, Germany and Japan. The riskier higher US upside yield beta group includes Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Italy and Spain. Chart 12Favor Bond Markets Less Correlated to RISING UST Yields Spain and Italy are less likely to behave like typical high-beta countries as US yields rise, however, because the ECB is likely to remain an aggressive buyer of their government bonds as part of their asset purchase programs over the next 6-12 months. We also do not recommend trading UK Gilts off their yield beta to US Treasuries in the immediate future, given the uncertainties over the negotiations over a final Brexit deal. Both sets of US yield betas suggest higher-beta Canada, Australia and New Zealand are more at risk of relative underperformance versus lower-beta France, Germany and Japan. In terms of government bond country allocation, we recommend reducing exposure to the former group and increasing allocations to the latter group. Bottom Line: Within global government bond portfolios, downgrade the US to underweight. Favor countries that have lower sensitivity to rising US Treasury yields, especially those with central banks that are likely to be more dovish than the Fed in the next few years. That means increasing allocations to core Europe and Japan, while reducing exposure to “higher-beta” Canada and Australia.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 http://www.crfb.org/papers/cost-trump-and-biden-campaign-plans 2 https://www.moodysanalytics.com/-/media/article/2020/the-macroeconomic-consequences-trump-vs-biden.pdf 3 Please see BCA Research Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, “Introducing Our Quantitative US Senate Election Model”, dated October 16, 2020, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 4 For more details on this recommended steepener trade please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Positioning For Reflation And Avoiding Deflation”, dated August 11, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 For more details on our Adaptive Expectations Model please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “How Are Inflation Expectations Adapting?”, dated February 11, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 For a detailed look at the implications of the Fed’s policy shift please see US Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, “A New Dawn For US Monetary Policy”, dated September 1, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com
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