Economy

Special Report

Dear Client, Next Monday, July 20, we will be hosting our quarterly webcast, one at 10am EST for our US and EMEA clients and one at 9pm for our Asia Pacific, Australia and New Zealand clients; our regular weekly publication will resume on Monday July 27, 2020. Kind Regards, Anastasios Highlights A Democratic sweep would not prevent the stock market from grinding higher over the 12 months after the election. With this year’s massive stimulus, this cyclical view is reinforced. Whether Biden governs as a centrist or a left-winger will depend not on Biden’s preferences but on whether Republicans have a majority in the Senate to constrain the Democratic Party. But the party that wins the White House is highly likely to win the Senate in this cycle. Investors should expect Biden to govern from the left. A Biden presidency would lead to negative surprises on regulation, taxes, health care, trade, energy, and tech. Democrats would remove the Senate filibuster. Yet the macro agenda is reflationary. A blue trifecta would dent S&P 500 profit margins and take a bite out of EPS in 2022. Small caps will also likely suffer at the margin versus mega caps. While select Tech Titans are exposed to a blue sweep regulatory shock, the broad technology sector will prove to be more resilient especially compared with banks and health care equities. Feature Online political betting markets are still not fully pricing our “Blue Wave” scenario for the US election this year. The odds are closer to 50%-55% than 35%. Hence the equity market, especially the NASDAQ, is complacent about rising political risks to US equity sectors (Chart 1). The immediate risk to the rally is not politics but the pandemic, namely the COVID-19 resurgence in the United States, which is causing governors of major states like Texas, California, and Florida to slow down the economic reopening. The US’s failure to limit the spread of the virus has not yet led to a spike in deaths in aggregate, but it is leading to a spike in major states like Texas and Florida (Chart 2). Deaths are ultimately what matter to politicians and financial markets, since governments will not shut down all of society for less-than-lethal ailments. Fear will weigh on consumer and business confidence, including fear of a deadly second wave this winter. Near-term risks to the equity rally are elevated. Chart 1Blue Wave Expected, Equities Unconcerned Chart 2COVID-19 Outbreak Still A Risk Beyond this risk, the driver of the cyclical rally is the gargantuan monetary and fiscal stimulus – and more is on the way. President Trump wants another $2 trillion coronavirus relief package, while House Democrats already passed a $3 trillion package to demonstrate their election platform that government should take a greater role in American life. Senate Republicans (and reportedly Vice President Mike Pence) want a smaller $1 trillion bill but will capitulate in the face of a growing outbreak and any financial turmoil. Congress is highly likely to pass a new relief bill before going on recess on August 10. If COVID-19 causes another swoon in financial markets and the economy, then this congressional timeline will accelerate. America’s total fiscal stimulus for 2020 is rapidly approaching 20% of GDP, or 7% of global GDP (Chart 3). Thus it is understandable that the market has not reacted negatively to an impending blue wave election. Bipartisan reflation is overwhelming the Democratic Party’s market-negative agenda of re-regulation, tax hikes, minimum wage hikes, energy curbs, price caps, and anti-trust probes. Moreover the Democrats’ agenda also includes social and infrastructure spending, cheap immigrant labor, and less hawkish trade policy ex-China, which are all reflationary. Chart 3US Stimulus Greater Than Global – And Rising In short, over the next year, the US is not lurching from massive stimulus to a mid-term election that imposes budget controls and “austerity,” as occurred in 2010, but rather from massive stimulus to a likely Democratic sweep that will be fiscally profligate (Charts 4A & 4B). After all, Democrats are openly flirting with modern monetary theory. Chart 4ADeficits Would Soar Under Democrats Chart 4BDemocrats Would Be Ultra-Dovish On Fiscal Debt monetization is the big change, regardless of the election, which makes investors cyclically bullish. China is also bound to provide massive fiscal-and-credit stimulus because its first recession since the 1970s is threatening the Communist Party’s source of legitimacy (Chart 5). The European Union is uniting under a banner of joint debt issuance to fend off deflation. Bottom Line: Near-term risks to the exuberant post-lockdown rally abound, but the cyclical view remains constructive due to the ultimate policymaker stimulus put. Chart 5China Loosens Credit And Fiscal Taps Pre-Election Volatility And Post-Election Equity Returns Volatility normally rises ahead of US elections and it could linger in the aftermath given extreme polarization and the risk of vote recounts, contested results, Supreme Court interventions, and refusals by either candidate to concede. This is a concern in the short run but not the long run. US equities will grind higher over the long run regardless of the election outcome. Stocks normally rise by 10% in the 12 months after a presidential election that yields single-party control, though the upside is smaller and the initial downside is bigger than is the case with a gridlocked government (Chart 6, top panel). In cases of gridlock – which is virtually assured if Trump wins – the equity pullback after the election is just as deep but tends to be later in coming. On average stocks rise by the same amount after 12 months in either case (Chart 6, bottom panel). Thus political risks are primarily relevant in their regional or sectoral effects, though investors should take note that a Democratic sweep probably limits next year’s upside. Chart 6Equities Have Less Upside Under Democratic Sweep There are two likely scenarios. The first is the risk that President Trump makes a historic comeback and wins re-election, with Republicans retaining the Senate. Subjectively we put Trump’s odds at 35% though our quantitative model suggests they could be as high as 44%. The second scenario is our base case that the Democratic Party wins the Senate as well as the White House. In this scenario, the Democrats will prove more left-wing and anti-corporate than the market currently expects. Bottom Line: A Democratic sweep would not prevent the stock market from grinding higher over the 12 months after the election. With this year’s massive stimulus, this cyclical view is reinforced. However, history shows that a clean sweep limits the market’s upside risk. And full Democratic rule entails major political risks that have a regional and sectoral character. Biden And The Blue Wave Our expectation of a blue sweep is not based only in polling – which is uniformly disastrous for Trump as we go to press – but in the surge in unemployment. The basis for investors to view Biden as a risk-on candidate is driven by the macro and market views outlined above, not political fundamentals. From the political point of view, Biden may prefer to govern as a centrist, but victory in the Senate would remove constraints on his party’s domestic agenda. He would move to the left. Indeed, a Democratic sweep would mark a paradigm shift in domestic economic policy that is negative for corporate profits and the capital share of national income. It would unleash pent-up ideological and generational forces in favor of redistributing wealth and restructuring the economy. Progressivism would have the tendency to overshoot and create negative surprises for investors (Chart 7). Unlike 2008-10, when Republicans were last out of power, Republicans this time would be divided over Trump and populism and would be unlikely to recuperate as quickly. Chart 7Democratic Party Would Focus On Inequality Biden would end up governing to the left of the Obama administration, promoting Big Government while restricting Big Business and re-regulating Wall Street banks. A sharp leftward turn would be in keeping with the trend in the Democratic Party and the generational shift in the electorate (Chart 8). Only if Republicans pull off a surprise and keep the Senate despite losing the White House (~10% chance) would Biden be forced to govern as a true centrist. Even then Biden would oversee a large re-regulation of the economy through executive powers alone (Chart 9).1 Chart 8Generational Shift Favors Wealth Redistribution Chart 9Biden Would Re-Regulate The Economy Additional reasons to expect a left-wing policy overshoot:  · Presidents tend to succeed in passing their initial legislative priority after an election. This is incontrovertible when they control both chambers of Congress, as Obama showed in 2009 and Trump showed in 2017.2 · Biden will have huge tailwinds. He will not be launching a new agenda so much as restoring a policy status quo in most cases (laws and agreements that Trump either revoked or refused to enforce). He will also benefit from majority popular opinion and support of the bureaucracy and media (Chart 10). · Biden and the Democrats will be even more determined not to “let a good crisis go to waste” after having witnessed the Obama administration’s frustrations the last time the party took over in a sweeping victory on the back of a national disaster. · Democrats will not hesitate to use the budget reconciliation process to pass their first priority legislation with a mere 51 votes in the Senate. This is how Trump passed the Tax Cut and Jobs Act (TCJA). This is also how progressive stalwart Howard Dean believed the party should have passed a public health insurance option in 2009. This means Biden will be capable of increasing the corporate tax rate higher than 28%, pass a minimum 15% tax rate for corporations, and raise the capital gains tax and individual taxes. Chart 10Popular Opinion Would Boost Biden Administration · Contrary to consensus, Democrats are likely to remove the filibuster in the Senate – enabling bills to pass with a simple majority rather than the 60/100 votes required to close off debate. Yes, some moderate Democrats have already spoken out against “going nuclear” and changing such a critical norm. But populism and polarization are the driving forces in US politics today and we would advise investors not to bet heavily on “norms.” If Republicans prove capable of obstructing major legislative initiatives in the Senate, then Democrats, remembering obstructionism in the Obama years, will go nuclear to enact their progressive agenda. This would mark a massive increase in uncertainty for investors on everything from taxes to wages to anti-trust laws. Bottom Line: Whether Biden governs as a centrist or a left-winger will depend not on Biden’s preferences but on whether Republicans have a majority in the Senate to constrain the Democratic Party. But the party that wins the White House is highly likely to win the Senate in this cycle. Investors should expect Biden to govern from the left. If Republicans are obstructionist, Democrats will remove the filibuster. Biden’s Legislative Priorities First, Biden would seek to restore and expand the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare). The party has fixated on health care since 1992. Investors are complacent about Biden’s plan. A public health insurance option will be a major new progressive initiative that would undercut private health insurers over time (Chart 11). The bill will also impose caps on pharmaceutical prices and allow imports, reducing Big Pharma’s pricing power (Chart 12). Chart 11Health Insurers Will Be Undercut By Biden Public Option Investors are also complacent about taxation. Biden will pay for health care reform by partially repealing the Tax Cut and Jobs Act. He has proposed raising the corporate rate from 21% to 28%, but this could go higher and still fall well below the 35% that Trump inherited in 2017. Chart 12Big Pharma Faces Price Caps A rate above 28% would be a major negative surprise for financial markets and yet it is an obvious way for Democrats to raise much-needed revenue. Biden also intends to pass a 15% minimum tax that would hit large firms adept at paying lower effective taxes. Capital gains taxes and individual income taxes for high-earners could also rise by more than is expected (Table A1 in Appendix). Second, Biden will seek to offset the negative growth impact of falling stimulus and rising taxes by enacting large “Great Society” fiscal spending on infrastructure, the Green New Deal, education, and other non-defense discretionary spending (Table A2 in Appendix). Even defense spending will be largely kept flat due to rising geopolitical conflicts. As mentioned, this part of the agenda is reflationary, especially relative to a scenario in which fiscal largesse is normalized more rapidly by a Republican Senate. The redistribution effects would be marginally positive for household consumption, but marginally negative for corporate investment. On immigration, Biden will follow the Obama administration in pursuing a path to citizenship for “Dreamers” (illegal immigrants brought to the US as children) and taking executive action to allow more high-skilled workers and refugees, defer deportation of children and families, and reduce border security enforcement. There will be some constraints due to the risk of provoking another populist backlash, but comprehensive immigration reform is possible. This would be positive for potential GDP, agriculture, construction, and housing demand on the margin (Chart 13). On trade, Biden will have to steal some thunder back from Trump if he is to win the election and maintain the Rust Belt. He will concentrate his protectionist policy on China, while removing virtually all risk of a trade war with Europe, Mexico, or other partners. China may get a reprieve at first but Biden will ultimately prove hawkish (Chart 14). Investors are underrating the use of import duties to punish countries like China for carbon-intensive production. Chart 13Biden Lax Immigration Policy A Boon For Housing Biden will take a multilateral approach and restore international agreements that Trump revoked. Joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) is not a massive change given that even Trump agreed to trade deals with Canada, Mexico, and Japan. But it is marginally positive for the US-friendly trade bloc while contributing to the US economic decoupling from China (Chart 15). Chart 14Watch Out, Biden Won’t Be Too Dovish On China In Office! Chart 15Biden Eliminates Risk Of Global Trade War Ex-China On foreign policy, Biden will face the ongoing US-China cold war. He will also seek to restore the Iranian nuclear deal of 2015. The removal of Iran risk is positive for European companies with a beachhead in Iran as well as for the euro more generally, since regional instability ultimately threatens the EMU with waves of refugees (Chart 16). Chart 16Biden Removes Tail-Risk Of Iran War Bottom Line: A Biden presidency will lead to negative surprises on regulation, taxes, health care, trade, energy, and tech. But Biden’s agenda is mostly reflationary in other respects. Blue Wave Equity Market And Sector Implications The most profound implication of a blue sweep of government is an SPX profit margin squeeze that will weigh heavily on EPS. Importantly, there are two clear avenues through which net profit margins will suffer: An increase in the corporate tax rate. A rise in labor’s share of national income. As a reminder these are two of the four primary profit margin drivers we discussed in detail in our “Peak Margins” Special Report last October (Chart 17). The other two are selling price inflation and generationally low interest rates. Odds are high that all four drivers are slated to dent S&P 500 margins. With regard to corporate tax rates, the mirror image of the one time fillip that SPX EPS enjoyed in 2018, owing to Trump’s 1.2% increase in fiscal thrust that year, is a drop in S&P 500 profits given that a Biden presidency will boost the corporate tax rate from 21% to 28% or higher. In early-December 2017 we posited that SPX EPS would jump 14% on the back of that fiscal easing package, which is very close to what actually materialized. Chart 18 compares S&P 500 EBIT growth with S&P 500 net profit growth. The 2018 delta hit a zenith of 16%. Chart 17Profit Margin Drivers Chart 18Spot Trump's Tax Cut Assuming a blue wave, the opposite would happen, i.e. net profit growth would suffer an 11% one-time contraction according to our calculations (Table 1). The bill would pass in 2021 and take effect in 2022. Importantly, Table 1 reveals that the hardest hit GICS1 sectors are real estate, tech and health care, and the ones faring the best are consumer staples, industrials and energy. Table 1What EPS Hit To Expect? Table 2S&P 600/S&P 500 Sector Comparison Table The second way SPX margins undergo a squeeze is via climbing labor costs. Labor costs have been increasing since 2008/09 (labor’s share of income shown inverted, second panel, Chart 17), coinciding with the apex of globalization (third panel, Chart 17). A Biden presidency would also more than double the federal minimum wage to $15 per hour for all workers over six years. These policies would take a bite out of corporate profits by knocking down profit margins. While S&P 500 EPS maybe recover back to trend near $162 in 2021, they would gap lower in 2022 which is not at all priced in sell side analysts’ EPS expectations of $186. A blue sweep would produce some other US equity sore spots. Small caps would suffer disproportionately compared with their large cap brethren as would banks, health care, and parts of tech (see below). Chart 19 shows that according to the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) survey, small and medium enterprise (SME) owners grew extremely concerned about higher taxes and red tape by the end of the Obama presidency. When President Trump got elected, he cut back these fears drastically. Today concerns about taxes and regulation are probing multi-decade lows, which implies that SMEs are not prepared for the regulatory shock that a Biden administration has in store for them (Chart 19). These small business concerns will resurface with a vengeance if there is a blue sweep this November. The implication is that at the margin small caps would underperform their large cap peers, especially given that small cap indexes sport 1.5x the financials sector market cap weight compared with the SPX (Table 2). Bottom Line: A blue trifecta would dent S&P 500 profit margins and take a bite out of EPS in 2022. Small caps will also likely suffer at the margin versus mega caps as they will have to vehemently contend with rising red tape and taxes. Chart 19Re-Regulation Will Weigh On Small Business Sentiment Historical Parallel Of Blue Sweeps And Select Sector Performance A more detailed discussion on banks, health care, and technology sectors is in order, as they are the likeliest candidates to be at the forefront of Biden’s regulatory, wage, and tax policies. There are two recent episodes when US presidential elections resulted in a blue sweep, namely in 1992 and 2008. Both times, Democrats took control of both chambers of Congress and the White House but eventually surrendered this trifecta two years later during the 1994 and 2010 mid-term elections.3 Charts 20 & 21highlight the S&P banks, S&P health care, and S&P IT sectors’ performance during the last two blue waves. In both cases, banks remained flat to down; health care equities went down sharply; while tech stocks had mixed results. Tech took off in 1993-1994, but remained flat in 2009-2010 (excluding the recovery rally off the recessionary trough). Armed with this general roadmap, we now dive deeper into each of these three sectors for a more detailed discussion. Chart 20Not Everyone Is A Fan... Chart 21...Of The Blue Sweeps Banks Face High Risk Of Re-Regulation There is little doubt that Biden will re-regulate Wall Street, especially after the recent COVID-19-related watering down of the Dodd-Frank Act. Big banks are popular scapegoats. In fact, Biden already moved to the left on bankruptcy reform by adopting Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth Warren’s progressive proposal after a long drawn-out battle over this issue between them. Both of the earlier blue wave elections proved challenging for the banking sector. In addition, banks are already under pressure from the recent Fed stress tests. There are high odds that a number of banks will further cut or suspend dividend payments in coming quarters in line with the Fed’s guidance, especially if profits take a big hit, as we expect. Currently, the market is underestimating the Biden threat to the banking sector as a substantial divergence has materialized between the banks’ relative performance and the blue sweep probability series (Chart 22). As the election draws closer, a repricing in the banking sector is likely looming. Chart 22Mind The Divergence Health Care Stands To Lose The Most From A Blue Sweep The health care sector was the only sector we analyzed that clearly underperformed in both 1992 and 2008 blue waves. Health care reform will be Biden’s top priority, as outlined above. Biden will also go after pharma manufacturers. As a reminder, while Medicare has substantial bargaining power with hospitals and other drug providers due to the number of Americans enrolled, it has no leverage when it comes to pharma manufacturers leaving them free to set prices at will. Biden intends to end such practices, enabling Medicare to bargain for prices. He also wants to link the rise in drug prices to inflation and allow foreign imports. These actions will put a cap on pharma manufacturers’ pricing power. Importantly, the S&P pharmaceuticals index is the dominant player within the S&P health care universe comprising 29% of the entire health care sector. A direct hit to pharma earnings will be a hard pill to swallow, especially if the S&P biotech index (comprising 17% of the S&P health care market cap weight) is included that are similar to Big Pharma as they manufacture blockbuster drugs. In fact, as the American electorate is getting more interested in Biden’s campaign, the market is pricing in a tougher environment for US pharmaceuticals (Chart 23). Markets can rely on the fact that Biden has rejected a single-payer government health system (“Medicare For All”) – this policy position helped him beat Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders for the Democratic nomination. However, he is proposing a public insurance option, which will have the ability to absorb losses indefinitely and will have the insurance regulators at its side. Thus private health insurers will be undercut. Chart 23Beginning Of The End A public option is also seen even by promoters as a “Trojan Horse” that will increase the odds that Democrats will move toward a single-payer system in 2024 or thereafter. Thus the risk/reward ratio skews further to the downside for the S&P health care sector. Will Technology Escape Unscathed? In the wake of COVID-19, and facing geopolitical competition in cyber space, a Biden administration will also seek a much stronger regulatory handle on Big Tech. Social media companies are already buttering up to the Democrats to ensure that Biden maintains the Obama administration’s alliance with Silicon Valley and does not pursue extensive anti-monopoly and anti-trust investigations. Yet the tech sector cannot avoid heightened scrutiny due to its conspicuous gains in the midst of an economic bust – this is what normally prompts anti-trust actions (Chart 24). The Democrats will pursue probes into data privacy and excessive market concentration and will demand stricter patrolling of the ideological space in battles that will be adjudicated by the courts. Chart 24How Much Is Too Much? Should the monopolistic tech stocks – including FB and GOOGL, which are now classified under the GICS1 S&P communication services index – be forced to sell their crown jewel assets, then a hit to earnings is a given. The S&P technology sector plus FB & GOOGL commands more than one third on the SPX index, meaning that a dent in tech earnings will have negative ramifications for the entire market. In previous research, we drew a parallel with the chemicals industry and the regulatory shock that came in 1976 when the Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA) was introduced.The bill pushed chemical stocks off the cliff as investments in the index became dead money for a whole decade – until 1985 when chemicals finally troughed (Chart 25) In the near future, a similar shock might come as a result of privacy-related regulation. A series of anti-monopoly or anti-trust probes, whether by the US or the EU, would make investors cautious about their tech exposure. While the probes may not result in a break-up, the heightened uncertainty would dampen the allure of tech stocks. The pattern of anti-trust probes in US history is that a probe first causes a selloff in the stock of the company investigated; then another selloff occurs when it is clear that a break-up is a real option under consideration; then a buying opportunity emerges either when the company is cleared or when the long dissolution process is completed. Bottom Line: While select Tech Titans are exposed to a blue sweep regulatory shock, the broad technology sector will prove to be more resilient especially compared with banks and health care equities. Chart 25Will History Rhyme?     Matt Gertken Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com Arseniy Urazov Research Associate arseniyu@bcaresearch.com   Appendix Table A1Biden Would Raise $4 Trillion In Revenue Over Ten YearsTable A2Biden Would Spend $6 Trillion In Programs Over Ten Years   Footnotes 1     Republicans have 13 Senate seats at risk this cycle while Democrats have only four. More conservatively, Republicans have nine at risk while Democrats have two. Opinion polling has Democrats leading in seven out of nine top races, and tied in the other two – including states like Kansas where Democrats should have zero chance. Most of these races are tight enough that they will hinge on whether the election is a referendum on Trump. If so, Democrats will likely win the net three seats they need to control the chamber. Most likely they will have a 51-49 majority if Biden wins, though a 52-48 balance is possible.   2     The Republican failure to repeal and replace Obamacare in 2017 but success in passing the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act reflects the fact that political constraints are higher on taking away an entitlement than they are on giving benefits (tax cuts). 3    As noted above, however, investors today cannot be assured that Republicans will come roaring back in 2022 to impose constraints. Trump’s populism threatens to divide the party if he loses and delay its ability to regroup and recover.  

Highlights The bull market in US-Iran tensions was never resolved, and now a series of suspicious explosions in Iran raises the possibility that tensions will re-escalate. Iran’s interest lies in waiting out Trump so that a Democratic victory in the US election can restore the US-Iran strategic détente agreed in 2015. However, both the Trump administration and US ally Israel are applying “maximum pressure” on Iran and could go on the offensive at a time when Trump’s odds of re-election are collapsing. Israel cannot engage in a full-fledged war with Iran alone but it would have American backing for pressure tactics through the duration of Trump’s term. A “wag the dog” scenario is not inconceivable because the US and Israel have long-term national security interests at stake while Iran is on the verge of economic collapse. Investors should prepare for near-term global equity volatility and safe-haven demand for a number of reasons but a major escalation in Iran would add to the list. Stay long Brent crude oil. Feature Since May 2018 we have argued that US-Iran tensions will remain market-relevant. We downgraded the odds of US air strikes from 40% in June 2019 to 20% in January of this year after Iran’s lackluster retaliation to the US assassination of its top military commander. Now things are heating up again due to a series of extremely suspicious explosions in Iran that may or may not be linked to Israel and the United States. The COVID-19 pandemic, oil price rout, and global recession have reinforced this bull market in US-Iran tensions by weakening and destabilizing the entire Shia Crescent, from Lebanon to Iran. They have also pushed President Trump dangerously close to “lame duck” status, which reduces the constraints on conflict with Iran for the remainder of his term. In this report we update our Iran view by looking at whether the Trump administration or Israel could attempt to “wag the dog,” i.e. provoke a conflict with Iran to boost Trump’s re-election odds or achieve some long-term strategic objectives while Trump is still in power. We have long held the view that Iran poses a market-relevant geopolitical risk and now the mysterious attacks in Iran suggest it could be materializing. Nothing is confirmed, but it is wise for investors to monitor these developments in case they escalate. Geopolitical incidents often cause buying opportunities but they can create substantial equity drawdowns first. Cyber-Rattling In The Middle East A string of mysterious explosions and fires at military and economic facilities have rocked Iran in recent days (Table 1). Table 1Iran Hit By A String Of Mysterious Attacks The most significant of these incidents is the July 2 explosion at the Natanz nuclear facility – Iran’s main uranium enrichment facility, which houses a new centrifuge assembly center.1 The fire resulted in a significant setback to the development and production of advanced IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges used to enrich uranium – by up to two years. Iranian officials initially downplayed the incidents as unsuspicious accidents. However the Natanz explosion was too significant to cast off. Iran’s state-run news agency IRNA declared that the Natanz incident may be the work of foreign countries, “especially the Zionist regime [Israel] and the US,” and vowed Iranian retaliation if sabotage is proven to be the case. Similarly, the New York Times reported that an anonymous Middle Eastern intelligence official – rumored to be Mossad chief Yossi Cohen – called the incident the work of Israel.2 Israel’s response to these allegations has been oblique, but the accusation is not far-fetched. Israel has a successful history of halting the advancement of nuclear programs in the region. Mossad’s Operation Opera destroyed Iraq’s only known nuclear facility in 1981, and Operation Outside the Box bombed a suspected nuclear reactor at the Kibar site in Syria in 2007. Israeli intelligence has also previously been accused of targeting Iran’s missile program – with the assassination of four Iranian nuclear scientists between 2010 and 2012. Israel is also believed to be involved, with the US, in Operation Olympic Games, the Stuxnet cyber attacks that stunted Iran’s uranium enrichment program circa 2010. Iran’s ballistic missile program and alleged nuclear weapons ambitions remain Israel’s greatest long-term strategic threat in the region. More recently, Iran and Israel have been locked in a series of cyber-attacks. Israel claims to have foiled an Iranian attack on its water facilities in April which attempted a cyber break on water control systems. A May 9 cyberattack on Iranian shipping hub Shahid Rajaae – through which half of Iran’s maritime trade traverses – is seen as Israeli retaliation. Most recently, Israel’s Mossad revealed that it thwarted Iranian attempts to attack Israeli diplomatic missions in Europe. These attacks come as the US increases pressure on UN Security Council members to support the indefinite extension of the UN arms embargo against Iran, which is scheduled to expire on October 18.3 But other signatories to the 2015 Iranian nuclear agreement – China, Russia, Germany, Britain, and France – argue that since the US withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA), its threat to invoke a “snapback” provision of the deal to reimpose former UN sanctions on Iran is not legally valid. The other JCPA signatories remain committed to the deal, arguing for its necessity in order to continue IAEA inspections that prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. They are biding their time to see if Trump is re-elected before deciding anything. Iran has moved further from the JCPA’s requirements since announcing, on January 5, 2020, that it will no longer comply with restrictions to its nuclear program (Table 2). The risk is that unless controlled, this will eventually significantly reduce Iran’s “breakout time” – the time required to acquire enough fissile material for one bomb. The nuclear deal aimed to maintain at least a one-year breakout time, and this is generally understood to be the US’s “red line.” Table 2Iran No Longer Complying With 2015 Nuclear Deal Despite some non-compliance, Iran is still permitting IAEA inspectors to monitor and verify its nuclear activities. Yet the IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution, requesting Iran’s cooperation in the investigation into possible undeclared nuclear materials and sites.4 Chart 1Iran's Sphere Of Influence In Collapse As tensions with US and Israel escalate, Tehran has been keen to highlight its military capabilities. Revolutionary Guard Navy Commander Rear Admiral Alireza revealed the existence of onshore and offshore underground missile sites along the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman, holding advanced long-range missiles and new weapons, more capable of launching attacks against enemies. Escalating tensions raise the likelihood of retaliation as Iran reconsiders its “strategic patience” policy.5 Tehran had been playing the waiting game, especially since Trump’s decision to assassinate Quds Force chief Qassem Soleimani in January. Iran has an interest in avoiding confrontation in the months ahead of the US election on November 3. Iran’s attack on Saudi Arabia in September 2019 led to a boost in Trump’s approval rating. A major conflict today would cause a patriotic rally around the president at a time when he is beset with negative opinion over the coronavirus response and poor race relations. Iran has an interest in Joe Biden winning the presidency in November. Biden would likely restore the US-Iran deal, which would remove sanctions and allow Iran to open its economy. However, neither the Trump administration nor the Israeli government share that interest. The latest attacks raise the possibility that the US and/or Israel are going on the offensive. This could force Iran to retaliate. Iranian moderates are already suffering domestically. Iran’s hardline parliamentarians were never on board with the nuclear deal and criticized President Hassan Rouhani when President Trump pulled out of it in May 2018. This past weekend Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, an ally of Rouhani whose reputation also rests on the deal, was heckled as he addressed the parliament. As of February, parliament is mostly comprised of hardliners.6 Iran is also on shaky ground in the Shia Crescent. Lebanon and Iraq – the two countries most entrenched in Iran’s sphere of influence – have been experiencing civil unrest. Protesters in both countries initially took to the streets last fall in demonstration of anger over government corruption, the sectarian based political system, and poor economic conditions. The pandemic and recession have breathed new life into these movements. The Lebanese pound collapsed on the parallel market since October, and some groups have called for the disarmament of Iran-backed Hezbollah (Chart 1). Meanwhile a June cabinet decision in Iraq to cap the amount and number of state salaries and pension payments collected – in attempt to buttress the country’s ailing finances – fueled outrage. Iraq’s Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi is also in a tussle with Iran-backed paramilitary forces as he attempts to curb their influence and bring them under state control.7 Chart 2Iran Has Little To Lose Thus a timid stance by Iran in face of foreign attacks will not go down well. Instead, with oil production having collapsed, the economy in shambles, and its sphere of influence in turmoil, Tehran has little to lose in protecting what is left of its nuclear program and deterring American or Israeli aggression (Chart 2). With few options left, Iran is likely to move further away from its “strategic patience” in response to the uptick in “maximum pressure.” Bottom Line: Tensions are escalating between Tehran and Washington/Tel Aviv. Cyber attacks are likely to increase in the lead up to the expiration of the arms embargo on October 18 and US elections this fall. Iran may be forced to abandon its policy of “strategic patience” if its foes sabotage its nuclear capabilities. Expect the conflict to spillover to Iran’s proxies in the region – Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. So What? Massive monetary and fiscal stimulus and continued commitment from OPEC 2.0 on the supply side will keep oil prices moving higher this year. Barring a second COVID-19 wave, our Commodity & Energy Strategists expect oil markets to rebalance beginning in 3Q2020, with Brent prices averaging $40/bbl this year and $65/bbl in 2021 (Chart 3). We remain long Brent which is up 70.55% since initiation in March.   The escalation in tensions in the Persian Gulf is an upside risk to this assessment. That said, with major oil producers now operating significantly below capacity in compliance with the OPEC 2.0 production agreement, the net impact on oil prices will likely be muted and short-lived. Production can be increased to fill gaps. As demonstrated by the recent acts of sabotage in Iran and Israel, the increase in geopolitical tensions globally will manifest in cyberattacks, supporting cyber stocks. Our strategically long ISE Cyber Security Index relative to the S&P500 Info Tech sector trade is up 2% since initiation in April (Chart 4). Chart 3Oil Markets On The Way To Recovery Chart 4Buy Cybersecurity Stocks Finally, we should note that Iran is not the only geopolitical risk that could explode amid the US election cycle. China is the greater risk. But President Trump faces fewer financial and economic constraints in a conflict with Iran than he does in a conflict with China. A conflict with Iran could change the game ahead of the election at a time when Trump is beset with the coronavirus and social unrest. His opinion polling would benefit from a rally around the flag, as it did in September 2019. The risk for Trump is that this bump may not last long. Americans are less concerned about Iran than China and Russia and Trump himself has benefited from American weariness of Middle Eastern wars. All we can say for certain is that the US election is of critical strategic importance to several major and minor powers. Trump’s allies and enemies know that the next six months offer their best chance to take actions that either affect the election or exploit the current alignment of US foreign policy relative to a Democratic Party alignment. While China probably prefers Biden, it can deal with either ruling party. Whereas Israel has a unique opportunity to advance its objectives under Trump and Iran has a clear imperative to remove Trump from office.   Roukaya Ibrahim Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The damaged building was constructed in 2013 to be a site for the development of advanced centrifuges. Work there was stopped in 2015 as per requirements of the JCPA, but was restarted when the US withdrew from the deal in 2018. 2 Meanwhile a group of dissidents from within Iran’s military and security forces, calling themselves Homeland Cheetahs, claimed responsibility for the Natanz attack. However, it is possible that the claim was made with the intention to mislead. Please see Jiyar Gol, "Iran blasts: What is behind mysterious fires at key sites?" BBC News, July 6, 2020. 3 The draft US resolution bans Iran from supplying, selling, or transferring weapons after the October 18 expiration of the embargo. It bans UN member states from purchasing Iranian arms or permitting citizens to train or provide financial resources or assistance to Iran without Security Council approval. 4 This resolution, introduced by France, Germany, and the UK, refers to an undeclared uranium metal disc, potential fuel-cycle-related activities such as uranium processing and conversion, and suspected storage of nuclear material. Iran’s parliament responded by issuing a statement signed by 240 out of the 290 members which called the resolution excessive and requested that Iran halt voluntary implementation of additional protocol and change inspections 5 Iran’s state-run news agency IRNA published the following commentary in response to the Natanz explosion: "The Islamic Republic of Iran has so far tried to prevent intensifying crises and the formation of unpredictable conditions and situation … the crossing of red lines of the Islamic Republic of Iran by hostile countries, especially the Zionist regime and the US, means that strategy … should be revised." 6 In addition, 120 out of the 290 parliamentarians signed and delivered a motion to the presiding board of the assembly, requesting that Rouhani be summoned for questioning. The presiding board may not issue the summons and is unlikely to result in Rouhani’s impeachment as Khamenei has requested unity amid high foreign tensions. It nonetheless reflects Rouhani’s weakened position ahead of next year’s elections. 7 Hisham al-Hashemi, an advisor to Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi who had advised the government on reducing the influence of Iran-backed militias in Iraq, was killed on July 6, days after receiving threatening telephone calls from militias.

Special Report

Highlights Our quantitative US election model suggests Trump has a 44% chance of re-election. This presents a risk to our formal subjective view that he has a 35% chance. We are sticking with our subjective odds for now, as Trump is beset with a reviving COVID-19 outbreak, a recession, social unrest, and execution risks for the next round of fiscal stimulus. But we may increase his chances in August if his circumstances improve. In the worst case, the devastated economy will lead to a landslide in which Trump even loses Iowa. But peak political polarization makes that unlikely and suggests that the race will tighten from here. Uncertainty and volatility will rise from here through November and possibly beyond. Feature The BCA Geopolitical Strategy presidential election model was first introduced to our readers in November 2019 in order to predict and quantify the Electoral College vote outcome of the 2020 US presidential election. The election model is a state-by-state model that uses both economic and political variables in order to predict the probability of the incumbent party winning the Electoral College votes in each of the 50 states. We favored predicting the Electoral College vote over the popular vote since the winner of the presidential election is determined by the Electoral College. There have been five cases in history where the popular vote did not determine the outcome and two in recent history (George W. Bush in 2000 and Donald Trump in 2016). The college imposes a significant (and deliberate) constraint on popularity and mass movements. Our sample size includes nine elections over the period 1984-2016, across 50 states, netting 450 observations. One of our four explanatory variables, the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia State Leading Index, was suspended indefinitely amid the COVID-19 crisis. Hence we needed a replacement variable that could capture a similar impact on the predicted outcome, and one that was readily available on a state-by-state basis. Enter our replacement variable: 1. The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia State Coincident Index. The state leading index in our previous election model was an estimate of the six-month growth rate in the state coincident index. Therefore the state coincident index is the natural replacement variable as it will essentially proxy the state leading index, albeit without the forward-looking element. The coincident index for each state combines four of the state’s indicators to summarize current economic conditions in a single statistic. The four indicators are nonfarm payroll employment; average hours worked in manufacturing by production workers; the unemployment rate; and wage and salary disbursements plus proprietors' income deflated by the consumer price index (US city average). We applied several transformations to the data to obtain meaningful results in the modeling process. Transformations included three-month, six-month, and twelve-month changes in the state coincident indexes. Ultimately we decided to use the three-month change of the state coincident index in our updated Version 2 (V2) election model. As before, we took a weighted average of the three-month change of all the monthly state coincident indexes in the presidential term preceding the election. Later months are weighted heavier than earlier months. A significant difference from the first version of our model is that, unlike the state leading indexes, the state coincident indexes do not have leading properties that give a forward-looking “view” on what the economic environment will look like going into Q1 of the post-election year. We acknowledge that past, current, and future economic conditions are likely to weigh on voters’ minds when casting their vote, but we also note the difficulties in accurately weighting one expectation more than another. We assume that prevailing economic conditions matter most to voters (as people’s assessment of their current situation inevitably affects their future expectations, and vice versa), and this bolsters our rationale in using a 3-month change of the state coincident index. Our final calculation of three-month changes to the state coincident indexes occurs in September of the election year, given that most voters make their decision at least one month in advance of the election, as we have previously shown. The October data release will arrive too late in November for inclusion in the election forecast anyway. Our remaining explanatory variables for V2 of our model update: 2. The incumbent party’s margin of victory in the previous presidential election in each state. Same as our original model. 3. A “time for change” variable – a categorical variable indicating whether the incumbent party has been in the White House for one or more terms. Same as our original model. 4. The range of the incumbent president’s job approval rating. Our original model used the level of approval. Our V2 model excludes the average approval level of the incumbent president in July of the election year as it was found to be statistically insignificant at widely accepted significance levels (1%, 5% and 10%) when estimated with the state coincident index (as opposed to the state leading index), no matter the transformation applied to that index. This does not mean we exclude Trump’s approval data from our modeling process. Instead, we include the range of the incumbent president’s job approval rating. This was the only transformed variation in presidential job approval rating data that showed statistical significance when combined with the variables above. For V2 of our model, the range is computed as the maximum monthly average of various job approval polls less the minimum monthly average of such polls throughout a president’s term. Despite Trump’s job approval being low relative to previous presidents, he has maintained consistency. Hence the range of Trump’s job approval is fairly tight relative to previous presidents and should not be ignored in affecting the election outcome. Upside Risk To Trump’s Re-Election Odds? Chart 1 below depicts our revised prediction of November’s presidential election. Chart 1Trump Is Slated To Lose Re-election With 259 Electoral College Votes As it stands, Trump is slated to lose the election with 259 Electoral College votes (45 less than his 2016 victory). This is just ten votes shy of our previous prediction in March this year, but several swing states that were narrowly in Trump’s camp in March are now far less likely to go his way. Our previous prediction, which of course did not account for COVID-19’s economic shock, had Trump tied with the presumptive democrat nominee at the time. But the latest results still point to a tight race come November. Our updated quantitative model gives Trump a 44% chance of winning. The collapse of the state economies is overwhelming Trump’s re-election bid. Poor economic conditions hardly ever favor a sitting president up for reelection. But note that the three-month change in the state indexes will be the first to register the economic rebound this summer and fall (should it continue). This would improve Trump’s probability of victory. Under our V2 model, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin are no longer toss-up states. Rather, Florida is the only toss-up state, with a 52% probability of staying with the incumbent party. Minor negative changes to the state indexes could result in more toss-up states, even throwing traditionally red states into toss-up territory. States that are expected to turn from Republican in 2016 to Democratic in 2020 are Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin – the entire “Blue Wall” that delivered Trump his surprise victory four years ago. On the whole, the model gives Trump a 44% chance of retaining the White House. Do we uncritically accept these results? No. As with all of our analysis, we provide a qualitative judgment in addition to our quantitative indicators and models. In general the findings make sense. We agree that Florida, Arizona, and North Carolina remain in Trump’s camp at present, if narrowly. Our qualitative estimate, since March, has given Trump a 35% chance of winning, in keeping with the historical win rate of incumbent parties when recessions occurred during the election year (Table 1). Online political betting markets have recently converged to this view (Chart 2). Thus our quant model suggests that the risk to our view, and the new consensus, is a Trump comeback. Table 1Recessions Weigh On Incumbent Win Rates Chart 2A Democratic Victory Is The New Consensus We will not formally upgrade Trump’s odds until we are convinced that his freefall has been reversed. We are concerned about the rise in deaths from COVID-19 in key swing states, including Florida, Arizona, and Texas and the potential for another major economic setback. We also would want to see Trump get the next round of fiscal stimulus passed in order to turn more optimistic on his chances. Therefore we will stick to our 35% odds and will reassess in late August when the Republican and Democratic party conventions are held. Model Performs Well In Back Tests Our V2 model performs well during in-sample back testing when comparing actual Electoral College vote outcomes for each election since 1984. On balance, V2 correctly predicts all election outcomes over our sample period (Chart 3). Chart 3Our Model Predicts All Election Outcomes In Our Sample … The same can be said of V2 during out-of-sample back testing, correctly predicting election outcomes from 2000 - 2016 (Chart 4). Chart 4… And During Out-Of-Sample Back Testing As mentioned, we cannot ignore the impact that Trump’s job approval may have on his re-election. Since no other transformation of Trump’s approval data test significantly in our V2 model, what if we transform the state coincident index by a longer frequency? What would the predicted outcome be? Trump would maintain his current level of predicted Electoral College votes of 259. The major change is that the state of Florida would no longer be a toss-up. Instead New Hampshire would become the only toss-up, with Trump having only a 45% chance of winning it. Transforming the state coincident index by a longer frequency is more favorable for Trump. Florida moves out of toss-up territory and New Hampshire moves in. But no change in Electoral College votes are recorded as neither party flips a state in this scenario. What if we were to exclude Trump’s approval range as a variable entirely – how would Trump fare? This “barebones” or economic-focused variation is the least favorable for Trump, allocating just 180 Electoral College votes. Arizona and – surprisingly – Iowa would become toss-up states with probabilities of Trump victory at 47% and 49%, respectively (Table 2). Table 2The Economy Is Weighing Down On Trump’s Odds Of Re-Election It should be noted that models including Trump’s approval range as an explanatory variable exhibited higher over/under estimation during the sample period when compared to models that excluded Trump’s approval range entirely. Despite larger errors in some election years, these models also predicted two elections with almost no error (1988 and 2004), and one election with zero error (2008). These results suggest that Trump’s job approval should not be ignored. Peak Polarization Chart 5Peak Polarization An interesting takeaway from our V1 model was that it produced a new measure of American political polarization, a phenomenon widely observed by scholars. The model showed that many states would be won or lost with extreme certainty (0% or 100%), i.e. that they are not even competitive. We take this finding as an indication of polarization, in which group loyalty overcomes all other variables. Results of in-sample predictions from our V2 model corroborate this finding (Chart 5). They are virtually the same as in V1, except that they show a higher degree of polarization in 2020, which now matches the previous peak in 2012. This is intuitive and corroborates other evidence that US polarization is reaching or exceeding recent highs. Polarization may or may not rise higher in the next election cycle, but we suspect that we are witnessing peak polarization from a historical point of view. Over five to ten years, polarization should fall. Generational change in the US will produce more domestic policy consensus, while geopolitical struggle with China will unify the nation against a common enemy for the first time since the cold war. Expect uncertainty and market volatility ahead of the election and in the aftermath. Thus the US may continue to export political instability to the rest of the world in the near-term. But eventually it will find an internal equilibrium and external sources of instability will become the bigger geopolitical risk for investors. So What? Our V2 US presidential election model predicts Trump will lose the November reelection, only amassing 259 Electoral College votes. The model implies that Trump has an overall probability of 44% in taking the White House. Florida is the only toss-up state in the latest prediction, with a 52% probability of staying with the incumbent party. Florida accounts for 29 Electoral College votes. Should the states of Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin switch back to Republican, Trump would score an additional 46 Electoral College votes. But if Trump has Florida then he only needs to win one of these three states to win the election. Should the states of Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin switch back to Republican, Trump would score an additional 46 Electoral College votes which would hand him the win in November. Conversely, the Democrats are expected to win in November with 279 Electoral College votes. As it stands, the Democrats have a 55% chance of victory. For now, we will maintain our subjective 35/65 odds. But the model shows that the risk is to the upside for Trump and that the race will likely tighten from here. We will likely increase his odds in late August if the renewed virus outbreak in Sunbelt swing states gets under control and Congress passes another major stimulus bill by August 10, as we expect. These findings reinforce our long-held view that the election will come down to narrow margins in the swing states. The deluge of bad news for Trump makes it less likely that the election will be narrow. But the fundamentals, as captured in our V2 model, suggest that Florida, at minimum, will still be an extremely tight race. Thus we would reiterate that this election may feature contested results, vote recounts, and Supreme Court interventions, like the year 2000. Investors should prepare for uncertainty and market volatility to rise between now and November 3, and possibly beyond.   Guy Russell Research Analyst GuyR@bcaresearch.com   Statistical Appendix Some clients may be curious about how our V2 election model differs from our V1 model. We discuss the salient differences herein. Chart A1Our Updated Model Offers Reduced Error 1. The modeling method remains the same Firstly, our V1 model was based off a probit regression, where the dependent variable is stated as 1 = incumbent party wins all Electoral College votes in a given state, or 0 = incumbent party does not win any Electoral College votes in this state.1 The probit regression allows us to assign probabilities of the incumbent party winning each state, given that the inverse of the probability is modeled as a linear combination of the model’s predictors. This modeling technique is maintained in V2 of our model. 2. Variable replacement In V1 of our model, we relied on the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia State Leading Index as an economic variable. In V2, due to the state leading index being discontinued, we adopt the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia State Coincident Index. V1 of our model also used the average approval level of the incumbent president in July of the election year. Since this transformation of job approval data proved statistically insignificant, we tested and included the range of the incumbent president’s job approval rating. The approval range variable showed statistical significance at 5% and 10% levels. 3. Predicted error Assessing the predicted error by each election outcome shows that our V2 model, on balance, trends well with our V1 model (Chart A1), and offers reduced error, on balance, post the 2000 election. Our V2 model also has a lower absolute error when compared to our V1 model. Note, and as we pointed out earlier, our V2 model suffers from some large errors mid-way through the sample period but V2’s predictability improves notably over time. Comparing the error of our V2 model with alternative models that we highlighted in Table A1 also shows just how closely they trend together, despite offering some differing results pertaining to Electoral College votes and toss-up states. Table A1Variations Of Our Model Offer Similar Classified Predicted Outcomes Our V2 model has a lower predicted error in the 2012 and 2016 election than an alternative V2 in which the state coincident indicator is transformed by a six-month change (Chart A2). This warrants our decision in choosing V2 as our preferred model. Chart A2Three-Month Change In State Coincident Indicators Reduces Model Error Chart A3Including Trump’s Approval Data Improves The Model’s Robustness Our V2 model versus the “barebones” V2 model (which excludes the approval range variable and thus can be seen as a purely economic model) has higher predicted error in the elections of 1992 and 1996, but lower error from 2000 onwards (Chart A3). Whilst our V2 model does have a higher absolute error in contrast to the “barebones” model, we believe minimizing a model’s error while still including an element of Trump’s approval data provides us with the most robust election model. Model Diagnostics Regression diagnostics for V2 of our model and other variations that we highlighted in Table A1 above, but do not use, show that our updated model correctly classifies predicted outcomes at a rate of 88.21%. The “barebones” model classifies predicted outcomes marginally better, but we take confidence in the fact that predicted error in our V2 model trends lower as we move further into our sample period, and in the lead up to the 2020 election, bolstering our preferred model choice. The V2 model, if we apply a six-month change to the coincident indicator, classifies predicted outcomes the lowest at 87.43%. Summary Our V2 model shows areas of improved robustness when compared to V1. We keep to the same modeling technique as we did in V1 of our model, a probit regression. We replaced the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia State Leading Index with the Coincident Index and through statistical testing. We opted to drop the average approval level of the incumbent president in July and replace it with the range of the incumbent president’s job approval rating. With mostly lower error for election outcomes from 2000-2016, and lower absolute error and higher correctly classified outcomes, V2 is an adequate model in predicting the upcoming presidential election. Footnotes 1 Two states, Maine and Nebraska, do not have a “winner takes all” distribution of Electoral College votes. Instead they give two Electoral College votes to the winner of the statewide election, plus additional Electoral College votes to the winner within each congressional district. Maine has two congressional districts, Nebraska has three. Nebraska’s second district voted for President Obama in 2008 while Maine’s second district voted for President Trump in 2016.

Feature Over the last several years when I travelled to Europe, I would meet with Ms. Mea, an outspoken client of the Emerging Markets Strategy service. We have published our conversations with Ms. Mea in the past and this semi-annual series has complemented our regular reports. She has challenged our views and convictions, serving as a voice for many other clients. In addition, these conversations have highlighted nuances of our analysis, for her and to the benefit of our readers. With travel restrictions in force, this time we had to resort to an online meeting with Ms. Mea. Below are the key parts of our conversation from earlier this week. Ms. Mea: Let’s begin with your main thesis, which over the past several years has been as follows: China’s growth drives EM business cycles and financial markets overall. Indeed, as long as China’s growth dithers, EM growth and asset prices languish. However, since the pandemic started China has stimulated aggressively and there are clear signs that the economy is recovering. The latest surge in Chinese share prices confirms that a robust recovery is underway. Why do you not think China’s economy is on the upswing? Answer: True, we believe China’s business cycle is instrumental to EM economies’ growth and balance of payments. We upgraded our outlook for Chinese growth in our May 28 report as the National People’s Congress set the objective for monetary policy in 2020 to significantly accelerate the growth rate of broad money supply and total social financing relative to last year. Indeed, broad money growth as well as both private and public credit have accelerated since April and will continue to increase (Chart I-1). Domestic orders have also surged though export orders are still languishing (Chart I-2). Chart I-1China: Money And Credit Will Continue Accelerating Chart I-2China: Improvement In Domestic Orders But Not In Export Ones     That said, financial markets, including the ones leveraged to China, have run ahead of fundamentals and a pullback is overdue. We have been waiting for such a setback to turn more positive on EM risk assets and currencies. Further, the snapback in business activity following the lockdown should not be confused with an economic expansion. As economies around the world reopened, business activity was bound to improve. Were any asset markets priced to reflect months or a whole year of closures? Even at the nadir of the global equity selloff in late March, we do not think risk assets were priced for extended lockdowns. The Chinese economy will likely eventually experience a robust expansion later this year but the nearterm outlook for global risk assets and commodities remains risky. In our view, the rally in global stocks and commodities has been much stronger than is warranted by the near-term economic conditions in a majority of economies around the world. In short, we have not been surprised at all by the economic data that has emerged since economies have reopened, but we have been perplexed by the markets’ response to these data. Even in China, which is ahead of all other countries in regards to the reopening and normalization of business activity, the level and thrust of economic activity remains worrisome. Specifically: China's manufacturing PMI new orders and the backlog of orders sub-components remain below the neutral 50 line (Chart I-3). The imports subcomponent of the manufacturing PMI has shown signs of peaking below the 50 line, portending a risk to industrial metals prices (Chart I-4). Chart I-3China Manufacturing PMI: Measures Of Orders Are Still Below 50 Chart I-4A Yellow Flag For Commodities   Marginal propensity to spend for both enterprises and households continues to trend lower (Chart I-5). These gauge the willingness of consumers and companies to spend and, hence, reflect the multiplier effect of the stimulus. These indicators contend that the multiplier so far remains low/weak. Finally, with the exception of new economy stocks (such as Ali-Baba and Tencent) that have been exceptionally strong worldwide, Chinese share prices leveraged to capital expenditure and consumer discretionary spending had not been particularly strong before last week, as illustrated in Chart I-6.  Chart I-5Marginal Propensity To Spend Among Chinese Households And Enterprises Chart I-6Chinese Stocks Had Been Languishing Till Late Outside New Economy Ones In a nutshell, the Chinese economy will likely eventually experience a robust expansion later this year but the near-term outlook for global risk assets and commodities remains risky. As to EM risk assets, the key risk to our stance is a FOMO-driven rally buoyed by the “visible hand” of governments. Ms. Mea: What is your interpretation of the latest policy push in China for higher share prices? Is it also a part of the “visible hand” of government? Don’t you think this could create another strong multi-month run like it did in early 2015? Answer: Yes, this is one of many instances of the “visible hand” of governments around the world. It is not clear why Beijing is boosting investor sentiment and explicitly promoting higher share prices given how badly similar efforts in 2015 ultimately ended. At the moment, we can only speculate that one or several of the following reasons are behind this move: Beijing is preparing for an escalation in the US-China geopolitical confrontation ahead of the US presidential elections. This latter is highly probable in our opinion.1 To limit the impact of this confrontation on their economy, they want to ensure that the stock market remains in an uptrend. The same can be said for the US authorities. Apparently, the “visible hands” of both Washington and Beijing have and will continue to push share prices higher in their domestic markets. Robust equity markets will become a prominent feature of the geopolitical confrontation between the US and China. In the long run, however, this is a very negative phenomenon for the world because the two of the largest and most prominent stock markets could increasingly be driven by the “visible hand” of their governments rather than by fundamentals. As a result, equity markets could regularly send wrong price signals and will no longer serve as an efficient mechanism of capital allocation. Chart I-7Foreign Inflows Into China Have Accelerated This Year Beijing has been luring foreign investors to buy onshore stocks and bonds and this strategy has become more vital in expectation of an escalation in the US-China confrontation. Chart I-7 shows that net inflows into onshore stocks and bonds have been surging. The more US investors buy into mainland markets, the more these investors will exercise pressure on the current and future US administrations to go soft on China. Like those US companies relying on Chinese demand, large US investment funds will have a notable exposure to Chinese financial markets and will accordingly lobby the White House and Congress to take a less adversarial stance toward China. This will reduce the maneuvering room of US politicians in this geopolitical confrontation. Finally, it is also possible that these latest media reports encouraging a bull market in China were not initiated by leaders in Beijing but were in fact spurred by mid-level bureaucrats. If that is the case, a full-blown mania akin to the one in 2015 will not be repeated and the latest frenzy surrounding Chinese stocks could end up being the final surge before a correction sets in. In brief, Chinese stocks, like other bourses worldwide, are in a FOMO-driven mania that might last for a while. Nevertheless, regardless of the direction of Chinese stocks in absolute terms, we reiterate our overweight stance on Chinese equities within the EM benchmark. Also, we have a strong conviction with respect to the merits of a long Chinese/short Korean stocks trade. Both these positions were initiated on June 18 before the latest surge in Chinese stocks. The “visible hands” of both Washington and Beijing have and will continue to push share prices higher in their domestic markets. Ms. Mea: What will it take for you to go long EM risk assets and currencies in absolute terms? Answer: EM equities, credit markets and currencies are driven by three, or more recently four, factors. We need to witness or foresee an imminent improvement in three out of four of these to go outright long. These factors include: (1) China’s business cycle and its impact on EM via global trade; (2) each individual EM country’s domestic fundamentals (inflation/deflation, balance of payments, return on capital, domestic economic cycles, monetary and fiscal policies, health of the banking system, domestic politics, etc.); (3) global risk-on and risk-off cycles that drive portfolio flows into EM. The direction of the S&P500 is an important trendsetter for these risk-on and risk-off cycles; (4) swings in geopolitical confrontation between the US and China. The first element – China’s impact on EM – is becoming positive. There could be a minor setback in mainland business cycles in the near term, but this should be used as a buying opportunity. As to structural problems in China like credit/money and property bubbles as well as the misallocation of capital, ongoing money and credit growth acceleration will fill in holes and kick the can down the road. That said, those structural problems will become even more challenging in the years to come. In short, Beijing is making credit, money and property bubbles even bigger. The second factor – domestic fundamentals in EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan – remain downbeat. The COVID-19 outbreak has been out of control in a number of EM economies (Chart I-8). In addition, outside of China, Korea and Taiwan, EM fiscal stimulus has not been as large as in DM economies. Critically, the monetary transmission mechanism has been broken in several developing economies. In particular, central banks’ rate cuts have not translated to lower lending rates in real terms (Chart I-9). Chart I-8The COVID-19 Pandemic Has Not Peaked In Several Major EM Economies Chart I-9Lending Rates Are Still High In EM ex-China, Korea And Taiwan   The basis is two-fold: First, banks saddled with non-performing loans are reluctant to bring down their lending rates and lend more; and second, the considerable decline in EM inflation has pushed up real lending rates (Chart I-9). The third variable driving EM financial markets – the S&P 500 – remains at risk of a material setback. If the S&P drops more than 10 or 15%, EM stocks, currencies and credit markets will also sell off markedly. Finally, there is the fourth aspect of the EM view – geopolitics – which could be critical in the coming months. The US-China confrontation will likely heighten leading up to the US elections. This will likely involve North and South Korea and Taiwan. Chart I-10EM ex-China, Korea And Taiwan: Stocks And Currencies Chinese investable stocks as well as Korean and Taiwanese equities altogether make up 65% of the MSCI EM benchmark. Hence, a flareup in geopolitical tensions will weigh on these three bourses. Outside these markets, EM share prices and currencies have already rolled over (Chart I-10). In sum, out of the four factors listed above only the Chinese business cycle warrants an upgrade on overall EM. The other three drivers of the EM view are still negative. This keeps us on the sidelines for now. Importantly, we have been gradually moving our investment strategy from bearish to neutral on EM. Specifically, we: Took profits on the long EM currencies volatility trade on March 5. Took large profits on the long gold / short oil and copper trade on March 11. Booked gains on the short position in EM stocks on March 19. Recommended receiving long-term (10-year) swap rates (or buying local currency bonds while hedging the exchange rate risk) in many EMs on April 23. Upgraded EM sovereign credit from underweight and booked profits on our short EM corporate and sovereign credit / long US investment grade bonds strategy on June 4. The only asset class where we have not yet closed our shorts is EM currencies. In fact, we now recommend shifting our short in EM currencies (BRL, CLP, ZAR, TRY, KRW, PHP and IDR) from the US dollar to an equal-weighted basket of the Swiss franc, the euro and the Japanese yen. Unlike the March selloff, the dollar could depreciate even if the S&P 500 and global stocks drop. Ms. Mea: What is the rationale behind switching your short positions in EM currencies against the US dollar to short positions versus the Swiss franc, the euro and Japanese yen? Wouldn’t the selloff in global stocks drive the greenback higher? Answer: We have been bullish on the US dollar since 2011, consistent with our negative view on EM and commodities prices and recommendation of favoring the S&P 500 versus EM. What is making us question this strategy are the following, in order of importance: First, the Federal Reserve is monetizing US public and some private debt. The amount of US dollars is surging. Meanwhile, the pace of broad money supply growth is much more timid in the euro area, Switzerland and Japan. Broad money growth is 23% in the US, 9% in the euro area, 2.5% in Switzerland, 5% in Japan and 11% in China. This will reduce investors’ willingness to hold dollars as a store of value, incentivizing them to switch to other DM currencies. Second, the pandemic is out of control in the US and this will damage its near-term growth outlook. More fiscal stimulus and more debt monetization will be required to revive the economy. Third, the Fed will not hike interest rates even if inflation rises well above their 2% target in the next several years. This implies that the Fed will prefer to be behind the inflation curve in the years to come, which is bearish for the greenback. Finally, the yen and the euro as well as EM currencies are cheaper than the US dollar (Chart I-11 and Chart I-12). Chart I-11The US Dollar Is Expensive, The Yen Is Cheap Chart I-12EM ex-China, Korea And Taiwan: Currencies Are Cheap     The broad trade-weighted US dollar has yet to break down as per the top panel of Chart I-13, but we are becoming nervous about it. Unlike the March selloff, the dollar could depreciate even if the S&P 500 and global stocks drop. Ms. Mea: That is interesting. Has there ever been an episode where the US dollar depreciated while the S&P 500 sold off? Answer: Yes, it occurred in late 2007 and H1 2008. The 2007-08 bear market in global stocks can be split into two periods. During the initial phase of that bear market, the US dollar depreciated substantially despite the drawdowns in global equity and credit markets (Chart I-14, top and middle panels). Chart I-13Trade-Weighted Dollar And Asian Currencies: At A Critical Juncture Chart I-14In Late 2007 And H1 2008: The US Dollar Fell Amid An Equity Bear Market   EM stocks performed in line with DM ones during the first phase (Chart I-14, bottom panel). The economic backdrop was characterized by the US recession and US banks tightening credit. In fact, EM growth was still robust during that phase even though the US economy was shrinking. Remarkably, commodities prices were surging – oil reached $140 per a barrel and copper $4 per ton in June 2008. The second phase of that bear market commenced in autumn of 2008 when Lehman went bust. The orderly bear market in global stocks gave way to an acute phase – a crash in all global risk assets. Business activity collapsed worldwide and the US dollar surged. In the current cycle, the order will likely be the reverse of the 2007-08 bear market. March 2020 witnessed a crash in global risk assets and the global economy plunged similar to the second phase of the 2007-08 bear market while the US dollar surged. The second stage of this recession could resemble the first phase of the 2007-08 bear market. There will be neither worldwide lockdowns nor a crash in business activity. However, the level of activity might struggle to recover as rapidly as markets have priced in or there might be relapses in economic conditions in certain parts of the world. This is especially true for the US and other countries where the pandemic has not been effectively contained. On the whole, the second downleg in the S&P 500 and global stocks will be less dramatic but could last for a while and still be meaningful (more than 10-15%). Critically, unlike the March 2020 selloff, the greenback will likely struggle during this episode for the reasons we outlined above. Ms. Mea: What about overweighting EM equities and credit versus their DM peers? Will EM equities, credit and currencies underperform their DM peers in the potential selloff that you expect? Wouldn’t USD weakness help EM risk assets to outperform even in a broad risk selloff? Answer: Yes, we can see a scenario where EM stocks and credit markets perform in line or better than their DM peers in a potential selloff. The key is the dollar’s dynamics. If the dollar rebounds, EM stocks and credit markets will underperform their DM counterparts. If the dollar weakens during this selloff, EM stocks and credit will likely perform in line with or better than their DM peers. In sum, a technical breakdown in the broad trade-weighted dollar and a breakout in the emerging Asian currency index – both shown in Chart I-13 – would lead us to upgrade our EM allocation in both global equity and credit portfolios. For now, we are only switching our shorts in EM currencies from the US dollar to an equally-weighted basket of the Swiss franc, the euro and the Japanese yen. Ms. Mea: What are some of your other current observations on financial markets? Answer: The breadth and thrust of this global equity rally has already peaked and is weakening. It is just a matter of time before a narrowing breadth translates into lower aggregate stock indexes for both EM and DM equities as illustrated by our advance-decline lines in Chart I-15. Chart I-15EM and DM Equity Breadth Measures Have Rolled Over Chart I-16Cyclicals And High-Beta Stocks Have Been Struggling Consistently, there has already been a decoupling between various sectors and industries. The rally has been solely focused on tech and new economy stocks. Equity prices in China and Taiwan have been surging while the rest of the EM equity index has been languishing. In the DM equity space, global industrials, US high-beta stocks and micro caps have already rolled over (Chart I-16). Further, our Risk-On/Safe-Haven currency index is flashing red for EM equities (Chart I-17). Chart I-17A Red Flag For EM Equities? Chart I-18Long Gold / Short Stocks Finally, EM share prices have outperformed DM stocks since late May mostly due to the sharp rally in Chinese, Korean and Taiwanese stocks. Hence, the breadth of EM equity outperformance has been subdued. Ms. Mea: To wrap up our conversation, I want to ask you what is your strongest conviction trade for the coming months? Answer: Our strongest conviction trade is long gold / short global or EM stocks (Chart I-18). This trade will do well regardless of the direction of global share prices, the US dollar, and bond yields. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1  Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report "Watch Out For A Second Wave (Of US-China Frictions)," dated June 10, 2020, available at gps.bcaresearch.com   Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Please note that I will be hosting a webcast on Friday July 17 and that the webcast will replace next week’s report. Highlights Go tactically short stocks versus bonds. But express it as short DAX versus the US 10-year T-bond, given the greater scope for compression in US bond yields than in German bond yields. Target a profit of 10 percent but apply a stop-loss if stock versus bond outperformance continues for another 10 percent. There is now a strong incentive for short-term investing and a strong disincentive for long-term investing, forcing formerly long-term investors to think and behave like traders. Don’t obsess with the Covid-19 mortality rate. Focus instead on the morbidity, or hospitalization, rate. Covid-19 is unlikely to kill you, but it can make you ill and, in some unlucky cases, permanently ill. Feature Chart of the WeekA Sell Signal For Stocks To Bonds Financial markets have reached an absurdity. It is now more rewarding to be a short-term trader who holds investments for just three months than it is to be a long-term investor who buys and holds them for ten years. And just to be clear, we are comparing cumulative returns over the entire holding period of three months versus one that is forty times longer at ten years. The case for buying and holding most mainstream investments has collapsed. Investors seeking attractive long-term returns can no longer rely on mainstream bond and stock markets. Nowadays, the long-term investment story is about sectors and themes, and we will continue to tell this story in our regular reports. However, this week we will focus on the implications of short-termism in the mainstream markets. Short-Term Returns Now Beat Long-Term Returns Through the past year, anybody who has bought the German 10-year bund, with the intention of holding it until it redeems in 2029 is guaranteed a deeply negative return. Yet there have been many three-month periods in which the bund has generated a high single-digit return (Chart I-2). Chart I-23-Month Returns Now Beat 10-Year Returns! Likewise, anybody who owns the US 10-year T-bond has made almost as much money in the first three months of this year as they mathematically can by holding it for ten years! By extension, the same principle also applies to mainstream stock markets which are priced for feeble long-term returns – yet can rally by 20-30 percent in the space of a few weeks. It is now more rewarding to be a short-term trader who holds investments for three months than it is to be a long-term investor who buys and holds them for ten years. Admittedly, these are nominal returns, and the long-term real returns could be boosted by deflation. Nevertheless, the economy would have to experience Great Depression levels of deflation to make the long-term real returns genuinely attractive. Yet it wasn’t always like this. Until recent years, the cumulative returns available from long-term investing were many multiples of those available from short-term investing – as they should be (Chart I-3 and Chart I-4). But today, the incentive structure is back-to-front. There is a strong disincentive for long-term investing and a strong incentive for short-term investing, forcing formerly long-term investors to think and behave like traders. Albeit traders that must get their timing right. Chart I-3Today, There Is A Strong Disincentive For Long-Term Investing... Chart I-4...And A Strong Incentive For Short-Term Investing Unfortunately, when everybody behaves like traders there are worrying implications for financial market liquidity and stability. Short-Termism Destroys Market Liquidity We have been brought up to believe that agreement and consensus create peace and harmony, whereas disagreement and opposition create conflict and discord. Hence, it is natural to think that agreement and consensus also create calm and stability in the financial markets. Yet nothing could be further from the truth. A calm and stable market requires disagreement. Disagreement is the source of market liquidity and stability. Meaning, the ability to convert stocks into cash, or cash into stocks, quickly and in volume without destabilising the stock price. For an investor to convert a large amount of stocks into cash without destabilising the price, a mirror-image investor must be willing to take the opposite position. It follows that market liquidity comes from a disagreement about the attractiveness of the investment at a given price. As an aside, we often read comments such as ‘investors are moving out of stocks into cash’, or vice-versa. Such comments are nonsensical. If one investor is selling stocks, then a mirror-image investor must be buying stocks. The stocks cannot just vanish into thin air! A market which loses its variation of investment horizons loses its liquidity and stability. If institutional investors are selling, then a mirror-image investor must be buying. The mirror-image buyer could be less savvy retail investors, in which case we might interpret the institutional selling as a sell signal. Or the mirror-image buyer could be ‘smart money’ hedge funds, in which case we might interpret the institutional selling as a buy signal. It follows that unless we know the identity of both the seller and the buyer, the ‘flows’ information is useless. The much more useful information is the variation of investment horizons in the market. This is because a market which possesses a variation of investment horizons also possesses the disagreement required for liquidity and stability. Conversely, a market which lacks this variation of investment horizons could soon run out of liquidity and undergo a change in trend. Investors with different time horizons disagree about the attractiveness of an investment at a given price because they interpret the same facts and information differently. For example, a day-trader will interpret an outsized rally as a ‘momentum’ buy signal, whereas a value investor will interpret the same information as a ‘loss of value’ sell signal. Therefore, the market possesses liquidity and stability when its participants possess a variation of investment horizons. For example, both a 1-day horizon and a 3-month (65 business days) horizon. The corollary is that the market’s liquidity and stability disappear when its participants no longer possess this healthy variation in horizons. In technical terms, this occurs when the market’s fractal structure collapses. In the above example, it would be signalled by the 65-day fractal dimension collapsing to its lower limit (Chart I-5). Chart I-5The Stock-To-Bond Fractal Structure Has Collapsed All of which brings us to our tactical stock-to-bond sell signal. A Sell Signal For Stocks To Bonds Since 2015, a collapsed 65-day fractal structure of the German stock-to-bond ratio has reliably presaged a change in trend, implying either a sell or buy signal based on the direction of the preceding trend. The two most recent occurrences happened this year on January 2, a sell signal, and March 9, a buy signal (Chart of the Week). A collapsed 65-day fractal structure of the German stock-to-bond ratio has reliably presaged a change in trend. The 65-day fractal structure of the German stock-to-bond ratio has collapsed once again, reinforced by a similar observation in the US stock-to-bond ratio. This suggests that the recent 40 percent rally in stocks versus bonds is approaching exhaustion and is susceptible to a tactical reversal (Chart I-6). Chart I-6The 40 Percent Rally In Stocks Versus Bonds May Be Near Exhaustion Hence, go tactically short stocks versus bonds. But express it as short DAX versus the US 10-year T-bond, given the greater scope for compression in US bond yields than in German bond yields. Target a profit of 10 percent but apply a stop-loss if the outperformance continues for another 10 percent. One caveat is that bullish fundamentals can swamp fragile fractal structures. Hence, the strong outperformance of stocks versus bonds would persist if, for example, a breakthrough treatment or vaccine suddenly emerged for Covid-19. On the other hand, it is worth noting that US hospitalizations for the disease are rising once again, even if deaths, so far, are not (Chart I-7). Nevertheless, we reiterate that the Covid-19 morbidity (severe illness) rate is much more important than the mortality rate, for two reasons. Chart I-7US Hospitalizations For Covid-19 Are Rising Again First, it is morbidity rather than mortality that swamps the finite and limited intensive care unit (ICU) capacity in healthcare systems. Second, the evidence now suggests that many recovered Covid-19 victims suffer long-term damage to their lungs and/or other vital organs such as kidneys, the liver, and the brain. This is the case even for apparently mild cases of the disease that do not require hospitalization. Therefore, don’t obsess with the Covid-19 mortality rate. Focus instead on the morbidity, or hospitalization, rate. The threat from Covid-19 is not that it will kill you. It almost certainly won’t. The threat is that it will make you ill and, in some unlucky cases, permanently ill. Fractal Trading System* As discussed, this weeks recommended trade is short DAX versus 10-year T-bond, setting a profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 10 percent. Chart I-8GBP/RUB In other trades, long GBP/RUB is within a whisker of its 3 percent profit target. The rolling 1-year win ratio now stands at 59 percent When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated  December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com.   Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System   Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields   Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations