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The BoC places a lot of weight on the Business Outlook Survey (BoS) in determining its economic forecasts, and in setting monetary policy. Thus, it is no surprise that in the official statement following the April 24 monetary policy meeting, the BoC…
The problem for the BoC is that its policy rate of 1.75% remains well below its own estimated neutral range, which is now 2.25%-3.25%. A similar message comes when looking at the neutral real rate (“r-star”) estimate for Canada produced by the New York Fed,…
In 2018, prior to the year-end correction in U.S. equity markets, the contribution to core PCE inflation from the Financial Services category was a steady 0.5-0.6 percentage points. After the market rout, that contribution has fallen to 0.2 percentage points,…
The official statement acknowledged that U.S. inflation was running below the 2% target, but Fed Chair Jerome Powell later described that inflation shortfall as “transitory” and expected to reverse. Powell standing his ground so firmly was a sharp rebuke…
Special Report Highlights Odds are that the recently improved access to financing will allow property developers to boost construction volumes modestly in the coming months. Yet, the outlook for new credit origination and government tolerance of another credit binge is highly uncertain. For now, the completion of previously launched projects will help construction-adjacent industries in the short run. However, these activities will consume real estate developers’ cash augmenting both their liquidity needs and financial vulnerability. That is a basis to underweight the Chinese real estate sectors within both the Chinese MSCI investable universe and the onshore A-share indexes. Feature The emergent divergence among Chinese property sales, starts and completions constitutes an exceptionally bizarre phenomenon. The gaps between these three indicators are currently unprecedented (Chart I-1). Understanding these divergences is critical to correctly gauging the outlook for the Chinese real estate market. This report aims to assess the growth outlook of these three variables. Odds are that these gaps will narrow going forward. Over the next three to six months, the Chinese property market is likely to be characterized by a contraction in floor space sold, a considerable relapse in floor space starts, and a rebound in floor space completions (Chart I-2). Chart I-1An Unprecedented Divergence… Chart I-2…But A Convergence Looms   In terms of the strength of construction activity in the Chinese property market, the real estate developers’ access to funding has been and remains the key. Over the next three to six months, the Chinese property market is likely to be characterized by a contraction in floor space sold, a considerable relapse in floor space starts, and a rebound in floor space completions. For now, we reckon the improved access to financing in recent months should help property developers to boost construction volumes modestly in the coming months (Chart I-3). Chart I-3Construction Activity Will Modestly Improve In The Coming Few Months That said, the current round of credit stimulus has probably been front-loaded in the first quarter, and property developers’ access to funding will begin to deteriorate again going forward. This will weigh on their ability to raise construction volumes materially. Understanding The Construction Cycle In China Floor space sold, starts and completions generally move in tandem. Specifically, strong sales lead rising starts, which then with a time lag result in increased completions. However, over the past 15 months, the growth rate of property starts has accelerated to over 20%, while sales have mildly contracted and floor space completions have been shrinking dramatically (Chart I-2). The key reason for these divergences has been the considerable financing difficulties facing property developers. Tighter monetary policy and credit beginning in late 2016 severely impaired developers’ ability to raise funds. This made Chinese real estate developers desperate for any source of possible revenue or financing. Launching new projects aggressively last year – i.e., more property starts – allowed real estate developers to pre-sell and get cash at a time when credit was tight.  Property developers were also aiming to conserve cash flow amid tight credit. After investing 25% of the total investment required for a property project (excluding the value of the land), they received a presale permit from the authorities. The permits allowed them to sell housing units in advance. Home-buyers had to pay at least 30% of the total property value at the time they signed the presale contract. This way, developers were able to obtain both deposits and advance payments1 (Chart I-4). This was a welcome addition to scarce financing last year. After this phase, property developers then slowed their investment in construction, installation and equipment purchases – because these would consume precious, limited cash. This depressed construction activity has resulted in a material contraction in floor space completed (Chart I-5). Chart I-4Developers’ Funding Has Improved Due To Deposits & Advanced Payments   Bottom Line: Launching new projects and pre-selling housing units while shrinking construction enabled Chinese real estate developers to stay afloat last year amid tight access to credit. What Does This Mean? There are two important implications related to this unprecedented divergence among property sales, starts and completions. The first is that raising funds via launching property starts along with shrinking completions has resulted in a significant increase in Chinese property developers’ liabilities. This is a form of borrowing money for property developers, and it has been occurring on top of very poor financial health. Specifically, Chinese real estate developers’ debt-to-equity ratio is currently above 4, and continues to surge (Chart I-6). Further, in 2018, 54 out of 131 Chinese property developers had negative free cash flow. This scheme of raising funding via new launches along with postponing building and completions is becoming unsustainable. The divergence between surging property starts and contracting completions suggests that real estate developers have raised funds through selling more uncompleted buildings instead of completed properties (Chart I-7, top panel). Chart I-6Chinese Property Developers Are Very Leveraged Chart I-7A Big Increase In Sales Of Uncompleted Buildings   Specifically, some 87% of total residential floor space sold in the past 12 months has been sold in advance, much higher than the approximate 77% total recorded in the years prior to 2018 (Chart I-7, bottom panel). The second important implication is that property developers’ ability to raise financing will determine the strength of property construction activities in China going forward. Chinese real estate developers are facing massive funding requirements this year. Developers need considerable amounts of funding this year to speed up their construction activities on delayed projects (launched but not completed ones). It generally takes about two years for real estate developers to complete a construction project and deliver the presold properties. Developers had already slowed their construction progress last year. They must accelerate the pace this year to ensure deliveries are made on time. Developers also need to roll over or repay significant amounts of debt coming due in 2019. On the whole, they have issued nearly RMB3.9 trillion of bonds so far, with most in the three- to five-year duration. Chart I-3 on page 2 shows that further improvements in credit flows in the economy will likely lead to ameliorating construction activity. Credit easing has allowed developers to raise funds through bank loans, bond issuances (both domestic and overseas) and other forms of borrowing (Chart I-8). Property developers’ ability to raise financing will determine the strength of property construction activities in China going forward. As a result, real estate investment in construction, installation and equipment purchases have all ameliorated in recent months (Chart I-9). This reflects a true pickup in real estate construction activities since the beginning of this year. Chart I-8Marginal Credit ##br##Easing   However, whether or not this latest improvement develops into full-fledged recovery is contingent on credit flows in the economy in general, and property developers’ access to financing in particular. If the overflow of credit decelerates after the massive binge that took place in the first quarter, it will weigh on construction activity. If the first-quarter credit binge persists, Chinese property developers will likely be able to raise sufficient funds to speed up property completions and roll over their maturing debt this year. In this scenario, construction activity will gather speed, facilitating a recovery in the overall economy.  At the current juncture, it is impossible to make a definite conclusion. The outlook for new credit flows and government tolerance of another credit binge is highly uncertain. On the one hand, the Politburo last month reiterated that China will push forward structural deleveraging and prevent speculation in the property market. Preliminary credit flow numbers for April appear to be very weak, not confirming blockbuster credit in the first quarter. Besides, the banking regulator has renewed pressure on banks to recognize non-performing loans and provision for them.2 This will curb banks’ ability to originate new loans and buy corporate bonds. On the other hand, an escalation of tensions between China and the U.S. and the uncertainty it is instilling in the economy and financial markets could lead the authorities to keep the credit taps open for longer, allowing credit to flow into the broader economy. Bottom Line: Real estate developers are extremely leveraged and lack cash to complete launched projects. Hence, property developers’ ability to raise financing holds the key in terms of the strength of property construction activities in China. Further easing in credit will likely lead to rebounding property completions and rising construction activity, and vice versa. What About Chinese Property Demand? Easy credit may alleviate the financing stress facing Chinese real estate developers and lift construction activity temporarily. However, the most important and sustainable source of funding for real estate developers is property sales. Chart I-10 shows that funding from property sales, including deposits, advance payments and mortgages assumed by property buyers, contributes nearly half of the sources of funds raised in that year. Self-raised funds are the second-largest component of the source of funds, with a share of 34%. One major component of self-raised funds – retained earnings – are also closely related to property sales. The other major component is equity and bond issuance. Bank loans and foreign investment (including direct equity injections, sales of bonds and equity, and borrowing from foreign banks) together account for only about 15%. Even though there has been some credit easing for Chinese real estate developers, the bad news is that property sales are still in a structural downtrend. Chart I-11Slower PSL Injections Will Negatively Impact Property Demand As discussed in our previous reports,3 China’s property market is currently facing structural impediments. Low affordability, slowing rural-to-urban migration, demographic changes, the promotion of the housing rental market and the government’s continuing emphasis on clamping down speculation are together generating strong structural headwinds for property demand in China. Importantly, surging property demand between late 2015 and 2017 was mainly driven by the Chinese central bank’s direct lending to the real estate sector, which is not sustainable. Our calculations indicate that about 20% of floor space sold (in volume terms) in 2017 was due to the Pledged Summary Lending (PSL) facility designed for slum area reconstruction.4 Indeed, the central bank’s PSL injections have already decelerated considerably since last year (Chart I-11). This has resulted in contracting overall property sales. Late last month, the authorities significantly cut their slum-area reconstruction target by more than one-half – from 6.4 million units last year to 2.85 million units this year. This suggests the amount of PSL injections will decline correspondingly (Chart I-12). Besides the diminishing PSL scheme, some other factors are also signaling a dismal outlook for Chinese property demand. A deep and long contraction in property demand in rich provinces indicates demand saturation (Chart I-13). Sales outside eastern provinces track PSL injections very closely, as per Chart I-11, and are facing headwinds. Chinese households are more leveraged than U.S. ones, with the former’s debt-to-disposable income ratio having surpassed that of the latter (Chart I-14). Chart I-13Demand Is Saturated In China’s (Richer) Eastern Provinces Chart I-14China’s Household Debt Burden Is Very Elevated   In addition, mortgage rates in China have not dropped much, despite monetary policy easing in the past 12 months. Recent data shows the average mortgage rate paid by first-time homebuyers has fallen from 5.71% last November to 5.56% this March, a still-high number. With respect to the ability to service mortgage payments, on a 90-square-meter house with a 30% down payment, our calculations show that annual interest costs account for about 27% of average household disposable income levels (Table I-1). Overall, poor affordability for Chinese homebuyers will constrain property demand in the coming years. Finally, the government is quite determined to implement its property tax in a few years. Local governments’ financing needs will become more acute as revenue from land sales decline substantially. China’s property market is on the way to becoming the market dominated by second-hand properties instead of new buildings – similar to many developed countries. Critically, the progress in establishing property tax laws in China seems to be accelerating. There have been more high-level meetings and discussions about the property tax law, and these meetings/discussions are becoming more detailed and concrete. Bottom Line: Chinese housing demand will be in a structural downtrend, weighing on construction activity beyond any near-term rebound. Investment Implications Based on the above findings, we draw the following investment strategy conclusions: It is reasonable to expect a slight pickup in real estate construction activity in China over the next few months. This will be marginally positive for construction-related commodities demand. Consequently, construction-related commodities markets (steel, cement, and glass) may be supported in the near term (Chart I-15). However, over the longer term, we remain fundamentally negative on construction activity within China’s property markets, as property sales will be in a structural downtrend. BCA’s Emerging Market Strategy service recommends equity investors underweight Chinese property developers within the Chinese equity indexes (Chart I-16). Chart I-15Construction-Related Commodities May Marginally Benefit From A Pickup In Activity Chart I-16Underweight Real Estate Stocks Relative To The Domestic And Investable Benchmarks   The completion of previously launched projects will help construction-related industries. Yet, these activities will consume real estate developers’ cash augmenting their liquidity needs and amplifying their financial vulnerability. This is a basis for our recommendation to underweight property stocks, especially following their significant outperformance in the past six months.  Further, property stocks respond to marginal changes in financing conditions rather than housing sales or construction activities. The basis is that they are extremely leveraged, and access to funding is key. In the coming months, if credit conditions tighten at a time when real estate developers must commit cash to complete previously launched projects, their cash flow will deteriorate. This will be reflected in their share prices, which will underperform the Chinese broader onshore and offshore indexes. This is likely to occur regardless of the absolute performance of Chinese stocks. Ellen JingYuan He, Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      Chinese real estate developers could also slow the construction activity after completing 50% of a property project, which allows them to receive at least 60% of the presold property value from house buyers. 2      https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-06/china-is-said-to-imp… 3      Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report “China Real Estate: A Never-Bursting Bubble?” dated April 6, 2018 and China Investment Strategy Special Report “China’s Property Market: Where Will It Go From Here?” dated September 13, 2018. 4      Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report “China’s Property Market: Where Will It Go From Here?” dated September 13, 2018. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Highlights U.S.: The Fed remains decidedly neutral, despite market expectations (and White House pressure) for lower U.S. interest rates. Treasury yields are mispriced and should grind higher over the next 6-12 months, led first by inflation expectations and later by a more hawkish Fed. Canada: The Bank of Canada’s latest reports and commentary indicate that monetary policy will stay on hold over at least the balance of 2019. Bond markets are already priced for that outcome. Maintain a neutral stance on Canadian government bonds in global hedged fixed income portfolios. Sweden: The Riksbank’s recent dovish turn, calling for a flatter trajectory for interest rates and extending asset purchases, will keep Swedish bond yields lower for longer. Thus, we are closing our recommended tactical trades in Sweden that were positioned for rate hikes. Feature Global bond yields remain stuck in a range, seeking a new directional narrative. The downside is limited by green shoots of improving global growth (mostly from China stimulus), some commodity price reflation through higher oil prices and robust returns in most risk asset markets (i.e. an easing of financial conditions). At the same time, the upside for yields is capped by dovish forward guidance from data-dependent central banks who see below-trend economic growth and below-target inflation in the rearview mirror. Chart of the WeekForward MIS-guidance We expect these opposing forces to be resolved through faster global growth and higher realized inflation over the next 6-12 months. Major central banks will not need to turn even more dovish and begin a monetary policy easing cycle to boost growth, despite current market pricing suggesting otherwise. Global bond yields will grind upward, first through higher inflation expectations and, later, from a shift away from discounting rate cuts and, in some countries, pricing in rate hikes. The pressure for higher yields will be strongest in the U.S., where the Treasury market now discounts that the current 2.5% fed funds rate will be the cyclical peak, below the median FOMC projection, even as inflation expectations have been moving higher (Chart of the Week).  We continue to recommend pro-growth, pro-risk allocations in global fixed income markets: below-benchmark overall duration exposure, favoring global corporates over government bonds, focusing government bond exposure to countries where policymakers will be relatively less hawkish (Japan, U.K., Australia, Canada, New Zealand), and positioning for faster inflation expectations and bearish steepening of yield curves (most notably in the U.S. and core Europe). May FOMC Meeting: Sorry, Mr. President The Fed kept rates unchanged at last week’s FOMC meeting, dashing market hopes of a potential shift in language toward a future rate cut. The official statement acknowledged that U.S. inflation was running below the 2% target, but Fed Chair Jerome Powell later described that inflation shortfall as “transitory” and expected to reverse. Treasury yields got whipsawed by the mixed messaging, with the 2-year yield falling -6bps after the statement but then climbing +11bps during Powell’s press conference. Powell standing his ground so firmly was a sharp rebuke to U.S. money markets, which remain priced for rate cuts over the next year. It was also a strong sign of the Fed maintaining its political independence in the face of U.S. President Trump calling for aggressive rate cuts. From a growth perspective, the Fed is right to not panic. The employment backdrop remains solid, with the U.S. unemployment rate hitting a 50-year low in April of 3.6%. While cyclical growth indicators like the ISM Manufacturing index have trended lower, the headline index remains above the expansionary 50 level (Chart 2). The rally in U.S. equity and credit markets seen so far in 2019 has eased financial conditions, signaling an imminent rebound in the U.S. leading economic indicator (second panel). Furthermore, core measures of retail sales and capital goods orders have begun to reaccelerate after the Q1 slump impacted by the U.S. government shutdown. From a growth perspective, the Fed is right to not panic. On the inflation side, the story is more nuanced. Higher oil prices will boost headline inflation measures over the next six months. At the same time, the lagged impact of the surprising pickup in U.S. productivity growth (+2.4% year-over-year in Q1) will help dampen core inflation rates (Chart 3) via lower unit labor costs (flat year-over-year in Q1). Further complicating the issue for the Fed is the impact of lower inflation in the components that Fed Chair Powell deemed “transitory”, such as airfares, apparel and, most interestingly, the cost of financial services. Chart 2A Blossoming U.S. ##br##Rebound Chart 3Blame Equities For The Cooling Of ##br##U.S. Core Inflation The broad Financial Services and Inflation grouping, which includes market-related costs such as wealth management fees, now represents 9% of the overall U.S. core PCE deflator. The inflation rate of the Financial Services index is highly correlated to the performance of U.S. equity markets (Chart 4). This makes sense, as the costs of professional portfolio management are often tied to the size of assets under management. At a minimum, the market should be priced for the same neutral (unchanged) stance that the Fed is currently signaling, which is appropriate given signs of U.S. growth perking up. Chart 4Faster Productivity Means The Fed Can Be Patient In 2018, prior to the year-end correction in U.S. equity markets, the contribution to core PCE inflation from the Financial Services category was a steady 0.5-0.6 percentage points. After the market rout, that contribution has fallen to 0.2 percentage points, accounting for nearly all of the 40bp decline in core PCE inflation since U.S. equities peaked last September. With equity markets having now regained all the late-2018 losses, Financial Services inflation should boost core PCE inflation by at least 20-30bps by year-end – and perhaps more if stocks continue to appreciate, per the BCA House View. With our Fed Monitor now sitting just above the zero line, indicating no pressure on the Fed to hike rates, the -30bps of rate cuts now discounted over the next year is too aggressive (Chart 5). At a minimum, the market should be priced for the same neutral (unchanged) stance that the Fed is currently signaling, which is appropriate given signs of U.S. growth perking up. The Fed will remain cautious on returning to a more hawkish stance until actual U.S. inflation turns higher, which will take some time given the competing forces of falling unit labor costs and fading “transitory” disinflationary effects. Chart 5Stay Underweight USTs & Below-Benchmark UST Duration We think the 2017 experience will be useful to think about in the coming months. Then, the Fed paused its rate hiking cycle for a few months, primarily due to softer inflation readings related to unusual forces temporarily dampening core inflation (most notably, a one-time collapse in wireless phone prices related to a change in how those costs were measured). Once those “transitory” forces faded out of the data, the Fed resumed lifting the funds rate. It will likely take longer in 2019 before the Fed would feel confident enough to begin raising rates again, especially with the funds rate now much closer to neutral than two years ago. Nonetheless, we expect a similar story of rebounding inflation driving Treasury yields higher to unfold over the latter half of this year. A moderate below-benchmark U.S. duration stance, favoring shorter maturities, combined with a long position in inflation-protected TIPS over nominal Treasuries, remains appropriate. Bottom Line: The Fed remains decidedly neutral, despite market expectations (and White House pressure) for lower U.S. interest rates. Treasury yields are mispriced and should grind higher over the next 6-12 months, led first by inflation expectations and later by a more hawkish Fed. Canada Update: Stay Neutral Back in March, we upgraded our recommended Canadian government bond exposure to neutral after spending a long time at underweight.1 The rationale for our move was that the stunning loss of momentum in the Canadian economy at the end of 2018 would force the Bank of Canada (BoC) to not only stop raising rates, but stay on hold for longer than expected. After our upgrade, we noted that we would consider additional changes to our Canadian allocation after the releases of the latest BoC Business Outlook Survey (BoS) and the updated economic projections at the April 24 monetary policy meeting. None of those events makes us want to move away from the current neutral recommendation. The problem for the BoC is that its policy rate of 1.75% remains well below its own estimated neutral range, which is now 2.25%-3.25% (Chart 6). A similar message comes when looking at the neutral real rate (“r-star”) estimate for Canada produced by the New York Fed, with an r-star of 1.5% versus a current real policy rate around 0%.2 This suggests that Canadian monetary policy remains accommodative and that the BoC should be looking for opportunities to continue moving interest rates toward “neutral” when the economy is accelerating. Yet our own BoC Monitor suggests that an unchanged policy stance is currently appropriate, while -11bps of rate cuts are now discounted in the Canadian Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve. In other words, the BoC is torn between a fundamental interest rate framework that says the hiking cycle is not done yet, and a sluggish economy that demands a dovish bias. The BoC is torn between a fundamental interest rate framework that says the hiking cycle is not done yet, and a sluggish economy that demands a dovish bias. In the press conference following the April 24 BoC policy meeting, BoC Governor Steve Poloz noted that any reference to the need for interest rates to return to the BoC’s neutral range was deliberately omitted from the official policy statement. This is a clear signal that the central bank has shifted its focus from “normalizing” rates to preventing a deeper downturn in Canadian growth. The latest BoS showed that business confidence, expected sales and future investment intentions all fell sharply in the first quarter of 2019 (Chart 7). There was a huge drop in the number of firms reporting capacity pressures and labor shortages, with more firms now expecting their prices to fall than rise over the next year. The main headwinds to the diminished outlook for future sales were related to “a more uncertain outlook in the Western Canadian energy sector, continued weakness in housing-related activity in some regions, and tangible impacts from global trade tensions”.3 Chart 6A Long Way From BoC ##br##Rate Cuts Chart 7Negative Messages From The BoC Business Outlook Survey   The BoC places a lot of weight on the BoS in determining its economic forecasts, and in setting monetary policy. Thus, it is no surprise that in the official statement following the April 24 monetary policy meeting, the BoC Governing Council noted that they were “monitoring developments in household spending, oil markets and global trade policy to gauge the extent to which the factors weighing on growth and the inflation outlook were dissipating”.4 Those were the same three concerns of businesses highlighted in the BoS, assuming that “weakness in the Canadian housing market” is related to “developments in household spending” – a logical link given the high level of Canadian household and mortgage debt. Looking at those three factors, there is nothing suggesting that the BoC needs to adjust policy anytime soon (Chart 8). Oil prices are rising, but household spending remains weak and global trade uncertainties have not completely diminished and Canadian export growth has stagnated. Given the mixed picture from the economic data, the BoC will likely remain on hold until there is a clear signal from the data. From a bond investment strategy perspective, staying at neutral also makes sense. A move to overweight Canadian bonds would require an even deeper economic downturn into recessionary territory that would push Canadian unemployment higher (Chart 9). Downgrading back to underweight, however, would require signs of a sustainable rebound in Canadian domestic demand and stronger global growth that would boost Canadian exports – an outcome that would not be visible in the data until at least the third quarter of 2019. Chart 8Watch What The BoC ##br##Is Watching Chart 9A Neutral Weight On Canada Is Still Justified   One final point on staying neutral on Canada comes from looking at cross-country spread levels between government bonds in Canada and other major developed economies. The spread levels look historically wide versus sovereign debt from Germany, the U.K., and Australia; wide versus recent history in Japan; but very narrow versus the U.S. (Chart 9). Those spreads are shown without hedging out the currency risk of going long Canadian bonds – and, by association, the Canadian dollar. Once the currency risk is hedged out of those cross-country spreads using 3-month currency forwards, the spread differentials are all far less interesting both in absolute terms and relative to history (Chart 10 & 11). Chart 10Big Differences In Canadian Bond Spreads Vs Other Major DM... Chart 11… But Those Spreads Disappear Once The C$ Exposure Is Hedged So even on an individual country basis, there is no compelling case to be anything but neutral Canadian government bonds versus global currency-hedged benchmarks – which is how we present all our fixed income recommendations in Global Fixed Income Strategy. Bottom Line: The Bank of Canada’s latest reports and commentary indicate that monetary policy will stay on hold over at least the balance of 2019. Bond markets are already priced for that outcome. Maintain a neutral stance on Canadian government bonds in global hedged fixed income portfolios. Sweden Trade Update – Time To Retreat & Regroup Exactly one year ago (May 8, 2018), we initiated trades in our Tactical Overlay portfolio to position for tighter monetary policy, and higher bond yields, in Sweden.5 Specifically, we have been recommending shorting 2-year Swedish government bonds versus German equivalents (hedging the currency exposure back into krona), while also selling 2-year Swedish bonds and buying 10-year Swedish debt in a yield curve flattening trade. The positions were chosen to benefit from an expected bearish repricing of the short-end of the Swedish curve. At this time last year, the positive upward momentum of Swedish growth and inflation had reached a point where the Riksbank was clearly – and credibly – signaling that the long process of normalizing its highly accommodative crisis-era monetary policies would begin. That meant lifting policy rates away from negative territory, as well as shutting down the bond-buying quantitative easing (QE) program. One year later, the economic backdrop has done a 180-degree turn against our original thesis (Chart 12): Swedish growth has slowed, with both the manufacturing PMI and leading economic indicator at the lowest levels since 2013. Unemployment has increased and nominal wage growth has rolled over. Headline CPIF inflation has fallen back below the Riksbank 2% target, while core CPIF inflation remains stuck near 1.5%. The Riksbank changed its forward guidance at last month’s monetary policy meeting, signaling that the benchmark interest rate will remain at -0.25% for “somewhat longer” than was indicated as recently as February (when a rate hike around the end of 2019 or in early 2020 was signaled). The Riksbank also pledged to maintain the size of its QE bond purchases from July 2019 to December 2020, a dovish surprise. Swedish money markets are still discounting 13bps of rate hikes over the next twelve months. Yet our Riksbank Monitor, on the other hand, is now indicating a need for rate cuts, driven by both softer inflation and weaker growth. The minutes from last month’s policy meeting revealed that the forward guidance was adjusted simply because headline inflation had temporarily dipped back below the 2% Riksbank target. The implication is that a return to 2% inflation would prompt the Riksbank to hike. Swedish money markets are still discounting 13bps of rate hikes over the next twelve months. Yet our Riksbank Monitor, on the other hand, is now indicating a need for rate cuts, driven by both softer inflation and weaker growth. A useful rule for investment risk management is: when the underlying rationale for a position is clearly not unfolding as expected, the best thing to do is simply close that position and look for new opportunities better aligned to the current reality. Chart 12No More Pressure On Riksbank ##br##To Hike Chart 13Time To Exit Our Recommended "Hawkish" Trades In Sweden With that in mind, we are choosing to close our tactical trades in Sweden (Chart 13). The 2-year Sweden-Germany spread trade generated a loss of -52bps (including the return from hedging the euro exposure in Germany back into Swedish krona). We were more fortunate with the curve flattening trade, which generated a return of +61bps as the Swedish curve bullishly flattened through falling 10-year yields rather than bearishly flattening through rising 2-year yields (our original expectation). Thus, we are closing out our Sweden trades at a small net gain of +9bps. We will do a deeper analysis on Sweden in an upcoming Global Fixed Income Strategy report to search for new potential trade ideas. Bottom Line: The Riksbank’s recent dovish turn, calling for a flatter trajectory for interest rates and extending asset purchases, will keep Swedish bond yields lower for longer. Thus, we are closing our recommended tactical trades in Sweden that were positioned for a faster path of rate hikes.   Robert Robis, CFA, Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, CFA, Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “March Calmness”, dated March 19, 2019, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 The NY Fed’s estimates for non-U.S. r-star rates for the euro area, Canada, and the U.K. can be found on the NY Fed website. https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/policy/rstar 3https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2019/04/business-outlook-survey-spring-2019/ 4https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2019/04/fad-press-release-2019-04-24/ 5 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, “Sweden: The Riksbank Cannot Kick The Can Down The Road Anymore”, dated May 8, 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
Feature In lieu of our regular Weekly Report this week, tomorrow we will be publishing a joint Special Report on the Chinese housing market with our Emerging Markets Strategy service, authored by my colleague Ellen JingYuan He. Ellen’s previous housing report was extremely well received,1 and clients should look forward to tomorrow’s update. Chart 1A Full Trade War: Clear Near-Term Risk, But An Uncertain Cyclical Outlook Turning to the financial markets, investors have been squarely focused this week on the sudden escalation in tension between the U.S. and China, caused by President Trump’s renewed threat on May 5 to heighten tariffs on Chinese imports at the end of this week. Specifically, President Trump has claimed that he would increase the current 10% tariff rate on $200 billion worth of Chinese imports to 25%, a move that was originally due on March 1, but was delayed to extend the talks and seek a better agreement. Trump also threatened to raise tariffs on the remaining $325 billion of Chinese imports that are so far untouched. This is the most significant escalation in rhetoric since before the tariff truce agreed on December 1 between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Buenos Aires. The financial market reaction was swift: Chinese A shares fell nearly 6% on Monday, and USD-CNY surged nearly half a percent (Chart 1). Chinese stocks fared better on Tuesday, but may come under pressure again later in the week as China’s trade delegation returns to the U.S. for talks on Thursday & Friday. Despite this week’s volatility, we would not yet recommend any portfolio strategy changes to investors who are positioned in favor of Chinese stocks or China-related assets more generally. First, we still see the combined odds of a deal or a further extension in talks as being as high as 60%, and investors would view an agreement to extend the negotiations in a positive light after this week’s selloff. At a minimum, investors are likely to get a better chance to sell in such a scenario. Second, over that past year we have steadfastly maintained that China’s economy and its earnings cycle are driven by monetary conditions, money, and credit growth, and two of these three drivers are clearly now pointing to improving economic activity over the coming year. Certainly, the imposition of a 25% import tariff on all Chinese goods would represent a new, negative shock to the Chinese economy, but in this scenario Chinese policymakers would also substantially dial up their reflationary response. As such, while the near-term response in the equity market is likely to be very negative if President Trump follows through with his threat, the cyclical (i.e. 6-12 month outlook) for Chinese relative equity performance is not yet clear. This is only true in local currency (i.e. hedged) terms, however, as we agree that there is meaningful downside potential for the RMB in a full tariff scenario. So while we are likely to advise investors to wait and assess the likely reflationary response if a 25% “second round” tariff rate is imposed this week before changing their equity stance, we would recommend a long USD-CNY/CNH position in the interim as a hedge against a potentially substantial decline in the RMB. Stay tuned.   Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      Please see BCA Research’s China Investment Strategy Special Report, “China’s Property Market: Where Will It Go From Here?,” published September 13, 2018. Available at cis.bcaresearch.com.   Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
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